PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AS A TOOL OF
PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING
An Assignment Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the
Course on Professional Ethics and Professional Accounting System
[Name of Student]
[Enrolment Number]
[Semester / Year]
[Name of Law School]
I. INTRODUCTION
The Indian legal system, like most common law systems, began its journey as a
largely adversarial, elitist institution, accessible primarily to those with financial resources,
education, and social capital. For decades after Independence, the poor, the marginalised, and
the voiceless found themselves outside the gates of justice—not because the Constitution did
not protect their rights, but because the legal machinery was simply not designed to serve
them. It is against this backdrop that Public Interest Litigation (PIL) emerged as a
transformative legal innovation that fundamentally altered the relationship between law,
courts, and society.
Public Interest Litigation, as understood in the Indian context, refers to litigation
instituted in a court of law not for the purpose of enforcing the private rights of an individual,
but for vindicating a public interest or asserting a constitutional or legal right for the benefit
of a class of persons who are unable to approach the court on their own. The Supreme Court
of India and the various High Courts have, over the decades, acted as the primary institutional
forums through which such litigation has flourished.
This assignment situates PIL within the broader framework of public interest
lawyering—a mode of legal practice that places the interests of society, particularly its
vulnerable sections, at the centre of legal activity. It examines the historical evolution of PIL
in India, its constitutional and procedural underpinnings, its role as a vehicle for public
interest lawyering, the ethical responsibilities it imposes on lawyers, and a critical assessment
of its achievements and limitations.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING
Before understanding PIL as a tool, it is necessary to understand the broader
framework within which it operates—public interest lawyering. Public interest lawyering is a
form of legal practice in which lawyers use their legal skills, knowledge of the law, and
access to judicial institutions not merely to serve paying clients, but to advance social justice,
protect constitutional rights, and challenge systemic injustice. It is premised on the belief that
the legal profession carries an obligation not only to individual clients but to society at large.
In India, this philosophy draws its legitimacy from the Bar Council of India Rules and
the Advocates Act, 1961. The preamble to the Bar Council of India Rules explicitly
acknowledges that the legal profession is not merely a commercial enterprise but a service to
society. Chapter II of Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules sets out duties of advocates
towards the court, clients, opponents, and the society. Duty towards society is not merely
aspirational—it is a professional obligation embedded in the regulatory framework of the
profession.
Public interest lawyers in India have historically worked in three modes: first, by
directly litigating cases that benefit the public or a class of persons; second, by providing
legal aid and access-to-justice services to the poor; and third, by engaging in law reform
advocacy, drafting legislation, and participating in policy processes. PIL, as a judicial
mechanism, primarily enables the first of these functions, though PIL petitions are often
accompanied by efforts at the second and third levels as well.
III. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PIL IN INDIA
A. The Pre-PIL Phase and the Access-to-Justice Problem
In the early decades after Independence, the locus standi doctrine—the rule that only a
person whose legal right has been directly violated can approach the court—severely
restricted access to justice. The formalistic rules of procedure, the costs associated with
litigation, and the sheer geographical distance between courts and rural populations meant
that vast sections of the Indian population remained outside the ambit of constitutional
remedies, despite the expansive rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.
B. The Emergence of PIL: The Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer Era
The transformation began in the late 1970s and early 1980s under the activist
judiciaries associated with Justices V.R. Krishna Iyer and P.N. Bhagwati. These judges
fundamentally liberalised the rules of locus standi, holding that any public-spirited citizen or
organisation could approach the Supreme Court or High Court on behalf of persons who, by
reason of poverty, ignorance, or social disadvantage, could not do so themselves.
The landmark case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 149)—popularly
known as the Judges Transfer Case—marked a watershed moment. Justice Bhagwati held
that when a legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a person or class of persons by reason of a
violation of a constitutional or legal right, any member of the public can maintain an
application for an appropriate direction or writ in the High Court or the Supreme Court. This
effectively dissolved the rigid boundaries of locus standi for matters of public concern.
Around the same period, in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC
1360), a letter written by a lawyer to the Chief Justice of India drawing attention to the plight
of undertrial prisoners in Bihar was treated as a writ petition. This case not only expanded the
concept of standing but also demonstrated that PIL need not conform to conventional
procedural norms—a postcard or a newspaper report could serve as the basis for judicial
intervention.
C. Consolidation and Expansion: 1980s to 2000s
Through the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court entertained a series of landmark
PILs that addressed an extraordinary range of public concerns. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India
became a series of cases that shaped Indian environmental jurisprudence, leading to factory
closures near the Taj Mahal, vehicular emission norms in Delhi, and the regulation of
hazardous industries. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India addressed bonded labour.
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1997 SC 3011) resulted in the Vishaka Guidelines on
sexual harassment at workplaces, which remained the governing law until the Sexual
Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013 was enacted.
