Scientific method

The scientific method is an empirical method for acquiring knowledge through careful observation,
rigorous skepticism, hypothesis testing, and experimental validation. Developed from ancient and
medieval practices, it acknowledges that cognitive assumptions can distort the interpretation of the
observation. The scientific method has characterized science since at least the 17th century. Scientific
inquiry includes creating a testable hypothesis through inductive reasoning, testing it through experiments
and statistical analysis, and adjusting or discarding the hypothesis based on the results.[1][2][3]

Although procedures vary across fields, the underlying process is often similar. In more detail: the
scientific method involves making conjectures (hypothetical explanations), predicting the logical
consequences of hypothesis, then carrying out experiments or empirical observations based on those
predictions.[4] A hypothesis is a conjecture based on knowledge obtained while seeking answers to the
question. Hypotheses can be very specific or broad but must be falsifiable, implying that it is possible to
identify a possible outcome of an experiment or observation that conflicts with predictions deduced from
the hypothesis; otherwise, the hypothesis cannot be meaningfully tested.[5]

While the scientific method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it actually represents a set of
general principles. Not all steps take place in every scientific inquiry (nor to the same degree), and they
are not always in the same order.[6][7] Numerous discoveries have not followed the textbook model of the
scientific method, and, in some cases, chance has played a role.[8][9][10]

History
The history of the scientific method is different from the history of science itself. The development of
rules for scientific reasoning has not been straightforward; the scientific method has been the subject of
intense and recurring debate throughout the history of science, and eminent natural philosophers and
scientists have argued for the primacy of various approaches to establishing scientific knowledge.

Different early expressions of empiricism and the scientific method can be found throughout history, for
instance with the ancient Stoics, Aristotle,[11] Epicurus,[12] Alhazen,[A][a][B][i] Avicenna, Al-Biruni,[17][18]
Roger Bacon[α], and William of Ockham.[21]

In the Scientific Revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries, some of the most important developments
were the furthering of empiricism by Francis Bacon and Robert Hooke,[22][23] the rationalist approach
described by René Descartes, and inductivism, which was further brought to particular prominence by
scientists such as Isaac Newton and those who followed him. Newton postulated four principles which
form the basis of modern science,[24] and refined the scientific method.[25] Experiments were advocated
by Francis Bacon and performed by Giambattista della Porta,[26] Johannes Kepler,[27][d] and Galileo
Galilei.[β] There was particular development aided by theoretical works by the skeptic Francisco
Sanches,[29] by idealists as well as empiricists John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume.[e] C. S.
Peirce formulated the hypothetico-deductive model in the 20th century, and the model has undergone
significant revision since.[32]
The term scientific method emerged in the 19th century, as a result of significant institutional
development of science, and terminologies establishing clear boundaries between science and non-
science, such as scientist and pseudoscience.[33] Throughout the 1830s and 1850s, when Baconianism
was popular, naturalists like William Whewell, John Herschel, and John Stuart Mill engaged in debates
over "induction" and "facts," and were focused on how to generate knowledge.[33] In the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, a debate over realism vs. antirealism was conducted as powerful scientific theories
extended beyond the realm of the observable.[34]

Modern use and critical thought

The term scientific method came into popular use in the twentieth century; Dewey's 1910 book, How We
Think, inspired popular guidelines.[35] It appeared in dictionaries and science textbooks, although there
was little consensus on its meaning.[33] Although there was growth through the middle of the twentieth
century,[f] by the 1960s and 1970s numerous influential philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn
and Paul Feyerabend had questioned the universality of the "scientific method", and largely replaced the
notion of science as a homogeneous and universal method with that of it being a heterogeneous and local
practice.[33] In particular, Paul Feyerabend, in the 1975 first edition of his book Against Method, argued
against there being any universal rules of science;[34] Karl Popper,[γ] and Gauch 2003,[6] disagreed with
Feyerabend's claim.

Later stances include physicist Lee Smolin's 2013 essay "There Is No Scientific Method",[37] in which he
espouses two ethical principles,[δ] and historian of science Daniel Thurs' chapter in the 2015 book
Newton's Apple and Other Myths about Science, which concluded that the scientific method is a myth or,
at best, an idealization.[38] As myths are beliefs,[39] they are subject to the narrative fallacy, as pointed out
by Taleb.[40] Philosophers Robert Nola and Howard Sankey, in their 2007 book Theories of Scientific
Method, said that debates over the scientific method continue, and argued that Feyerabend, despite the
title of Against Method, accepted certain rules of method and attempted to justify those rules with a meta
methodology.[41] Staddon (2017) argues it is a mistake to try following rules in the absence of an
algorithmic scientific method; in that case, "science is best understood through examples".[42][43] But
algorithmic methods, such as disproof of existing theory by experiment have been used since Alhacen
(1027) and his Book of Optics,[a] and Galileo (1638) and his Two New Sciences,[28] and The Assayer,[44]
which still stand as scientific method.

Elements of inquiry

Overview
The scientific method is the process by which science is carried out.[45] As in other areas of inquiry,
science (through the scientific method) can build on previous knowledge, and unify understanding of its
studied topics over time.[g] Historically, the development of the scientific method was critical to the
Scientific Revolution.[47]

The overall process involves making conjectures (hypotheses), predicting their logical consequences,
then carrying out experiments based on those predictions to determine whether the original conjecture
was correct.[4] However, there are difficulties in a formulaic statement of method. The scientific method
represents general principles rather than a fixed sequence, not
all steps occur in every inquiry, nor always in the same order.
It requires intelligence, imagination, and creativity rather than
rigid adherence to procedure.[48]

Factors of scientific inquiry

There are different ways of outlining the basic method used
for scientific inquiry. The scientific community and
philosophers of science generally agree on the following
classification of method components. These methodological
elements and organization of procedures tend to be more
characteristic of experimental sciences than social sciences. The scientific method is often
Nonetheless, the cycle of formulating hypotheses, testing and represented as an ongoing process. This
analyzing the results, and formulating new hypotheses, will diagram represents one variant, and
resemble the cycle described [Link] scientific method is there are many others.

an iterative, cyclical process through which information is

continually revised.[49][50] It is generally recognized to
develop advances in knowledge through the following elements, in varying combinations or
contributions:[51][52]

Characterizations (observations, definitions, and measurements of the subject of inquiry)

Hypotheses (theoretical, hypothetical explanations of observations and measurements of
the subject)
Predictions (inductive and deductive reasoning from the hypothesis or theory)
Experiments (tests of all of the above)
Each element of the scientific method is subject to peer review for possible mistakes. These activities do
not describe all that scientists do but apply mostly to experimental sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry,
biology, and psychology). The elements above are often taught in the educational system as "the scientific
method".[C]

The scientific method is not a single recipe: it requires intelligence, imagination, and creativity.[53] In this
sense, it is not a mindless set of standards and procedures to follow but is rather an ongoing cycle,
constantly developing more useful, accurate, and comprehensive models and methods. For example,
when Einstein developed the Special and General Theories of Relativity, he did not in any way refute or
discount Newton's Principia. On the contrary, if the astronomically massive, the feather-light, and the
extremely fast are removed from Einstein's theories – all phenomena Newton could not have observed –
Newton's equations are what remain. Einstein's theories are expansions and refinements of Newton's
theories and, thus, increase confidence in Newton's work.

An iterative,[50] pragmatic[16] scheme of the four points above is sometimes offered as a guideline for
proceeding:[54]

1. Define a question
2. Gather information and resources (observe)
3. Form an explanatory hypothesis
4. Test the hypothesis by performing an experiment and collecting data in a reproducible
manner
 5. Analyze the data
6. Interpret the data and draw conclusions that serve as a starting point for a new hypothesis
7. Publish results
8. Retest (frequently done by other scientists)
The iterative cycle inherent in this step-by-step method goes from point 3 to 6 and back to 3 again.

While this schema outlines a typical hypothesis/testing method,[55] many philosophers, historians, and
sociologists of science, including Paul Feyerabend,[h] claim that such descriptions of scientific method
have little relation to the ways that science is actually practiced.

Characterizations
The basic elements of the scientific method are illustrated by the following example (which occurred
from 1944 to 1953) from the discovery of the structure of DNA (marked with and indented).

In 1950, it was known that genetic inheritance had a mathematical description, starting
with the studies of Gregor Mendel, and that DNA contained genetic information (Oswald
Avery's transforming principle).[57] But the mechanism of storing genetic information (i.e.,
genes) in DNA was unclear. Researchers in Bragg's laboratory at Cambridge University
made X-ray diffraction pictures of various molecules, starting with crystals of salt, and
proceeding to more complicated substances. Using clues painstakingly assembled over
decades, beginning with its chemical composition, it was determined that it should be
possible to characterize the physical structure of DNA, and the X-ray images would be the
vehicle.[58]

The scientific method depends upon increasingly sophisticated characterizations of the subjects of
investigation. (The subjects can also be called unsolved problems or the unknowns.)[C] For example,
Benjamin Franklin conjectured, correctly, that St. Elmo's fire was electrical in nature, but it has taken a
long series of experiments and theoretical changes to establish this. While seeking the pertinent properties
of the subjects, careful thought may also entail some definitions and observations; these observations
often demand careful measurements and/or counting can take the form of expansive empirical research.

A scientific question can refer to the explanation of a specific observation,[C] as in "Why is the sky blue?"
but can also be open-ended, as in "How can I design a drug to cure this particular disease?" This stage
frequently involves finding and evaluating evidence from previous experiments, personal scientific
observations or assertions, as well as the work of other scientists. If the answer is already known, a
different question that builds on the evidence can be posed. When applying the scientific method to
research, determining a good question can be very difficult and it will affect the outcome of the
investigation.[59]

The systematic, careful collection of measurements or counts of relevant quantities is often the critical
difference between pseudo-sciences, such as alchemy, and science, such as chemistry or biology.
Scientific measurements are usually tabulated, graphed, or mapped, and statistical manipulations, such as
correlation and regression, performed on them. The measurements might be made in a controlled setting,
such as a laboratory, or made on more or less inaccessible or unmanipulatable objects such as stars or
human populations. The measurements often require specialized scientific instruments such as
thermometers, spectroscopes, particle accelerators, or voltmeters, and the progress of a scientific field is
usually intimately tied to their invention and improvement.

