12th De La Salle Model United Nations

STUDY GUIDE
United Nations Industrial Development
Organization
Agenda 01: Utilizing Sustainable Industrial Strategies to Address the
Global North and South Economic Divide
Agenda 02: Fostering Inclusive Industrial Innovation Through
Decentralized Manufacturing

Head Chair: Journey Padme P. Fernando

Vice Chair: Kelly Gabrielle Divingarcia
Rapporteur: Miguel Santino M. Boniol
Auxiliary Dais: Leona Elyssa S. Aboy
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS​ 3
YOUR BOARD OF DAIS​ 5
FERNANDO, JOURNEY PADME​ 5
DIVINAGRACIA, KELLY GABRIELLE​ 5
BONIOL, MIGUEL​ 6
LETTER FROM THE BOARD OF DAIS​ 7
COMMITTEE INTRODUCTION​ 9
BACKGROUND OF THE COMMITTEE​ 9
COMMITTEE MANDATE​ 10
COMMITTEE STRUCTURE​ 10
Agenda 01: Utilizing Sustainable Industrial Strategies to Address the Global North and South
Economic Divide​ 11
Introduction​ 11
History​ 12
Background​ 13
Key Definitions​ 14
Discussion​ 16
Equitable Access to Green Technology and Innovation​ 16
Bridging the Climate Finance Gap​ 16
Promoting Inclusive and Sustainable Policy​ 17
Addressing Global Value Inequities​ 17
Key Stakeholders​ 18
Role of the International Community​ 18
Conclusion​ 19
Guide Questions​ 20
Agenda 02: Fostering Inclusive Industrial Innovation Through Decentralized Manufacturing​ 21
Introduction​ 21
History​ 22
Background​ 23
Key Definitions​ 24
Discussion​ 25
Supporting Businesses Entering Competitive Industries​ 25
Ensuring Equitable Participation in Innovations​ 25
 The Question of Sustainability in Production and Manufacturing​ 25
Incentivizing the Decentralization of Manufacturing​ 26
Key Stakeholders​ 26
Role of the International Community​ 27
Conclusion​ 27
Guide Questions​ 28
REFERENCES​ 29
YOUR BOARD OF DAIS

FERNANDO, JOURNEY PADME

Head Chair
Journey Padme Fernando, also known as Journ, is a freshman at Ateneo de Manila University, where she studies
Diplomacy and International Relations with a specialization in East and Southeast Asian Studies. She has been
active in Model United Nations since 2024, gaining experience as both a delegate and a member of the dais
across multiple conferences. Outside MUN, she is engaged in human rights and inclusion advocacy, having
represented the Philippines and Southeast Asia in regional and global platforms such as UNFCCC, ASEAN,
UNCSW, UN-HLPF, and FAO. She is also currently working as a Partnerships Assistant at the World
Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA), supporting international cooperation and
multistakeholder engagement. Driven by a deep interest in diplomacy, culture, and global dialogue, Journey is
particularly passionate about youth representation in policymaking and building bridges across cultures. In her
free time, she enjoys traveling and learning new languages.

DIVINAGRACIA, KELLY GABRIELLE

Vice Chair​
Kelly Gabrielle Divinagracia is a second-year student in the Diplomacy and International Affairs Program of De
La Salle–College of St. Benilde. She has been actively participating in Model United Nations conferences since
2023, serving as both a delegate and a member of the dais, and most recently as the Director-General of the 26th
BenildeMUN. Beyond this, she demonstrates a strong passion for advocacy as the President of her school’s
Scholars’ Association, the Secretary-General of an upcoming ASEAN Meeting, and as a recent representative of
the Philippines at the ASEAN Literary Summit and Global Landscapes Forum (GLF). In addition, Kelly is a
member of the Bayanihan, the National Folk Dance Troupe of the Philippines, where she combines her love for
dance with her dedication to promoting local heritages. Guided by her interest in inclusive policy making,
climate action, and cultural diversity, she believes that meaningful global change begins at the grassroots level
through informed, ethical dialogues.
BONIOL, MIGUEL
Rapporteur
Miguel Boniol is a current first-year student at De La Salle University—Manila, studying under the
Management of Financial Institutions; Essentially, a Finance student. However, despite being in an extensively
business-centric field of study, he also possesses a somewhat extensive history in Model UN, having been in the
circuit since 2024. He has been a delegate, dais, and even a member of a conference’s organizing committee on
some occasions, although, as of late, he is not as active in the circuit as he once was. In that span of time, and due
to his being an ABM student beforehand, he gained an interest in the intersection between international affairs
and the private sector, particularly in the role and influence private entities have on the global state of affairs,
which is what led him to this committee; As such, he looks forward to how the topics for the committee will be
tackled, and the different perspectives brought to the table by the delegates in pursuit of these challenges.
LETTER FROM THE BOARD OF DAIS
Dear Delegates,

It is a privilege to welcome you to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization committee at the
12th DLSMUN. You have chosen to engage with two topics that sit at the very heart of the most pressing
questions facing the Global South today: how we build, who we build for, and whether the industries of the
twenty-first century will be structured to include the people and places that the last century left behind. That is
the weight of what you will debate, and we are honored to guide you through it.

