TEAM CODE:

IME LAW COLLEGE, SAHIBABAD INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2025

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF MISHTHISTAN

ON THE SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF MISHTHISTAN

UNDER SECTION 372 PROVISO READ WITH SECTION 378(3) OF THE CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF:

STATE OF MISHTHISTAN …………. PETITIONER

VS

MARRY .………...RESPONDENT

MEMORANDUM FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 IME LAW COLLEGE, SAHIBABAD INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF ABBREVIATION………………………………………………………………2

LIST OF REFERENCES AND CITED CASES...………………………………………….3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………………...…………………………5

STATEMENT OF FACTS…………..……………………………………………………….6

ISSUES RAISED………….………………………………………………………………….8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS……..………………………………………………………9

DETAILED ARGUMENTS………………………………………………………………...11

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT RIGHTLY ACQUITTED THE

RESPONDENT ON THE GROUNDS OF SELF-DEFENCE, NECESSITY, AND
PROTECTION OF LIFE...……………………………………...…………………………11

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND

DOUBT THAT A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN THE
RESPONDENT AND MR. JOHN U/S 120B OF THE MISHTHISTAN PENAL
CODE………………………………………………………………………………………..15

ISSUE 3: FORENSIC EVIDENCE POINTS TOWARDS AN ALTERNATE

POSSIBILITY, POISONING FROM CHARLES’S MILITARY CAMP………………19

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE CHARGES OF TRESPASS AND DESTRUCTION OF

EVIDENCE ARE LEGALLY SUSTAINABLE AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.

Prayer……………………………………………………………………………………….24

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC Appeal Cases

AIR All India Reporter

Bom Bombay

Crl Criminal

CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure

CRA Criminal Appeal

Gau Gauhati

Hon’ble Honourable

ILR Indian Law Report

IO Investigating Officer

MD Medical Defence

MPC Mishthistan Penal Code

NCT National Capital Territory

OP Old Precedent

P&H Punjab and Haryana

QB Queen Bench

QBD Queen Bench Division

Ref Referred

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SC Supreme Court

Supp. Supplementary

u/s Under Section

UK United Kingdom

v. Versus

& And

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LIST OF REFERENCES AND CITED CASES

Case Laws Cited:

1) Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland (1993) AC 789 (UK)

2) B.P. Achala Anand v. S. Appi Reddy (2005) 3 SCC 313
3) Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1992) 2 SCC 406
4) Buta Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 2 SCC 612
5) C. Chenga Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2024 SCC SC 36
6) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) 2 SCC 333
7) Firozuddin Basheeruddin v. State of Kerala 2001 SCC (Crl) 1341
8) Kashmiri Lal v. State of Punjab (1996) 10 SCC 471
9) Mahmood v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1961 All 538
10) Mathri v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 986
11) Mata Din Singh v. State AIR 1999 P&H 161
12) Mohan v. State of Madhya Pradesh CRA-456/2024
13) Muthu v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu AIR 2008 SC 1
14) Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration AIR 1968 SC 702
15) Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667
16) R. v. Dudley & Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273 (QB)
17) R. v. Mawgridge (1957) 2 QB 196 (UK)
18) R. v. Shayler [2002] 1 AC 247 (UK)
19) Raghavan Achari v. State of Kerala 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 719
20) Ranbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 4 Crimes 460
21) Ramesh Babulal Ramesh v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225
22) Raisan Hansda v. State of West Bengal C.R.A. 696 of 2019
23) Reg v. Govinda (1877) ILR 1 Bom 342
24) Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee 2005 8 SCC 140
25) Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116
26) Smt. Suljina Dhan v. State of Assam 2018 SCC Gau 645
27) State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 797
28) State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604
29) State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan (2000) 8 SCC 203
30) State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub AIR 1980 SC 1111
31) State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003) 11 SCC 271
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32) State of Uttar Pradesh. v. Rajesh Gautam (2003) 5 SCC 288

33) State v. Lokesh Kumar Solanki (2022) SCC Del 12456
34) State v. Vijaykumar Lallanprasad Bharati (Sessions Court, Thane, 2025)
35) Thenappan v. State of Kerala CRL OP(MD). No.22530 of 2024
36) Triloki Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2005) 13 SCC 323
37) V. Subramani v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005) 10 SCC 358

Statutes:

1) Indian Penal Code, 1860

2) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Online Sources:

1) [Link]
2) [Link]
3) [Link]
4) [Link]
5) [Link]
6) [Link]
7) [Link]
8) [Link]
9) [Link]

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondents respectfully submit that this Hon’ble Court has competent jurisdiction to
hear and adjudicate upon the present appeal u/s 372 Proviso1 and 378(3)2 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Respondents were acquitted by the Trial Court in a Sessions matter within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court at Bamboo City. The appeal is filed in the interest of justice
for the deceased victim, Mr. Charles. Section 372 Proviso gives the High Court the power to
review acquittals made by lower courts. At the same time, Section 378(3) allows the State to
appeal an acquittal. This ensures that the rights of the deceased are upheld and that any
mistakes in justice are corrected.

