DISEC Committee Guide Final
DISEC Committee Guide Final
Security Committee
COMMITTEE GUIDE
Addressing the growing concerns of the artificial intelligence arms race and
cyber-warfare
DISEC deals with some of the most imminent threats to international security, and
this conference, the agenda deals with artificial intelligence arms and cyber-
warfare. The role that AI plays in modern warfare is increasing at an alarming rate,
with more and more autonomy given to deadly weapon systems. Taking into
account the current rate at which AI development is progressing, it doesn’t seem
long before fully autonomous weapons become widespread in the world’s
militaries.
However, there exist many concerns regarding this new technology. Most
prominent are the ethical ones, which question the amount of autonomy that a
machine should be given with regards to ending a human life. Then come the
massive threats to international peace and security. With the cost of human life
gone, there exists the possibility of deadly conflicts becoming almost
commonplace.
The latter part of the agenda deals with the issue of cyber-warfare. With a growing
dependency of the world on computers, militaries are beginning to store an
increasing amount of highly sensitive data on digital systems and platforms.
Cyber-warfare involves coordinated attacks that target a country’s vital digital
systems, including databases, sensitive files and power grids.
Fields such as these are only the beginning of a new era of warfare and deadly
conflict. As the primary organization for promoting world peace and co-operation,
the UN must lead the way in advocating and regulating the peaceful and
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constructive use of this potent new technology. At this year’s CIRSMUN
conference, it is up to the first committee to herald the world into the dawn of the
artificial intelligence age.
We look forward to constructive, quality debate over the two days of CIRSMUN,
and we can’t wait to see you there.
Directors – DISEC,
CIRSMUN ’23
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Contents
Letter from the Dias .......................................................................................................... 1
Committee Procedures..................................................................................................... 4
Introduction to the First Committee .............................................................................. 5
The General Assembly .................................................................................................. 5
Functions of the General Assembly............................................................................. 5
The Disarmament and International Security Committee....................................... 5
Working of the First Committee ................................................................................. 6
Landmark Resolutions .................................................................................................. 6
Statement of the Problem ................................................................................................ 7
The Artificial Intelligence Arms Race ......................................................................... 7
Cyber-warfare................................................................................................................. 8
History and Discussion of the Problem.......................................................................... 8
A Brief History of Artificial Intelligence ..................................................................... 8
Autonomous Weapons ................................................................................................ 12
Cyber-warfare................................................................................................................ 18
Past Actions by International Agencies......................................................................... 21
Autonomous Weapons ................................................................................................ 21
Cyber-warfare............................................................................................................... 22
Country Positions ............................................................................................................23
Autonomous Weapons ................................................................................................23
Cyber-warfare................................................................................................................23
Resolutions ...................................................................................................................... 24
Citations ........................................................................................................................... 24
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Committee Procedures
The procedures for the Disarmament and International Security Committee are
the same as any other United Nations Body. You can find these rules of procedure
in the CIRSMUN ROP Guide.
Furthermore, as chairs of DISEC, we’d like to remind you of a few important rules
that you’ll have to follow during committee sessions. First and foremost, it is
expected that every delegate maintains a standard of decorum and respect in their
interactions with others during the conference. Any form of abuse, verbal or
physical, either towards a delegate or their representative country, will not be
tolerated. This may include any form of racism or hate-speech. A serious violation
of these rules may lead to the immediate removal of a delegate from their
committee. Unparliamentary language, whether in speeches (moderated or
unmoderated caucuses) or chits is unacceptable, and will be dealt with severely.
Another important thing that we’d like you all to keep in mind is that the primary
intention of Model UN is to come up with constructive, workable resolutions to
the various issues being discussed. To adhere to that objective, collaboration
between delegates is key. Although delegates are expected to maintain geopolitical
tensions between countries (more about this in the CIRSMUN ROP Guide), as well
as have a healthy competitive spirit, you are also expected to arrive at a fruitful
resolution through debate. For example, if an opposing bloc’s resolution contains
more practical, workable clauses than your own, you are encouraged to vote in
favor of it, even though it may not be authored by your bloc. This way, the
committee as a whole produces a much more productive resolution.