This committee is designed to push beyond the surface of diplomatic performance and into the substance of
how industrial policy actually works. You will grapple with terms not as jargon to be recited, rather as concepts
that determine real outcomes. You will consider whether decentralized manufacturing can genuinely reach rural
communities or whether it risks becoming another enclave industry dressed in a new language. You will confront
the tension between open-source innovation and intellectual property protection, between the urgency of
climate action and the imperative of industrial growth, between the models that have worked for some and the
models that must work for all. We expect you to defend your country's interests with precision and conviction,
but we also expect you to listen, to negotiate, and to recognize that in this forum, the solutions you craft will be
judged not by how loudly they are argued but by how well they hold together.

As your dais, we are here not to lecture but to guide, to challenge, and to ensure that the debate remains
grounded in the realities that make this work matter. We have prepared this study guide to give you a
foundation, but what you build on it is entirely yours. Read closely, research thoroughly, and come prepared to
represent your country with the seriousness that this agenda deserves. We know that Model UN can sometimes
feel like a game of procedure and persuasion, but on these topics, the stakes are real. The decisions you simulate
here mirror decisions being made in capitals and conference rooms across the world, decisions that will
determine whether the next phase of global industrial development lifts the many or consolidates the gains of the
few.

We cannot wait to see what you bring to the committee room. Bring your arguments, bring your evidence, but
also bring your willingness to be surprised by a good idea from a delegate you thought you disagreed with. Bring
your understanding that in a committee on industrial development, the most powerful tool you have is a
well-constructed proposal that enough countries can see themselves in. And bring your energy, because this is
going to be a debate worth having.

Welcome to UNIDO, let’s get to work!

United By Diplomacy, Powered By Service.

Fernando, Journey
Head Chair
[Link]@[Link]

Divinagracia, Kelly
Vice Chair
[Link]@[Link]

Boniol, Miguel
Rapporteur
miguel_santino_boniol@[Link]

Aboy, Leona Elyssa

Auxiliary Dais
leonaelyssaa@[Link]
COMMITTEE INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND OF THE COMMITTEE

Following a series of programmes in the 1950s engaging in the rapid industrialization of several developing
countries undertaken by the United Nations’ (UN) Secretariat, the General Assembly (GA), and the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC), it was clear to the whole body that there was a need for a change in their
operations to conduct more substantive work in the field and to address its complex issues more effectively
(Bredel, 2017). Pursuant to this, in 1963, a ten (10) member advisory committee under ECOSOC was formed,
consisting of various experts on the UN’s work in this field to formulate a viable approach to tackle this
problem, and, in 1965, they concluded to establish a subsidiary body under the GA dedicated to
Industrial Development (Bredel, 2017). This decision was later endorsed by the GA under A/RES/2089,
aiming to form an “autonomous organization for the promotion of industrial development” (United
Nations General Assembly, 1965), and further substantiated in A/RES/2152 in 1966, defining the mandate,
functions, and organizational structure of the body, as well as giving it the name of the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) (United Nations General Assembly, 1966); In 1967, the
body was formalized, and the organization came into existence.

Despite this, it eventually became clear to the members of UNIDO that further changes and development were
necessary for the organization to be able to perform its mission to its best ability, and, in 1975, the UNIDO
General Conference held that year recommended that the body be converted into a specialized agency
independent from the GA and further recommended the creation of an Industrial Development Fund to
operate with greater autonomy and, with it, greater capability to fulfill its purpose (Hurt, 2024). The GA
endorsed this recommendation later that year through both A/RES/32/166 for the creation of the Industrial
Development Fund (United Nations General Assembly, 1977a) and A/RES/32/167 for the conversion of
UNIDO into a specialized agency (United Nations General Assembly, 1977a). Through the latter resolution,
the GA convened a conference dedicated to the formalisation of UNIDO as a specialized agency that would, in
1979, produce the UNIDO Constitution, which would then be ratified in 1985, solidifying UNIDO’s status as
a specialized agency (Hurt, 2024).
COMMITTEE MANDATE
Aligned with the ninth (9th) Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) of Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure,
UNIDO fundamentally serves as a global platform for knowledge and technology, with its primary mandate
being to promote inclusive and sustainable industrial development and cooperation among its member
states, supporting developing countries and emerging economies to further build their industries (United
Nations Industrial Development Organization, n.d.-d). In order to carry out their operations, UNIDO, under
its convening function, also serves as a medium between nations, business associations, and the private
industrial sector, which, in turn, allows UNIDO to facilitate and develop the industrial capabilities and
infrastructure needed for states to develop sustainably and, in turn, reap the benefits of globalization throughout
the industry (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.).

Additionally, the organization upholds its mandate through its five (5) functions: (1) technical cooperation,
(2) policy advice and statistical analysis, (3) development and compliance with norms and standards, (4)
the aforementioned convening function, and (5) partnership development (United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, n.d.-d). As it stands, these functions, and the rest of the work done by the
organization, is currently focused on three (3) priority areas: (1) advancing agro-industries and local
value addition to end world hunger, (2) driving clean and sustainable energy, energy efficiency measures,
and climate action, and (3) building fair and sustainable supply chains to ensure fair deals among
producers in developing countries (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, n.d.-d).

COMMITTEE STRUCTURE
As of the present day, UNIDO is composed of 173 member states (United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, n.d.-d) and has two policymaking organs. The General Conference (GC) serves as the
organization’s supreme policymaking organ, wherein all member states meet every two years, determining
the guiding principles and policies of the organization, as well as approving its budget and work
programme. The GC also appoints the organization’s Director-General, who serves as its head, every four
years, and elects the members of the Industrial Development Board (IDB) and the Programme and
Budget Committee (PBC) (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, n.d.-a).

