1963, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, London:

Routledge .
essays on hypothesis and criticism.
●​ Popper was also profoundly impressed by the differences between the
allegedly “scientific” theories of Freud and Adler and the revolution effected
by Einstein’s theory of Relativity in physics in the first two decades of the
twentieth century
●​ The main difference between them, as Popper saw it, was that while
Einstein’s theory was highly “risky”, in the sense that it was possible to
deduce consequences from it which were, in the light of the then dominant
Newtonian physics, highly improbable (e.g., that light is deflected towards
solid bodies—confirmed by Eddington’s experiments in 1919), and which
would, if they turned out to be false, falsify the whole theory, nothing could,
even in principle, falsify psychoanalytic theories.
●​ They were, Popper argues, “simply non-testable, irrefutable. There was no
conceivable human behaviour which could contradict them” (1963: 37). As
such, they have more in common with myths than with genuine science;
“They contain most interesting psychological suggestions, but not in a
testable form” (1963: 38).
●​ What is apparently the chief source of strength of psychoanalysis, he
concluded, viz. its capability to accommodate and explain every possible
form of human behaviour, is in fact a critical weakness, for it entails that it is
not, and could not be, genuinely predictive. To those who would respond
that psychoanalytic theory is supported by clinical observations, Popper
points out that

… real support can be obtained only from observations undertaken as tests (by
‘attempted refutations’); and for this purpose criteria of refutation have to be
laid down beforehand: it must be agree which observable situations, if actually
observed, mean that the theory is refuted. (1963: 38, footnote 3)

The two psycho-analytic theories were in a different class. They were simply
non-testable, irrefutable. There was no conceivable human behaviour which
could contradict them. This does not mean that Freud and Adler were not seeing
certain things correctly: I personally do not doubt that much of what they say is
of considerable importance, and may well play its part one day in a
psychological science which is testable.

But it does mean that those 'clinical observations' which analysts naïvely believe
confirm their theory cannot do this any more than the daily confirmations which
astrologers find in their practice. 3 And as for Freud's epic of the Ego, the
Super-ego, and the Id, no substantially stronger claim to scientific status can be
made for it than for Homer's collected stories from Olympus. These theories
describe some facts, but in the manner of myths. They contain most interesting
psychological suggestions, but not in a testable form. At the same time I realized
that such myths may be developed, and become testable; that historically
speaking all--or very nearly all--scientific theories originate from myths, and that
a myth may contain important anticipations of scientific theories.

Popper, K. (1934/1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.

Induction and falsification

According to a widely accepted view—to be opposed in this book —

the empirical sciences can be characterized by the fact that they use
‘inductive methods’, as they are called. According to this view, the logic of
scientific discovery would be identical with inductive logic, i.e. with
the logical analysis of these inductive methods.

It is usual to call an inference ‘inductive’ if it passes from singular statements

(sometimes also called ‘particular’ statements), such as
accounts of the results of observations or experiments, to universal
statements, such as hypotheses or theories.

The question whether inductive inferences are justified, or under

what conditions, is known as the problem of induction.
The problem of induction may also be formulated as the
question of the validity or the truth of universal statements which
are based on experience, such as the hypotheses and theoretical
systems of the empirical sciences.

For many people believe that the

truth of these universal statements is ‘known by experience’; yet it is
clear that an account of an experience—of an observation or the
result of an experiment—can in the first place be only a singular
statement and not a universal one. if we want to find a way of justifying inductive
inferences, we
must first of all try to establish a principle of induction. A principle of
induction would be a statement with the help of which we could put
inductive inferences into a logically acceptable form. In the eyes of
the upholders of inductive logic, a principle of induction is of
supreme importance for scientific method: ‘. . . this principle’, says
Reichenbach, ‘determines the truth of scientific theories. To eliminate
it from science would mean nothing less than to deprive science of
the power to decide the truth or falsity of its theories. Without it,
clearly, science would no longer have the right to distinguish its theories from the
fanciful and arbitrary creations of the poet’s
mind.’

