BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Bosnia and Herzegovina , one of the six constituent republics of the former Social- ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , was formally recognized
as an independent State in early April but swiftly fell victim to some of the most widespread and egregious human rights abuses witnessed in the
past 50 years . Paramilitary forces ( both Ser- bian and Bosnian Serbian ) , armed and abetted by the army of the former Yugo- slavia ( JNA ) and
the political leadership of Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic , com- mitted the vast majority of these abuses against Bosnian Muslims . Limitations
of space and the standardized format used in this report make it difficult to detail the true scope and horror of the atrocities committed by these
Serbian forces . To be sure , members of other ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia , including Croats and , to a much lesser extent , Bosnian
Muslims , were responsible for human rights violations directed in almost all cases against members of other ethnic groups , par- ticularly Serbs .
However , the atrocities of the Croats and Bosnian Muslims pale in comparison to the sheer scale and calculated cruelty of the killings and other
abuses committed by Serbian and Bosnian Serbian forces against Bosnian Muslims , osten- sibly in defense of the interests of Serbs in Bosnia .

Much of the earliest violence ( predating recognition ) was caused by paramilitary units from Serbia and Montenegro which carried out acts of
terror and intimidation against non - Serbs . The war did not break out spontaneously but was consciously stimulated from the outside in the
absence of any significant threat to the safety of the Serbian population . The greatest atrocity - the systematic shelling and starva- tion by siege
of large cities - was carried out by Serbian forces , which alone had both the means and the will to carry out such crimes against humanity .
Civilians were the primary targets of military action , making a mockery of the Geneva Conven- tions . Accompanying abuses of individuals and
groups of non - Serbs took almost every conceivable form of torture , humiliation , and killing . The policy of driving out innocent civilians of a
different ethnic or religious group from their homes , so - called ethnic cleansing , was practiced by Serbian forces in Bosnia on a scale that
dwarfs anything seen in Europe since Nazi times .

Bosnian politics had undergone growing ethnic polarization since the 1990 elec- tions which resulted in the three nationalist parties the Muslim
Party of Demo- cratic Action ( SDA ) , the Croatian Democratic Union ( HDZ ) , and the Serbian Demo- cratic Party ( SDS ) -forming a governing "
partnership " under the leadership of President Alija Izetbegovic , a Muslim . Muslims and Croats in the governing coali- tion wanted
independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina , while Bosnian Serbs insisted it was their right to remain within " Yugoslavia . " In January SDS
leaders pro- claimed their own Serbian entity within Bosnia , claiming 70 percent of the territory . In a referendum on February 29 - March 1 , over
63 percent of the Bosnian elector- ate voted in favor of sovereignty and independence for the Republic . However , the SDS , led by Radovan
Karadzic , boycotted the referendum , and on March 1 its armed followers erected barricades in Sarajevo . By the time Bosnia and Herzegovina
achieved international recognition on April 6 , Serbian paramilitary forces , reinforced by the JNA , had begun a campaign of terror in the eastern
Bosnian town of Bijeljina , and the SDS was completing the withdrawal of its members from Bosnian institutions .

By mid - April , Bosnian territorial defense forces blockaded JNA installations in Sarajevo and elsewhere , demanding that the JNA turn over its
weapons . In early May , the JNA announced it would withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina by May 19 , but in fact it pulled out no more than 15
percent of its personnel , asserting the rest were Bosnian Serbs and leaving behind an arsenal of heavy weaponry , includ- ing tanks and
warplanes . SDS leaders began in April to create institutions ( includ- ing " the Serbian Army " commanded by a former JNA general ) for this
entity , which they later named " the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina . " Croatian na- tionalists led by Mate Boban , vice president of
the HDZ and leader of the Croatian Defense Council ( HVO ) , proclaimed their own entity within Bosnia , which they called " the Croatia
Community of Herceg - Bosna . " Troop strength of the HVO is be- tween 20,000 and 30,000 ; many were trained in Croatia and received
weapons from the Croatian Government . Beginning in April , SDS and former JNA forces seized territory in northern and eastern Bosnia ,
expelled much of the non - Serbian popu- lation in a systematic campaign of terror that became known as " ethnic cleansing , " and carried out
massive artillery attacks against Sarajevo and other population cen- ters .

In the early months of 1992 , several thousand men belonging to the paramilitary Croatian Defense Forces ( HOS ) of the extremist Croatian Party
of Right ( HSP ) were deployed in Western Herzegovina ; many of these reportedly were Bosnian Croats

- DIADV

who joined the Croatian Armed Forces during the war there in 1991. When violence broke out in March in Bosanski Brod , regular units of the
Croatian Armed Forces were engaged against Serbian paramilitary groups , which were operating with JNA support . Regular Croatian forces
were also engaged against Serbian forces in subse- quent fighting in the " northern corridor " between Banja Luka in the west and Bijeljina in the
east , and in Herzegovina , as far east as Trebinje . The Bosnian Gov- ernment has never objected to the presence of Croatian forces on its
territory , how- ever , and has welcomed their support in resisting aggression against Bosnia by Ser- bia and Montenegro . Similarly , although the
HVO is in fact controlled ( through Mate Boban's hard - line faction of the HDZ ) by Zagreb rather than Sarajevo and has clashed on several
occasions with Bosnian Muslim forces , it is considered by the Bosnian Government to be part of the Bosnian Armed Forces .

Bosnian forces were initially called the Territorial Defense Force ; this was later altered to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina . Croatian
armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina include members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia as well as HVO .

Many civilians were taken prisoner , primarily by Serbian forces but also by Cro- atian militias and the primarily Muslim Bosnian government
forces , and held in prison camps , often under the most brutal and inhumane conditions . While precise figures were not available , the number of
refugees from Bosnia exceeded 1.5 million , more than one - third of the population , and the number of dead and missing reached into the tens of
thousands . All of Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered terribly , but eth- nic Muslims were the most severely affected and accounted for the largest
share of casualties and of displaced persons . As winter set in , Bosnia and Herzegovina faced a humanitarian disaster , as many tens of
thousands of undernourished people with- out proper shelter faced possible death from starvation and exposure .