On the other hand, the Industrial Development Board, which convenes once every year, is composed of 53
of the organization’s members, each elected for a four-year term on a rotating roster that goes through all
member states. The organ is concerned with the implementation of the organization’s work programme,
its regular and operational budgets, and the formulation of recommendations to the GC on policy
matters (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, n.d.-b). In addition, the IDB possesses a
subsidiary organ in the form of the Programme and Budget Committee, similarly meeting once a year in
order to assist the board for the preparation and examination of the work programme, budget, and
other similar financial matters (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, n.d.-c).
Agenda 01: Utilizing Sustainable Industrial Strategies to Address the
Global North and South Economic Divide

Introduction

The divide between the Global North and South is one of the enduring structural features of the world
economy, and it is perhaps nowhere more visible than in the realm of industry. For countries in the Global
South, industrial capacity remains the critical link between raw material extraction and lasting economic
prosperity—the difference between exporting unprocessed minerals and manufacturing finished goods, between
vulnerability to global price swings and the stability of diversified production; yet the pathways that allowed
industrialized nations to build their wealth now exist in an entirely different context. The carbon-intensive
model that powered earlier development is no longer viable, and the countries that industrialized first are now
the ones setting the terms of global climate policy. This leaves developing economies in a difficult position,
expected to pursue growth without replicating the very methods that historically made growth possible.

The United Nations Industrial Development Organization occupies an unusual space in this tough situation.
Unlike agencies focused on humanitarian relief or financial assistance, UNIDO focuses on productive capacity.
Found in factories, energy systems, technology transfer, and the technical standards that shape what countries
can actually make. Its mandate rests on a proposition that industrial development does not have to come at the
expense of the environment and that the choice between economic growth and sustainability is a false one. This
has proven to be very difficult to execute. In practice, this means working with governments on industrial policy,
helping small and medium enterprises adopt cleaner technologies, and trying to ensure that the green
technologies transforming global energy systems are actually accessible to the countries that need them most.

What makes this agenda complicated is that the barriers are not primarily technical. The knowledge and tools to
build cleaner industries exist, but the challenge is that they are concentrated in the places that were already
industrialized decades ago. Developing countries hold many of the minerals essential for the global energy
transition, yet they capture only a small fraction of the value they generate. Investment in renewable energy
flows overwhelmingly toward wealthier nations, leaving regions like Africa with a sliver of global clean energy
financing despite its enormous potential. Against all of this, the question before the committee is not simply
how to promote sustainable industry, but whether industrial policy can be structured to close the very gaps that
previous waves of industrialization helped create.
History

The economic divide between the Global North and South dates back to the colonial era. Colonization under
European countries and North America has involved major exploitation of resources, both material and human,
in countries in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, West Asia, and Southeast Asia, which are considered part of
the Global South.

A crucial example of this includes the export-reliant economies of African states in the 19th Century, which not
only led to a major struggle for many nations to maintain economic footing after gaining independence but also
highlighted a major issue of trade ports and infrastructure being made mainly to accommodate export and
external trade (Settles, 1996). Similarly, during the Industrial Revolution, Britain established around 300 cotton
mills in India, a century after having driven millions of local cotton businesses to bankruptcy (Chatterjee, 2018).
These are only some of the many instances where historical colonialism has contributed to the development of
an economic divide between North and South.

Despite efforts worldwide, the economic gap between the global North and South remains wide. In the 1980s,
former Chancellor of West Germany Willy Brandt drew the line that later came to be known as the Brandt Line
(Jacobs, 2024). This line divided the world into the developed Global North and the developing Global South.
In this map, the countries that fall under the Global South line include all of Latin America; the Caribbean;
Cyprus; Turkey; China and the rest of Asia aside from Japan, and the entirety of Africa. In the Southern
Hemisphere, only New Zealand and Australia are considered by the Brandt line to be part of the Global North
due to their stable, well-developed economies.

Recently, however, notable changes have been made in the economies of many of these nations initially
considered part of the Global South. While the Brandt line has yet to be officially updated, many countries, such
as Singapore and South Korea have significantly developed their economies to the point of being considered part
of the Global North instead (Braff & Nelson, 2021). Despite that, the entirety of Africa and many parts of Latin
America remain to be seen as part of the Global South.
Background

The structural divide between industrialised and developing economies did not emerge overnight, nor is it
maintained by accident. Its roots trace back to the colonial era, when entire continents were organised around
the extraction of raw materials to feed factories in Europe and later North America. This pattern did not end
with political independence. Through the 1980s and 1990s, many countries in the Global South were
encouraged, and in some cases compelled, to open their markets, remove tariffs, and privatize state-owned
industries as conditions for loans from international financial institutions (Prashad, 2025). The result, in too
many cases, was not the flourishing of competitive industries but something closer to the opposite, with textile
mills closed across West Africa, fabrication shops shut down in Southern Africa, and manufacturing belts in
Latin America shedding workers and capacity. What remained was an economy structured much as it had been
under colonial rule, focused on exporting commodities and importing manufactured goods. This history
matters because it shaped the starting point. When the conversation turns to sustainable industrialisation, the
countries being asked to build clean industries are often the same ones whose earlier attempts at building any
industries at all were actively dismantled.

