Structural Adjustment: Glossary
Structural Adjustment: Glossary
1
2 Structural Adjustment
the current period is examined, where, despite changes in looked for other avenues for profitable investment. These
name and emphasis, SAPs are still very much in so-called petrodollars were lent to developing countries
evidence. at relatively low interest rates. In the late 1970s, as one of
SAPs are based on a belief that free markets can the earliest neoliberal attacks on inflation in the core
deliver the best route to prosperity and development. In economies, interest rates were raised rapidly. For those
terms of economic policy the post-war period up to the developing countries with loans from Northern banks
early 1970s was broadly characterized as one of Key- this created a massive and unsustainable debt problem
nesianism, which saw a role for the state to balance with Mexico famously declaring itself bankrupt and un-
out economic cycles and protect the marginalized. able to repay in 1982. For the banks this was a huge (and
By contrast, neoliberalism believes in a minimalist state embarrassing) issue that could threaten the legitimacy of
and a faith that open and unfettered economies can the international financial system and the privileges of
generate growth, which will eventually trickle down to wealth it secured. Hence, a mechanism was needed to
the poorest. repay the debt, which ensured that these economies did
While Keynesian policy was focused on national not decline further so that funds were available for debt
economies, international economic regulation in the post- servicing. It is at this critical point that structural ad-
war period was through a system called the ‘gold stand- justment first appears.
ard’, which pegged currencies to the value of gold and Given that state financing was available commercially,
prevented wild speculation. Additionally, a system of the Bretton Woods Institutions had to ‘reinvent’ them-
international economic institutions was created to avoid selves as development agencies whose main work was in
volatility. The architecture of this was laid down at a the developing world, and from the late 1980s the former
conference in 1944 at the Bretton Woods ski resort in the Soviet Bloc as well. Their role became that of ensuring
USA, so that this complex of regulatory bodies became the steady repayment of debt and the inculcation of
known as the Bretton Woods Institutions and included neoliberal economic ‘openness’, which they did by at-
the IMF, the International Bank for Reconstruction and taching policy conditions to the concessional loans they
Development (more usually called the World Bank), and granted to developing countries. It was following the
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), neoliberal turns in the USA under President Ronald
which later became the World Trade Organization Reagan, in the UK under Prime Minister Margaret
(WTO). In different ways these institutions sought to Thatcher, and in Germany under Chancellor Helmut
regulate international economic flows and were governed Kohl that the Bretton Woods Institutions formally
by representatives of the countries that contributed introduced SAPs in the early 1980s.
finances. Although set up in Bretton Woods, these institutions
By the early 1970s pressures had mounted which saw a are all based in Washington, DC. The orthodoxy that
gradual dismantling of the Keynesian regulatory system. came to dominate their relationships with the developing
The gold standard was abandoned and currency move- world became known as the Washington Consensus and
ment became easier, in many developed economies in- enforced a dogmatic reading of neoliberal policy as part
flation and labor unrest were distressing governments, of their conditions. This started in the early 1980s and
and an oil crisis forced an international recession. This was in full flow by the middle of that decade. These
was set against Cold War polarities, which saw aid and controversial policies had mixed impacts that are dis-
(often covert) military support for regimes that professed cussed below, but in the subsequent quarter of a century
support for one of the superpowers. they became, and remain, a major feature of international
In September 1973, a US-backed coup d’etat in Chile development despite undergoing some changes in
ousted the left-leaning Salvador Allende and replaced emphasis.
him with General Pinochet. Pinochet and his allies in As a result of limited impacts, theoretical critique, and
the US put in place an economic model that removed active resistance, the 1990s saw a softening on the hard
labor regulations and brutally suppressed dissent. The neoliberal line. The discourse shifted away from growth-
intellectual support came from a group of economists at-any-costs liberalization to poverty eradication by a
based in the University of Chicago and led by Milton more diverse set of means, although never displacing the
Friedman. These ‘Chicago Boys’ were the architects centrality of the market mechanism. This saw structural
of the neoliberal policies in Chile, which acted as a adjustment programs falling out of circulation as a term
test bed for ideas that would soon come to dominate to describe neoliberal policies and being replaced by a
policy. new, but very similar, initiative called Poverty Reduction
Internationally the oil crisis of the early 1970s gen- Strategies (PRSs). In order to fully appreciate how
erated a recession but also huge profits for oil producers. structural adjustment operates and the difference that
With vast amounts of money in the banks, but geographical context makes, it is necessary to understand
fewer productive outlets in the capitalist core, bankers what constitutes a typical SAP.
