A REVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY DILEMMA AND REFORM IN THE

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS), 1977-2007

Ahmad Dahiru Aminu, Ph.D

Department of History and Diplomatic Studies,
University of Abuja, Abuja
Email: [Link]@[Link]

Abstract:
Although it had high expectations that it would spearhead the process of economic
regionalism in West Africa by embracing the principle of supranationality, the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is still struggling to achieve its fundamental
objectives of establishment. Most of the blame lies in the inefficient functioning of the
Executive Secretariat charged with the onus of superintending the community’s integration.
To rectify these, the ECOWAS reform was made in 1993 to transform the Executive
Secretariat into institutional machinery capable of executing the organisation’s foundational
goals. The reform granted the Secretariat the mandate to exercise supranational functions
and to reassert its supervisory powers over all ECOWAS institutions. However, scholarly
researches on this historical development are limited, particularly relating to the impact of
the reform on the capacity of the Secretariat to superintend ECOWAS integration. Using
historical analysis, this paper shows how the regional governance framework prescribed in
the reform limited the capacity of the Executive Secretariat to successfully achieve the
region’s integration objectives.
Keywords: ECOWAS Secretariat, West African Integration, Reform, Regional Governance
Structure, Institutional Capacity
INTRODUCTION

On 28th May, 1975, Heads of States and Plenipotentiaries, representing fifteen post-
independent West African countries signed the treaty establishing the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) after series of historic failed attempts to establish a
regional organisation covering the entire West African region. 1The goal of ECOWAS
formation was to manage the economic interdependence of West African states, create
opportunities for regional economic self-reliance, and address emerging security issues
bordering on non-traditional security threats that challenged the survival of several countries
in the region. The move to establish ECOWAS was initiated by the Nigerian and Togo
military leaders in 1972. The initiative later received the endorsement of other regional states
and the support of international goodwill partners and non-state actors, thus, culminating in
the launching of the West African regional economic integration organisation (ECOWAS) in
Lagos, Nigeria.
As enshrined in Article 2 of the foundational treaty, the organisation aim “to promote
cooperation and development in all fields of economic activities” by implementing measures
that would help raise the standard of living of the people and foster closer relations among the

1 The countries that signed the ECOWAS foundational treaty were Benin (formerly, Dahomey), Burkina Faso
(formerly, Upper Volta), Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Cape Verde joined ECOWAS in 1977 and Mauritania
withdrew its membership in 2000.

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member states.2 To achieve the objectives, the treaty also provided for an intergovernmental
regional hierarchical structure that comprised two arms of governance, namely the Executive
and the Judiciary.
At the apex of the ECOWAS governance hierarchy, is the Authority of Heads of State
and Government, whose chairman is the Head of State of a member country appointed by the
other Heads of State to pilot the affairs of the organisation. Next is the Council of Ministers,
also headed by the Minister in charge of ECOWAS affairs in the country of the Chairman of
the Authority. These two organs were the only decision-making bodies of the organisation
recognised by the 1975 treaty. The Authority is the overall decision-making organ of
ECOWAS closely assisted by the Council of Ministers which the treaty mandated with the
powers of reviewing regional policies and regulating the operation of all other subordinate
institutions of ECOWAS on behalf of the Authority. In that regard, the directives of the
Council are binding on all subordinate institutions of the community and it also has the
mandate to exercise other powers and duties assigned to it by the Authority.3
Down the ladder, the treaty established an Executive Secretariat for practical
administrative purposes. The secretariat is to be headed by an Executive Secretary, who is to
be assisted by two Deputy Executive Secretaries, a Financial Controller and other relevant
staffs. The strategy as stipulated by Article 12 of the Treaty was for the Executive Secretariat
to facilitate the establishment of a West African Customs Union by progressively
harmonising the elimination of customs duties and other levies with equivalent effect on
imports, as well as enhancing the process for the removal of all restrictions, prohibitions or
administrative obstacles to trade among the member states within the course of the fifteen
years transitional period set from the definitive entry into force of the treaty.4
However, the Secretariat did not begin to function until the first quarter of 1977 due to
a number of challenges including the delay in negotiating the five key operating protocols for
institutional formation and functioning, and other regional political schisms mainly relating to
the right for hosting the headquarters of the key regional institutions and contest for selection
of the principal officers to lead them. Since then, the institution had been making efforts to
achieve the primary objective of establishing a West African Economic Union as envisaged
in the ECOWAS statues. Some of the significant achievements of the ECOWAS Secretariat
includes; facilitating the adoption of supplementary protocols on the Free Movement of
Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment adopted in 1986 and 1990 respectively; the
signing of the protocol on the ECOWAS Court of Justice in 1991, the protocol on the
ECOWAS Community Parliament adopted in 1994, and the protocol relating to the fight
against corruption signed in 2001.
However, in line with the critical objective of the ECOWAS foundational treaty of
establishing a free trade area in fifteen years from the effective entry of the 1975 treaty, the
secretariat achieved very little tangible result. Particularly as it relates to the communities
necessary economic integration goals of promoting ‘cooperation and integration’ by;
removing all barriers to free regional trade and exchange; suppressing custom duties and
equivalent taxes; establishing a common external tariff; harmonisation of economic and
financial policies and the effective implementation of a protocol on the Free Movement of
People, Goods and Services.

