ALTERED VS REAL VISUALS

Abstract
This study investigated the accuracy of people’s memories for famous logos and quotes by
comparing recognition performance between real and altered versions. Based on research in
iconic and reconstructive memory, it was hypothesized that participants would show higher
accuracy for real stimuli and lower accuracy for altered versions, reflecting susceptibility to
false recognition. Participants (N = ) completed a recognition task in which they were
presented with logos and quotes in both real and altered forms, and indicated whether each
was accurate. Accuracy rates were compared across conditions. Results are expected to show
significantly lower accuracy for altered items, consistent with prior findings on schema-
driven memory distortions and false recognition. These findings would highlight the
fallibility of memory for even highly familiar cultural information.
Keywords: memory, iconic memory, false recognition, logos, quotes, Mandela effect
 Introduction
Memory is a fundamental cognitive function that allows humans to store, retrieve, and apply
knowledge across contexts. Yet, contrary to the common belief that memory functions like a
camera recording reality, decades of psychological research have shown that memory is
highly reconstructive, fallible, and influenced by prior experiences, expectations, and cultural
context (Bartlett, 1932; Schacter, 1999). Even when individuals are highly familiar with
information, such as brand logos or popular quotations, memory errors can occur with
surprising frequency. This makes the study of memory for well-known cultural symbols
particularly useful in understanding the boundary between accurate recall and false
recognition.
Early research on memory processes emphasized the distinction between sensory memory,
short-term memory, and long-term memory. Sperling’s (1960) studies on iconic memory
demonstrated that individuals briefly store nearly complete representations of visual stimuli,
but this information rapidly decays unless transferred into longer-term systems. Once
encoded, however, information is not retained as an exact copy. Instead, memory is
continuously reconstructed during both storage and retrieval. Bartlett’s (1932) classic
experiments with “The War of the Ghosts” illustrated this reconstructive quality, showing that
participants often altered details of a story to fit their cultural schemas and personal
expectations. These findings laid the foundation for understanding memory not as passive
reproduction, but as an active process shaped by meaning-making.
False memories represent one of the most compelling outcomes of reconstructive processes.
Schacter (1999) described these errors as part of the “seven sins of memory,” highlighting
how suggestibility, bias, and misattribution can distort recall. More recently, the phenomenon
known as the Mandela Effect has drawn attention to large-scale instances of collective false
memory, where groups of people confidently misremember cultural details such as the
wording of famous movie quotes or the design of corporate logos (French, 2012). The
Mandela Effect demonstrates that memory distortions are not random but are often
systematic, reflecting the influence of schemas, cultural narratives, and repeated exposure to
incorrect versions.
Logos offer a particularly rich domain for studying memory accuracy. They are designed to
be simple, recognizable, and frequently encountered in everyday life, which should, in
theory, support strong memory encoding. However, research suggests otherwise.
For example, Blake et al. (2015) found that fewer than 20% of participants
could accurately draw the Apple logo from memory, despite its ubiquitous
presence. Similar results have been observed with other brand logos, where
participants recognized the general design but failed to reproduce specific
features such as colors, shapes, or lettering (Brysbaert et al., 2018). These
studies suggest that repeated exposure fosters familiarity rather than precise
memory, leaving individuals vulnerable to confidently endorsing incorrect
versions.
Taken together, these findings suggest that memory for logos and quotes while grounded in
repeated exposure and cultural reinforcement is nonetheless prone to distortion. Recognition
tasks that directly contrast real versus altered stimuli provide an effective means of
quantifying this vulnerability. If memory is as reconstructive as the literature indicates,
individuals are likely to show lower accuracy for altered versions, even when they appear
highly familiar or plausible.
The present study investigates this question by comparing participants’ accuracy in
identifying real and altered versions of famous logos and quotes. By doing so, it aims to
assess the reliability of memory for cultural symbols and contribute to the broader
understanding of how familiarity, schemas, and cultural exposure interact in shaping recall.
 Early Theories of Memory
Memory has been a central focus of psychology since the late 19th century, with early
theorists attempting to explain how humans store and retrieve information. One of the
foundational contributions came from Hermann Ebbinghaus (1885/1913), who systematically
studied memory using nonsense syllables and introduced the concept of the forgetting curve
and spacing effect. His work demonstrated that memory loss occurs rapidly after initial
learning but slows over time, providing the first quantitative evidence of memory decay.
Later, memory was conceptualized in terms of distinct stores. The multi-store model of
memory, proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968), described memory as a flow of
information through three stages: sensory memory, short-term memory, and long-term
memory. Sensory memory briefly retains raw sensory inputs, including iconic memory
(visual) and echoic memory (auditory), before information either decays or moves into short-
term storage. This model emphasized the importance of attention and rehearsal in transferring
information into more durable storage systems.
Building on this, Craik and Lockhart (1972) introduced the levels-of-processing framework,
which argued that memory retention depends less on separate stores and more on the depth of
processing. Shallow processing (e.g., focusing on the physical features of a stimulus) leads to
weaker recall, while deep semantic processing (e.g., focusing on meaning) results in stronger,
longer-lasting memory traces. This view highlighted the role of meaningful analysis in
encoding information, an idea particularly relevant for studies using logos and quotes, where
familiarity and semantic associations can shape recall accuracy.
These early theories provided the groundwork for later experimental research, including
Sperling’s (1960) studies of iconic memory, which revealed that sensory memory has a high
capacity but decays rapidly within a fraction of a second. Together, these foundational
perspectives shaped our modern understanding of how individuals perceive, encode, and
recall visual information.
 Review of Literature
The study of memory has long fascinated psychologists, with early theories emphasizing its
reconstructive nature. One of the foundational contributions in this area comes from Bartlett
(1932), who challenged the then-prevailing notion that memory is a passive repository of
experiences. In his seminal work Remembering, Bartlett proposed that memory is an active
