UNIT 2: GENERAL EXCEPTIONS (S.

14 - 33, 34-44)

I. UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND
II. INTOXICATION
III. PRIVATE DEFENCE

CASE LAWS

a) *BASDEV V. STATE OF PEPSU AIR 1956 SC 488

b) *SRIKANT ANANDRAO BHOSALE V. STATE OF MAHARSHTRA
(2003) 7 SCC 748
c) DEO NARAIN V. STATE OF UP AIR 1973 SC 473
d) JAMES MARTIN V. STATE OF KERALA (2004) 2 SCC 203
e) DARSHAN SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB, (2010) 1 S.C.R. 642
 GENERAL EXCEPTIONS (Section 14 TO 33)

I. UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND:

The concept of "Unsoundness of Mind" as a general exception to criminal

liability is a critical and complex defence in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
(BNS), 2023. The concept of "Unsound Mind" in criminal law is a legal, not
medical, concept used as a complete defense against criminal liability.
"Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it,
by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the
act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law."

Three Essential Components (The Legal Test)

For the defense of unsound mind to succeed, ALL THREE must be proven:

Component What It Means Example

Schizophrenia, severe
1. Presence
Medical/psychological disorder bipolar disorder, psychotic
of
exists episode, intellectual
Unsoundness
disability

2. At the Disorder was active at the Not before, not after, but
Time of Crime exact moment of criminal act during the offense

Because of the disorder, person

was incapable of knowing:
a) Nature of act (physical "Incapable" means
3. Legal
reality) complete inability, not just
Incapacity
OR confusion
b) Wrong/Illegal (moral/legal
wrong)
 WHAT "UNSOUND MIND" IS NOT IN BNS

The defense DOES NOT APPLY to:

Situation Reason

Voluntary Drunkenness Self-induced intoxication

Irresistible Impulse Loss of control but still knows right/wrong

Mental Retardation Alone Must prove it caused legal incapacity

Emotional Disturbance Anger, jealousy, depression alone

Psychopathy Lack of empathy ≠ legal unsoundness

Partial/Mild Illness Must reach threshold of legal incapacity

II. INTOXICATION:

Under the BNS, intoxication is generally not a defense for committing a

crime. A person cannot claim innocence simply because they were drunk or
under the influence of drugs. However, there is one narrow exception.

BNS Section 23

This is the main section dealing with the defense of intoxication.

 General Rule (Section 23(1)): If a person commits an offence while

voluntarily intoxicated (by alcohol, drugs, or any other substance),
they are held legally responsible as if they were sober. The law
assumes that by choosing to intoxicate oneself, the person takes the
risk of their actions.

 The Exception (Section 23(2)): A person can avoid criminal

liability only if they can prove both of the following:
 1. Involuntary Intoxication: The intoxication was administered
without their knowledge or against their will (e.g.,
someone spiked their drink).

2. Lack of Required Mental State: As a result of this involuntary

intoxication, they were incapable of knowing:

 The nature of the act they were doing, OR

 That the act was wrong or contrary to law.

o This exception is extremely strict and difficult to prove.

Examples: A person who gets into a fight, drives dangerously, or commits

theft while drunk cannot use intoxication as a defense. They will be charged
for the primary offence (e.g., culpable homicide, rash driving, theft). The
defense of involuntary intoxication succeeding is very rare. Courts require
strong medical and factual evidence to prove the person was completely
deprived of their reasoning faculties against their will.

III. PRIVATE DEFENCE

The law recognizes the inherent right of every person to defend

themselves, their body, and their property against unlawful aggression
when immediate state protection is not available. "Right of Private
Defence" is now simply called "Private Defence". Now explicitly
includes the defence of property against theft, robbery, mischief, or
criminal trespass. The old IPC limited it to specific property offences.

The Two Categories of Private Defence

1. Defence of Body (Sections 41-42)

You have the right to defend your own body or another person's body
against any offence that:

 Reasons apprehension of death (e.g., murder, attempted murder).

 Reasons apprehension of grievous hurt (e.g., assault with a

deadly weapon).

 Is an offence like rape, kidnapping, abduction, or unnatural

sexual offences.

2. Defence of Property (Sections 43-44)

You have the right to defend your property (movable or immovable) or
another person's property against any act which is:

 Theft, robbery, mischief, or criminal trespass.

 House-trespass (illegal entry into a dwelling).

When Does the Right Arise?

The right of private defence arises the moment a reasonable

apprehension of danger to body or property exists. It is
a preventive right, not a punitive one.

When Does the Right End?