2 The section also called for the creation of a common customs tariff in respect of all goods imported into the
member states from third countries within the same period. See, Article 2, Treaty of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS), United Nations Treaty Series 14843, 1976, p. 20.
3 Article 6, paragraph 2a & d and paragraph 3, Treaty of the Economic Community, pp. 21-22.
4 Article 12, Treaty of the Economic Community, p. 24.

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 Hence, over the years, most regional stakeholders concluded that the Secretariat had
failed to engineer a successful integration process, as envisaged in the foundational treaty. 5
The assertion featured in the report of the Eminent Persons Committee that reviewed the
1975 ECOWAS establishment treaty in 1993. Additionally, the committee’s findings also
discovered severe defects in the institutional and operational framework of the ECOWAS
institutions and the decision-making processes and procedures of the organisation.
The committee analyses these issues and asserted that, the ECOWAS governance
structure had denied the Secretariat any meaningful role in regional decision-making and
implementation, thus effectively restricting its capacity to oversee ECOWAS programmes
and the gamut of the integration process. In the final report, the committee also claim that, it
was these defects that were responsible for the failure in the delivery capacity of the
Executive Secretariat and were central in hindering the delivery of the ECOWAS treaty’s
foundational objectives.6
Strikingly, existing literature has not paid sufficient attention to the Secretariat’s
dilemma in the ECOWAS West African integration scheme. To date, only a few official
studies have identified the issues of lack of bureaucratic capacity as a major impediment to
ECOWAS integration.7 Instead, most researchers argued that, ECOWAS integration is
hampered mainly by the prevalence of neo-colonial agenda-driven regional institutions with
same mandate and objectives as ECOWAS. Indeed, agencies like the Union douanaire de
l”Afrique occidental (U.D.A.O.), Organisation commune Africaine et mauricienne
(O.C.A.M.), Communaute konomique de l’Afrique de I'ouest (C.E.A.O.), Union douanaire
des Etats de l’Afrique de l”ouest (U.D.E.A.O.), the West African Economic and Monetary
Union (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, UEMOA in French)8 were used in
the promotion of neo-colonial schism. However, on the positive side they were also useful in
the pursuance of multilateral diplomacy, developmental goals and integration particularly
among the francophonie block of countries. Other scholars claim that, the lack of adequate
infrastructure and the problem of inclusiveness in policy and programme coordination
between the ECOWAS and member states were partly responsible for the under-performance
of the Secretariat in facilitating the ECOWAS programmes for West African economic
integration.9
This research examine data obtained from the archives and libraries of the Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) and the ECOWAS commission to establish that, in
5See, G. Piccolino, and S. Minou "The EU and regional integration in West Africa: effects on conflict
resolution and transformation.(February 1, 2014)." University of Pretoria RegioConf Working Paper 5 (2014),
27. &, MT Bala, "The challenges and prospects for regional and economic integration in West
Africa." Asian Social Science 13, no. 5 (2017): 24-33.
6 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Final Report by the Committee of Eminent
Persons for the Review of the ECOWAS Treaty, 1992, p. 5.
7 Ama Konadu and Maty Fall, “Sustaining Regional Integration through Research and Analysis,” Regional
Integration Observer, 1(1), (2013).
8 See, S. Grimm, "Institutional change in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) since
1994: A fresh start after the devaluation shock? Africa spectrum, (1999), Pp: 5-32; and DC Bach. "The politics
of West African economic co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS." The Journal of Modern African Studies 21, no.
4 (1983): 605-623; and Amuwo, Kunle. "France and the economic integration project in Francophone
Africa." African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique 4, no. 1 (1999): 1-20.

9 See, M Deen-Swarray, B. Adekunle, and G. Odularu, "Policy recipe for fostering regional integration through
infrastructure development and coordination in West Africa." Regional economic integration in West
Africa (2014): 29-56. And, C Torres, J van Seters, K Karaki, R Kpadonou, "An exploratory analysis of measures
to make trade facilitation work for inclusive regional agro-food value chains in West Africa." European Centre
for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) Discussion Paper 214 (2017). And HO Musibau, S Mahmood,
AY Hammed, "The impact of foreign capital inflows, infrastructure and role of institutions on economic growth:
an error correction model." Academic Journal of Economic Studies 3, no. 4 (2017): 35-49.

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addition to the above, ECOWAS integration is particularly hampered by the institutional
capacity deficit of the Executive Secretariat. The research has found that, efforts aimed at
addressing the capacity dilemma in ECOWAS administration have failed despite the many
rationalisations and reforms including the famous 1993 treaty review. The study analyses
ECOWAS policy documents, official reports and the 1993 ECOWAS treaty reform to
identify some of the key gaps in the treaty preventing the Executive Secretariat from
achieving the integration objectives of ECOWAS. The policy documents examined by this
research have proved to be very valuable and the discussion presented as a result is
significant for its contribution to understanding the historical and contemporary challenges of
West African integration. The dialogue contained in them sets out the historical context of
the issues and challenges that determined the decisions taken by the political organs to guide
ECOWAS integration.
Furthermore, the article is also especially significant in identifying the bureaucratic
challenges of managing ECOWAS integration by distinguishing the shortfalls in the regional
governance framework, institutional model and the ethics and practices guiding ECOWAS
integration. It is also important in examining the limited success of the Executive Secretariat
in accomplishing the ECOWAS foundational goals after several decades of repeated
postponements and expiry of the time-frame set in the establishment treaty.
The study covers the period between 1977 to 2007, representing the entire lifespan of
the Executive Secretariat. Although ECOWAS was established in 1975, the appointment of
the Executive Secretary and the commencement of formal activities at the Secretariat were
delayed by technical and political challenges until the first quarter of 1977. The study
therefore evaluates the Institutional capacity challenges of the Secretariat from its inception
in 1977 to 2007 when the Executive Secretariat was transformed into a Commission with a
new governance structure and mandate. The transformation marked a turning point in
ECOWAS integration efforts, notably with the affirmation of supranationalism and the
subsequent implementation of the transformation agenda.