I am not accustomed to saying anything with certainty after only one or two observations.

—Andreas Vesalius (1546)[60]

Definition
The scientific definition of a term sometimes differs substantially from its natural language usage. For
example, mass and weight overlap in meaning in common discourse, but have distinct meanings in
mechanics. Scientific quantities are often characterized by their units of measure which can later be
described in terms of conventional physical units when communicating the work.

New theories are sometimes developed after realizing certain terms have not previously been sufficiently
clearly defined. For example, Albert Einstein's first paper on relativity begins by defining simultaneity
and the means for determining length. These ideas were skipped over by Isaac Newton with, "I do not
define time, space, place and motion, as being well known to all." Einstein's paper then demonstrates that
they (viz., absolute time and length independent of motion) were approximations. Francis Crick cautions
us that when characterizing a subject, however, it can be premature to define something when it remains
ill-understood.[61] In Crick's study of consciousness, he actually found it easier to study awareness in the
visual system, rather than to study free will, for example. His cautionary example was the gene; the gene
was much more poorly understood before Watson and Crick's pioneering discovery of the structure of
DNA; it would have been counterproductive to spend much time on the definition of the gene, before
them.

Hypothesis development

Linus Pauling proposed that DNA might be a triple helix.[62][63] This hypothesis was also
considered by Francis Crick and James D. Watson but discarded. When Watson and Crick
learned of Pauling's hypothesis, they understood from existing data that Pauling was
wrong.[64] and that Pauling would soon admit his difficulties with that structure.

A hypothesis is a suggested explanation of a phenomenon, or alternately a reasoned proposal suggesting a

possible correlation between or among a set of phenomena. Normally, hypotheses have the form of a
mathematical model. Sometimes, but not always, they can also be formulated as existential statements,
stating that some particular instance of the phenomenon being studied has some characteristic and causal
explanations, which have the general form of universal statements, stating that every instance of the
phenomenon has a particular characteristic.

Scientists are free to use whatever resources they have – their own creativity, ideas from other fields,
inductive reasoning, Bayesian inference, and so on – to imagine possible explanations for a phenomenon
under study. Albert Einstein once observed that "there is no logical bridge between phenomena and their
theoretical principles."[65][i] Charles Sanders Peirce, borrowing a page from Aristotle (Prior Analytics,
2.25)[67] described the incipient stages of inquiry, instigated by the "irritation of doubt" to venture a
plausible guess, as abductive reasoning.[68]: II, p.290 The history of science is filled with stories of
scientists claiming a "flash of inspiration", or a hunch, which then motivated them to look for evidence to
support or refute their idea. Michael Polanyi made such creativity the centerpiece of his discussion of
methodology.

William Glen observes that[69]

the success of a hypothesis, or its service to science, lies not simply in its perceived "truth", or
power to displace, subsume or reduce a predecessor idea, but perhaps more in its ability to
stimulate the research that will illuminate ... bald suppositions and areas of vagueness.

— William Glen, The Mass-Extinction Debates

In general, scientists tend to look for theories that are "elegant" or "beautiful". Scientists often use these
terms to refer to a theory that is following the known facts but is nevertheless relatively simple and easy
to handle. Occam's Razor serves as a rule of thumb for choosing the most desirable amongst a group of
equally explanatory hypotheses.

To minimize the confirmation bias that results from entertaining a single hypothesis, strong inference
emphasizes the need for entertaining multiple alternative hypotheses,[70] and avoiding artifacts.[71]

Predictions from the hypothesis

James D. Watson, Francis Crick, and others hypothesized that DNA had a helical
structure. This implied that DNA's X-ray diffraction pattern would be 'x shaped'.[72][73] This
prediction followed from the work of Cochran, Crick and Vand[74] (and independently by
Stokes). The Cochran-Crick-Vand-Stokes theorem provided a mathematical explanation for
the empirical observation that diffraction from helical structures produces x-shaped patterns.
In their first paper, Watson and Crick also noted that the double helix structure they proposed
provided a simple mechanism for DNA replication, writing, "It has not escaped our notice
that the specific pairing we have postulated immediately suggests a possible copying
mechanism for the genetic material".[75]

Any useful hypothesis will enable predictions, by reasoning including deductive reasoning.[j] It might
predict the outcome of an experiment in a laboratory setting or the observation of a phenomenon in
nature. The prediction can also be statistical and deal only with probabilities.

It is essential that the outcome of testing such a prediction be currently unknown. Only in this case does a
successful outcome increase the probability that the hypothesis is true. If the outcome is already known, it
is called a consequence and should have already been considered while formulating the hypothesis.
If the predictions are not accessible by observation or experience, the hypothesis is not yet testable and so
will remain to that extent unscientific in a strict sense. A new technology or theory might make the
necessary experiments feasible. For example, while a hypothesis on the existence of other intelligent
species may be convincing with scientifically based speculation, no known experiment can test this
hypothesis. Therefore, science itself can have little to say about the possibility. In the future, a new
technique may allow for an experimental test and the speculation would then become part of accepted
science.

For example, Einstein's theory of general relativity makes several specific predictions about the
observable structure of spacetime, such as that light bends in a gravitational field, and that the amount of
bending depends in a precise way on the strength of that gravitational field. Arthur Eddington's
observations made during a 1919 solar eclipse supported General Relativity rather than Newtonian
gravitation.[76]

Experiments

Watson and Crick showed an initial (and incorrect) proposal for the structure of DNA to a
team from King's College London – Rosalind Franklin, Maurice Wilkins, and Raymond
Gosling. Franklin immediately spotted the flaws which concerned the water content. Later
Watson saw Franklin's photo 51, a detailed X-ray diffraction image, which showed an X-
shape[77][78] and was able to confirm the structure was helical.[79][80][k]

Once predictions are made, they can be sought by experiments. If the test results contradict the
predictions, the hypotheses which entailed them are called into question and become less tenable.
Sometimes the experiments are conducted incorrectly or are not very well designed when compared to a
crucial experiment. If the experimental results confirm the predictions, then the hypotheses are
considered more likely to be correct, but might still be wrong and continue to be subject to further testing.
The experimental control is a technique for dealing with observational error. This technique uses the
contrast between multiple samples, or observations, or populations, under differing conditions, to see
what varies or what remains the same. We vary the conditions for the acts of measurement, to help isolate
what has changed. Mill's canons can then help us figure out what the important factor is.[84] Factor
analysis is one technique for discovering the important factor in an effect.

Depending on the predictions, the experiments can have different shapes. It could be a classical
experiment in a laboratory setting, a double-blind study or an archaeological excavation. Even taking a
plane from New York to Paris is an experiment that tests the aerodynamical hypotheses used for
constructing the plane.

These institutions thereby reduce the research function to a cost/benefit,[85] which is expressed as money,
and the time and attention of the researchers to be expended,[85] in exchange for a report to their
constituents.[86] Current large instruments, such as CERN's Large Hadron Collider (LHC),[87] or
LIGO,[88] or the National Ignition Facility (NIF),[89] or the International Space Station (ISS),[90] or the
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST),[91][92] entail expected costs of billions of dollars, and timeframes
extending over decades. These kinds of institutions affect public policy, on a national or even
international basis, and the researchers would require shared access to such machines and their adjunct
infrastructure.[ε][93]
Scientists assume an attitude of openness and accountability on the part of those experimenting. Detailed
record-keeping is essential, to aid in recording and reporting on the experimental results, and supports the
effectiveness and integrity of the procedure. They will also assist in reproducing the experimental results,
likely by others. Traces of this approach can be seen in the work of Hipparchus (190–120 BCE), when
determining a value for the precession of the Earth, while controlled experiments can be seen in the
works of al-Battani (853–929 CE)[94] and Alhazen (965–1039 CE).[95][l][b]

Communication and iteration

Watson and Crick then produced their model, using this information along with the
previously known information about DNA's composition, especially Chargaff's rules of base
pairing.[83] After considerable fruitless experimentation, being discouraged by their superior
from continuing, and numerous false starts,[97][98][99] Watson and Crick were able to infer
the essential structure of DNA by concrete modeling of the physical shapes of the nucleotides
which comprise it.[83][100][101] They were guided by the bond lengths which had been
deduced by Linus Pauling and by Rosalind Franklin's X-ray diffraction images.

The scientific method is iterative. At any stage, it is possible to refine its accuracy and precision, so that
some consideration will lead the scientist to repeat an earlier part of the process. Failure to develop an
interesting hypothesis may lead a scientist to re-define the subject under consideration. Failure of a
hypothesis to produce interesting and testable predictions may lead to reconsideration of the hypothesis or
of the definition of the subject. Failure of an experiment to produce interesting results may lead a scientist
to reconsider the experimental method, the hypothesis, or the definition of the subject.

This manner of iteration can span decades and sometimes centuries. Published papers can be built upon.
For example: By 1027, Alhazen, based on his measurements of the refraction of light, was able to deduce
that outer space was less dense than air, that is: "the body of the heavens is rarer than the body of air".[14]
In 1079 Ibn Mu'adh's Treatise On Twilight was able to infer that Earth's atmosphere was 50 miles thick,
based on atmospheric refraction of the sun's rays.[m]

This is why the scientific method is often represented as circular – new information leads to new
characterisations, and the cycle of science continues. Measurements collected can be archived, passed
onwards and used by others. Other scientists may start their own research and enter the process at any
stage. They might adopt the characterization and formulate their own hypothesis, or they might adopt the
hypothesis and deduce their own predictions. Often the experiment is not done by the person who made
the prediction, and the characterization is based on experiments done by someone else. Published results
of experiments can also serve as a hypothesis predicting their own reproducibility.