The current context only sharpens these contradictions, as the global energy transition, necessary as it is, has
introduced a new set of pressures. Developing countries hold many of the minerals essential for batteries, solar
panels, and green technologies, like lithium, cobalt, copper, and rare earths. However, they capture a tiny
fraction of the value they generate, continuing to export raw materials while wealthier nations manufacture the
finished products (Gandhinagar, 2023). Meanwhile, the rules of the game are shifting. Carbon border
adjustments, supply chain due diligence laws, and environmental standards are increasingly being set by the very
countries that industrialised first, creating new barriers for latecomers. At the same time, the technologies that
will define the next industrial era—artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, and green hydrogen—are
concentrated in the Global North, where adoption rates already outpace those in the South by a significant
margin (IANS, 2026). The World Bank's president recently warned that a "mistrust is quietly pulling the Global
North and South apart," with developing countries watching resources flow toward reconstruction elsewhere
while their own aspirations for industrial growth remain constrained.

Within this difficult landscape, there are shifts worth noting. The old assumption that industrialisation must
follow a single, carbon-intensive path is being challenged not just in theory but in practice. Projects like the
Daures Green Hydrogen Village in Namibia, still under construction, aim to show that a country can leapfrog
the fossil-fuel stage entirely, producing green fertilizer from renewable energy and creating local employment in
the process. Morocco and Costa Rica are participating in UNIDO's green hydrogen programmes. Ethiopia's
industrial parks, developed with UNIDO support, have attracted investment and drawn interest from other
African countries looking for models they might adapt (Lennon, 2025). These are not yet transformations at
scale, but they represent something significant, an insistence that sustainable industry is not a luxury reserved for
the already rich but a possibility that must be made accessible. The question before the committee is whether oo
such experiments can be replicated, scaled, and connected into something that resembles a genuine rebalancing
of global industrial capacity.

Key Definitions

Term Definition

Special Economic Zones (SEZs)

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are strategically
designated areas within a country that aim to
enhance economic growth through unique
regulatory measures. Offering tax incentives and
reduced tariffs, SEZs are tailored to attract substantial
foreign direct investment (FDI) by creating an
appealing business environment. This investment
involves cross-border interests where firms or
individuals from one country invest in another,
unlocking regional and global economic potential.
(Eichler et al., 2025)

Critical Raw Materials (CRMs)

Raw materials that are essential to the economy but
have a high risk of supply disruption. The term is
most commonly associated with the European Union
(EU), which maintains a regularly updated list of
CRMs based on their economic importance and
supply risk. These materials are vital for the
production of renewable energy technologies,
high-tech devices, defence applications, and much
more. Some examples of CRMs include lithium,
cobalt, and graphite. (Loughlin, 2025)

Leapfrogging Occurs when a nation bypasses traditional stages of

development to either jump directly to the latest
technologies, often called "stage-skipping," or explore
an alternative path of technological development
involving emerging technologies with new benefits
and new opportunities, known as “path-creating"
(Yayboke et al., 2020).
Circular Economy
Promotes sustainability by minimizing resource
consumption and encouraging reuse, recycling, and
recovery. Although the Global North has advanced
CE policies, Global South continues to face
persistent challenges, including weak waste
management systems and social inequality (Márquez
et al., 2025).

Global North
Economically developed, industrialized, and
wealthier nations, which are predominantly located
within the Northern Hemisphere. Countries from
the Global North include nations within the
European Union, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Canada, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea.
(Braff & Nelson, 2021).

Global South
Resource-constrained, economically dependent, and
industrially developing countries within the
Southern Hemisphere. Even after achieving
independence, these countries still bear the
sociocultural and economic repercussions of
colonialism by the Global North. The Global South
spans regions of Latin America, Africa, Asia
(excluding Japan, South Korea, and Singapore), and
Oceania. (Dados & Connell, 2012).
Discussion

Equitable Access to Green Technology and Innovation

Developing green technology and innovation in already developed countries is extremely difficult, as it often
incurs high financial costs and, without basic technological systems, makes it even more inaccessible, requiring
substantial technological assistance for implementation and large-scale adaptation. Additionally, intellectual
property has played a critical role in the international debate over sustainable technology, as entities from
higher-income countries often hold patents over innovative sustainable technology (Sustainability Directory,
2025). As many of these developing countries depend on donor- or lender-driven projects, donors' needs are also
often prioritized over local needs, which can pose even greater challenges in the long-term implementation of
projects that are not suited to local contexts. Thus, the culmination of bearing high costs and donor-favoring
technology projects makes it extremely difficult for developing countries in the Global South to continually
develop.

