“Internet, a Campaign Tool of Filipino Politicians: How Social Media Shaped 2016 to 2022

Philippine National Elections Outcomes”

A final requirement for the subject course POL3213

Submitted by:

James Charles B. Lara

2POL2

Submitted to:

Ms. Jeshamar Villasis

December 23, 2019

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Abstract

Through the past years when digital campaigns already exist, social media was only on
the sidelines and a mere option for politicians that did not require a significant amount of
organization and investment. In recent years, specifically after the 2016 Philippine National
Elections, social media successfully integrated into political campaigns and affected Filipino
public opinions. How did this happen and what are the factors that enabled this phenomenon?
This paper reviews related works of literature regarding the actors of social media campaigns and
the specific roles they are playing during elections, as well as the effect of social media on the
Philippine political landscape. With this literature review, the paper is expected to answer the
question “How Social Media Shaped 2016 to 2022 Philippine National Elections Outcomes?”

Introduction

Many individuals are deliberately being misled by fake news and disinformation agents at
an alarming rate. 51% of Filipinos, according to a survey conducted in December 2021 by Social
Weather Station, reported experiencing trouble recognizing fake news on social media, radio,
and television (Tuquero, 2022, as stated in, Imbuido, 2022). As a complementary to the
aforementioned statistic, the research of Bringula et al. (2022) conducted an interview with
university students and reviewed related literature regarding peoples’ susceptibility to fake news
that came out with the findings that social media users like those they interviewed were already
deceived by fake news at least once in their life. According to the study of Bringula et al. (2022),
university students mainly resort to searching on Google and asking for an expert or close
friend/family member when confirming an information’s validity. This shows the gravity of
social media fake news and disinformation dilemma. Social media and disinformation became
integrated into people’s daily lives and it is already usually neglected and normalized. For an
issue with extensive effect on political opinions and processes in general, the existence of studies
regarding the concealed perpetrators of fake news and disinformation is a must. Hence, this
paper reviews related works of literature concerning the underlying factors affecting fake news
dissemination, the political landscape of the Philippines with consideration to the effects of
social media, and the political landscape during the peak of disinformation proliferation–during
the Philippine National Elections.

1. Factors Affecting the Spread of Fake News, Misinformation, and Disinformation

Social media platforms were intendedly developed to catch consumers' attention and
pique their interests through algorithms that determine how news is chosen, sorted, and ordered,
while also prioritizing and shaping the content to the public's attention and interest (Carlson,
2017, p. 2., as cited in Talamayan, 2020). Tech giants portray social networking sites as places
that people can manage using the relevance basic concept. These sites give their users the notion
that they can filter their news feeds, block materials they find offensive or filthy, or follow and

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share stories they find interesting or amusing. However, it should be acknowledged that what is
shown or supplied to the audience may have an impact on what is interesting to them. As a
result, when algorithmic manipulation restricts content choice, what is relevant to social media
user's feeds is managed discreetly. Social media developers also designed their platforms with
user-friendly user interfaces, hence making information consumption and dissemination a lot
simpler and more accessible. In the research from Woolley and Howard (2018), it was stated that
social media algorithms might be generating echo chambers where polarized and corrupted
public discourse takes place. Whereas political bots serve as actual political movements in an
effort to sway public opinion and boost or distort a politician’s character. Despite creating a tool
that is capable of providing wider Internet resources to help access data, knowledge, social
networks, and collective engagement opportunities; social media developers were not able to
create concrete systems that would prevent the abuse or exploitation of social media for political
control and penalize the perpetrators.

Social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are powerhouses used for both spreading
and consuming various information online, hence it is worth noting that developers of these
platforms are responsible for the spread of fake news, misinformation, and disinformation. Social
media developers, however, are not solely responsible for the spread of fake news,
misinformation, and disinformation. There are also extrinsic factors such as individuals’ lack of
fact-checking skills, individuals or groups that directly perpetuate the spread of fake news,
misinformation, and disinformation (i.e. Pseudonymous Influencers, Horny 'Alts', and social
media trolls), clientelism, and weak social media regulatory law.

