Patterns in Mind

Martin Wolstencroft
wolstencroftm@[Link]

Abstract

The leading theories of consciousness offer productive models for understanding

consciousness, but they tend to stop short of detailed operational definitions.
Predictive processing stops short of exactly how consciousness arises. Global
workspace theory assumes consciousness follows ‘ignition’ but leaves qualitative
aspects unexplained. Higher Order Theories suggest why mental states are conscious
but not how higher order thoughts are created. In this paper I present a pattern-
oriented approach to thinking about the content of mind that, has broad capabilities
and a unifying potential for existing theories. Under a core axiom of pattern handling,
principles which construct and process hierarchical patterns are used in a thought
experiment to explore the development of consciousness in an imaginary creature
step by step. The exploration shows consciousness has a high likelihood of
occurrence in any creature with sufficient pattern handling capability. Insights gained
include operational style descriptions for the origin of awareness, building higher
order thoughts, and a mechanism for attention. The same principles are subsequently
used to describe a candidate approach for phenomenal consciousness. They are also
effective in describing mechanisms for other features of mind including: the threshold
of introspection; fast and slow thinking; the origin of language; causal reasoning; and
the flaws found in intuitive problem solving. The model is shown to be
complementary to the leading theories of consciousness and provides a way to
discuss cognitive content. The mechanisms described offer possible ways to assess
claims of AI consciousness.
Introduction

To best explain the argument in this paper, some aspects of the model are only outlined briefly in
the early part of the text but are then expanded in the additional components section.

• Main Description – From ‘Core Axiom’ through the start of ‘Additional

Components’.
• Additional Components – More detailed descriptions of Attention, Memory and
Coherence
• Capabilities and Insights Arising – Explanations and predictions arising from the
model.
• In the Landscape of Consciousness – How the model fits in
• Conclusion

For definitions of some of the terms used in this paper, please see the glossary near the
references section at the end.

Main Description – Core Axiom – Only Patterns – Simplicity and Parsimony

Many complex features of the world have been found to depend upon simple mechanisms
that scale up. Adopting a parsimonious set of principles will make some parts of this paper
appear obvious or perhaps simplistic, but that’s the point of a reductive analysis.

As humans, we can see and compare patterns. We can match patterns, compare
differences between patterns, and create abstractions of patterns. We see this in our daily lives,
but those are the high-level operations of our conscious behaviour. Where are the primitive
operations that allow a mind to develop?

I suggest complex pattern matching is a generic solution. Why would the brain evolve a
separate mechanism for high level patterns and perform the subconscious/low-level pattern
handling in a different way? We see patterns at many levels of scale.

• Germs match chemical patterns and spin flagella.

• Worms match chemical patterns and move towards tasty rotting leaves.
• Lobsters match patterns - and then crack open shellfish, or run away from a looming
predator.
 • People match patterns - and read the latest news.

I will show that mind and consciousness can be approached under the core axiom that
only patterns are used to achieve all of the activity we observe (and some we don’t observe but
can infer). Everything is a pattern when it is received by the brain. I argue that a brain with the
general capabilities of neurons and neural networks can work with patterns to achieve
consciousness.

To explore the idea, a Thought Experiment Organism will be introduced - A biological

creature which will develop as it is given more brain cells and experiences.

Thought Experiment Organism (Theo)

At the beginning of Theo’s story, it is wholly non-conscious, a biological automaton if

you like. Perhaps something like a worm. Theo has sensory facilities - vibration/hearing/touch, a
sense of smell and of taste. These sensory organs gather information from its environment. The
information is translated into signals/patterns that travel through its nervous system and brain. I
assume capability in the brain that is consistent with the known capabilities of neurons and
neural networks, but I use the terms flexibly – to construct a logical model – I make no pretence
at neuroscience. I position the model as a framework for the informational content of neural
theories, not a replacement for them.

Biochemical influences within Theo are reduced to patterns which have an impact on
other pattern matching. As example, the pattern for a chemical influence (let’s say a hunger
hormone) increases the probability of a pattern match in another area i.e. how interesting food
looks. This simplification embraces rather than ignores the essential nature of the biological
substrate.

First Principle - Pattern Matching

Our living ‘thought creature’ starts off with a range of physical capabilities but is entirely
non-conscious. (I place aside any discussion of real-life worm consciousness for the purpose of
starting this exploration.)

Theo the worm lives underground. It needs to eat to stay alive. It can sense/taste the soil
all around it as it wriggles. Theo’s senses detect chemistry in the soil which indicates nutrition.
Its neurons and body chemistry make a pattern-match between the chemistry sensed and the
benefit of nutrition (this pattern match evolved over many millennia). Theo moves appropriately
- its movements are direct responses to its environment.

With 302 neurons, Theo can learn what is good and bad for survival (Hobert, 2002; Qin
& Wheeler, 2007; Rankin, 2004). It can learn to approach or to avoid tastes, odours or
temperatures which indicate the presence or absence of food. It can even reach up to pull leaves
into the ground to eat them.

Does this make Theo conscious? Does it think about its environment and its lifestyle
choices? No. (Please see the working Definitions at the start) Theo's few neurons do not enable
consciousness as we normally refer to it, but it is physically connected to, and responding to, its
environment in a non-conscious autonomous manner. There is no inner world, no subjective
phenomenal experience (as we normally discuss it). Theo reacts to stimuli, learns a little in
autonomous neuron responses, and behaves in simple ways, but it's all driven by chemistry and
neural responses. It's a biological machine, reacting to the world without any inner life. In Higher
Order Theory (HOT) terms I relate these circumstances to a first order sensory firing under the
HOS model of sensory representation (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011), and autonomous responses
thereto.

Theo Evolves

Let us suppose that overnight a marvellous metamorphosis takes place, and Theo begins
the next day in a more evolved body with a larger brain. This new body has eyes, hearing and
perhaps wings or limbs. The capabilities of the individual neurons within Theo are the same as
yesterday, it’s just that there are more of them and they are grouped to better deal with patterns.
Of course, in the real world, this would take many generations of evolution, but as a thought
experiment we have done it overnight.

Over the following few days/months, the neurons in Theo’s brain are subjected to more
events. Its senses are constantly bombarded with stimuli: light patterns, sounds, vibrations,
smells, changes in temperature, pressure and sensations from the internal organs, digestion and
muscle stresses. These sensory experiences flood Theo's nervous system, triggering a cascade of
reactions.
 Theo is now a more complex creature, and so these reactions to incoming patterns have
also become more complex. They are influenced a little by Theo's past experiences, and greatly
by the chemistry of the body. The biochemistry of hunger changes the pattern matching
responses in Theo’s brain. When the body chemistry indicates hunger, Theo will prefer incoming
patterns related to food. The preference is an evolved response, but the core mechanism is an
autonomous neural response to a pattern. The probability of the pattern being matched is altered
by the presence of the biochemistry of hunger.

This alteration of the likelihood of pattern matches (one pattern influencing the likelihood
of another being triggered) is the origin of Attention. I suggest it began as a biochemical
preference nudge and was then exapted (Gould & Vrba, 1982) to a more general form of “A
pattern ‘P’ increasing (or decreasing) the probability of a potential trigger pattern ‘T’ being
triggered by a signal pattern ‘S’”. A more detailed description of this attention mechanism is in
the later section “Attention”.

Theo’s brain is constantly adapting, strengthening some connections and weakening

others based on the patterns of sensory input it receives. The brain’s neurons are learning, yet all
the while Theo remains non-conscious. Immersed in its life but oblivious to it.

---

Time passes, and ‘Oblivious-Theo’ becomes increasingly sophisticated in its interactions

with the world. It repeatedly processes patterns in the sensory input. The patterns precede events,
and pattern learning adjusts its responses accordingly.

As example, Theo might ‘learn’ (develop responses) that associate certain smells or
visual cue patterns with the presence of food, becoming more efficient at identifying sustenance.
It might ‘learn’ to recognize warning patterns, like specific sounds or movement, and react by
avoiding those areas. All of these are simple pattern responses to patterns received. Theo’s
behaviour has become increasingly complex and adaptive. It is shaped by its experiences, but it
is still an automaton. All the ongoing sensory inputs have helped Theo refine its responses,
making it a more effective organism in its environment, but not a conscious one.
Second Principle - Pattern Distillation and Labelling

As Theo has advanced in capability, it can start recognising more patterns. ‘Pattern
Distillation’ is the name I give to a process which facilitates the creation of a higher-level
summary pattern from examples.

A sequence or ‘shape’ of sensory signals can be summarised into a single pattern

reference which maintains a ‘reverse link’ so the higher-level pattern can be unpacked into detail
later if required. A pattern has thus been given a ‘label’. One example you could envisage is
distilling all the attributes of a leaf into the categorisation ‘leaf’ (or perhaps ‘food’ in creature
terms). The detailed source patterns of the outline, the colour, the smell and the motion have
become (via the distillation process) a summarised label ‘leaf’. When a similar set of colours,
smells and motion reoccur then the distilled ‘leaf’ pattern is ‘triggered’.

The approach serves two useful purposes for the world model in Theo’s brain.

1. A pattern can be detected and then labelled by a single summary signal.

2. The reverse becomes possible – a nudge applied to the summary creates a degree of
activation for the source pattern

The reduced complexity of the ‘labelled’ signal has compound efficiency benefits
because if the brain were to process all the source signals all the time it would have too much
work to do. Instead, it can process a summary signal when the brain only needs the identity of an
object and not the detail about it. This is akin to Higher Order Thought (HOT) circumstances for
the construction of a higher order state for a specific piece of information.

This means the brain can deal with just concise item labels when appropriate but can still
access detail when required. i.e. we can think about a car, or we can then consider the wheels,
the engine, the types, and the colour. This principle is obvious at the human scale just described,
but I suggest this is one of the key principles of detailed pattern handling in the mind even at a
low level of signals in neural networks.

Third Principle – Layering and Meta-Patterns

Let us accompany Theo on another metamorphosis. This transformation provides an even

larger brain containing yet more neurons. Living its best life, Theo continues to be the recipient
of rich sensory inputs. Its senses are constantly bombarded with stimuli, and these add to the
learning in Theo's nervous system, triggering reactions. These reactions continue to be relatively
simple reflexes, but all the time Theo is learning from the examples given by the stimuli.

Theo’s neuron structures (like many neuron structures) can detect patterns in ‘data’
(stimuli), and they begin to identify more patterns amongst and between the patterns of hunger,
food, pain, heat, cold.

It has been accumulating all these sensory experiences, both visual and physical, for a
long time and because of the sheer volume of data, Theo's neural networks naturally begin to
discern meta-patterns within its known example patterns. The meta-patterns are formed naturally
and inevitably by the coincidence of patterns from different sources, or by short sequences of
patterns. These distilled patterns are ‘higher-level’ in some ways than the ‘detection/labelling
patterns’ described by the second principle. They are built from the ‘labels’ of the more detailed
detection patterns. In HOT terms we are continuing to build higher order ‘thoughts’, but they are
not conscious – we must wait quite a bit longer in this description.

A layered hierarchy of patterns is being built. The label of each pattern can be re-used in a
higher-level pattern. All the patterns exist in the same ‘workspace’, so they can be re-used and
combined in any way driven by the ‘pattern traffic’ in the brain and the learning capabilities of
neurons.