The right ceases as soon as:

 The threat has ended.

 Public authorities (like the police) take over.

 The assailant retreats or is disabled.

 For property: The offence (e.g., theft) is completed and the offender
has fled.

Exceptions (When the Right is NOT Available)

You do not have the right of private defence in the following scenarios:

1. Against a public servant: If the act is done by a public servant (e.g.,

police officer) in good faith under color of their office, and you
know or should know they are a public servant.

2. Against acts authorized by law: If the act is done under

the direction of a public servant and you know it is legally
authorized.

3. NO RIGHT TO RETALIATE: There is no right to inflict more harm

than necessary once the threat has been neutralized.

4. No pre-emptive strike: The right does not exist for an act that is not
likely to cause death/grievous hurt and there is time to seek
public authorities.

Practical Example
  Scenario A (Defence of Body): An attacker with a knife runs toward
you shouting threats. You can use necessary force, even causing death,
to defend yourself.

 Scenario B (Defence of Property): A thief is running away with your

laptop. You cannot shoot him in the back (as theft is complete and no
threat to life exists). You can, however, use reasonable force to
apprehend him.

SECTION 14. ACT DONE BY A PERSON BOUND, OR BY MISTAKE OF

FACT BELIEVING HIMSELF BOUND, BY LAW.

Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of

a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes
himself to be, bound by law to do it.

Illustrations.

(a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in

conformity with the commands of the law. A has committed no offence.

SECTION 15. ACT OF JUDGE WHEN ACTING JUDICIALLY.

Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the

exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be,
given to him by law.

SECTION 16. ACT DONE PURSUANT TO JUDGMENT OR ORDER OF

COURT.

Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which is warranted by the

judgment or order of, a Court; if done whilst such judgment or order remains
in force, is an offence, notwithstanding the Court may have had no
jurisdiction to pass such judgment or order, provided the person doing the
act in good faith believes that the Court had such jurisdiction.
 SECTION 17. ACT DONE BY A PERSON JUSTIFIED, OR BY MISTAKE OF
FACT BELIEVING HIMSELF JUSTIFIED, BY LAW.

Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or

who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in
good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it.

Illustration

A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the exercise, to the

best of his judgment exerted in good faith, of the power which the law gives
to all persons of apprehending murderers in the fact, seizes Z, in order to
bring Z before the proper authorities. A has committed no offence, though it
may turn out that Z was acting in self-defence.

SECTION 18. ACCIDENT IN DOING A LAWFUL ACT.

Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without

any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful
manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution.

Illustration.

A is at work with a hatchet; the head flies off and kills a man who is standing
by. Here, if there was no want of proper caution on the part of A, his act is
excusable and not an offence.

SECTION 19. ACT LIKELY TO CAUSE HARM, BUT DONE WITHOUT

CRIMINAL INTENT, AND TO PREVENT OTHER HARM.

Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge
that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to
cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other
harm to person or property.

Explanation.—It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be

prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or
excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to
cause harm.

Illustrations.
A, in a great fire, pulls down houses in order to prevent the conflagration
from spreading. He does this with the intention in good faith of saving human
life or property. Here, if it be found that the harm to be prevented was of
such a nature and so imminent as to excuse A’s act, A is not guilty of the
offence.

SECTION 20. ACT OF A CHILD UNDER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE.

Nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age.

SECTION 21. ACT OF A CHILD ABOVE SEVEN AND UNDER TWELVE

YEARS OF AGE OF IMMATURE UNDERSTANDING.

Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and
under twelve years of age, who has not attained sufficient maturity of
understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on
that occasion.

SECTION 22. ACT OF A PERSON OF UNSOUND MIND.

Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it,
by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the
act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.

SECTION 23. ACT OF A PERSON INCAPABLE OF JUDGMENT BY

REASON OF INTOXICATION CAUSED AGAINST HIS WILL.

Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it,
is, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or
that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law; provided that the
thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge
or against his will.

SECTION 24. OFFENCE REQUIRING A PARTICULAR INTENT OR

KNOWLEDGE COMMITTED BY ONE WHO IS INTOXICATED.
In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular
knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication
shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would
have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated
him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.

SECTION 25. ACT NOT INTENDED AND NOT KNOWN TO BE LIKELY TO

CAUSE DEATH OR GRIEVOUS HURT, DONE BY CONSENT.

Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is
not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an
offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the
doer to cause, to any person, above eighteen years of age, who has given
consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of any
harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such
person who has consented to take the risk of that harm..

Illustration:

A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement
implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such
fencing, may be caused without foul play; and if A, while playing fairly, hurts
Z, A commits no offence.