FUNCTIONING OF THE ECOWAS SECRETARIAT

The Historical Context

At the Lagos maiden summit of May 1975, the ECOWAS Authority scheduled
another summit to be held in Lagos in November or December 1975. The summit aimed at
adopting the ECOWAS operating protocols as soon as possible to get the Executive
Secretariat and other institutions functioning. The protocols were considered crucial in
determining the operational modules of the community and its institutions. They were
expected to provide guides on issues such as the regional policy on the re-exportation of
goods from third countries, the classification of products of origin, the formula for the
payment of compensation for losses resulting from trade liberalisation, the template for
calculating member states’ contributions to the community budget and the structure and
functions of the ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development.
To that effect, at the end of the Lagos maiden summit, the ECOWAS Authority of
Heads of States and Governments issued a provisional proclamation for the establishment of
the organisation’s Executive Secretariat. The leaders envisaged that the immediate
establishment of the Secretariat would provide ECOWAS with the foundational secretarial
services required to facilitate the formulation of the protocols, the implementation of the
provisions of the foundational treaty and aid the smooth take-off of community institutions.
In the same respect, the regional leaders also facilitated the immediate ratification of the

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ECOWAS foundational treaty which came into force definitively on the 20 June 1975, barely
three weeks after the landmark Lagos summit.’10
The desire of the leaders to have the Secretariat functioning was, however, hampered
by a myriad of challenges. Notably were the persistent bickering among the member states
regarding the location of key community institutions; the delay in the allocation and
appointment of statutory officers of the community; and the successive military coups and
political changes that affect some of the member states including Nigeria, and Niger.
However, by late 1976, these contentious political issues were resolved when Nigeria
and Togo negotiated a compromise in Lome. Soon after, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of
States adopted the Nigeria/Togo deal and commenced the community building process. Thus,
both the Executive secretariat and the community Fund began operations almost
simultaneously from the first quarter of 1977.
Sadly, no sooner had the community institutions began functioning another
debilitating administrative crisis erupted thus, delaying further the take up of ECOWAS
programmes for another two years. The administrative crisis was instigated and fueled by
gaps in the institutional governance framework prescribed in the 1975 treaty regarding the
scope of powers of the community chief executives. The crisis also lingered because at the
time, the ECOWAS founding treaty lack formal legal mechanisms of resolving inter-agency
disagreements and had vaguely left some of the details regarding the structure and functions
of the institutions to be determined by the Council of Ministers, in addition to its mandate of
overseeing the recruitment of staffs and determination of the condition of service of
personnel at the Secretariat and the Fund. As a result of the gaps in the governance
framework and issues of interpersonal relation, progress in ECOWAS formation and
programme implementation became stagnated thus, hindering the integration efforts for
another two years.

ISSUES AFFECTING THE SECRETARIAT ADMINISTRATION OF ECOWAS

INTEGRATION
In November 1977, the members of the Council of Ministers approved and forwarded
a proposal submitted by the Executive Secretary requesting the ceding of some of the
reserved decision-making powers of the ECOWAS Authority under the 1975 treaty to the
Executive Secretary and the Secretariat.11 In anticipation of the Authorities’ positive
response, the Council also granted immediate provisional authorisation to the Executive
Secretary to access reports and documents prepared for the member states by international
organisations. The Council also authorised the secretariat to liaise with mainly the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, specialised agencies of the United Nations
(UN), Communaute Economique de l’Afrique de I'Ouest (CEAO), and relevant institutions,
to obtain information on the economic environment of the ECOWAS member states. In so
doing, the Council also authorised the Secretariat to maintain cooperative relations with same
bodies and to negotiate and administer technical assistance and cooperation that might be
provided by the appropriate international organisations and other bodies.12
The Council’s action was aimed at empowering effective functioning of the
Secretariat by mitigating the deficiencies that stalled the functioning of the ECOWAS

10 Y. Gowon, "The Economic Community of West African States: a study in political and economic
integration." PhD diss., University of Warwick, (1984), p. 394.
11 ECW/CM (2)/1, Meeting of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers, Lagos 18-19 November 1977.
12 The Council passed Resolution ECW/CM/ (2) / Res. 2 Concerning Access of the Secretariat of the
Community to the reports and Documents prepared for Member States and ECW/CM/ (2) /Res. 1 concerning
Technical Assistance and Cooperation.

