Falsifiability - Wikipedia [Link]

org/wiki/Falsifiability

Falsifiability
Falsifiability is a standard of evaluation of
scientific statements, including theories and
hypotheses. A statement is falsifiable if it
belongs to a language or logical structure
capable of describing an empirical observation
that contradicts it. In the case of a theory, it
says that, given an initial condition, the theory
must theoretically prohibit some observations,
that is, it must make formal predictions. It was
introduced by the philosopher of science Karl
Popper in his book The Logic of Scientific
Discovery (1934).[A] Popper emphasized that
the contradiction is to be found in the logical
structure alone, without having to worry about
methodological considerations external to this Here are two black swans, but even with no black
structure. He proposed falsifiability as the swans, "All swans are white" would still be shown
cornerstone solution to both the problem of falsifiable by "Here is a black swan"—it would still be a
induction and the problem of demarcation. valid observation statement in the empirical language,
even if empirically false.
Popper also emphasized the related asymmetry
created by the relation of a universal law with
basic observation statements and contrasted falsifiability with the intuitively similar concept of
verifiability that was then current in the philosophical discipline of logical positivism. He argued
that the only way to verify a claim such as "All swans are white" would be if one could empirically
observe all swans, which is not possible. On the other hand, the observation of a single black swan
is enough to refute this claim.

This asymmetry can only be seen rigorously when methodological falsification issues are put aside.
Otherwise, a stated observation of one or even more black swans constitute at best a problematic
refutation of the claim. Accordingly, to be rigorous, falsifiability is a logical criterion within an
empirical language that is accepted by convention and allows these methodological considerations
to be avoided. Only then the asymmetry and falsifiability are rigorous. Popper argued that it should
not be conflated with falsificationism, which is a methodological approach where scientists actively
try to find evidence to disprove theories.[1] Falsifiability is distinct from Lakatos' falsificationism.[2]
Its purpose is to make theory predictive, testable and useful in practice.

By contrast, the Duhem–Quine thesis says that definitive experimental falsifications are
impossible[3] and that no scientific hypothesis is by itself capable of making predictions, because
an empirical test of the hypothesis requires background assumptions, which acceptations are

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methodological decisions in Lakatos' falsificationism.[4]

Popper's response was that falsifiability is a logical criterion. Experimental research has the Duhem
problem and other problems, such as the problem of induction, but, according to Popper, logical
induction is a fallacy[5][6] and statistical tests, which are possible only when a theory is falsifiable,
are useful within a critical discussion.

Popper's distinction between logic and methodology has not allowed falsifiability to escape some
criticisms aimed at methodology. For example, Popper's rejection of Marxism as unscientific
because of its resistance to negative evidence is a methodological position, but the problems with
this position are nevertheless presented as a limitation of falsifiability.[7] Others, despite the
unsuccessful proposals of Russell, the Vienna Circle, Lakatos, and others to establish a rigorous
way of justifying scientific theories or research programs and thus demarcating them from non-
science and pseudoscience, criticize falsifiability for not following a similar proposal and for
supporting instead only a methodology based on critical discussion.

As a key notion in the separation of science from non-science and pseudoscience, falsifiability has
featured prominently in many controversies and applications, used as legal precedent.

Induction and demarcation

One concern about the scientific method is how to move from observations to scientific laws. This
is the problem of induction. Considering the hypothesis that all swans are white, given an
observation of a white swan, there is no logical path from "here is a white swan" to "all swans are
white"; doing so would involve a logical fallacy such as, for example, affirming the consequent.[6]

Popper's idea to solve this problem was that while it is impossible to verify that every swan is white,
finding a single black swan shows that not every swan is white. Such falsification uses the valid
inference modus tollens: if, from a law , can be logically deduced, but is observed, is
false. Thus, given "all swans are white", "the specific swan here is white", but if what is
observed is "the observed swan is not white", then "all swans are white" is false. More
precisely, the deducible statement can be broken into an initial condition and a prediction as in
in which "the thing here is a swan" and "the thing here is a white swan". If what
is observed is C being true while P is false (formally, ), the law is false by modus tollens.

Popper claimed that induction is not needed in science, that is, he rejected that we learn by the
repetition of observations and considered that logical induction was a fallacy.[8][9] Instead, laws
are conjectured in a non-logical manner on the basis of expectations and predispositions and trials
continue as long as there are problems.[10] This led Popper's student and collaborator David Miller
to write "the mission is to classify truths, not to certify them".[11] In contrast, the logical empiricism
movement, led by philosophers such as Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, and A. J.
Ayer, wanted to formalize the idea that, for a law to be scientific, it must be possible to argue on the
basis of observations in favor of its truth or falsity. No consensus emerged about how to achieve
that, but the thought expressed by Mach's dictum that "where neither confirmation nor refutation
is possible, science is not concerned" was accepted as a scientific precept.[12][13][14]

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Popper said that a demarcation criterion for the laws of science was possible, but that what matters
is the logical possibility of falsification of these laws, which is falsifiability. He cited his encounter
with psychoanalysis in the 1910s, especially with Alfred Adler. It did not matter what observation
was presented, psychoanalysis could explain it. The reason it could explain everything is that it did
not exclude anything.[15] Popper claimed that this was a failure, because it meant that the criterion
could not lead to a prediction. From a logical standpoint, observations that do not contradict a law
does not mean that the law is true. A verification has no value in itself. But, if a hypothesis makes
risky predictions and these are corroborated, Popper stated, that was a reason to prefer this
hypothesis over others that makes less risky predictions or no predictions at all.[16][17] In the
definition of falsifiability, contradictions with observations are not used to support falsifications,
but for logical "falsifications" that show that the law makes risky predictions.

Popper said that some philosophers of the Vienna Circle had conflated two problems, that of
meaning and that of demarcation, and had proposed in verificationism a single solution to both: a
statement that could not be verified was considered meaningless. Popper instead said that
meaningful non-scientific theories exist, and that, accordingly, a criterion of meaningfulness does
not coincide with a criterion of demarcation.[18]

Hume's problem
The problem of induction is often called Hume's problem. David Hume studied how human beings
obtain new knowledge that goes beyond known laws and observations, including how to discover
new laws. He understood that deductive logic could not explain this learning process and argued in
favour of a mental or psychological process of learning that would not require deductive logic. He
argued that this learning process cannot be justified by any general rules, deductive or not.[19]
Popper accepted Hume's argument and therefore viewed progress in science as the result of quasi-
induction, which is induction without inference rules and which he also called the "path of
science".[20][21]

Philip N. Johnson-Laird agreed with Hume that no general method of justification for induction is
possible but that induction does not require justification.[22] Instead, these steps use patterns of
induction, which are not expected to have a general justification: they may or may not be
applicable depending on context.