Finally, the use of any form of technology during formal debate is banned, in order
to ensure a level playing field for all the delegates. During unmoderated caucuses,
use of technology will be permitted, however, it is expected that the delegates use
their facilities solely for committee-related purposes. Any violations of this rule
will come with serious repercussions.
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Introduction to the First Committee
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Established in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly
serves as the primary functioning body of the United Nations. Comprising all of
the 193 member-states of the United Nations, it provides a platform for every
country to express its views and opinions on pressing international issues,
ensuring that the governance of our world does not rest in the hands of only a few.
In adherence to this objective, every nation in the General Assembly is given
exactly one vote. The General Assembly consists of six committees, each
specializing in their own fields. They are the Disarmament and International
Security Committee (GA-1), the Economic and Financial Committee (GA-2), the
Social, Cultural and Humanitarian Committee (GA-3), the Special Political and
Decolonization Committee (GA-4), the Administrative and Budgetary Committee
(GA-5), and the Legal Committee (GA-6). With the recommendations provided by
these six committees, the GA takes decisions on a wide variety of global issues.
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include threats to international peace, the widespread distribution of conventional
weapons, and the acquisition and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs). In order to further its objectives, there are six agenda items assigned to
the first committee: nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction,
disarmament aspects of outer space, conventional weapons, regional disarmament
and security, other disarmament measures and international security, and the
disarmament machinery.
The first committee also has two main bodies reporting to it: the Geneva-based
Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission. In addition
to this, non-governmental organizations and other experts in the field can speak
and contribute, albeit without voting rights, at committee sessions, in order to
provide their valuable insights on the topics at hand.
The first committee normally meets and finishes its work from the months of
September through December. The sessions of the first committee are divided into
three distinct stages: general debate, thematic discussions and actions on drafts. In
recent years, there has been a push towards reforming the organization and work
of the first committee, and efforts are being made to ensure that the committee is
as productive as can be.
With regards to voting, most votes are decided by a simple majority (50+1). For
more important matters, the committee adopts a two-thirds majority.
The first committee is also the only one in the General Assembly which is entitled
to verbatim record coverage, in which reporters make records of committee
proceedings and speeches delivered by delegates, using audio recordings and
written statements for reference.
LANDMARK RESOLUTIONS
Over the course of its history, the first committee has passed a number of
important resolutions. These include the first resolution passed by the General
Assembly, “Establishment of a Committee to Deal with the Problems Raised by the
Discovery of Atomic Energy” (1946), as well as “General and Complete
Disarmament” (1959), the first resolution to be co-sponsored by every member-
state of the UN at the time.
Like all other bodies of the United Nations (bar the Security Council), the first
committee cannot pass binding resolutions. This means that the clauses in its
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resolutions cannot include words like “requires” and “compels”. Instead, it can only
send its resolutions as recommendations to its member-states.
An “arms race” occurs when two or more countries constantly compete with each
other to gain an upper hand in their weaponry and military technology. A famous
example, possibly the most impactful in history, is the Cold War between the
United States and the former Soviet Union. Lasting from roughly after the Second
World War all the way to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it saw
unprecedented developments in weapon technologies. A few notable examples are
supersonic jet-powered aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), air-to-air missiles (AAMs), advanced diesel- and
nuclear-powered submarines, and hydrogen bombs.
Today, one of the most prominent threats to international security is a new arms
race in artificial intelligence-based weaponry. This race is primarily concerned
with the development and effective usage of lethal autonomous weapons systems
(LAWs).
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At the same time, autonomous weapons do have a positive side to them. From a
purely military standpoint, they are more efficient and less prone to mistakes than
conventional weapons with human operators. Many functions, such as targeting
and detonation, have become much more accurate with the development of AI
technology.
Another key point in favor of autonomous weapons is that it reduces the human
cost of war. Having an autonomous weapon in the field means soldiers can stay
well behind the frontlines, exposing themselves to less danger and thus reducing
the number of casualties. However, is this trade-off worth the cost? By saving the
lives of soldiers, are we inadvertently increasing the risk towards civilians and
other non-military parties? These are just some of the discussions that the first
committee will have to consider during the course of this conference.