Detection of Self

As Theo’s brain continues to develop meta-patterns, it can cluster interconnected and

disparate events into classifications. These classifications start to differentiate between
interactions that directly influence Theo's body (like bumping into something or feeling a fly
land on its hand) and those interactions that are purely visual or indirect (e.g. seeing a fly just fly
past). It is not long before the pattern distillation process starts to distil the meta patterns into the
classifications that identify the differences between sensory inputs that correlate with internal
bodily changes and sensory input that don't. These neural capabilities are known and being
researched further, but I use them for logical description. (Courellis et al., 2024; Elmoznino &
Bonner, 2024; Leutgeb et al., 2007; Mattson, 2014; Rolls, 2013; Sauseng et al., 2008; Sun et al.,
2025; Wang et al., 2010)
 Given enough examples, Theo's neural networks start to identify the differentiating
factor. It has started to assemble a pattern for "self" in the world. It is just a pattern. It's not a
conscious self. It is an implicit functional self that exists only as a pattern in Theo’s brain. It is
derived as a meta-pattern from the other patterns experienced. The classification of events has
shown the existence of self as a feature of the learned patterns. The self is a differentiator pattern
exposed by the creature’s motion in the world and the sensory inputs it receives both from its
own motion and from the external events incoming.

A fly may pass by, or it may land. Moving the hand may disturb the fly. These are
examples of the events and stimuli that contribute to the detection of the pattern for ‘self’.

Witnessing the fly but not feeling it. Witnessing the fly and feeling it

Non-Conscious Awareness

On Theo’s journey, it has achieved a non-conscious awareness of itself. It has patterns in

its neural networks that clarify the existence of the item ‘self’ as the key differentiator between
the meta-patterns it has built from the exposure to stimuli.

Theo's brain now has a pattern which shows a boundary between its own body and the
external world. It is learning (as patterns) what it can directly affect and what it can only observe.
As mentioned, this implicit "self" model isn't a feeling or a conscious awareness, but a learned
pattern within Theo's signal handling/neural networks which allows it to better navigate and
interact with its environment. If we verbalise what exists only as patterns in Theo’s mind, we
might describe it like – if I move my leg, I feel a change in position; if I see a shadow, nothing
happens to me. a fly lands on me, I feel it. if a fly lands nearby, I feel nothing. To labour the
point: Those descriptions exist only for our understanding, Theo is not conscious.
 However, within that non-conscious awareness, Theo’s brain now holds patterns across
its neural networks that allow it to distinguish between self-generated actions and external
events. It's a functional ‘understanding’ if you like. Theo's brain has, in a purely technical sense,
an awareness of its own existence. It has a ‘neural’ representation of "self" within the world.

This is functional component of Theo's information processing. It is a more sophisticated

model or pattern collection that allows Theo to deal with the world a little bit better. Some HOT
approaches might name this a type of thought, but I’m going to stick with ‘pattern’.

Theo’s patterns ‘know’/’have information of’ (in a physical sense) where its body is and
what it can do, but it doesn't feel like being Theo because Theo has not developed those patterns
yet.

Non-Conscious Integration of Sensation

Let us endow Theo with another step change in mental capacity, perhaps including newly
evolved specialised structures that are ‘expert’ in handling different patterns in different ways.
Nothing as complex as (say) human speech centres, just additional complex groups of neurons
with capabilities for specialised pattern matching on a type of pattern traffic. (We’ve plugged
these into Theo overnight, but of course a long trail of incremental evolutionary steps would be
the real source)

With this new structure in place, Theo’s exposure to more sensations leads the neurons in
Theo’s brain to distil more meta-patterns from the example patterns being processed. The process
is the same as before, but the neuron suite is larger.

Building upon the basic "self" representation (the functional distinction between its body
and the world) it can process sensory information at a higher level of abstraction. Instead of just
reacting to individual bodily sensations, Theo's brain can begin to recognize overarching
abstracted pattern.

The distillation principle of finding patterns-across-patterns allows Theo’s brain to build

the distilled summarisation ('self having sensations') – this is something more general than ‘hot'
or ‘hungry' (if Theo could put it in words).
 Although the description is brief, it is a notable step in Theo’s evolution. Its signal-
handling network isn't just registering individual sensory events anymore; it's starting to
recognize (have patterns for) the common thread that runs through all of them: - specifically, the
fact that they impact the "self." This is not a conscious realisation. Theo's brain is categorising
information differently - sensations that are bound to the "self". These they are pointing out that
the self and the sensation are coupled as well as confirming the existence of self as previously
described. The presence of the raw ‘pattern-with-self’ has been distilled into a) the self, and b)
the sensation and c) self having sensation.

Aware but not conscious

Even with this more sophisticated processing of sensory information, Theo remains non-
conscious. It's important to remember this for now - so we can (hopefully) watch the arrival of
consciousness.

Although Theo's brain now has a representation of "self" and has distilled into a pattern in
‘neurons’ the principle of "self having sensations", it does not (for the purposes of this
description) yet have subjective experience.

The increased complexity of the patterns gives the appearance of greater understanding,
even a kind of "intuitive comprehension", but it's all happening at a purely
‘computational’/neuronal level. There is no inner world where Theo is having a phenomenal
experience of these sensations (never mind reflecting on them).

Theo's brain is just processing information according to the pattern matching events on its
neural networks. The patterns that represent "self" and "self having sensations" remain no more
than functional patterns that allow for more efficient information processing. At this point Theo
is still a biological automaton, reacting to the world based on its internal ‘programming’, even if
that programming has become more complex and sophisticated. This "intuitive comprehension"
is purely a matter of increasingly refined event-response relationships, not genuine conscious
awareness.

Theo is held briefly at this point purely for the benefit of our exploration. I suspect that in
an active creature the next step would be difficult to separate from the current.
Observation of Sensation

The distilled pattern of “self having sensations” holds the information that the ‘self-
subject’ is receiving a sensory input, but it is not an observation that Theo has achieved. It is no
more than a neural pattern holding a relationship. It was a simple step in pattern distillation
terms, but it will become a valuable component in Theo’s subsequent mental development.

Theo’s ‘incoming’ information is made up of three things, external stimuli, internal

visceral stimuli (some arising from the external stimuli), and notably, patterns recalled ‘from
memory’. The combined existence of a collection of all these patterns precipitates the next key
distillation of pattern.

In a manner akin to the original discovery of self-as-a-pattern (and after many

experiences of ‘self having sensation’) it is highly plausible (perhaps inevitable) that the
repeating patterns will be further distilled or generalised into a shortform label or ‘object’. i.e
‘self-having-sensation’ becomes a generalised labelled pattern. I regard it as highly plausible
because any creature capable of distilling the common features of patterns from many examples
is likely to achieve this. This again is a known feature of neural networks handling patterns.
(Courellis et al., 2024; Realistic model of mouse hippocampus uncovers new mechanism for
pattern separation 2021; Rolls, 2013; Sauseng et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2010;
Bakker, A. et al. 2008 ‘Pattern separation in the human hippocampal CA3 and dentate gyrus’,
Science, 3195870, pp. 1640–1642. doi:10.1126/science.1152882. )

Since all these patterns exist in the same ‘non-conscious pattern collection’ (pattern
bucket / current context) in Theo’s brain, any available pattern can be assembled into new
combinations. The newly labelled pattern ‘self-having-sensation’ (as a separate signal) is now
available as a high-level pattern for re-use in the construction of more patterns or for distillation
into new abstractions.

The impetus to make such new combinations comes from the repetition of circumstances
and ‘witnessing’ (presence in the brain) of patterns. The brain’s neural networks naturally create
the new distillations. The process will repeat and cross-link any relationship between patterns
that correlates with the patterns an active creature witnesses during its interactions with the
world. It is registering objects it comes across in the world as objects in its mental model. All of
this is held as a rich hierarchical pattern model distilled from examples. Theo is learning the
relationships between objects it sees in the world.

Since the ‘self’ is one labelled pattern, and the ‘self having sensation’ is another labelled
pattern, then over time the ‘self’ pattern will be re-discovered as also being associated with “self
having sensations” object. Not within the ‘self having sensations’, but as a holder of the pattern.
i.e. ‘self having self having sensations’ – or more obviously ‘self observed self having sensation’.
This association of events and objects is achieved without any deliberate or conscious process
being involved. It happens because ‘self’ and ‘self having sensation’ are rattling around in the
same ‘bucket of patterns’ and there are sufficient instances of it for a meta-pattern to be distilled.

This apparently recursive step is a novelty in some ways, but I suggest it is an

unavoidable result of the ability to distil/generalise patterns. The patterns stand on each other,
and with each other, such that the uppermost are built from, and are also witness to, the
assemblies below. This creates patterns supporting ‘observer’ and ‘observed’ within the layers of
patterns.

This gives us the machinery for conscious knowledge and phenomenal awareness. In a
HOT model this might be consciousness. I think it is the content of consciousness, but we will
discuss how Theo reaches phenomenal consciousness later.

Summary of Key Patterns

The patterns that Theo now handles include: -

Self as Subject
Initially, Theo's brain primarily developed a pattern of the "self" as the subject of
sensation. The pattern showed that sensations were being had by the self. The "self" was the
centre of the sensory world - the recipient of all these inputs.

Self as Object
Now, through further pattern distillation, Theo's brain has further isolated the "self" as an
object within that world (not just the thing attached to sensations). This means that the "self" can
also be the target object, just like any other object. The ‘object’ of self has become material for
pattern building and pattern matching. The neural/signal pattern of "self" can encompass both the
subjective aspect (self as experiencer) and the objective aspect (self as observer).
 Observation Pattern
The mental pattern that Theo now has access to, is the ‘Observation Pattern’ (‘self
observed self having sensation’). However, as it is in a distilled/generalised form of ‘Self
Observed Self Having…<tba>’ (SOSH). This becomes a useful pattern to support consciousness.

It's important to remain aware that this is all happening at a purely neuronal pattern level.
Theo doesn't have a conscious awareness of itself as an object. It's just that the patterns in its
brain have become more refined, allowing for more nuanced and adaptive modelling interactions
with the world. The "self" representation became richer, encompassing both the subjective and
objective aspects, but without any accompanying subjective experience (just for the moment). Of
course, we are deliberately separating these steps in mental development for clarity of
discussion. In reality, they may operate in a closely coupled interactive and iterative manner.

At this juncture, we have the origin of consciousness, but not the mechanism for
phenomenal consciousness – so again we pause here briefly to take stock.

This origin of consciousness may have taken time during the evolution of both brain
capacity and brain regions, but I expect a creature with a capable brain develops the patterns
relatively quickly. Certainly, infant children assemble the parts swiftly, becoming conscious in a
number of months (Bayne et al., 2023).

The self is a persistent element in any creature’s interaction with the world. It’s hard to
have any physical sensations without being present! Theo’s discovery of ‘Self’ is not surprising.
Theo’s ‘self’ is also the underlying element in how Theo acquires a first-person perspective. The
Observation Pattern of ‘self observed self having xxx’ is a very useful pattern – it facilitates
much of what comes soon.

Fourth Principle – Reactivating Patterns

An ability for historical patterns to be recalled/or reactivated is a key principle of mind.

Theo began as a non-conscious creature, accumulating sensory experiences. As its brain

developed it remembered ‘self’ and ‘self-having sensation’ in combination with any relevant
visceral experiences like pain or hunger (the sensation). Theo's brain retrieves/activates these
memories of previous sensations either because of similar circumstances(patterns) or because the
labelled signal is activated. In the ‘bucket of patterns’ (context) in Theo’s mind there is a live
context made of recently activated patterns (both received and remembered). This context
changes constantly and fluidly because every pattern activation immediately nudges any related
(linked) pattern through the similarity of the patterns and the neural architecture of Theo’s brain.