[P]hilosophers have worried about which properties of objects warrant inductive

inferences. The answer rests on knowledge: we don't infer that all the passengers on a
plane are male because the first ten off the plane are men. We know that this observation
doesn't rule out the possibility of a woman passenger.[22]

Johnson-Laird's view was that "induction is just something that animals, including human beings,
do to make life possible".[22]

Popper accepted the possibility of a psychological explanation for the learning process, especially
when psychology is seen as an extension of biology, but claimed that biological explanations were
not within the scope of epistemology.[23][20] In line with Johnson-Laird's view, Popper proposed

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an evolutionary mechanism to explain science's success,[24] but he did not consider it part of his
epistemology.[25] He referred to this as psychologism.[26] He wrote that his interest was mainly in
the logic of science and that epistemology should be concerned with logical aspects only.[27]
Instead of asking why science succeeds, he considered induction pragmatically.[23] He asked what
methodology should be used to accept one among multiple hypotheses. He proposed that it be the
one that was the most tested: "the one, which in the light of our critical discussion, appears to be
the best so far".[23] By his own account, because only a negative approach was supported by logic,
Popper adopted a negative methodology[28] to prevent the "policy of immunizing our theories
against refutation". It also supported a "dogmatic attitude" in defending theories against criticism,
because this would allow the process to be more complete.[29] This view was much criticized.

A different notion of induction

In practice, some steps based on observations can be justified under assumptions. For example,
Bayesian inductive logic[30] is justified by theorems that make explicit assumptions. These
theorems are obtained with deductive logic. They are sometimes presented as supporting steps of
induction, because they refer to laws of probability, even though they do not extend beyond
deductive logic. This is a different notion of induction, which overlaps with deductive logic in the
sense of being supported by it. Hume's argument does not reject the possibility of a general
procedure that relies on hypotheses to explain the progress of science, but it says the problem of
how to choose the initial hypotheses and prove their validity creates an infinite regress.

Logic of science versus applied methodology

Popper distinguished the logic of science from its applied methodology.[31] For example, the
falsifiability of Newton's law of gravitation, as defined by Popper, depends purely on the logical
relation it has with a statement such as "The brick fell upwards when released".[32][33] A brick that
falls upwards would not alone falsify Newton's law of gravitation. The capacity to verify the absence
of conditions such as a hidden string[34] attached to the brick is also needed for this state of
affairs[35] to eventually falsify Newton's law of gravitation. However, these applied methodological
considerations are irrelevant in falsifiability, because it is a logical criterion. The empirical
requirement on the potential falsifier, also called the material requirement,[36][37] is only that it is
communicable inter-subjectively. The potential falsifier is not required to actually show the law to
be false. The purely logical contradiction, together with the material requirement, are sufficient.
The logical part consists of theories, statements, and their logical relationship together with this
material requirement, which is needed for a connection with the methodological part.

The methodological part consists, in Popper's view, of informal rules, which are used to formulate
hypotheses, accept observations as factual, etc. These include statistical tests: Popper is aware that
observation statements are accepted with the help of statistical methods and that these involve
methodological decisions.[38] When this distinction is applied to the term "falsifiability", it
corresponds to a distinction between two different meanings of the term. The same is true for the
term "falsifiable". Popper said that he only uses "falsifiability" or "falsifiable" in reference to the
logical side and that, when he refers to the methodological side, he speaks instead of "falsification"

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and its problems.[1]

Popper said that methodological problems require methodology rules. One such rule is that,
refusing to go along with falsifications is equivalent to retiring from science.[39] The logical side has
no such methodological problems, in particular with regard to the falsifiability of a theory, because
basic statements are not required to be possible. Methodological rules are only needed in the
context of actual falsifications.

So observations have two purposes. On the methodological side, observations can show that a law
is false. On the logical side, observations, which are purely logical constructions, contradict a law to
show its falsifiability. Unlike falsifications and free from the problems of falsification, these
contradictions establish the value of the law, which may eventually be corroborated.

Popper wrote that an entire literature exists because this distinction between the logical and the
methodological was not observed.[1] This survives in later literature. For example, in their 2019
article "Evidence based medicine as science", Vere and Gibson wrote "[falsifiability has] been
considered problematic because theories are not simply tested through falsification but in
conjunction with auxiliary assumptions and background knowledge."[40]

According to Thornton, Popper's distinction between logic and methodology did not allow
falsifiability, even when presented as a logical criterion, to escape criticism aimed at methodology.
[7] For example, the dismissal of Marxism as unscientific because it was not abandoned despite the

evidence was a methodological position adopted by Popper, and problems with this position have
been presented by Lakatos and others as a limitation of his criterion of demarcation.[7]

Practical value of a logical criterion

The fact that science must be based on empirical evidence does not mean that a logical criterion
fails to address the real concerns of science. As explained by Thornton,[41] there is no
methodological falsifications in the process of science except in those tests that compare the theory
with factual observations, but in these tests too the procedure is mostly logical and involves
observations that are only logical constructions. Popper distinguishes four different lines along
which the testing of a theory could be carried out. First there is the logical comparison of deduced
statements by which the internal consistency of the system is tested. Second, there is the
determination whether it has the character of an empirical or scientific theory, or whether it is, for
example, tautological, as required by the falsifiability criterion. Third, there is the comparison with
other theories to determine whether the theory would constitute a scientific advance if not
empirically rejected. Finally and most importantly, there is the testing of the theory by way of
empirical applications of the conclusions which can be derived from it, which would not be possible
without falsifiability. Here, too, the testing procedure turns out to require deductive logic,
essentially because it is needed to properly conceive, implement, and interpret observations.[42]
The logical aspect of the criterion makes it practical, because it goes along the usual activities in
science.

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Basic statements
In Popper's view, observation statements can be analyzed within a logical structure independent of
factual observations.[42] The set of all purely logical observations that are considered constitutes
the empirical basis. Popper calls them the basic statements or test statements. They can be used to
show the falsifiability of a theory. Popper says that basic statements do not have to be possible. It is
sufficient that they are accepted by convention as belonging to the empirical language, a language
that "must be testable by intersubjective observation (the material requirement)".[43]

When there is a technological advance, a technology that was previously only hypothetical, for
example, the use of a rocket to examine the hidden surface of the moon, might become available
with all the details known. This has led Herbert Keuth to write: "a hypotheses that was first
untestable may become testable later on."[44] Formally, though, one might counter argue that it's
not the same theory, because the basic statements are interpreted slightly differently with the
actual details.

In The Logic of Scientific Discovery,[45] Popper discusses informally which statements among
those that are considered in the logical structure are basic statements. A logical structure uses
universal classes to define laws. For example, in the law "all swans are white" the concept of swans
is a universal class. It corresponds to a set of properties that every swan must have. It is not
restricted to the swans that exist, existed or will exist. Informally, a basic statement is simply a
statement that concerns only a finite number of specific instances in universal classes. In
particular, an existential statement such as "there exists a black swan" is not a basic statement,
because it is not specific about the instance. On the other hand, "this swan here is black" is a basic
statement. Popper says that it is a singular existential statement or simply a singular statement. So,
basic statements are singular (existential) statements.

