Criminal Conspiracy 61 : When two or more persons agree with the common object to do, or
cause to be done--
(a) an illegal act; or
(b) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal
conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a
criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties
to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation.--It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement,
or is merely incidental to that object.
Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible
representations, makes or publishes in any manner, any imputation concerning any person
intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the
reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that
person.
Explanation 1: It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if
the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful
to the feelings of his family or other near relatives.
Explanation 2: It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company
or an association or collection of persons as such.
Explanation 3: An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may
Case: Sushil Suri vs. C.B.I. and Ors. (06.05.2011 - SC) : MANU/SC/0563/2011
Relevant para - 17, 21
17. “In the Chargesheet, the accused are alleged to have committed offences punishable
under Section 120B, read with Sections 420, 409, 468 and 471 IPC. We feel that at this
preliminary stage of proceedings, it would neither be desirable nor proper to return a final
finding as to whether the essential ingredients of the said Sections are satisfied. For the
purpose of the present appeal, it will suffice to observe that on a conspectus of the factual
scenario, noted above, prima facie, the Chargesheet does disclose the commission of
offences by the Appellant under the afore-noted Sections. The essential ingredient of the
offence of "criminal conspiracy", defined in Section 120A IPC, is the agreement to commit an
offence. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment of an act which by itself
constitutes an offence, then in that event, unless the Statute so requires, no overt act is
necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a fact-situation criminal
conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement. In other words, where the
conspiracy alleged is with regard to commission of a serious crime of the nature as
contemplated in Section 120B read with the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 120A IPC,
then in that event mere proof of an agreement between the accused for commission of such
crime alone is enough to bring about a conviction under Section 120B and the proof of any
overt act by the accused or by any one of them would not be necessary. “
21. In the present case, having regard to the modus operandi adopted by the accused, as
projected in the Chargesheet and briefly referred to in para 17 (supra), we have no hesitation
in holding that it is not a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as also by this Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India. As noted above, the accused had not only duped PSB, they had also
availed of depreciation on the machinery, which was never purchased and used by them,
causing loss to the exchequer, a serious economic offence against the society.
Case: E.K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala MANU/SC/0205/1995
Relevant Para: 20
“As to when conspiracy can be taken as established, it has been accepted in the decisions
relied on by Shri Sanyal, that there can hardly be direct evidence on this, for the simple
reason that conspiracies are not hatched in open; by their very nature they are secretly
planned; and so, lack of direct evidence relating to conspiracy by this accused has no
significance.”
Case: Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi and Ors.
Relevant Para: 9
It is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint
all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging.
Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of
the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different
components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have
been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage.
If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the court should not
hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that
one or two ingredients have not been stated with details.
For quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information
in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for
making out the offence.
In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra) this Court laid down the premise on which the FIR
can be quashed in rare cases. The following observations made in the aforesaid decisions
are a sound reminder:
We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding
should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the
extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act
according to its whim or caprice.
Case Law: Ram Narain Popli v. CBI
Relevant Paras: 372,375,376,377,378,380,382,383,384
Dealing with the question of criminal conspiracy, it was held by the SC that
“372. In Halsbury's Laws of England (vide 4th Ed. Vol.11. page 44. page 58), the English
Law as to conspiracy has been stated thus:
"Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do
a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an indictable offence at common law, the punishment for
which is imprisonment of fine or both in the discretion of the Court.
The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by agreement. The
agreement may be express or implied, or in part express and in part implied. The conspiracy
arises and the offence is committed as soon as the agreement is made; and the offence
continues to be committed so long as the combination persists, that is until the conspiratorial
agreement is terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration
or however, it may be. The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal
conduct, not the execution of it, it is not enough that two or more persons pursued the same
unlawful object at the same time or in the same place: it is necessary to show a meeting of
minds, a consensus to affect an unlawful purpose. It is not, however, necessary that each
conspirator should have been in communication with every other."
373. There is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of conspiracy
and that of any other offence, it can be established by direct or circumstantial
[Link] Swarup Lal Bishan Lal etc. etc v. State of Maharashtra
MANU/SC/0063/1963: AIR 1965 SC …………
375. We are aware of the fact that direct independent evidence of criminal conspiracy is
generally not available and its existence is a matter of inference. The inference are normally
deduced from acts of parties in pursuance of a purpose in common between the
conspirators. ………
376. Privacy and secrecy are more characteristics of a conspiracy, than of a loud discussion
in an elevated place open to public view. Direct evidence in proof of a conspiracy is seldom
available; offence of conspiracy can be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. It
is not always possible to give affirmative evidence about the date of the formation of the
criminal conspiracy, about the persons who took part in the formation of the conspiracy,
about the object, which the objectors set before themselves as the object of conspiracy, and
about the manner in which the object of conspiracy is to be carried out, all this is necessarily
a matter of inference.
377. Coleridge. J. while summing up the case to Jury in Regina v. Murphy [(1837) 173 ER
502 at p. 508] states:
"I am bound to tell you, that although the common design is the root of the charge, it is not
necessary to prove that these two parties came together and actually agreed in terms to
have this common design and to pursue it by common means, and so to carry it into
execution. This is not necessary, because in any cases of the most clearly established
conspiracies there are no means of proving any such thing and neither law nor common
sense requires that it should be proved. If you find that these two persons pursued by their
acts the same object, often by the same means, one performing one part of an act, so as to
complete it, with a view to the attainment of the object which they were pursuing, you will be
at liberty to draw the conclusion that they have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect that
object. The question you have to ask yourselves is, had they this common design, and did
they pursue it by these common means the design being unlawful."