Structural Adjustment 3
specific projects, such as the revamping of a port facility, Table 1 Performance indicators for a sample of adjusting
they are given directly to the national treasury to be countries
spent in accordance with the home-grown adjustment Country Average annual per capita growth rate
program set out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (%), from first SAP to 1999
(PRSP). This so-called ‘direct budget support’ appears to Africa
give greater control to recipient governments, but despite Niger 2.3
this rhetoric of ownership all PRSs contain the same Zambia 2.1
Madagascar 1.8
elements as SAPs in terms of liberalization and cost Togo 1.6
recovery. Cote d’Ivoire 1.4
Malawi 0.2
Mali 0.1
Impacts and Effects Mauritania 0.1
Senegal 0.1
Kenya 0.1
Although neoliberalism is usually talked about in uni- Ghana 1.2
versal terms, its elaboration and effects are locally spe- Uganda 2.3
cific. In this subsection we review some of the key Other developing
impacts of SAPs, while trying to capture these complex countries
geographical patterns. Analysis is difficult for various Bolivia 0.4
reasons. First is the counterfactual problem, because it Philippines 0.0
Jamaica 0.4
can never be known what would have happened to the
Mexico 0.4
economy had SAPs never been implemented. The usual Argentina 1.0
approach is simply to take ‘before’ and ‘after’ snapshots of Morocco 1.1
key indicators to try and capture what impacts SAPs have Bangladesh 2.4
had. Second, SAPs focused on domestic conditions and Pakistan 2.7
constraints, whereas economic performance is also af- Minimum in the top 2.3
fected by global conditions so it is hard to separate out 20
which effects were produced by what factors. Third, data Average top 20 0.1
Maximum in the top 2.7
for many developing countries are poor so calculating 20
impacts is always difficult. However, qualitative data is Average all 0.3
often used to get behind the aggregate trends. We begin developing
with aggregate trends before disaggregating the impacts countries
of major reform areas. Transition countries
Table 1 shows the performance of countries classified Ukraine 8.4
as ‘strong adjustors’ meaning a commitment to SAPs Russian Federation 5.7
and receiving many loans. It shows that contrary to the Kyrgyz Republic 4.4
Kazakhstan 3.1
objective of ‘adjustment with growth’, the recipients of Bulgaria 2.2
adjustment loans had the same near-zero per capita Romania 1.2
growth rates as the overall developing country sample. Hungary 1.0
In the worst cases, there were very poor macroeconomic Poland 3.4
outcomes, although the best cases showed that growth Albania 4.4
Georgia 6.4
was possible. The best performers tended to stabilize
their economies, which could have gone further Minimum 8.4
Median 1.7
awry with SAPs, but then failed to kick-start growth.
Maximum 6.4
However, there were no cases where growth was rea-
From Easterly, W. (2002). What did structural adjustment adjust? The
sonable and all macroeconomic imbalances were under
association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank
control for the adjustment lending period. For example, adjustment loans, Center for Global Development, Institute for
by 1992 Uganda had shown good growth, but erratic and International Economics, August 2002, [Link]/content/
high inflation, despite having received 14 adjustment publicatons/detail/2779.
loans.
This strong adjustment lending group includes some
notable disasters. Zambia received 18 adjustment loans initiation of adjustment lending, Bolivia had hyper-
but had sharp negative growth, large current account and inflation, negative real interest rates, and overvaluation.
budget deficits, high inflation, massive overvaluation of Even when Bolivia stabilized inflation in 1987, growth
the currency, and a negative real interest rate. In other was poor, interest rates swung from excessively negative
regions, there were also problem cases. After the to excessively positive, and overvaluation remained.
Structural Adjustment 5
The ex-communist ‘transition’ countries only received survival strategies. So, those worse affected by trade
adjustment loans in the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin liberalization are smallholder farmers who cannot pro-
Wall and the breakup of the USSR. Their average growth duce for export, very small manufacturing enterprises,
was –1.7% per annum, showing an overall decline, but and semiskilled labor.