Definition of falsifiability
Thornton says that basic statements correspond to particular "observation-reports". He then gives
Popper's definition of falsifiability:

A theory is scientific if and only if it divides the class of basic statements into the following
two non-empty sub-classes: (a) the class of all those basic statements with which it is
inconsistent, or which it prohibits—this is the class of its potential falsifiers (i.e., those
statements which, if true, falsify the whole theory), and (b) the class of those basic
statements with which it is consistent, or which it permits (i.e., those statements which, if
true, corroborate it, or bear it out).[46]

As in the case of actual falsifiers, decisions must be taken by scientists to accept a logical structure
and its associated empirical basis, but these are usually part of a background knowledge that
scientists have in common and, often, discussion is not necessary.[47] The first decision described

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by Lakatos[48] is implicit in this agreement, but the other decisions are not needed. The agreement
exists only in principle. This is where the logical/methodological distinction becomes important.
When an actual falsifier is proposed, the technology used is considered in detail and an actual
agreement is needed. This may require using a deeper empirical basis,[49] to make sure that the
properties or values used in the falsifier were obtained correctly.[50]

Popper says that despite the fact that the empirical basis can be shaky,[49] the above definition is
simply the formalization of a natural requirement on scientific theories, without which the whole
logical process of science would not be possible.

Initial condition and prediction in falsifiers of laws

In his analysis of universal laws, Popper conclusion was that laws must "allow us to deduce,
roughly speaking, more empirical singular statements than we can deduce from the initial
conditions alone."[51] A singular statement that has only one part cannot contradict a universal law.
To contradict a universal law, a falsifier must have two parts: the initial condition and the singular
statement that contradicts the prediction as in in which "the thing here is a swan" and
"the thing here is a white swan".

However, falsifiers need not have two parts in the definition itself. In this way, the definition is
more general and allows basic statements to be falsifiable.[51] For example, "the thing here is a
black swan" is falsifiable, because it is contradicted by the falsifier "the thing here is a white swan".
Popper wrote that criteria that require that a law must be predictive, just as is required by
falsifiability when applied to laws, "have been put forward as criteria of the meaningfulness of
sentences (rather than as criteria of demarcation applicable to theoretical systems) again and again
after the publication of my book, even by critics who pooh-poohed my criterion of falsifiability."[52]

Necessity to strengthen laws to make them falsifiable

Grover Maxwell discussed statements such as "All men are mortal."[53] This is not falsifiable,
because it does not matter how old a man is, he might die next year.[54] Maxwell said that this
statement is nevertheless useful, because it is often corroborated. He coined the term
"corroboration without demarcation". Popper's view is that it is indeed useful, because he
considers that metaphysical statements can be useful, but also because it is indirectly corroborated
by its agreement with the falsifiable law "All men die before the age of 150." For Popper, if no such
falsifiable law exists, then the metaphysical law is less useful, because it is not indirectly
corroborated by a stronger law, a law that prohibits more.[55] This kind of non-falsifiable
statements in science was noticed by Carnap as early as 1937.[56]

Maxwell also used the example "All solids have a melting point." This is not falsifiable, because
maybe the melting point will be reached at a higher temperature.[53][54] The law is falsifiable and
more useful if we specify an upper bound on melting points or a way to calculate this upper bound.
[57]

Another example from Maxwell is "All beta decays are accompanied with a neutrino emission from
the same nucleus."[58] This is also not falsifiable, because maybe the neutrino can be detected in a

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different manner. The law is falsifiable and much more

useful from a scientific point of view, if the method to
detect the neutrino is specified.[55] Maxwell said that most
scientific laws are metaphysical statements of this kind,[59]
which, Popper said, need to be made more precise before
they can be indirectly corroborated.[55] In other words,
specific technologies must be provided to make the
statements inter-subjectively-verifiable, i.e., so that
scientists know what the falsification or its failure actually
means.

In his critique of the falsifiability criterion, Maxwell

considered the requirement for decisions in the
falsification of both the emission of neutrinos and the
existence of the melting point.[58] For example, he pointed
out that had no neutrino been detected, it could have been
Clyde Cowan conducting the neutrino
because some conservation law is false. Popper did not experiment (1956)
argue against the problems of falsification per se. He
always acknowledged these problems. His response was at
the logical level. For example, he pointed out that, if a specific way is given to trap the neutrino,
then, at the level of the language, the statement is falsifiable, because "no neutrino was detected
after using this specific way" formally contradicts it (and it is inter-subjectively-verifiable—people
can repeat the experiment).

Falsifiability in model theory

Herbert A. Simon studied the semantic aspects of falsifiability.[60][61] There it is proposed that two
formal requirements govern a formally defined and stringent falsifiability that a theory must satisfy
to qualify as scientific: that they be finitely and irrevocably testable.[62] These studies were done in
the perspective that a logic is a relation between formal sentences in languages and a collection of
mathematical structures, each of which is considered a model within model theory.[62] The
relation, usually denoted , says the formal sentence is true when interpreted in the
structure —it provides the semantic of the languages.[B] According to Rynasiewicz, in this
semantic perspective, Popperian falsifiability means that in some observation structure (in the
collection) there exists a set of observations which refutes the theory.[63]

A stronger notion of falsifiability was considered, which requires that all structures in the collection
that cannot be expanded to a structure that satisfies contain such a contradicting set of
observations. This stronger definition makes sense, because it says that we want a falsifier
whenever the theory is actually false. It also implies other interesting properties, but it is not the
usual falsifiability. For example, « all swans are white and there exists a white raven » is falsifiable
in the usual sense, but not strongly falsifiable, because in the case where all swans are white and all
ravens are black we cannot find a falsifier. The fact that all ravens are black contradicts the theory,
but it is not a singular statement, not a possible observation.[63]

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Examples

Newton's theory
Lakatos suggested that Isaac Newton's law of universal gravitation was as difficult to show to be
falsifiable as Sigmund Freud's theory of psychoanalysis. To refute this, Popper gave the example of
an apple that moves from the ground up to a branch and then starts to dance from branch to
branch. According to Popper's definition, this is a basic statement and a potential falsifier for
Newton's theory, because the position of the apple at different times can be measured. This
appears controversial, because Newtonian physics does not deny that forces stronger than Earth's
gravity can act on the apple. However, the definition of falsifiability only asserts the well-
established fact that Newton's law is predictive, that is, it prohibits certain states of affairs. To this
end, it restricts itself to what the law formally says about the basic statements, just as when
theoretical physicists compute the direction of a rocket and ignore all methodological
considerations that are not a part of the initial conditions that they decided to consider, including
unexpected extra forces. It is possible that some unexpected phenomena invalidate their
prediction, but that does not concern falsifiability. Methodological considerations have been
known since at least Duhem to imply the impossibility of predictions, but falsifiability is a logical
criterion.[64]

Equivalence principle
Another example of a basic statement is "The inert mass of this object is ten times larger than its
gravitational mass." This is a basic statement because the inert mass and the gravitational mass
can both be measured separately, even though it never happens that they are different. It is, as
described by Popper, a valid falsifier for the equivalence principle, a concept associated with Albert
Einstein.[65]

Evolution

Industrial melanism
In a discussion of the theory of evolution, Popper mentioned industrial melanism[66] as an
example of a falsifiable law. A corresponding basic statement that acts as a potential falsifier is "In
this industrial area, the relative fitness of the white-bodied peppered moth is high." Here "fitness"
means "reproductive success over the next generation".[67][68][69][70] It is a basic statement,
because it is possible to separately determine the kind of environment, industrial vs natural, and
the relative fitness of the white-bodied form (relative to the black-bodied form) in an area, even
though it never happens that the white-bodied form has a high relative fitness in an industrial area.