Induction is Logically Invalid

Popper argued that no matter how many confirming observations you make, they
can never logically guarantee a universal statement.
Observing many white swans never proves that all swans are white — one black
swan can falsify it.
So, inductive reasoning cannot justify scientific laws.
This is sometimes called the problem of induction (traced back to Hume), and
Popper took it as unsolvable.

●​ Science Does Not Begin with Observation

Popper reversed the inductivist order:
Inductivists say: “First observe → then generalize.”
Popper said: “First guess (a hypothesis) → then test it.”
He believed that all observation is theory-laden — we see the world through
conceptual lenses.
Therefore, observation cannot be a neutral starting point.

●​ Confirmation Is Meaningless
Popper criticized the inductivist idea that science grows by confirming hypotheses.
He argued that:
No number of confirmations can establish a universal theory.
Even if we see a million confirming cases, the next one might falsify it.
So instead of confirmation, he proposed corroboration — meaning “the theory
has survived tests so far,” not “it has been proven true.”

Popper also considers that contemporary Marxism also lacks scientific status.
Unlike psychoanalysis, he argues, Marxism had been initially scientific, in that it
was genuinely predictive. However, when these predictions were not in fact borne
out, the theory was saved from falsification by the addition of ad hoc hypotheses
which made it compatible with the facts.

●​ pseudo science and falsification

For Popper the central problem in the philosophy of science is that of demarcation,
i.e., of distinguishing between science and what he terms “non-science” (e.g.,
logic, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, and Adler’s individual psychology).

Popper holds that there is no unique methodology specific to science; rather,

science, like virtually every other organic activity, consists largely of
problem-solving.
Popper accordingly rejects the view that induction is the characteristic method of
scientific investigation and inference, substituting falsifiability in its place. It is
easy, he argues, to obtain evidence in favour of virtually any theory, and he
consequently holds that such “corroboration”, as he terms it, should count
scientifically only if it is the positive result of a genuinely “risky” prediction,
which might conceivably have been false. In a critical sense, Popper’s theory of
demarcation is based upon his perception of the asymmetry which, at the level of
logic, holds between verification and falsification: it is logically impossible to
verify a universal proposition by reference to experience (as Hume saw clearly),
but a single genuine counter-instance falsifies the corresponding universal law. In a
word, an exception, far from “proving” a rule, conclusively refutes it.
Popper stresses in particular that there is no unique way, no single method such as
induction, which functions as the route to scientific theory, and approvingly cites
Einstein on that point:

There is no logical path leading to [the highly universal laws of science]. They
can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an intellectual
love of the objects of experience.

Popper draws a clear distinction between the logic of falsifiability and its applied
methodology. The logic of his theory is utterly simple: a universal statement is
falsified by a single genuine counter-instance. Methodologically, however, the
situation is complex: decisions about whether to accept an apparently falsifying
observation as an actual falsification can be problematic, as observational bias and
measurement error, for example, can yield results which are only apparently
incompatible with the theory under scrutiny.
Thus, while advocating falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation for science,
Popper explicitly allows for the fact that in practice a single conflicting or
counter-instance is never sufficient methodologically for falsification, and that
scientific theories are often retained even though much of the available evidence
conflicts with them, or is anomalous with respect to them.
Basic statement/proposition & acceptance by jury
In this connection, in the Logic of Scientific Discovery Popper introduces the
technical concept of a “basic statement” or “basic proposition”, which he defines
as a statement which can serve as a premise in an empirical falsification and which
takes the singular existential form “There is an X at Y”. Basic statements are
important because they can formally contradict universal statements, and
accordingly play the role of potential falsifiers.
Every test of a theory, whether resulting in its corroboration or falsification, must
stop at some basic statement or other which we decide to accept. If we do not come
to any decision, and do not accept some basic statement or other, then the test will
have led nowhere.

Experiences can motivate a decision, and hence an acceptance or a rejection of a

statement, but a basic statement cannot be justified by them—no more than by
thumping the table.