Confirmation
Science is a social enterprise, and scientific work tends to be accepted by the scientific community when
it has been confirmed. Crucially, experimental and theoretical results must be reproduced by others within
the scientific community. Researchers have given their lives for this vision; Georg Wilhelm Richmann
was killed by ball lightning (1753) when attempting to replicate the 1752 kite-flying experiment of
Benjamin Franklin.[103]
If an experiment cannot be repeated to produce the same results, this implies that the original results
might have been in error. As a result, it is common for a single experiment to be performed multiple
times, especially when there are uncontrolled variables or other indications of experimental error. For
significant or surprising results, other scientists may also attempt to replicate the results for themselves,
especially if those results would be important to their own work.[104] Replication has become a
contentious issue in social and biomedical science where treatments are administered to groups of
individuals. Typically an experimental group gets the treatment, such as a drug, and the control group
gets a placebo. John Ioannidis in 2005 pointed out that the method being used has led to many findings
that cannot be replicated.[105]

Peer review—anonymous expert evaluation of research—assesses experimental soundness rather than

certifying correctness. Some journals request that the experimenter provide lists of possible peer
reviewers, especially if the field is highly specialized. Specialists review methodology and design; if
approved (sometimes requiring additional experiments), the prestige of the journal where the work is
published indicates perceived quality.[n]

Scientists typically are careful in recording their data, a requirement promoted by Ludwik Fleck (1896–
1961) and others.[106] Though not typically required, they might be requested to supply this data to other
scientists who wish to replicate their original results (or parts of their original results), extending to the
sharing of any experimental samples that may be difficult to obtain.[107] To protect against bad science
and fraudulent data, government research-granting agencies such as the National Science Foundation, and
science journals, including Nature and Science, have a policy that researchers must archive their data and
methods so that other researchers can test the data and methods and build on the research that has gone
before. Scientific data archiving can be done at several national archives in the U.S. or the World Data
Center.

Foundational principles

Honesty, openness, and falsifiability

The unfettered principles of science are to strive for accuracy and the creed of honesty; openness already
being a matter of degrees. Openness is restricted by the general rigour of scepticism. And of course the
matter of non-science.

Smolin, in 2013, espoused ethical principles rather than giving any potentially limited definition of the
rules of inquiry.[δ] His ideas stand in the context of the scale of data–driven and big science, which has
seen increased importance of honesty and consequently reproducibility. His thought is that science is a
community effort by those who have accreditation and are working within the community. He also warns
against overzealous parsimony.

Popper previously took ethical principles even further, going as far as to ascribe value to theories only if
they were falsifiable. Popper used the falsifiability criterion to demarcate a scientific theory from a theory
like astrology: both "explain" observations, but the scientific theory takes the risk of making predictions
that decide whether it is right or wrong:[108][109]
 "Those among us who are unwilling to expose their ideas to the hazard of refutation do not take
part in the game of science."

— Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002 [1935])

Theory's interactions with observation

Science has limits. Those limits are usually deemed to be answers to questions that aren't in science's
domain, such as faith. Science has other limits as well, as it seeks to make true statements about
reality.[110] The nature of truth and the discussion on how scientific statements relate to reality is best left
to the article on the philosophy of science here. More immediately topical limitations show themselves in
the observation of reality.

It is the natural limitations of scientific inquiry that there is no

pure observation as theory is required to interpret empirical data,
and observation is therefore influenced by the observer's
conceptual framework.[112] As science is an unfinished project,
this does lead to difficulties. Namely, that false conclusions are
drawn, because of limited information.

An example here are the experiments of Kepler and Brahe, used

by Hanson to illustrate the concept. Despite observing the same
sunrise the two scientists came to different conclusions—their
intersubjectivity leading to differing conclusions. Johannes Kepler
used Tycho Brahe's method of observation, which was to project This cloud chamber photograph is
the image of the Sun on a piece of paper through a pinhole the first observational evidence of
aperture, instead of looking directly at the Sun. He disagreed with positrons, 2 August 1932;
interpretable only through prior
Brahe's conclusion that total eclipses of the Sun were impossible
theory.[111]
because, contrary to Brahe, he knew that there were historical
accounts of total eclipses. Instead, he deduced that the images
taken would become more accurate, the larger the aperture—this fact is now fundamental for optical
system design.[d] Another historic example here is the discovery of Neptune, credited as being found via
mathematics because previous observers didn't know what they were looking at.[113]

Empiricism, rationalism, and more pragmatic views

Scientific endeavour can be characterised as the pursuit of truths about the natural world or as the
elimination of doubt about the same. The former is the direct construction of explanations from empirical
data and logic, the latter the reduction of potential explanations.[ζ] It was established above how the
interpretation of empirical data is theory-laden, so neither approach is trivial.

The ubiquitous element in the scientific method is empiricism, which holds that knowledge is created by
a process involving observation; scientific theories generalize observations. This is in opposition to
stringent forms of rationalism, which holds that knowledge is created by the human intellect; later
clarified by Popper to be built on prior theory.[115] The scientific method embodies the position that
reason alone cannot solve a particular scientific problem; it unequivocally refutes claims that revelation,
political or religious dogma, appeals to tradition, commonly held beliefs, common sense, or currently
held theories pose the only possible means of demonstrating truth.[16][82]

In 1877,[51] C. S. Peirce characterized inquiry in general not as the pursuit of truth per se but as the
struggle to move from irritating, inhibitory doubts born of surprises, disagreements, and the like, and to
reach a secure belief, the belief being that on which one is prepared to act. His pragmatic views framed
scientific inquiry as part of a broader spectrum and as spurred, like inquiry generally, by actual doubt, not
mere verbal or "hyperbolic doubt", which he held to be fruitless.[o] This "hyperbolic doubt" Peirce argues
against here is of course just another name for Cartesian doubt associated with René Descartes. It is a
methodological route to certain knowledge by identifying what can't be doubted.

A strong formulation of the scientific method is not always aligned with a form of empiricism in which
the empirical data is put forward in the form of experience or other abstracted forms of knowledge as in
current scientific practice the use of scientific modelling and reliance on abstract typologies and theories
is normally accepted. In 2010, Hawking suggested that physics' models of reality should simply be
accepted where they prove to make useful predictions. He calls the concept model-dependent realism.[118]

Rationality
The following section will first explore beliefs and biases, and then get to the rational reasoning most
associated with the sciences.[119]

Beliefs and biases

Scientific methodology often directs that hypotheses be tested in controlled conditions wherever possible.
This is frequently possible in certain areas, such as in the biological sciences, and more difficult in other
areas, such as in astronomy.

The practice of experimental control and reproducibility can have the effect of diminishing the potentially
harmful effects of circumstance, and to a degree, personal bias. For example, pre-existing beliefs can alter
the interpretation of results, as in confirmation bias; this is a heuristic that leads a person with a particular
belief to see things as reinforcing their belief, even if another observer might disagree (in other words,
people tend to observe what they expect to observe).[39]

[T]he action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained.

— C.S. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear (1877)[68]

A historical example is the belief that the legs of a galloping horse are splayed at the point when none of
the horse's legs touch the ground, to the point of this image being included in paintings by its supporters.
However, the first stop-action pictures of a horse's gallop by Eadweard Muybridge showed this to be
false, and that the legs are instead gathered together.[120]
Another important human bias that plays a role is a preference for
new, surprising statements (see Appeal to novelty), which can
result in a search for evidence that the new is true.[121] Poorly
attested beliefs can be believed and acted upon via a less rigorous
heuristic.[122]

Goldhaber and Nieto published in 2010 the observation that if

theoretical structures with "many closely neighboring subjects are
described by connecting theoretical concepts, then the theoretical Flying gallop as shown by this
structure acquires a robustness which makes it increasingly hard – painting (Théodore Géricault, 1821)
though certainly never impossible – to overturn".[123] When a is falsified; see below.
narrative is constructed its elements become easier to
believe.[124][40]

Fleck (1979), p. 27 notes "Words and ideas are originally

phonetic and mental equivalences of the experiences coinciding
with them. ... Such proto-ideas are at first always too broad and
insufficiently specialized. ... Once a structurally complete and
Muybridge's photographs of The
closed system of opinions consisting of many details and relations
Horse in Motion, 1878, were used to
has been formed, it offers enduring resistance to anything that
answer the question of whether all
contradicts it". Sometimes, these relations have their elements four feet of a galloping horse are
assumed a priori, or contain some other logical or methodological ever off the ground at the same
flaw in the process that ultimately produced them. Donald M. time. This demonstrates a use of
MacKay has analyzed these elements in terms of limits to the photography as an experimental tool
accuracy of measurement and has related them to instrumental in science.
elements in a category of measurement.[η]

Deductive and inductive reasoning

The idea of there being two opposed justifications for truth has shown up throughout the history of
scientific method as analysis versus synthesis, non-ampliative/ampliative, or even confirmation and
verification. (And there are other kinds of reasoning.) One to use what is observed to build towards
fundamental truths – and the other to derive from those fundamental truths more specific principles.[125]

Deductive reasoning derives specific conclusions from established general principles—if the premises are
true, the conclusion must be true. Inductive reasoning builds general principles from observations—
conclusions are probable but not guaranteed. Scientific inquiry employs both: induction generates
hypotheses from observations; deduction predicts testable consequences. This process requires stringent
scepticism regarding observed phenomena, because cognitive assumptions can distort the interpretation
of initial perceptions.[126]

An example for how inductive and deductive reasoning works can be found in the history of gravitational
theory.[p] It took thousands of years of measurements, from the Chaldean, Indian, Persian, Greek, Arabic,
and European astronomers, to fully record the motion of planet Earth.[q] Kepler(and others) were then
able to build their early theories by generalizing the collected data inductively, and Newton was able to
unify prior theory and measurements into the consequences of his laws of motion in 1727.[r]
Another common example of inductive reasoning is the
observation of a counterexample to current theory inducing
the need for new ideas. Le Verrier in 1859 pointed out
problems with the perihelion of Mercury that showed
Newton's theory to be at least incomplete. The observed
difference of Mercury's precession between Newtonian theory
and observation was one of the things that occurred to
Einstein as a possible early test of his theory of relativity. His
relativistic calculations matched observation much more
closely than Newtonian theory did.[s] Though, today's Precession of the perihelion –
Standard Model of physics suggests that we still do not know exaggerated in the case of Mercury, but
at least some of the concepts surrounding Einstein's theory, it observed in the case of S2's apsidal
precession around Sagittarius A*[127]
holds to this day and is being built on deductively.

A theory being assumed as true and subsequently built on is a

common example of deductive reasoning. Theory building on
Einstein's achievement can simply state that 'we have shown
that this case fulfils the conditions under which
general/special relativity applies, therefore its conclusions
apply also'. If it was properly shown that 'this case' fulfils the
conditions, the conclusion follows. An extension of this is the
assumption of a solution to an open problem. This weaker
kind of deductive reasoning will get used in current research,
when multiple scientists or even teams of researchers are all
Inductive Deductive Reasoning
gradually solving specific cases in working towards proving a
larger theory. This often sees hypotheses being revised again
and again as new proof emerges.