Precambrian rabbit
A famous example of a basic statement from J. B. S. Haldane is "[These are] fossil rabbits in the

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Precambrian era." This is a basic statement because it is

possible to find a fossil rabbit and to determine that the
date of a fossil is in the Precambrian era, even though it
never happens that the date of a rabbit fossil is in the
Precambrian era. This shows the scientific character of
paleontology, because it contradicts the hypothesis in
paleontology that all mammals existed in a much more
recent era, despite opinions to the contrary.[71][72] Richard
Dawkins adds that any other modern animal, such as a
hippo, would suffice.[73][74][75]
A black-bodied and white-bodied
peppered moth
Unfalsifiable statements
A simple example of a non-basic statement is "This
angel does not have large wings." It is not a basic
statement, because though the absence of large wings
can be observed, no technology (independent of the
presence of wings) exists to identify angels. Even if it
is accepted that angels exist, the sentence "All angels
have large wings" is not falsifiable.

Another example from Popper of a non-basic

statement is "This human action is altruistic." It is
not a basic statement, because no accepted Even if it is accepted that angels exist, "All
technology allows us to determine whether or not an angels have large wings" is not falsifiable,
action is motivated by self-interest. Because no basic because no technology exists to identify and
observe angels.
statement falsifies it, the statement that "All human
actions are egotistic, motivated by self-interest" is
thus not falsifiable.[76]

Omphalos hypothesis
Some adherents of young-Earth creationism make an argument (called the Omphalos hypothesis
after the Greek word for navel) that the world was created with the appearance of age; e.g., the
sudden appearance of a mature chicken capable of laying eggs. This ad hoc hypothesis introduced
into young-Earth creationism is unfalsifiable because it says that the time of creation (of a species)
measured by the accepted technology is illusory and no accepted technology is proposed to
measure the claimed "actual" time of creation. Moreover, if the ad hoc hypothesis says that the
world was created as we observe it today without stating further laws, by definition it cannot be
contradicted by observations and thus is not falsifiable. This is discussed by Dienes in the case of a
variation on the Omphalos hypothesis, which, in addition, specifies that God made the creation in
this way to test our faith.[77]

Natural selection

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In the 5th and 6th editions of On the Origin of Species, following a suggestion of Alfred Russel
Wallace, Darwin used "Survival of the fittest", an expression first coined by Herbert Spencer, as a
synonym for Natural Selection.[78] Popper and others said that the most widely accepted definition
of "fitness" in modern biology, namely reproductive success, the expression "survival of the fittest"
is a tautology.[79][80][81]

Darwinist Ronald Fisher worked out mathematical theorems to help answer questions regarding
natural selection. But, for Popper and others, no (falsifiable) law of Natural Selection has been
offered, because these tools apply only to certain rare traits.[82][83] Instead, for Popper, the work of
Fisher and others on Natural Selection is part of an important and successful metaphysical
research program.[84]

Mathematics
Popper said that some unfalsifiable statements may be useful to science. Mathematical statements
are good examples. Like all formal sciences, mathematics is not concerned with the validity of
theories based on observations in the empirical world, but rather, mathematics is the study of
abstract topics such as quantity, structure, space and change. Mathematical methods are, however,
applied in constructing and testing models dealing with observable reality. Albert Einstein wrote,
"One reason why mathematics enjoys special esteem, above all other sciences, is that its laws are
absolutely certain and indisputable, while those of other sciences are to some extent debatable and
in constant danger of being overthrown by newly discovered facts."[85]

Historicism
Popper distinguished the original theory of Marx and what came to be known as Marxism.[86] He
claimed that the original theory contained genuine scientific laws. Though they could not make
preordained predictions, these laws constrained how changes occur in society. One of them was
that changes cannot "be achieved by the use of legal or political means".[87] In Popper's view, this
was both testable and subsequently falsified. "Yet instead of accepting the refutations", Popper
wrote, "the followers of Marx re-interpreted both the theory and the evidence in order to make
them agree. ... They thus gave a 'conventionalist twist' to the theory; and by this stratagem, they
destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status."[88][89] Popper's attacks were not directed
toward Marxism, or Marx's theories, which were falsifiable, but toward Marxists who he
considered to have ignored the falsifications which had happened.[90] Popper more fundamentally
criticized 'historicism' in the sense of any preordained prediction of history, given what he saw as
human's right, ability and responsibility to control its destiny.[90]

Courts of law
Falsifiability was used in the McLean v. Arkansas case (in 1982),[91] the Daubert case (in 1993)[92]
and other cases. A survey of 303 federal judges conducted in 1998[C] found that "[P]roblems with
the nonfalsifiable nature of an expert's underlying theory and difficulties with an unknown or too-
large error rate were cited in less than 2% of cases."[93]

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McLean v. Arkansas case

In the McLean v. Arkansas case, Judge William Overton used falsifiability as a criterion to
determine that "creation science" was not scientific and should not be taught in Arkansas public
schools as such (it can be taught as religion). In his testimony, philosopher Michael Ruse defined
the characteristics which constitute science as:[94][95]

▪ It is guided by natural law;

▪ It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law;
▪ It is testable against the empirical world;
▪ Its conclusions are tentative, i.e., are not necessarily the final word; and
▪ It is falsifiable.
In his conclusion related to this criterion Judge Overton stated:

While anybody is free to approach a scientific inquiry in any fashion they choose, they
cannot properly describe the methodology as scientific, if they start with the conclusion
and refuse to change it regardless of the evidence developed during the course of the
investigation.

— William Overton[96]

Daubert standard
In several cases, the United States Supreme Court described scientific methodology using the five
Daubert factors, which include falsifiability.[D] The Daubert case cited Popper and other
philosophers of science:

Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is

scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has
been) tested. Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and
testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what
distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry. Green 645. See also Carl
Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science 49 (1966) ([T]he statements constituting a
scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test); Karl Popper, Conjectures and
Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989) ([T]he criterion of the
scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability) (emphasis
deleted).