1.1. The Perpetrators of Fake News, Misinformation, and Disinformation

Online hate speech has become increasingly prevalent. Fake news factories are operated
by corrupt agents and digital marketers that want to harm opponents or profit from click-through
advertising opportunities (Woolley & Howard, 2018). According to research from Ong and
Cabbuag (2022), pseudonymous influencers in the form of parody accounts, meme pages,
passionate love quotes accounts, and lusty LGBT "alt" accounts have been able to elude
disinformation interventions such as fact-checking and account banning since their media
manipulation objectives are more focused on signal boosting politically biased hashtags or
backing campaigning politicians rather than spreading ostensive inaccurate material. The
research concentrated on "pseudonymous influencers" and identified them as significant but
underreported sources of misinformation that contaminate the media landscape. Although they
do not exhibit the same impact in political conversation as the direct fake news disseminators
and traditional celebrities that deliberately support or undermine politicians, pseudonymous
influencers play a unique contribution to disinformation proliferation by exploiting regulatory
gaps in legislation governing electoral campaigns and campaign financing; these can be seen
through their deceitful schemes that are delivered in an obnoxious yet humorous and entertaining
manner or sensual selfies to mask aggressive statements and political agendas that gather a

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specific group of audience. They are also able to maintain anonymity which helps them evade
both social media regulations and official investigations, hence making it difficult to stop them
from abusing the system. Ong and Cabbuag’s research was able to acknowledge the threat these
pseudonymous influencers and LGBT alternative accounts pose to democracy and the decision-
making of Filipinos. It also revealed the existence of larger disinformation agents and operations
behind the spread of fake news, misinformation, and disinformation. Public relations firms,
advertising agencies, and influencer agencies’ are identified by the research as instigators of false
news dissemination by disinformation-for-hire or influence-for-hire actors.

The article's assertions were supported by their joint effort, which they carried out
between December 2018 and may 2019 to track disinformation narratives on social media and
analyze social media discourses during the 2019 Philippine elections. Additionally, the
researchers also looked at a variety of news sites across other platforms including influencer
accounts on Instagram and Twitter. In order to document changing trends in election
campaigning, including distinguishable official political marketing and advertising as well as
black operations campaigning incorporating disinformation and smear campaigns, the project
used a mix of qualitative online observations, big data analysis, and interviews with digital
campaign strategists. Considering that they are underreported in mainstream media and bypass
the fact-checking system; these disinformation agents, their media manipulation techniques, and
their instigators are worth researching and should be revealed to the general public and those in
authority to establish a concrete and collective way of regulating them and holding them
accountable. Ong and Cabbuag’s research also called out legislators and those in authority to
create a transparency and accountability framework that would be sufficient, yet not dangerous
legislation that extends government power and monitoring over social media users.

Diving deeper into the study on disinformation architects, the research conducted by Ong
and Cabañes (2018) revealed through their extensive interviews with twenty (20) disinformation
developers at the management and staff levels that spanned from December 2016 to December 2017
the different categories of disinformation operators and the roles they play in an online political
campaign. According to the interview, a senior strategist with experience in the PR and advertising
industries frequently leads a team working on a digital campaign. The chief disinformation architects'
primary duty is to mobilize and motivate support through online interaction. To do this, they
assemble a group of unidentified digital influencers and false account managers to plant key
campaign messages online and produce "illusions of interaction" that will pique the interest of actual
supporters. Here is where the clientelistic network can be seen at work. Chief architects such as Ad
and PR executives or strategists are considered high-level political instigators, although they are at
the top level of networked disinformation campaigns, it should still be noted that there exist the
higher and more powerful elites or politicians that serve as the clients that instigate the social media
campaign to obtain their political goal. Moving on to the middle level of the hierarchy of networked
disinformation are the anonymous digital influencers–they also include the aforementioned
pseudonymous influencers–and key opinion leaders such as public figures with loud, high-profile