These cases illustrate how PIL functioned as a mechanism through which lawyers,
civil society organisations, and concerned individuals could translate constitutional
guarantees into tangible social outcomes—precisely the goal of public interest lawyering.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL BASIS OF PIL
PIL in India rests on a robust constitutional foundation. Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution of India confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court and High Courts
respectively to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court has
interpreted these provisions expansively to permit PIL, holding that Article 32 is itself a
fundamental right and must be given the widest possible interpretation.
The Right to Life under Article 21 has been the most fertile ground for PIL
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has read into Article 21 a vast array of rights—the right to
a clean environment, the right to health, the right to education, the right to livelihood, the
right to shelter, and the right to a speedy trial—many of which were originally not
contemplated as fundamental rights by the Constituent Assembly. PIL has been the primary
vehicle through which this expansive interpretation has been operationalised.
Procedurally, PIL departs significantly from conventional litigation. Epistolary
jurisdiction allows courts to treat letters, telegrams, and newspaper reports as writ petitions.
The court may appoint amicus curiae, commissioners, or expert committees to investigate
facts. The court may issue continuing mandamus, monitoring the implementation of its orders
over extended periods. Costs may be waived or even awarded against the State in favour of
the petitioner to encourage genuine public interest litigation. These procedural innovations
have made PIL a uniquely accessible and flexible tool.
V. PIL AS A VEHICLE OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING
A. Giving Voice to the Voiceless
The most fundamental contribution of PIL to public interest lawyering is its capacity
to give legal voice to persons who are structurally excluded from the justice system. Bonded
labourers, undertrial prisoners, slum dwellers facing eviction, factory workers exposed to
toxic materials, women subjected to workplace harassment, children employed in hazardous
industries—all of these groups have found a legal advocate through PIL. A public interest
lawyer acting for such groups does not merely perform a technical legal service; they perform
a deeply political and social function by translating human suffering into justiciable claims.
B. Norm Creation and Law Reform
PIL has served as a significant mechanism of norm creation and law reform in India.
Courts acting on PIL petitions have issued directions that effectively have the force of law in
the absence of legislative action. The Vishaka Guidelines, the right to food orders in PUCL v.
Union of India (2001), and the directions in Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006) on police
reforms are all examples of judicially created norms that emerged from PIL. For the public
interest lawyer, this represents a unique opportunity to use the courts as a forum not merely
for dispute resolution, but for policy-making and law reform.
C. Institutional Accountability
PIL has served as a mechanism for holding public institutions accountable. Cases
addressing corruption, environmental violations by State-owned industries, illegal mining,
custodial deaths, and prison conditions have all been entertained as PILs. The public interest
lawyer, in such cases, acts as a form of constitutional watchdog, ensuring that institutions of
the State discharge their constitutional and statutory obligations. This accountability function
is central to the ethos of public interest lawyering.
D. The Ethical Dimension for Lawyers
From the perspective of Professional Ethics, PIL places unique ethical obligations on
the lawyer. The Bar Council of India Rules impose a duty of integrity, candour, and
diligence. A public interest lawyer must be particularly vigilant about conflict of interest,
since PIL proceedings often involve competing interests among the public. The lawyer must
also resist the temptation to use PIL as a vehicle for personal or political gain—a concern that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly flagged.
The Supreme Court in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar (AIR 1991 SC 420)
cautioned that PIL is a weapon that must be used with great care and circumspection. The
court warned against 'publicity interest litigation' disguised as public interest litigation. The
ethical lawyer engaged in PIL must therefore maintain the purity of motive that the remedy
demands. This ethical responsibility is not merely a professional nicety—it is a constitutional
imperative, since PIL derives its legitimacy from the principle that the court is acting for the
benefit of persons who cannot act for themselves.
VI. KEY LANDMARK CASES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
A survey of landmark PIL cases reveals the breadth of issues that public interest
lawyering through PIL has addressed in India. In Parmanand Katara v. Union of India (AIR
1989 SC 2039), the Supreme Court held that every doctor—government or private—is under
an obligation to extend emergency medical treatment to accident victims without demanding
formalities. The case arose from a petition by a human rights organisation and directly
impacted millions of ordinary citizens.
In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (AIR 1986 SC 180), the Supreme
Court recognised the right to livelihood as part of the right to life under Article 21, and held
that pavement dwellers could not be evicted without following due process. The case
exemplifies how PIL can be used to challenge State action affecting the most vulnerable
populations.
In MC Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997), the Supreme Court articulated the public trust
doctrine in Indian environmental law, holding that the State is a trustee of natural resources
and cannot alienate them for private gain. This doctrine, borrowed from American
environmental jurisprudence, was introduced into Indian law through a PIL. In Vineet Narain
v. Union of India (1998), PIL was used to compel investigation into high-level corruption,
illustrating the accountability dimension of the remedy.
More recently, in Common Cause v. Union of India (2018), a PIL led to the
recognition of passive euthanasia and living wills as legally valid. These cases demonstrate
that PIL remains a living, evolving legal institution capable of addressing contemporary
challenges, from environmental degradation to end-of-life rights.