—Harry Blackmun[99]
David H. Kaye[E] said that references to the Daubert majority opinion confused falsifiability and
falsification and that "inquiring into the existence of meaningful attempts at falsification is an

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appropriate and crucial consideration in admissibility determinations."[100]

Statistical theories and falsifiability

Considering the specific detection procedure that was used in the neutrino experiment, without
mentioning its probabilistic aspect, Popper wrote, "it provided a test of the much more significant
falsifiable theory that such emitted neutrinos could be trapped in a certain way". Popper was not
concerned with the probabilistic aspect of the experiment.[55] Together with Maxwell, who raised
the problems of falsification,[58] he was aware that some convention must be adopted to fix what it
means to detect or not detect a neutrino. This is Lakatos' third kind of decision.[101] For Popper
and most philosophers, some theory underpins observations. The theory that justifies that we
conventionally accept the potential falsifier "no neutrino was detected" is statistical. In statistical
language, the potential falsifier that can be not rejected statistically is typically the null hypothesis,
as understood even in popular accounts on falsifiability.[102][103][104]

Statisticians use various techniques to draw conclusions about hypotheses on the basis of available
evidence. Fisher, Neyman, and Pearson proposed approaches that require no prior probabilities. In
contrast, Bayesian inference emphasizes the importance of prior probabilities.[105] Any approach
that provides a way to accept or reject a potential falsifier can be used, including Bayes' theorem
and estimates of prior probabilities that are made using critical discussions and reasonable
assumptions taken from background knowledge. No general rule considers a hypothesis with small
Bayesian revised probability to be falsified, because the individual outcomes described will have
small probabilities under available evidence without qualifying as genuine anomalies (Mayo and
Popper).[106] Nevertheless, Mayo added, "they can indirectly falsify hypotheses by adding a
methodological falsification rule".[106] In general, Bayesian statistics can play a role in the context
of inductive logic,[107] which is said to be inductive because implications are generalized to
conditional probabilities.[108] According to Popper and others such as Colin Howson, Hume's
argument precludes inductive logic, but only when the logic makes no use "of additional
assumptions: in particular, about what is to be assigned positive prior probability".[109] Inductive
logic is not precluded, especially not when it is a deductively valid application of Bayes' theorem
that is used to evaluate the probability of the hypotheses using the observed data and what is
assumed about the priors. Gelman and Shalizi mentioned that Bayes' statisticians do not have to
disagree with the non-inductivists.[110]

Because statisticians often associate statistical inference with induction, Popper's philosophy is
often said to have a hidden form of induction. Mayo wrote "The falsifying hypotheses ... necessitate
an evidence-transcending (inductive) statistical inference. This is hugely problematic for Popper".
[111] Yet, also according to Mayo, Popper [as a non-inductivist] acknowledged the useful role of

statistical inference in the falsification problems: she mentioned that when Popper wrote her "I
regret not studying statistics", her thought was "not as much as I do".[112]

Lakatos's falsificationism

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Imre Lakatos divided the problems of falsification into two categories. The first corresponds to
decisions that must be agreed upon by scientists before they can falsify a theory. The other is the
use of falsifications and corroborations to explain progress in science. Lakatos described four kinds
of falsificationisms:

▪ Dogmatic falsificationism – ignores both types of problems.

▪ Methodological falsificationism – addresses the first type of problem by accepting that
decisions must be taken by scientists.
▪ Naive methodological falsificationism or naive falsificationism – does not do anything to
address the second type of problems.[113][114]
▪ Sophisticated falsificationism – attempts to address both problems.
Lakatos used dogmatic and naive falsificationism to describe how Popper changed over time and
viewed sophisticated falsificationism as his refinement, but also said that Popper sometimes
presents as a sophisticated falsificationist.[115] Popper responded that Lakatos was misrepresenting
his intellectual history.[116]

Dogmatic falsificationism
A dogmatic falsificationist rejects that every observation is theory-impregnated, which means that
it goes beyond direct experience. For example, the statement "Here is a glass of water" goes beyond
experience, because the concepts of glass and water "denote physical bodies which exhibit a certain
law-like behaviour" (Popper).[117] This leads to the critique that it is unclear which theory is
falsified: the one under study or the one behind the observation. This is sometimes called the
'Duhem–Quine problem'.

An example is Galileo's refutation of the theory that celestial bodies are faultless crystal balls. Many
claimed that the optical theory of the telescope was false, not the reigning theory of celestial bodies.
Another example is the theory that neutrinos are emitted in beta decays. Had they not been
observed in the Cowan–Reines neutrino experiment, many would have considered that the
strength of the beta-inverse reaction used to detect the neutrinos was not sufficiently high. At the
time, Grover Maxwell wrote that the possibility that this strength was sufficiently high was a "pious
hope".[58]

A dogmatic falsificationist ignores the role of auxiliary hypotheses. The assumptions or auxiliary
hypotheses of a particular test are all the hypotheses that must be correct in order for the test to
perform as expected.[118] The predicted observation that is contradicted depends on the theory and
these auxiliary hypotheses. Therefore, whether it is the theory or an auxiliary hypothesis that is
falsified by the observation is undetermined. Lakatos gives the example of the path of a planet. If
the path contradicts Newton's law, it is not clear what should be rejected: Newton's law or the
hypothesis that no other body influenced the path. A dogmatic falsificationist would ignore that
and consider that Newton's law is falsified.

Lakatos says that Popper's solution to these criticisms of the dogmatic falsificationist requires
relaxing the assumption that an observation can show a theory to be false:

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If a theory is falsified [in the usual sense], it is proven false; if it is 'falsified' [in the
technical sense], it may still be true.

— Imre Lakatos[119]
Popper's solution, in his own words, is to distinguish between states of affairs as logical
falsifications and actual methodological falsifications. Popper never relaxed the notion that logical
falsifications show that a theory is falsifiable. He always accepted the existence of methodological
problems. He always maintained that actual falsifications are not possible.[1] He wrote that one
should nor read Lakatos to understand his intellectual history.[120]

Methodological falsificationism
Methodological falsificationism replaces the usual notion of contradicting observation in a
falsification with a new notion of 'contradicting observation' (now in quotes), a convention that
requires four kinds of decisions with accompanying goals:

▪ selecting all basic statements (statements that correspond to logically possible observations),
▪ selecting the accepted basic statements among those basic statements,
▪ making statistical laws falsifiable and
▪ applying the refutation to the specific theory (instead of an auxiliary hypothesis).[121]
The experimental falsifiers and falsifications thus depend on decisions in view of accepted
technology and associated theory. A fifth decision is mentioned by Lakatos to allow even more
theories to be falsified.