CYBER-WARFARE
To fully understand the artificial intelligence arms race, we must first begin with
an understanding of what artificial intelligence actually is.
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Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, authors of one of the eminent textbooks on AI,
define artificial intelligence as the “study of intelligent agents that receive precepts
from the environment and take action.” An “agent” can be considered intelligent if:
The concept of “artificial intelligence”, sentient beings that possess the capacity to
think like humans, has been around for thousands of years. Mythology and lore
from various cultures around the world depict non-human beings who possess the
innate ability to think. There was also no dearth of artificial intelligence in science
fiction. In fact, the term “robot” itself was coined by Czech playwright Karel Čapek
in his 1920 play R.U.R (Rossum’s Universal Robots). Other notable examples
include Metropolis, which marked the first time an artificial humanoid was
portrayed in a movie, and the pioneering works of Isaac Asimov, such as I, Robot.
The first tangible research into artificial intelligence, however, began in the 1950s.
In 1950, the father of modern computing, Alan Turing, published one of the most
influential papers in early AI research. Titled “Computer Machinery and
Intelligence”, it introduced a test to determine whether or not a machine could be
considered as possessing “artificial intelligence.” Now known as the Turing test, it
works in the following way:
The test involves three parties: two humans and one computer. All three parties are
kept physically separate from each other, and are not allowed any form of contact
other than those required for the test. One of the humans is designated the
“interrogator”. The interrogator’s job is to ask questions to both the remaining
parties, and attempt to identify which one of them is the computer. If the computer
can successfully trick the human into believing that it is not a machine, Turing
hypothesized that it could be perceived as possessing artificial intelligence.
Through the test, Turing showed, at the time, what could be considered artificial
intelligence. However, the test could prove neither the feasibility nor the
practicality of artificial intelligence technology. In the 1950s, there was much
doubt about whether or not an algorithm-powered machine could actually
showcase near human-like intelligence. On top of that, there were more problems.
Computers in the 1950s weren’t nearly as advanced as what they are today. If a
person were to give them a problem, they could solve it, but they couldn’t store
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that data and retrieve it at a later time. Therefore, to create machines that could
adapt and solve any problem posed to it using previous data, computers had to be
radically scaled up. Even if the technology caught up, the price was still a problem.
Computers back then were ridiculously expensive, and only prestigious
universities or government-funded agencies could afford to buy or rent one.
A few major leaps forward would occur in the years to come. In 1952, Arthur
Samuel created the first checkers-playing program on the IBM 704. Although not
near the levels of the engines of today, the program possessed considerable skill
and accuracy. Five years after Turing’s paper, Alan Newell, Cliff Shaw and Herbert
Simon created the Logic Theorist, a program now widely considered to be the very
first AI program. Built using pattern recognition, it was made to prove
mathematical theorems, primarily similar to the ones in Bertrand Russell and
Alfred Whitehead’s massive work, Principia Mathematica. When tested for the first
time, it succeeded in proving 38 of the 52 theorems in the second chapter of the
book, providing much more rigorous proofs that Russell and Whitehead.
“…that every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle
be so precisely described that a machine can be made to stimulate it. An attempt
will be made to find out how to make machines use language, form abstractions
and concepts, solve kinds of problems now reserved for humans, and improve
themselves. We think that a significant advance can be made in one or more of
these problems if a carefully selected group of scientists work on it together for a
summer.”
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In spite of this, the conference went on to be known for quite a lot of things.
Firstly, it is widely regarded as the birthplace of the field of artificial intelligence.
In addition to that, the term “artificial intelligence” itself was coined during the
conference at New Hampshire. Many of the scientists that attended would also go
on to revolutionize the field of AI and computing.
After the birth of the field of AI, research regarding it would accelerate at a never-
before-seen pace. In 1958, John McCarthy created LISP (list processing), the
second-oldest high-level programming language in use today and the most used
language for artificial intelligence research. In 1959, Arthur Samuel coined the
term “machine learning” when he was working on a program that could play
games like chess against human beings.