378. As noted above, the essential ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy is the
agreement to commit an offence. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment of
an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event no overt act is necessary to
be proved by the prosecute on because in such a situation, criminal conspiracy is
established by proving such an agreement. Where the conspiracy alleged is with regard to
commission of a serious crime of the nature as contemplated in Section 120B read with the
provision to Sub-section (2) of Section 120A, then in that event mere proof of an agreement
between the accused for commission of such a crime alone is enough to bring about a
conviction under Section 120B and the proof of any overt act by the accused or by any one
of them would not be necessary. The provisions, in such a situation, do not require that each
and every person who is a party to the conspiracy must do some overt act towards the
fulfilment of the object of conspiracy, the essential ingredient being an agreement between
the conspirators to commit the crime and if these requirements and ingredients are
established, the act would fall within the trapping of the provisions contained in Section 120B
[See. S.C. Bahari v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0500/1994 : 1994CriLJ3271 ]
3 8 0 . I n Kehar Singh and Ors. v. The State (Delhi Administration) [ MANU/SC/0241/1988 :
1989CriLJ1 at p. 1954], this Court observed:
"Generally, a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct
evidence of the same. The prosecution will often rely on evidence of acts of various parties
to infer that they were done in reference to their common intention. The prosecution will also
more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by
such evidence direct or circumstantial. But the court must enquire whether the two persons
are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together to the pursuit of the
unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators, but the latter does. It is,
however, essential that the offence of conspiracy required some kind of physical
manifestation of agreement. The express agreement, however, need not be proved. Nor
actual meeting of the two persons is necessary. Nor it is necessary to prove the actual words
of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design
may be sufficient. Conspiracy can be proved by circumstances and other materials. (See:
State of Bihar v. Paramhans MANU/BH/0161/1986 : 1987(35)BLJR127 ). ……….
Finally, when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary
for the prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the
conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do so, so long as it is known
that the collaborator would put the goods of service to an unlawful use. (See: State of
Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa MANU/SC/0451/1996 : 1996CriLJ2448 )..............
3 8 2 . I may usefully refer to Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0265/1993 :
1993CriLJ2516 . It was held:
"3.....It is not necessary that each conspirator must know all the details of the scheme nor be
a participant at every stage. It is necessary that they should agree for design or object of the
conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as having three elements: (1) agreement: (2) between
two or more persons by whom the agreement is effected: and (3) a criminal object, which
may be either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the
means by which that aim is to be accomplished. It is immaterial whether this is found in the
ultimate objects. The common law definition of 'criminal conspiracy' was stated first by Lord
Denman in Jones' case that an indictment for conspiracy must "charge a conspiracy to do an
unlawful act by unlawful means" and was elaborated by Willies, J. on behalf of the judges
while referring the question to the House of Lords in Mulcahy v. Reg and House of Lords in
unanimous decision reiterated in Quinn v. Leathem:
A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two
or more, to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a
design rest in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the
very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus
contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful; punishable of for a criminal object, or for
the use of criminal means.
383. In Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0169/1977 : 1978CriLJ189 the rule was
laid as follows:
'The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the offence. It is not necessary
that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they
are co-participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many devices and
techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may be division
of performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end of which
every collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them must be interested. There
must be unity of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means sometimes even
unknown to one another, amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences
may be committed by some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only
relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to be in
furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may be sometimes misfire or
overshooting by some of the conspirators.
I n Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Manivar and Ors. v. State of
09-10-2025 (Page 115 of 120) [Link] Chinmay J Mirji
Maharashtra MANU/SC/0180/1981 : 1981CriLJ588 , it was held that for an offence under
Section 120B IPC, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators
expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved by
necessary implication."
384. After referring to some judgments of the United States Supreme Court and of this Court
in Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0169/1977. and Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of
India MANU/SC/0265/1993 the Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa
MANU/SC/0451/1996 summarized the position of law and the requirements to establish the
charge of conspiracy, as under: .
"24. The aforesaid decisions, weighty as they are, lead us to conclude that to establish a
charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by
illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods of
services in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself.
This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use was intended,
so long as the goods or service in question could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when
the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the
prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the
conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long as it is known
that the collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful use," [See
MANU/SC/0601/2000 : 2000CriLJ4584 State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan and Anr. ]
385. As was observed by this Court in State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan and Anr.
MANU/SC/0601/2000 : 2000CriLJ4584 , it would be extremely difficult to find direct evidence
in case of criminal conspiracy. The circumstances and surrounding factors have to be taken
note of.“
Case: Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.
Relevant Paras: 30,32
30. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possesses
to exercise while examining the legality of any FIR complaining commission of several
cognizable offences by Accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual
contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court
cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can exercise the powers like an appellate
Court. The question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the
contents of the FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof.
32. In our considered opinion, once the Court finds that the FIR does disclose prima facie
commission of any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and allow the investigating
machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth the crime in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in the Code.