Naive falsificationism
According to Lakatos, naive falsificationism is the claim that methodological falsifications can by
themselves explain scientific progress. Very often a theory is still useful and used even after it is
found in contradiction with some observations. Also, when scientists deal with two or more
competing theories which are both corroborated, considering only falsifications, it is not clear why
one theory is chosen above the other, even when one is corroborated more often than the other. In
fact, a stronger version of the Quine-Duhem thesis says that it is not always possible to rationally
pick one theory over another using falsifications.[122] Considering only falsifications, it is not clear
why a corroborating experiment should be seen as progress. Lakatos described Popper as being in
part a naive falsificationist and in part a sophisticated falsificationist."[123] In his own words,
Popper's critical rationalism used both falsifications and the value of a theory in practice to explain
progress.[124]

Popper distinguishes between the creative, informal process from which accepted basic statements
and accepted theories emerge, and the logical, formal process that compares all theories to all basic
statements and defines falsifiability without saying how to methodologically accept basic
statements and theories.[31][125][126] The main issue addressed by Lakatos is whether the
methodological side could be made more formal, in particular, whether the decision to select one

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among competing theories in the light of falsifications and corroborations could be justified using a
formal logic.[127] Such logic would be inductive: it justifies a universal law in view of instances.
Lakatos and many others claimed that the decision should be so justified.[128][129] In
contradistinction, for Popper, the creative and informal part is guided by methodological rules,
which naturally favour theories that are corroborated and have shown their merit over those that
are falsified,[125] but this methodology cannot be made rigorous.[130]

Popper's way to analyze progress was through verisimilitude, a way to define how close a theory is
to the truth, which he did not consider significant, except as an attempt to describe a concept
already accepted in practice. Later, it was shown that the specific definition proposed by Popper
cannot distinguish two false theories, as is the case for all theories in the history of science.[131][132]

Sophisticated falsificationism
Hume explained induction with a theory of the mind[133] that was in part inspired by Newton's
theory of gravitation.[134] Popper rejected Hume's explanation and proposed his own mechanism:
science progresses by trial and error within an evolutionary epistemology. Hume believed that his
psychological induction process follows laws of nature, but that this does not imply the existence of
a method of justification based on logical rules. In fact, he argued that any induction mechanism,
including the one his theory described could not be justified logically.[135] Similarly, Popper
adopted an evolutionary epistemology that implies that some laws explain progress, but insists that
the process of trial and error is not rigorous and that an element of irrationality is unavoidable.

Though they be rational, these explanations cannot be turned into methods of justification. This
was insufficient for philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, who once expressed the view that if
Hume's problem cannot be solved, "there is no intellectual difference between sanity and
insanity"[135] and discussed what is needed for induction to be possible.[136][137] He argued that for
induction to be possible, a law to make inferences from matters of fact is needed and such law,
unlike the principles of deductive logic, must be synthetic. He said "the only alternative to this
hypothesis is complete scepticism".[138] Lakatos approved Russell's justificationist view.[139] His
proposal of sophisticated falsificationism was natural in that context.

Therefore, Lakatos urged Popper to find an inductive principle behind the trial and error learning
process[140] and sophisticated falsificationism was his own approach to this challenge.[141][142]
Kuhn, Feyerabend, Musgrave and others mentioned and Lakatos himself acknowledged that this
attempt failed, because no normative methodology existed—Lakatos' methodology was anarchy in
disguise.[143][144][145][146][147][148][149]

Popperian falsificationism
Popper's philosophy is sometimes said to fail to recognize the Quine-Duhem thesis, which would
make it a form of dogmatic falsificationism. For example, Watkins wrote "apparently forgetting
that he had once said 'Duhem is right [...]', Popper set out to devise potential falsifiers just for
Newton's fundamental assumptions".[150] But, Popper's philosophy is not always qualified of
falsificationism in the pejorative manner associated with dogmatic or naive falsificationism.[151]

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The problems of falsification are acknowledged by the falsificationists. For example, Chalmers
pointed out that falsificationists freely admit that observation relies on theory.[152] Thornton,
referring to Popper, says that the predictions inferred from conjectures are not directly compared
with the facts simply because all observation statements are theory-laden.[153] For the critical
rationalists, the problems of falsification are not an issue, because they do not try to make
experimental falsifications logical or to logically justify them, nor to use them to logically explain
progress. Instead, they rely on critical discussions around experimental falsifications.[10] Lakatos
made a distinction between a "falsification" (with quotation marks) in Popper's philosophy and a
falsification (without quotation marks) that can be used in a systematic methodology where
rejections are justified.[154] He knew that Popper's philosophy had never been about this kind of
justification, but claimed that it should have been.[140] Sometimes, Popper and other
falsificationists said that when a theory is falsified it is rejected[155][156] (dogmatic falsificationism),
but they said that in the general context of critical rationalism, in which all decisions are open to
critical discussions and can be revised.[157] Popper complained that his discussions of rejection are
often taken out of context.

Controversies

Creativity versus induction

As discussed in the section § Naive falsificationism, Lakatos and Popper agreed that universal
scientific laws cannot be derived logically, except from broader laws that encompass them.
However, unlike Popper, Lakatos believed that induction was the only alternative to deduction. He
encouraged Popper to explicitly adopt an inductive approach[140] and sought such an inductive
method.[158] However, Lakatos' method never provided precise inductive rules. In response to
critiques from Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Alan Musgrave, Lakatos admitted that his
methodology relied on scientists' judgment.[143] Feyerabend, in Against Method, argued that
Lakatos' methodology was essentially epistemological anarchism in disguise,[159][145][160] a view
echoed by Musgrave.[159] Later, Feyerabend noted that Lakatos proposed rules, but these rules did
not specify when they must be applied and Feyerabend maintained his position.[146][147][148]

Popper also proposed a methodology with rules, but these were non-inductive, as they did not
independently confirm the validity of scientific laws. Instead, they relied on scientists' creativity or
judgment to determine which theories to study, identify significant problems, and propose testable
hypotheses.[161] Citing Einstein, Popper argued that this creative process eliminated the need for
an inductive methodology or a logical pathway to discover scientific laws.[162][163][164]

Ahistorical versus historiographical

Lakatos' methodology built significantly on Popper's by incorporating a historical perspective.
Lakatos supported his methodology with examples from the history of science. He defined what he
called research programmes, that can be either pursued or abandoned. Research programmes are
classified as progressive or degenerative; the latter are eventually abandoned. Lakatos claimed that

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this classification is largely supported by historical evidence. In contrast, Popper did not design his
methodology to rigorously analyze the history of science. However, he occasionally called on
historical examples. For instance, he noted that highly successful scientific theories were often
disproven. He also introduced, before Lakatos, the notion of metaphysical research programs.[165]
[166] He never intended to use them in a rigorous inductive methodology, but in a text that inspired

Lakatos he discussed how they change over time.[167] Later, he compared them to Kuhn's
paradigms.[167] Lakatos removed the "metaphysical" part and sought rigorous inductive rules.
Later, he abandoned this research and adopted rules that require judgment. According to Eli
Zahar, Lakatos "admitted that the difference between his position and Popper's was so small as to
become purely verbal".[168]

State of affairs as falsifier versus actual falsification

In 1974, Lakatos challenged Popper to demonstrate that his theory of falsifiability was itself
falsifiable, asking, "Under what conditions would you abandon your demarcation criterion?"[169]
Popper responded, "I shall abandon my theory if Professor Lakatos succeeds in showing that
Newton's theory is no more falsifiable by observable states of affairs than Freud's."[170] In Popper's
terminology, a "falsifier" is not an actual observation, but instead a hypothetical situation, a state of
affairs, a logical concept that as such is not open to evasive methodological explanations. For
example, Newton's law of gravitation states that a brick falls downward. A hypothetical observation
that the brick falls upward is a falsifier (demonstrating falsifiability) even if something else such as
strings attached to the brick could explain the observation.[171]

