I.
Concept of Safety and Risk
1. Definitions
• Safety: In its simplest terms, safety is the freedom from the
occurrence or risk of injury or loss. In an engineering context, a
product or project is considered "safe" when the known risks are
judged to be acceptable.
• Risk: Risk is the potential that something unwanted and harmful
may occur. It is an inherent part of any technological advancement
because engineering often involves "partial ignorance"—
uncertainties about material behavior, user environments, and
unintended side effects.
2. The Mathematical Relationship
Risk is generally quantified as:
• Risk = Probability of occurrence × Consequence in magnitude.
• Probability of safety = 1 – Probability of risk.
Analogy: Imagine a tightrope walker. Safety isn't just the absence of a
fall; it's the condition where the tension of the rope, the wind speed, and
the walker's skill make the potential fall an "acceptable risk." The risk is
the product of the probability of slipping and the severity of hitting the
ground.
II. Assessment of Safety and Risk
Engineers use several methodologies to test and predict the safety of a
system:
1. Testing Methods
• Destructive Testing: Testing a component until it fails. While
expensive, it provides a realistic look at failure limits.
• Prototype Testing: Building a scale model with vital components to
project how the full system will behave.
• Simulation Testing: Using computers to model safe boundaries and
predict outcomes based on controlled input variables.
2. Analytical Tools
• FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis): A systematic, proactive
tool used to identify possible failure modes in products or processes
and plan for their reduction or elimination. It prioritises risks based
on severity, occurrence, and detection.
• Fault-tree Analysis (FTA): A "top-down" approach that starts with
an undesirable event (failure) and traces it back to identify the causal
relationships between hardware and human errors.
• Event-tree Analysis (ETA): This explores both success and failure
alternatives at each level of a process to show the different paths a
system might take after a specific event.
III. Risk-Benefit Analysis and Reducing Risk
1. Risk-Benefit Analysis This involves weighing the anticipated benefits
of a project against its potential risks to decide on its design and viability.
• Limitations: It can be ethically complex because the benefits often go
to one group (e.g., shareholders) while the risks are borne by another
(e.g., local residents). Additionally, it is difficult to compare unlike
units, such as "monetary savings" versus "human lives".
2. Reducing Risk Engineers can proactively lower risk through several
strategies:
• Redundancy Principle: Designing "standby" systems for critical
components (e.g., a backup generator in a hospital).
• Periodical Monitoring: Regular inspection of safety systems (like
fire extinguishers or circuit breakers).
• Safe Exit Design: Ensuring that if a product fails, it does so "safely"
or allows users to escape (e.g., fire escapes in high-rises or lifeboats
on ships).
• Operation Manuals and Training: Educating personnel on standard
operating procedures and emergency drills.
IV. Public Risk and Acceptance
1. Acceptance of Risk There is a distinct psychological difference in how
the public accepts risk:
• Voluntary Risk: People are more likely to accept risks they choose
themselves, such as car racing or stunts, even if the probability of
injury is high. They believe they are "in control".
• Involuntary Risk: The public strongly objects to risks imposed on
them without their consent, such as pollution from a nearby chemical
plant or radiation from a nuclear facility.
2. Informed Consent For a social experiment (like a new engineering
project) to be ethical, "Informed Consent" is required. This includes:
• Knowledge: Giving the public all relevant information to make a
decision.
• Voluntariness: Participation without force, fraud, or deception.
3. Normalisation of Deviance This is a dangerous phenomenon where
engineers or managers start accepting anomalies or small failures as
"normal" instead of fixing the underlying cause.
• Example: In the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster, past flights
showed that O-rings were eroding. Rather than redesigning them,
NASA "normalised" the deviance, enlarging the boundary of
acceptable risk until it resulted in total catastrophe.
Analogy for Normalisation of Deviance: It is like ignoring a small
"check engine" light on your dashboard because the car still runs fine.
You keep driving until the engine eventually seizes up on the highway.
You accepted the deviance (the light) as normal, which led to the
disaster.
References
1. Naagarazan, R.S. (2006). Professional Ethics and Human Values. New
Age International (P) Ltd.
2. Aswathappa, K. (2017). Human Resource Management: Text and Cases
(7th ed.). McGraw Hill Education (India).
3. Robbins, S. P., & Judge, T. A. (2013). Organizational Behavior (15th
ed.). Pearson Education.
4. Chitale, A.K., Mohanty, R.P., & Dubey, N.R. Organizational Behaviour:
Ethics and Human Values. PHI Learning.
5. Griffin, R. W., & Moorhead, G. (2013). Organizational Behavior:
Managing People and Organizations (11th ed.). Cengage Learning.