5
governance system. The Ministerial authorisation laid the foundation for series of ad hoc
political interventions, amendments and reforms aimed at enhancing the powers of the
Executive Secretary and the capabilities of the Secretariat. The action was clearly in line with
the ministers’ recognition that, the attainment of ECOWAS integration objectives is
contingent on the effective functioning of the Secretariat.
Since, the secretariat is the administrative nerve center of the ECOWAS integration
scheme, the Council’s decisions were intended to be the first step to developing the set of
appropriate mechanisms and policies that would help bridge the obvious lacunas in the
governance framework prescribed in the establishment treaty. However, the in-house
adjustments and rationalisations by the decision-making organs made little impact in
bolstering the capacity of the Executive Secretariat to discharge its mandate as demonstrated
by its inability to achieve the objectives of the maiden programmes of the Free Movement
Protocol and Trade Liberilisation Scheme (ETLS) lunched in May 1979. As a result,
ECOWAS had to embark on a holistic reform of the foundational treaty by setting up a
review committee in 1993. The 1993 treaty review committee report made fundamental
recommendations that would reform the ECOWAS. The key recommendations were vetted
and adopted. But after more than a decade of operating the reviewed treaty, the Executive
Secretariat still could not make tangible progress in administering ECOWAS integration due
to persistent but mutating internal and external issues.
At the formative stage, the external factors were linked to the changes in the then
global economy that undermined the economic capacities of the ECOWAS member states.
This was primarily the problem of Neo-colonial meddling, the lack of sufficient funding
resources, lack of political will, and apprehension of economic dominance and hegemony by
smaller member states. Gaye identified these problems when he lamented that the parameter
by which the under-performance of ECOWAS could be measured was the degree of lethargy
that ECOWAS itself encountered.13
…no one can deny that up-to-date ECOWAS has fallen far below the
expectations raised by the prospect of building an economic
Community. It has failed to achieve a sizeable regional trade flow
roughly between 5-10% of the total trade of West Africa and the rest of
the world. It has made no decisive progress towards the realization of an
Economic Union. ECOWAS is yet to promote effective monetary or
fiscal harmonization; and has also failed to facilitate an effective free
movement of persons, goods and services.14

He blamed the unsuccessful progress of ECOWAS integration on the adamant stance of the
member states on sovereignty issues, which constrained the Secretariat’s capacity in the
process and, therefore, resulted in a loss of credibility with the West African public. Under
the 1975 treaty, the ECOWAS decision-making bodies particularly the Council of Ministers,
was given powers for executive management and institutional oversights. 15 The Council was
designed as a buffer between the Authority and the community institutions such that, all
matters dealt with by the institutions passed through the Council to the Authority whose
decision was final.
13 A. Gaye, ECOWAS AT 20: The Challenges of a Community, The West African Bulletin, Department of
Information of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 1995, p. 2.
14 Ibid.
15 Article 7 addressed the decision-making powers and retained the powers to decide the process for the
transmission of decisions and directives by the Authority and the Council of Ministers, as well as matters
relating to their entry into force by the Authority. Article 6 (2) a-b-c-d & (3) conferred on the Council the
powers of management, monitoring, decision-making and directions and made them binding on all the
subordinate institutions of the Community, unless otherwise decided by the Authority.

6
 As mentioned above, during the ECOWAS formative stages, the Council ceded parts
of its powers to the Secretariat to monitor implementation and compliance of community
decisions. The Council acted in recognition of the fact that, in order for ECOWAS to have
any chance of success, the bureaucracy had to have the leverage to oversee the management
of all community institutions without political interference. However, over the years, the
enthusiasm of the Ministerial Council began to wean despite the glaring utility the action had
in ensuring institutional cohesion and delivery of policy objectives. The surprising reluctance
of the Council to continue to delegate the necessary powers to the Secretariat to plan and
monitor the integration process has effectively slowed the tempo of the ECOWAS integration
drive.16
While it is clear that, the reluctance of the Council has to do with the apprehension of
member states bordering on sovereignty. It is also a recognised fact that, without improving
the powers and operational capacity of the Secretariat, there was little hope of ECOWAS
succeeding. It is also clear that, the non-compliance of member states to community decision
underlined the problem of continued cooperation and the political will of the member states
and institutions, including financing.
But, had the Council continue to transfer some of the supervisory powers to the
Secretariat, it would have boosted the Secretariat’s capacity and enhanced the integration
process. Consequently, however as a result of the Council’s reluctance, the operation of
ECOWAS institutions and the Secretariat suffered from a lack of focus. Hence, after more
than a decade of experimentation, ECOWAS only made a partial success in solving the
economic problems of the West African region.
In a paper delivered at the regional integration forum in Dakar, President Rawlings of
Ghana made the following glaring but alarming remarks; “the ECOWAS integration is at a
virtual standstill,” noting further that, if one view it from the contemporary global norm “…,
as the developed and the developing countries were increasingly integrating their economies,
West Africa was still struggling to take the first step.” 17 He further suggested that, as leaders
of the region, it behooves on us “… to stop paying lip service to ECOWAS and commit
ourselves to the full implementation of ECOWAS programmes, protocols and decisions.” 18
The statements by the Ghanaian leader affirms that, in order to advance the ECOWAS
integration, member states must avoid the coloniality of power by placing the legitimating
structures required to exercise the hierarchy of power and functions in the governance system
of the organisation.19
In the same vein, the inaugural ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Dr Aboubakar Diaby
Ouattara also questioned the efficacy of the ECOWAS strategy, model, priorities, ideology,
regulatory and administrative procedures. He pointed out that, the state of the region after
three decades of attempts to achieve regional integration have revealed that, regional
integration in West Africa had not been very successful. He contended that, in economic
groupings of developing countries like ECOWAS it is necessary that, ‘a discussion be held
on the regional approach to be adopted if market integration is considered as an absolute
necessity.’ In such situations he asked:
16 In his remarks at the 27th Session of the Council of Ministers, held between the 22-27 May 1990 in Banjul,
the Executive Secretary, Dr Abbas Bundu, suggested that the integration scheme be more rationalised and urged
the Council to consider setting up an interim ministerial committee to monitor member states’ program and
policy implementation. Both proposals were rejected by the Council. See, ECW/CM/XXV11/17/Rev. 1, 22-27
May 1990.
17 J J Rawlings. “Time to Act”, A paper delivered at the regional integration forum, Dakar, in the The West
African Bulletin, p. 3 - 4.
18 Ibid.
19 RB Persaud, N Kumarakulasingam, "Violence and ordering of the Third World: an introduction." Third
World Quarterly 40, no. 2 (2019): 199-206.