This way of presenting inductive and deductive reasoning shows part of why science is often presented as
being a cycle of iteration. It is important to keep in mind that that cycle's foundations lie in reasoning, and
not wholly in the following of procedure.

Certainty, probabilities, and statistical inference

Claims of scientific truth can be opposed in three ways: by falsifying them, by questioning their certainty,
or by asserting the claim itself to be incoherent.[t] Incoherence, here, means internal errors in logic, like
stating opposites to be true; falsification is what Popper would have called the honest work of conjecture
and refutation[36] — certainty, perhaps, is where difficulties in telling truths from non-truths arise most
easily.

Scientific measurements include uncertainty estimates, calculated through repeated measurements, error
propagation from underlying quantities, or sampling limitations. uncertainty.[85] Counts of things may
represent a sample of desired quantities, with an uncertainty that depends upon the sampling method used
and the number of samples taken.

In the case of measurement imprecision, there will simply be a 'probable deviation' expressing itself in a
study's conclusions. Statistics are different. Inductive statistical generalisation will take sample data and
extrapolate more general conclusions, which has to be justified — and scrutinised. It can even be said that
statistical models are only ever useful, but never a complete representation of circumstances.

In statistical analysis, expected and unexpected bias is a large factor.[131] Research questions, the
collection of data, or the interpretation of results, all are subject to larger amounts of scrutiny than in
comfortably logical environments. Statistical models go through a process for validation, for which one
could even say that awareness of potential biases is more important than the hard logic; errors in logic are
easier to find in peer review, after all.[u] More general, claims to rational knowledge, and especially
statistics, have to be put into their appropriate context.[126] Simple statements such as '9 out of 10 doctors
recommend' are therefore of unknown quality because they do not justify their methodology.

Lack of familiarity with statistical methodologies can result in erroneous conclusions. Foregoing the easy
example,[v] multiple probabilities interacting is where, for example medical professionals,[133] have
shown a lack of proper understanding. Bayes' theorem is the mathematical principle lining out how
standing probabilities are adjusted given new information. The boy or girl paradox is a common example.
In knowledge representation, Bayesian estimation of mutual information between random variables is a
way to measure dependence, independence, or interdependence of the information under scrutiny.[134]

Beyond commonly associated survey methodology of field research, the concept together with
probabilistic reasoning is used to advance fields of science where research objects have no definitive
states of being. For example, in statistical mechanics.

Methods of inquiry

Hypothetico-deductive method
The hypothetico-deductive model, or hypothesis-testing method, or "traditional" scientific method is, as
the name implies, based on the formation of hypotheses and their testing via deductive reasoning. A
hypothesis stating implications, often called predictions, that are falsifiable via experiment is of central
importance here, as not the hypothesis but its implications are what is tested.[135] Basically, scientists will
look at the hypothetical consequences a (potential) theory holds and prove or disprove those instead of
the theory itself. If an experimental test of those hypothetical consequences shows them to be false, it
follows logically that the part of the theory that implied them was false also. If they show as true
however, it does not prove the theory definitively.

The logic of this testing is what affords this method of inquiry to be reasoned deductively. The formulated
hypothesis is assumed to be 'true', and from that 'true' statement implications are inferred. If the following
tests show the implications to be false, it follows that the hypothesis was false also. If test show the
implications to be true, new insights will be gained. It is important to be aware that a positive test here
will at best strongly imply but not definitively prove the tested hypothesis, as deductive inference (A ⇒
B) is not equivalent like that; only (¬B ⇒ ¬A) is valid logic. Their positive outcomes however, as Hempel
put it, provide "at least some support, some corroboration or confirmation for it".[136] This is why Popper
insisted on fielded hypotheses to be falsifieable, as successful tests imply very little otherwise. As Gillies
put it, "successful theories are those that survive elimination through falsification".[135]
Deductive reasoning in this mode of inquiry will sometimes be replaced by abductive reasoning—the
search for the most plausible explanation via logical inference. For example, in biology, where general
laws are few,[135] as valid deductions rely on solid presuppositions.[126]

Inductive method
The inductivist approach to deriving scientific truth first rose to prominence with Francis Bacon and
particularly with Isaac Newton and those who followed him.[137] After the establishment of the HD-
method, it was often put aside as something of a "fishing expedition" though.[135] It is still valid to some
degree, but today's inductive method is often far removed from the historic approach—the scale of the
data collected lending new effectiveness to the method. It is most-associated with data-mining projects or
large-scale observation projects. In both these cases, it is often not at all clear what the results of proposed
experiments will be, and thus knowledge will arise after the collection of data through inductive
reasoning.[r]

Where the traditional method of inquiry does both, the inductive approach usually formulates only a
research question, not a hypothesis. Following the initial question instead, a suitable "high-throughput
method" of data-collection is determined, the resulting data processed and 'cleaned up', and conclusions
drawn after. "This shift in focus elevates the data to the supreme role of revealing novel insights by
themselves".[135]

The advantage the inductive method has over methods formulating a hypothesis that it is essentially free
of "a researcher's preconceived notions" regarding their subject. On the other hand, inductive reasoning is
always attached to a measure of certainty, as all inductively reasoned conclusions are.[135] This measure
of certainty can reach quite high degrees, though. For example, in the determination of large primes,
which are used in encryption software.[138]

Mathematical modelling
Mathematical modelling, or allochthonous reasoning, typically is the formulation of a hypothesis
followed by building mathematical constructs that can be tested in place of conducting physical
laboratory experiments. This approach has two main factors: simplification/abstraction and secondly a set
of correspondence rules. The correspondence rules lay out how the constructed model will relate back to
reality-how truth is derived; and the simplifying steps taken in the abstraction of the given system are to
reduce factors that do not bear relevance and thereby reduce unexpected errors.[135] These steps can also
help the researcher in understanding the important factors of the system, how far parsimony can be taken
until the system becomes more and more unchangeable and thereby stable. Parsimony and related
principles are further explored below.

Once this translation into mathematics is complete, the resulting model, in place of the corresponding
system, can be analysed through purely mathematical and computational means. The results of this
analysis are of course also purely mathematical in nature and get translated back to the system as it exists
in reality via the previously determined correspondence rules—iteration following review and
interpretation of the findings. The way such models are reasoned will often be mathematically deductive
—but they don't have to be. An example here are Monte-Carlo simulations. These generate empirical data
"arbitrarily", and, while they may not be able to reveal universal principles, they can nevertheless be
useful.[135]
Scientific inquiry
Scientific inquiry generally aims to obtain knowledge in the form of testable explanations[139][81] that
scientists can use to predict the results of future experiments. This allows scientists to gain a better
understanding of the topic under study, and later to use that understanding to intervene in its causal
mechanisms (such as to cure disease). The better an explanation is at making predictions, the more useful
it frequently can be, and the more likely it will continue to explain a body of evidence better than its
alternatives. The most successful explanations – those that explain and make accurate predictions in a
wide range of circumstances – are often called scientific theories.[C]

Most experimental results do not produce large changes in human understanding; improvements in
theoretical scientific understanding typically result from a gradual process of development over time,
sometimes across different domains of science.[140] Scientific models vary in the extent to which they
have been experimentally tested and for how long, and in their acceptance in the scientific community. In
general, explanations become accepted over time as evidence accumulates on a given topic, and the
explanation in question proves more powerful than its alternatives at explaining the evidence. Often
subsequent researchers re-formulate the explanations over time, or combined explanations to produce
new explanations.

Properties of scientific inquiry

Scientific knowledge is closely tied to empirical findings and can remain subject to falsification if new
experimental observations are incompatible with what is found. That is, no theory can ever be considered
final since new problematic evidence might be discovered. If such evidence is found, a new theory may
be proposed, or (more commonly) it is found that modifications to the previous theory are sufficient to
explain the new evidence. The strength of a theory relates to how long it has persisted without major
alteration to its core principles.

Theories can also become subsumed by other theories. For example, Newton's laws explained thousands
of years of scientific observations of the planets almost perfectly. However, these laws were then
determined to be special cases of a more general theory (relativity), which explained both the (previously
unexplained) exceptions to Newton's laws and predicted and explained other observations such as the
deflection of light by gravity. Thus, in certain cases independent, unconnected, scientific observations can
be connected, unified by principles of increasing explanatory power.[141][123]

Since new theories might be more comprehensive than what preceded them, and thus be able to explain
more than previous ones, successor theories might be able to meet a higher standard by explaining a
larger body of observations than their predecessors.[141] For example, the theory of evolution explains the
diversity of life on Earth, how species adapt to their environments, and many other patterns observed in
the natural world;[142][143] its most recent major modification was unification with genetics to form the
modern evolutionary synthesis. In subsequent modifications, it has also subsumed aspects of many other
fields such as biochemistry and molecular biology.
Heuristics

Confirmation theory
During the course of history, one theory has succeeded another, and some have suggested further work
while others have seemed content just to explain the phenomena. The reasons why one theory has
replaced another are not always obvious or simple. The philosophy of science includes the question: What
criteria are satisfied by a 'good' theory. This question has a long history, and many scientists, as well as
philosophers, have considered it. The objective is to be able to choose one theory as preferable to another
without introducing cognitive bias.[144] Though different thinkers emphasize different aspects,[ι] good
theories are accurate, internally consistent, explanatory beyond required data, unifying of disparate
phenomena, and fruitful for research. When empirical evidence is limited, scientists favor parsimony and
invariant observations. Scientists will sometimes also list the very subjective criteria of "formal elegance"
which can indicate multiple different things.

The goal here is to make the choice between theories less arbitrary. Nonetheless, these criteria contain
subjective elements, and should be considered heuristics rather than a definitive.[κ] Also, criteria such as
these do not necessarily decide between alternative theories. Quoting Bird:[150]

"[Such criteria] cannot determine scientific choice. First, which features of a theory satisfy
these criteria may be disputable (e.g. does simplicity concern the ontological commitments of a
theory or its mathematical form?). Secondly, these criteria are imprecise, and so there is room
for disagreement about the degree to which they hold. Thirdly, there can be disagreement about
how they are to be weighted relative to one another, especially when they conflict."