SECTION 26. ACT NOT INTENDED TO CAUSE DEATH, DONE BY

CONSENT IN GOOD FAITH FOR PERSON'S BENEFIT.

Nothing, which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any

harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known
by the doer to be likely to cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in
good faith, and who has given a consent, whether express or implied, to
suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm.

Illustration:

A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death

of Z, who suffers under the painful complaint, but not intending to cause Zs
death, and intending, in good faith, Zs benefit, performs that operation on Z,
with Zs consent. A has committed no offence.

SECTION 27. ACT DONE IN GOOD FAITH FOR BENEFIT OF CHILD OR

PERSON OF UNSOUND MIND, BY, OR BY CONSENT OF GUARDIAN.
Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve
years of age, or person of unsound mind, by, or by consent, either express or
implied, of the guardian or other person having lawful charge of that person,
is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by
the doer to cause or be known by the doer to be likely to cause to that
person:

Provided that this exception shall not extend to---

(a) the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;

(b) the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to
cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous
hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;

(c) the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause

grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing death or grievous
hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;

(d) the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would
not extend.

Illustration

A, in good faith, for his child's benefit without his child's consent, has his
child cut for the stone by a surgeon knowing it to be likely that the operation
will cause the child's death, but not intending to cause the child's death. A is
within the exception, in as much as his object was the cure of the child.

SECTION 28. CONSENT KNOWN TO BE GIVEN UNDER FEAR OR

MISCONCEPTION.

Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve
years of age, or person of unsound mind, by, or by consent, either express or
implied, of the guardian or other person having lawful charge of that person,
is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by
the doer to cause or be known by the doer to be likely to cause to that
person:

Provided that this exception shall not extend to---

(a) the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;

(b) the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to
cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous
hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;

(c) the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause

grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing death or grievous
hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;

(d) the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would
not extend.

Illustration.

A, in good faith, for his child's benefit without his child's consent, has his
child cut for the stone by a surgeon knowing it to be likely that the operation
will cause the child's death, but not intending to cause the child's death. A is
within the exception, in as much as his object was the cure of the child.

SECTION 29. EXCLUSION OF ACTS WHICH ARE OFFENCES

INDEPENDENTLY OF HARM CAUSED.

A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Sanhita,

—.

(a) if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a

misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason
to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or
misconception; or.

(b) if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or

intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to
which he gives his consent; or.

(c) unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a
person who is under twelve years of age.

SECTION 30. ACT DONE IN GOOD FAITH FOR BENEFIT OF A PERSON

WITHOUT CONSENT.

The exceptions in sections 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts which are
offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to
cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent, or
on whose behalf the consent is given.

Illustration.

Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving
the life of the woman) is an offence independently of any harm which it may
cause or be intended to cause to the woman. Therefore, it is not an offence
"by reason of such harm"; and the consent of the woman or of her guardian
to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act.

SECTION 31. COMMUNICATION MADE IN GOOD FAITH.

Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to a person

for whose benefit it is done in good faith, even without that person's consent,
if the circumstances are such that it is impossible for that person to signify
consent, or if that person is incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian
or other person in lawful charge of him from whom it is possible to obtain
consent in time for the thing to be done with benefit:

Provided that this exception shall not extend to--

(a) the intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death;

(b) the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to
cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous
hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;

(c) the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to cause hurt, for any
purpose other than the preventing of death or hurt;

(d) the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would
not extend.

Illustrations.

(1) Z is thrown from his horse, and is insensible. A, a surgeon, finds that Z
requires to be trepanned.

A, not intending Zs death, but in good faith, for Z's benefit, performs the
trepan before Z recovers his power of judging for himself. A has committed
no offence.
 SECTION 32. ACT TO WHICH A PERSON IS COMPELLED BY THREATS.

Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death,
nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by
threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension
that instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence:

Provided that the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a
reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place
himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint.

Explanation 1.--A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of

being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled
to the benefit of this exception, on the ground of his having been compelled
by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law.

Explanation 2.--A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of

instant death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith
compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to
enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception.

SECTION 33. ACT CAUSING SLIGHT HARM.

Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause,

or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight
that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.

RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE SECTION 34 to 44

Section 34. Things done in private defence.

Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private

defence.

Section 35. Right of private defence of body and of property.

Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 37,
to defend—.

(a) his own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence
affecting the human body;.
(b) the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other
person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of
theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to
commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.

Section 36. Right of private defence against act of a person of

unsound mind, etc.

