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The document presents three game theory problems related to Nash equilibria and sequential games. Problem 1 involves determining the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a symmetric game with three players and unique actions. Problems 2 and 3 focus on strategies for emptying boxes and finding subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes in a sequential game, respectively.

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8 views1 page

Samples Games

The document presents three game theory problems related to Nash equilibria and sequential games. Problem 1 involves determining the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a symmetric game with three players and unique actions. Problems 2 and 3 focus on strategies for emptying boxes and finding subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes in a sequential game, respectively.

Uploaded by

f20230527
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

STEMvibe

Integral Cup 2026: Grand Prix


Sample Problems

Game Theory

Problem 1. Consider a symmetric simultaneous-move game with n = 3 players, each


choosing a pure strategy (an integer action) from the set {1, 2, 3}. The integer playoff
rule is defined as follows: if at least one action is chosen by exactly one player, the
player who chose the largest such unique action receives +1, and all others receive −1;
otherwise, if no unique actions exist, all receive 0. A pure-strategy profile (a1 , a2 , a3 ),
where each a1 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is a Nash equilibrium if no player can strictly increase their
payoff by unilaterally deviating to another action, Determine the total number fo pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in this game.
Problem 2. There are 2025 boxes containing 1, 2, . . . , 2025 chips, respectively. You may
choose any subset of boxes and subtract the same number of chips from each (selected)
box. What is the minimum numbers of moves you need to empty all boxes?
Problem 3. Aditya and Shubhojit are engaged in the following sequential game of perfect
information: Aditya moves first and chooses between Left and Right. If Aditya chooses
Left, the game ends with payoffs (0,2) (Aditya, Shubhojit). If Aditya chooses Right,
Shubhojit moves and chooses between Up and Down. If Shubhojit chooses Up, the
game ends with payoffs (1,0). If Shubhojit chooses Down, Aditya moves again and
chooses between Stop and Continue. If Aditya chooses Stop, payoffs are (0,0). If Aditya
chooses Continue, payoffs are (3,1). Using backward induction, determine the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
(a) Aditya chooses Left; payoffs (0,2)
(b) Aditya chooses Right; Shubhojit chooses Up; payoffs (1,0)
(c) Aditya chooses Right, Shubhojit chooses Down, Aditya chooses Stop; payoffs (0,0)
(d) Aditya chooses Right, Shubhojit chooses Down, Aditya chooses Continue; payoffs
(3,1)

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