process, wherein individuals reconstruct past experiences rather than retrieve them as exact
replicas. His “War of the Ghosts” experiment demonstrated that participants often altered
details of a culturally unfamiliar story to fit their own cultural expectations or schemas.
Specifically, participants omitted or transformed story elements that were inconsistent with
their prior knowledge, demonstrating the influence of existing cognitive frameworks on recall
(Bartlett, 1932). This work was revolutionary because it emphasized the dynamic interplay
between perception, encoding, and retrieval, suggesting that memory is inherently
interpretative rather than literal.
Subsequent research reinforced the notion that human memory is highly susceptible to
distortion. Loftus and Palmer (1974) provided compelling evidence of this through studies on
eyewitness testimony. In their experiment, participants watched a video of a car accident and
were later asked questions using different verbs such as “hit” or “smashed.” Those exposed to
the verb “smashed” reported higher speed estimates and were more likely to “remember”
broken glass that was not present, compared to participants who heard “hit” (Loftus &
Palmer, 1974). These findings highlight that post-event information, even subtle linguistic
cues, can systematically alter memory recall, a phenomenon referred to as the misinformation
effect. Later, Loftus (2005) extended these observations by demonstrating that entire false
events can be implanted into memory through suggestion, leading individuals to confidently
recall experiences that never occurred. Such research underscores the interplay of external
influences and internal cognitive processes in shaping memory accuracy.
Experimental paradigms have further elucidated the mechanisms underlying memory
distortions. The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, for example, investigates the
creation of false memories through semantic associations. Roediger and McDermott (1995)
found that participants often falsely recalled or recognized words that were not presented but
were semantically related to studied items, highlighting the role of associative networks in
memory retrieval. Similarly, Alba and Hasher (1983) emphasized the role of schematic
processing, arguing that memory tends to retain the “gist” or meaning of information rather
than precise details.
While this approach allows for efficient cognitive functioning, it also renders individuals
prone to systematic errors when recalling specific features, demonstrating a trade-off between
efficiency and accuracy in human memory.
These principles extend to the study of visual memory for culturally familiar stimuli, such as
logos. Despite repeated exposure to corporate branding, individuals often misremember
specific visual details. For instance, Blake et al. (2015) found that fewer than 20% of
participants could accurately reproduce the Apple logo from memory, even though it is a
globally recognized symbol. Participants typically relied on generalized expectations or
prototypical features of the logo rather than its exact design, illustrating that memory for
familiar visual stimuli is influenced by both perceptual schemata and semantic knowledge.
This finding aligns with Bartlett’s (1932) assertion that memory is reconstructive and
highlights the prevalence of errors even in domains where familiarity is high.
Taken together, these studies indicate that memory is a constructive process, shaped by prior
knowledge, semantic associations, and external suggestion. While it efficiently preserves the
essence or meaning of experiences, memory is highly susceptible to distortion at the level of
detail, whether for verbal narratives, eyewitness accounts, or visual representations.
Understanding these dynamics is crucial not only for theoretical models of cognition but also
for practical applications in legal contexts, education, and marketing, where accurate recall
is often critical.
Beyond verbal narratives and brand logos, research has also examined the accuracy of
memory for well-known cultural symbols such as famous quotes and images. Studies
consistently reveal that individuals often misremember iconic phrases, a phenomenon
sometimes referred to as the “Mandela Effect” (French, 2019). For example, people
frequently recall lines from films or historical speeches in slightly altered forms, such as
misquoting “Luke, I am your father” instead of the actual line “No, I am your father” from
Star Wars: The Empire Strikes Back. Such errors illustrate that memory does not function as a
verbatim record but as a constructive system that emphasizes meaning and gist over precise
linguistic accuracy. This pattern is consistent with Alba and Hasher’s (1983) argument that
schematic processing preserves the essence of information at the expense of detail.
Similarly, experimental research on altered or doctored images has shown that visual memory
can be easily manipulated. Wade et al. (2002) demonstrated that participants who were shown
digitally altered photographs depicting them in events that never occurred, such as riding in a
hot air balloon, later “remembered” these experiences as genuine.
This suggests that visual memory, like verbal recall, is vulnerable to suggestion and
reconstruction. More recently, Bernstein and Loftus (2009) found that exposure to fabricated
food-related images could lead participants to form false beliefs and memories about their
own eating experiences. Such findings underscore that both linguistic and visual cues play a
central role in shaping recollection, often overriding the actual details of past experiences.
The susceptibility of memory to cultural influence further complicates its reliability. Brewer
and Treyens (1981) found that participants who waited in a room designed to resemble an
office later recalled items consistent with office schemas (e.g., books, pens) even if those
objects were not present, while failing to recall atypical but present objects. Applied to
famous logos and quotes, this suggests that people rely on cultural scripts and expectations
when reconstructing memories. For instance, when recalling a logo, individuals may draw
upon generic features associated with “professional” or “technological” designs rather than
accurately reproducing the specific details of the brand (Blake et al., 2015). Similarly, when
recalling famous quotes, people often reproduce a version that is more concise or culturally
reinforced, rather than the verbatim statement.
Another important contribution comes from research on familiarity and repetition. While
frequent exposure to logos, slogans, or quotes might be expected to enhance memory
accuracy, studies show that high familiarity does not always protect against error. Wilton
(2019) argued that overexposure can lead to “semantic saturation,” where repeated stimuli
lose their distinctiveness, prompting individuals to rely on generalized knowledge rather than
detailed recall. This phenomenon may help explain why individuals often fail to reproduce
well-known logos such as Apple or Starbucks correctly, despite encountering them daily
(Blake et al., 2015). In the same way, iconic quotes are often remembered in culturally
simplified versions because those versions are more frequently rehearsed socially, even
though they differ from the original.
 Research Question
How accurate are people’s memories of famous logos when recalling or recognizing real
versus altered versions?