Statements can be justified only by other statements, and therefore testing comes to
an end, not in the establishment of a correlation between propositional content and
observable reality, as empiricism would hold, but by means of the conventional,
inter-subjective acceptance of the truth of certain basic statements by the research
community.
The acceptance of basic statements is compared by Popper to trial by jury: the
verdict of the jury will be an agreement in accordance with the prevailing legal
code and on the basis of the evidence presented, and is analogous to the acceptance
of a basic statement by the research community:

By its decision, the jury accepts, by agreement, a statement about a factual

occurrence—a basic statement, as it were. (2002: 92)

The jury’s verdict is conventional in arising out of a procedure governed by clear

rules, and is an application of the legal system as a whole as it applies to the case in
question. The verdict is accordingly represented as a true statement of fact, but, as
miscarriages of justice demonstrate all too clearly,

the statement need not be true merely because the jury has accepted it. This …
is acknowledged in the rule allowing a verdict to be quashed or revised.

since the scientist begins with problems rather than with observations or “bare
facts”, he argues that the only logical technique which is an integral part of
scientific method is that of the deductive testing of theories which are not
themselves the product of any logical operation. In this deductive procedure
conclusions are inferred from a tentative hypothesis and are then compared with
one another and with other relevant statements to determine whether they falsify or
corroborate the hypothesis. Such conclusions are not directly compared with the
 but cannot check
with reality- since
reality is value
laden observation
facts, Popper stresses, simply because there are no “pure” facts available; all
observation-statements are theory-laden, and are as much a function of purely
subjective factors (interests, expectations, wishes, etc.) as they are a function of
what is objectively real.
How then does the deductive procedure work? Popper specifies four steps (2002:
9):
1.​ The first is formal, a testing of the internal consistency of the theoretical
system to see if it involves any contradictions.
2.​ The second step is semi-formal, “the investigation of the logical form of the
theory, with the object of determining whether it has the character of an
empirical or scientific theory, or whether it is, for example, tautological”
(2002: 9).

(Tautological statement - true by definition, cannot be falsified. Need a

falsifyable statement)

3.​ The third step is the comparing of the new theory with existing ones to
determine whether it constitutes an advance upon them. If its explanatory
success matches that of the existing theories, and it additionally explains
some hitherto anomalous phenomenon or solves some hitherto unsolvable
problems, it will be adopted as constituting an advance upon the existing
theories. In that sense, science involves theoretical progress: on this account,
a theory X is better than a “rival” theory Y if X has greater empirical content,
and hence greater predictive power, than Y
4.​ The fourth and final step is the testing of a theory by the empirical
application of the conclusions derived from it. If such conclusions are shown
to be true, the theory is corroborated (but never verified).

(Corroboration refers to the degree of support a scientific theory has after

being tested and not yet falsified.
 It does not mean that the theory is proven true — only that it has survived
rigorous testing so far.)

If the conclusion is shown to be false, then this is taken as a signal that the
theory cannot be completely correct (logically the theory is falsified), and
the scientist begins his quest for a better theory. He does not, however,
abandon the present theory until such time as he has a better one to
substitute for it.

Scientific theories, for him, are not inductively inferred from experience, nor is
scientific experimentation carried out with a view to verifying or finally
establishing the truth of theories; rather, all knowledge is provisional, conjectural,
hypothetical—the universal theories of science can never be conclusively
established. Hence Popper’s emphasis on the importance of the critical spirit to
science—for him critical thinking is the very essence of rationality. For it is only
by critical thought that we can eliminate false theories and determine which of the
remaining theories is the best available one, in the sense of possessing the highest
level of explanatory force and predictive power. how confidence
interval
In the view of many social scientists, the more probable a theory is, the better it is,
and if we have to choose between two theories which differ only in that one is
probable and the other is improbable, then we should choose the former. Popper
rejects this. Science values theories with a high informative content, because they
possess a high predictive power and are consequently highly testable. For that
reason, the more improbable a theory is the better it is scientifically, because the
probability and informative content of a theory vary inversely—the higher the
informative content of a theory the lower will be its probability. Thus, the
statements which are of special interest to science are those with a high informative
content and (consequentially) a low probability, which nevertheless come close to
the truth.