In 1962, George Charles Devol, Jr and Joseph Charles Engelberger created the
Unimate, the first industrial robot in the world. Almost at the outset, automobile
manufacturers showed immense interest in the product, and it entered service
with General Motors, marking the first time a robot would work on an automobile
assembly line. A short while after, in 1961, James Robert Slagle, in his PhD thesis,
created a computer program called SAINT (Symbolic Automatic INTegrator) that
could solve symbolic integrals, problems in calculus that were roughly at the level
of a first-year college student.
Around this time, Joseph Weizenbaum released ELIZA, the first artificial chatbot.
Capable of conversing with humans in English, it was a pioneering invention in the
field of natural language processing (NLP).
In 1966, SRI’s Shakey the Robot became the first general-purpose robot, capable of
simple tasks like rearranging objects and route-finding. Above all, it was the first
robot that was able to be aware of its surroundings, and react accordingly.
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computer to beat a reigning world chess champion, when it beat Garry Kasparov in
a rematch after it lost the previous year.
Yet another exciting possibility is the integration of the latest chatbot technology
with the latest advancements in computer hardware. With humans gaining a
greater understanding of quantum computing, and building increasingly capable
quantum computers, the combination of the complexity of these AI models with
the amazing computational power of quantum computers may spell a future
unlike anything we’ve imagined.
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
The concept of LAWs was initially conceived to reduce the human cost of war.
Fighting with a weapon that required no human operator could greatly reduce the
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number of soldiers that died on the battlefield. The first “LAWs” to be employed in
large-scale combat were, in fact, landmines. They were weapons armed with
explosives and a detonator that would be set off by pressure, and when the
necessary amount was applied, the mine would trigger the explosives. From their
first wide-scale use in World War 2, they remain a potent weapon to this day.
Simple antipersonnel mines have now been developed into a number of variants,
including anti-tank and anti-ship mines. Technology to combat them has also
grown considerably. Minesweepers are present in almost every army in the world,
and they have become increasingly accurate at detecting these deadly explosives.
Computer-guided missiles such as the V-2 would only become more widespread as
the Second World War drew to a close. Owing to computing machines becoming
smaller and faster, several weapons with greater autonomy began to be developed
in during the latter half of the twentieth century. These systems have gotten highly
advanced over the years, and now include some of the world’s most advanced
weapons. Examples worth mentioning are the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile
system (SAM), the A-135 anti-ballistic system, the American Patriot and
Tomahawk missile systems, the AIM-7, AIM-9 and AIM-120 missiles, and the
Israeli Iron Dome.
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Another class of weapons that have become almost synonymous with autonomy,
albeit not showcasing complete independence from human control, are unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). UAVs are aircraft
that are guided autonomously or by remote control, and carry an array of sensors,
communication devices and often offensive ordnance. The earliest UAVs were
used mainly for testing, practice and surveillance, and provided a cheap,
expendable system that could be used in place of a human. The Vietnam War
(1955-1975) saw the first widespread use of UAV technology, with the Ryan AQM-
34 “Firebee” employed by the United States Armed Forces. It was instrumental in
providing crucial data to ground forces from deep inside enemy territory.
However, engineered in the 1960s, it came with its own limitations. It had to be
launched from the underside of a much bigger, manned Lockheed C-130 Hercules,
and its capabilities were limited to only reconnaissance. With advanced cameras
still a long time away, these drones were equipped with only a normal film camera.
At this time, another major player in the global scene was the State of Israel. After
the Yom-Kippur war, Tadiran Electronics Industries was tasked with developing an
unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicle for the Israeli Armed Forces. They would
engineer the Tadiran Mastiff, regarded the world’s first modern unmanned drone.
With a wingspan of around 4.25 meters, it could reach a maximum of 183 km/h
and stay in the air for around 7 hours. In response to this, Israeli Aerospace
Industries (IAI) developed the Scout, a drone comparable in performance to the
Mastiff. Both were inducted into the Israeli Armed Forces, and would see action
for the first time during the conflict in Lebanon (1982).