As a result of the aggression against Bosnia , the U.N. Security Council ( UNSC ) on May 30 adopted Resolution 757 , imposing comprehensive
sanctions on Serbia / Montenegro , cutting off economic relations between them and all U.N. member states , while providing exceptions for food
and medicines .

UN . peacekeeping forces ( UNPROFOR ) were present in Bosnia before Serbian forces unleashed the war there in April , since UNPROFOR
headquarters for the de- ployment in Croatia was initially located in Sarajevo . While UNPROFOR head- quarters were subsequently withdrawn
from Sarajevo , a separate Bosnian operation was authorized by Resolution 758 , adopted on June 8 , which extended the UNPROFOR's
mandate and specifically sought to facilitate the reopening of Sara- jevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian relief on the basis of an agreement
be- tween the Bosnian Government and Karadzic's SDS . In August the UNSC adopted Resolution 770 , authorizing the use of " all necessary
means " to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief in Bosnia . In October UNSC resolution 781 established a ban on military flights in the
airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina , though by the end of the year agreement had not been reached on enforcement of the ban .

A staff report on " ethnic cleansing " in Bosnia issued in August 1992 by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee found there was prima
facie evidence that Ser- bian forces had perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity , and an inter- national human rights organization's
report on war crimes in Bosnia issued at the same time found prima facie evidence that genocide was taking place .

In response to proliferating reports of gross human rights violations in Bosnia , particularly by the Bosnian Serb forces , the UNSC in August
adopted Resolution 771 , calling on all parties to respect international humanitarian law , demanding unimpeded access for the International
Committee of the Red Cross ( ICRC ) and other international humanitarian organizations to all prisons and detention centers , inviting the
submission to the UNSC of information concerning serious violations of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia , and asking the Secretary
General to report to the Council on information received and possible measures to be taken . In October the Security Council established a
Commission of Experts , chaired by ju- rist Frits Kalshoven , to investigate charges of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia . The United States
Government has submitted to the United Nations summary re- ports of such atrocities , totaling over 50 pages and encompassing thousands of
in- stances of killings , torture , rape , and other abuse , which themselves represent only a small fraction of the offenses committed . Illustrative
examples of these abuses ap- pear in appropriate sections of this report .

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person , Including Freedom from

a . Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing . — In the circumstances of the Bosnian war , it was difficult to distinguish targeted killings from killings
resulting from in-

discriminate attacks . ( See Section 1.g. for a description of large - scale war - related atrocities committed against civilians , including killings . )
Before the outbreak of war in April , there were a number of killings that appeared to be politically or ethnically motivated . In January the head of
the Muslim Bosnjak Organization ( MBO - an op- position political party ) in Bijeljina , Abdulah Kovacevic , was murdered . In February an ethnic
Croat who headed the referendum commission in Glamoc was killed . In neither case were the killers apprehended . Some members of the MBO
charged that Kovacevic was killed by Serbian paramilitary members in collusion with the JNA . It appears that the man killed in Glamoc was the
victim of Serbian nationalists op- posed to the referendum on independence , but this has not been proven .

In several instances , persons working for international organizations were killed in what appeared to be deliberate attacks . The ICRC delegate in
Sarajevo , Frederic Maurice , was killed in June when his convoy came under fire as it entered the city . A Belgian member of the European
Community ( EC ) monitoring mission was killed south of Mostar in April , apparently in an attack by SDS forces . In August Amer- ican journalist
David Kaplan was killed by a sniper while traveling in a motorcade in Sarajevo with " Yugoslav " Prime Minister Milan Panic . On September 3 , an
Ital- ian plane participating in the Sarajevo airlift was shot down west of the city ; inves- tigators were unable to determine who fired on the aircraft
. By October , five mem- bers of the UNPROFOR contingent in Sarajevo had been killed ; in one incident , two French soldiers were killed by fire
from Bosnian government positions .

b . Disappearance . - In the chaos that accompanied the Bosnian war , the number of missing people reached into the tens of thousands , and
only rough estimates of the total were possible . Bosnian government figures as of early October put the number of missing at 57,000 , of whom
about 8,500 were said to be children . There are no reliable figures for the number of persons missing as a result of the Bosnian war . ( See
Section 1.g. for a description of the circumstances resulting in these dis- appearances . )

c . Torture and Other Cruel , Inhuman , or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.- In prison camps operated by each faction - the Serbian SDS , the
Croatian HVO , and the predominantly Muslim Bosnian Government - inmates were subjected to beat- ings , sometimes leading to death ,
intimidation , and other forms of inhuman treat- ment . In Serb - run camps , many prisoners were subjected to the most brutal forms of torture
and murder their captors could devise . International observers formally gained access to some prison camps in July , including those operated by
Serbian forces in northwest Bosnia ( e.g. , Omarska , Trnopolje , Manjaca ) and by the HVO in western Herzegovina ( e.g. , Ljubuski , Capljina ,
Mostar ) . Later missions gained access to camps operated by the Bosnian Government where Serbian civilians were held ( e.g. , Konjic , Viktor
Bubanj barracks in Sarajevo ) .

Refugee accounts indicate that the mistreatment of prisoners in SDS camps ex- tended to beating and egregious forms of torture and mutilation ,
as well as killing . According to refugee accounts , in a number of SDS camps , physical mutilation of prisoners extended to deliberate
disfigurement and excision of body parts . System- atic rape has been used , largely against the Muslim population , by the Bosnian Serbs as part
of their " ethnic cleansing " campaign .

At Keraterm , there were reports of murders of prisoners , with inmates forced to carry their bodies out and stack them on trucks to be transported
elsewhere . At the Trnopolje camp , Serbian soldiers wandered through nightly , brutally beating the male prisoners and randomly raping female
prisoners . In Serbian camps near Foca , Muslim women were repeatedly raped , according to refugee accounts .