1
Section 372 Proviso, CrPC: Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order
passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate
compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of
conviction of such Court.
2
Section 378(3), CrPC: Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), an appeal against an
order of acquittal may be filed by the Public Prosecutor or, in the absence of legal heirs, by the State in the
interest of justice on behalf of the deceased victim.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1) The Respondent, Ms. Marry, is a qualified gynaecologist employed at a reputed

hospital, while the Petitioner, Mr. Charles, served as a commissioned officer in the
Mishthistan Armed Forces.
2) On 14th February 2010, the Respondent and the Petitioner entered into a lawful
marriage under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, with the consent and
blessings of both families.
3) On 20th April 2013, the couple was blessed with a daughter born with special needs.
Despite her demanding profession, Ms. Marry devoted herself to her daughter’s
medical and emotional care. The Petitioner’s frequent absences due to military duties,
along with alleged emotional neglect, placed considerable strain on their marriage and
affected the welfare of their child.
4) On 20th June 2021, during one of Mr. Charles’s annual leaves, the Respondent was
allegedly subjected to severe physical abuse, resulting in grievous injuries.
considering her daughter’s delicate condition and hoping for reconciliation, Ms.
Marry chose not to inform either family.
5) During this period, Ms. Marry received occasional humanitarian and financial
assistance from her friend, Mr. John, a cardiologist, who helped her care for the child.
6) On 17th November 2024, after a long hospital shift and unavailability of transport,
Mr. John accompanied Ms. Marry and her daughter home. Upon reaching the
residence, Mr. Charles was already present. A heated argument broke out between Mr.
Charles and Ms. Marry.
7) During the altercation, Mr. Charles allegedly physically assaulted Ms. Marry. In self-
defence, she struck him on the head with a glass flower vase. As Mr. John intervened
to protect Ms. Marry from further harm, Mr. Charles turned his aggression towards
him and began beating him. In a desperate attempt to save Mr. John from serious
injury, Ms. Marry discharged a licensed firearm at Mr. Charles, resulting in fatal
injuries.
8) The sound of the gunshot alerted neighbours, who immediately called the police.
Upon arrival, Mr. Charles was found fatally injured, Mr. John severely beaten, and
Ms. Marry in shock holding the firearm. Both Ms. Marry and Mr. John were taken
into custody, while the child was shifted to trauma care.

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9) Following registration of the First Information Report and recording of preliminary

statements, the Investigating Officer collected additional information on 3rd March
2025 from the society secretary. Letters exchanged between Mr. John and Ms. Marry
were recovered, indicating a close emotional bond.
10) The post-mortem report revealed traces of arsenic in Mr. Charles’s body in addition to
the gunshot wounds. Forensic reports showed that the fingerprints on the firearm
matched Mr. John, not Ms. Marry.
11) The Trial Court, after examining the evidence, acquitted Ms. Marry and Mr. John on
grounds of self-defence, necessity, and protection of life.
12) The Respondent, Ms. Marry, respectfully submits that the acquittal was rightly passed
by the Trial Court, and prays that this Hon’ble High Court uphold the acquittal and
dismiss the appeal filed by the Petitioner, Mr. Charles (through the State of
Mishthistan), in the interest of justice.

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ISSUES RAISED

Issue 1

Whether the Trial Court rightly acquitted the Respondent on the grounds of self-defence,
necessity, and protection of life.

Issue 2

Whether the Petitioner has failed to prove beyond doubt that a criminal conspiracy existed
between the Respondent and Mr. John u/s 120B of the Mishthistan Penal Code.

Issue 3

Forensic evidence points towards an alternate possibility, poisoning from Mr. Charles’s
military camp.

Issue 4

Whether the charges of Trespass and Destruction of Evidence are legally sustainable against
the Respondents.