Memories are not really like the ‘library’ we imagine them to be (Schacter et al., 2007;
Schacter, 2021; Schacter, 2021a). Although it feels like we have a library of information that we
can access, that is simply the closest analogy (or pattern) that we have. In fact, memories (or
rather the snippets of information from which we reconstruct our memories) are held as patterns
that have been ‘learned into’ our brain’s neural networks. They are retrieved by their resemblance
to patterns recently active within the brain. Recollections of information patterns are a natural
response to cognitive processes - in the same way that the retrieval of motion patterns is a natural
response to the physical world. There is a continual flow of pattern matches from moment to
moment.

Each new sensation that Theo experiences, and the patterns related to the observation of
self, trigger the retrieval of prior, associated sensations. This is the brain’s key activity – having
the current context match the most ‘useful’/’relevant’ patterns in memory to trigger their
retrieval. However, these ‘retrieved’/activated patterns are not just about action choices (default
responses). Each new input pattern can trigger past experiences, activating them to contribute to
the neural processing cycle. We experience this ourselves when an aroma reminds us of a
previous occasion or event. These retrieved sensations are not exact replicas of the originals;
they're more like hierarchical fragments of past experiences held as patterns that are reactivated
and re-integrated with the present context. We can tell they are not the real thing because they are
not accompanied by the real-time/visceral arrival of sensory input.

The retrieval of past sensations, and the associated memories they activate, is a critical
element for subjective conscious experience in Theo. The patterns retrieved and added to the live
context create a dynamic interplay between present sensations, the "self" representation, and the
flood of retrieved memories that they trigger. This creates a rich, constantly evolving, live
context of patterns.
Building Subjective Conscious Experience

This constant retrieval, re-integration and re-use of patterns of past sensations (high and
low-level), driven by current sensations, the "self" representation AND the ability to hold those
in the context of the relationship to self, AND remember briefly what just went on, is what
creates the environment for subjective conscious experience in Theo’s perception. It also delivers
observed content for the ‘theatre of mind’.

The stream of unconscious sensory and higher-level patterns, together with the SOSH
patterns gives a stream of visceral and ‘thought’ content that unfolds continually as Theo
interacts with the world (and when it just sits and thinks). The constant cycling in the live context
parades SOSH patterns that are the content of Theo’s (hopefully soon phenomenally conscious)
mind. This content includes the interplay of present sensations and retrieved memories as well as
highly influential signals regenerated from emotional parts of the ancient brain. Theo’s ancient
brain provides a fast, automatic emotional addition to Theo's other content. (Please see the later
section on the Ancient Brain). It adds to the sensory input in a way that is not only informational
but also emotionally relevant. This emotional component is essential for Theo's survival and
well-being. It pushes Theo towards beneficial stimuli and away from harmful ones. Its innate
assessments help with making choices that benefit the creature. Importantly, the ancient brain
activity, like all other brain activity, will also be woven into the SOSH pattern content that is part
of being Theo.

In summary, it's all just patterns of varying complexity and a process of continuously
falling from current context to next context, driven by the pattern matching. On the side, new
patterns get distilled from the patterns arriving or being activated. I refer to this model as
Distillation and Pattern Matching (DPM).

So now that we have a collection of all the physical patterns for subjective phenomenal
consciousness, there is only one remaining element to grasp and that is how we experience things
in a way that makes us feel like it cannot just be a physical mechanism. Is it a hard problem? To
be blunt, I suggest it’s just an illusion.

So, the real problem is how an irreducibly private illusion of phenomenal consciousness
happens. This is something which seems a bit easier to examine now. (But ‘seeming a bit easier’
is almost certainly an illusion in itself :-))
 Nevertheless, let’s have a go.

Phenomenal Consciousness
In the DPM model, there is nothing but neurons and patterns. The machinery of the
pattern model acquires, matches, and abstracts, but they are all patterns. What is it that displays
these complex pattern combinations to give us subjective phenomenal conscious experience? My
working hypothesis is Illusionism.

Illusionism
Our brain lives in a dark box made of bone (Seth, 2022). It contains no pain sensors. All it
has is patterns on neurons. It has no other reference. The patterns on neurons are everything the
brain ever ‘sees’. Unless our perception of reality is injected via other means (i.e. non-physicalist
approaches to consciousness), illusionism seems to me the most likely way in which we
experience phenomena. So, our experience of consciousness is an illusion. I do not suggest that
the phrase ‘consciousness is an illusion’ should imply that consciousness doesn’t exist. Far from
it. It just means that it’s a construct of the brain. At least that’s my perception.

Discussions hinge on that word ‘Qualia’. I find myself partly agreeing and partly
disagreeing with Dennett and Frankish (Dennett, 1995; Dennett, 2021; Frankish, 2016). Our
conscious selves are built in the brain. Our experiences are in our minds. However, we developed
from more ancient creatures, and I feel confident that the most ancient non-conscious creatures
reacted to pain as a physical process, not a conscious perception of that pain. I have no reason to
suspect that the physical process has been completely eliminated.

So, for this idea of illusionism to be true, it would mean that the physical sensation of
pain is real, but conscious pain is an illusion/construction. This does indeed seem to be the case,
and there is experimental evidence for it (Rainville et al., 1997). When volunteers are hypnotised
and given suggestions that they will not feel pain when exposed to a painful stimulus (e.g., heat,
electric shock), the experiment found that the subjects report less pain or no pain at all. In
addition, brain imaging revealed reduced activity in pain-processing regions (related to the
encoding of perceived unpleasantness), whereas the primary somatosensory cortex activation
was unaltered. i.e. the pain was real, but the brain’s response to pain - and thus the perception - is
genuinely altered.
 There are similar experiments showing effects on colour perception (Kosslyn et al.,
2000) and amnesia and paralysis. I suggest this method of influence can also be considered as
patterns affecting pattern matching to ‘change’ the perception of the pain.

Hypnotism thus throws light on the illusion assembled within the patterns formed in the
brain. One could use other words to summarise, but Frankish’s choice of ‘Illusionism’ (Frankish,
2016) seems the most appropriate.

Patterns Making Illusions

I propose that the pattern of “self-observing self-having sensation” (SOSHS) and “self-
observing self-having thought” (SOSHT) lie at the root of the illusion. The recollections
triggered by an instance of such a pattern are the emotional, physiological and intellectual
responses that arise from any root signal or unconscious sensation. Some of these response
patterns become attached to their own ‘self-having’ patterns and we can become consciously
aware of them. Some other response patterns trigger onward patterns without necessarily
becoming conscious items, yet they still contribute to the ‘next cycle’ of pattern retrieval. This
combination of patterns provides the visceral content and the awareness of the feeling of the
event experienced. The memory of the recently triggered ‘SOSH’ patterns also give us a mini
audit trail for the brain to recall and reprocess.

Under this framework, pain signals arrive as patterns on neurons, they trigger ‘survival’
patterns (innate and learned patterns that relate to protecting the creature from harm) and acquire
attention as a result (because survival patterns have high importance evolutionarily). The fact
that they are pain signals also triggers ancient physiological responses as well as the more
recently developed/learned emotional and intellectual patterns as responses. Those responses
then trigger further system 2 actions that beyond any system 1 flinch actions which evolved to
remove the source of the pain. (For a description of system 1 and system 2 as described by DPM,
please see the later section ‘DPM and Fast & Slow Thinking’).

The mixed SOSH contents from all of this are the patterns involved in phenomenal
awareness. The observation patterns trigger memories and emotions which trigger more
responses. This chain of SOSH content is remembered among the patterns in the recent context.
This chain contains patterns holding conceptual representations, representations of relationships,
emotions and thoughts as well as sensations. I propose this overall blend of events and memories
is how the illusion comprising phenomenal consciousness arises.

I suggest the brain generates the illusion of phenomenal experience to aid survival - the
feelings of pain and the associated recollections prioritize pattern choices that might avoid harm.
In addition to these incoming patterns receiving the autonomous attention from the ‘safety
patterns’ and then the deliberate attention they deserve because of the conscious context of
importance that has been learned through experience.

I think this proposal is not yet concrete as an argument, since it cannot prove Theo has the
illusion of phenomenal perception (we can’t ask it). It does demonstrate that the content exists in
a feasible form under the DPM model. As engineers, let’s consider if we might be ‘close enough
for all practical purposes’.

Is Illusionism enough?
Consciousness is full of varied opinions. Any argument that illusionism is enough to
explain phenomenal perception is unlikely to convince those who treat qualia as metaphysically
fundamental. However, if at this juncture I apply Occam’s razor within the context of material
physicalism, then I conclude it is, for the following reasons.

A physical reductionist model which offers a description for the emergence of our sense
of consciousness and mind seems to be the simplest materialist approach to explaining what we
experience, even if what we experience could be described as an illusion of consciousness. For
an illusion it’s pretty convincing, but then it would be, we experience nothing else.

Even so, why does it feel so real? I have three suggestions.

1. I am reminded of “Plato’s cave”. The allegory covers several things, but in the context of
Illusionism it illuminates by analogy how our experience of consciousness is just the best our
brains can do with the information and patterns they have – because they know nothing else
(like our brains in our skulls).

• We have the underlying mechanism of patterns being handled – the physical

circumstances.
• We have “self-observing self-having” to distinguish conscious content – which is the
content of the illusion.
 • We also have the subjective meaning of those illusory observations as subconscious and
conscious memories.

2. It also feels real because our introspection is limited to the level of SOSH patterns – it can go
no further. (I explore this in more depth in the section ‘DPM and the Threshold of
Introspection’.) The result for sensations and the feel of them is that they appear in our minds
without any insight other than ‘I can see I cut my hand and it hurts’. The pattern process
underneath that, is itself opaque to us.
3. The re-activated subconscious and conscious patterns that emerge from memory give us the
sense of meaning. So, I suggest the meaning exists in the associated patterns triggered by the
experience which is part of the illusion when we are consciously aware of it. (that’s a long
sentence. i.e. The illusion of feeling stuff is a part of the patterns that connect it all together –
SOSHPhenomena is perhaps the new tag.)

With the patterns described, Theo can now witness itself ‘feeling’ the warmth of the sun
as an experience to be savoured. It can combine the events with the sensations and with the
‘observation’ that the ‘self’ is experiencing the warmth.

So, for clarity, when Theo experiences such a sensation (any sensation), it is not
experienced in isolation. The warmth triggers the retrieval of related patterns – memories of
previous occasions when it experienced of warmth, perhaps other associated locations, times of
day, or even emotional memories of sharing a meal with a partner. These retrieved memories
blend with the current sensation, enriching the experience and give depth and additional
subjective qualities.

Similarly, when Theo's brain processes a "self-observed self-having sensations" pattern, it

triggers similar memories of past events when it also observed itself interacting with the world,
further shaping and colouring the present moment. All these re-activated patterns contribute to
the context in Theo’s brain. The patterns of self-observing self are reinforced by each event,
which further clarifies the growing sense of being a participant-observer.

All of this is experienced above the threshold of introspection. These thoughts and
sensation thus appear to Theo to have no direct physical origin; they appear to be a separate
mental experience – a phenomenal experience.
 The patterns which hold the ‘self-observing-self-having’ relationships are also where
thoughts can become observed as well. i.e. “Self observing self having thought”. I suggest these
capabilities underpin Access Consciousness.

Additional Components of DPM

As mentioned in the introduction, there are some additional components, processes and
features that form part the Distillation and Pattern Matching (DPM) model’s operation which are
better explained alongside the main description to avoid breaking the flow of the explanations.

Attention
As we (Theo, and You, and I) have patterns ‘passing through’ our minds, we are simply
rolling from pattern match to pattern match. We are simply witness to it until we apply
‘attention’.