In Livno and Tomislavgrad , Croatian paramilitary forces , which took over from civilian authorities in April , forbade Serbian residents to leave . In
September the Thomson mission of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ( CSCE ) inspected two sites in Livno where a total of
79 Serbs were incarcerated and appar- ently subjected to beatings . The mission reported that the three rooms holding pris- oners in the Livno
police station were overcrowded and lacked heating and that there were signs that prisoners had been beaten . The Thomson mission also visited
the village of Rascani , in Tomislavgrad district , where about 250 Serbs , mostly women and children , some of whom had been brought to
Rascani after their homes were demolished , were held prisoner and subjected to abuse by Croatian national- ists . According to credible refugee
accounts , HOS forces were involved in the deten- tion and mistreatment of Serbian civilians , including the rape of female prisoners . Bosnian
government authorities operating a prison in the Viktor Bubanj barracks in Sarajevo subjected Serbian prisoners to beatings ; the facility also held
a number of female prisoners , including some elderly women and one pregnant woman . Ac- cording to the account of a refugee who said she
was imprisoned in the Bubanj bar- racks during July and August , women inmates there as well as men were subject to beatings by the guards ,
and in one incident medical assistance was withheld from women prisoners injured by glass shattered by an exploding shell .

Karadzic and his supporters , in addition to denying charges of systematic and widespread rape of Muslim women by Bosnian Serb forces , have
made countercharges against Bosnian Muslim and Croatian forces . These outrageous inci- dents of violence against Serbian women are the by -
product of war and not part of a campaign of " ethnic cleansing . " The CSCE Thomson mission found that the HVO held 75 Serbs , half of them
women , at the city prison . Prisoners were forced to work constructing bunkers and cleaning up rubble from Serbian shelling and were beaten if
they refused , according to refugee accounts . According to refugee accounts , several dozen Serbian women were raped while confined to their
homes in Novi Grad and other villages near Odzak by Croatian forces during June . According to these ac- counts , the rapes were committed by
local Croats , not by members of regular Cro- atian Armed Forces , who were present in the area at the time .

d . Arbitrary Arrest , Detention , or Exile . - The onset of fighting in many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the virtual siege of Sarajevo
rendered the criminal jus- tice system inoperable . In addition to instances of mass detention of civilians in prison camps ( treated in Section 1.g.
below ) , there were a number of cases of deten- tion of prominent individuals for political purposes .

On his return to Sarajevo from an international conference in April , Bosnian President Izetbegovic was abducted by the JNA , which offered his
release in return for the guaranteed safe passage of Second Military District commander General Milutin Kukanjac , who was in a blockaded JNA
installation in the city . Both men were released , but there was a dispute between the two sides over the terms of the agreement . The JNA
attempted to withdraw a contingent of men and equipment from the barracks together with Kukanjac , and Bosnian forces fired on the with-
drawing JNA column , killing as many as six JNA personnel .

In September an ethnic Serbian writer and former member of the SDS , Vladimir Srebrov , was arrested near Sarajevo when he attempted to
cross " Serbian Army " lines on a peace mission . Srebrov , a harsh critic of Radovan Karadzic , was forcibly removed to the Kula prison at the
former JNA barracks at Lukavica , and the SDS threatened to try him for treason .

On numerous occasions in Sarajevo , local police on their owninitiative detained prominent citizens of Serbian nationality for questioning . Senior
Bosnian officials repeatedly intervened to obtain the release of detainees but were unable to prevent arrests from occurring .

The Bosnian Government did not practice exile . The practice of " ethnic cleansing " by Serbian forces in Bosnia resulted in de facto exile for tens
of thousands of non- Serbs ( see Section 1.g. ) .

e . Denial of Fair Public Trial . - In the context of the war , there was no guarantee of a fair public trial for the accused anywhere in Bosnia ,
regardless of whose forces were in control . By the summer of 1992 , the authority of Bosnia's government insti- tutions generally was limited to a
small area , including the cities of Sarajevo , Zenica , Tuzla , Gorazde , Srebrenica , and Bihac , and surrounding areas . Even there , the civil
justice system had collapsed along with civil government generally , and ef- fective power rested largely in the hands of Bosnian military
authorities or militias , and the Bosnian Government's ability and inclination to protect the rights of citi- zens , particularly ethnic Serbs , declined
steadily .

In areas controlled by the HVO and " the Serbian Army , " legal rights of non- Croats and non - Serbs , respectively , were severely abridged , as
were those of all citi- zens who did not accept the legitimacy of the " governments " proclaimed by the para- military forces or who ran afoul of
local militia leaders .

f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy , Family , Home , or Correspondence . - Efforts by republic and local authorities to monitor political activity
were widespread in the period preceding the outbreak of war . The Bosnian Government admitted that it monitored telephone communications of
SDS members in the Government when it publicized their conversations with political leaders in Serbia . Similarly , the police of the " Serbian
Republic " monitored telephone conversations of citizens and interro- gated citizens about specific conversations , without attempting to conceal
that eavesdropping was taking place .

g . Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Con- flicts . - Violations of humanitarian law and international
conventions on the treat- ment of civilians in time of war were so egregious and systematic as to defy full description . These violations fell into
several categories , including : indiscriminate attacks against civilians , including massacres ; detention of civilians and the worst kinds of torture
and killings of prisoners ; forced movements of populations ; and use of paramilitary groups , including criminals . Because of the extent of the
violence in Bosnia , this report can only cite illustrative examples of some of the worst incidents

for which reliable information is currently available . Accurate figures for total cas- ualties are not available . In late December , a Bosnian
government spokesman said that 130,000 people had been killed in the Bosnian war , including 8,000 residents of Sarajevo . U.S. submissions to
the United Nations to date on war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflect well over 25,000 deaths .

While all sides were guilty of purposefully carrying out violence against civilians , attacks on population centers were a central feature of the
behavior of the " Serbian Army " and its paramilitary allies . Even after the passage of UNSC Resolution 770 , Serbian forces frequently prevented
the delivery of humanitarian aid to cities and towns they were besieging and cut off basic services , including electricity and water , to the civilian
population .