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1) Whether the Trial Court rightly acquitted the Respondent on the grounds of self-
defence, necessity, and protection of life.
The Respondent humbly submits that her actions were not premeditated but were the
result of an immediate threat to life. The Petitioner's violent conduct towards both the
Respondent and Mr. John left no reasonable ways to escape. The Respondent's initial
act of striking with a flower vase was purely defensive. The later discharge of the
licensed firearm occurred in a moment of panic, without any intent to kill. u/s. 96-
1063& 814 of the Mishthistan Penal Code (MPC), an act done to prevent grievous
injury or to save other person’s life, without pre-determined intent, falls within the
scope of private defence and necessity. Therefore, the essential ingredients of
“murder” u/s. 3005 are absent, and the Trial Court rightly recognized this in acquitting
the Respondent.
2) Whether the Petitioner has failed to prove beyond doubt that a criminal
conspiracy existed between the Respondent and Mr. John u/s 120B of the
Mishthistan Penal Code.
The Respondent submits that the allegation of conspiracy relies on speculation and
lack of strong evidence. Mere friendship between the Petitioner and Mr. John does not
mean there was an agreement to commit an illegal act. The prosecution's arguments
rests only on invalid assumptions, without any direct proof of planning, intent, or
coordinated action. The legal principle is clear: conspiracy must be shown through
strong evidence, not by a guess. Consequently, the charge u/s 120B6 of the
Mishthistan Penal Code fails to meet the high standard of proof required, and the
acquittal in this regard is justified.
3) Forensic evidence points towards an alternate possibility, poisoning from Mr.
Charles’s military camp.
The post-mortem of deceased shows traces of arsenic in his body; however, the
prosecution failed to prove any connection between the Respondent and the alleged
poisoning. The Petitioner, being an army officer, had access to military rations and
compounds that could have been a source of arsenic exposure. In the absence of direct

3
96-106 MPC: Right to Private Defence
4
81 MPC: Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm
5
300 MPC: Murder
6
120B MPC: Punishment of criminal conspiracy

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evidence linking the Respondent to the substance, the benefit of doubt must be
extended to her, which the Trial Court rightly did in acquitting her.
4) Whether the charges of trespass and destruction of evidence are sustainable
against the Respondent.
The Respondent submits that she cannot be held guilty of criminal trespass, as she
was in her own matrimonial home at the time of the incident. Mr. John was present
only to help Ms. Marry and her child get home safely, with no unlawful intent. Any
movement or handling of objects after the events happened in a state of shock and
confusion, without any intention to destroy evidence or obstruct justice. Therefore, the
charges of trespass and destruction of evidence against both Respondent and Mr. John
do not stand.

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DETAILED ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT RIGHTLY ACQUITTED THE

RESPONDENT ON THE GROUNDS OF SELF-DEFENCE, NECESSITY, AND
PROTECTION OF LIFE.

1.1. The act arose out of a sudden and grave provocation, not premeditation

1) The incident of 17th November 2024 occurred without any prior planning or criminal
intention. The deceased, Mr. Charles, an army officer, returned home unexpectedly
and, upon finding his wife accompanied by her friend, lost control and began
violently assaulting both of them.
2) In the course of this assault, he dragged the respondent, Ms. Marry, by her hair, hurled
abuses, and struck her repeatedly. Overwhelmed by physical and emotional distress,
she acted in the heat of the moment to protect herself and her minor child.
3) The sequence of events reveals a complete absence of ‘mens rea’. The act was a
reflexive and defensive reaction to immediate aggression and not the outcome of
premeditated malice. Therefore, the essential element of “intention to cause death”
u/s. 300 of the Mishthistan Penal Code (MPC) is absent. R v. Mawgridge 7The court
held that defensive action causing death can be justified if it is proportional and
occurs in the heat of the moment. This supports the Respondent’s single-shot use of
the revolver during the immediate threat posed by the deceased. Further, in
Thenappan v. State of Kerala8,the Supreme Court of India clarified the application of
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, distinguishing between deaths caused by sudden and
grave provocation and those in a sudden fight. The Court held that where an act is
committed without premeditation, in the heat of passion, and without taking undue
advantage, culpability is reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Similarly, Marry’s immediate defensive action during Mr. Charles’s violent assault,
aimed solely at protecting herself and her child, falls squarely within these principles.