Popper also argues that all scientific criticism must be piecemeal, i.e., he holds that
it is not possible to question every aspect of a theory at once, as certain items of
what he terms “background knowledge” must be taken for granted. But that is not
knowledge in the sense of being conclusively established; it may be challenged at
any time, especially if it is suspected that its uncritical acceptance may be
responsible for difficulties which are subsequently encountered.
How then can one be certain that one is questioning the right thing? The Popperian
answer is that we cannot have absolute certainty here, but repeated tests usually
show where the trouble lies. As we saw, for Popper even observation statements
are corrigible and open to review, and science in his view is not a quest for certain
knowledge, but an evolutionary process in which hypotheses or conjectures are
imaginatively proposed and tested in order to explain facts or to solve problems.
For that reason, he emphasises both the importance of questioning the background
knowledge when the need arises, and the significance of the fact that
observation-statements are theory-laden and corrigible.

Verisimilitude
he came to accept Tarski’s reformulation of the correspondence theory of truth, and
in Conjectures and Refutations (1963) he integrates the concepts of truth and
content to frame the metalogical concept of “truthlikeness” or “verisimilitude”. A
“good” scientific theory, Popper argues in that work, has a higher level of
verisimilitude than its rivals, and he explicates this concept by reference to the
logical consequences of theories. A theory’s content is the totality of its logical
consequences, which can be divided into two classes:
1.​ the “truth-content”, which is the class of true propositions which may be
derived from it, (actual assertions by theory thats true irl- it is actually iv
causing dv)
2.​ the “falsity-content” of a theory, which is the class of the theory’s false
consequences (which may be empty, and in the case of a theory which is true
is necessarily empty).

Popper offers two accounts of how rival theories can be compared in terms of their
levels of verisimilitude; these are the qualitative and quantitative definitions. On
the qualitative account, verisimilitude is defined in terms of subclass relationships:
a theory t2 has a higher level of verisimilitude than t1 if and only if their truth-
and falsity-contents are comparable through subclass relationships, and either

Popper’s hostility to psychologistic approaches to epistemology is evident from his

earliest works. Questions relating to the origins of convictions, feelings of certainty
and the like, he argues, are properly considered the province of psychology; their
attempted use in epistemology, which has been characteristic in particular of some
schools of empiricism, can lead only to confusion and ultimately to scepticism.
Against it, he repeatedly insists on the objectivity of scientific knowledge and sees
it as the principal task of epistemology to engage with the questions of justification
and validity in that connection (2002: 7).

Objectivity
Popper, K. (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford
University Press.

Popper develops the notion of objectivity further in a novel but controversial way
by seeking to free it completely from all psychological constraints. What is central
to epistemology, he reaffirms, is the concept of objectivity, which he seeks to show
requires neither the notions of subjective mental states nor even that of a subject
“possessing” knowledge: knowledge in its full objective sense, he argues, is
knowledge “without a knowing subject”.
Popper’s angle of approach here is to situate the development of knowledge in the
context of animal and human evolution. It is characteristic of evolutionary
processes, he points out, that they come to take place in an environment which is
itself in part fashioned by the species in question. Examples of this abound, such as
the reefs built by corals, the hives built by bees, the dams built by beavers and the
atmospheric effects yielded by plants. This, Popper contends, is also true of human
beings: we too have created new kinds of products, “intellectual products”, which
shape our environment. These are our myths, our ideas, our art works and our
scientific theories about the world in which we live. When placed in an
evolutionary context, he suggests, such products must be viewed instrumentally, as
exosomatic artefacts. Chief amongst them is knowledge

in the objective or impersonal sense, in which it may be said to be contained in

a book; or stored in a library; or taught in a university. (1979: 286)

On this view, termed “evolutionary epistemology”, the growth of human

knowledge is an objective evolutionary process which involves the creation and
promulgation of new problem-solving theories, which are then subjected to the
challenge of criticism, modification, elimination and replacement. These latter
activities are seen by Popper as growth-promoting in the evolution of knowledge,
which he represents by means of a tetradic schema (1979: 287):

P1→TT→EE→P2

Here “
P1 stands for the “initial problem”; “TT” stands for “tentative theory” designed to
solve it, “EE” stands for “attempts at error-elimination”, and “P2
” represents further problems that arise out of the critical process.