From the beginning of the war in April , SDS paramilitary forces in the hills around Sarajevo bombarded the city , causing heavy civilian casualties
day after day . The " Serbian Army's " assault killed thousands of innocent people and damaged or destroyed hospitals , schools , residential
buildings , mosques , churches , and all kinds of civilian facilities . The attacks on Sarajevo became even more brutal and frequent after May 19 ,
when Ratko Mladic assumed the position of commander of the " Ser- bian Army " as well as direct supervision of the siege of the Bosnian capital .
In July a University of Sarajevo demographer estimated the average daily death toll in Sa- rajevo as a result of the attacks on the city at 17
persons ; 70 percent of the dead were civilians , he calculated , and 10 percent were children . In addition to their at- tacks on Sarajevo with
mortars , artillery , multiple rocket launchers , tanks , and other heavy weapons , the " Serbian Army and former JNA forces also attacked the vital
infrastructure of the city . In late July , outgoing telephone lines were made in- operable , although connections with the SDS stronghold in Pale (
which is on the same intercity exchange ) remained . SDS and former JNA forces later cut off the main water line and fired on electrical workers
who attempted to repair trans- mission lines and restore power . Natural gas supplies were also periodically inter- rupted by Serbian forces .

On April 19 , the commander of JNA forces in Mostar , General Momcilo Perisic , bombarded the town in retaliation for the disappearance of two
JNA pilots , despite pleas by diplomats in Belgrade to the JNA General Staff for restraint . By the time Perisic's forces withdrew , they had
destroyed much of Mostar and killed many resi- dents . In their counteroffensive , Croatian forces also inflicted damage on parts of the city . In
addition , JNA reservists wreaked havoc on Croatian and Muslim vil- lages in the Neretva valley , south of Mostar .

JNA forces and Serbian irregular units began an assault on the northeastern city of Tuzla in May . The JNA officer commanding the assault ,
Colonel Mile Dubajic , threatened to destroy Tuzla if Bosnian forces there did not release the prisoners of war ( POW's ) they held . While his
forces did not destroy the town , they repeatedly shelled the city center , where tens of thousands of Muslim refugees from north- eastern Bosnia
were sheltering . The JNA's successor , the " Army of Yugoslavia " ( VJ ) has not prosecuted its personnel who appear to have been involved in
war crimes in Bosnia .

Among the weapons left for Karadzic's " Serbian Republic " by the JNA were war- planes based at Banja Luka , which were used in attacks on
Gradacac , Jajce , Bihac , Gorazde , and other towns . The air force of the " Serbian Army , " under the command of General Zivomir Ninkovic ,
dropped cluster bombs in raids on Sarajevo and other places , and the commander of the Banja Luka - based " First Krajina Corps " ( the re-
named Banja Luka Corps of the JNA ) , General Momir Talic , claimed in October that the Bosnian Serbs ' planes were using napalm . The
Bosnian Government has reported that territory under its control has been attacked with napalm by Serbian planes , and the Bosnian Serb air
force has this capability .

As the war continued into the summer and fall , Serbian forces bombarded pre- dominantly Muslim and Croatian towns and villages throughout
northern Bosnia , inflicting heavy civilian casualties and extensive destruction . In eastern Bosnia , they encountered stiff resistance from
predominantly Muslim Bosnian forces in Gorazde and Srebrenica , and " the Serbian Army " again applied the tactic of heavy shelling of civilian
targets . In August the siege of Gorazde was lifted , but attacks on Srebrenica continued . Twice in the fall , Serbian forces blocked convoys
assembled by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees ( UNHCR ) that were attempting to bring humanitarian aid to Srebenica but later bowed
to pressure and allowed some convoys to get through .

Regular Croatian forces shelled the town of Trebinje in August , and Bosnian forces in Sarajevo fired shells at the town of Pale in September .
However , there was no general pattern of Bosnian Territorial Defense or HVO assaults with heavy weapons on civilian targets .

- YDDADY

As they seized towns and villages , Serbian forces began carrying out involuntary population transfers called " ethnic cleansing , " particularly of
the Muslim population in northern and eastern Bosnia . Hundreds of thousands of people were affected . In some cases , residents were coerced
into signing away their property ; in others , vil- lages were simply destroyed , and residents were either killed or rounded up to be sent to
detention camps . In attacks by Serbian forces on towns along the Drina river in April and May , hundreds and perhaps thousands of Muslim
civilians were killed . During the violence along the Drina , massacres were reported in Bijeljina , Bratunac , Zvornik , Foca , and elsewhere .

Massive systematic rape , committed by Bosnian Serb military units and prison guards , was used as an extension of " ethnic cleansing " to terrify
the population . Bosnian authorities claim that between 30,000 to 50,000 women have been raped since the onset of hostilities , while a
December EC study put the figure closer to 20,000 .

In addition to expelling non - Serbs from their homes , Serbian forces systematically destroyed the homes of Muslims who had fled . To a lesser
extent , in areas of west- ern Herzegovina and other areas under Croatian control , many Serbs fled from their homes , and in some cases their
homes were then destroyed .

In the northwest , Serbian forces cleared the districts of Bosanski Novi , Bosanski Petrovac , Prijedor , Sanski Most , Kljuc , and Kotor Varos . In
late May , attacks by Serbian irregulars in northwest Bosnia caused many casualties in the district of Prijedor ; the settlement of Kozarac , with a
population of 25,000 , was virtually de- stroyed . Many Muslim men were imprisoned , while women and children were herded into freight cars and
sent eastward . At Banja Luka , Serbian authorities re- fused to shelter the refugees or to allow citizens to bring food and water to them at the
railway station . Banja Luka police claimed the Muslim women and children were being sent to Doboj ( where fighting was under way ) en route to
Zenica , in central Bosnia , but it is uncertain how many arrived there . Some of the male family members of these deportees were killed in SDS
and JNA attacks , while others were incarcerated in prison camps such as Omarska and Manjaca , where an unknown number were killed or
otherwise died .