7
 Would it not be better to accord priority, for instance, to macro-
economic policy coordination in order to enhance the ability of our
regional economies to adapt to external market and physical
infrastructural development trends and to facilitate the harmonization of
administrative and regulatory procedures?20

The former Executive Secretary highlights the primacy of institutional structure, and
administrative processes in achieving the objectives of ECOWAS. His assertions underlined
the important variables that define the ECOWAS integration scheme which envisages taking
advantage of aggregate regional economic factors of production to promote intra-regional
trade, economic development and integration among the member states. According to the
treaty, this goal was to be achieved by promoting cooperation and development in all fields of
economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications,
energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in
social and cultural matters.21 However, achieving the above objectives require not only the
material resources but also, the structural institutional framework that would provide the
facilitating role for effective policy harmonisation and programme implementation.
But, instead of the treaty creating an institution geared towards the pursuance of the
above objectives, it birthed a lame bureaucratic institution. Considering the expected role of
the Executive secretariat as enshrined in Article 4 (1) 22 and Articles 5-11 and the Authority's
‘demonstrable will’ to have the community institutions up and running, it is surprising that
the secretariat still lacked the capacity to deliver the ECOWAS objectives.
After over a decade without a significant achievement in economic integration, same
questions like the one asked by Dr Quattara above were again asked regarding the mandate,
model, and operational conduct of the institutions within ECOWAS. Indeed, the formative
years of ECOWAS were marred by political issues. But, the inability of the regional officials
to devise appropriate lasting measure that will address the lacuna in the structural governance
of the organisation compounded its weaknesses. Therefore, these gaps and the issues of the
disagreement on the location of key community institutions, nomination and appointment of
the chief executives of the community and other institutional superiority and personality
debacles all combined to hamper institutional formation in the community.
To make matters worse, by 1985, when ECOWAS entered its second decade,
economic development in many of the member countries remained at a very low pace. The
rate of inflation rose to unprecedented level and unemployment became rife. 23 Therefore,
with these and other related security concerns the focus and attention of the community
leadership was diverted away from ECOWAS integration to state survival. Consequently, in
the bid to protect their national economies and prevent the growing tide of internal
dissension, the member states resorted to accepting the strict conditions imposed by the
Bretton Woods institutions and began receiving foreign loans.

20 D Quattara Aboubakar “Rethinking Regional Integration,” in, The West African Bulletin, p. 5.
21 The Treaty of the Economic Community 14843, p. 20.
22 Article 4(1) provided that the institutions of the community shall be: (a) the Authority of Heads of State and
Government; (b) the Council of Ministers; (c) the Executive Secretariat; (d) the Tribunal of the Community; and
(e) the following technical and specialized commissions: the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and
Payments Commission; the Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission; the Transport,
Telecommunications and Energy Commission; the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission: and such other
Commissions or bodies as may be established by the Authority of Heads of State and Government. See, The
Treaty of the Economic C, 14843, 1975, 21.
23 R Olaniyan Omotayo “The Second Decade of West African Development: Growth or Stagnation?,”
Nigerian Journal of international Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 1 & 2, (1995).