Hypotheses
 Null Hypothesis (H₀):
There will be no significant difference in accuracy between recalling/recognizing real and
altered logos.

 Alternative Hypothesis (H₁):

Participants will demonstrate significantly higher accuracy for real logos compared to altered
logos.

Operational Definitions of Variables

 Independent Variable (IV):
Type of logo presented
Level 1: Real logos (authentic, correct versions of famous brand logos)
Level 2: Altered logos (modified versions with small but noticeable changes in color, shape,
or design elements)

 Dependent Variable (DV):

Accuracy score of memory recall/recognition, measured as the number of correctly identified
logos.

Control Variables:
Presentation time of logos (e.g., 5 seconds for each logo).
Number of logos presented (kept constant across participants).
Same display medium (laptop/phone screen).
Quiet testing environment for all participants.
Consistent instructions provided.

Confounding Variables:
Differences in prior familiarity with certain logos.
Individual differences in visual memory ability.

Distractions or background noise during recall.

Method
Participants- A convenience sample of 25-30 students (aim for an even number; age range
18–28 years) will be recruited from the university campus.
Inclusion criteria: normal or corrected-to-normal vision, fluent in English, and familiarity
with mainstream consumer brands (self-reported).
Exclusion criteria: current diagnosis of a neurological disorder, colour-blindness (self-
reported), or prior participation in a pilot of this study. Obtain written informed consent from
all participants.

Design
The experiment uses a within-subjects (repeated measures) design with one independent
variable:
Independent Variable (within-subjects): Logo Type- Real (authentic logos) vs Altered (subtly
modified versions of the same logos).
Each participant is exposed to both levels of the IV. Presentation order of logos is randomized
and the assignment of which brands appear as real vs. altered in the recognition phase is
counterbalanced across participants to control order and item effects.