Despite international condemnation of the practice of " ethnic cleansing " and promises by SDS leader Karadzic that it would stop , in September
and October Ser- bian paramilitary forces continued to drive ethnic Muslims from their homes in Bosanski Petrovac , Prijedor , Kljuc , Kotor Varos
, and other districts of northwestern Bosnia . Many Muslim refugees attempted to cross battle lines into Bosnian - held ter- ritory at Travnik ; along
the way they were harassed and robbed , and some never reached Travnik at all . On August 21 , about 200 Muslim men were abducted from
one such convoy and killed by Serbian paramilitary forces , according to credible ref- ugce accounts . A column of refugees left Bosanski
Petrovac in late September after an unknown number of Muslims there were killed . In October Muslim refugees fled the villages of Cela and
Brezicani in the Prijedor district after an attack by Serbian paramilitary forces killed at least seven people . Also in October , violence erupted in
Kotor Varos , and Muslim and Croatian villagers sought international protection to guarantee their flight into central Bosnia .

" Ethnic cleansing " was not always carried out at gunpoint or under direct threat . The general atmosphere of violence and intimidation drove
many people , whose eth- nic group was not dominant in a given area , to flee . International aid officials stated in October that more than 100,000
Muslims and Croats were seeking to leave north- western Bosnia , which was largely under the control of the SDS . Although the Bosnian
Government sought to prevent reprisals against Serbs in Sarajevo , the con- tinuing siege of the city increased ethnic tension ; reports of violence
against Serbs and arbitrary arrest increased , and more and more Serbs sought to flee the city . Tensions were exacerbated by Bosnian
government moves toward an alliance with Croatia , which fueled the fear of Serbs that they would lose their status as one of Bosnia's three
constituent nationalities ( together with Muslims and Croats ) . Al- though ethnic Serbs remained in the Bosnian presidency and government and
were represented in the command of the Bosnian Armed Forces , all of the most senior figures in these structures were Muslims or Croats .
Speaking in December , Bosnian Prime Minister Mile Akmadzic ( a Croat ) referred to the Muslim and Croatian na- tionalist parties ( the SDA and
the HDZ ) as the legitimate representatives of the two respective nationalities , while implying that , since the Serbian nationalist party ( the SDS )
had been banned , the Bosnian Serbs do not have a corresponding " legitimate representative ” .

By the end of 1992 , the number of persons displaced by the war exceeded 1.5 mil- lion , more than one - third of Bosnia and Herzegovina's total
population . In early July , a demographer estimated that half of Bosnia Herzegovina's Muslim popu- lation , one - fifth of its Croats , and
something less than one - tenth of its Serbs had been displaced by the war . The percentage of refugees among the Serbian popu- lation later
rose considerably , including many refugees from " the Serbian Republic . " Of the refugees , 45 percent were children and 30 percent elderly ,
with women mak- ing up the majority of the remaining one - quarter .

As indicated in Section 1.c. , all sides held civilians in prison camps . Serbian forces confined thousands on non - Serbs , mostly ethnic Muslims ,
in " collection centers " as an adjunct to their campaign of " ethnic cleansing . " The SDS held the majority of prisoners and subjected them to
inadequate living conditions , beatings , torture , rape , and forced labor . In some camps , they executed prisoners , sometimes sum- marily and
sometimes as the culmination of tortures carried out for the amusement of camp guards .

About 3,000 men , women , and children were killed during May and June at the Brcko - Luka camp , which held approximately 1,000 civilian
internees at any one time . Some 95 percent were ethnic Muslims , and the remainder were Croats . About 95 percent were men . Until May the
bodies were dumped into the Sava river .

In late July , more than 100 died in an incident at the Keraterm prison in Prijedor . According to refugee accounts , a riot erupted on a hot evening
in July , when men who had been deprived of water and were locked in a building that lacked ventilation panicked and tried to break out . Most of
the victims were said to have suffocated in the crush of men trying to get out , while others were executed the next day for their part in the riot .
When Western journalists visited Keraterm a few weeks later , they were prevented from examining that part of the facility where , according to
refugee accounts , the executions had taken place . Two of these journalists said it appeared that the Serbian authorities there were cleaning a
wall and adjacent area where prisoners had allegedly been shot .

According to former inmates , 10 to 15 prisoners were killed each day at Omarska between May and August , and prisoners were also subjected
to torture and mutila- tion . At the " Serbian Army " prison camp on Manjaca , prisoners were also killed ; local residents found the bodies of 25
prisoners near the camp in July , while a CSCE team that visited Manjaca in August and saw prisoners who had been beaten with blunt
instruments concluded that detainees had been executed there beginning in late May . According to credible and consistent accounts given by a
number of Bosnian refugees , it appears that Muslim women were raped systematically and re- peatedly while being held prisoner by Serbian
forces in northern and southeastern Bosnia . The CSCE Thomson mission visited the village of Ripac , near Bihac , where about 60 Muslim
inhabitants , mostly women and children , were denied freedom of movement and prevented from communicating with family members on the
other side of the front line .

Serbian civilians held in prison camps by Croats and Muslims were also subjected to violence . According to credible refugee accounts , at least
20 Serbian civilians were murdered in the Celibici prison , operated by Muslim authorities near Konjic ; the CSCE team which visited Celibici
found circumstantial evidence of killings there . ( See also Section 1.c. on the treatment of inmates in prison camps . )

The Bosnian Government has intervened to secure the release of Serbs arrested by police or paramilitary forces in Sarajevo , both in the case of
individuals and of larger groups , as in one case where several hundred Serbian civilans were detained in the Kosevo stadium in Sarajevo . In
addition , according to Serbs who were held in prison camps run by Bosnian Muslims , some prison officials suspected of atroc- ities , such as the
commander of the prison camp at Celebici , have been arrested by the Bosnian Government .

Serbian civilians were the victims of violence by Croatian militias , by the pri- marily Muslim armed forces of Bosnia , and by Croatian and Muslim
irregulars . Bosnian forces relieving the besieged town of Gorazde in August attacked columns of fleeing Serbs and killed a number of civilians ,
including women and children . Ser- bian refugees from Gorazde also asserted that some Serbian civilians were mur- dered in the town itself .
Bosnian irregular forces attacked Serbian villages in east- ern Bosnia during the summer and fall and in once incident near Milici in Septem- ber
reportedly killed at least 28 Serbian villagers . Other credible refugee accounts indicate that the HVO in a Mostar prison beat and threatened
Serbian civilians , in- cluding women , and that some inmates died as a result of beatings or mistreatment . In the town of Prozor in October ,
following a dispute between the HVO and local Muslims , the heavily armed Croatian forces went on a rampage directed against the Muslim
population , killing civilians and destroying much of the town .