VII. CRITICISMS AND LIMITATIONS OF PIL
Despite its extraordinary contribution to Indian jurisprudence, PIL has attracted
significant criticism, and an intellectually honest assessment requires engaging with these
criticisms seriously.
The first and most fundamental criticism is that of judicial overreach. When courts
issue detailed administrative directions—mandating how garbage must be collected, how
prisons must be run, or how police must function—they effectively usurp the role of the
executive. Separation of powers, a basic feature of the Constitution, requires that each branch
of government operate within its domain. Critics argue that activist PIL jurisprudence has
blurred this line in ways that may ultimately undermine democratic accountability.
The second criticism relates to the abuse of PIL. The Supreme Court has itself
expressed concern about the increasing number of frivolous, malicious, and politically
motivated PILs. Petitions challenging film releases, opposing the construction of roads, and
targeting business rivals under the guise of public interest have clogged court dockets and
brought the remedy into disrepute. This abuse problem directly implicates professional ethics,
since it involves lawyers or petitioners filing petitions in bad faith—in violation of their duty
to the court.
The third criticism is structural. PIL, by its very design, is court-centric and often
elite-driven. The lawyers who file significant PILs tend to be senior advocates practising in
the Supreme Court or High Courts—not lawyers embedded in local communities. The
remedies ordered are also often implemented unevenly, with States in better administrative
shape implementing court orders more faithfully than others. There is a real question,
therefore, about whether PIL delivers justice to the very people it purports to serve, or
whether it primarily serves the interests of urban, educated petitioners.
The fourth criticism is institutional. Courts are not equipped to manage the complex,
polycentric problems that PIL petitions frequently throw up. Questions of environmental
science, urban planning, public health policy, and prison administration require expertise,
sustained engagement, and administrative capacity that courts typically lack. The
appointment of commissioners and monitoring committees helps, but it adds to costs and
delays.
VIII. PIL AND THE PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
The subject of Professional Ethics and Professional Accounting System, within which
this assignment is situated, is concerned not only with the moral duties of the legal
profession, but also with the systems of accountability and record-keeping that govern
professional conduct. PIL raises several important questions from this perspective.
Lawyers filing PILs must maintain meticulous records of their clients' instructions (or
lack thereof, in cases of epistolary jurisdiction), the evidence gathered, and the
communications with the court. This is a matter of professional accounting in the broad sense
—accounting for one's conduct as a professional. The Bar Council of India requires
advocates to maintain proper accounts and to account to their clients for all monies received.
In PIL matters involving large public interest organisations, the management of funds,
donations, and legal aid grants must be conducted with full transparency and in accordance
with applicable regulations.
Moreover, the phenomenon of 'amicus curiae' fees, court-appointed commissioner
costs, and legal aid fees in PIL proceedings creates a complex web of financial relationships
that must be managed ethically. A public interest lawyer must be scrupulous in ensuring that
financial considerations do not compromise the integrity of the PIL or create a conflict
between the lawyer's interests and those of the public the PIL claims to serve. These concerns
are directly relevant to the professional accounting dimension of legal practice.
IX. CONCLUSION
Public Interest Litigation, as it has evolved in India, represents one of the most
significant innovations in constitutional jurisprudence anywhere in the world. It has
transformed the role of the judiciary, expanded the scope of fundamental rights, and created a
new model of lawyering in which legal skills are deployed not for private gain but for the
common good. As a tool of public interest lawyering, PIL has given voice to the voiceless,
held institutions accountable, reformed law and policy, and embedded social justice concerns
at the heart of the constitutional order.
At the same time, PIL is not a panacea. It carries within itself the seeds of its own
distortion—through abuse, judicial overreach, and the structural limitations of court-centric
justice. The public interest lawyer must therefore approach PIL with both conviction and
humility: conviction in the justice of the cause, and humility about the limits of the judicial
process as an instrument of social transformation.
From the perspective of professional ethics, PIL demands the highest standards of
integrity, candour, and public-spiritedness. The Bar Council of India Rules and the Advocates
Act provide the formal framework, but the true ethical foundation of PIL practice lies in the
lawyer's internalisation of the principle that the legal profession is, at its core, a public
service. When lawyers approach PIL with this understanding, it becomes what it was always
intended to be: not merely a legal remedy, but a moral commitment to justice.
REFERENCES
1. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (Judges Transfer Case)
2. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360
3. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086
4. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011
5. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180
6. Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420
7. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2039
8. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802
9. Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226
10. Prakash Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 1
11. Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1
12. PUCL v. Union of India, (2001) — Right to Food Case
13. Advocates Act, 1961
14. Bar Council of India Rules, Chapter II, Part VI
15. Upendra Baxi, 'Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme
Court of India' (1985) 4 Third World Legal Studies 107
16. S.P. Sathe, 'Judicial Activism in India' (Oxford University Press, 2002)
17. Rajeev Dhavan, 'Litigation Explosion in India' (N.M. Tripathi, 1986)