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public personas, like celebrities who use their insightful knowledge of the general public’s pop
culture preferences, political views, and behaviors on social media to become adept attention-
hackers. These influencers at mid-ranking are the translators of the campaign message, they are the
individuals or groups who convert the message into creative and shareable content that aims to sway
mainstream media coverage. With their high count of followers, it is expected that their posts can
take up the trending lists on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. A small number of
unnamed digital influencers work as second-level subcontractors. They operate as negotiators for
chief architects and their fellow, anonymous influencers, to whom they assign jobs related to
disinformation. Finally, community-level operators of fake accounts make up the bottom level of the
networked disinformation ladder. They are tasked to create the “illusions of engagement” by posting,
sharing, commenting, and reacting to the posts of influencers and strategists, thus affirming and
amplifying the key messages of the political campaign. They are usually in charge of sustaining the
movement and launching bandwagon effects that would encourage true genuine supporters to come
out and publicly discuss their enthusiasm for a certain politician. These agents are the actual trolls
and mobs that are usually seen quarreling with supporters of their client’s rivals, harassing journalists
online, and excessively posting positive messages to publicize their support for a politician with the
goal to sway others’ political views (Neilson & Ortiga, 2022).

Since Duterte took office, the frequency of cyberbullying and harassment of political
opponents in the Philippines has substantially grown (Talamayan, 2020). It was noted that some
Filipinos who voiced their disapproval of Duterte were persistently pursued and harassed with
the use of derogatory remarks, profanities, and threats of violence. The existence of the
abovementioned industry that is responsible for the algorithm manipulation of online platforms
contributed to the Philippines' political propaganda campaign's propagation, this manipulation
was evidently seen in Duterte’s administration and their campaign strategies. The Duterte and
succeeding administration’s suppression of freedom through online means is not what people
would normally expect. Journalism in the Philippines is constantly harassed and forcefully
suppressed by shutting down or disenfranchising journalism companies and extrajudicial killings
of journalists. For an instance, even before Duterte assumed office, the unabated killing of
journalists in the Philippines that international agencies have recognized and documented already
existed; an example would be the Maguindanao Massacre, in which 32 of the 57 victims were
journalists (Tandoc, 2016). Authoritarian regimes such as that of Duterte also control the press
by branding opposing media outlets as fake news disseminators, hence causing the public to
distrust media outlets. An example of this would be Duterte’s public war against the digital-born
news site Rappler where the company’s operating license was revoked by the government (Lees,
2018).

Suppression of individual freedom using social media, however, is relatively

inconspicuous. Social media’s algorithmic manipulation limits content selection and those in
control such as campaign strategists of politicians influence what is relevant to social media
users’ feeds. Individuals do not really get to fully decide what they would only see in social

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media. The "illusion" of freedom claimed to and by the people is reinforced by the lack of
transparency around algorithmic processes. Users of social media are susceptible to manipulation
since algorithms are hidden. Because an algorithm predetermines options, the manipulation of
online material and the discourse on the aforementioned platform effectively gives the
impression that there are choices. Algorithmic gatekeeping–the method for selecting what
information flows through internet platforms and related media through which transparent
algorithmic computational tools automatically filter, highlight, suppress, or do other editorial
actions–is used to control the digital material that the general public consumes (Napoli, 2015).
Algorithmic gatekeeping is essential for regulating popular sentiment because it allows actors to
govern political communication and meaning-making systems using algorithmically based
filtering. Utilization of social media and manipulation of algorithms are crucial in winning votes
and sympathies during campaign periods. This stated algorithmic system was seen in Duterte’s
extensive amount of cyber trolls, keyboard army, and social media influencers that crowd the
social media sphere and proliferate pro-Duterte statements. Through this, Duterte-related posts
and information gained relevance and boosted his campaign (Talamayan, 2020).

1.2. Weak Social Media Regulatory Law in the Philippines

Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram have already been
notorious for having weak fact-checking and troll-banning systems (Caplan et al., 2018). This
lack of systematic countermeasure of social media platforms is even complemented by the weak
social media regulatory law in the Philippines. These are attributed to unrestrained
disinformation campaigns, negative campaigning, online dark propaganda, and cyberbullying.
As for cyberbullying, when someone uses social media for bullying, the law in the Philippines
does not specify exactly what legalities are being broken. This is due to the lack of specific
legislation outlining the offenses of cyberbullying in the Philippines. Law enforcement defines
the crime that occurs in the real world and applies the same standard to the crime that occurs in
the virtual world since there is no clear legislation on this topic (Gonzales, 2014). Authoritarian
regimes, such as the Duterte regime, have tried to create solutions that are apparently intended to
stop the spread of false information, but they are instead used to silence opposition. These task
teams are frequently used in tandem with media legislation and surveillance tools, computational
propaganda efforts, Internet blocking or filtering, and computational propaganda campaigns to
further justify censorship, curtail free speech, and influence online political discussion
(Bradshaw & Howard, 2017).