Its next advancement would come with the RQ-3 “Pioneer” and the RQ-5 “Hunter”,
two much more capable drones that were developed in collaboration with the
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United States of America. Once completed, these UAVs saw widespread use with
the militaries of both countries, most notably playing a part in the 1991 Persian
Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The most modern Israeli UAVs include the
IAI Heron and the Elbit Systems Hermes 900. The Hermes 900 is capable of flying
at 30,000 feet and carrying up to 300 kilograms of ammunitions, making it a lethal
force in any battlefield. It was used in active combat by Azerbaijan against
Armenia, in the 2020 skirmishes between the two countries.
The most recent advancement to drone technologies came with the optimization
of UAVs to carry and fire weaponry. Advanced drones like the IAI Eitan, General
Atomics MQ-1 Predator and the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper are capable of
flying at speeds roughly around 450 km/h, with a service ceiling of about 50,000-
55,000 feet. However, their mist defining advancement is their capability to carry
weaponry. The MQ-1 and the MQ-9 for instance, carry AGM-114 Hellfire missiles
on their missions, and their role has broadened to include drone strikes on specific
targets, in addition to reconnaissance. The two UAVs were deployed by the USAF
first in Iraq, then in Afghanistan, both to considerable effect. They have been
responsible for quite a number of definitive events, most notably over the course
of the conflicts in the Middle East, like the drone strike which killed Iranian IRGC
General Qassem Soleimani in 2020.
However, there have been multiple instances of drone strikes carried out on
wrongly identified civilian targets. For example, on August 29, 2021, an MQ-9
Reaper drone fired a Hellfire missile at what operators presumes was a building
housing an ISIS terrorist that they had been tracking. However, this information
turned out to be false, and 10 innocent civilians were killed, including 7 children.
Yet another issue raised by the development of drone technology its easy
accessibility and widespread proliferation. One has to keep in mind that armed
groups, including ones that are not organized or controlled by legitimate
governments, like terrorist organizations, do not need a million-dollar drone to
carry out attacks. Over the years, drone strikes have been carried out with
increasingly crude machines, like simply strapping a grenade onto a commercially
available drone (easily obtainable for a few thousand dollars) and dropping the
grenade over an enemy target. These factors mean that almost every major
military, along with a whole host of non-state actors (armed organizations not
controlled by a legitimate government) have access to drone technology.
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restricted to land. The earliest “UGVs” were developed during the Second World
War, with models like the Russian TT-26 and German Goliath entering service.
However, these vehicles came with their own limitations. For example, the Goliath
could be driven up to an enemy target and detonated remotely, but it would result
in the loss of the vehicle. And the TT-26, while possessing the capability to fire
weapons through remote control and return to base, had a host of other problems.
For example, if it wandered out of range of its remote controller (which was about
1 km), it would simply stop until contact was reestablished. It also lacked the
capability to transmit sound or audio back. The only conflict in which the
remotely operated tank saw action was the Winter War against Finland from
November 1939 to March 1940, and it became obsolete after just a brief period of
active service.
In the early 2000s, the US began deploying UGVs such as the Foster-Miller Talon
and Flir PackBot. Although initially utilized for EOD missions, the capabilities of
these UGVs have been improved to include reconnaissance as well as weapon
capabilities.
In recent times, the role of UGVs has grown to encompass EOD missions,
reconnaissance, combat support and logistics support. Advancements in robotics
and artificial intelligence have enabled UGVs to command a greater level of
autonomy, along with improving their mobility and situational awareness, greatly
increasing the complexity of the tasks they can perform and the environments they
can operate in. Some examples of advanced UGVs currently in deployment include
the American Multi-Utility Tactical Transport (MUTT) and the Russian Uran-9.
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Apart from these, a few other classes of autonomous weapons are worth noting,
these being autonomous naval systems and autonomous sentry robots.
Autonomous naval systems, as their name suggests, are being employed to
perform autonomous maritime duties. A good example of this would be the
American Sea Hunter. Autonomous sentry robots are bots that can perform duties
such as protecting an area and engaging potential threats (using lethal or non-
lethal means) autonomously. Some examples of these include the Samsung SGR-A1
and the IAI RoBattle.