It also is debatable whether existing scientific theories satisfy all these criteria, which may represent goals
not yet achieved. For example, explanatory power over all existing observations is satisfied by no one
theory at the moment.[151][152]

Parsimony
The desiderata of a "good" theory have been debated for centuries, going back perhaps even earlier than
Occam's razor,[w] which is often taken as an attribute of a good theory. Science tries to be simple. When
gathered data supports multiple explanations, the most simple explanation for phenomena or the most
simple formation of a theory is recommended by the principle of parsimony.[153] Scientists go as far as to
call simple proofs of complex statements beautiful.

We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to
explain their appearances.
 — Isaac Newton, Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1723 [3rd ed.])[1]
The concept of parsimony should not be held to imply complete frugality in the pursuit of scientific truth.
The general process starts at the opposite end of there being a vast number of potential explanations and
general disorder. An example can be seen in Paul Krugman's process, who makes explicit to "dare to be
silly". He writes that in his work on new theories of international trade he reviewed prior work with an
open frame of mind and broadened his initial viewpoint even in unlikely directions. Once he had a
sufficient body of ideas, he would try to simplify and thus find what worked among what did not.
Specific to Krugman here was to "question the question". He recognised that prior work had applied
erroneous models to already present evidence, commenting that "intelligent commentary was
ignored".[154] Thus touching on the need to bridge the common bias against other circles of thought.[155]

Elegance
Occam's razor might fall under the heading of "simple elegance", but it is arguable that parsimony and
elegance pull in different directions. Introducing additional elements could simplify theory formulation,
whereas simplifying a theory's ontology might lead to increased syntactical complexity.[149]

Sometimes ad-hoc modifications of a failing idea may also be dismissed as lacking "formal elegance".
This appeal to what may be called "aesthetic" is hard to characterise, but essentially about a sort of
familiarity. Though, argument based on "elegance" is contentious and over-reliance on familiarity will
breed stagnation.[146]

Invariance
Principles of invariance have been a theme in scientific writing, and especially physics, since at least the
early 20th century.[θ] The basic idea here is that good structures to look for are those independent of
perspective, an idea that has featured earlier of course for example in Mill's Methods of difference and
agreement—methods that would be referred back to in the context of contrast and invariance.[156] But as
tends to be the case, there is a difference between something being a basic consideration and something
being given weight. Principles of invariance have only been given weight in the wake of Einstein's
theories of relativity, which reduced everything to relations and were thereby fundamentally
unchangeable, unable to be varied.[157][x] As David Deutsch put it in 2009: "the search for hard-to-vary
explanations is the origin of all progress".[148]

An example here can be found in one of Einstein's thought experiments. The one of a lab suspended in
empty space is an example of a useful invariant observation. He imagined the absence of gravity and an
experimenter free floating in the lab. — If now an entity pulls the lab upwards, accelerating uniformly,
the experimenter would perceive the resulting force as gravity. The entity however would feel the work
needed to accelerate the lab continuously.[x] Through this experiment Einstein was able to equate
gravitational and inertial mass; something unexplained by Newton's laws, and an early but "powerful
argument for a generalised postulate of relativity".[158]

The feature, which suggests reality, is always some kind of invariance of a structure
independent of the aspect, the projection.
 — Max Born, 'Physical Reality' (1953), 149 — as quoted by Weinert (2004)[147]
The discussion on invariance in physics is often had in the more specific context of symmetry.[157] The
Einstein example above, in the parlance of Mill would be an agreement between two values. In the
context of invariance, it is a variable that remains unchanged through some kind of transformation or
change in perspective. And discussion focused on symmetry would view the two perspectives as systems
that share a relevant aspect and are therefore symmetrical.

Related principles here are falsifiability and testability. The opposite of something being hard-to-vary are
theories that resist falsification—a frustration that was expressed colourfully by Wolfgang Pauli as them
being "not even wrong". The importance of scientific theories to be falsifiable finds especial emphasis in
the philosophy of Karl Popper. The broader view here is testability, since it includes the former and
allows for additional practical considerations.[159][160]

Philosophy and discourse

Philosophy of science looks at the underpinning logic of the scientific method, at what separates science
from non-science, and the ethic that is implicit in science. There are basic assumptions, derived from
philosophy by at least one prominent scientist,[D][161] that form the base of the scientific method –
namely, that reality is objective and consistent, that humans have the capacity to perceive reality
accurately, and that rational explanations exist for elements of the real world.[161] These assumptions
from methodological naturalism form a basis on which science may be grounded. Logical positivist,
empiricist, falsificationist, and other theories have criticized these assumptions and given alternative
accounts of the logic of science, but each has also itself been criticized.

There are several kinds of modern philosophical conceptualizations and attempts at definitions of the
method of science.[λ] The one attempted by the unificationists, who argue for the existence of a unified
definition that is useful (or at least 'works' in every context of science). The pluralists, arguing degrees of
science being too fractured for a universal definition of its method to by useful. And those, who argue that
the very attempt at definition is already detrimental to the free flow of ideas.

Additionally, there have been views on the social framework in which science is done, and the impact of
the sciences social environment on research. Also, there is 'scientific method' as popularised by Dewey in
How We Think (1910) and Karl Pearson in Grammar of Science (1892), as used in fairly uncritical
manner in education.

Pluralism
Scientific pluralism is a position within the philosophy of science that rejects various proposed unities of
scientific method and subject matter. Scientific pluralists hold that science is not unified in one or more of
the following ways: the metaphysics of its subject matter, the epistemology of scientific knowledge, or
the research methods and models that should be used. Some pluralists believe that pluralism is necessary
due to the nature of science. Others say that since scientific disciplines already vary in practice, there is
no reason to believe this variation is wrong until a specific unification is empirically proven. Finally,
some hold that pluralism should be allowed for normative reasons, even if unity were possible in theory.
Unificationism
Unificationism, in science, was a central tenet of logical positivism.[163][164] Different logical positivists
construed this doctrine in several different ways, e.g. as a reductionist thesis, that the objects investigated
by the special sciences reduce to the objects of a common, putatively more basic domain of science,
usually thought to be physics; as the thesis that all theories and results of the various sciences can or
ought to be expressed in a common language or "universal slang"; or as the thesis that all the special
sciences share a common scientific method.[y]

Development of the idea has been troubled by accelerated advancement in technology that has opened up
many new ways to look at the world.

The fact that the standards of scientific success shift with time does not only make the
philosophy of science difficult; it also raises problems for the public understanding of science.
We do not have a fixed scientific method to rally around and defend.

— Steven Weinberg, 1995[162]

Epistemological anarchism
Paul Feyerabend examined the history of science, and was led to deny that science is genuinely a
methodological process. In his 1975 book Against Method he argued that no description of scientific
method could possibly be broad enough to include all the approaches and methods used by scientists, and
that there are no useful and exception-free methodological rules governing the progress of science. In
essence, he said that for any specific method or norm of science, one can find a historic episode where
violating it has contributed to the progress of science. He jokingly suggested that, if believers in the
scientific method wish to express a single universally valid rule, it should be 'anything goes'.[166] As has
been argued before him however, this is uneconomic; problem solvers, and researchers are to be prudent
with their resources during their inquiry.[E]

A more general inference against formalised method has been found through research involving
interviews with scientists regarding their conception of method. This research indicated that scientists
frequently encounter difficulty in determining whether the available evidence supports their hypotheses.
This reveals that there are no straightforward mappings between overarching methodological concepts
and precise strategies to direct the conduct of research.[168]

Education
In science education, the idea of a general and universal scientific method has been notably influential,
and numerous studies (in the US) have shown that this framing of method often forms part of both
students' and teachers' conception of science.[169][170] This convention of traditional education has been
argued against by scientists, as there is a consensus that educations' sequential elements and unified view
of scientific method do not reflect how scientists actually work.[171][172][173] Major organizations of
scientists such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) consider the
sciences to be a part of the liberal arts traditions of learning and proper understating of science includes
understanding of philosophy and history, not just science in isolation.[174]
How the sciences make knowledge has been taught in the context of "the" scientific method (singular)
since the early 20th century. Various systems of education, including but not limited to the US, have
taught the method of science as a process or procedure, structured as a definitive series of steps:[178]
observation, hypothesis, prediction, experiment.

This version of the method of science has been a long-established standard in primary and secondary
education, as well as the biomedical sciences.[180] It has long been held to be an inaccurate idealisation of
how some scientific inquiries are structured.[175]

Traditional science education faced criticism for presenting an oversimplified, singular methodology that
overemphasized experimentation, ignored social context, and suggested automatic knowledge generation
through procedural steps.[181][182]

The scientific method no longer features in the standards for US education of 2013 (NGSS) that replaced
those of 1996 (NRC). They, too, influenced international science education,[181] and the standards
measured for have shifted since from the singular hypothesis-testing method to a broader conception of
scientific methods.[183] These scientific methods, which are rooted in scientific practices and not
epistemology, are described as the 3 dimensions of scientific and engineering practices, crosscutting
concepts (interdisciplinary ideas), and disciplinary core ideas.[181]

The scientific method, as a result of simplified and universal explanations, is often held to have reached a
kind of mythological status; as a tool for communication or, at best, an idealisation.[38][172] Education's
approach was heavily influenced by John Dewey's, How We Think (1910).[35] Van der Ploeg (2016)
indicated that Dewey's views on education had long been used to further an idea of citizen education
removed from "sound education", claiming that references to Dewey in such arguments were undue
interpretations (of Dewey).[184]

Sociology of knowledge
The sociology of knowledge is a concept in the discussion around scientific method, claiming the
underlying method of science to be sociological. King explains that sociology distinguishes here between
the system of ideas that govern the sciences through an inner logic, and the social system in which those
ideas arise.[μ][i]

Thought collectives
A perhaps accessible lead into what is claimed is Fleck's thought, echoed in Kuhn's concept of normal
science. According to Fleck, scientists' work is based on a thought-style, that cannot be rationally
reconstructed. It gets instilled through the experience of learning, and science is then advanced based on a
tradition of shared assumptions held by what he called thought collectives. Fleck also claims this
phenomenon to be largely invisible to members of the group.[188]

Comparably, following the field research in an academic scientific laboratory by Latour and Woolgar,
Karin Knorr Cetina has conducted a comparative study of two scientific fields (namely high energy
physics and molecular biology) to conclude that the epistemic practices and reasonings within both
scientific communities are different enough to introduce the concept of "epistemic cultures", in
contradiction with the idea that a so-called "scientific method" is unique and a unifying concept.[189][z]
Situated cognition and relativism
On the idea of Fleck's thought collectives sociologists built the concept of situated cognition: that the
perspective of the researcher fundamentally affects their work; and, too, more radical views.