Bridging the Climate Finance Gap

Climate Finance, referring to the local, national, or transnational funding from various sectors of the economy,
including public and private, seeks to support climate change mitigation as well as promote sustainable
development. Oftentimes, climate finance in the international community refers to developed countries
donating to developing countries, which creates an imbalance in the strategies in which climate change
development occurs. More developed donor countries continually have more input into the implementation of
climate-change policies and technology, creating large biases in global sustainability discussions while also
undermining local perspectives in the implementation of their donor projects. However, international policy
regarding this has aimed to combat these issues. For instance, under the UNFCC-Paris architecture, developing
countries take the lead in providing climate finance to LDCs and SIDs, namely through the newly established
New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), setting a minimum floor of $3oo billion per year to work towards
sustainable development investment. Frameworks like the NCQG aim to reduce vulnerability within the
business cycle and climate shocks to establish a fairer global financial security net for countries, as well as scale up
climate finance for climate-resilient structural support. Additionally, by having a global goal and collective
international governance, it ensures that climate finance and implementation are representative and reflective of
an international perspective, encompassing the needs of countries worldwide. Moreover, investors often perceive
developing countries as high-risk when investing in projects due to currency volatility, political uncertainty, and
less developed capital markets, which disincentivize sustainable development investment.
 Promoting Inclusive and Sustainable Policy
Inclusive and sustainable policy refers to the all-encompassing and diverse perspectives taken into account within
sustainable policy development, which allows for long-term ecological stability. Although global, these policies
are often dominated by the developed global North, as they provide money for sustainability-focused donor
projects and spearhead a large portion of global sustainable technological innovation. This creates a democratic
deficit as the Global South possesses less influence despite also continually contributing to sustainable
development. Additionally, weak international, inclusive, and sustainable policy frameworks from overlapping
institutions are often inconsistent, making it difficult for countries to coordinate and implement coherent
policies. Voluntary commitments continually lack incentives for countries to engage and uphold these
sustainability goals. Furthermore, the limited institutional capacity also makes it difficult to design and
implement sustainable policies as they lack technical expertise, data systems, and human-resource capacity in the
climate planning, finance, and monitoring systems. Thus, these factors must all be considered when discussing
the current gaps between the global North and South when attempting to implement inclusive sustainable
development.

Addressing Global Value Inequities

Global value inequities often refer to the unequal distribution of wealth, income, and opportunities between the
Global North and South. Within the context of climate, wealthier countries often produce more emissions but
bear fewer consequences, which contributes to the imbalance in global economic and financial power. In this
way, preexisting wealth inequalities are further exacerbated by fewer consequences faced from their position in
power. These inequities are also visible within international value chains, in which Global Northern countries
outsource raw materials, production, and cheap labor from less developed Southern countries, and are able to
capture economic value and innovation. Climate change itself amplifies current economic inequities, as a
projected 88-135 million people will be pushed into poverty by exposing them to greater climate risks and
providing them with less access to finance, technology, and political leverage. Thus, due to exacerbations in
climate change as well as unequal wealth and economic power, addressing this conflict must take a multifaceted
perspective to solve the global issue.
Key Stakeholders
Some key stakeholders within the scope of addressing the global divide include international agencies, financial
investors, national governments, and local communities. International agencies are responsible for setting global
rules and frameworks while offering technical assistance, capacity building, and platforms to aid countries when
developing and monitoring sustainable development. Additionally, these agencies are also responsible for
facilitating finance and technology; specifically, in the context of providing funding and grants to international
funds is also another responsibility of these agencies. In relation to the work of international agencies, national
governments are another key stakeholder, who, on the international side, negotiate and interpret international
standards, which are translated through the implementation and design of national climate strategies and
regulatory frameworks. Global North governments often influence global economic chains while spearheading
donor-driven projects, while Global South governments often translate international goals and frameworks into
local laws and adaptation strategies. Financial investors, such as firms and development banks, also play a key role
in facilitating and funding climate projects while supplying capital for green infrastructure. However, financial
investor projects are often driven by self-interest, which may avoid adaptation for local contexts and render the
projects ineffective. Lastly, local governments and communities are essential to ensure that climate projects are
successful, scalable, and effective. They face the direct impacts of climate change as well as the effects of
implemented policies and projects. As affected populations, they bear the brunt of climate change consequences,
and as stakeholders to legislation, they provide input to create inclusive policy models and adoption plans and
constructive input to effective government implementation.

Role of the International Community

The international community bears the responsibility of ensuring economic equality amongst all nations.
Member states and stakeholders of the UNIDO and the international community must work with one another
to decrease the gap and address the economic divide between the Global North and South. The existence of such
a divide hinders the goal of the United Nations to bridge economic gaps between nations. The international
community holds an important role in assessing and implementing sustainable strategies to bridge the gap
between the Global North and South. The committee must be able to collaborate and take into account the
challenges and limitations countries of the Global South experience. At the same time, it is valuable to
understand how best to collaborate between countries and/or organizations to provide the resources needed for
these sustainable strategies.
Conclusion

The history of industrial development is not linear, nor is it a story that has already been written. For too long,
the assumption has been that the Global South must wait, wait for technology to trickle down, wait for
investment to arrive, wait for permission to industrialize in a way that no longer damages a planet that the North
already altered. But waiting has never been a strategy that serves those on the periphery of the global economy.
The countries that industrialized successfully did so because they made deliberate choices, protected nascent
industries, and understood that economic sovereignty is built instead of granted. Today, the tools are different,
but the principle remains the same: industrial capacity is not a gift from wealthier nations but something that
must be developed through policy, investment, and collective action among countries that share similar
challenges and aspirations.

This is where the notion of shared responsibility becomes something more than rhetoric. Countries of the
Global South face distinct but overlapping constraints of volatile commodity prices, crippling debt burdens,
climate vulnerability, and a global trading system designed by others. No single country can solve these problems
alone, yet when nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America coordinate on industrial policy, share knowledge on
green technologies, and negotiate together on the rules governing trade and investment, they shift the balance.
The responsibility, then, is not only to one's own country but also to the broader project of ensuring that the
next phase of global industrialisation does not reproduce the inequities of the last one.