1.2. The disparity in physical strength justified the defensive use of the weapon.

1) The deceased was a trained army officer, possessing substantial physical strength and
combat skills. The Respondent, Ms. Marry, is a medical professional with no physical

7
1707, Kelyng 119
8
CRL OP(MD). No.22530 of 2024

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or military training. She had previously been assaulted by her husband, resulting in
bruises and even a fractured leg (incident of 20th June 2021).
2) In that moment, her physical strength was no match for his violent aggression. She
was unarmed and overpowered, facing the real possibility of death or grievous hurt.
The Supreme Court in Raghavan Achari v. State of Kerala9emphasized that courts
recognize the right to self-defence when facing imminent danger, particularly where
the defender is physically weaker or already suffering grievous injury. This reinforces
that the Respondent’s use of the revolver was lawful and proportionate under the
circumstances. Similarly, in Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of Madhya Pradesh10, the
Court held that when a person reasonably apprehends danger to themselves or a loved
one, here a father receiving lathi blows using a firearm in immediate defence is
justified. This underscores that the Respondent’s use of the revolver to protect herself,
her minor child and friend, [Link] was lawful and proportionate under the
circumstances. Further, in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Punjab11, the Court observed that
a person who is unlawfully attacked has every right to counteract and inflict necessary
injury to ward off the apprehended danger. This principle supports the Respondent’s
defensive use of the revolver against an imminent threat from the deceased.
3) Under such circumstances, it was lawful and reasonable for her to use whatever
means were available to safeguard her life. The revolver used was the licensed
weapon of the deceased himself, not one brought by the respondent. The Supreme
Court of India in Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab12, observed that a person faced
with imminent assault is not expected to weigh the force used in “golden scales”;
what matters is the genuine perception of danger.
4) When the aggressor is stronger and violent, the defender cannot be expected to choose
a milder response. The law of private defence does not compel a woman under attack
to risk her life before defending herself.

1.3. The use of the weapon was sudden, instinctive, and proportionate to the threat.

1) The revolver was used spontaneously during the struggle; there was no pre-arranged
plan to use a firearm. Only one bullet was fired, showing the absence of deliberate

9
1993 Supp. (1) SCC 719
10
1992 2 SCC 406
11
1996 10 SCC 471
12
2010 2 SCC 333

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intent to kill. Similarly, in State of Maharashtra vs Mohd Yakub13, the Supreme

Court held that mere preparatory actions do not establish criminal intent; only overt
acts with clear intent constitute an offense. This reinforces that the respondent’s
single-shot defensive act cannot be treated as premeditated. Had there been any plan
or hostility, multiple shots could have been discharged. This reasoning aligns with V.
Subramani v. State of Tamil Nadu14, where the Court held that when an unarmed
person suddenly uses the aggressor’s weapon out of fear for life, the act falls within
self-defence, not murder. Similarly, in Reg v. Govinda15, the Court held that even
though a violent act caused death, the absence of specific intent placed it under
culpable homicide, not murder. This supports the respondent’s position that her
single-shot, defensive action was instinctive and lacked premeditation. Additionally,
as held in Buta Singh v. State of Punjab16, a person facing imminent death or bodily
injury cannot be expected to weigh force in golden scales. In the spur of the moment
and under disturbed mental equilibrium, it is lawful to repel force in self-defence, and
hyper-technical scrutiny of minor excesses is inappropriate. In the present case, the
Respondent’s use of the revolver was a natural human reaction to immediate, violent
threat, fully justifying her defensive act.
2) The force used was proportionate to the threat faced, a physically violent, armed, and
enraged aggressor. Hence, the action falls squarely within Section 100 of the MPC,
which extends the right of private defence to causing death when there is a reasonable
apprehension of death or grievous hurt. Under such circumstances, it was lawful and
reasonable for her to use whatever means were available to safeguard her life. This
principle is reinforced by Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration17, where the Supreme
Court of India held that a person facing immediate threat need not flee and may use
proportionate force in private defence. Further, as held in Triloki Nath v. State of
Uttar Pradesh18, no law mandates that injuries on the accused must be explained in
all situations. Each case depends on its own facts, and here, the Respondent acted in
the heat of the moment, facing sudden and grave provocation

13
1980 AIR 1111
14
2005 10 SCC 358
15
1877 ILR 1 Bom 342
16
1991 2 SCC 612
17
1968 AIR 702
18
2005 13 SCC 323

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3) The history of abuse formed the psychological background of fear that resurfaced
during the final assault. Jurisprudence recognizes the “Battered Woman Syndrome” as
a mitigating factor, where years of abuse make the victim reasonably apprehensive of
death in moments of renewed violence. Hence, when Petitioner turned violent once
again, the respondent’s belief that her life and that of her child were in immediate
danger was not exaggerated, but reasonable and well-founded.