When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence,
by reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the
unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by
reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the
same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act
were that offence.

Illustrations.

Z, a person of unsound mind, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But

A has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane.

Section 37. Acts against which there is no right of private defence.

(1) There is no right of private defence, —

(a) against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of
death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public
servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act, may
not be strictly justifiable by law;

(b) against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of
death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction
of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that
direction may not be strictly justifiable by law;

(c) in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the
public authorities.

(2) The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more
harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.

Explanation 1.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence

against an act done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such,
unless he knows or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is
such public servant.
Explanation 2.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence
against an act done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public
servant, unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the
act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the authority
under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces
such authority, if demanded.

Section 38. When right of private defence of body extends to

causing death.

The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions
specified in section 37, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other
harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right
be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:—

(a) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death
will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;

(b) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous
hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;

(c) an assault with the intention of committing rape;

(d) an assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;

(e) an assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;

(f) an assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under

circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be
unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release;

(g) an act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or

administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous
hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such act.

Section 39. When such right extends to causing any harm other
than death.

If the offence be not of any of the descriptions specified in section 38, the
right of private defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing
of death to the assailant, but does extend, under the restrictions specified in
section 37, to the voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than
death.

Section 40. Commencement and continuance of right of private

defence of body.

The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable

apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to
commit the offence though the offence may not have been committed; and it
continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.

Section 41. When right of private defence of property extends to

causing death.

The right of private defence of property extends, under the restrictions

specified in section 37, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other
harm to the wrong-doer, if the offence, the committing of which, or the
attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right, be an
offence of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely: —

(a) robbery;

(b) house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise;

(c) mischief by fire or any explosive substance committed on any building,

tent or vessel, which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling, or
as a place for the custody of property;

(d) theft, mischief, or house-trespass, under such circumstances as may

reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the
consequence, if such right of private defence is not exercised.

Section 42. When such right extends to causing any harm other
than death.

If the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which

occasions the exercise of the right of private defence, be theft, mischief, or
criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions specified in section 41, that
right does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend,
subject to the restrictions specified in section 37, to the voluntary causing to
the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.

Section 43. Commencement and continuance of right of private

defence of property.

The right of private defence of property,—

(a) commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property
commences;

(b) against theft continues till the offender has effected his retreat with the
property or either the assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or the
property has been recovered;

(c) against robbery continues as long as the offender causes or attempts to

cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or as long as the fear
of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal restraint continues;

(d) against criminal trespass or mischief continues as long as the offender

continues in the commission of criminal trespass or mischief;

(e) against house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise continues as long
as the house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking
continues.

Section 44. Right of private defence against deadly assault when

there is risk of harm to innocent person.

If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which

reasonably causes the apprehension of death, the defender be so situated
that he cannot effectually exercise that right without risk of harm to an
innocent person, his right of private defence extends to the running of that
risk.

Illustration.

A is attacked by a mob who attempt to murder him. He cannot effectually

exercise his right of private defence without firing on the mob, and he cannot
fire without risk of harming young children who are mingled with the mob. A
commits no offence if by so firing he harms any of the children.

CASE LAWS

1) BASDEV V. STATE OF PEPSU AIR 1956 SC 488:

Citation: AIR 1956 Supreme Court 488

Key Issue: Whether voluntary intoxication can be a defence to a
criminal charge, specifically for establishing the requisite mens
rea (guilty mind).
 Facts of the Case
1. Accused: Basdev, a retired military officer.
2. Incident: He attended a wedding feast and consumed alcohol. While
intoxicated, he asked a boy (deceased) to move aside so he could sit.
When the boy did not move, Basdev took out a pistol and shot him
dead.
3. Trial Court: Convicted him for murder under Section 302 of the IPC.
4. High Court: Upheld the conviction.
5. Supreme Court Appeal: Basdev appealed, arguing that due to
intoxication, he was incapable of forming the specific intent to commit
murder.
Legal Questions Before the Supreme Court
1. Does voluntary drunkenness negate the mens rea required for an
offence?
2. Can intoxication reduce the charge from murder to culpable homicide
not amounting to murder?
Supreme Court's Judgment & Reasoning
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction for
murder. Key principles laid down:
1. General Rule: Intoxication is No Defence
 Voluntary intoxication (self-induced by alcohol or drugs) is not an
excuse for committing a crime.
 A person who voluntarily consumes intoxicants cannot claim exemption
from criminal liability merely because they were drunk.
2. Exception: Only in Rare Cases of Specific Intent Crimes
 Intoxication may be considered only where the crime requires
a specific intent (e.g., murder requires an "intention to kill").
 Even then, it is not a full defence but may reduce the gravity of the
offence if it is proved that due to intoxication, the accused
was incapable of forming that specific intent.
 Example: If intoxication prevents forming the intent to kill, the charge
may be reduced from "murder" (Section 302 IPC) to "culpable homicide
not amounting to murder" (Section 304 IPC).
3. Burden of Proof
 The burden lies on the accused to prove that due to intoxication, they
were so utterly intoxicated as to be incapable of forming the necessary
intent.
 Mere drunkenness or lowered inhibitions is not sufficient. The level of
intoxication must be extreme enough to render the accused incapable
of knowing the nature of the act or its consequences.
 4. Application to This Case
 The Court found that Basdev, though drunk, was not so intoxicated as
to be incapable of forming intent.
 Evidence showed he could walk, talk, and handle a pistol deliberately—
indicating he knew what he was doing.
 Hence, he had the requisite intent to kill, and his intoxication did not
mitigate the offence.
Key Legal Principles Established
1. No General Defence: Voluntary intoxication is not a defence to a
criminal charge.
2. Specific Intent Exception: It may only be relevant for crimes requiring
specific intent (like murder), and only if it completely obliterates the
capacity to form that intent.
3. High Threshold: The accused must prove a state of near-insanity due to
intoxication, not just disinhibition or poor judgment.
4. Proportionality of Punishment: If the specific intent is negated, the
charge may be reduced, but liability for a lesser offence (like culpable
homicide) remains.

Impact
This case is a cornerstone precedent in Indian criminal law on
intoxication.
 It clearly distinguishes between general intent and specific
intent crimes concerning intoxication.
 It reinforced the principle that self-induced intoxication cannot be a
license to commit crime.
 The reasoning from this case is largely incorporated into Section 23 of
the new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, which retains the same
legal position.

2) SRIKANT ANANDRAO BHOSALE V. STATE OF MAHARSHTRA

(2003) 7 SCC 748

Supreme Court case Srikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra

(2003) 7 SCC 748, which is a crucial authority on the doctrine of recent and
unexplained possession of stolen property.

Key Issue: Whether the presumption of guilt under Section 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 can be applied for a conviction of murder based solely on
the recovery of the deceased's property from the accused soon after the
incident.

Facts of the Case

1. The Crime: The deceased, M. K. Aney (a retired civil servant), was

found murdered in his flat in Bombay on the night of 21st/22nd March
1985. He had been brutally assaulted (15-16 stab wounds and head
injuries). Several valuable items, including a gold ring, a wristwatch,
and a camera, were missing from the flat.

2. Accused: Srikant Anandrao Bhosale, a distant relative of the deceased

who occasionally visited him. He was allegedly in financial difficulty.

3. Crucial Evidence: Just 4 days after the murder, the police recovered
the deceased's gold ring and wristwatch from the accused. The
recovery was made based on the accused's own statement (disclosure
statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act).

4. Other Evidence: No eyewitnesses. No fingerprints or bloodstains

matching the accused were found at the scene. The motive was
allegedly robbery. The accused denied the charges and claimed the
recovery was planted.

5. Lower Courts: The Trial Court and the Bombay High Court convicted
the accused under Section 302 (murder) of the IPC, primarily relying on
the presumption drawn from the recent possession of stolen property.

Legal Questions Before the Supreme Court

1. Can the presumption under Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence
Act (presumption from recent possession of stolen goods) be extended
to presume the accused committed the murder itself?

2. What are the limits of this presumption? What other corroborative

evidence is required to sustain a murder conviction?

Supreme Court's Judgment & Reasoning

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the murder conviction, and
acquitted the accused of the charge of murder.

1. The Doctrine of Recent Possession & Its Limits

 Presumption under Section 114, Illustration (a): The Court

affirmed that if a person is found in possession of stolen goods soon
 after the theft, the court may presume he is either the thief or has
received the goods knowing them to be stolen.

 Key Limitation: The presumption is not a presumption of law but of

fact. It is permissive, not mandatory. It can be used to presume theft or
receiving stolen property, but it does not automatically extend to a
graver offence like murder or robbery.

 Critical Distinction: The Court held:

"The presumption permitted to be drawn under Section 114, Illustration (a) of

the Evidence Act has limited application only. The presumption can be used
in support of other evidence. There is no rule of law that the presumption
must be drawn."