8
 The handouts, however, failed to improve the economic conditions in the region and
thus, compounded their socio-political crises. In the end, all the important ECOWAS
programmes, including the harmonisation of trade, customs and economic policies,
implementation of free movement of persons, goods and right of establishment, defense
cooperation pacts (for example, the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC),
stagnated and failed to materialise in the prescribed time-frame. Studies have shown that
ECOWAS member countries accounts for 35% of the African LDC making West Africa the
foremost LDC in Africa and the world. No less than 11 of the 15 ECOWAS countries exhibit
some of the lowest socio-economic development indicators, including the lowest Human
Development Index ratings in the world. Significantly, Usman and Adeyinka posits thus:
…with about 80% of them falling below human development index
counties and characterized by widespread poverty and inequality. …
according to human development reports 2016: Benin 0.485 ranked 167th,
Burkina Faso 0.402 ranked 185th, Cape Verde 0.648 ranked 122th, Cote
d’Ivoire 0.474 ranked 171th , Gambia 0.452 ranked 173th, Ghana 0.579
ranked 139th, Guinea 0.414 ranked 183th, Guinea-Bissau 0.424 ranked
178th, Liberia 0.427 ranked 177th , Mali 0.442 ranked 175th, Niger 0.353
ranked 187th, Senegal 0.494 ranked 162th , Sierra Leone 0.420 ranked
179th, Togo 0.487 ranked 166th and finally Nigeria as Africans leading oil
producer and the most populous black nation in the world is scored as low
as 0.531 and ranking of 152nd out of the 188 counties.24
Ironically, even the much taunted IMF-financed national reforms embarked by most
of the member states also failed to spur a meaningful economic development of the states.
Rather, the western capitalist induced reforms caused more calamitous economic decline with
social, political and developmental fallout on the member states. Thus, forcing them to resort
back to the ECOWAS framework for solutions.

THE 1993 REFORM

Since its entry into force on 20th June, 1975, regional operators and observers have
begun noticing gaps in the ECOWAS establishment treaty. For example, the treaty had been
criticised for not paying enough attention to issues such as political cooperation and regional
peace and security. There was also the issue of the lack of a binding effect to the decisions of
the Authority and the Council and the question of supranationality of ECOWAS and its
institutions in the gamut of the regional integration scheme. These defects left a wide gap
both in the ability of ECOWAS to integrate the economies of its member states and quality of
policy and programme delivery of its implementing institutions. 25 Thus, since its ratification,
regional stakeholders across the community have argued that the treaty needed an urgent
review. Particularly, on the aspects that relates to institutional mandate/model, governance
structure, funding, community work ethics, and the rules and procedures that governed the
operations of the regional agencies and the bureaucracy.26

24 FK Usman, and OB Adeyinka “Effect of human capital development on economic growth of ECOWAS
member states,” Advances in sciences and humanities 5, no. 1 (2019): 27-42.
25 AO Victor Adetula “The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Challenges of
Integration in West Africa,” In ECOWAS: Milestone in Regional Integration, (Lagos: The Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs, 2009), 40
26 In an address to the 26th and 27th sessions of the Council of Ministers meetings of 29 November 1989 and 22
May 1990 at Lomé and Banjul respectively, the newly appointed Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr Abbass
Bundu, urged the Council to find ways of propping up the implementation of ECOWAS cooperation programs
and to begin the political process that would lead to the rationalization of the institutional arrangement in
ECOWAS as a way of enhancing performance and delivery of objectives. See, ECW/CM XXVI/11/Rev. 1, 29 –
30 November 1989 Lome and ECW/CM/XXV11/17/Rev. 1, 22-27 May 1990 Banjul. Other IGOs and NGOs

9
 Since then, series of low-level internal administrative adjustments aimed at addressing
some of the glaring lacunas in the treaty were embarked upon particularly between 1979 and
1990. However, the low-level nature of these efforts fall short of engendering a far reaching
reform in ECOWAS operations and thus, failed to facilitate the delivery of scheduled
regional programmes or boosting the capacity of the Secretariat to oversee the integration
process.
Therefore, in 1989, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in
conjunction with ECOWAS organised series of conferences on West African integration in
Dakar, Lagos, Accra, Ouagadougou and Abidjan to formulate possible solution to the
community debacles. Participants at the conferences call on ECOWAS stakeholders to
consider a change in strategy if the regional experiment is to have any chance of success. 27
Unfortunately, while the stakeholders were considering embarking on a holistic reform as
recommended, the region woke up to the news of a rebellion in Liberia, one of the key
member states of ECOWAS, on 24 December 1989.
The Liberian Civil War was later discovered to have been an aggression aided by
some ECOWAS member countries. The aggression dimension of the conflict was a clear and
serious danger that poses direct threat to peace, security and the economic prosperity of the
entire West African region. Thus, the outbreak of the civil war in Liberia diverted the
attention and energy of the organisation and the entire West African community. As the
conflict escalates, the ECOWAS decision organs summoned their annual meetings in Banjul
Gambia in May 1990. In a statement to the Council, the Executive Secretary informed
members that, upon the recommendations of the Authority, the Executive secretariat had
drafted two separate agenda for the 27 th session of the Council. The first part from 22 nd - 24th
May was devoted to the consideration of the economic issues on the agenda and the second
part, from 25th – 26th May, was allotted for the consideration of political matters. While the
first part of the session was meant for the ministers responsible for ECOWAS affairs, the
second part was reserved for the ministers of foreign affairs.28
The ministers recommended the adoption of sweeping set of political measures by the
Authority aimed at restoring political cohesion and regional security, and to get ECOWAS on
the path of progress. Immediately after the Council meeting, the authority met and
deliberated on the Councils’ recommendations at its 13 th Ordinary Summit also held in the
Gambia. The summit adopted the Council’s landmark recommendation and issued; Decision:
A/DEC. 10/5/90, dated 30th May 1990, directing the Executive Secretary to set up a
Committee of Eminent Persons to undertake a review of the ECOWAS treaty and to also set
up a Special Ministerial Committee to find ways of resolving the civil war in Liberia. 29
In conjunction with the decision of the organs, the Executive Secretary constituted
and inaugurated the review committee on the 27 th of May 1991 with the mandate of
overhauling the 1975 establishment treaty. Upon inauguration, the committee formed four
sub-committees each of which was further devolved into sectoral sub-committees. Six
plenary sessions were later held by the entire review committee between 27 th of May 1991
and the 9th of June 1992. The plenaries were convened to harmonise the recommendations of
like the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) also made calls for changes in strategy by
ECOWAS during series of conferences on West African integration, organized in Dakar, Lagos, Accra,
Ouagadougou and Abidjan. See, Sunday Babalola Ajulo “The Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993): A Synopsis,”
The Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21 No. 1 & 2, (1995), p. 120.
27Babalola, “The Revised ECOWAS Treaty.
28 ECW/CM. XXVII/17/REV. 1, Final Report, 27 th Session of the Council of Ministers, Economic Community
of West African States, p. 4.
29 At its 13th ordinary summit in Banjul the Gambia, the Authority adopted and issued a decision tagged
A/DEC. 10/5/90, 30 May 1990. By that decision the Authority directed the Executive Secretary to set up a
Committee of Eminent Persons to undertake a review of the ECOWAS treaty.