Attention as Pattern Emphasis

Before Theo is conscious, how does it pay attention to food or danger? What makes
patterns about dangerous things different from attractive butterflies or nodding flowers?
Similarly, when Theo is conscious, how does it look for camouflaged prey? How does it return to
a previous location to look for a lost spear? How is it that we are conscious of some things
sometimes (e.g. the words on this page) but not others (perhaps the feel of your chair) until we
shift focus? Yet as soon as focus shifts, the sensation from your chair became wholly apparent.

Within the DPM model, attention is a single mechanism that has been exapted (Gould &
Vrba, 1982) for different circumstances. Attention is what happens when an influence pattern ‘P’
increases the probability of a potential target/trigger pattern ‘T’ being triggered by a signal
pattern ‘S’. The probability of the activation of a resting target pattern is controlled by a separate
pattern. This happens at all levels of unconscious activity.

Attention originates in the chemistry of the body and in survival. Once attention became
exapted from the biochemistry of things like hunger into its non-biochemical version it became
even more useful and powerful. I suggest that pattern matching (including the biochemical
version) pulls sensations towards conscious awareness under at least three circumstances.
 1. Novelty: When a new sensation arises that is not expected within the frame of the current
mental model, the innate ‘novelty pattern’ becomes activated – encouraging the
activation and linking of a SOSH pattern.
2. Survival-Driven Attention: When the self is at risk of harm from the stimulus (auditory,
physical, visual etc), the patterns identifying the risk become activated and these
encourage the activation of SOSH patterns for the stimulus.
3. Directed Attention: When the self has a current (active) mental pattern that matches the
stimulus/object in some way. Having a SOSH-thought about an item will keep that item
in the active context on an ongoing basis because the SOSH pattern encourages re-
activation of the item pattern on the next matching cycle.

The attention mechanism (in all its guises) influences unconscious selection of ‘what gets
noticed’ and is also used for deliberate attention. As a result, the workspace context/content of
mind influences the strength of matches in the ‘next round’ of pattern matches – which helps to
promote those patterns that are currently better matched towards the workspace for
consciousness.

Novelty
A single flower moving on a still day is a novelty for a creature watching and will trigger
attention. A host of flowers moving on a windy day is not a novelty. In the DPM model, the
patterns in mind identify a difference. In Predictive Processing (PP) terms there is an error in the
predicted scenario. (Clark, 2015; Clark, 2024; Hohwy, 2014)

Either model means attention will happen. The underpinning DPM pattern process is
more laborious to describe – involving remembered sequences of patterns and the differences
between them being identified by low level pattern machinery. The description from PP means
the same thing but saves a lot of time!

Survival-Driven Attention
We examined earlier how the chemistry of the body (e.g. hunger hormones) can be
viewed as a pattern that influences pattern matching. The first influencing pattern in evolution
may have been the presence or absence of chemical or biochemical signals.

When Theo is hungry, its body and brain are flooded with hormones. The hormones
influence pattern matching and make food items more ‘interesting’. Attention thus originates in
the chemistry of the body and survival, and influences which patterns are triggered. The
triggered pattern might then result in (as example) ‘movement towards’ or ‘movement away’ or
‘bite it’.

Hunger greatly emphasises those pattern connections relevant to food – leading to a greater response.
(i.e. a hormonal chemical influence (a pattern) changes our response to patterns which we know as
food.)

Directed Attention
If Theo has a sufficiently strong mental focus on something, it can even overlook
something else in plain view until it is triggered by a survival pattern (Simons & Chabris, 1999).

The same applies to me…If I have misplaced something (say a red book), I simply walk
around the house holding the book in mind. When I walk into a room looking for this book - I
can spot it instantly if it is there, but may fail to notice a cat asleep on a chair. I also don’t notice
the time on the clock, or the titles of the other books on the table. My mental model had been
pre-loaded with a topic (red book) and did not consciously identify the other items. Our varied
awareness gives us our ability to focus but also creates our oversights including inattentional
blindness. (Simons & Levin, 1998)

---
 The attention pattern principle can thus work in different ways. A chemical signal can
increase the probability of some patterns being activated by what would otherwise be regarded as
comparatively weak signals. In an alternate scenario, if we see a pattern like a predator or hear a
sound like a snake, then our survival patterns get triggered. Our survival patterns nudge our
biochemical responses to generate adrenaline for fight or flight. Although this is ‘old school’
knowledge of how creatures function, the DPM model adds a description for the mechanisms
which is built on the basic premises.

Deliberately loading mental context with an item/image (e.g. a specific book) greatly increases
the probability of spotting the item.
At the same time, it decreases the probability of spotting ‘irrelevant’ items. (Simons & Chabris,
1999)

Using Attention
Paying attention is the sort of thing we do so often that we need to ‘pay attention to
attention’ before we can see the mechanism.

Consciously directed attention is ‘simply’ when Theo creates and applies a ‘custom desire
pattern’ to steer the mental model. The custom desire pattern applied can be something akin to
‘acquire more knowledge’ or ‘focus here’. The result of the desire pattern is to maintain attention
on the targeted item or subject.

But… how does a Theo choose to apply a desire pattern? How do you separate the cats in
the diagram below?
 The mechanism involved the existence of another pattern that is learned. This is the
pattern/idea to ‘use attention’ in the circumstances it finds itself. Sometimes the most appropriate
‘system 1’ response is to launch a ‘system 2’ process – one that involves ‘using attention’. Once
‘use attention’ is active, then Theo’s pattern matching brings its attention machinery to bear.

We can think about it in the same way as a pattern for ‘move hand’ or ‘grasp object’. It is
akin to an action response or learned reflex, but the action is to ‘use attention’. The result of the
attention is the retrieval of a wider and deeper range of supporting patterns and options. So, it’s
not just about the identity of the objects being considered, it’s also about the relationship those
objects happen to demonstrate within its mental model. Persisting with attention on an object or
concept allows for extended pattern matching and retrieval of less-well-matched patterns. This
enables the system 2 thinking of applying a wider range of patterns/concepts to a problem.

So how did Theo learn to apply attention? Any child development specialist would
probably be able to explore the arena in terms of their specialism. Children learn by playing and
by being told things – but experience is a most powerful teacher. Have you ever warned a small
child “don’t do that you’ll bang your head”? What happened? I expect the child learned
something through direct experience.

Three identical cats? (Credit: Copilot)

You can pay deliberate attention to find differences.
(hint – check the mouth and the exact location of the pupils of the eyes)
---
 Learning to focus on solving a problem emerges naturally. Let’s consider the infant toy
‘Shapes and holes’. As the child spends more time with the shapes it learns to pay a modicum of
attention to the nature of the shape – inevitably creating several mental patterns that it can re-use.
A parent or carer may even point out the natures of the shapes to draw attention to the features.
The effect is the reward of success in fitting the shapes into the holes – often reinforced by
additional reactions from the parent or carer.

So, in summary, what Theo needed for deliberate attention to be assembled:

• A desire-pattern mechanism – (the aim)

• An autonomous attention mechanism – (novelty and movement)
• A pattern for how to learn new patterns – (experience followed by abstraction yields
new patterns).
• A mechanism for choosing to apply a pattern (current context with desire patterns
influences pattern recall).
• A ‘focus’ pattern it can re-use on demand (‘use attention’)
• A mechanism to ‘score’ subsequent recalled patterns – to identify if they yield a
solution to the current situation (a combination of prediction and desire matching to
find the ‘least error’ / ‘best fit’ / ‘simplest abstraction’ to a desired result)
• And, of course, the memory mechanisms that support this.

Memory’s Contribution to Experience

As mentioned earlier, memories are ‘just’ activated patterns. As a pattern matching
machine, the brain always continues to fetch the next pattern-match, and the next, and the next.
This is the nature of ‘neurons’ - they match patterns. These patterns come from external and
internal stimuli as well as from the activity of the brain as it learns and reactivates(remembers)
patterns.

As we learn more about memory there is evidence that specific neurons do not record a
single element of an episodic memory, but rather they code for the conjunction of the different
elements that make up an episode (Kolibius et al., 2023). Our memories are thus a related set of
elements. No wonder they can be flawed or mixed-up at times. It also implies a single neuron
can hold the pattern for an episodic memory – like how a single neuron can code for identifying
a person (Rey et al., 2020). This is analogous to how distilled and labelled patterns can behave in
the DPM model.

The implication is that although we often think of ‘patterns’ in a two-dimensional form,

or as a grid of neurons, the pattern is much more three dimensional (and even temporally spread)
and is built from the relationships of ‘neurons’ in very complex structures. This is of course what
one might expect in something as complex as a brain, but it is great to see the research evidence
in the paper mentioned (Kolibius et al., 2023).

There may be other complex firing pattern relationships beyond the interconnections just
mentioned but the simplification in this paper which reduces everything to patterns will still
hold.

---

Some of the things flashing through our minds are not live experiences but are memories.
Do we experience them?

Yes, but a little differently. Any retrieval of a pattern from memory is analogous in some
ways to re-experiencing the original event (Favila et al., 2020; Schacter, 2021a). This gives
recalled memories the power to create biological responses in the creature as the patterns of the
memory re-traverse the brain and mind.

When the original sensation happened and was remembered, the tight coupling of the
brain with the body meant they respond jointly – as they always did when sensory input arrived
in the ancient brain before our creature acquired consciousness. When sensations are recalled
from memory, they resemble the originals and match similar patterns. As these ‘reminders’ of
those core signals circulate in the pattern-holding machinery, they trigger repeat responses as
well as the memories of the original response.

So, the patterns are being re-experienced – bringing forth swathes of memories of
previous experiences and emotions linked together by the patterns and chemistry of the body.
They all contribute to the emotional and physical responses in the creature. Our newly conscious
creature will identify these responses as both affecting itself and coming from itself.
 So, in the real-time activity of an experience, we also have patterns that are recollections,
and we have patterns that are a visceral coupling of event-biology-self. From these, the creature
can distil a pattern to identify the real-time visceral events - differentiating them from pure
recollection of experience.

---

Memories are outlines, not photos. (Notwithstanding how some people have high
resolution ‘photographic’ memories – which I think work the same way as for the rest of us but
are more reliably structured to retain detail). When we recall something (an event or an episode)
we retrieve the outline high-level patterns, and the remembered sub-parts (item detail patterns),
and at some point we start to unpack and also fabricate what is in the scene. We fabricate simply
because in many circumstances we have a) no explicit information (just a higher-level pattern)
and b) the whole scene was a fabrication by our brain when we saw it in the first place!

As example : Was George wearing trousers or a kilt? – (we might remember more clearly
if it was a special event rather than just ‘in Scotland’). What colour were his trousers? Or his
shirt? Was he standing to the left or to the right of Jemima? As we imagine the scene, a great deal
of it is fabricated within our mind to support the remembered (or imagined or believed) features.

This fabrication in the mind of the person remembering is probably supported by a

pattern that insists everyone was wearing shoes. They probably were, but it is very unlikely that
the style of each shoe is explicitly remembered. Thus, the overall pattern is recalled has the
details predicted by the ‘standard patterns’ that exist in your underlying ‘library’. (e.g. ‘people
wear shoes at social events’, ‘people wear kilts at Scottish Reeling events’ ) Certainly an
absence of shoes is likely to be a memorable feature. What is happening is that the
knowledge/typification that people generally wear shoes leads to the inference that shoes were
worn, and this populates our recollection even though we may not actually recall the shoes worn.