One thing must be kept in mind, however. All of the weapon systems discussed
above, although able to almost completely eliminate human risk in certain military
operations, cannot be classified as fully autonomous weapons. This is due to one
simple fact: although they show a great level of autonomy, there is still a human
command involved in the process. For example, a cruise missile can target and
detonate autonomously, making complex calculations to determine its exact
position with respect to its target, but it still requires human authorization to be
fired in the first place. UAVs and UGVs can carry weapons, but they are controlled
by human operators. Noting this fact, let us move on to the topic of fully
autonomous weapons.
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becomes all the more complex. Also, the lack of a human commander or operator
has been brough into question. How can AI judge the necessity of a certain attack?
Can it possibly deliberate upon the morality of its decisions? Can it take into
account the consequences, long-term and short-term, of its actions? Again, the
question of accountability is brought up here as well.
The final issue is target identification. How accurately will an AI model be able to
identify targets? More importantly, if a target cannot be identified with certainty,
what will the algorithm do? Will if fire a lethal weapon based off a suspicion, or
will it risk letting a potential threat to international security go free?
Of course, after all this comes the issue of misuse. Taking into account the rapid
development of AI systems, as well as the widespread proliferation of cheap drone
and robotics technologies, it is not hard to imagine a future where almost every
non-state actor has access to autonomous weapons. Needless to say, the notion of
non-state actors gaining access to weapons capable of such destruction is
frightening, to say the least.
CYBER-WARFARE
Cyber warfare, according to Richard A. Clarke, a former US National Coordinator
for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism is "actions by a
nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes
of causing damage or disruption.” Although the term cyber warfare has always
been controversial. There have been several debates among professionals about
what actions specifically define cyber warfare.
Cyber-warfare has the potential to harm state and civilian infrastructures, which
could disrupt crucial functions, resulting in damage to the country or loss of life.
According to the cyber security and Infrastructure Security Agency, cyber warfare
aims to "weaken, disrupt or destroy" another nation.
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times. Cyber warfare programmes aim to accomplish a wide range of goals that can
be detrimental to national interests. These threats range from propaganda to
espionage to Distributed denial-of-service attack (DDOS).
There are many different types of cyberwarfare, but they all include either
destroying or destabilising vital systems. By undermining its fundamental systems,
the target nation is meant to become weaker. This means that cyberwarfare may
take an array of forms:
In 1988, Robert Tappan Morris made the first internet computer worm in history.
It is considered as one of the very first public attacks on computer systems and
also the oldest to be distributed via internet. The worm was created by Morris
simply to see if it could be done, and was released from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT). The worm took advantage of a number of
weaknesses in the targeted systems, including a flaw in the UNIX send mail
programs debug mode and a bug in the finger network service caused by a buffer
overflow. Additionally, it exploited weak passwords.
The worm was powerful despite not corrupting or erasing files. Important military
and academic operations slowed to a halt. Days went by before emails arrived. The
network community worked diligently to understand how the worm operated and
how to get rid of it. Some organisations deleted their entire system, while others
temporarily removed their PCs from the network. An estimated 6,000 PCs went
down and were rendered useless as a result of the worm exhausting their
computational power.
In 2010, U.S. designed Stuxnet, a powerful computer worm to disable a key part of
the Iranian nuclear program. It was a 500-kilobyte computer worm that infiltrated
numerous computer systems. It was the first cyber weapon intended for physically
attacking people. The Stuxnet virus attacked and entered more than fifteen Iranian
facilities. The nuclear facility in Natanz was one among the industrial
establishments that was impacted.
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When IAEA inspectors visited the Natanz facility, they saw that a strangely high
percentage of uranium enrichment centrifuges were breaking. At the time, it was
unknown as to what led to these errors. Later in 2010, Iranian technicians hired
Belarusian computer security experts to audit their computer systems. Eventually,
this security company located numerous malicious files on the Iranian computer
systems. It was later discovered that the Stuxnet worm was contained in these
malicious files. According to reports, 20% of the centrifuges Iran used to build its
nuclear weapons were destroyed by Stuxnet.