Norwood Russell Hanson, alongside Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, extensively explored the
theory-laden nature of observation in science. Hanson introduced the concept in 1958, emphasizing that
observation is influenced by the observer's conceptual framework. He used the concept of gestalt to show
how preconceptions can affect both observation and description, and illustrated this with examples like
the initial rejection of Golgi bodies as an artefact of staining technique, and the differing interpretations
of the same sunrise by Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler. Intersubjectivity led to different
conclusions.[112][d]

Kuhn and Feyerabend acknowledged Hanson's pioneering work,[193][194] although Feyerabend's views on
methodological pluralism were more radical. Criticisms like those from Kuhn and Feyerabend prompted
discussions leading to the development of the strong programme, a sociological approach that seeks to
explain scientific knowledge without recourse to the truth or validity of scientific theories. It examines
how scientific beliefs are shaped by social factors such as power, ideology, and interests.

The postmodernist critiques of science have themselves been the subject of intense controversy. This
ongoing debate, known as the science wars, is the result of conflicting values and assumptions between
postmodernist and realist perspectives. Postmodernists argue that scientific knowledge is merely a
discourse, devoid of any claim to fundamental truth. In contrast, realists within the scientific community
maintain that science uncovers real and fundamental truths about reality. Many books have been written
by scientists which take on this problem and challenge the assertions of the postmodernists while
defending science as a legitimate way of deriving truth.[195]

Limits of method

Role of chance in discovery

Somewhere between 33% and 50% of all scientific discoveries are estimated to have been stumbled upon,
rather than sought out. This may explain why scientists so often express that they were lucky.[9] Scientists
themselves in the 19th and 20th century acknowledged the role of fortunate luck or serendipity in
discoveries.[10] Louis Pasteur is credited with the famous saying that "Luck favours the prepared mind",
but some psychologists have begun to study what it means to be 'prepared for luck' in the scientific
context. Research is showing that scientists are taught various heuristics that tend to harness chance and
the unexpected.[9][197] This is what Nassim Nicholas Taleb calls "Anti-fragility"; while some systems of
investigation are fragile in the face of human error, human bias, and randomness, the scientific method is
more than resistant or tough – it actually benefits from such randomness in many ways (it is anti-fragile).
Taleb believes that the more anti-fragile the system, the more it will flourish in the real world.[198]

Psychologist Kevin Dunbar says the process of discovery often starts with researchers finding bugs in
their experiments. These unexpected results lead researchers to try to fix what they think is an error in
their method. Eventually, the researcher decides the error is too persistent and systematic to be a
coincidence. The highly controlled, cautious, and curious aspects of the scientific method are thus what
make it well suited for identifying such persistent systematic
errors. At this point, the researcher will begin to think of
theoretical explanations for the error, often seeking the help
of colleagues across different domains of expertise.[9][197]

Relationship with statistics

When the scientific method employs statistics as a key part of
its arsenal, there are mathematical and practical issues that
can have a deleterious effect on the reliability of the output of
scientific methods. This is described in a popular 2005 A famous example of discovery being
scientific paper "Why Most Published Research Findings Are stumbled upon was Alexander Fleming's
False" by John Ioannidis, which is considered foundational to discovery of penicillin. One of his bacteria
the field of metascience.[132] Much research in metascience cultures got contaminated with mould in
seeks to identify poor use of statistics and improve its use, an which surroundings the bacteria had died
off; thereby the method of discovery was
example being the misuse of p-values.[199]
simply knowing what to look out for.[196]
The points raised are both statistical and economical.
Statistically, research findings are less likely to be true when
studies are small and when there is significant flexibility in study design, definitions, outcomes, and
analytical approaches. Economically, the reliability of findings decreases in fields with greater financial
interests, biases, and a high level of competition among research teams. As a result, most research
findings are considered false across various designs and scientific fields, particularly in modern
biomedical research, which often operates in areas with very low pre- and post-study probabilities of
yielding true findings. Nevertheless, despite these challenges, most new discoveries will continue to arise
from hypothesis-generating research that begins with low or very low pre-study odds. This suggests that
expanding the frontiers of knowledge will depend on investigating areas outside the mainstream, where
the chances of success may initially appear slim.[132]

Science of complex systems

Science applied to complex systems can involve elements such as transdisciplinarity, systems theory,
control theory, and scientific modelling.

In general, the scientific method may be difficult to apply stringently to diverse, interconnected systems
and large data sets. In particular, practices used within Big data, such as predictive analytics, may be
considered to be at odds with the scientific method,[200] as some of the data may have been stripped of
the parameters which might be material in alternative hypotheses for an explanation; thus the stripped
data would only serve to support the null hypothesis in the predictive analytics application. Fleck (1979),
pp. 38–50 notes "a scientific discovery remains incomplete without considerations of the social practices
that condition it".[201]
Relationship with mathematics
Science is the process of gathering, comparing, and evaluating proposed models against observables. A
model can be a simulation, mathematical or chemical formula, or set of proposed steps. Science is like
mathematics in that researchers in both disciplines try to distinguish what is known from what is unknown
at each stage of discovery. Models, in both science and mathematics, need to be internally consistent and
also ought to be falsifiable (capable of disproof). In mathematics, a statement need not yet be proved; at
such a stage, that statement would be called a conjecture.[202]

Mathematical work and scientific work can inspire each other.[44] For example, the technical concept of
time arose in science, and timelessness was a hallmark of a mathematical topic. But today, the Poincaré
conjecture has been proved using time as a mathematical concept in which objects can flow (see Ricci
flow).[203]

Nevertheless, the connection between mathematics and reality (and so science to the extent it describes
reality) remains obscure. Eugene Wigner's paper, "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the
Natural Sciences", is a very well-known account of the issue from a Nobel Prize-winning physicist. In
fact, some observers (including some well-known mathematicians such as Gregory Chaitin, and others
such as Lakoff and Núñez) have suggested that mathematics is the result of practitioner bias and human
limitation (including cultural ones), somewhat like the post-modernist view of science.[204]

George Pólya's work on problem solving,[205] the construction of mathematical proofs, and
heuristic[206][207] show that the mathematical method and the scientific method differ in detail, while
nevertheless resembling each other in using iterative or recursive steps.

Mathematical method Scientific method

1 Understanding Characterization from experience and observation

2 Analysis Hypothesis: a proposed explanation

3 Synthesis Deduction: prediction from the hypothesis

4 Review/Extend Test and experiment

In Pólya's view, understanding involves restating unfamiliar definitions in your own words, resorting to
geometrical figures, and questioning what we know and do not know already; analysis, which Pólya takes
from Pappus,[208] involves free and heuristic construction of plausible arguments, working backward
from the goal, and devising a plan for constructing the proof; synthesis is the strict Euclidean exposition
of step-by-step details[209] of the proof; review involves reconsidering and re-examining the result and the
path taken to it.

Building on Pólya's work, Imre Lakatos argued that mathematicians actually use contradiction, criticism,
and revision as principles for improving their work.[210][ν] In like manner to science, where truth is
sought, but certainty is not found, in Proofs and Refutations, what Lakatos tried to establish was that no
theorem of informal mathematics is final or perfect. This means that, in non-axiomatic mathematics, we
should not think that a theorem is ultimately true, only that no counterexample has yet been found. Once
a counterexample, i.e. an entity contradicting/not explained by the theorem is found, we adjust the
theorem, possibly extending the domain of its validity. This is a continuous way our knowledge
accumulates, through the logic and process of proofs and refutations. (However, if axioms are given for a
branch of mathematics, this creates a logical system —Wittgenstein 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
5.13; Lakatos claimed that proofs from such a system were tautological, i.e. internally logically true, by
rewriting forms, as shown by Poincaré, who demonstrated the technique of transforming tautologically
true forms (viz. the Euler characteristic) into or out of forms from homology,[211] or more abstractly, from
homological algebra.[212][213][ν]

Lakatos proposed an account of mathematical knowledge based on Polya's idea of heuristics. In Proofs
and Refutations, Lakatos gave several basic rules for finding proofs and counterexamples to conjectures.
He thought that mathematical 'thought experiments' are a valid way to discover mathematical conjectures
and proofs.[215]

Gauss, when asked how he came about his theorems, once replied "durch planmässiges Tattonieren"
(through systematic palpable experimentation).[216]

See also
Empirical limits in science – Idea that knowledge comes only/mainly from sensory
experience
Evidence-based practices – Pragmatic methodology
Methodology – Study of research methods
Metascience – Scientific study of science
Outline of scientific method
Quantitative research – All procedures for the numerical representation of empirical facts
Research transparency
Scientific law – Statement based on repeated empirical observations that describes some
natural phenomenon
Scientific protocol
Scientific technique
Testability – Ability to examine a theory by experimentation