In 1982, David Stove criticized Popper, claiming that Lakatos' challenge was successful. Stove
contended that any observation appearing to contradict Newtonian physics could be explained by
other laws or mechanisms, suggesting no truly "non-Newtonian" behavior was possible. Stove
claimed that Popper's counterexamples, such as missiles following a "non-Newtonian trajectory" or
objects not falling due to obvious counteracting forces, were either flawed (e.g., begging the
question) or consistent with Newtonian physics.[172] Popper reiterated that his falsifiability
criterion was a purely logical concept, distinct from the practical ability to disprove a theory. He
wrote, "An entire literature rests on the failure to observe this distinction."[1]

Routine versus revolutionary science

Kuhn examined periods of normal science and the transitions (revolutions), that separate them.
[173] Popper was interested only in revolutions.[174][175] He claimed that the purpose of science,

mathematics, and metaphysics–all forms of knowledge—is to address and solve problems.[176]

Kuhn noted that during periods of normal science, scientists use established theories to routinely
solve problems, questioning their validity only when the theory fails. This perspective aligns with
Popper's view of problem solving, but places more emphasis on solving routine problems that do
not challenge the underlying theory. Kuhn claimed that Popper focused too heavily on formal or
logical falsifications and did not adequately explain the social and informal aspects of scientific
progress.

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Unfalsifiability versus falsity of astrology

Popper often used astrology as an example of a pseudoscience. He says that it is not falsifiable
because both the theory itself and its predictions are too imprecise.[88] Kuhn remarked that many
predictions made by astrologers were quite precise and were often falsified.[177]

Epistemological anarchism vs the scientific method

Feyeraband entirely rejected prescriptive methodology, including Lakatos' argument for ad hoc
hypotheses, arguing that science could not have progressed without making use of every available
method. He rejected reliance on a scientific method, along with any special authority for science
that might derive from such a method.[178] He said that the only possible universally valid
methodological rule was epistemological anarchism (anything goes) was the only candidate.[179]
Ultimately, he claimed that science's special status derives from the value of the results rather than
its method.[180]

Sokal and Bricmont

In Fashionable Nonsense, physicists Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont criticise falsifiability on several
grounds but especially for its disregard of the importance of predictions:

...the history of science teaches us that scientific theories come to be accepted above all
because of their successes. For example, on the basis of Newtonian mechanics, physicists
have been able to deduce a great number of both astronomical and terrestrial motions, in
excellent agreement with observations. Moreover, the credibility of Newtonian mechanics
was reinforced by correct predictions such as the return of Halley's comet in 1759 and by
spectacular successes such as finding Neptune in 1846 where Le Verrier and Adams
predicted it should be.[181]

Sokal and Bricmont also argue that the problems of falsifiability gave "rise to a strongly
irrationalist reaction"[182] of postmodernist epistemological relativism.[183]

Falsification and open science

Falsifiability and research integrity

At the core of Popper's falsification principle, Karl Popper's principle of falsification centers on
figuring out what specific observation would prove a hypothesis wrong, and then trying to find it.
The research process, therefore, is ideally structured to test a hypothesis by seeking the specific
result that would falsify it. If a prediction is observed, the hypothesis is corroborated (supported);
repeated failures to observe the predicted result may lead to its rejection in a critical discussion.

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Compromised methodology
However, numerous authors have highlighted that due to the reproducibility crisis,[184] the
rejection is compromised by poor practices through the research process, including vague or ill-
defined hypotheses,[185][186] inadequate or under-reported data processing,[187][188] and
problematic data analysis.[189][190] The issue is that the methodology maybe negatively influenced
by the researcher degrees of freedom in which the procedures are carried out.

Open science solutions

The Open Science movement has introduced valuable tools and practices aimed at mitigating these
biases and restoring the integrity required for meaningful falsification. By increasing transparency
and rigor, Open Science measures help to reduce researcher degrees of freedom and improve
rejection of wrong hypotheses. Key tools and practices include:

▪ Pre-registration: researchers commit to their hypotheses, methods, and analysis plans before
data collection. This eliminates the possibility of post hoc (after the fact) changes and prevents
the selective reporting of results, known as cherry picking.[191]
▪ Open data and open methods: the sharing of data and materials facilitate independent
attempts to replicate findings, which directly tests the robustness and potential falsity of
previous results and help contribute to reduce biases for assessing biases.[192][193]
▪ Reporting standards: checklists and standardized guidelines improve the quality and
completeness of research reports, ensuring all procedural steps and data analyses are
transparently detailed,[194][195][196][197][198][199] allowing others to fully assess the study's
adherence to falsification standards.[200]

See also
▪ Black swan theory – Theory of response to ▪ Not even wrong – English phrase
surprise events ▪ Philosophical razor – Principle that allows
▪ Contingency (philosophy) – Possible truths one to eliminate unlikely explanations
which are not necessary ▪ Mike Alder § Newton's Flaming Laser
▪ Defeasible reasoning – Reasoning that is Sword
rationally compelling, though not deductively ▪ Occam's razor – Philosophical problem-
valid solving principle
▪ Deniable encryption – Encryption ▪ Philosophy of mathematics
techniques where an adversary cannot
▪ Plausible deniability – Ability to deny
prove that the plaintext data exists - claim
responsibility
that a ciphertext decrypts to a particular
plaintext can be falsified by possible ▪ Pragmatic maxim – Maxim of logic
decryption to another potential plaintext formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce
▪ Fallibilism – Philosophical principle ▪ Precambrian rabbit – Evolutionary biology
hypothetical posed by J. B. S. Haldane
▪ Metaphysical solipsism – Variety of
philosophical idealism ▪ Raven paradox – Paradox arising from the
question of what constitutes evidence for a
▪ Methodological solipsism – Term in
statement
epistemology and philosophy of mind

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▪ Russell's teapot – Analogy devised by ▪ Scientific skepticism – Questioning of claims

Bertrand Russell lacking empirical evidence
▪ Scientific method – Interplay between ▪ Superdeterminism – Class of theories in
observation, experiment, and theory in quantum mechanics
science ▪ Tautology (logic) – In logic, a statement
▪ Adversarial collaboration – Method of which is always true
research ▪ Trial and error – Method of problem-solving
▪ Experimentum crucis – Critical
experiment
▪ Explanatory power – Ability of a theory
to explain a subject
▪ Hypothetico-deductive model –
Proposed description of the scientific
method
▪ Models of scientific inquiry
▪ Predictive power – Ability of a scientific
theory to generate testable predictions
▪ Reproducibility – Aspect of scientific
research
▪ Statistical hypothesis testing – Method of
statistical inference
▪ Superseded scientific theories –
Obsolete theories in natural history and
natural philosophy
▪ Theory-ladenness – Degree to which an
observation is affected by one's
presuppositions

Notes
A. Popper wanted the main text of the 1959 English version, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, to
conform to the original and therefore refused to make substantial corrections, but only added
notes and appendices and marked them with an asterisk. See Popper 2002, Translators' note
B. This perspective can be found in any text on model theory. For example, see Ebbinghaus
2017.
C. Surveys were mailed to all active U.S. district court judges in November 1998 (N = 619). 303
usable surveys were obtained for a response rate of 51%. See Krafka 2002, p. 9 in archived
pdf.
D. The Daubert case and subsequent cases that used it as a reference, including General Electric
Co. v. Joiner and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, resulted in an amendment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence[97][98]). The Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael case and other cases considered
the original Daubert factors, but the amended rule, rule 702, even though it is often referred to
as the ''Daubert'' standard, does not include the original Daubert factors or mention falsifiability
or testability and neither does the majority opinion delivered by William Rehnquist in the
General Electric Co. v. Joiner case.
E. Not to be confused with David Kaye (law professor), United Nations special rapporteur. David

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H. Kaye is distinguished professor of law at Penn State Law.