Three world ontology

This kind of knowledge development, Popper argues, cannot be explained either by
physicalism, which seeks to reduce all mental processes and states to material ones,
or by dualism, which usually seeks to explicate knowledge by means of
psychological categories such as thought, perception and belief. Consequently, he
proposes a novel form of pluralistic realism, a “Three Worlds” ontology, which,
while accommodating both the world of physical states and processes (world 1)
and the mental world of psychological processes (world 2), represents knowledge
in its objective sense as belonging to world 3, a third, objectively real ontological
category. That world is the world
 of the products of the human mind, such as languages; tales and stories and
religious myths; scientific conjectures or theories, and mathematical
constructions; songs and symphonies; paintings and sculptures. (1980: 144)

In short, world 3 is the world of human cultural artifacts, which are products of
world 2 mental processes, usually instantiated in the physical world 1 environment.
For those who would suggest that such objects are mere abstractions from world 2
thought processes, Popper counters that world 3 objects are necessarily more than
the thought processes which have led to their creation. Theories, for example,
usually have logical implications beyond anything considered by their original
author, as instanced in the case of Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity.
Moreover, what is most characteristic about such objects is that, unlike world 2
mental processes, they can stand in logical relationships to each other, such as
equivalence, deducibility and compatibility, which makes them amenable to the
kind of critical rational analysis and development that is one of the hallmarks of
science. As he puts it,

Criticism of world 3 objects is of the greatest importance, both in art and

especially in science. Science can be said to be largely the result of the critical
examination and selection of conjectures, of thought contents.
8. Social and Political Thought—The
Critique of Historicism and Holism
Given Popper’s personal history and background, it is hardly surprising that he developed a
deep and abiding interest in social and political philosophy. He understood holism as the
view that human social groupings are greater than the sum of their members, that they
act on their human members and shape their destinies and that they are subject to their own
independent laws of development. Historicism he identified as the belief that history
develops inexorably and necessarily according to certain principles or rules towards a
determinate end (as for example in the Marx’s dialectical materialism). The link between
them is that holism holds that individuals are essentially formed by the social groupings to
which they belong, while historicism suggests that we can understand such a social grouping
only in terms of the internal principles which determine its development.
These lead to what Popper calls “The Historicist Doctrine of the Social Sciences”, the
views (a) that the principal task of the social sciences is to make predictions about the
social and political development of man, and (b) that the task of politics, once the key
predictions have been made, is, in Marx’s words, to lessen the “birth pangs” of future
social and political developments. Popper thinks that this view of the social sciences is
both theoretically misconceived and socially dangerous, as it can give rise to
totalitarianism and authoritarianism—to centralised governmental control of the
individual and the attempted imposition of large-scale social planning. (ex. jews)

Against this, he advances the view that any human social grouping is no more (or less)
than the sum of its individual members, that what happens in history is the (largely
unforeseeable) result of the actions of such individuals, and that large scale social
planning to an antecedently conceived blueprint is inherently misconceived—and
inevitably disastrous—precisely because human actions have consequences which
cannot be foreseen. Popper, then, is an historical indeterminist, insofar as he holds that
history does not evolve in accordance with intrinsic laws or principles, that in the
absence of such laws and principles unconditional prediction in the social sciences is an
impossibility, and that there is no such thing as historical necessity.
The link between Popper’s theory of knowledge and his social philosophy is his
fallibilism. We make theoretical progress in science by subjecting our theories to critical
scrutiny, and abandoning those which have been falsified. So too in an open society the
rights of the individual to criticise administrative policies will be safeguarded and
upheld, undesirable policies will be eliminated in a manner analogous to the elimination
of falsified scientific theories, and political differences will be resolved by critical
discussion and argument rather than by coercion. The open society as thus conceived of
by Popper may be defined as

an association of free individuals respecting each other’s rights within the

framework of mutual protection supplied by the state, and achieving, through the
making of responsible, rational decisions, a growing measure of humane and
enlightened life. (R. B. Levinson 1953: 17)

Such as society is not a utopian ideal, Popper argues, but an empirically realised form
of social organisation which is in every respect superior to its (real or potential)
totalitarian rivals. His strategy, however, is not merely to engage in a moral defence of the
ideology of liberalism, but rather to show that totalitarianism is typically based upon
historicist and holist presuppositions, and of demonstrating that these presuppositions are
fundamentally incoherent.