2. How Social Media Established the Existing Political Landscape in the Philippines

The research of Ong et al. (2019), about the role of digital disinformation in the 2019
Philippine midterm election found that digital operations already became integrated into the
overall campaign of politicians. A considerable portion of the campaign war fund is allocated to
social media. Political candidates from the national level down to the barangay (village) level

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utilize digital laborers for their campaigns, with operators varying in skill level from professional
to amateur to ad hoc. This shows that social media political campaign has gained prevalence and
has been shaping the political climate of the Philippines. The research states that the
disinformation tactics in 2019 are more clever and covert than those used during the 2016
election, where toxic incivilities were exposed and are still ongoing. Digital campaigns already
became strategically obscured and it is already hard to determine which is propaganda or not,
who perpetuates and who does not. The political sphere in the Philippines has already been
highly influenced by social media. Candidates now have the chance to discuss a wider variety of
issues in reaching out to communities on many platforms with vernaculars. The downside of this
trend is the rise of hyper-partisan platforms, including private Facebook groups and fake news
channels on YouTube, that take advantage of people's hatred of the political system in return for
clicks that can be made money from ads. Although social media alone does not determine
electoral outcomes, its significant impact on altering the character of political discussions makes
it a huge part of election results and proceeding political processes done by those who would
win.

Media bribery and the use of local radio stations as propaganda factories are still typical
dirty tricks. Political dynasties and name recognition, money politics and vote buying, and co-
option of security agencies, among other factors, continue to have an impact on how elections
turn out (Ong et al., 2019). Even the old-style patronage politics that has been a plague since the
colonial Philippine state still exists and continues to be a strong contributor to electoral success
and political processes in general (Abinales, P., & Amoroso, D., 2017). Reformist and Populist
politicians still dominate Philippine Politics every election period, social media comes into play
with the dissemination of the candidates’ platforms and propaganda (Curato, 2016). In the 2016
presidential election, Rodrigo Duterte's chief campaign strategist asserts that he had a budget of
just PHP 10 million for social media marketing, despite the fact that Duterte's team assembled a
sizable group of followers whose job was to promote Duterte and attack his rivals online. The
landslide win of Rodrigo Duterte is said to be attributed to social media that swayed Filipino
sentiments, this result happened despite social media only being a cheaper substitute for political
machinery. The Philippines' political climate has shifted in 2019 in large part as a result of
Duterte's social media victory. In terms of the overall campaign strategy and operations in 2019,
digital operations are regarded as being key and completely integrated. Statistical data shows that
the top 20 senators of the 2019 elections significantly boosted their social media presence when
compared to the top 20 finishers in the 2013 and 2016 elections. Additionally, it is clear that
politicians are increasingly active on platforms like Youtube and Instagram, which suggests that
these media are crucial for reaching certain individuals (Ong et al., 2019). Moreover, content
creation is observed to be the main strategy used by cyber trolls, influencers, and legitimate
politician channels in political opinion manipulation. In the case of the politicians themselves,
the usual content of their pages contains their official campaign trail meetings with ordinary
citizens. Politicians also commonly post about their personal lives in order to develop
connections and demonstrate honesty. Strategies would also include online advocacy campaigns

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and opposition tactics. This was seen in Pia Cayetano and Doc. Willie Ong’s health advocacy,
whereas opposition candidates were attacking the policies of the Duterte administration and
criticized the public safety under his governance.