10
the sectoral sub-committees. Finally, on 9 th May 1992, the Eminent Persons review
committee headed by the former Nigerian military leader and one of the founders of
ECOWAS, General Yakubu Gowon, submitted their final report to the Executive Secretary.
Upon receipt of the final report, the secretariat immediately commenced the process
of subjecting the reviewers’ recommendations to administrative and legal scrutiny for the
consideration of the Council of Ministers. The legal experts met in Lagos from the 13 th – 21st
of October 1992 and examined the draft treaty report and the observations of Council made at
its Dakar meeting of the 23rd – 25th July. The legal experts made their professional
recommendations which the Council later met in Abuja on the 4 th & 5th of December 1992 to
consider and make further recommendations to the Authority for adoption. At the Abuja
meeting, the Council again tendered additional reservation on Articles 2, 3, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17,
20, 34, 44 and 46, 54, 58, 75, 78, 82, 88 and revert to the legal experts for further
examination.
Finally, after series of back and forth, the Council reconciled its position and passed
resolution C/Res. 1/7/93, at its ordinary sessions of 17 th - 20th July 1993 in Cotonou and
recommending same to the ECOWAS Authority for its adoption. 30 Thus, on July 24th, 1993
the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and Governments met in Cotonou, Benin
Republic, and approved the revised ECOWAS treaty, ushering a regime of a major reform
and total overhaul in ECOWAS.
The revised treaty introduced some changes in ECOWAS operations but fall short of
engendering the holistic overhaul needed to ensure the effective implementation of
ECOWAS economic and political policies and programmes of integration in the West
African region. For example, Chapter III, Article 6 of the revised treaty amended Article 4 of
the 1975 treaty and provided for the setting up of additional institutions. Articles 6 and 15
provided a new framework that establishes a Community Court of Justice, despite the
provisions in Articles 4 (1) (d), 11, and 56 of the 1975 treaty and, Protocol A/P. 1/7/91 which
gave effect and operationalise Article 11 of the 1975 treaty that established the community
tribunal,. Also, Article 13 of the revised treaty created the ECOWAS parliament and
introduced major changes in the ECOWAS structure and operations including a new
governance structure, a provision for a regional levy to fund community integration and the
granting of supranational mandate to the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat.
However, as stated above, in addition to the continued adherence to the bureaucratic
model of administration, even the details of the structure, composition, and competence of the
newly promulgated regional legislature (parliament) and the modalities for the operation of
the Court of Justice of the community were left out by the revised treaty to be decided later
by the decision-making organs. The Court was finally inaugurated in November 2000 after a
tedious negotiation process that culminated with the adoption and signing on 6 th August 1994
of the protocol relating to the Court competencies and operational modules, and till date the
parliament is still evolving its competence and functions.
THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE ECOWAS GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
The quality of the governance framework of a regional organisation is determined by
the political competence (autonomy of institutions), capacity (ability to devise and implement
policies), legitimacy and the interactions between formal and informal regional political
institutions and their relations with the international society. 31 Effective regional governance,
therefore, requires rules and qualities of systems, cooperation to enhance legitimacy and

30 ECW/CM/XXX111/18/Rev. 1; 17 -20th July 1993, Cotonou.

31 DC Christopoulos, "Regional governance capacity and political agency: a comparative study of EU
regions." Available at SSRN 1366147 (2005).