9. Scientific Knowledge, History, and

Prediction
Historicism and holism, Popper argues, have their origins in what he terms

one of the oldest dreams of mankind—the dream of prophecy, the idea that we can know
what the future has in store for us, and that we can profit from such knowledge by
adjusting our policy to it. (1963: 338)

This dream was given impetus, he suggests, by the emergence of a genuine predictive
capability regarding solar and lunar eclipses at an early stage in human civilisation, which
became refined with the development of the natural sciences. Historicism derives a
superficial plausibility from the suggestion that, just as the application of the laws of the
natural sciences can lead to the prediction of such events as eclipses, knowledge of “the laws
of history” as yielded by a social science or sciences can and should lead to the prediction of
future social phenomena. Why should we not conceive of a social science which would
function as the theoretical natural sciences function and yield precise unconditional
predictions in the appropriate sphere of application? Popper seeks to show that this idea is
based upon a series of misconceptions about the nature of science, and about the relationship
between scientific laws and scientific prediction.
In relation to the critically important concept of prediction, Popper makes a distinction
between what he terms “conditional scientific predictions”, which have the form “If X
takes place, then Y will take place”, and “unconditional scientific prophecies”, which
have the form “Y will take place”. Contrary to popular belief, it is the former rather than
the latter which are typical of the natural sciences, which means that typically prediction in
natural science is conditional and limited in scope—it takes the form of hypothetical
assertions stating that certain specified changes will come about if and only if particular
specified events antecedently take place. This is not to deny that “unconditional scientific
prophecies”, such as the prediction of eclipses, for example, do take place in science,
and that the theoretical natural sciences make them possible. However, Popper argues
that (a) these unconditional prophecies are not characteristic of the natural sciences,
and (b) that the mechanism whereby they occur, in the very limited way in which they
do, is not understood by the historicist.
What is the mechanism which makes “unconditional scientific prophecies” possible?
Popper’s answer is that they are possible because they are derived from a combination of
conditional predictions (themselves derived from scientific laws) and existential statements
specifying that the conditions in relation to the system being investigated are fulfilled.
Given that this is the mechanism which generates unconditional scientific prophecies, Popper
makes two related claims about historicism:

The first is that the historicist does not, as a matter of fact, derive his historical
prophecies from conditional scientific predictions. The second … is that he cannot
possibly do so because long term prophecies can be derived from scientific conditional
predictions only if they apply to systems which can be described as well isolated,
stationary, and recurrent. These systems are very rare in nature; and modern society is
surely not one of them. (1963: 339)

Popper accordingly argues that it is a fundamental mistake for the historicist to take the
unconditional scientific prophecies of eclipses as being typical and characteristic of the
predictions of natural science; they are possible only because our solar system is a stationary
and repetitive system which is isolated from other such systems by immense expanses of
empty space. Human society and human history are not isolated systems and are continually
undergoing rapid, non-repetitive development. In the most fundamental sense possible, every
event in human history is discrete, novel, quite unique, and ontologically distinct from every
other historical event. For this reason, it is impossible in principle that unconditional
scientific prophecies could be made in relation to human history—the idea that the successful
unconditional prediction of eclipses provides us with reasonable grounds for the hope of
successful unconditional prediction regarding the evolution of human history turns out to be
based upon a gross misconception. As Popper succinctly concludes, “The fact that we predict
eclipses does not, therefore, provide a valid reason for expecting that we can predict
revolutions” (1963: 340).