2. When Can Presumption Extend to Murder/Robbery?

The Court laid down a two-step test:

 Step 1 - Nature of Possession: The possession must be "recent,"

exclusive, and unexplained.

 Step 2 - Nexus to the Crime: To connect the possession to

murder, there must be some other cogent and convincing evidence
linking the accused to the crime of violence.

o Examples of such "other evidence": The accused was seen with

the deceased around the time of murder; weapon of offence
recovered at his instance; bloodstains of the deceased on his
clothes; motive established; confession.

 In this case, the Court found no other link. The gap of 4 days was
considered "recent," and the possession was unexplained, but there
was absolutely no other evidence to connect the accused to the act of
murder. The prosecution failed to prove he was present in the flat at
the time of the murder.

3. Burden of Proof & Standard

 The primary burden always remains on the prosecution to prove guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. A presumption cannot fill in gaping
holes in the prosecution's case.

 The accused's failure to explain possession can strengthen the case of

theft, but not necessarily murder.
Final Decision

 Murder Charge (Section 302 IPC): ACQUITTED. The Court held the
conviction was based on "surmisings and conjectures" and not on solid
evidence.

 Alternative Charge: The Court noted that the accused could potentially
have been convicted for the lesser offence of theft or receiving stolen
property, but since he was not charged for those offences, he could not
be convicted for them.

Impact:

 This is a leading case frequently cited to prevent miscarriages of

justice where courts might be tempted to infer a graver crime from
circumstantial evidence of possession alone.

 It serves as a safeguard, reinforcing the principle that conviction for a

serious offence like murder requires proof of a high degree of certainty,
which cannot be supplied by presumption alone in the absence of
connecting evidence.

3) DEO NARAIN V. STATE OF UP AIR 1973 SC 473

Supreme Court case Deo Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1973 SC 473),
a key precedent on the law of private defence, particularly regarding
the right to cause death in defence of property.

Key Issue: Whether the accused had exceeded their right of private defence
of property, and under what circumstances causing death is justified in such
defence.

Facts of the Case

1. Parties:

o Deceased: Raghunandan (complainant’s side), who was cutting

crops from a disputed field.

o Accused: Deo Narain and others (defendants), who claimed

ownership/cultivation rights over the same field.
 2. Background: A civil dispute over land was pending between the
parties. On the day of the incident, Raghunandan and his labourers
went to harvest the crop. The accused party objected and asked them
to stop, but they continued.

3. The Incident: The accused party, armed with lathis (sticks), arrived to
prevent the harvesting. A fight ensued. Deo Narain struck
Raghunandan on the head with a lathi, causing fatal injuries.
Raghunandan died later.

4. Trial & High Court: The Trial Court convicted Deo Narain
under Section 304 Part I IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to
murder). The Allahabad High Court upheld the conviction.

5. Supreme Court Appeal: Deo Narain appealed, claiming he was

exercising his right of private defence of property.

Legal Questions Before the Supreme Court

1. Did the accused have a right of private defence of property in this

situation?

2. If yes, did the accused exceed that right by causing death?

3. What are the limits of using force, especially deadly force, in defence of
property?

Supreme Court's Judgment & Reasoning

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction under
Section 304 Part I IPC. The Court held that the accused had exceeded the
right of private defence.

1. Right of Private Defence of Property Did Exist

 The Court acknowledged that the accused had a right to defend

their property (the standing crop) against criminal trespass and
mischief committed by the deceased’s party.

 The act of unlawfully harvesting the crop

constituted mischief (damage to property) and potentially theft.

2. However, the Right Was Exceeded – Key Principles Laid Down

The Court emphasized the doctrine of proportionality. The right of private

defence does not include the right to cause death in defence of
property, except in very specific, severe situations as outlined in Section
103 of the IPC (now Section 43 BNS).

The Court categorically stated:

"The right of private defence of property does not extend to causing

death unless the offence is one of the kinds enumerated in Section
103 IPC."

Enumerated offences under (old) Section 103 IPC (now Section 43

BNS) where death can be caused:

 Robbery

 House-breaking by night

 Mischief by fire to any building, tent, or vessel

 Theft, mischief, or house-trespass under such circumstances as

may reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous
hurt will be the consequence.

3. Application to the Facts

 The offence committed by the deceased was not one of the

enumerated grave offences in Section 103 IPC.

 It was a case of daytime mischief/theft related to crops. There

was no reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt to
any person from the acts of the harvesting party.

 Therefore, the accused had no right to cause death. Their right was
limited to using necessary force to repel the trespass and
protect the crop, such as chasing them away or using moderate
force to prevent the harvesting.