The Influence of the Ancient Brain

In addition to the facilities for the distillation of patterns and self-representation that we
have discussed, Theo's brain also contains a more ancient brain known as the limbic system. It
has been found to regulate many core brain functions including reaction, emotion and memory. It
evolved earlier, and it persists as a transit route for the nerves carrying Theo's sensory
information as it arrives. Incoming sensory information is thus close to, and can be interpreted
by, the ancient brain (including the amygdala and the hypothalamus) before the larger cortical
areas even receive the signals. This gives Theo a rapid, pre-cognitive pathway for pre-processing
sensory information. It's the part of the brain responsible for basic emotions like fear, anger,
pleasure, and disgust. Since sensory signals arrive in the cortical areas after passing through the
limbic system, they are accompanied by emotional response patterns from the ancient brain when
they reach the cortical areas.

The emotional responses and the memory of them are formed by an interplay between the
amygdala, hippocampus and insula (Huang et al., 2025; Neuroscience News, 2025; Qasim et al.,
2023). The insula is a part of the brain which appears to act as a bridge between bodily
sensations and our awareness.

The Coherence of Experience

Why do the patterns and brain activity that have been described for Theo’s development
gel into a coherent experience?

The brain is receiving disparate signals from scattered and inefficient bodily sensors via
the nerves. The timing of those signals varies greatly but, our brains evolved to help us get about
in the world and survive using the tools available. Our brains have had to compensate for the
timing difference between vision, sound, touch and motion. Our brains do this by being good at
predicting what comes next – i.e. when in possession of one pattern they have a rapid retrieval of
the most likely ‘next’ pattern.

As an example, given the current patterns for stroll. it looks ahead to anticipate the
texture of the surface on which we are walking, compensating in advance for lumps and bumps
to make muscle adjustments sufficiently in advance that we don’t fall. However, we don’t
experience it like that, we experience just walking, and we think we experience it as it happens.
In fact, the ill-timed physical and visual signals are re-assembled in the brain into a coherent
pattern which we perceive as ‘us walking’.

So, our brains have built the coherent patterns that let us make the best sense of the
world. This skill of assembling disparate and ill-timed patterns is what glues our frenzied mix of
sensations, smells, retrieved patterns, triggered emotional signals, visceral responses, fears and
matched patterns into a coherent first-person conscious experience. I suggest this assembly
process is pattern-match oriented. The patterns that have previously been experienced as helpful
in dealing with the world are more likely to be activated by similar events and the learned
patterns of daily life facilitate the predictions required for movement.

We are touching on Predictive Processing as a framework for maintaining a mental

model, but what I think is happening is that the hodgepodge of signals and patterns received are
being aligned into a wrapper-pattern ‘conclusion’ that best fits our understanding of the world.
Gazzaniga’s ‘Interpreter’ (Gazzaniga, 2016; Schacter, 2021a; Volz & Gazzaniga, 2017) is a
feature of mind which illuminates how strongly our brain mechanisms try to find coherent
patterns to rationalise and integrate new information.

Capabilities and Insights arising from the DPM Model

Any good theory of consciousness should have something to say about things like thinking,
problem solving, and perhaps even why we find consciousness so problematic. To that end, we
should look at the following in the context of the DPM model.

• The Threshold of Introspection

• Fast and Slow thinking
• The origin of language
• Causal Reasoning
• Intuitive Problem Solving
• Free Will
• Déjà vu
• The Rhythms in EEG
• Non-human consciousness
• Non-biological substrates for consciousness

DPM and the Threshold of Introspection

One reason consciousness presents as a mystery is because we cannot introspect
adequately to examine the processes. We form physical, philosophical and psychological
theories, and then models, for what goes on, but we can only inspect what we find to be
accessible.
 The diagram below (Fig: Introspect ) is an attempt to illustrate the fuzzy boundary for
introspection. The left part of the diagram shows layers of patterns within the DPM model. The
central part shows the cognitive content/impact. The right-most part suggests how only the upper
parts of the pattern layers are available to introspection.

We can sit quietly and examine our thinking with care and precision but there is a
boundary beyond which we will never successfully introspect. As a framework, DPM accounts
for how consciousness appears to us as ‘separate’ from the physical as well as providing a
background for the (apparent) existence of Free Will. We cannot ‘see’ the lower patterns that
make it function, but we can ‘see’ the patterns that let us perceive changes in our surroundings
and thoughts. This makes consciousness appear to the holder as something unexplainable and
ineffable.

Any mental activity which is not, or cannot be, included within a pattern resembling
‘self-observing self-having <thought>’ is not available for introspection and is thus also not
available to ‘Access Consciousness’. This is because when a conscious being’s brain experiences
a pattern which is not identified as being attached to the ‘self-object’ then the existence of, and
the origin of, of that pattern is not available to the holder as conscious content. It remains as non-
conscious pattern processing because is it not part of a ‘Self-Observing Self-Having’ (SOSH)
pattern. One or more of the subsequently triggered patterns may become available via the SOSH
mechanism. This means that in most circumstances the true origin of a thought is hidden from
the holder. The holder thus may experience a thought as entirely novel and without obvious
origin.

Clearly the holder of thoughts will also experience thoughts where the origin is known to
them (such as when concentrating on a topic and they focus on, and cycle round, a thought they
previously had), but not all thoughts will have a ‘visible history’ like that. Thoughts in mind thus
have a frequent habit of appearing from nowhere but being related to recent circumstances of
events and thinking. This will give them the appearance of being disembodied or ‘separate’ from
the physical, even if closely related.

DPM thus provides a reasonable description of why we have these problematic questions
about consciousness. The lack of insight on the mechanism then causes us to ask why
consciousness seems non-physical.
 When Theo introspects on the fact that it has thoughts, it cannot get past “I’m aware of
<x>”. or perhaps even “I’m aware of me thinking, so I exist.”

Theo will probably then start to invent reasons for why it’s here and thinking. Causal
reasoning learned through childhood (dropping things means they falls, banging things makes
noise) means it will invent theories to fill the gap of ‘what makes things happen in my head’. The
threshold of introspection makes it highly likely that an intelligent conscious creature will ask
questions about the nature of consciousness – they cannot observe the process.

Of course, amongst Theo’s theories, it could be that EM field theories, Quantum theories,
biological naturalism, panpsychism, and maybe even neurons are all required for brains to work,
but that’s just substrate. I suggest the content is best considered and traced as patterns within
DPM.

The Boundary of Introspection

Distillation and Pattern Human Cognition Introspection
Matching Perspective Perspective Perspective
Patterns are Available for
Language-augmented Thinking Complex Thinking
Introspection
Patterns of Labelling and Language
Thinking

Increasing conscious capability →

Patterns for Memory of Thought
Pattern for Observation of Self+Thought Cognitive awareness Fuzzy boundary of cognitive
Patterns for world models and movement Experience of Self+Thought Introspection

Pattern for Memory of Sensation

Phenomenal Awareness
Pattern for Observation of Self+Sensation
Experience of Self+Sensation
Self+Senstation
Self Pattern Patterns Not Available for
Introspection
Patterns of Sensation
Neuronal Patterns
Biological Patterns
Chemical reactions

Layers of Patterns Content and Capability Impact on Introspection

Fig:Introspect The DPM model illuminates the threshold for introspection.

DPM and Fast & Slow Thinking

The distillation and pattern matching (DPM) model is consistent with the proposition of
System 1 and System 2 thinking (Augusto, 2023; Kahneman, 2011)

• System 1 is Autonomous pattern matching that can rapidly respond to circumstances.

 • System 2 is the use of patterns that inform how to approach circumstances that cannot
be addressed using immediate reaction – such as problem patterns to be solved.

System 1 within DPM

System 1 thinking is all about our streamlined ‘default response’ answer to
circumstances. These responses can be autonomous or consciously seen but are those which we
have learned give us rapid effective answers. We learn the circumstances and appropriate
responses for success (whatever ‘success’ is) and then can rapidly deploy the response when the
circumstances arise.

System 1 Optical Illusions

Being based on pattern matching and prediction, our perceptions can be fooled by some
types of drawing (Bach, 2025)

Perceptions are fooled because of the rapid (system 1) pattern matching that we perform.
We form rapid conclusions based on our previous experiences. In the diagram below (Fig
BUMP). We tend to see image ‘a’ as a bump, and image ‘b’ as a dip. This is driven by the well-
practiced pattern we have learned - that lighting tends to come from above.

Figure BUMP. Examples of the classic bump/dent stimuli used to test lighting assumptions
when judging shape from shading, with shading orientations (a) 0- and (b) 180- from the vertical.
 System 1 Pitfall Example – The Cognitive Reflection Test

The Cognitive Reflection test contains 3 questions in total. The psychologist Shane
Frederick wanted to study examine how people challenge, or don’t challenge, their intuitive
thinking.

• A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?
• If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets?
• In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to
cover half of the lake?

Notwithstanding that many people reading this text are already experienced with such
questions…
Intuitively the answers would be:
• $1
• 100 minutes
• 24 days
The correct answers are at the end of this section.

What we have in these tests are examples of what is referred to as System 1 and System 2
ways of thinking
System 2 within DPM
System 1 mistakes stem from the default patterns that we build (sometimes as children).
The patterns are built using our innate inference machinery. It yields rapid thinking via the ready-
made patterns of simpler problems. It means that the answers that hop to mind are the incorrect
‘intuitive’ answers for the circumstances (covering half a lake will take half the time).

System 2 approaches are triggers by the errors created by some system 1 events. System
2 is itself a System 1 pattern. The pattern triggered support System 2 is along the lines of ‘Stop
and Reconsider’. It is a learned response to failures/errors.
 We can witness the migration of problems from System 2 into System 1 when we
consider the effort required to learn how to ride a bicycle. At first, we consider all our actions
and senses in detail as we learn how to position ourselves on the bicycle. We plan and make
specific motions for propelling the bicycle AND at the same time plan, execute and learn the
movements of body and steering to reduce wobbling. After time and experience, the physical and
mental tasks required become embedded in the system 1 mechanism of autonomous response.
i.e. some neurons which are close enough to the senses and intentions become much faster at
operating the bicycle than any ‘slow’ conscious learning process can carry them out.
The same learning of solutions applies to solving problems. As we grow, we acquire more
ready-made templates (patterns) for solving problems. e.g. “Turn it over”, “Lean something
against it to climb up”, “Get a stick to make your arm longer”. The same principles apply to
intellectual efforts - “Get the average”, “Use differentiation”, “Calculate the volume”, “Look in
the index”. Many of these are second nature by the time we are adults.
Our creature’s intuitive responses when living and surviving in the world are acquired in
at least two ways.

1. Completely innately – by evolution having burned the patterns in.

2. Learned and embedded – from early life experience, and from ongoing life
experience.

Learned or Embedded patterns (System 1) are a ‘gear change’ in performance for dealing
with known circumstances and problems. They have been acquired because the creature was
exposed to the circumstances often enough to learn the approaches and the persistence required.

System 2 thinking begins at failed System 1 problem solving. By finding patterns that
offer ‘Stop and Retry’ or ‘Stop and Reconsider’ Theo develops persistence. These ‘more
conscious’ system 2 patterns are a gear-change in performance for dealing with unknown,
complex or ‘I failed at’ problems. The response to apply them is learned by exposure to problem
circumstances frequently enough to learn the approaches and the persistence required.
 Solution to the Cognitive Reflection test

The correct answers to the puzzles are of course.

• $0.05
• 5 minutes
• 47 days

A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost?
- Remove one dollar from the total price and divide what’s left by two

If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets?
- How many per machine? – 1 per minute
- So 100 machines can make 100 widgets in 5 minutes

In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake?
- One day before the end it must have covered half the lake – because it
only takes one day to double.