Serbian attacks on Muslim and Croatian towns and villages in Bosnia were fre- quently spearheaded by paramilitary " volunteers , " including
many citizens of Serbia and Montenegro . In particular , three paramilitary leaders carried on activities pub- licly and with evident official support in
Serbia .

Zeljko Raznjatovic , a criminal wanted in several Western countries , is a para- military leader known by the name " Arkan . " Based in Belgrade ,
he took part in the fighting in Croatia in 1991. He led paramilitary forces in early April that murdered Muslim civilians in Bijeljina . He also
participated in the seizure of the predomi- nantly Muslim town of Zvornik where his forces allegedly murdered civilians . He was known to travel
on some occasions in JNA aircraft .

Vojislav Seselj , a member of both the Serbian and “ Yugoslav ” parliaments and the leader of the Serbian Radical Party ( SRSA ) and its
paramilitary wing , the Serbian Chetnik Movement ( SCP ) , personally reviewed his SCP paramilitary forces in Sara- jevo and in Herzegovina ,
traveling in some cases in JNA aircraft . His SCP forces were active in northern Bosnia and eastern Herzegovina where they were accused of
killing civilians .
Mirko Jovic , the leader of the Serbian National Renewal Party ( SNO ) , whose paramilitary wing is known as the White Eagles , was
photographed in August at Serbian artillery positions outside Gorazde . The White Eagles took part in the as- sault on Visegrad in April , in which
Muslim civilians were murdered , as well as in other actions in many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina .

In several areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina , followers of the Croatian nationalist extremist , Dobroslav Paraga , and his Croatian Party of Rights
( HSP ) , formed units of the Croatian Defense Forces ( HOS ) . Thousands of HOS troops were already in western Herzegovina in March , before
the outbreak of heavy fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina .

All sides in the Bosnian war charged each other with widespread atrocities against civilians , but many of these could not be substantiated by
international ob- server investigations . The practice of the SDS of issuing through the Serbian News Agency ( SRNA ) a flood of unfounded
charges of crimes by Bosnian government forces , charges then picked up by the wire service Tanjug and other Serbian media , in fact made it
more difficult to sort out the real instances in which ethnic Serbs were the victims of atrocities . SRNA reported in September , for example , that
150 Serbs had been killed in Bihac in the presence of UNPROFOR and ICRC personnel , a report that these two agencies subsequently said was
untrue . An investigation by the UNPROFOR in Bihac failed to produce any evidence of such killings . For its part , the Bosnian Government made
allegations concerning atrocities by " Serbian Army " forces and Serbian paramilitary forces without solid evidence , charges that damaged its
credibility .

The widespread incidence of violations of humanitarian law in the Bosnian war led the UNSC in September to adopt a resolution seeking the
investigation of al- leged war crimes . The War Crimes Commission , established by the UNSC following its first meeting in November ,
announced that it would be investigating reports of violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and analyzing applicable
law . The Commission noted that it had received information relevant to the investigation from several governments , including that of the United
States . Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties , Including

a . Freedom of Speech and Press . Before the outbreak of the war in April , the Bosnian media and particularly Sarajevo radio and television , the
major Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje , and the independent television studio Yutel were widely re- garded as accurate and balanced . They
displayed a critical stance toward all politi- cal parties and maintained a fair ethnic mix among their journalists . While the three major nationalist
parties ( the SDA , HDZ , and SDS ) had earlier attempted un- successfully to place Sarajevo radio and television and Oslobodjenje under direct
government control and effectively segregate them into three ethnic units , by early 1992 SDA leaders were supporting the independence of the
media , although critics charged this was only a tactical retreat and that Muslim nationalists too were quiet- ly seeking to place the media under
state control . The SDS remained bitterly critical of Sarajevo radio and television and Oslobodjenje , and , after Mate Boban took con- trol of the
HDZ in February , it too renewed its demands for ethnically segregated media . SDS paramilitary forces , with the support of the JNA , seized
most Sarajevo television relay stations and reprogrammed them to relay Belgrade television braodcasts . When the siege of Sarajevo began in
April , the radio and television stu- dios and the Oslobodjenje building came under heavy bombardment . After the war began , Sarajevo radio and
television increasingly reflected government policy . The director of Sarajevo television , Nenad Pejic , left Bosnia in May , saying he was re-
ceiving threats from all sides in the conflict . Oslobodjenje continued to operate as an independent voice ; its editor - in - chief was a Muslim and
the deputy editor - in - chief a Serb , and major Bosnian ethnic groups were represented on its staff .

The SDS - created information office , SRNA ( Serbian News Agency ) , produced a steady stream of propaganda that was circulated widely by
Tanjug , the officially controlled Belgrade press agency , and other Serbian media . The reporting of the Bosnian Government's official news
agency , BH Press , supported government poli- cies and interests .

Individual journalists suffered reprisals from local authorities who did not ap- prove of their reporting or of their employer . The Oslobodjenje
correspondent in Zvornik was murdered in April after Serbian paramilitary forces took control of the town . In Banja Luka , Sarajevo television
journalists were expelled from their offices , which were taken over by Serbian nationalists for a local television studio .

Two journalists for the Belgrade daily Borba , Zeljko Vukovic and Natka Buturovic , received threats from all sides because of their nonpartisan
reporting from Sarajevo . In September the Bosnian Interior Ministry issued warrants for their arrest on charges of spying for the JNA . Although
the warrants were not with- drawn , the two journalists remained free and continued to file reports from Sarajevo until their departure for Belgrade
in November . Bosnian authorities in July de- tained the Tanjug correspondent in Zenica , Milan Sabic , and held him prisoner for almost 3 months
before they released him and let him depart for Belgrade in Sep- tember .