 By using a lathi blow on the vital head with sufficient force to cause
death, Deo Narain far exceeded the necessary and proportionate
force allowed by law.

IMPACT

Deo Narain v. State of UP is a foundational case cited in almost every

discussion on the limits of private defence of property.
  It firmly establishes that Indian law values human life over
property. You cannot kill a person simply for stealing crops or
trespassing during the day unless your own life is in danger.

 This reasoning is fully incorporated into the new Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita, 2023 (Sections 43 & 44), which retains the same
restrictive list for when death can be caused in property defence.

4) JAMES MARTIN V. STATE OF KERALA (2004) 2 SCC 203

Supreme Court case James Martin v. State of Kerala (2004) 2 SCC 203, a
crucial judgment on medical negligence in criminal law, specifically
under Section 304A of the IPC (now Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023).

Key Issue: Whether a doctor can be held criminally liable for death caused
by alleged negligence under Section 304A IPC, and what is the legal standard
for establishing such negligence.

Facts of the Case

1. The Deceased: A 7-year-old boy, Abhilash, was admitted to a hospital

in Kottayam, Kerala, with a fracture in his right forearm.

2. The Accused: Dr. James Martin, an orthopedic surgeon at the hospital.

3. Treatment & Incident:

o Dr. Martin performed a closed reduction of the fracture under

general anesthesia and applied a plaster cast.

o Shortly after, the child developed compartment

syndrome (increased pressure within the muscles, compromising
blood flow).

o Despite signs of severe pain and complications (swollen, bluish

fingers), the doctor did not split or remove the plaster cast in
time. He prescribed painkillers and antibiotics.

o After two days, the child was referred to a higher center where
the cast was removed, but it was too late. Gangrene had set in,
leading to amputation of the forearm and later, the child's death
due to septicemia.
 4. Prosecution Case: The death was a direct result of the doctor's gross
negligence in failing to diagnose and timely manage compartment
syndrome.

5. Trial & High Court: The Trial Court convicted Dr. Martin under Section
304A IPC (causing death by negligence). The Kerala High Court
dismissed his appeal.

6. Supreme Court Appeal: Dr. Martin appealed, contending that it was

a case of error of judgment, not criminal negligence.

Legal Questions Before the Supreme Court

1. What is the distinction between civil negligence (tort) and criminal

negligence under Section 304A IPC?

2. What is the legal test to establish criminal medical negligence?

3. Did Dr. Martin's acts/omissions amount to criminal negligence?

Supreme Court's Judgment & Reasoning

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction under
Section 304A IPC. The Court held that the doctor's conduct amounted
to gross negligence of a high degree.

1. The Critical Distinction: Civil vs. Criminal Negligence

The Court elaborated the difference, which is central to this case:

 Civil Negligence (Tort): A breach of a duty of care that causes

damage. It involves a "lack of reasonable care and skill."

 Criminal Negligence (Under S.304A IPC): Requires a much higher

degree of fault. It involves "gross or reckless negligence," i.e., a rash or
negligent act of such a magnitude that it shows a utter disregard for
the life and safety of others.

The Court quoted the classic test: "Criminal negligence is the gross and
culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care to
guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in
particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances, it was the
imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted."

2. The "Gross Negligence" Test for Medical Professionals

The Court laid down principles for prosecuting doctors:

  Error of Judgment vs. Negligence: A mere error of judgment or
an accident does not constitute criminal negligence. Doctors must be
allowed to make difficult decisions without fear of criminal prosecution.

 When it becomes Criminal: It becomes criminal when the

negligence is so egregious, gross, or reckless that it transcends mere
compensation and warrants punishment. This is demonstrated by:

o A failure to act in accordance with standard medical practice in

an obvious situation.

o Indifference to or disregard of an evident risk to the patient's life.

o Omitting to do something which a reasonable person, guided by

ordinary considerations, would do.

3. Application to Dr. Martin's Conduct – Finding of Gross Negligence

The Court found the evidence established criminal negligence:

 Clear Standard of Care Ignored: Compartment syndrome is a well-

known, serious complication of fractures and plaster casts.
The standard medical response is immediate splitting or removal of the
cast to relieve pressure.

 Willful Omission: Despite clear signs (severe pain unrelieved by

medication, swollen and bluish fingers indicating ischemia), Dr.
Martin did nothing for two days except prescribe painkillers. This was
not an error in diagnosis; it was a failure to act on a known and obvious
emergency.