11
effectiveness, and new processes, arrangements and methods. 32 For the West African
ECOWAS integration scheme, the major defects that stagnates its operations were embedded
in its form of regional governance framework. These defects mainly concern the role and
power of the political organs vis-a-vis the mandate, political competence, powers and
capacity of the community bureaucracy.
As indicated above, deficiencies were identified early in the ECOWAS integration
process, but were not adequately addressed. While, the dilemma of ECOWAS administration
began in the form of a disagreement over key political decisions among some Member States,
the crisis came to a head due to the gaps in the regional governance structure and procedural
issues that spark administrative and personality conflicts. Admittedly, the issues bedeviling
ECOWAS integration were multidimensional, ranging from the Neo-colonial economic
interference that affects funding of community development, to issues of lack of political will
as manifested in the implementation failures of regional integration schemes like the
ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS).
However, it is also obvious that, the issues surrounding the delivery capacity of the
Secretariat cannot be disconnected from ECOWAS regional integration failures. In fact, it
was because of the primal place of the Secretariat in the gamut of the integration efforts that
the Authority and regional leaders urged the treaty reviewers to pay careful attention to the
decision-making procedures of the Authority and the council of ministers, vis-a-vis the
capacity dilemma of the Secretariat as crucial areas needing improvement.
As a result, in its final report, the review committee recommended that additional
provision be made in the preamble to the revised treaty for “the pooling of national
sovereignties and the establishment of supranational bodies endowed with relevant and
adequate powers.”33 The report also recommended that the main body of the revised treaty
should have:
…provisions explicitly designating ECOWAS as the sole economic
community for regional integration in West Africa and clearly defining
relations between the executive secretariat and the specialized
institutions of the community; provisions which introduced the
principles of supranationality into ECOWAS…; provisions that
authorize the executive secretary to convene sectoral ministerial
meetings as and when necessary; provisions clearly specifying the status
of the executive secretary as chief executive officer of the community
and all its institutions and extending his powers to include initiating
drafts texts or decisions for adoption by the decision-making bodies of
the community.34

Indeed, the 1993 revision exercise corrected some of the deficiencies of the ECOWAS
governance structure. The reform formalised the establishment of the community tribunal and
parliament and expanded the mandate of the Secretariat with supranational functions.
Additionally, the revised treaty also consolidated the powers and functions of the Executive
secretariat, as contained in Article 17- 1 and 2 and the provisions in Article 19-2 and 19-3.
Theoretically, these amendments were supposed to grant the Secretariat substantial
authority over policy recommendation, formulation, adoption, implementation and
monitoring of community institutions and organs, including budget implementation. But, a
close examination of the scope of the powers granted to the Executive secretariat shows that

32 J Kooiman, "Governance. A social-political perspective." Participatory governance: Political and societal

implications (2002): 71-96.
33 Final Report, 27th Session of the Council of Ministers, p. 6.
34Ibid, p. 7.

12
it fell short of granting it with sufficient powers to discharge its functions without hindrance.
Yes, the reform did improve the functions of the Secretariat but, the decision-making bodies
still maintained the actual executive and supranational powers to execute them.
Thus, even after the 1993 reform, and in spite of the granted elaborate functions, the
ECOWAS Secretariat was left with marginal roles in decision-making and implementation
both at the economic and security level as policies and programmes continue to stagnate on
the account of the ratification threshold requirement.
Hence, in 2006, the ECOWAS stakeholders had to once again reach another
consensus in order to address the issues impeding the performance of ECOWAS, including
the regional governance structure. As a result, a new reform was inaugurated in January
2007, tagged the ‘ECOWAS Trans-formation Agenda”. The crux of the agenda was to further
enhance the powers of the newly established Commission by removing the lingering
encumbrances in the governance structure.
This study has found that the choice of bureaucratic approach adopted in the reform as
oppose to the agency model has failed in creating a professional management system to
oversee the integration process. And that the trail of programme and policy failure in
ECOWAS integration schemes since inception is pinned on the little attention paid to the
institutional model, the governance processes, and issues of capability, work ethics and
practice standards in the regional bureaucracy.
There was also a lack of consistency in strategy and programme due to short tenure of
statutory political officers. Additionally, the legislative and political appointees spent much
of their time on travel and other engagements rather than contributing tangible value to the
integration programme. Procedural and personality issues continue to linger despite the
lessons of the mediation efforts of key regional governments, the Council of Ministers, and
the ECOWAS Authority in May 1979.35 The intervention brought some stability in the
administration of the community, but the challenges that precipitated the crisis continued to
impede implementation of regional policies. Added to the above, redundancy was also a
significant hindrance to the integration scheme.

CONCLUSION
A review of the functions of the Executive Secretariat in ECOWAS integration
reveals a noticeable decline in efficiency. Since its formation, the Executive Secretariat had
undergone a series of rationalisations and reforms in order to enhance its capacity. However,
much of the attempts were a disappointment. Flaws in the regional governance structure of
the Secretariat continued to hinder its ability to liberalise the member states’ economies and
gradually remove all economic barriers in regional trade among the West African member
States. Initially, the ECOWAS treaty laid down both the strategy and timetable for achieving
the goals and objectives of the community. The treaty also designated the Executive
Secretariat as the main institution responsible for overseeing the administration of the
community and coordinating the integration scheme.
However, the gaps in the treaty led to disagreements over structural governance and
relationship between the community institutions and the officials. Together with the
35 Gowon, “The Economic Community…” 508.

13
inappropriate choice of institutional model for the regionalisation process and the lack of
standard work ethics and practices, the Executive Secretariat’s ability to effectively oversee
the integration process was seriously impeded. These shortcomings of the ECOWAS were
also due to the lackadaisical attitude of the member states towards the integration scheme.
Most member states constantly withheld vital operating funds. There was also a lack of
political will on the part of the states to ensure that national agencies comply with the
implementation of regional policies. These shortcomings were found soon after the treaty
ratification ceremony, leading to the series of attempts by the governing organs to resolve
them with little or no success over the thirty-year lifespan of the Secretariat.

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16