1.4. The doctrine of necessity protects the Respondents’ act.

1) Even if the Court views the act as exceeding private defence, it remains protected
under Sec. 81 MPC (Doctrine of Necessity), which excuses acts done to prevent
greater harm. The doctrine finds its classic articulation in R. v. Dudley & Stephens19,
where necessity was recognized as a valid defence when an act was done to avoid
imminent peril. Further, in R. v. Shayler 20, the court held that disclosure of
confidential information could be excused under the defence of necessity to prevent
imminent danger to life or serious harm. This reinforces that acts taken to avert
greater peril, even if otherwise unlawful, are legally defensible. Similarly, the
Respondent’s firing of one shot to protect her own life and that of her child falls
squarely within the doctrine of necessity.
2) The Respondent faced two simultaneous threats, danger to her own life and to her
minor daughter and her friend Mr. John, who witnessed the violence. In Airedale
NHS Trust v. Bland21, The House of Lords held that withdrawing life support from a
patient in a persistent vegetative state was lawful under the doctrine of necessity, as it
prevented prolongation of inevitable harm. The court recognized that acts causing
harm can be excused when done to avert a greater peril.
3) In such dire circumstances, firing one defensive shot was the lesser harm, done to
preserve life, not to destroy it. The maxim Necessitas non habet legem, necessity
knows no law squarely applies. In Ranbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 22 the court
held that the burden of proving self-defence is on accused. Such burden can be
reduced by establishing a mere preponderance of probabilities either by laying the

19
1884 14 QBD 273 (QB)
20
2002 1 AC 247 (UK)
21
1993 AC 789 (UK)
22
2014 4 Crimes 460

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basis for the plea in the cross examination of the prosecution or adducing the defence
evidence.

1.5. The Respondent’s act is protected under the exceptions to Sec. 300 MPC.

1) The facts of the case fall within the following exceptions to Sec. 300:
Exception 1: Grave and sudden provocation, In Mahmood vs State of Uttar
Pradesh23, the Court held that whether provocation is ‘grave and sudden’ is a question
of fact, judged from the perspective of a normal person in similar circumstances.
Excessive retaliation beyond what a reasonable person would do cannot be excused
under this exception. Similarly, In Smt. Suljina Dhan v. State of Assam24 the Gauhati
High Court held that when an accused acts under grave and sudden provocation
causing loss of self-control, the act falls under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. The
Court reduced the charge from murder to culpable homicide (Section 304 Part II IPC),
recognizing that cumulative provocation and emotional distress warrant a lenient
view. In Muthu v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu 25, the Supreme Court of
India held that if an accused acts under grave and sudden provocation causing loss of
self-control, the offence falls under Section 304 Part II IPC, not murder. The Court
emphasized that cumulative provocation and the accused’s emotional state reduce
culpability under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC.: and
Exception 2: Act done in good faith in exercise of the right of private defence.
Consequently, even assuming the act caused death, it constitutes at most culpable
homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 MPC.
2) The Respondent, therefore, cannot be held guilty of murder, and are entitled to full
acquittal under Sections 96–100 & 81 of the Mishthistan Penal Code.
3) In sum, the Respondent’s conduct reflects a desperate act of survival, not of
aggression or premeditation.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND

DOUBT THAT A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN THE
RESPONDENT AND MR. JOHN U/S 120B OF THE MISHTHISTAN PENAL CODE

23
AIR 1961All 538
24
2018 SCC Gau 645
25
AIR 2008 SC

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2.1. The essence of conspiracy is agreement, which is absent here.

1) In the present case, the prosecution has miserably failed to demonstrate any meeting
of minds between the Respondent, and Mr. John. The entire allegation of conspiracy
rests upon a few letters and friendly communications exchanged between them. But
expression of concern, emotional warmth, or personal gratitude cannot, by any stretch
of imagination, constitute a criminal agreement.
2) In State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan 26, this Hon’ble Court held that mere knowledge,
discussion, or emotional proximity does not amount to conspiracy unless there is clear
and cogent evidence showing a shared design to commit an offence.
3) Here, no such evidence exists, there is not a single message, witness, or act that shows
any prior plan to harm Petitioner. As observed in Firozuddin Basheeruddin v. State
of Kerala27, conspirators typically plan and act in secrecy over time, and participation
need not be from start to finish. In the present case, however, there is no evidence of
any prior planning, secret arrangement, or coordinated action between Respondent
and Mr. John; their interactions were purely spontaneous and supportive, negating any
inference of conspiracy.