As delegates, you carry something that no outside institution can provide, which is an understanding that
development is not an abstract concept to be debated in conference halls but can and will be a lived reality that
determines whether your neighbors have jobs, whether your cities can provide reliable electricity, and whether
your countries will be producers of the future or merely suppliers of its raw materials. The decisions made in this
committee on technology transfer, on financing mechanisms, and on trade rules will matter because they will
shape the options available to your countries for decades to come. But the work does not begin or end in this
room. It continues in the ministries, factories, and communities you represent. Sustainable industrialisation is
not a compromise between growth and the environment; it is the only durable path forward, and it is yours to
build.
Guide Questions
1.​ How can existing small-scale projects in LDCs aligned with sustainable innovations, such as the Daures
Green Hydrogen Village, be utilized to vitalize the LDCs’, and by extension, the rest of the global
south’s industrial development and growth opportunities?
2.​ How can existing green-adjacent projects designed for cost accessibility be further developed and
utilized as models for other states in the Global South to further develop their industries sustainably
and independently?
3.​ Given a sizable portion of the Global South are exporters of CRMs, how can the committee ensure a
shift toward sustainable strategies allows opportunities for these states to further develop their
economies and industrial markets, while ensuring the global supply chain does not get disrupted
significantly?
Agenda 02: Fostering Inclusive Industrial Innovation Through
Decentralized Manufacturing

Introduction

The idea that industrial production belongs in massive, centralized factories is not a law of nature, rather is a
historical arrangement, one that emerged alongside fossil-fuel abundance, cheap long-distance logistics, and a
global trading system organized around the principle that raw materials move from the periphery to the core,
where finished goods are made and then sold back. That model delivered extraordinary wealth to the countries
that industrialized first, but it also left deep structural marks on the economies that came later in the form of
fragmented industrial bases, dependence on imported manufactured goods, and manufacturing sectors that
often bypassed rural communities and small-scale producers entirely. Today, however, the world is shifting.
Supply chain disruptions, climate constraints, and the spread of digital manufacturing technologies are forcing
second opinions of what industrial production looks like and who it serves.

Decentralized manufacturing offers a completely different approach to this, where instead of concentrating the
production of a product in a handful of large facilities, it distributes it across smaller, often digitally connected
areas. Such as fabrication labs, agro-processing facilities near farming communities, and assembly networks
spread across regions rather than countries. The concept is not simply about making things smaller too, but
about restructuring who gets to participate in industrial production and where the value lands. In parts of
Africa, new trade initiatives are being built around decentralized production hubs designed to move finished
goods across borders without passing through extra-continental supply chains. In Southeast Asia, discussions
around industrial policy increasingly consider how small-scale manufacturing can be integrated into provincial
economies rather than confined to industrial estates on the outskirts of capital cities. What connects these efforts
is a shared recognition that industrial inclusion requires rethinking the architecture of production itself.

For the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, this shift aligns with a core part of its mandate of
ensuring that industrial development does not bypass the people and places that have historically been left
behind. UNIDO's work on decentralized manufacturing sits at the intersection of several priorities on job
creation, regional development, small enterprise growth, and the integration of advanced technologies into local
economies. But the model also raises practical questions that the committee will need to grapple with, which
delegates may find and raise in this study guide, questions that will determine whether the next era of industrial
innovation serves the few or the many.
History
The Industrial Revolutions (late 18th-early 19th Century and late 19th-20th Century) experienced a large
amount of innovations over the years—scientific, technological, and industrial. The mass production of goods
was made possible primarily by centralized factories, which allowed companies to concentrate machinery, labor,
and raw materials in a single location. This significantly made manufacturing much more cost and
labor-efficient. At the same time, centralized manufacturing and keeping all forms of labor in one area was costly
to the point mainly larger companies would be able to afford such a thing. This allowed these already large
companies to gain more leverage in their respective industry/ies, overshadowing smaller companies in being able
to produce more in a shorter amount of time due to the immense amount of resources.

Centralized manufacturing also later ran into a variety of problems. From being more vulnerable to disruptions,
being less flexible to local markets, and having negative impacts on the environment, many companies have come
to realize the limitations the strategy holds (Ike, 2024). After the Industrial Revolution, countries and
organizations looked for different solutions to these limitations, one of which includes decentralizing
manufacturing. Decentralized manufacturing has served as a way for businesses to not only increase the
sustainability of their factories and supply chains but also to prevent industries from becoming too centralized
or monopolized by large corporations (Mourtzis & Doukas, 2012). It allows other businesses and competitors,
big and small, to produce goods closer to places with high demand to customers, evening out the competition.