Reporters faced great risks in covering the Bosnian war . At least 20 domestic and foreign journalists were killed in Bosnia during 1992 , including
American Broad- casting Corporation news producer David Kaplan , who was shot by a sniper in Sara- jevo in August . Western journalists
covering the war said that some combatant forces targeted reporters . In June a Slovene journalist , Ivo Standeker , died after being wounded in
the Dobrinja neighborhood of Sarajevo . A car attempting to bring him to a hospital in the city center was stopped by SDS paramilitary forces who
took Standeker instead to Pale ; he died 8 hours after being seized , never having re- ceived medical care .

In Banja Luka , the largest Bosnian town under SDS control , the local radio and television spread nationalist propaganda , and only ethnic Serbs
occupied editorial positions . ( According to the 1991 census , the urban population of Banja Luka is al- most one - half Serb , while the population
of the district is 55 percent Serb ) . The Banja Luka newspaper Glas followed a hard nationalist line but within that frame- work maintained a
critical stance toward the local authorities .

Schools and universities could not function normally in Bosnian towns under siege . In Sarajevo , many ethnic Serbian professors fled , some
because of harassment due to their ethnic identity or political views , although many who left were harshly critical of SDS terrorism . In Banja Luka
, many professors were fired or removed from administrative positions because they were ethnic Muslims or Croats , and in June the local
newspaper frankly proclaimed that the university in Banja Luka was to be " a Serbian university . " '

b . Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association . - Fundamental rights such as the right of association ceased to be observed when war broke
out . Everywhere , pressure for conformity increased and the potential cost of dissent rose . The public prosecutor in Sarajevo declared the SDS
illegal , although the Government quashed a similar initiative to ban the SDA and HDZ as well . In Banja Luka , SDA activists were subject to
surveillance and frequent police interrogation , although they were allowed to meet with international observers .
c . Freedom of Religion . - All speaking the same language , the Serbs , Croats , and Muslim Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina are distinguished
most obviously by their religion ( Orthodox Christian , Roman Catholic , and Muslim , respectively ) . The SDS indoctrinated its forces to believe
they were fighting a religious war . Radovan Karadzic repeated this message many times , and Serbian forces systematically_de- stroyed
mosques and Catholic churches in many of the towns they captured . The mosque and Catholic church in the center of Prijedor were destroyed
during the summer , not by shells in battle , but demolished intentionally with explosives . Šimi- larly , the mosque in Celinac was destroyed , as
was the Catholic church in Kotor Varos , where the local Catholic priest was forbidden to practice . In Visegrad , SDS paramilitary forces
demolished a mosque in the center of the town after occupying it , and in Foca Serbian occupation forces destroyed the 15th - century " Sarena "
( mul- ticolored ) mosque . In Tuzla , the residence of the Serbian Orthodox bishop was at- tacked and considerable damage inflicted ,
presumably by Muslim or Croatian na- tionalists ; local officials condemned the attack , but no arrests were made . Many other mosques ,
churches , and other religious buildings were damaged or destroyed in the shelling of Sarajevo , Mostar , and other towns by " the Serbian Army "
and its paramilitary allies . There were also cases in which Serbian Orthodox churches were damaged or destroyed in the fighting and appear to
have been deliberately targeted . The Serbian Orthodox bishop of Herzegovina declared in September that 15 church- es in his diocese had been
destroyed in the districts of Mostar , Tomislavgrad , and Konjic , and that many Serbian villages in Herzegovina had been destroyed and their
inhabitants imprisoned or killed by regular Croatian army units , ethnic Croatian forces from Western Herzegovina , and Bosnian Muslim forces .

Those who promoted the war encouraged religious hatred to motivate their fol- lowers . Leaders of the three principal religions condemned the
violence but were un- able to rally their congregations to forgiveness and reconciliation . Most of Sarajevo's Jewish community fled the city during
the early weeks of the SDS / JNA siege .

d . Freedom of Movement Within the Country , Foreign Travel , Emigration , and Re- patriation . The war deprived most of the people of Bosnia of
the right to move free- ly in their own country or across its borders ; large numbers of people were either expelled from their homes or held
hostage because of their ethnic affiliation . Every- where , mobilizations were declared which gave the authorities power to restrict the movement
of most adults , other than the elderly . Serbs who wished to leave Sara- jevo or Muslims who wished to leave Banja Luka could be denied
permission on the grounds that they were subject to military duty . The northern corridor route cross- ing SDS - controlled territory between Banja
Luka and the Serbian border was gen- erally closed to non - Serbs .

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights : The Right of Citizens to Change Their Govern-

ment

On February 29 - March 1 , Bosnia and Herzegovina held a referendum on whether it should become a sovereign and independent state .
Bosnian leaders had preferred to try to hold Yugoslavia together in some loose form , since they believed this pro- vided the best hope for stability
and peace in their multiethnic republic . As it be- came clear that Croatia's independence would be recognized by the world commu- nity , these
Bosnian leaders , including the Muslim and Croatian nationalist parties , all major opposition parties , and most independent intellectuals
concluded that Bosnia must have the same status as Serbia and Croatia if Bosnia was to survive as a multiethnic society . The referendum
produced a vote of 63.4 percent of all eligi- ble voters in favor of independence . Staff members of the U.S. Congress ' Commis- sion on Security
and Cooperation in Europe who observed the referendum concluded in a published report that " citizens legitimately expressed their desire to be
sov- ereign and independent . "

The SDS organized a boycott of the referendum , and although its leader , Karadzic , said his followers would not hinder those who wished to vote
, many local governments under SDS control did not cooperate fully ; in a few districts , SDS offi- cials tried to prevent the vote from taking place .
In addition , some SDS activists pressured ethnic Serbs not to vote , threatening that they would lose their jobs or suffer other sanctions . In Banja
Luka , the local newspaper proclaimed on its front page that Serbs who voted ( whether for or against ) were " traitors " to their people . On March
1 , as it became clear that the referendum was producing a majority yes vote , the SDS seized on the murder of a Serb in Sarajevo that day to
throw up bar- ricades that paralyzed the city . The violence in Sarajevo in the first days of March and the war the SDS forces unleashed the
following month deprived Bosnian citi- zens of their right to determine their political future .