DPM and the Origin of Language (and its benefits)

The principles of the DPM model provide an outline for the origin of language.

Handling patterns leads to the insight that language is the association of sound patterns
with patterns that have meaning in the mind. Its mechanism is based on the labelling principles
for patterns. All the pattern matching and associative mechanisms described earlier come into
play. The acquisition of the mental models within DPM suggests that languages is an add-on to
mental processes and not the source of thinking. There is support for this in other papers (Culotta
& Hanson, 2004).
 I note that Language has a very interesting performance effect on the nature of thinking.
The pattern shortcuts triggered via labels and the syntax of language provides a toolset for more
deliberate thinking on complex matters. Verbalising a problem, or its possible solutions, can
boost performance. ‘If I can get higher up the tree by standing on something, then I can get the
fruit. There is nothing to stand on. Can I make something to stand on? Can I bring the nuts down
instead of climbing the tree?’

Language is a tool we use to crystalise thinking into a list of clarified items. It quietens
the subconscious background noise and allows attention to settle on the matter described by the
words. With hindsight, it seems likely that faking consciousness by mimicking language patterns
is going to produce such interesting results: - Sequences of words are the events in mind that
convey our own clarified thoughts to our conscious selves quite strongly – via the buffer/memory
of language. Our childhood development is filled with the receipt of words, advice and
knowledge. We build strong habits around language, but language is the labelling of thought not
the origin of thinking. The strength of language creates an interesting cognitive bias of
perceiving intelligence in language.

Of course, it also facilitates the acquisition of information from others. Holding and
sharing knowledge in any society means that learning is shared – not everyone needs to be a
genius who invents a way to crack tasty nuts, some can simply copy the other members of the
monkey troop (Boesch et al., 2019; Falótico et al., 2024). In human society, we can share more
complex information about the location of food, how to get it, and how to prepare it – without
needing to demonstrate every step. We can simply say ‘get a big rock with a flat side’ to teach
others how to crack nuts.

DPM and Rhythms in EEG

Electroencephalograms (EEG) show rhythms in the firing of neurons. I speculate with
some confidence that this cyclic firing arises from repeated bursts of pattern matching. Each
burst of matching being a step in the cyclic pattern matching that repeatedly updates the current
context with the results from the previous context and the unconscious contributions. Each of
those steps arising from the immediately prior state/step and the immediately prior firing of
neurons. The fired neurons would naturally rest briefly (or be suppressed by inhibitory neurons)
before starting again on the next set of patterns. This repeated firing and re-firing occurs as the
brain maintains its mental model and integrates sensory input and arising patterns to create a new
current context.

I suggest that the patterns change in frequency because of the nature of the activity
required at the time by the state of the brain.

There are five recognised brain frequencies that are identified in EEG readings
(Biasiucci et al., 2019) and they have the following associations.

Frequency band Frequency Brain states

Gamma (γ) >35 Hz Concentration

Beta (β) 12–35 Hz Anxiety dominant, active, external attention, relaxed

Alpha (α) 8–12 Hz Very relaxed, passive attention

Theta (θ) 4–8 Hz Deeply relaxed, inward focused

Delta (δ) 0.5–4 Hz Sleep

(Table REF 86)

Wakefulness is accompanied by fast, low-amplitude brain rhythms that are further

segregated into “alpha (8–13 Hz), “beta” (13–35 Hz) and “gamma” waves (35 Hz and
higher) (Miller, 2007)

Beta and gamma waves are typically observed in alert wakefulness and during
REM sleep

Alpha waves are associated with quiet arousal – commonly with the eyes closed
(Frank, 2008)

What about theta (θ) rhythms? It may be that some brain activities just need
different frequencies for their pattern matching. A growing number of studies suggest that
θ may represent a timing mechanism to temporally organize movement sequences,
memory encoding, or planned trajectories for spatial navigation (Nuñez & Buño, 2021).
 It is beyond the scope of this paper and my expertise to explore location of these rhythms
in any depth. However, I think it is within my purview to theorise about the relationship of the
observed frequencies to the pattern matching model. I make the suggestions below as speculative
alignment, not as evidenced behaviour.

When awake and concentrating, the mind will be working though a great many pattern-
matches, both for sensory input and for operating the internal mental model. When relaxed but
thinking about something the pattern matching demand will fall a little because the stimulation
and cognitive stress of concentrating on something will mean there is less material that needs to
be held and assembled within the mental model. When relaxed and thinking with eyes closed, the
external visual stimuli will be much reduced and just the rhythm of pattern matching arising
from the operation of thinking will predominate.

During NON-REM sleep, neither the internal models, nor external stimuli are being
processed. The brain’s pattern matching will fall further to some base state. During REM sleep,
when our bodies are deliberately paralysed by our nervous system (to avoid us thrashing around
too much as we dream) our eyes move rapidly behind our closed eyelids as we look at and
interact with our imagined dream world. REM sleep has higher frequencies of brain waves –
which to me indicates more pattern matching is going on.

There isn’t any obvious sensory input to process, so it could be the mental models simply
freewheeling on half power – making odd, yet creative and occasionally productive pattern
matches and associations. So, is REM sleep (dreaming) all about testing and exploring the
patterns in the model? Is it about embedding learned information (Lewis et al., 2018)? Do
dreams explore our fears in a safe environment? (Sterpenich et al., 2019; Vallat et al., 2017).

When we wake from sleep, we usually have a sense of time having passed – largely I
expect because of the periods of light sleep and momentary wakefulness that are part of the
cycle. In addition, the human perception of time appears to be related to the amount of activity
experienced rather than ‘clock time’ (Roseboom et al., 2019; Roseboom et al., 2022). Intuitively
then, we will be subconsciously ‘clocking’ (informal English ‘noticing’) the time while
dreaming, but it won’t relate to actual time.
 Asleep vs Anaesthesia
Anaesthesia differs somewhat from sleep. It brings a wholly different experience, or
rather, a lack of experience. A period of anaesthesia is less like a partly conscious hallucination
period, and more like BANG! someone turned out the lights.

Under anaesthetic we don’t have the dream states or the partial perceptions of what’s
going on. We have no ‘events’ in mind and so no sense of time passing.

Anaesthetist will admit they don’t really know how anaesthetic achieves the result of
removing consciousness yet leaving the autonomic functions of the brain still active. Of course,
if too much anaesthetic is administered, then all brain activity can be suppressed – to the point of
risking the patient’s life. On the other end of the scale, if the patient is insufficiently
anaesthetised, they can regain consciousness. This would be bad, so anaesthetists are very careful
to monitor the patient.

There is an interesting range of research around the depth of anaesthesia for different type
of anaesthetic. Measuring ‘how unconscious’ the patient is, is not as simple as one might imagine
(Hagihira, 2015).

What we do know about anaesthetics is that they suppress neural activity. They largely
work by interfering with how nerves pass messages. Local anaesthetics prevent nerves from
passing pain signals to the brain. General anaesthetics (the sort which knock you out) similarly
suppress neuronal connections – so within the pattern-matching model it makes sense that the
more complex patterns and mechanisms will be the first to be disrupted or made unreliable by
anaesthetic. The relative complexity of consciousness and thinking means that they are the bits of
machinery that are least able to continue when neural connectivity is suppressed. Enough
disruption will make it impossible for the brain to maintain a current context model that relates to
a model of ‘self’. I propose that this is why the lights go out in a different way from sleep. In
sleep nothing is broken - it is simply doing ‘sleep stuff’ and is not prevented from making and
building pattern matches (and ‘clocking’ the time) if required, as it does when we dream.
However, under anaesthetic, I posit that the pattern machinery of self and experience cannot
assemble adequately enough to be able to recall events witnessed, or construct perception, never
mind remember it.
 DPM and Causal reasoning
Causal reasoning is the process of figuring out what causes what. When you or Theo use
causal reasoning, you're thinking about how one thing (the cause) leads to another thing (the
effect). It’s a way of understanding how different events or actions are connected.

It is clear to see the connection to a pattern model. The overall pattern of A->B makes me
expect B, if I see A. Similarly, if I see B, then I anticipate that A has already occurred. Such a
relationship pattern can be applied to any level of a hierarchical pattern model built on
distillation of patterns. Causal reasoning helps us make sense of the world and predict what
might happen in the future. If you understand the cause of something, you can take steps to
repeat it if it’s good or avoid it if it’s bad.

We do this intuitively from childhood. Infants spend a large amount of time performing
experiments in the world (Gopnik et al., 2004) while they acquire their own memories in support
of causal reasoning. Gopnik’s ‘blicket’ experiment in the paper shows that children age 3 or 4
have good causal reasoning. This makes sense because, I propose, that infants touch/move/drop
so many things that the relationships of action and resulting change (for themselves and their
surroundings) become very clear to their pattern-distilling minds. It happens naturally, much like
the emergence of their consciousness and in the same way. I propose this is through pattern
distillation and matching – A implies B.
Learning Causal Relationships

Gopnik's blicket detector experiment (REF 199) is a classic study in

developmental psychology that investigates how children learn about causal relationships.
The experiment uses a fictional device called a "blicket detector" - typically a colourful
box that lights up and plays music when certain objects are placed on it.

In the basic version of the experiment, children are shown various objects and told
that some are "blickets" (objects that make the detector activate) while others are not. The
researcher demonstrates by placing different combinations of objects on the detector. For
example, they might show that when objects A and B are placed together, the detector
activates, but when object C is placed alone, nothing happens.

The key manipulation involves ambiguous scenarios where children must infer
causal relationships. In one version, children see that objects A and B together activate the
detector, then see that object A alone also activates it. From this, they should logically
conclude that A is a blicket (sufficient to cause activation) while B's status remains
unclear.

What makes this experiment particularly interesting is that it reveals children's

sophisticated causal reasoning abilities. Even preschoolers can make complex inferences
about which objects have causal power based on patterns of activation and non-activation.
They demonstrate understanding of concepts like sufficiency (A alone can cause the
effect), necessity (certain objects must be present), and can distinguish between causal and
merely correlational relationships.

The blicket detector paradigm has been used to study various aspects of causal
learning, including how children integrate prior knowledge with new evidence, how they
reason about hidden causes, and how they distinguish between different types of causal
relationships. It's become a widely used tool for understanding the development of
scientific thinking in young children.

In DPM terms, the blicket detector experiment shows induction in progress.

Deriving a rule or meta-pattern from example events.

---
 Causal reasoning is a high-level example of meta-pattern matching. We should regard it
as making use of the mental pattern ‘Cause has Effect’. It is learned intuitively in infancy and
childhood (moving hand towards an object creates touch sensation) but becomes more clearly
labelled as we age.

Causal reasoning can be tricky/error prone because not everything is as simple as it seems
(correlation is not always causation). Nevertheless, the cause has effect pattern built into people
is a strong one and is the source of superstitions. If someone wore a specific shirt or colour of
socks when their team won matches, their subconscious might confuse coincidence with
causation. The shirt didn't really cause the win, but intuitive causal reasoning might make them
think it did.

In the inductive case”) we are searching for theoretical (or real) patterns that end with the
event that was observed. (“Why did this happen?

In the deductive case we are hunting for patterns that begin with the action being
considered. (“What will happen if I do this?”)

Scientists use causal reasoning all the time to test ideas and theories. They try to figure
out what causes certain effects by experimenting and gathering evidence. Using induction to
build theories, and deduction from actual evidence to prove them. This makes every child an
experimental scientist while they learn the way the world works – dropping toys, squeezing
teddies, and learning to walk and talk.