Today, Industry 5.0 introduces a slightly larger array of innovations, such as the Internet of Things (IoT), 3D
Printing, and many more. Compared to its preceding Industry 4.0, Industry 5.0 contains much more advanced
forms of digital communication. It has also assisted in the optimisation skills such as improving efficiency,
ensuring product quality, reducing waste, and many others, without being centralized (Kumar, 2024). While
decentralization continues to rely on raw energy, it has proven to be a step toward better and more equitable
industrialization, allowing smaller businesses to have better manufacturing services and compete with bigger
producers in the industry that may have had a monopoly over it otherwise.
Background

The origins of decentralized manufacturing as a policy concept started not in technological novelty alone, but in
a much longer and collective recognition that centralized industrial models have consistently left certain
populations and regions behind. Throughout the twentieth century, industrialization was understood as an idea
where factories clustered in cities, supply chains anchored to ports and rail hubs, and economic activity
concentrated in zones that could attract large-scale capital. For countries in the Global South, this meant that
even successful industrial strategies often produced unequal development, as urban centers boomed while
provincial areas stagnated, and the employment generated rarely reached the communities that needed it most.
For example, Ethiopia's experience with industrial parks demonstrated that even substantial foreign investment
could fail to generate the mass employment necessary to absorb rapidly growing labor forces when production
remained concentrated in places with limited linkages to the broader economy (Lavers, 2023). The result was a
pattern familiar across the developing world: realities of industrial growth that lifted national statistics but left
structural unemployment and regional inequality largely untouched.

The contemporary shift toward decentralized models has been accelerated by two converging forces. The first is
the maturation of digital manufacturing technologies like additive manufacturing, automated fabrication, and
distributed sensing that lower the minimum efficient scale of production and make it feasible to locate
manufacturing closer to both raw materials and end users. The second force is the waterfall of supply chain
disruptions over the past half-decade, which has begun a reconsideration of the risks associated with
hyper-centralized global production networks. The Africa Trade Engine, launched in late 2025, explicitly
positions itself as a response to pandemic-era vulnerabilities, building a network of manufacturing hubs across
South Africa, Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya designed to move finished goods within the continent rather
than through distant supply chains (South African Times, 2025). These developments are not yet a
transformation at scale, but they represent a shift in thinking from industrial policy as the creation of large,
singular facilities to industrial policy as the weaving together of distributed, regionally embedded production
systems.
What makes this agenda particularly urgent is the demographic and environmental context in which it unfolds,
since the Global South is home to the world's youngest populations, with Africa's median age below twenty, and
formal employment generation has consistently lagged behind labor force growth across much of the developing
world (Lavers, 2023). Decentralized manufacturing is not a panacea for this challenge, but it offers a fair pathway
that centralized models have largely failed to provide, like the possibility of locating production in regions where
people actually live; using technologies that can be operated at smaller scales; and building supply chains that
connect local producers to regional markets rather than requiring integration into distant global value chains. At
the same time, the climate imperative adds pressure to get this right. Distributed production, when designed
intentionally, can reduce the emissions associated with long-distance transport and enable the use of locally
sourced, renewable inputs. The question is whether the policy frameworks, investment mechanisms, and
technology transfer arrangements necessary to support this shift will be put in place or whether decentralized
manufacturing will remain a collection of pilot projects while the old model continues, unreformed, in the
places that have long been excluded from it.

Key Definitions

Term Definition

Regional Value Chains

Depicts production and consumption systems that are not organised globally but
within a single world region or administrative boundaries (Hulke & Revilla Diez,
2022).

Enclave Industry
Economic systems where members of a specific minority group come together to
establish businesses that cater primarily to their own community (Silverman, 2025).

Decentralized
Manufacturing A production model where production occurs in multiple locations, meaning that
manufacturing is distributed between separate facilities.

​
This model allows more customization to meet the needs of specific regions, reducing
transportation costs and providing local job opportunities (Kivimaa, 2023).
Discussion
To reach the goal of inclusive industrial innovation, delegates are expected to understand and tackle a variety of
issues to keep industrial innovations equitable and sustainable. Decentralized manufacturing has been found to
be a viable solution to these; there is much demand to address other issues surrounding sustainability and the
willingness of countries or businesses to adopt similar recommendations or frameworks.

Supporting Businesses Entering Competitive Industries

Globally, business costs and business start-up costs have been increasing alongside the amount of risks for
businesses, due to many geopolitical conflicts and issues that shake economies and industries (Bhattacharya &
Schwartz, 2024). Not only does this discourage entrepreneurs from starting businesses, but it also discourages
them from entering industries that may be considered “competitive”. The UNIDO has no capacity or mandate
to meddle in geopolitical issues, unlike other international bodies, it has the ability to help the businesses and
organizations affected by these issues. This highlights the importance of more support, be it in the form of
financial support or capacity-building, toward business owners deciding to enter certain industries, or having
difficulty in staying afloat in these industries.

Ensuring Equitable Participation in Innovations

Equitable representation and participation in formulating and adapting policies or programs regarding
industrial innovation is important to prevent certain countries falling behind due to lack of resources or
capacity. Not only countries, but particular demographics of the world need to be supported to achieve equity in
participation and reward from these innovations. Gender equality, racism, ethnicism, and other forms of
discrimination prevent businesses or workers from maximizing their ability in businesses and other forms of
participation in innovation. The same also goes for the marginalized and impoverished members of society who
need support to make all members of the workforce and business receive enough to make equitable economies
and industries.