2.2. The letters reflect compassion, not conspiracy.

1) The prosecution has overemphasized the letters written by Mr. John to Respondent,
portraying them as proof of an “illicit relationship.” However, when these letters are
read in full context, they clearly reveal emotional support, not criminal intent.
2) It is undisputed that Respondent had been undergoing severe emotional trauma due to
Petitioner’s aggressive and controlling behaviour. Mr. John, being a colleague and
friend, often provided moral and financial support.
3) The expressions of concern in those letters were acts of humanity, not signs of
plotting. The Delhi District Court in State v. Lokesh Kumar Solanki 28,clarified that
merely exhorting others to indulge in criminal activities does not amount to an
agreement to commit a crime, and thus does not constitute a criminal conspiracy. In
the case of Dr. John and Ms. Marry, if the letters only express admiration and
emotional support without any agreement or exhortation to commit an illegal act, they

26
2000 8 SCC 203
27
2001 SCC (Crl) 1341
28
SCC 2022

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should not be construed as evidence of criminal conspiracy. The prosecution's attempt

to portray these letters as proof of an illicit relationship lacks a legal basis, as there is
no evidence of an agreement to commit a crime.
4) Even the investigating officer admitted under cross-examination that none of the
letters contained any reference to violence, weapons, or a plan to harm the deceased.

Therefore, to brand ordinary human empathy as criminal conspiracy would be to stretch

imagination beyond legal reason.

2.3. Presence of Dr. John at the residence was incidental, not intentional.

1) On the night of the incident, Mr. John had accompanied Respondent to her residence
because public transport was unavailable, and it was past midnight after hospital duty.
His presence there was purely circumstantial and a coincidence, not a plan.
2) Had there been any pre-arranged conspiracy, one would expect preparation, secrecy,
or planning none of which is evident. As held in Raisan Hansda v. State of West
Bengal29, the mere presence of an accused at a scene or suspicion against them does
not complete the chain of circumstances required to establish guilt. Likewise, here,
there is insufficient evidence to prove that the Respondent and Mr. John conspired to
commit any unlawful act.
3) Instead, what we see is a spontaneous chain of events that spiralled out of control
when Petitioner returned home unexpectedly and began to assault them violently.
4) Thus, Mr. John’s involvement was that of a bystander caught in chaos, not a co-
conspirator.

Ref: In State v. Vijaykumar Lallanprasad Bharati, Sessions Court, Thane,30, the Court
held that ‘mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof.’ Relying on circumstantial
evidence and proximity alone, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of
circumstances or intent, and the accused was acquitted. Presence or association without
proof of planning or participation is insufficient to establish guilt.

2.4. Absence of circumstantial chain and gap is too wide to infer conspiracy.

29
C.R.A. 696 of 2019
30
SCC 2025

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In a case of alleged conspiracy, every link must be unbroken and consistent only with the
guilt of the accused. Here, the prosecution’s narrative is full of contradictions:

1) There are no records of secret meetings or communications prior to the night of the
incident. No financial or personal benefit accrued to either accused from Mr.
Charles’s death. The charges against the Respondents rest on mere suspicion rather
than credible evidence. As held in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal31, judicial
interference is justified only in exceptional cases where allegations are mala fide or
fail to disclose a cognizable offence. Here, the absence of direct evidence and the
speculative interpretation of letters and actions make the charges of conspiracy and
trespass legally unsustainable.
2) No recovery of any incriminating object (poison, weapons, or plan) was made.
3) Even the timing of the gunshot and presence of poison remain medically inconsistent.

Such a fractured chain of evidence can never sustain a conviction for conspiracy. As held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in C. Chenga Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh32, a
conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence cannot stand unless the chain of
circumstances is complete, cogent, and coherent, leaving no reasonable doubt. In that case,
the Court categorically held that “scattered and incoherent pieces of evidence” and an
unproven motive could not sustain guilt under Section 120B. Similarly, in the present matter,
the prosecution’s theory of conspiracy rests merely on speculative interpretation of letters and
proximity, with no recovery, motive, or consistent medical evidence. The chain is visibly
broken and incapable of sustaining a finding of conspiracy.

2.5. Conspiracy cannot be presumed from moral judgment.

1) The prosecution’s approach appears to be guided more by emotion and social

perception than by legal reasoning. The mere fact that a married woman shared
emotional or personal correspondence with a male colleague cannot, by itself, be
construed as evidence of an unlawful design. Law draws a clear line between ‘moral
impropriety’ and ‘criminal liability’, the former may invite social criticism, but it does
not attract penal consequences.