MATERIALS:
DEMO IMAGE.1 DEMO IMAGE.2

DEMO IMAGE.3 DEMO IMAGE.4

DEMO IMAGE.5
MAIN TASK IMAGE.1 MAIN TASK IMAGE.2

MAIN TASK IMAGE.3 MAIN TASK IMAGE.4

MAIN TASK IMAGE.5

MAIN TASK IMAGE.6 MAIN TASK IMAGE.7

MAIN TASK IMAGE.8 MAIN TASK IMAGE.9

MAIN TASK IMAGE.10

 Materials
 Stimuli set: 12 well-known brand logos (e.g., Apple, Nike, Starbucks, McDonald’s,
Adidas, Pepsi, BMW, Google, Amazon, Coke, Samsung, Netflix).

For each brand produce:

 Real version- the correct official logo.
 Altered version- a single subtle modification (one per logo) such as: slight colour swap,
small shape change, missing element, reversed orientation, or changed font weight.
Alterations should be plausible but incorrect.

 Presentation software: Opensesame/ PowerPoint / PsychoPy / Google Slides configured

to full-screen; or an online survey tool that supports timed image presentation.

 Response sheets / Google Form: For recognition responses and demographic/familiarity

checks.

 Distractor task materials: 30-second (paper or on-screen) to prevent rehearsal between

exposure and test phases.

 Scoring key: Pre-prepared answer key mapping each logo to correct/altered labels.
 Procedure
Welcome & Consent: Greet participant, explain the study is about visual memory for brand
images (do not reveal the real vs altered comparison detail). Obtain written consent and
screen for vision or colour-blindness issues.
Demographic & Familiarity Check: Short questionnaire (age, gender, how familiar are you
with the 12 brands on a 1–5 scale). This will be used as a covariate if necessary.
Demo trial: Present 2 practice images (non-experimental logos) to acquaint participant with
timing and response format.
Study phase (Encoding): Present the 12-15 logos one at a time in random order. Each logo
appears for 5 seconds (adjustable to 3–7s depending) with a 500 ms blank screen between
items. Instruct participants to observe carefully because they will be tested afterwards.
Distractor task: Immediately after exposure, participant completes a 30-second odd man out
distractor to prevent immediate rehearsal and to mimic real-world forgetting.
Recognition phase (Test): For each brand, present two images side-by-side: the real logo and
the altered logo (left-right position randomized). Ask participant to select the image they
believe is the authentic/correct logo by marking left/right or clicking the image.
Record accuracy (1 = correct selection, 0 = incorrect)
Debriefing: Full disclosure about altered logos and the study aim. Offer contact details and
thank participant.
 Individual Data:
For the purpose of presenting individual data. The participant was presented with 10
recognition trials, consisting of both real and altered versions of popular logos. Out of these
10 trials, the participant identified 6 items correctly and misidentified 4, resulting in an
overall accuracy rate of 60%. This score suggests that while the participant demonstrated a
moderate ability to distinguish between authentic and altered stimuli, a considerable
proportion of errors occurred .This highlights an important aspect of memory research the
fact that even with widely recognized logos or quotes, individuals may rely on familiarity
rather than exact recall, which can lead to inaccuracies.
Several potential confounding variables could have influenced this outcome. For instance,
prior exposure to specific brands or quotes may have varied across participants, creating a
bias in recognition. Additionally, attentional factors during the task, fatigue, or environmental
distractions could have played a role in the participant’s ability to process the stimuli
accurately. Another possible influence is the inherent similarity between the real and altered
versions, which may have induced false recognition. In my view, this participant’s data
exemplifies how memory is not a perfect recording device but rather a reconstructive process
that is highly vulnerable to error.
Overall, the individual data from Participant reflects the central theme of this experiment: the
fallibility of memory in distinguishing between authentic and manipulated representations of
familiar cultural symbols. This observation aligns with prior research emphasizing that
recognition memory can be influenced by both perceptual familiarity and schematic
expectations rather than purely accurate recall. Thus, the errors observed here are not random
but may point to systematic memory distortions that could also be expected across the group
data.
Thus, alternate hypothesis aligns with the individual data.
 Group Data
The present study aimed to examine how accurately participants could recognize real versus
altered logos and quotes, focusing on memory reliability in the context of familiar cultural
symbols. Based on the results, the data did not meet normality assumptions as indicated by
the Shapiro-Wilk test (W = 0.9331, p = .0204), necessitating the use of a non-parametric test.
Consequently, a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test was conducted, which revealed a statistically
significant difference in recognition accuracy (T = 739.50, p < .001). This result indicates that
participants performed significantly better when identifying real logos and quotes compared
to altered ones. Therefore, the alternate hypothesis that participants would show higher
accuracy in recognizing real logos and quotes was supported.
Descriptive statistics further support this conclusion. The sample (N = 40) demonstrated a
mean score of 7.47 with a median of 8.00, suggesting overall good recognition performance.
The data displayed slight negative skewness (-0.1139), indicating that most participants
scored at the higher end of accuracy, with fewer participants performing poorly. The
histogram confirmed this pattern, showing a clustering of scores around 8 correct
identifications. Interestingly, the kurtosis value (-0.7700) suggests a platykurtic distribution,
meaning the scores were more spread out and flatter compared to a normal distribution,
which might reflect varying levels of attention, prior exposure, or confidence in recognition
tasks.
These findings align with previous research emphasizing the role of familiarity and prior
exposure in memory recognition tasks. According to Bartlett’s (1932) schema theory,
individuals rely on mental frameworks to encode and retrieve information, which often
results in better recall for familiar and frequently encountered stimuli, such as logos from
daily life. Similarly, Brewer and Treyens (1981) demonstrated that schemas guide memory
recall, sometimes accurately and other times leading to distortions.
In this study, participants’ stronger performance for real logos likely reflects their established
schemas, while altered versions disrupted these mental patterns, causing recognition errors.
From a broader perspective, the findings highlight how memory is not only constructive but
also fallible. While participants demonstrated strong accuracy for authentic images, their
errors with altered versions illustrate susceptibility to false recognition, a phenomenon widely
reported in memory research (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). This dual pattern accuracy for
familiar stimuli and errors with distortions mirrors real-world cognitive processing, where
individuals often misremember details when exposed to similar but slightly altered
information.
In conclusion, the group results suggest that memory for culturally significant logos and
quotes is generally reliable when stimuli are presented in their real form. However, subtle
alterations can disrupt recognition, leading to errors. These findings reinforce the importance
of schemas in guiding memory processes and support the view that memory, though
powerful, is inherently reconstructive and prone to biases. Future research could explore
whether individual differences, such as visual memory capacity, attention, or brand exposure,
moderate recognition accuracy in such task.
SHAPIRO WILK TEST
NORMAL DISTRIBUTED CURVE