Citations
1. Popper 1983, Introduction 1982. 39. Popper 2002, p. 32 ([Link]
2. Popper 1974, p. 1009. m/books?id=0a5bLBbe_dMC&pg=PA32).
3. Mayo 2018, Sec. 2.3. 40. Vere & Gibson 2019.
4. Harding 1976, p. X. 41. Thornton 2016, Sec. 4.
5. Greenland 1998, p. 545. 42. Popper 2002, pp. 9–10.
6. Grayling 2019, p. 397. 43. Shea 2020, Sec. 2.c ([Link]
p-sci/#SH2c).
7. Thornton 2016, Sec. 9.
44. Keuth 2005, p. 43.
8. Popper 1983, chap. 1, sec. 3.
45. Popper 2002, sec. 13–15, 28.
9. Popper 2002, part I, chap. 2, sec. 11.
46. Thornton 2016, end of section 3.
10. Popper 1972.
47. Popper 2002, Start of section 7.
11. Miller 1994, p. 1.
48. Lakatos 1978, p. 22.
12. Uebel 2019.
49. Popper 2002a, p. 387.
13. Creath 2017.
50. Andersson 2016.
14. MacLennan 2021, Chap. 8.1.
51. Popper 2002, pp. 64–65 ([Link]
15. Popper 2002a, p. 35.
[Link]/books?id=LWSBAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA6
16. Thornton 2007, p. 3. 4).
17. Popper 2002, p. 19. 52. Popper 2002, p. 65 Footnote *1 ([Link]
18. Feigl 1978. [Link]/books?id=LWSBAgAAQBAJ&
19. Thornton 2007. pg=PA65).
20. Popper 2002, Sec. 85. 53. Maxwell 1974, pp. 294–295.
21. Watkins 1984, Sec. 7.2. 54. Keuth 2005, pp. 44–45.
22. Johnson-Laird 2006, Chap. 13. 55. Popper 1974, p. 1038.
23. Popper 1972, Sec. 1.9. 56. Leitgeb & Carus 2021, Sec. 8.1.
24. Popper 1972, App. [Link]. 57. Keuth 2005, p. 46.
25. Popper 1972, App. [Link]. 58. Maxwell 1974, p. 299.
26. Popper 2002, Sec 1.2. 59. Maxwell 1974, p. 295.
27. Popper 2002, pp. 7–8. 60. Simon & Groen 1973.
28. Popper 1972, Sec. 1.8. 61. Simon 1985.
29. Popper 1972, p. 30. 62. Rynasiewicz 1983, pp. 225–6.
30. Gelman & Shalizi 2013. 63. Rynasiewicz 1983, Sec. 2.
31. Thornton 2016, sec. 3. 64. Popper 1974, pp. 999–1013.
32. Chalmers 2013, p. 62. 65. Popper 1983, Introduction, sec. I.
33. Popper 1974, p. 1005. 66. Rudge 2005.
34. Watkins1984, Sec. 8.52. 67. Fisher 2010, p. 34 ([Link]
35. Popper 1972, Chap.2, Sec.5. m/books?id=WPfvAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA34).
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om/books?id=nzRtDwAAQBAJ&dq&pg=PA1
37. Shea 2020, Sec 2.c.
56).
38. Popper 2002, Sec. 68.

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69. Muehlenbein 2010, p. 21 ([Link] 99. Daubert 1993, p. 593.

[Link]/books?id=3NRf_8gwmO8C&pg=PA 100. Kaye 2005, p. 2.
21).
101. Lakatos 1978, p. 25.
70. Ridley 2003, website complement ([Link] 102. Wilkinson 2013.
[Link]/ridley/tutorials/T
he_theory_of_natural_selection__part_2_ 103. Chiasma 2017.
[Link]). 104. Wigmore 2017.
71. Theobald 2006. 105. Lehmann 1993, p. 201.
72. Popper 1980, p. 611. 106. Mayo 2018, p. 82.
73. Wallis 2005. 107. Hawthorne 2018, Sec. 3.2.
74. Dawkins 1995. 108. Hawthorne 2018, Sec. 2.1.
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Dialectica. 32 (1): 29–40. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1978.tb01300.x ([Link]
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Fundamental Physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108671224
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▪ De Pierris, Graciela; Friedman, Michael (4 June 2008). "Kant and Hume on Causality" ([Link]
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▪ Derksen, A. A. (November 1985). "The Alleged Unity of Popper's Philosophy of Science:

Falsifiability as Fake Cement". Philosophical Studies. 48 (3): 313–336. doi:10.1007/
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dynamics and genetic bases of adaptation" ([Link]
AJ&pg=PA531). Nature Reviews Genetics. 4 (6): 457–469. doi:10.1038/nrg1088 ([Link]
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▪ Elkana, Yehuda (2018). "Einstein and God". In Galison, P.L.; Holton, G.; Schweber, S.S. (eds.).
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▪ Ferguson, Christopher J.; Heene, Moritz (2012). "A Vast Graveyard of Undead Theories:
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▪ Johansson, Lars-Goran (2015). "Theories About the Development of Science". Philosophy of
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Knowledge. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 119–123 ([Link]
s/dialecticscontro0000resc/page/119). ISBN 0-87395-372-X. OCLC 3034395 ([Link]
[Link]/oclc/3034395).
▪ Rescher, Nicholas (1989). "Generality Preference and Falsificationism" ([Link]
ils/cognitiveeconomy0000resc/page/118). Cognitive Economy: The Economic Dimension of the
Theory of Knowledge. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 118–123 ([Link]
rg/details/cognitiveeconomy0000resc/page/118). ISBN 0-8229-3617-8. OCLC 19264362 (http
s://[Link]/oclc/19264362).
▪ Watkins, John (1974). "The Unity of Popper's Thought" ([Link]
karl01popp/page/371). In Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.). The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Vol. I.
Illinois: Open Court. pp. 371–412 ([Link]
. ISBN 0-87548-141-8. OCLC 2580491 ([Link]
▪ Woit, Peter (2018). "Beyond Falsifiability" ([Link]
=9938). Not even wrong.

External links
▪ The dictionary definition of falsifiability at Wiktionary

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