31
AIR 1992 SC 604
32
2024 SCC SC 36

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2) Further, in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand33, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
cautioned courts against being swayed by moral or social bias, emphasizing that
criminal liability must rest solely on proven facts and legal principles, not societal
assumptions.
3) In the present case, the prosecution has substituted moral suspicion for legal proof.
Such reasoning undermines the fundamental principle that guilt must be established
beyond reasonable doubt and not on the basis of perceived morality.
4) Therefore, since there is neither direct evidence nor a continuous chain of
circumstances establishing any prior agreement, the allegation of conspiracy under
Sections 120A and 120B of the Mishthistan Penal Code cannot stand. The acquittal of
the respondent is thus fully justified, as the prosecution’s case is based on conjecture,
not proof and convicting her on such assumptions would amount to a grave
miscarriage of justice. As held in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu34, mere
correspondence or association, without clear evidence of agreement or criminal intent,
cannot establish conspiracy. Similarly, the letters exchanged between Mr. John and
Respondent, reflecting moral support and admiration, cannot be construed as forming
the basis of a criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC.

ISSUE 3: FORENSIC EVIDENCE POINTS TOWARDS AN ALTERNATE

POSSIBILITY, POISONING FROM MR. CHARLES’S MILITARY CAMP.

1) It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the most telling piece of
evidence that undermines the conspiracy theory is the forensic report itself. The post-
mortem reveals arsenic poisoning in Petitioner’s body, a fact that the prosecution
conveniently overlooks. There is no testimony, forensic evidence, or witness account
that places either accused at the scene of the alleged poisoning. In Mohan v. State of
Madhya Pradesh35, the Court held that when the primary witness fails to conclusively
implicate the accused and corroborative forensic evidence is lacking, conviction
cannot be sustained merely on suspicion. Similarly, in the present case,
inconsistencies in the prosecution’s narrative and absence of direct proof warrant the
benefit of doubt to the Respondent.

33
2010 7 SCC 667
34
2005 11 SCC 797
35
CRA-456/2024

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2) The prosecution has not established a clear motive for Respondent or Mr. John to
poison Petitioner. Without a compelling reason, it is unreasonable to assume that the
accused would engage in such a serious criminal act.
3) Now, arsenic is not a common household substance. It is, however, widely used in
certain military operations, and Petitioner, being an army officer, had access to
hazardous materials in his camp. There is every possibility that the arsenic entered his
system through his professional environment.

In State of U.P. v. Rajesh Gautam36, the Supreme Court held that circumstantial evidence
must form a complete chain leading only to the guilt of the accused. In this case, the
possibility that arsenic entered the Petitioner’s body through his work environment
unexcluded. As the prosecution failed to establish a direct link between the accused and the
poisoning, the Respondent is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Thus, the poisoning could have stemmed from circumstances or individuals other than the
Respondent or Mr. John. In the presence of such a plausible alternate explanation, the law
mandates that the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused. In Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda v. State of Maharashtra37, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that when a case is
founded on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be fully established, consistent
only with the guilt of the accused, and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. The Court further observed that in cases of circumstantial evidence, if two views
are possible, one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the accused is entitled to the
benefit of the view favourable to them.

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE CHARGES OF TRESPASS AND DESTRUCTION OF

EVIDENCE ARE LEGALLY SUSTAINABLE AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.

4.1. There was no unlawful entry, hence, no trespass in the eyes of law.

1) To constitute criminal trespass u/s 441 of the Mishthistan Penal Code, the essential
ingredient is entry into property with intent to commit an offence or to annoy, insult or
intimidate the possessor. In the present case, none of these elements are satisfied.
2) Firstly, the alleged “trespass” pertains to the presence of Mr. John in the residence of
Respondent, on the night of the incident.

36
2003 5 SCC 288
37
1984 4 SCC 116

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3) It is admitted that Respondent herself was one of the lawful occupants of that
residence, being the legally wedded wife of Mr. Charles, and hence a co-owner or co-
possessor of the property. Under settled matrimonial and property law, a wife has
equal residential rights in her matrimonial home. As held in B.P. Achala Anand v. S.
Appi Reddy38, the right of residence of a wife in the matrimonial home is not a
concession, but a legal entitlement.
4) Therefore, when Respondent was already a lawful resident, her inviting Mr. John into
the house cannot amount to “trespass,” because one lawful occupant’s consent is
sufficient to legitimize entry.
5) In simpler words, you cannot trespass into a home you have the right to live in, nor
can a guest invited by you be treated as a trespasser.