The bicameral National Assembly comprised 240 seats , of which 99 were filled by Muslims , 84 by Serbs , 50 by Croats , and 7 by others . This
composition paralleled the breakdown in the population of 4,355,000 , in which 43.7 percent were Muslim , 31.3 Serbs , 17.3 Croats , and 7.7
others .

The Republic's institutions , including the legislature , could not function , and effec- tive political power fell to those who had arms and men at
their disposal . The Bosnian Territorial Defense Force , later renamed the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina , controlled relatively little
territory , and , as the war went on , it was increasingly taken over by ethnic Muslims . The Croatian militias , the HVO and HOS , controlled
western Herzegovina , parts of central Bosnia , and some territory along the Sava river in the north . More than half of Bosnia came under the
control of SDS paramilitary groups and the former JNA forces that after May 19 referred to themselves as " the Serbian Army . "

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental In- vestigation of Alleged Violation of Human Rights

The Bosnian Government , the SDS , and the Croatian militias all agreed in prin- ciple to allow international observers access to territory under
their control to inves- tigate alleged human rights abuses and for other purposes . In practice , political au- thorities imposed obstacles , and the
ongoing war made it difficult for international observers to carry out such investigations in many parts of Bosnia . While Radovan Karadzic
responded to charges that his forces were operating concentration camps for non - Serbs by organizing group visits to SDS prison camps ,
journalists were not granted full access to such sites . For example , journalists participating in an SDS-organized visit were prevented from
inspecting an area of the Keraterm prison where executions allegedly took place ; " Serbian Republic " police detained several journalists
traveling independently when they attempted to visit the Batkovic camp , without prior notice ; and journalists in general were not permitted private
discourse with prisoners .

Another journalist was summarily expelled from Banja Luka when he asked " Ser- bian Army officials for the autopsy report on a prisoner who
died at Manjaca . The UN . Special Human Rights Rapporteur , Tadeusz Mazowiecki , was denied access to the Manjaca camp by " Serbian Army
" officers in September , on the grounds that he had arrived there too late in the day and that preparations for his visit had not been made properly
.
All sides in the Bosnian war viewed the work of international organizations through the prism of their political interests . The Government
sometimes turned against the UNPROFOR because , in its view , the UNPROFOR would not clearly distinguish between aggressor and victim in
the conflict . Karadzic and the SDS al- leged that UNHCR planes were not only ferrying food into Sarajevo but also smug- gling arms to Muslim
and Croatian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina . Such obstruc- tionist attitudes rendered the work of international organizations both difficult and
dangerous .

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race , Sex , Religion , Language , or Social Status All other forms of social tension were eclipsed by the
ethnic hatred generated by the war to annex Bosnian territory to a " union of Serbian states . " There have been widespread dismissals and
intimidation of workers based on ethnicity and religion . Affiliation as an Orthodox Christian Serb , a Roman Catholic Croat , or a Muslim Slav
became the crucial factor that determined if a person would keep a job or lose it , would remain at home or be driven out of it , and , all too often ,
would live or die . Support for a multiethnic society was eroded by violence , fear , and anarchy . The Bosnian war was especially tragic for the
hundreds of thousands of citizens whose families included members of more than one ethnic group , a particularly common phenomenon among
young , urban , and educated Bosnians . ( In the 1991 census , 240,000 Bosnians did not even offer an ethnic affiliation , but declared themselves
to be " Yugoslavs . " )

Section 6. Worker Rights

a . The Right of Association . - Legally , all workers are entitled to form or join unions of their own choosing without prior authorization and , up
until Bosnia and Herzegovina's descent in early 1992 into war and economic chaos , this right was generally respected . Bosnian workers had
independent trade unions , and journal- ists , teachers , and others were organized in independent professional organizations , which attempted
through mass actions both to address labor issues and to promote peace during the tense early months of 1992. The activities of unions were
curtailed severely by the war and the collapse of the economy . Although statistics on the size of the organized work force are unreliable , the bulk
of Bosnian workers were prob- ably members of the semiofficial Council of Independent Trade Unions of Bosnia and Herzegovina ( CITUBH ) .
Throughout 1991 and into 1992 , new trade unions were formed as the centralized national structure eroded , but the old union umbrella or-
ganization continued to be able to offer some material benefits to members , such as preferential access to lower cost commodities from
government reserves , which the fledgling independent unions were unable to do .

The right to strike is recognized and was exercised in early 1992 prior to the out- break of hostilities .

b . The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively . - This right is guaranteed for- mally by Bosnian law , but Western - style collective bargaining
had yet to take hold , as the management of state - owned ( or " socially owned " ) enterprises had not been given , and had not taken ,
responsibility for collective bargaining . Some agreements were negotiated with the semiofficial Chamber of Economy but proved unsatisfac- tory
for lack of clear authority and management responsibility . Privatization of " so- cial property " was another problem in which the rights and
interests of workers were not well defined or understood . Ethnically motivated dismissals and curtail- ment of union activities increased in the
context of the war . There are no export processing zones .

c . Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor . - Bosnian law prohibits forced labor , and it was not known to occur before the war's outbreak .

d . Minimum Age for Employment of Children . - The minimum age for employment is 16 , although in villages and farm communities younger
children often assist with family agricultural work . The victimization of children is a horrifying aspect of the Bosnian war , and there were credible
reports of the employment of children for mili- tary functions , including reconnaissance and running messages .

e . Acceptable Conditions of Work . - Minimum wages are guaranteed , but delays and partial payments were pandemic even prior to the outbreak
of fighting , due to the collapse of the Bosnian economy . Serbia had imposed an embargo on food deliv- eries , including shipments that had
already been paid for . Banks had neither hard currency nor local currency , and purchasing power dropped to a fraction of its 1990 level .
Formally , sick leave and other benefit programs were generous , and regula- tions on occupational health and safety were adequate , although
enforcement was lax . In the context of the war , however , formal guarantees are worth very little ; the economy of the entire Republic has been
destroyed by the war and there have been widespread dismissals and intimidation of workers based on ethnicity and religion .