10. Immutable Laws and Contingent

Trends
An additional mistake which Popper discerns in historicism is the failure of the historicist to
distinguish between scientific laws and trends. This makes him think it possible to explain
change by discovering trends running through past history, and to anticipate and predict
future occurrences on the basis of such observations. Here Popper points out that there is a
critical difference between a trend and a scientific law: the latter is universal in form, while a
trend can be expressed only as a singular existential statement. This logical difference is
crucial: neither conditional nor unconditional predictions can be based upon trends, because
trends may change or be reversed with a change in the conditions which gave rise to them in
the first instance. As Popper puts it, there can be no doubt that

the habit of confusing trends with laws, together with the intuitive observation of trends
such as technical progress, inspired the central doctrines of … historicism. (1957: 106)

He does not, of course, dispute the existence of trends or deny that observing them can be of
practical utility value. But the essential point is that a trend is something which itself
ultimately stands in need of scientific explanation, and it cannot therefore function as the
frame of reference in terms of which an unconditional prediction can be based.
A point which connects with this has to do with the role which the evolution of human
knowledge has played in the historical development of human society. Human history has,
Popper points out, been strongly influenced by the growth of human knowledge, and it is
extremely likely that this will continue to be the case—all the empirical evidence suggests
that the link between the two is progressively consolidating. However, this gives rise to a
further problem for the historicist: no scientific predictor, human or otherwise, can possibly
predict its own future results. From this it follows, he holds, that no society can predict,
scientifically, its own future states of knowledge. Thus, while the future evolution of human
history is extremely likely to be influenced by new developments in human knowledge, we
cannot now scientifically determine what such knowledge will be.
From this it follows that if the future holds any new discoveries or any new developments in
the growth of our knowledge, then it is impossible for us to predict them now, and it is
therefore impossible for us to predict the future development of human history now, given
that the latter will, at least in part, be determined by the future growth of our knowledge.
Thus, once again historicism collapses—the dream of a theoretical, predictive science of
history is unrealisable, because it is an impossible dream.
Popper’s argues against the propriety of large-scale planning of social structures on the basis
of this demonstration of the logical shortcomings of historicism. It is, he argues, theoretically
as well as practically misguided, because, again, part of what we are planning for is our
future knowledge, and our future knowledge is not something which we can in principle now
possess—we cannot adequately plan for unexpected advances in our future knowledge, or for
the effects which such advances will have upon society as a whole. For him, this necessitates
the acceptance of historical indeterminism as the only philosophy of history which is
commensurate with a proper understanding of the provisional and incomplete nature of
human knowledge.
This critique of historicism and holism is balanced, on the positive side, by Popper’s
affirmation of the ideals of individualism and market economics and his strong defence of
the open society—the view that a society is equivalent to the sum of its members, that the
actions of the members of society serve to fashion and to shape it, and that the social
consequences of intentional actions are very often, and very largely, unintentional. This part
of his social philosophy was influenced by the economist Friedrich Hayek, who worked with
him at the London School of Economics and who was a life-long friend. Popper advocates
what he (rather unfortunately) terms “piecemeal social engineering” as the central
mechanism for social planning: in utilising this mechanism, intentional actions are directed to
the achievement of one specific goal at a time, which makes it possible to determine whether
adverse unintended effects of intentional actions occur, in order to correct and readjust when
this proves necessary. This, of course, parallels precisely the critical testing of theories in
scientific investigation. This approach to social planning (which is explicitly based upon the
premise that we do not, because we cannot, know what the future will be like) encourages
attempts to put right what is problematic in society—generally-acknowledged social
ills—rather than attempts to impose some preconceived idea of the “good” upon society as a
whole. For Popper, in a genuinely open society piecemeal social engineering goes
hand-in-hand with negative utilitarianism, the attempt to minimise the amount of suffering
and misery, rather than, as with positive utilitarianism, the attempt to maximise the amount of
happiness. The state, he holds, should concern itself with the task of progressively
formulating and implementing policies designed to deal with the social problems which
actually confront it, with the goal of mitigating human misery and suffering to the greatest
possible degree. The positive task of increasing social and personal happiness, by contrast,
can and should be left to individual citizens, who may, of course, act collectively to that end.
“My thesis”, Popper states, is that

human misery is the most urgent problem of a rational public policy and that happiness
is not such a problem. The attainment of happiness should be left to our private
endeavours. (1963: 361)

Thus, for Popper, in the final analysis the activity of problem-solving is as definitive of our
humanity at the level of social and political organisation as it is at the level of science, and it
is this key insight which unifies and integrates the broad spectrum of his thought.

11. Critical Evaluation

While it cannot be said that Popper was modest, he took criticism