After conducting research, the U.S. government came to the conclusion that a
cyber-attack was to blame for the power outage in Ukraine that temporarily cut off
more than 200,000 people. In 2022, examples of cyberwarfare since the outbreak of
Russia's conflict with Ukraine include attacks on the communication networks of
the Kyiv Post and attacks on Ukraine's computer networks, preventing access to
financial services and power.
An IDF official claimed to the media in 2014 that Iran had carried out multiple
sizable attacks against Israel's internet infrastructure. In 2015, there was a
significant power outage that lasted 12 hours and affected 40 million people in 44
of Turkey's 81 regions. Ankara and Istanbul were two locations that experienced
outages. According to accounts, the power outage was caused by Iranian hackers,
probably members of the Iranian Cyber Army.
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These and various other examples demonstrate how cyberwarfare can be used to
project state authority beyond international borders in a way that harms another
state, community, or group of people. These attacks are significantly harder to
prevent off because the victim can't readily identify their perpetrator. Most of the
time it is impossible to know with absolute certainty who or what is behind the
cyber-attack. And even with concrete evidence, a State will typically just deny the
accusations.
In recent times, there has also been regular discussion on how to combat cyber
warfare. Since 2010, Annual war games are held by the Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, to
improve readiness and test out remedies to protect countries from cyber-attacks.
The Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act was signed into law
by President Donald Trump on August 2, 2017. New sanctions were placed on Iran,
Russia, and North Korea as a result of this law, which seeks to strengthen the
American information security programme and deter acts of cyber warfare.
Numerous NGOs have been vocal about their stance on the issue, advocating for
either a partial or complete ban on autonomous weapons. These NGOs include the
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the International Committee for Robot Arms
Control and Human Rights Watch.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has held numerous
discussions on autonomous weapons. Currently, they make several
recommendations to governments, including a ban on autonomous weapons that
target humans, as well as imposing several limits on the targeting capabilities of
these weapons.
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In addition to this, many countries have also passed internal legislations as well as
pushed for international action on the issue.
CYBER-WARFARE
Considering how new the topic of cyber security is, various approaches have been
taken depending on the nation. Overall, there hasn't been much of a coordinated
strategy to combat cyber-attacks and the fallout from them. This disjointed
response has led to the United Nations being delayed in addressing the fast-
developing problem of cyber security. The International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) is the UN institution tasked with handling the problem of cyber
security.
Through its Global Cyber security Agenda, the ITU, a specialised agency of the
United Nations, facilitates international cooperation to enhance cyber security
while promoting the harmonisation of technical standards for information and
telecommunications technologies. Although the ITU and its member nations
acknowledge that cyber security is a significant issue that must be addressed, they
only provide limited options for how to do so.
Evan though the UN and ITU have been slow in taking actions, they have
recommended certain significant measures to protect nations from cyber warfare.
The ITU Global Cyber security Agenda (GCA), which was introduced in 2007 by
the then-ITU Secretary-General Dr. Hamadoun I. Touré, is a framework for
international cooperation aimed at increasing security in the global
community. However, despite the GCA's efforts, there is still no worldwide
attempt to handle cyber security as a whole.
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Country Positions
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
Yet another group of countries have not made any official statements regarding
their positions on autonomous weapons. It is worth noting, however, that some of
these countries have heavily invested in AI weaponry and technology, so it remains
to be known what their government’s official stance on the matter is. These
countries include the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and China.
Finally, a group of nations have either expressed serious concern or called for an
outright ban of lethal autonomous weapons. These countries advocate for
international regulation that either closely monitors the development and use of
autonomous weapons, or in some cases, outright bans them. Countries that have
expressed concern regarding the issue include the Netherlands, Japan, New
Zealand and Sweden, while countries that have called for an outright ban include
Chile and Egypt.