3. The Political Landscape during the 2022 Philippine National Elections in Regards of
Social Media

The social media platforms, once again, became an integral part of the campaign period
during the 2022 Philippine National and Local Elections. The reliance on social media in
campaigning, as well as in gathering political information increased due to the pandemic
restrictions (Arugay, 2022). In the Philippines, there were 73.91 million internet users, a 6.1%
rise from the previous year, which was linked to the Covid-19 pandemic. In the Philippines,
67.0% of people had access to the internet as of January 2021. Confoundingly, the number of
social media users in the Philippines increased by 22% from 2020 to 2021, reaching 89 million
(2021 We are Social survey, as cited in Arugay, 2022). The mentioned reliance and growing
number of social media users together with the government’s incapacity to regulate and monitor
social media due to its fast development made the social media application sowers of fake news
and disinformation regarding the 2022 elections. Social media misuse that is unwarranted,
uncontrolled, and outright unethical poses serious threats to electoral integrity in the Philippines.
Some politicians would go as far as disseminating fake news containing historical revisions or
myths, an example would be the “Tallano gold” issue where it was said that the Marcos family
has ownership of the tons of gold left by the said royal family, thus it was also speculated by the
netizens that voting Marcos would also mean that the entire Philippines would own the said gold
(Mendoza et al., 2022). Fake news regarding martial law also became rampant during the
election period. There were a lot of videos by influencers circulating in social media that
advocated that martial law was considered the “Golden era” with the booming economy of
Marcos's presidency and that prices of market commodities went down during those times
(Sierra & Yanuaria, 2023).

In countries such as the Philippines where illiteracy exists to be a problem, even the most
blatantly obvious fake news would be hard to extinguish in the social media public sphere (E.
Tandoc, 2019). This is even complemented by the numerous cyber trolls and influencers that
support fake news and make them seem true. The recent 2022 Philippine Elections outcome was
highly influenced by numerous factors such as vote-buying, patronage politics, and clientelism
(Canare & Mendoza, 2021). It was, however, the social media that had been felt by most people
and even perceived by the senses. Social media, despite being merely restricted to digital
platforms, has become a significant tool in shaping individual political opinions, as well as the
political landscape of the Philippines as a whole.

Conclusion

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 This review of related literature concerning the concealed perpetrators of fake news and
disinformation in social media, the extensive effect of social media on the Philippine political
landscape, as well as its significant influence on 2016 to 2022 Philippine National Elections with
the aim to answer the question “How Social Media Shaped 2016 to 2022 Philippine National
Elections Outcomes?”

First, the research identified the specific factors affecting the dissemination of fake news,
disinformation, and misinformation. Social media platforms’ weak content regulation system and
the developers that made it that way attributed to the uncontrolled disinformation spread in social
media. The paper also identified the disinformation perpetrators and found out that there exist
politicians who serve as patrons that incentivize people to do the dirty work of manipulating
social media political discussions and opinions. These people can be categorized regarding their
level in the political campaign and their roles. First in the hierarchy are the senior strategists with
experience in the PR and advertising industry, next is the anonymous digital influencers, and at
the bottom are the community-level operators of fake accounts. All of the abovementioned
people work together to create an illusion of authentic news and sway public opinion. Another
factor affecting fake news dissemination is the weak social media regulatory law in the
Philippines.

The paper then identified how social media established the existing political landscape in
the Philippines. The literature review found that social media evolved from merely a substitute
political campaign to an integrated strategy for political campaigns with the capacity to sway
public opinions on a large scale. The growing influence of social media already competes with
that of the old-style campaign strategies such as vote-buying, clientelism, and patron politics.

In specific, the paper analyzed the political landscape during Philippine National
Elections, both the 2016 and 2022 elections, with regard to social media. The literature review
saw a significant increase in fake news, examples given are historical revision by the Marcoses
and myth issues favoring them. With these, Philippine politics is being dominated by politicians
with greater social media control and strategies. All things considered, the review of literature
displayed the lack of concrete social media platform systems in regulating content creation and
the lack of overall social media regulation by the government. Hence this research calls for those
in authority to contribute to the battle against the disinformation dilemma. Throughout the
research period, it is noticeable that there are little to no research articles that tackle the weak
regulation of social media on its own and by the government in the Philippine context. This
paper contributes to the lack of knowledge regarding this issue, however, since fake news and
disinformation is a crucial issues, there should be more research that would criticize or review
social media systems and regulatory laws.

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