DPM and Intuitive Problem Solving

A variety of creatures exhibit learning - perhaps bees learn which flowers to go to through
a little trial and error as well as by the ultraviolet clues from the flowers (Muth et al., 2015). We
don’t generally ascribe consciousness to insects, but we may need to review that to a degree.
There is some evidence for complex behaviour that we find hard to explain by intuitive activity –
most notably how spiders can plan a route to food simply by surveying a scene (Cross &
Jackson, 2016). Is such a spider conscious or just aware of the environment? Does it consider its
actions?

Insects aside, we have already explored Inference as a causal problem-solving pattern.

Here we will look briefly ‘early years’ problem solving as an example.
 Is there such a thing as intuitive problem solving in humans, or is it all learned? I’m of
the opinion that most of the problem solving we see in action is learned. Our inference skills are
part of it, but inference needs some material to get started in early years….

Consider a simplified case of how a child gets small ball out of a cup. Does it seem
intuitively obvious, or do you remember learning how to do it as a very small child?

It’s not really intuitive while we learn it – it only seems like it because we learn so much
at such an early age that we forget the process of learning. Similarly, to any adult it is obvious
that an egg will roll away on a sloping surface. But as an infant, unless you had come across a
curved/round object, nothing else in your experience will have rolled away. Naturally you find it
endlessly entertaining, but you are learning core patterns. These early patterns build into the
patterns that make things ‘intuitively obvious’ to old children, teens, and adults. The nature of
‘intuitively obvious’ turns into discussions around ‘common sense’ when mature adults see
teenagers making rookie mistakes.

Intuitive problem solving is therefore no more than the application of known patterns to
analogous circumstances. Given a problem, the circumstances trigger the retrieval of known
similar (analogous) patterns. These patterns are then compared to the current circumstances
automatically and the closest match gets the most attention. It is the fast-thinking approach to
finding a solution to the problem. Our intuitions for solving simple problems are often correct.

Complex problem solving can require the application of a process to try different
approaches together with a pattern matching approach that used abstracted summary patterns of a
problem rather that the problem in naked form. A detailed exploration of complex problem
solving as patterns is not included in this paper.

DPM and Free Will

The limits of introspection mean that although some thoughts are clearly related to
observed events or sensations, there are other thoughts which appear to be independent. Our
thoughts appear able to roam freely across topics, often addressing novel areas without
prompting… or at least it seems that way…

I suggest this happens because, although each thought is the result of previous mental
patterns (i.e. produced deterministically), the depth of involvement of the unconscious patterns
means that our thoughts appear independent of our conscious awareness in many ways. This has
an interesting result. It means the ‘visible’ part of our thinking has the appearance of self-
determination and free will, but in fact our conscious thoughts are as dependent on the
underlying pattern machinery as they are on the recent conscious thoughts that also inhabit that
machinery.

But it never feels like that, we feel spontaneous and self-determining. We read books and
hold conversations with others in the ‘knowledge’ that we have free will, but because we cannot
access any pattern activity below the threshold of introspection, we cannot observe the
deterministic (if complex) pattern matching beneath it.

Those complex patterns are likely to be very complex – their interactions border on
chaotic and are certainly as unpredictable to our perception as the three body problem or a
double pendulum. So perhaps we can have determinism and free will.

DPM and Déjà vu

Déjà vu is the name given to the experience of believing that you have seen or
experienced something before the current occasion although you are also confident that this is
the first time you have seen it.

I posit that this happens when something in the environment is subconsciously

reminiscent of something else. i.e. either all, or part of the patterns now being observed matches
some, or all, of a previous experience. Déjà vu often feels incongruous because the original
pattern cannot be retrieved by introspection.

You may not recall the exact details of the previous experience because the pattern match
may be partial and based on nothing more than the shape of a room, or a colour, or an odour. The
fact that you can’t recall the circumstances properly is a discontinuity from the usual types of
recall. This is a novel pattern – a sense of prior knowledge but without supporting information –
and it triggers attention because of the novelty of pattern mismatch and lack of results from any
introspection. In the majority of circumstances déjà vu is a harmless distraction.

DPM and Non-Human Consciousness

DPM describes a feasible mechanism for the origin of consciousness. From this
mechanism we can infer that consciousness is not exclusive to humans. One might intuitively say
our experience with cats, dogs, parrots and corvids makes that obvious. However, since the
model explains how consciousness happens, at this point it is a prediction from the theory rather
than just an observation.

The relative simplicity of the DPM mechanism for the instantiation of consciousness
implies that it will exist in many creatures. Consciousness will occur in varied degrees in any
creature as soon as it is above ‘a threshold’ where consciousness can begin to happen. I expect
there are many creatures which have a non-conscious awareness of the world and many which
hold richer mental models encompassing a conscious awareness of experience. Given the various
scientific statements since 2012 about consciousness in various animals (Low et al., 2012), I
hope the DPM mechanism and explanation are a useful contribution to the discussion, even if
there isn’t yet an external ‘measure’ for consciousness.

DPM and Non-Biological Substrates for Consciousness

The logical and pattern-oriented nature of the DPM model may open different approaches
to the research and development of Artificial Intelligence. The model also offers a test for the
presence of consciousness in AI systems because ‘self-observing self having’ as a self-developed
internal state may be an appropriate measure, and because AI systems can be examined internally
(unlike living creatures). However, I suggest the requirement for a physical body with rich
sensory inputs together with the enormous complexity of the required pattern modelling should
not be underestimated.

In case of future success with AI, we must also consider whether it would be appropriate
to bring forth conscious robots that are enslaved by their desire to do washing, cleaning and
ironing while their minds explore other topics and perhaps philosophise about their bizarre role
as slaves. (Ratoff 2025a; Ratoff 2025b)

DPM in the Landscape of Consciousness

Distillation and Pattern Matching (DPM) provides a way of thinking about the content of mind
that is closer to the neurons than many other theories. Although developed independently, DPM
dovetails well with Global Workspace Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GWT and
GNWT) and Predictive Processing. It also qualifies as a Higher Order Theory (HOT) model. I
see DPM as the ‘machine inside’ Attention Schema Theory (AST).
 The model was developed around the idea that “it had to be simple, or it couldn’t get
started”. Using patterns as the only mechanism with which to devise feasible processes has led to
the insights and predictions in this paper.

The high quality of other theories of consciousness made me think DPM was
unnecessary, but I kept reading about the ‘gaps’ in those other theories – gaps which DPM seems
to fill (at least in part). So, I think there is space for DPM, not least because it offers an
operational description for the origin of conscious content, the limits of introspection, and a
candidate mechanism for illusionism. DPM also extends to causal reasoning and problem
solving, which gives me some confidence in it as a universal approach.

DPM and Predictive Processing

The Predictive Processing (PP) theory (Clark, 2015; Clark, 2024; Hohwy, 2014)
suggests the brain is an inference machine that actively constructs our reality rather than
passively receiving sensory data. In this framework, the brain maintains a hierarchical generative
model of the world, sending top-down predictions about incoming stimuli to lower sensory
levels. When sensory input does not match these expectations, it generates a prediction error,
which travels back up the hierarchy to update the internal model - a process known as Predictive
Coding. Proponents argue that consciousness emerges when these internal models reach a stable
"best guess" that successfully minimizes error, with attention acting as a precision-weighting
mechanism that boosts the influence of significant error signals.

PP offers an efficient model which resolves the problem of the limited ‘bandwidth’
between our senses and the brain. Updating a mental model is less effort than building one from
scratch, and it requires less data too. Similar principles are used in digital TV transmissions to
reduce bandwidth requirements. The predictive processing approach gives us a jet engine for our
full model of the mind.

The distillation and pattern matching model (DPM) lets us discuss the content that should
exist within the predictive machinery. DPM also offers the opportunity to discuss the content of a
predictive dysfunction. If I were designing an implementation of the PP predictive machinery it
would need to be layered and pattern oriented - like DPM.

My reading of the works by Jakob Hohwy (Hohwy, 2014) and Andy Clark (Clark, 2015)
suggests their view is that the brain is purely a predictive machine. I understand this position has
softened – I hope so, since then it would more resemble the top-down and bottom-up ‘juggling’
which I anticipate within DPM.

DPM is consistent with PP but treats everything as patterns which trigger each other and
form hierarchical layers of objects in the mind. These patterns are acquired through a process
resembling induction where abstracted/generalised patterns are developed from examples. Any
mental activity (anything in the current context) triggers the activation of the next cluster of
patterns. The triggered cluster of patterns will be high-level, low-level, any triggered meta-
patterns or even partially matched patterns. The most relevant are those supported by an
‘attention’ match. The attention matches may occur because a ‘novelty pattern’ is triggered, or if
a ‘safety pattern’ is triggered (growling heard nearby), or because a target content pattern has
been deliberately placed in the context (such as when I’m looking for a specific book/edible
plant). Objects in the current context can become the topic of a “self observed self having
thought/sensation/awareness” – and are then part of conscious awareness.

We assemble a memory of the hierarchy of the patterns around us. This mental model is
updated with new information. When I spot a shape out of the corner of my eye, the first pattern
match might be a high-level <something over there>. On the next pattern cycle this subject in
context might be updated to <something on the mat near the back door>. The next pattern cycle
might conclude this is a cat. Ancient safety reflexes will make me take a more accurate look at
the new object – only to find out it is a rucksack. The colour of the mat on which the rucksack
sits will only become consciously registered if it differs from my memory (expectation) or if I
choose to pay deliberate attention to it.

I suggest that DPM can describe the whole of a PP scenario in pattern form and is capable to
doing the detail of the error detection in the form of mismatched and partially matched patterns,
but it’s much more efficient to use the phraseology of prediction when discussing the process.
Prediction offers a very efficient framework. I think PP benefits from the DPM model as an
alternate approach to discussing the content of mind.

DPM and Global Workspace Theory

The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory
(Baars & Geld, 2019; Baars et al., 2013; Baars et al., 2021; Baars, 1998), posits that
consciousness emerges from a "theatre-like" architecture in the brain. While most neural
processing occurs in specialized, unconscious modules (like those for vision, language, or motor
control), information only becomes conscious when it wins a competition for selective attention
and enters a "global workspace". Once in this workspace, the information undergoes "global
ignition" (a nonlinear surge of activity once something has ‘enough’ attention) and is
"broadcast" widely across a frontoparietal network, making it accessible to multiple cognitive
systems for coordinated action, verbal report, and memory storage.

However, it doesn't explain why global access should subjectively feel like anything. The
theory assumes that once information is globally broadcast, consciousness naturally follows, but
this assumption leaves the qualitative/phenomenal aspect unexplained. GWT ‘s approach to
Attention is that attention operates like a spotlight in the theatre of consciousness.

I like the GWT model a lot. I think DPM and GWT benefit each other – with DPM as a
facilitating mechanism. Baars refers to ‘executive systems’ – which I agree will emerge – and
this is where the DPM model provides a solution for how executive functions come about. They
are built with DPM pattern preferences that steer attention by altering the probability of
particular patterns being matched sufficiently for them to reach the ‘self observed self having
sensation/thought’ pattern state.

DPM and Higher Order Theories(HOT).

HOT theories (Brown, 2025; Rosenthal, 2008) propose that consciousness requires
thoughts about thoughts. A mental state becomes conscious only when it's the object of a higher-
order thought, with first-order states existing unconsciously and consciousness emerging from
meta-cognitive awareness of these states. The brain generates first-order mental states
(perceptions, emotions) that remain unconscious until higher-order cognitive systems form
thoughts about them. Consciousness is encompassed within this higher-order representational
relationship rather than the first order states themselves. HOS/HOT theories have become more
complex. There are several HOT variants: HOS is an umbrella term for Higher Order Thought,
Higher Order Perception, Higher Order State Space, Higher Order Global States.