there were more successes than in Africa. Six of the In terms of financial liberalization the SAPs aimed to
countries had negative per capita growth and four had reform interest rates, ease the flow of funds in and out of
positive growth after the initiation of SAP lending. Only countries, and make credit easier to access. These are
Albania, Georgia, Poland, and Hungary are clear success basically about de-regulating the financial sector. A key
stories. outcome is that while these regulations have been re-
It would be wrong to argue that SAPs have had no laxed, only those people and businesses with a sound
benefits, but what is crucial is the distribution of these financial footing have been able to capitalize on these
benefits between and within countries, which brings the opportunities, leading to concentration of ownership and
logical rider of the distribution of their costs. At one level the further enrichment of the already rich at the expense
SAPs have been successful in ensuring debts are repaid. of the poorer section of society. Particularly badly hit
This net transfer of finance from the poor to rich coun- have been small- and medium-sized enterprises that
tries can be viewed as a form of tribute, not dissimilar lacked sufficient collateral for loans. Many of these are
to the actions of colonial governments in the nineteenth women run, so the effects of financial liberalization were
and twentieth centuries. In development speak adjusting felt worse by them. The wealthiest who could gain credit
countries service their debt, which when measured often used a portion of this on nonproductive con-
against economic activity (GDP) gives a ‘debt–service sumption, which raised demand for foreign imports over
ratio’. The higher the ratio, the greater percentage of a local goods, thereby exacerbating the effects of trade
country’s income goes on paying off loans. An example of liberalization.
the typical impacts of SAPs is Ghana. In 1983, at the start While competition from imports, among other things,
of the first SAP, its debt–service ratio was 0.81% but undermined local producers, other changes such as pri-
jumped to 10.82% in 1987 meaning that one dollar in vatization and labor market reforms have also impacted
nine went on repayments to the lenders. It was the on the poorest in adjusting countries. In countries with a
recognition of this crippling debt servicing that forced well-established manufacturing base, jobs that were cre-
HIPC and related moves. ated were often in ‘flexible’ and semiskilled industries,
Trade liberalization aims to enhance exports and which meant that labor has low pay, few rights, and little
encourage competition from imports to promote do- job security. Again, this changed labor market was gen-
mestic industries. All countries with an SAP put such dered with women usually taking the jobs in manu-
provisions in place and, in general, their exports did facturing and subject to harsh labor conditions. The
rise. In keeping with theories of comparative advantage export drive of SAPs also pushes the economy into
countries were encouraged to produce in sectors where specialization, which renders some sectors unviable. For
they had an advantage, which often meant relying on a example, where agricultural production is not for export,
narrow range of products, such as one or two commodity it becomes obsolete and generates rural unemployment
crops. As a result, adjusting economies rarely diversified and a concomitant rise in rural–urban migration, which
to develop intersectoral linkages or a more robust port- undermines rural communities. And as unemployment
folio of different activities. The rise in exports was set rises, households are forced into securing income and
against a rise in imports, which meant that the overall resources from wherever they can, which can mean for-
balance of payments position did not improve. Many of cing children into informal and risky jobs (Figure 1).
these imports are finished consumer goods rather than Privatization was intended to enhance the com-
intermediate capital goods that would be used in do- petitiveness of the economy and reduce the liability on
mestic manufacturing, which means they usually dis- the state of inefficient enterprises. SAP countries tended
placed comparable local products that may be more to produce an audit of their SOIs, get them into rea-
expensive or poorer quality. The net effect of this is de- sonable financial shape, and then offer them for sale on
industrialization where the number of firms declines, international markets. Typically these included hotels,
production falls away even more, unemployment rises, heavy industry and commodity processing plants, and
and purchasing power in the local economy is reduced. infrastructures like telecommunications, water, and
Sectorally there has been a shift away from manu- electricity. Privatization has had mixed results, with ef-
facturing to services, but local firms often lack the ex- ficiency rising in some and a reduction in the state’s
pertise, which opens the market up to foreign firms. In obligations coupled with a rise in taxable income. In
addition, as larger and more formal firms close, this re- general, the best SOIs were cherry picked by foreign
leases labor, which cannot be absorbed and is forced to investors which meant that profits leave the country.
enter the informal sector and rely on a range of risky Socially, the move toward efficiency resulted in
6 Structural Adjustment
streamlining practices and getting rid of unwanted labor, effects for society and economy. The introduction of user
which adds to unemployment levels. Additionally, in fees for these basic services puts them out of reach of the
most cases, the prices for privatized services like phones poorest in society, which further deepens their exclusion
rose after privatization pushing them further out of reach and poverty. These effects were so visible in the early
of the poor. In this respect, water has been the most days of adjustment that a landmark publication called
difficult and contested as it is obviously vital to life and ‘Adjustment with a human face’ was published by the United
costing it out of reach of the poor makes humane living Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in 1987, which
near impossible (Figure 2). highlighted the impacts on the poor and vulnerable and
Cutbacks in social spending and the repricing of called for the introduction of social safety nets to protect
government services are designed to balance the gov- people during the harsh, but supposedly temporary, ad-
ernment’s books and free up funds for debt repayment. In justment process. The social protection schemes were
practice, this means reduced funding for education and rolled out with much fanfare, but donor funding was
health in particular, which clearly has major knock-on quite limited and by making access conditional upon
Structural Adjustment 7
certain workfare practices they also served to reinforce a the donors despite a countervailing rhetoric of de-
pro-market logic. mocratization and self-determination.