The Question of Sustainability in Production and Manufacturing

Centralized manufacturing has already been found to be heavier on the environment due to the raw energy use
during production, and the amount of resources needed for centralized mass production (Ike, 2024). Beyond
that, centralized manufacturing produces more waste and leaves a greater carbon footprint from emissions of
transportation. In comparison, decentralized manufacturing contributes to global warming to less extents.
While the comparison is still significant, it is still important to keep in mind the fiscal requirements that
decentralized production demands, and how businesses and organizations may balance the pros and cons of
manufacturing strategies. Delegates are also encouraged to look beyond that and to consider integrating more
sustainable uses of energy into decentralized manufacturing strategies, to further encourage the use of it.
 Incentivizing the Decentralization of Manufacturing
The development of decentralized manufacturing also comes with the increasing cost to operate in different
areas, as it requires duplicates of resources, employees, and other relevant resources (Ike, 2024). This often
discourages companies and businesses from decentralizing production to reduce the cost of setting up another
completely separate facility elsewhere. At the same time, however, businesses may be encouraged to consider
decentralized manufacturing for its sustainability and better flexibility compared to centralized manufacturing.
Delegates are expected to consider this, alongside other potential hurdles to businesses thinking of adopting
decentralized manufacturing, to incentivize support and participation or to address the weaknesses or challenges
that come with it.

Key Stakeholders
Within the scope of fostering industrial innovation, key stakeholders include small and medium enterprises
(SME), national governments, international agencies, and the workforce. Small and medium enterprises play a
huge role in advancing industrial innovation as they tend to operate flexibly, with employees and capital
investments that fall under a certain threshold, relying more on local sustainability through geographical reach
and inclusive hiring rather than prioritizing a larger geographical footprint (Liberto, 2025). Additionally, SMEs
are under technological pressure in decentralized networks that compel them to adopt industry 4.0 technologies
to keep up with regional value chains, especially in the Global South in need of support amid high risks of
financial constraints. In line with this, the workforce, as a stakeholder, is the direct source of innovation; they are
part of the inclusive hiring process, especially within SMEs, which requires skills for decentralized systems. In the
Global South, where employment rates and GDP are high but with low participation, the workforce is affected
as there is already a lack of incentive in decentralizing manufacturing as it also comes with increasing the number
of capital, including employees. With regards to supporting local businesses, national governments are
stakeholders that have the incentive to decentralize manufacturing to advance economic inclusivity,
technological innovation, and resilience in each regional value chain. Their role is to set standards, frameworks,
and implementation of decentralized manufacturing models for SMEs, encouraging them to adopt innovative
and sustainable industrialization across regions left behind from economic development, while also mitigating
high risks associated with manufacturing models such as this. Lastly, in supplementing these national efforts,
international agencies like UNIDO are responsible for capacity-building in developing countries, and upholding
global standards and frameworks for inclusive industrial innovation, alongside mitigating the risks that come
with these standards, such as financial gaps posing as a major problem hindering the Global South from
achieving industrial innovation.
Role of the International Community
Decentralized manufacturing has proven to be a sustainable strategy for businesses and ensures quality for
manufactured goods. It is the responsibility of the international community to assess ways this strategy,
alongside similar strategies, may be promoted to support industrial developments worldwide. In the goal of the
UN to assist countries in making strides toward innovation and sustainable strategies, the international
community must also find ways to implement a form of decentralized manufacturing. To not only bring about
more inclusive economies but also inclusive markets and industrialization.

Conclusion

The question of how industry is organized, where factories sit, who owns them, who works in them, and where
their products go, has never been a neutral technical matter. It is a question of power, of opportunity, and of
whether the structures of the global economy are designed to concentrate wealth or to distribute it to the people.
The centralized manufacturing model that defined the twentieth century delivered unprecedented productivity,
but it also delivered an industrial geography in which entire regions were designated as suppliers of raw materials,
entire populations were excluded from formal manufacturing employment, and the capacity to make finished
goods was concentrated in a handful of countries that had industrialized early. That model is not inevitable, but
is a set of choices, made at specific moments in history, and it can be remade.

Decentralized manufacturing offers a different set of possibilities, not because technology alone can solve
structural problems, but because the technologies now available in forms of digital fabrication, distributed
energy systems, open-source hardware, align with a different logic. They make it feasible to locate production
where people live, to build supply chains that connect neighbouring countries rather than distant continents,
and to include small-scale producers, rural communities, and women-owned enterprises in industrial systems
that have historically excluded them. It is being built, piece by piece, by countries that have decided that their
industrial future does not have to replicate the patterns of the past.

For delegates in this committee, the task is to recognise that the choices made here will shape which version of
decentralized manufacturing becomes reality. It can be a model driven by imported technologies that remain
unaffordable for small enterprises, serving markets that extract value rather than circulating it. Or it can be a
model driven by open standards, regional cooperation, and policies deliberately designed to ensure that the
benefits of distributed production reach the communities that have waited longest for industrial employment.
The difference will not be determined by technology alone, but by the frameworks this committee helps to
shape a future on technology transfer, on trade rules, on investment in the infrastructure that makes distributed
production viable. The Global South has spent generations watching industrial capacity accumulate elsewhere.
The question now is whether the next wave of industrial innovation will be centralized in the same old places or
distributed across the places that need it most. And that question rests with you.
Guide Questions

1.​ How can the committee address the geographical characteristics and local economies of different
regions in implementing a viable decentralization model for member states?
2.​ How can the committee utilize a decentralization-centric approach to help stimulate economic growth
among LDCs while also ensuring these states do not become subject to exploitation by third parties?
3.​ Given the fiscal and capital demands in operating a decentralized manufacturing line, how can the
committee help support or incentivize the adoption of such a model to local businesses or growing
SMEs which may lack the needed resources for decentralization?
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