CYBER-WARFARE
Under such circumstances, it may be possible to identify countries that are divided
into two blocs. The first one being western democracies and authoritarian
governments who will most likely be “pro cyber warfare” These nations will either
have engaged in or been perpetrators of cyber warfare, and they will view this
tactic as the future of modern warfare. This group of countries may include
countries like the United States of America, the UK, France, China, Syria, Egypt,
PAGE 23
Venezuela, and others. It will also be possible to identify nation that are ‘Anti
cyber warfare”. These countries may want to limit cyber warfare because they aim
to protect their people from other governments as well as the oppressive hand of
their own. These countries could include nations like New Zealand, Switzerland,
Denmark, and others.
Please note that this section is merely to provide an overview of the stances of the
world’s countries on the issue of autonomous weapons. This is not necessarily
how blocs in committee must be formed. Each delegate is also encouraged to do
much more in-depth research about their country’s stances.
Resolutions
As outlined above, countries broadly fall into three categories on the issue of
autonomous weapons – ones that call for regulated use, ones that call for an
outright ban, and ones that do not explicitly call for any international regulation.
The committee will be expected to balance these stances while developing a
framework that ensures that autonomous weapons do not threaten international
security in the future.
Citations
The citations and further reading page contains a list of links. From these various
sources, we have compiled this guide, although not all of the information has been
covered. Therefore, you are encouraged to go through all the links given below, as
it will aid you in your research. A note to all delegates. Wikipedia links are
given at the end of the list. Although it can be used as a starting point,
Wikipedia is not counted as a valid source. All information gained from
Wikipedia will have to be cross-verified with other sources.
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1. [Link]/assets/Peace-Rights-and-Security/Our-work-with-the-
UN/[Link].
2. [Link]
bly%20makes%20recommendations%20to,humanitarian%2C%20social%20
and%20legal%20matters.
3. [Link]
20(UNGA,Charter%20of%20the%20United%20Nations.
4. [Link]
5. [Link]
6. [Link]
7. [Link]
8. [Link]
9. [Link]
weapons-are-already-here/
10. [Link]
autonomous-weapons/
11. [Link]
weapons-
systems#:~:text=Its%20definition%20preserves%20the%202012,by%20a%20
human%20operator.%E2%80%9D%5B
12. [Link]
13. [Link]
[Link]#:~:text=A%20Turing%20test%20works%20with,give%20the%20res
ponse%20or%20not.x
14. [Link]
s/assets/PDF/[Link]
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15. [Link]
16. [Link]
17. [Link]
18. [Link]
artificial-intelligence-ai/?sh=4bb0932b6fba
19. [Link]
20. [Link]
21. [Link]
abstract/354818054?redirectedFrom=fulltext#no-access-message
22. [Link]
perspectives/
23. [Link]
and-human-control/
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[Link]#:~:text=Precursors%20of%20the%20weapon%20are,and%2
0the%20first%20Gulf%20War.
25. [Link]
26. [Link]
27. [Link]
28. [Link]
29. [Link]
aerial-vehicles-UAVs
30. [Link]
Edition-Archives/May-June-2017/Pros-and-Cons-of-Autonomous-Weapons-
Systems/
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31. [Link]
of-war
32. [Link]
[Link]
33. [Link]
34. [Link]
rise-and-long-fall-russias-military-robots/
35. [Link]
Edition-Archives/November-December-2019/Turner-UGVs/
36. [Link]
[Link]
37. [Link]
38. [Link]
future-of-ai-5-things-to-expect-in-the-next-10-years/?sh=6f94da417422
39. [Link]
27/how-can-ai-and-quantum-computers-work-together/?sh=703579386ad1
40. [Link]
artificial-intelligence-machine-learning-and-big-data/
41. [Link]
fora/ccw/2023/laws#:~:text=The%20meeting%20of%20the%20Group,and%
2015–19%20May%202023.
42. [Link]
43. [Link]
guided-combat-drone-swarm-in-gaza-attacks/
44. [Link]
autonomous-weapons
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45. [Link]
systems
46. [Link]
47. [Link]
third-revolution-warfare/620013/
48. [Link]
weapons-group-of-governmental-experts-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-
systems-2023
49. [Link]
50. [Link]
51. [Link]
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