Notes
a. Book of Optics (circa 1027) After anatomical investigation of the human eye, and an
exhaustive study of human visual perception, Alhacen characterizes the first postulate of
Euclid's Optics as 'superfluous and useless' (Book I, [6.54] —thereby overturning Euclid's,
Ptolemy's, and Galen's emission theory of vision, using logic and deduction from
experiment. He showed Euclid's first postulate of Optics to be hypothetical only, and fails to
account for his experiments.), and deduces that light must enter the eye, in order for us to
see. He describes the camera obscura as part of this investigation.
b. Book of Optics Book Seven, Chapter Two [2.1] p.220: — light travels through transparent
bodies, such as air, water, glass, transparent stones, in straight lines. "Indeed, this is
observable by means of experiment".[96]
c. The full title translation is from Voelkel (2001), p. 60.
d. Kepler was driven to this experiment after observing the partial solar eclipse at Graz, July
10, 1600. He used Tycho Brahe's method of observation, which was to project the image of
the Sun on a piece of paper through a pinhole aperture, instead of looking directly at the
Sun. He disagreed with Brahe's conclusion that total eclipses of the Sun were impossible
because there were historical accounts of total eclipses. Instead, he deduced that the size
of the aperture controls the sharpness of the projected image (the larger the aperture, the
more accurate the image – this fact is now fundamental for optical system design). Voelkel
(2001), p. 61, notes that Kepler's 1604 experiments produced the first correct account of
vision and the eye, because he realized he could not accurately write about astronomical
observation by ignoring the eye. Smith (2004), p. 192 recounts how Kepler used
Giambattista della Porta's water-filled glass spheres to model the eye, and using an
aperture to represent the entrance pupil of the eye, showed that the entire scene at the
entrance pupil-focused on a single point of the rear of the glass sphere (representing the
retina of the eye). This completed Kepler's investigation of the optical train, as it satisfied his
application to astronomy.
e. Sanches and Locke were both physicians. By his training in Rome and France, Sanches
sought a method of science beyond that of the Scholastic Aristotelian school. Botanical
gardens were added to the universities in Sanches' time to aid medical training before the
1600s. See Locke (1689) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ([Link]
org/wiki/John_Locke#An_Essay_Concerning_Human_Understanding_(1689)) Berkeley
served as foil to the materialist System of the World of Newton; Berkeley emphasizes that
scientist should seek 'reduction to regularity'.[30] Atherton (ed.) 1999 selects Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume as part of the empiricist school.[31]
f. On Dewey's Laboratory school in 1902: Cowles 2020 notes that Dewey regarded the Lab
school as a collaboration between teachers and students. The five-step exposition was
taken as mandatory, rather than descriptive. Dismayed by the Procrustean interpretation,
Dewey attempted to tone down his five-step scheme by re-naming the steps to phases. The
edit was ignored.
g. The topics of study, as expressed in the vocabulary of its scientists, are approached by a
"single unified method".[35]: pp.8, 13, 33–35, 60 The topics are unified by its predicates, in a
system of expressions. The unification process was formalized by Jacques Herbrand in
1930.[46]
h. "no opinion, however absurd and incredible, can be imagined, which has not been
maintained by some of the philosophers". —Descartes[56]
i. "A leap is involved in all thinking" —John Dewey[66]
j. From the hypothesis, deduce valid forms using modus ponens, or using modus tollens.
Avoid invalid forms such as affirming the consequent.
k. The goal shifts: after observing the x-ray diffraction pattern of DNA,[79][78] and as time was
of the essence,[81] Watson and Crick realize that fastest way to discover DNA's structure
was not by mathematical analysis,[82] but by building physical models.[83]
l. Book of Optics Book II [3.52] to [3.66] Summary p.444 for Alhazen's experiments on color;
pp.343—394 for his physiological experiments on the eye[95]
m. The Sun's rays are still visible at twilight in the morning and evening due to atmospheric
refraction even when the depression angle of the sun is 18° below the horizon.[102]
n. In Two New Sciences, there are three 'reviewers': Simplicio, Sagredo, and Salviati, who
serve as foil, antagonist, and protagonist. Galileo speaks for himself only briefly. But
Einstein's 1905 papers were not peer-reviewed before their publication.
o. "What one does not in the least doubt one should not pretend to doubt; but a man should
train himself to doubt," said Peirce in a brief intellectual autobiography.[116] Peirce held that
actual, genuine doubt originates externally, usually in surprise, but also that it is to be sought
and cultivated, "provided only that it be the weighty and noble metal itself, and no counterfeit
nor paper substitute".[117]
p. The philosophy of knowledge arising through observation is also called inductivism. A
radical proponent of this approach to knowledge was John Stuart Mill who took all
knowledge – even mathematical knowledge – to arise from experience through induction.
The inductivist approach is still common place, though Mill's extreme views are outdated
today.[128]: 35
q. Hipparchus used his own observations of the stars, as well as the observations by Chaldean
and Babylonian astronomers to estimate Earth's precession.[129]
r. Isaac Newton (1727) On the System of the World condensed Kepler's law of for the
planetary motion of Mars, Galileo's law of falling bodies, the motion of the planets of the
Solar system, etc. into consequences of his three laws of motion.[130] See Motte's
translation (1846 ([Link]
hilosophy_(1846)/The_System_of_the_World))
s. The difference is approximately 43 arc-seconds per century. And the precession of
Mercury's orbit is cited in Tests of general relativity: U. Le Verrier (1859), (in French), "Lettre
de M. Le Verrier à M. Faye sur la théorie de Mercure et sur le mouvement du périhélie de
cette planète" ([Link]
Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l'Académie des sciences (Paris), vol. 49
(1859), pp.379–383.
t. ...simplified and (post-modern) philosophy [Link] Jr (2002), p. 33
u. ... and John Ioannidis, in 2005,[132] has shown that not everybody respects the principles of
statistical analysis; whether they be the principles of inference or otherwise.
v. For instance, extrapolating from a single scientific observation, such as "This experiment
yielded these results, so it should apply broadly," exemplifies inductive wishful thinking.
Statistical generalisation is a form of inductive reasoning. Conversely, assuming that a
specific outcome will occur based on general trends observed across multiple experiments,
as in "Most experiments have shown this pattern, so it will likely occur in this case as well,"
illustrates faulty deductive probability logic.
w. Occam's razor, sometimes referred to as "ontological parsimony", is roughly stated as:
Given a choice between two theories, the simplest is the best. This suggestion commonly is
attributed to William of Ockham in the 14th-century, although it probably predates him.[149]
x. Arthur Eddington, 1920: "The relativity theory of physics reduces everything to relations; that
is to say, it is structure, not material, which counts." — Weinert, giving the Einstein example
and quoting: "Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation (1920), 197"[147]
y. The topics of study, as expressed in the vocabulary of its scientists, are approached by a
"single unified method".[35]: pp.8, 13, 33–35, 60 A topic is unified by its predicates, which describe
a system of mathematical expressions.[165]: 93–94, 113–117 The values which a predicate
might take, then serve as witness to the validity of a predicated expression (that is, true or
false; 'predicted but not yet observed'; 'corroborates', etc.).
z. Comparing 'epistemic cultures' with Fleck 1935, Thought collectives, (denkkollektiven):
Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache: Einfǖhrung in die Lehre
vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv[190] Fleck (1979), p. xxvii recognizes that facts have
lifetimes, flourishing only after incubation periods. His selected question for investigation
(1934) was "HOW, THEN, DID THIS EMPIRICAL FACT ORIGINATE AND IN WHAT DOES
IT CONSIST?".[191] But by Fleck 1979, p.27, the thought collectives within the respective
fields will have to settle on common specialized terminology, publish their results and further
intercommunicate with their colleagues using the common terminology, in order to
progress.[192]

Notes: Problem-solving via scientific method

A. Twenty-three hundred years ago, Aristotle proposed that a vacuum did not exist in nature;
thirteen hundred years later, Alhazen disproved Aristotle's hypothesis, using experiments on
refraction,[13] thus deducing the existence of outer space.[14]
B. Alhazen argued the importance of forming questions and subsequently testing them: "How
does light travel through transparent bodies? Light travels through transparent bodies in
straight lines only... We have explained this exhaustively in our Book of Optics.[b] But let us
now mention something to prove this convincingly: the fact that light travels in straight lines
is clearly observed in the lights which enter into dark rooms through holes.... [T]he entering
light will be clearly observable in the dust which fills the air.[15]
He demonstrated his conjecture that "light travels through transparent bodies in straight
lines only" by placing a straight stick or a taut thread next to the light beam, as quoted in
Sambursky (1975), p. 136 to prove that light travels in a straight line.
David Hockney cites Alhazen several times as the likely source for the portraiture
technique using the camera obscura, which Hockney rediscovered with the aid of an
optical suggestion from Charles M. Falco. Kitab al-Manazir, which is Alhazen's Book of
Optics, at that time denoted Opticae Thesaurus, Alhazen Arabis, was translated from
Arabic into Latin for European use as early as 1270. Hockney cites Friedrich Risner's
1572 Basle edition of Opticae Thesaurus. Hockney quotes Alhazen as the first clear
description of the camera obscura.[16]
C. In the inquiry-based education paradigm, the stage of "characterization, observation,
definition, ..." is more briefly summed up under the rubric of a Question. The question at
some stage might be as basic as the 5Ws, or is this answer true?, or who else might know
this?, or can I ask them?, and so forth. The questions of the inquirer spiral until the goal is
reached.
D. Never fail to recognize an idea ([Link]
onthly_Volume_12.djvu/300)... .— C. S. Peirce, ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE LOGIC OF
SCIENCE, SECOND PAPER. —HOW TO MAKE OUR IDEAS CLEAR. Popular Science
Monthly Volume 12, January 1878, p.286[68]
E. Peirce (1899) First rule of logic (F.R.L)[82] Paragraph 1.136: From the first rule of logic, if we
truly desire the goal of the inquiry we are not to waste our resources.[81][139] — Terence Tao
wrote on the matter that not all approaches can be regarded as "equally suitable and
deserving of equal resources" because such positions would "sap mathematics of its sense
of direction and purpose".[167]

i. Sabra (2007) recounts how Kamāl al-Dīn al-Fārisī came by his manuscript copy of Alhacen's
Book of Optics, which by then was some two centuries old: al-Fārisī's project was to write an
advanced optics treatise, but he could not understand optical refraction using his best
resources. His mentor, Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi recalled having seen Alhacen's manuscript as
a youth, and arranged to get al-Fārisī a copy "from a distant country". al-Fārisī is now
 remembered for his Commentary on Alhacen's Book of Optics in which he found a
satisfactory explanation for the phenomenon of the rainbow: light rays from the sun are
doubly refracted within the raindrops in the air, back to the observer.[187] Refraction of the
colors from the sun's light then forms the spread of colors in the rainbow.

