Moncada vs.
People’s Court, 80 Phil 1 - OBSOLETE
On April 4, 1945 Moncado was arrested at his San Rafael residence by CIC personnel without an
arrest warrant and detained at the Bilibid prison, Muntinglupa. On April 11, 1945 CIC officers,
telling Mrs. Moncado they lacked a search warrant but would search regardless, took her to the
San Rafael house and seized a bundle of documents and other effects after ransacking trunks
and scattering contents. No receipt was issued. Petitioner identified a detailed list of missing
items (personal correspondence, official and personal papers, books, magazines, certificates,
and other effects)
Issue: Are the documents seized without a judicially issued warrant are inadmissible and must
be returned?
Ruling:
Yes. The Constitution and the laws of the land are not solicitous to aid persons charged
with crime in their efforts to conceal or sequester evidence of their iniquity.
If an official, or a mere petty agent of the state, exceeds or abuses the authority with
which he is clothed, he is to be deemed as acting, not for the state, but for himself only; and
therefore he alone, and not the state, should be held accountable for his acts. If the
constitutional rights of a citizen are invaded by a mere individual, the most that any branch of
government can do is to afford the citizen such redress as is possible, and bring the wrongdoer
to account for his unlawful conduct.
The fallacy of the doctrine contended for by appellant is in assuming that the
constitutional rights of the defendant are violated by using his private papers as evidence
against him, whereas it was the invasion of his premises and the taking of his goods that
constituted the offense irrespective of what was taken or what use was made of it; and the law
having declared that the articles taken are competent and admissible evidence, notwithstanding
the unlawful search and seizure
FROM JUR:
Legal Framework
The Supreme Court ruled that the illegality of the means by which evidence was obtained does
not render the evidence inadmissible in court. This is based on the interpretation of the Rules of
Court, specifically Rule 123, which does not classify illegally obtained documents as
incompetent evidence.
Majority Reasoning
The majority opinion emphasized that excluding evidence obtained through unlawful means
could hinder law enforcement and allow serious offenders to evade justice. The Court
maintained that while the actions of the officers could be subject to criminal or disciplinary
sanctions, the evidence itself could still be used in prosecution.
Constitutional Context
The ruling also noted that constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
do not automatically lead to the exclusion of evidence obtained illegally. The majority viewed
the admissibility of evidence as a separate issue from the legality of its acquisition.
Jacaban v. People, G.R No. 184355. March 23, 2015
Facts:
At about 12:45 a.m. on July 16, 1999, a police team led by P/S Insp. DueAas implemented a
search warrant at appellant’s house, accompanied by three barangay tanods. The warrant was
served, and despite appellant’s denial, officers searched the premises. A .45 caliber pistol was
found in the ceiling, and appellant grappled with an officer but failed to seize it. Additional
firearms and ammunition were recovered, inventoried, and signed by witnesses. A PNP
certification later confirmed appellant was unlicensed to possess firearms. The defense claimed
the pistol was recovered at the uncle’s house and was merely pledged to their father.
Issue: Whether the prosecution proved illegal possession of firearms and ammunition—
specifically, existence of the items, lack of license, and animus possidendi.
Ruling:
Yes.
The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions are: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused
who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.11 The
unvarying rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition.12 What the law requires is merely possession, which includes not only actual
physical possession, but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to oneas
control and management
The existence of the seized firearm and the ammunitions was established through the
testimony of PO3 Sarte. There was an inventory of the items seized which was made in the
presence of the petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all voluntarily signed the
inventory receipt. PO3 Sarte identified all the seized items in open court.
Issue: Whether ownership of the house where items were found is an essential element of the
crime under PD 1866, as amended.
Ruling:
No. Even assuming that petitioner is not the owner of the house where the items were
recovered, the ownership of the house is not an essential element of the crime under PD 1866
as amended. While petitioner may not be the owner, he indeed had control of the house as
shown by the following circumstances: (1) When the PAOCTF went to the house to serve the
search warrant, petitioner was very angry and restless and even denied having committed any
illegal act, but he was assured by P/SInsp. DueAas that he has nothing to answer if they would
not find anything, thus, he consented to the search being conducted; (2) while the search was
ongoing, petitioner merely observed the conduct of the search and did not make any protest at
all; and (3) petitioner did not call for the alleged owner of the house.
Issue: Whether the alleged discrepancy in PO3 Sarte’s testimony as to the time of the raid fatally
impaired her credibility.
Ruling:
No. It bears stressing that minor discrepancies might be found in her testimony, but this
does not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole, nor should it
reflect adversely on the witness' credibility as it erases suspicion that the same was perjured.
Here, prior testimony of PO3 Sarte as to the time of the raid is considered only a trivial matter
which is not even enough to destroy or discredit her credibility.
People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516 (1992)
Facts:
Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PC Company at
Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of
CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City.
Upon entering the house lessed by appellant, the group, as well as the Barangay
Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled Ang Bayan', xerox copiers and a computer machine.
They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa,
Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested
the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of
the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and
ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d)
Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters
for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters
for investigation. Said persons revealed that Bernie Mendoza was the lessee of the house and
owned the items confiscated therefrom.
SolGen claims that Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the
appellant's house; and that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities, the
same may be seized without a warrant.
Issue: Did the warrantless entry and seizure violated the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures?
Ruling: Yes.
There are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1)
search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in
plain view. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one
who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz
Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN,
October 31, 1989, p. 10). We find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados
was indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant
had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to
show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion
into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality.
As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have
been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the
authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that
they came to the house of the appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records), does not grant them
the license to go inside his house. In Alih v. Castro, We ruled that:
"The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent.
They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant
before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be
spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive
measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes
required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the
petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion.
Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383
Facts: Government prosecutors obtained, on various dates, 42 search warrants directed to
peace officers to search petitioners and the premises of certain corporations and residences.
The warrants authorized seizure of broadly described items: "books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers)." The applications alleged violations only in generic terms (e.g., "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code")
rather than specifying particular offenses or concrete acts. Some cash was reportedly seized
though not described in the warrants. Portions of the seized material were used or intended to
be used in deportation proceedings.
Issues:
Do petitioners, as corporate officers, have cause of action to challenge seizures made
at their corporations’ premises?
Ruling: No. Question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have
been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not
been disturbed
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock
or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be.
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, denied the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein
Respondent-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
Were the 42 warrants constitutionally valid in terms of probable cause, particularity of
offense and description of items?
NO. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent
proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," -
as alleged in the aforementioned applications - without reference to any determinate provision
of said laws or codes.
"no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized, to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Were the searches and seizures under those warrants lawful?
No. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of
the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied
by the constitutional provision above quoted - to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
If warrants/searches are invalid, may the seized documents and papers nevertheless be used
in evidence against petitioners?
NO. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of
a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why
the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other
hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that
there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence
to establish a probable cause.
Should the exclusionary rule of Moncado v. People be maintained or abandoned?
ABANDONED. We are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in
the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common
law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the
party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs. 68 SCRA 320,
Seizures made by the Collector of Customs of Davao of 1,480 sacks of copra and 86 sacks
of coffee from the M/V motor vessel Jolo Lema.
After Captain Pantinople informed the team that petitioner Tomas Velasco, the charterer
of the vessel, had other documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia carrying smuggled
copra and coffee, some members of the team proceeded to the room of petitioner Velasco at
the Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said documents; (b) Although petitioner Velasco was
not inside the hotel room, respondent Reynolds, after identifying himself as a police officer and
after explaining his purpose, was allowed to enter the room by Mrs. Tomas Velasco who
subsequently volunteered to open the suitcases and baggages of petitioner Velasco and
delivered the documents and things contained therein to respondent Reynolds; * (c) The said
police team did not search the room; neither did the members thereof forcibly open the
luggages and boxes nor seized and confiscated the documents and things contained therein,
since that was not necessary because * Mrs. Tomas Velasco voluntarily opened the baggages
and suitcases and gave their contents of documents and things to respondent Reynolds.
Issue: Do the the warrantless search of hotel Room 220 violated the constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure?
Ruling: No. Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure prohibits
warrantless searches unless consent is shown. Consent to search is a personal right waiver,
which may be express or implied and must be voluntary and informed.
The Court has previously ruled: "There can be no question that without the proper
search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his
consent for the purpose of search and seizure."15 It does not admit of doubt therefore that a
search or seizure cannot be stigmatized as unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution
if consent be shown. Such a view is implicit in People v. Malasugui. For this immunity from
unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which may be waived either expressly or impliedly.”
Here, Mrs. Ibanez, as apparent occupant, was informed of the purpose, voluntarily
opened her belongings, and received receipts for seized items—satisfying the consent
requirement.
Judicial precedents (Alvarez v. CFI; Lim v. Ponce de Leon; People v. Malasugui) confirm
that consent dispenses with the need for a warrant.
There was no evidence of coercion, force, or fraud in obtaining Mrs. Ibanez’s consent;
thus the search was reasonable.
People vs. Malasugui, G.R. No. 44335, Jul 30, 1936
Chinese merchant Tan Why was found on a path to Barrio Carcar, Cotabato, within Yu
Enching Sero’s property, suffering a fatal cranial fracture inflicted by a head wound. He was
taken to Cotabato Hospital but died shortly thereafter. Witness Moro Alamada reported that
Tan Why, before dying, named “Kagui” as his attacker. The appellant, known locally as Kagui
Malasugui, was arrested around 8:00 AM by Lt. A. Jacaria of the Constabulary.
Upon request, the appellant voluntarily surrendered two pairs of bracelets (Exhibit A). A
subsequent search (without protest) yielded a pocketbook (Exhibit B) containing P92 in bills
(Exhibit C), Tan Why’s identification card, and a handwritten memorandum of amounts in
Chinese (Exhibit D).
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in denying the return of articles seized from the appellant
in a warrantless search.
Ruling: Searches incidental to lawful arrests, and consented to by the accused, do not violate
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
Members of the Insular Police or Constabulary as well as those of the municipal police
and of chartered cities like Manila and Baguio, and even of townships may make arrests
without judicial warrant, not only when a crime is committed or about to be committed in their
presence, but also when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect that one has
been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested by them.
People Vs. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002
Facts: Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged with possession of
approximately 400 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (“shabu”)
Issue: Whether the warrantless opening and search of the locked Samsonite suitcase by private
vessel security personnel violated the accused’s constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure, rendering the drug evidence inadmissible.
Ruling: 1987 Philippine Constitution (Art. III, Secs. 2–3) restrains only state agents; private
individuals’ searches do not invoke exclusionary rule if government involvement occurs only
after the fact. Here, the vessel security’s opening of the suitcase was private action; government
agents (Coast Guard, PAOCTF) intervened only after contraband was discovered, so evidence
was not tainted.
Issue: Is accused’s lack of ownership and knowledge of the contents of the Samsonite suitcase
negated the element of animus possidendi required for conviction for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs?
Ruling: No. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object
identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. The first two elements
were sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed.
Possession itself raises a presumption of knowledge; the accused must then present
clear, convincing evidence to rebut it. Basher’s bare denial and unsubstantiated story of a
fictitious owner (“Alexa Macapudi”) failed to dispel the presumption. RTC credibility findings on
witnesses will not be disturbed absent palpable error.