Agricultural promotion was also geared to exporting A key paradox of structural adjustment is that the
cash crops at the expense of locally consumed food crops. creation of ‘free’ markets unencumbered by state regu-
Additionally, to enhance the market competitiveness of lation requires a great deal of state-based politicking,
the sector subsidies on key inputs such as fertilizer were encompassing both the use of raw power and the less
cut. This has major livelihood and environmental con- obvious deployment of theoretical discourses. The
sequences. Poorer farmers who could no longer afford Bretton Woods Institutions are bound, in theory, to
inputs saw yields decline, which reduced income and noninterference in the politics of sovereign countries, yet
food security. It also meant that larger farmers who had conditionality shows that they are central to the decision
the initial capital or could access credit were able to making of many countries. At the national level we see
consolidate their position and expand at the expense of the state heavily involved in the withdrawal of the state
smaller farmers. This often meant taking over the best from regulation and service delivery. Rather than dis-
land and forcing the poorest onto even more marginal appearing, the state is restructured to form a parallel
land, which was more prone to environmental degrada- government run by insulated and unaccountable tech-
tion, thereby fuelling a vicious cycle of poverty and nocrats, most often located in the finance ministries. On
degradation. The focus on cash crops also encouraged the other hand, much is made in the neoliberal armory of
mono-cropping, that reduced biodiversity and with it an devolution to enhance ‘choice’ at the local level which
increase in the susceptibility of crops to disease. Similar runs counter to the massive centralization of power that
trends were seen in mineral extraction as mining enter- the implementation of SAPs requires.
prises expanded operations at the expense of agricultural This polemic of devolution within SAPs suggests that
land, not to mention the pollution problems associated local governance is to be a key arena for enhancing
with under-regulated heavy industry. Overall, food pro- political choice. This localism has seen a whole host of
duction for local consumption was negatively affected political experiments centered on ‘civil society’, ‘par-
by these reforms, which saw a consolidation and spe- ticipation’, and ‘empowerment’. These positive and rad-
cialization of production. ical sounding concepts promise local self-determination,
While it is difficult to generalize about the aggregate but prove to be about marketizing services such as edu-
impacts of SAPs, compared to their stated aims there was cation, bypassing the central state which has in many
limited or negative economic growth, increased social cases proven obstructive to liberalization, and as a vehicle
polarization, and enhanced foreign ownership. However, for promoting certain civil society organizations that are
debt had been serviced. Within these general impacts known to be pro-market. As a result, ‘choice’ through
women and children were the worst affected. So the devolution is part of the wider move to create markets
economic pie did not increase much in size, but the and weaken opposition to SAPs, while all the time
richest peoples’ share of the pie got bigger. couching it in a language of empowerment.
As we have seen, the PRSs promise a big change from This localism has proven to be one of the mainstays of
the SAPs of the 1980s and 1990s. While it is a little early the ‘good governance’ programs already mentioned. After
to say with any precision what the effects have been, nearly a decade of SAPs it was realized that the economic
there is a lack of clarity over how they will contribute to impacts were limited, which donors put down to political
poverty reduction as opposed simply to stabilization and and bureaucratic bottlenecks. In many cases well-placed
growth. By and large, the strategies still focus on eco- political elites were able to benefit from the new inflows
nomic growth without really addressing how any growth of money, often through corrupt re-routing of funds for
is to be redistributed to the poor. At their heart are the personal or party gain, and so needed to be stopped or
same macroeconomic prescriptions of the old SAPs with bypassed. This led to a whole raft of political reforms
a continued emphasis on privatization, liberalization, and such as downsizing bureaucracies, removing key indi-
a reduced role for the state. viduals, insulating decision making, and using external
consultants to provide ‘objective’ analysis of what needed
to be changed. These programs were always couched in
terms of accountability and transparency, and were tied
The Politics of Sovereignty and to democratization agendas that also promised account-
Accountability ability. Such attempts to remove blockages to the reforms
were not only a donor-driven agenda, but were supported
The economic effects of SAPs are clearly far reaching, by domestic citizens keen to see an end to corruption.
but so too are their political impacts. In this subsection Where the tension arose was the sometimes untran-
we examine the politics of SAP intervention, which af- sparent and heavy-handed way in which good governance
fects national sovereignty and promotes accountability to reforms were implemented. People noted the irony of
8 Structural Adjustment
Conclusion
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