 Reckless Disregard: His inaction showed a "gross lack of

competence" and "utter disregard for the patient's life and safety." He
failed to perform the most basic and urgent intervention required in
such a case.

 Direct Causation: This negligence directly led to gangrene,

amputation, and eventual death from sepsis.

Impact

 James Martin v. State of Kerala is a landmark ruling frequently cited in

all cases of medical criminal negligence.

 It provides a clear and practical test to distinguish between actionable

civil negligence and punishable criminal negligence, preventing the
 harassment of doctors for every unfortunate outcome while holding
them accountable for truly egregious conduct.

 This precedent continues to guide the application of Section 106 of the

new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which corresponds to the old
Section 304A IPC.

5) DARSHAN SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB, (2010) 1 S.C.R. 642

Supreme Court case Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) 1 SCR 642, a
pivotal judgment on the right of private defence, particularly focusing on self-
defence against sudden attacks and the burden of proof.

Key Issue: Whether the accused acted in exercise of the right of private
defence when causing the death of the deceased, and the extent of this
right when faced with a sudden armed attack.

Facts of the Case

1. Parties:

o Accused: Darshan Singh and his father Babu Singh.

o Deceased: Kashmir Singh (nephew of Babu Singh) and Nirmal

Singh (son of Kashmir Singh).

2. Background: A long-standing property dispute existed between the

families. On the day of the incident, the deceased party (Kashmir
Singh, Nirmal Singh, and others) armed with kirpans (swords) and
sticks, came to the house of the accused to take forcible possession of
the disputed land.

3. The Incident:

o The deceased party broke open the gate, entered the courtyard,
and started demolishing a wall.

o When the accused (Darshan Singh and Babu Singh)

objected, Kashmir Singh gave a kirpan blow to Babu
Singh (father), causing a serious injury on his head.

o Seeing his father being attacked, Darshan Singh fired his

licensed double-barrel gun, killing Kashmir Singh and his son
Nirmal Singh.
 4. Trial & High Court: The Trial Court convicted Darshan Singh
under Section 302 IPC (murder) and sentenced him to life
imprisonment. The Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld the conviction.

5. Supreme Court Appeal: Darshan Singh appealed, claiming he acted

in right of private defence of his father and property.

Legal Questions Before the Supreme Court

1. Did Darshan Singh have a right of private defence in this situation?

2. If yes, did he exceed that right by using a firearm and causing two
deaths?

3. What is the nature of the burden of proof when a plea of private

defence is raised?

Supreme Court's Judgment & Reasoning

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction for
murder, and acquitted Darshan Singh. The Court held he acted within his
right of private defence.

1. Right of Private Defence Clearly Arose

The Court held that the circumstances clearly established the right:

 Aggression by Deceased: The deceased party was the aggressor –

they forcibly entered the property armed with deadly weapons and
started demolishing a wall (criminal trespass and mischief).

 Sudden Attack: When the accused protested, Kashmir Singh

immediately inflicted a serious kirpan blow on Babu Singh's
head. This created a reasonable apprehension of death for Babu
Singh.

 Defence of Body: At that moment, Darshan Singh had the right to

defend his father's life. The right under Section 100 IPC (now Section
41 BNS) to cause death arises when there is reasonable apprehension
of death/grievous hurt.

2. No Exceeding of Right – Proportionality Upheld

The Court rejected the prosecution's argument that using a gun was
disproportionate:
  Imminent Danger: The attack was sudden, violent, and with a
deadly weapon (kirpan). Faced with such an assault on his father's
life, Darshan Singh could not be expected to "weigh in golden
scales" the exact measure of force needed.

 One vs. Many: The accused (father and son) were two individuals,
while the attacking party was larger and armed. In such a scenario,
the use of a firearm to repel a sword attack was not
disproportionate.

 Single Action: The firing was a single, continuous act in response

to the sudden, joint attack. The fact that two bullets hit and killed two
assailants did not mean the right was exceeded, as both were part of
the attacking mob.

3. Important Clarifications on Burden of Proof

This case laid down crucial principles on burden of proof in private defence:

 Initial Burden: The general burden to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt always rests on the prosecution.

 Plea of Private Defence: Once the accused places material before

the court (through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or
defence evidence) that suggests the possibility of private defence,
the burden shifts.

 Prosecution's Ultimate Burden: It then becomes the duty of

the prosecution to disprove the plea of private defence beyond
reasonable doubt. The court must examine the probability of the
defence version.

 The Court famously held:

"It is not the law that a person who is apprehending death or injury must
weigh in golden scales on the spur of the moment and in the heat of
circumstances, the kind and amount of force he should use."