HOT theories connect consciousness and reportability well. They account for cases where
we are conscious of being in mental states. They link consciousness to cognitive sophistication
and meta-cognitive abilities. However, it can lead to infinite regress problems e.g. what is it that
makes the higher order thought conscious, and how did the higher order thought come about?
HOT theories continue to ‘evolve’ but maintain their core insight that consciousness
fundamentally involves a kind of mental self-awareness.

They have deep parallels with the pattern distillation and matching model (DPM) that I
describe. DPM qualifies as a HOT but also underpins them since it operationalises general
mechanisms for pattern formation, relating objects and the detailed construction of
consciousness. I believe all the variants of Higher Order Theories will find something helpful in
the DPM model.

DPM and Attention Schema Theory (AST)

Attention Schema Theory (AST), posits that consciousness is a simplified, internal model
the brain uses to track and control its own attention. The brain constructs a body schema to
monitor the position and movement of limbs without needing to process every individual muscle.
Similarly, it builds an attention schema to manage the complex process of focusing on specific
information. This internal model is a functional ‘cartoon sketch’ that omits the messy physical
details of neurons and synapses, the brain interprets its own attentional focus as a non-physical,
subjective ‘awareness’.

Beyond personal awareness, AST suggests this schema serves two primary adaptive
functions control and social cognition. By having a predictive model of its own attention, the
brain can more efficiently direct and sustain its focus, a claim supported by artificial intelligence
experiments where agents with a ‘schema’ performed better than those without. Furthermore, we
use the same machinery to attribute awareness to others; by modelling another person’s attention,
we can predict their behaviour and intentions, which is the foundational basis for Theory of Mind
and empathy in social animals.

AST is a great theory that is close to DPM in several ways. It operates ‘above’ the activity
of DPM. AST starts with a framework which proposes that subjective awareness is the brain’s
internal model of the process of attention. DPM starts from a pattern point of view to build a
whole framework. AST explains the threshold for introspection differently from DPM – along
the lines of ‘a detailed neuroscientific account of attention is not necessary for keeping track of
the current state’. DPM describes the pattern contents for that threshold. I think it’s all the same
basic shape.

Being ‘lower level’, DPM describes how attention is built from the patterns captured and
built into hierarchical models in mind. DPM works with the known capabilities of neural
networks but, like AST, it stays away from the hard-core neuroscience.

Known Shortfalls of DPM

Amongst likely shortfalls (many of which I am not yet aware), DPM has aspirations in
the following areas: -

1. The method by which a pattern receives a SOSH attachment could benefit from a
more robust definition of a threshold mechanism. At the moment, it is along the lines
of ‘the patterns most interconnected to the current live context’, but that may not be
the best approach. ‘Most interconnected’ might mean ‘best analogy match’ via meta-
patterns, as well as via direct hierarchical relationships.
2. The description of the interplay of pattern content as it combines to support
phenomenal awareness (the ‘Illusion’) is difficult to describe and extremely difficult
to evidence with examples since it is entirely subjective. It can also be difficult for
people to envisage.

Conclusion

I argue that the Distillation and Pattern Matching (DPM) model has explanatory
capabilities across a wide range of the observable features of mind. Using parsimonious
principles, it shows how the known capabilities of neurons and neural networks can
autonomously build the necessary patterns that result in self-awareness and consciousness.

The model reveals that consciousness is strongly predicted to occur in creatures with
appropriate mental capacity. The edge cases will remain difficult to explore because of the
autonomous aspects of some creature behaviours, but researchers may be able to make further
use of a ‘pattern system’ to consider the mental content of subjects.

Although DPM is simple in outline, it offers a unified approach which can build pattern-
based mechanisms for some of the more interesting features of consciousness and mind. These
include: the origin of self-awareness and consciousness; attention; fast and slow thinking; the
origin of language; the rhythms in EEG; causal reasoning; and the limits of introspection. The
patterns around the limits being one reason we ask difficult questions about consciousness.

The mechanism proposed for phenomenal consciousness via illusionism is not

unreasonable, but testing is difficult. I am not currently aware of an experiment which might
measure a proxy of phenomenal experience and relate it to patterns in mind.

The DPM model was developed independently with the aim of understanding human
consciousness. Its capabilities and feature were found to be consistent with the leading theories
of consciousness - most notably GWT, PP, AST and the HOT class of theories. DPM’s
construction around the ‘content’ of mind as patterns offers the opportunity to blend the leading
hypotheses of consciousness into something even more complete.

I suggest the pattern principles extend to complex thinking and psychology. The pattern
handling approach can address a great many of the ways we deal with the world, not just as the
building blocks for consciousness. I have found the model so effective in describing aspects of
human capabilities that I suggest it represents a unifying model which will be extremely useful.

Finally, as a logical model, DPM’s detailed description of how self-awareness and

consciousness come about makes it a candidate for assessing the presence (or otherwise) of types
of awareness claimed for machines. I further dare to suggest that the DPM model could form a
basis for machine consciousness.
Glossary/Definitions

In this paper I work with the following definitions.

Attention :

Autonomous Attention : The neural response of a creature to novel items or to changes

within in its perceived environment. This could also be described as unconscious attention. It can
influence conscious attention.
Conscious Attention : When a conscious mind pays attention to something though choice
rather than being purely event driven. (ignoring deterministic arguments about free will for the
moment)

Awareness :

Conscious Awareness : Being in receipt of sensation and having conscious recognition

of the sensation. See Consciousness.

Non-Conscious Awareness : Being receipt of signals indicating environment but without

conscious recognition of sensation. It has not differentiated itself from the environment. This is
on the edge of awareness and consciousness. It is minimal consciousness. It is a non-conscious
awareness of things but not necessarily in relation to itself.

Consciousness : The state of a brain/mind that can differentiate activity within its
environment as relating to itself or not, and is aware of experiencing sensations. Conscious
awareness of your unique thoughts, memories, feelings, sensations, and environment.

Conscious Access (Access consciousness) : The aspect of consciousness that involves

the access to information within cognitive processes. Closely aligned with conscious experience
it is enabled by the metacognition made possible by the distillation of patterns.

Conscious Attention : When a conscious mind pays attention to something though choice
rather than being purely event driven. (ignoring deterministic arguments about free will for the
moment).
 Conscious Experience (Phenomenal Consciousness) : The state of a brain/mind which is
aware of its experiences because of its sense of identity and its perception of sensations
influencing that self.

Determinism : the approach that all events are driven by prior events. i.e. everything,
including human action, is ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the will.
Some philosophers taken this to imply that individual human beings have no free will. (discussed
later)

Functionalism : the theory that mental states (beliefs, desires, pain) are defined solely by
their functional role—what they do—rather than what they are made of.

Illusionism : posits that consciousness is an illusion. i.e. our perceptions of what people
refer to as ‘Qualia’ are representations created by the brain. Daniel Dennett (Dennett, 1995;
Dennett, 2021) and also Keith Frankish (Frankish, 2016) argue that ‘qualia’ do not exist of
themselves and the perception of them is the result of brain processes. Illusionism says that
consciousness is not a real ‘thing’ in the universe, we (and other creatures) experience it because
of what our brains do, and we experience the illusion our brain constructs. Of course, the phrase
‘real thing’ is distracting – since we do experience consciousness – so… it is real as we see it, but
not fundamentally ‘real’ like energy, space or time. (Other opinions do exist)

Mind : the collection of content, capabilities and experiences which make up a

consciousness in a creature. It is the thing that is known to have the set of faculties responsible
for subjective experience, consciousness, thought, memory, and volition.

Panpsychism : the view that the mind or a mindlike aspect is a fundamental and
ubiquitous feature of reality. Which I think means that everything is conscious ‘just because’.
(not a view to which I subscribe) Whilst I can see the philosophical angle on Panpsychism, I
choose to restrict my working definition of consciousness to the physical nature of creatures
rather that fight over how conscious my desk, pencil or laptop might be. (Notwithstanding that at
some point a conscious laptop might become a reality because of work in AI.)

Physicalism – the view that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and
above" the physical: comprising Functionalism, Behaviourism and Identity Theory.
 Functionalism : the view that mental states come about because of physical processes.
(The pattern matching model falls within the definition)

Behaviourism : a theory of learning based on the idea that all behaviours are acquired
through conditioning, and conditioning occurs through interaction with the environment. (all
behaviours? There may be some that are not acquired. – e.g. our pre-programmed friend the
carabid beetle in Chapter 3)

Identity Theory : a theory that mental states are literally identical with brain states.
(Any complete functional model meets this criterion – it’s all in the state of the brain. Identity
theory does not explain how.)

Qualia : a quality or property as perceived or experienced by a person. Given that the

description describes these as ‘perceived’, and illusionism says they do not exist of themselves, I
wish to clarify. I take the view that they ‘exist’ only because of the perception. They do not exist
outside of that. Lemons exist. Brains exist. Tastebuds exist. But the taste of lemon is something
that is experienced – it is assembled within the mind. Don’t fret about the qualia word, I hardly
ever use it, and it only really helps when other people want to talk about ‘qualia’.

Realism : the position that consciousness is a real thing. i.e. It is a real fundamental thing
in the universe (a bit like time, energy and matter). This would mean it cannot be an illusion.

Reductionism : the intellectual and philosophical position which interprets any complex
system as the sum of its parts. (that’s the approach in this book)

Sentience : Some people use this to mean conscious. Some people use this to mean
conscious and intelligent. The root of the word is to do with the senses. I am going to avoid using
the word where possible, and stick to awareness/consciousness plus a separate mention of
intelligence where applicable.

Subjective Experience : a phrase used to refer to an individual's personal, internal, and

unique perception of events, emotions, and sensations that cannot be objectively measured or
verified by others. i.e. I don’t know if your foot hurts unless you tell me. I also don’t feel the pain
that you do – it is your subjective experience.

Thought : the mental activity performed through the use of concepts, symbols, or
representations. It is the "internal dialogue" of the mind. It is the process of manipulating mental
representations. Your mind doesn't interact with the world directly; instead, it works with
"proxies" (ideas, images, or concepts). When you think of a "tree," you are manipulating a
mental symbol that represents the physical tree.

Typification : an understanding of something as adhering to a type, or perhaps an

archetype. Coffee shops typically sell coffee and sometimes food. You can buy to take out, or
you can drink in. Our knowledge of such means there is a typification for coffee shops that we
hold. Many other things have a ‘core pattern’ that can be applied to them.

Understanding : To have the power of comprehension. To achieve a grasp of the nature,

significance, or explanation of something. To know the meaning of something that someone
says. To know what something is like – to touch, to hold, to see, to act upon.

Cognitive understanding : LLMs achieve a capability of language which gives them the
patterns that allow their algorithms to exhibit the appearance of cognitive understanding. They
can use the words to discuss, but they have no real-world grasp of the meaning of the words, they
only calculate that the words fit together in certain ways that make sense as a response. They
show structural competence in language and can arrange symbols plausibly.

Conscious understanding : Theo, humans (and other creatures) achieve conscious

understanding within months of being born. We grasp the true experiential meaning of ‘cat’ or
‘dog’ in way that an LLM never can. We have an experience of what things are like. (and if you
have ever washed a dog, or tried to bathe a cat, you really know what things are like)

Volition : the mental act or process of willing : specifically, the bridge between a person’s
inner deliberation (thoughts/desires) and their outward physical action.
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