4.2. Dr. John’s presence was not clandestine or malicious; it was for safety and support.

1) The prosecution’s attempt to portray Mr. John as an “intruder” is inconsistent with the
facts. It is submitted, that evening, when Mr. John had accompanied Respondent from
the hospital, as it was late at night and unsafe for her to travel alone.
2) There was no element of secrecy or deceit, neighbours saw them arriving together and
there was no concealment or attempt to hide his visit.
3) Moreover, there is no evidence that Mr. John entered with the intent to commit any
offence.
4) As the Supreme Court observed in Mathri v. State of Punjab39, the intent at the time
of entry determines whether an act constitutes trespass or not. Here, the intent was
clearly innocent to ensure safety, not crime. Similarly, in Mata Din Singh v. State of
Punjab40it was held that even if an entrant knows that annoyance is likely, unless the
intent to annoy was the dominant intention of entry, criminal trespass cannot be made
out; the Court further observed that the purpose and circumstances of entry must be
examined to determine the presence or absence of ‘mens rea’.

Hence, the foundational element of ‘mens rea’ for trespass is entirely absent.

4.3. The right of the wife in the matrimonial home negates the concept of trespass
altogether.

38
2005 3 SCC 313
39
AIR 1964 SC 986
40
AIR 1999 P&H 161

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1) The law recognizes the shared dominion of spouses over their matrimonial residence.
Whether the property is in the husband’s name or otherwise, the wife enjoys an
inseparable right of residence by virtue of the marital relationship.
2) Therefore, even if the property was officially owned by Mr. Charles (the deceased),
Respondent had a legal and moral right to occupy, enter, and use that property at any
time. By that logic, her companion or guest cannot be treated as a trespasser. In fact,
several judgments e.g., Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee41 affirm that the
wife’s right to residence extends to inviting friends, relatives, or helpers into the
home.
3) Hence, the allegation of “house trespass” is legally unsustainable and must fail at the
threshold.

4.4. No evidence of tampering, the allegation of “destruction of evidence” is purely

speculative.

1) Turning to the second limb, destruction of evidence, the prosecution has produced no
material proof to show that any document, object, or trace was destroyed or concealed
by the Respondents.
2) The crime scene photographs taken by the investigating officer clearly show that all
items, including the revolver, glass shards, and blood stains, were present and intact
when the police arrived.
3) If the Respondents had intended to destroy evidence, they had ample time to flee or
clean the site before neighbours intervened, yet they chose not to.
4) Instead, both Respondents remained on the spot, visibly distressed, and cooperated
fully with the authorities.
5) This behaviour is inconsistent with the conduct of guilty minds; rather, it reflects
innocence, shock, and transparency.
6) As held in Ramesh Babulal Ramesh v. State of Gujarat42, the Supreme Court
observed that circumstantial evidence must be complete and cogent, and an appellate
court cannot disturb an acquittal unless the trial court’s conclusions are palpably
wrong or wholly untenable. Incidental presence, delayed reporting by witnesses, or

41
2005 8 SCC 14041
42
1996 9 SCC 225

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recovery of items under suspicious circumstances cannot, by themselves, sustain a

conviction.
7) Thus, even if certain items were moved during the scuffle, such movement occurred
in confusion, not with criminal intent. The crime scene photographs clearly show all
items were intact. Even if some items were displaced during the scuffle, this cannot
amount to destruction. As held in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh43, mere
disturbance or displacement of articles does not constitute destruction of evidence
without proof of intent.

4.5. There was full cooperation with investigation, negating guilty intent.

1) From the moment of the incident, the Respondents displayed complete cooperation.
They did not abscond, resist arrest, or attempt to mislead the authorities. Every
statement was recorded voluntarily; no contradictions were later found. Such
cooperation is the hallmark of an innocent mind not of one trying to erase the truth.
2) If the Respondents had any intent to destroy evidence, they would have acted before
the arrival of neighbours and police, not remained at the scene awaiting questioning.

Therefore, the respondent’s actions, when viewed overall, demonstrate innocence and a lack
of ‘mens rea’ to commit any offence.

43
2003 11 SCC 271

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PRAYER

Therefore, in light of the facts stated, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is most
humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble High Court of Mishthistan that it may please
to:

1) Uphold the acquittal of the Respondent by the Learned Trial Court, affirming that her
actions undertaken in lawful exercise of the right of private defence and under the
doctrine of necessity, and therefore do not constitute murder.
2) Declare that the Respondent cannot be held liable for any charge of criminal
conspiracy u/s120B of the Mishthistan Penal Code, as there is no direct evidence or
continuous chain of circumstances proving an agreement or premeditated design to
commit any offence.
3) Confirm that she bears no criminal responsibility for trespass or destruction of
evidence, as she was in her lawful residence and acted without intent to obstruct
justice.

And/or pass such other and further orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit, just, and
proper in the interest of justice, equity, and good conscience.

For this act of kindness, the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.

S/d-

(Counsel for the Respondent)

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