Notes: Philosophical expressions of method

α. His assertions in the Opus Majus that "theories supplied by reason should be verified by
sensory data, aided by instruments, and corroborated by trustworthy witnesses"[19] were
(and still are) considered "one of the first important formulations of the scientific method on
record".[20]
β. ...an experimental approach was advocated by Galileo in 1638 with the publication of Two
New Sciences.[28]
γ. Popper, in his 1963 publication of Conjectures and Refutations argued that merely Trial and
Error can stand to be called a 'universal method'.[36]
δ. Lee Smolin, in his 2013 essay "There Is No Scientific Method",[37] espouses two ethical
principles. Firstly: "we agree to tell the truth and we agree to be governed by rational
argument from public evidence". And secondly, that ..."when the evidence is not sufficient to
decide from rational argument, whether one point of view is right or another point of view is
right, we agree to encourage competition and diversification". Thus echoing Popper (1963),
p. viii
ε. The machinery of the mind can only transform knowledge, but never originate it, unless it be
fed with facts of observation. —C.S. Peirce[68]
ζ. "At the heart of science is an essential balance between two seemingly contradictory
attitudes—an openness to new ideas, no matter how bizarre or counterintuitive, and the
most ruthlessly skeptical scrutiny of all ideas, old and new. This is how deep truths are
winnowed from deep nonsense." — Carl Sagan[114]
η. The scientific method requires testing and validation a posteriori before ideas are
accepted.[85]
θ. Friedel Weinert in The Scientist as Philosopher (2004) noted the theme of invariance as a
fundamental aspect of a scientific account of reality in many writings from around 1900
onward, such as works by Henri Poincaré (1902), Ernst Cassirer (1920), Max Born (1949
and 1953), Paul Dirac (1958), Olivier Costa de Beauregard (1966), Eugene Wigner (1967),
Lawrence Sklar (1974), Michael Friedman (1983), John D. Norton (1992), Nicholas Maxwell
(1993), Alan Cook (1994), Alistair Cameron Crombie (1994), Margaret Morrison (1995),
Richard Feynman (1997), Robert Nozick (2001), and Tim Maudlin (2002).[147] — Deutsch in
a 2009 TED talk proclaimed that "the search for hard-to-vary explanations is the origin of all
progress".[148]
ι. Differing accounts of which elements constitute a good theory:
Kuhn (1977) identified: accuracy; consistency (both internal and with other relevant
currently accepted theories); scope (its consequences should extend beyond the data it
is required to explain); simplicity (organizing otherwise confused and isolated
phenomena); fruitfulness (for further research);[145]
Colyvan (2001) listed simplicity/parsimony, unificatory/explanatory power,
boldness/fruitfulness, and elegance;[146]
Weinert (2004) noted the recurring theme of invariance;[θ]
Hawking (2010): simplicity/parsimony, unificatory/explanatory power, and elegance, but
did not mention fruitfulness.[118]
κ. ...Hawking & Mlodinow on criteria for a good theory: "The above criteria are obviously
subjective. Elegance, for example, is not something easily measured, but it is highly prized
among scientists." The idea of 'too baroque' is connected to 'simplicity': "a theory jammed
with fudge factors is not very elegant. To paraphrase Einstein, a theory should be as simple
as possible, but not simpler".[118] See also:[149]
λ. There is no universally agreed upon definition of the method of science. This was expressed
with Neurath's boat already in 1913. There is however a consensus that stating this
somewhat nihilistic assertion without introduction and in too unexpected a fashion is
counterproductive, confusing, and can even be damaging. There may never be one, too. As
Weinberg described it in 1995:[162]

The fact that the standards of scientific success shift with time does not only make
the philosophy of science difficult; it also raises problems for the public
understanding of science. We do not have a fixed scientific method to rally around
and defend.

μ. "The sociology of knowledge is concerned with "the relationship between human thought
and the social context in which it arises."[185] So, on this reading, the sociology of science
may be taken to be considered with the analysis of the social context of scientific thought.
But scientific thought, most sociologists concede, is distinguished from other modes of
thought precisely by virtue of its immunity from social determination — insofar as it is
governed by reason rather than by tradition, and insofar as it is rational it escapes
determination by "non-logical" social forces." — M. D. King leading into his article on
Reason, tradition, and the progressiveness of science (1971)[186]
ν. Stillwell's review (p. 381) of Poincaré's efforts on the Euler characteristic notes that it took
five iterations for Poincaré to arrive at the Poincaré homology sphere.[214]

References

Footnotes
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itself is on pp. 371–946). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 791–796 ("Rules of
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5. Popper (1959), p. 273.
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(AAAS 2000:18). The claim here is that science has general principles that must be
mastered to increase productivity and enhance perspective, not that these principles provide
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critique of Ptolemy's books Almagest, Planetary Hypotheses, and Ptolemy's Theory of
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33. Thurs (2011).
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up as yet more of the proverbial 'flogging a dead horse'. We beg to differ. ... We shall claim
that Feyerabend did endorse various scientific values, did accept rules of method (on a
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the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical
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these, one is wandering around in a dark labyrinth." – Galileo Galilei, Il Saggiatore (The
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thing needful for learning the truth, and that is a hearty and active desire to learn what is
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realized that in Pauling's model, DNA's phosphate groups had to be un-ionized. But DNA is
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65. Einstein, Albert (1949). The World as I See It. New York: Philosophical Library. pp. 24–28.
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72. Judson (1979), pp. 137–138: "Watson did enough work on Tobacco mosaic virus to produce
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occasion of a total eclipse of the sun would afford favorable conditions for testing Einstein's
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expedition to the island of Principe yielded a set of photographs, which, when compared to
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pattern of a helical structure. But additional questions remained, requiring additional
iterations of their research. For example, the number of strands in the backbone of the helix
(Crick suspected 2 strands, but cautioned Watson to examine that more critically), the
location of the base pairs (inside the backbone or outside the backbone), etc. One key point
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Further reading
Bauer, Henry H., Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method, University of Illinois
Press, Champaign, IL, 1992
Beveridge, William I.B., The Art of Scientific Investigation, Heinemann, Melbourne, Australia,
1950.
Bernstein, Richard J., Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis,
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1983.
Brody, Baruch A. and Capaldi, Nicholas, Science: Men, Methods, Goals: A Reader: Methods of
Physical Science ([Link] Archived ([Link]
[Link]/web/20230413233902/[Link]
2023-04-13 at the Wayback Machine, W.A. Benjamin, 1968
Brody, Baruch A. and Grandy, Richard E., Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 2nd edition,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1989.
Burks, Arthur W., Chance, Cause, Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Scientific Evidence,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1977.
Chalmers, Alan, What Is This Thing Called Science?. Queensland University Press and Open
University Press, 1976.
Crick, Francis (1988), What Mad Pursuit: A Personal View of Scientific Discovery, New York:
Basic Books, ISBN 978-0-465-09137-9.
Crombie, A.C. (1953), Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100–1700,
Oxford: Clarendon
Earman, John (ed.), Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of
Science, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA, 1992.
Fraassen, Bas C. van, The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980.
Franklin, James (2009), What Science Knows: And How It Knows It, New York: Encounter
Books, ISBN 978-1-59403-207-3.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Reason in the Age of Science, Frederick G. Lawrence (trans.), MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981.
Giere, Ronald N. (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science, vol. 15 in 'Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science', University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1992.
Hacking, Ian, Representing and Intervening, Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural
Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
Heisenberg, Werner, Physics and Beyond, Encounters and Conversations, A.J. Pomerans
(trans.), Harper and Row, New York, 1971, pp. 63–64.
Holton, Gerald, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein, 1st edition 1973,
revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988.
Karin Knorr Cetina, Knorr Cetina, Karin (1999). Epistemic cultures: how the sciences make
knowledge. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-25894-
5.
Kuhn, Thomas S., The Essential Tension, Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1977.
Latour, Bruno, Science in Action, How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.
Losee, John, A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1972. 2nd edition, 1980.
Maxwell, Nicholas, The Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New Conception of Science,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. Paperback 2003.
Maxwell, Nicholas, Understanding Scientific Progress ([Link]
[Link]) Archived ([Link]
org/web/20180220210819/[Link]
[Link]) 2018-02-20 at the Wayback Machine, Paragon House,
St. Paul, Minnesota, 2017.
McComas, William F., ed. (1998). "The Principal Elements of the Nature of Science: Dispelling
the Myths" ([Link]
[Link]) (PDF). The Nature of Science in Science Education. Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 53–70. Archived from the original ([Link]
ase/[Link]) (PDF) on 2014-07-01.
Misak, Cheryl J., Truth and the End of Inquiry, A Peircean Account of Truth, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1991.
Oreskes, Naomi, "Masked Confusion: A trusted source of health information misleads the public
by prioritizing rigor over reality", Scientific American, vol. 329, no. 4 (November 2023),
pp. 90–91.
Piattelli-Palmarini, Massimo (ed.), Language and Learning, The Debate between Jean Piaget
and Noam Chomsky, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980.
Popper, Karl R., Unended Quest, An Intellectual Autobiography, Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1982.
Putnam, Hilary, Renewing Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992.
Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,
1979.
Salmon, Wesley C., Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, MN, 1990.
Shimony, Abner, Search for a Naturalistic World View: Vol. 1, Scientific Method and
Epistemology, Vol. 2, Natural Science and Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1993.
Thagard, Paul, Conceptual Revolutions, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1992.
Ziman, John (2000). Real Science: what it is, and what it means. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

External links
Andersen, Hanne; Hepburn, Brian. "Scientific Method" ([Link]
entific-method/). In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
ISSN 1095-5054 ([Link] OCLC 429049174 ([Link]
[Link]/oclc/429049174).
Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley (eds.). "Confirmation and Induction" ([Link]
nf-ind). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002 ([Link]
sn/2161-0002). OCLC 37741658 ([Link]
Scientific method ([Link] at PhilPapers
Scientific method ([Link] at the Indiana Philosophy
 Ontology Project
An Introduction to Science: Scientific Thinking and a scientific method ([Link]
[Link]/esp/files/[Link]) Archived ([Link]
49/[Link] 2018-01-01 at the Wayback
Machine by Steven D. Schafersman.
Introduction to the scientific method ([Link]
[Link]) at the University of Rochester
The scientific method from a philosophical perspective ([Link]
YmafclMpBKM)
Theory-ladenness ([Link] by Paul Newall at The
Galilean Library
Lecture on Scientific Method by Greg Anderson ([Link]
32/[Link]
(archived 28 April 2006)
Using the scientific method for designing science fair projects ([Link]
[Link]/scientific_method.html)
Scientific Methods an online book by Richard D. Jarrard ([Link]
ci/[Link])
Richard Feynman on the Key to Science ([Link]
0) (one minute, three seconds), from the Cornell Lectures.
Lectures on the Scientific Method ([Link]
[Link]/2010/03/14/what-it-means-to-be-scientifically-proven/) by Nick Josh Karean, Kevin
Padian, Michael Shermer and Richard Dawkins (archived 21 January 2013).
"How Do We Know What Is True?" (animated video; 2:52) ([Link]
v=Yk5IWzTfWeM)

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