HISTOGRAM
 WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TEST

Discussion
The present study aimed to investigate the accuracy of memory for famous logos and quotes
by comparing recognition of real versus altered versions. The results from 40 participants
indicated that the distribution of scores was not normally distributed as per the Shapiro-Wilk
test, leading us to conduct a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The findings revealed no statistically
significant difference between recognition of real and altered logos and quotes. This suggests
that participants were not necessarily more accurate in identifying the real versions, leading
to the acceptance of the null hypothesis.
These findings align with previous literature on reconstructive memory, particularly Bartlett’s
(1932) theory, which emphasizes that memory is not a perfect reproduction of past
experiences but instead a reconstruction influenced by prior knowledge, schemas, and
expectations. The fact that participants did not consistently show higher accuracy for real
logos and quotes supports the idea that memory can be distorted by familiarity and prior
exposure to altered versions. For example, many individuals may have been repeatedly
exposed to incorrect versions of logos or misquoted lines on social media, which could
explain why recognition accuracy did not favor the real versions.
Another explanation could be that when participants rely on familiarity rather than detailed
recall, both real and altered items may appear equally convincing. This is consistent with
Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) work on false memories, which showed that people can
confidently recall items that were never presented if they are semantically related or widely
believed. Thus, memory errors in this experiment reflect broader cognitive processes that
affect recognition tasks.
It is also important to consider possible confounding variables that may have influenced
performance. Participants’ prior exposure to logos and quotes, differences in cultural
familiarity, and varying levels of attention during the task could have impacted accuracy.
Additionally, the distraction task, while designed to reduce rehearsal, might not have been
equally effective for all participants. These factors could partially explain why performance
did not show a clear advantage for recognizing real items.

Conclusion
Overall, the results of this experiment demonstrate that memory for logos and quotes is
highly reconstructive and prone to error. The null hypothesis was accepted, indicating no
significant difference in accuracy between real and altered versions. These findings reinforce
the importance of schema-driven memory processes (Bartlett, 1932) and support modern
research on false memories (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). From a real-world perspective,
this highlights how individuals may confidently remember information inaccurately, such as
misquoting famous lines or misremembering brand logos, which has implications for
advertising, education, and even eyewitness testimony. Future research could benefit from
expanding the sample size, including more diverse cultural stimuli, and testing additional
variables such as confidence ratings to better understand the mechanisms behind memory
distortions.
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