We Need to Reprocess

Spent Nuclear Fuel,

And
Can
Do It P. Lesage/ AREVA

Safely, At Reasonable Cost

by Clinton Bastin

A veteran nuclear
R
eprocessing is the chemical separation of energy-usable Above: Spent
materials from used nuclear fuel. It permits full use of nu- nuclear fuel can be
reprocessing expert for clear materials that would provide a virtually inexhaust- reprocessed into
the U.S. government ible energy resource that does not add pollutants to the atmo- new fuel like this
mixture of uranium
recounts the little-known sphere. It is also needed to separate weapons-usable materials
and plutonium
from nuclear wastes so that the weapons-usable materials can be
history of America’s transmuted to non-weapons materials for beneficial use, and the
oxides, called MOX,
shown here at
successful reprocessing wastes disposed of without need for indefinite safeguards, which AREVA’s MOX
program, and the cannot be assured. fabrication plant in
Nuclear power plants in the United States and most nations use France. One gram of
unfortunate political less than 1 percent of the energy in nuclear materials. In the best MOX-recycled
decisions to thwart its possible reprocessing concept, essentially all of the products pro- plutonium generates
as much electricity
progress. duced in nuclear reactors could be recovered and put to benefi-
as one ton of oil.
cial uses.

10 Summer 2008 21st Century Science & Technology

 Decision-makers for every light water reactor built in the world
to date had the full expectation that spent fuel would be repro- Editor’s Note: This highly informed description of the fi-
cessed, the remaining energy values would be recycled for pro- asco which befell nuclear fuel reprocessing in the United
States, penned by one of the nation’s leading experts in the
duction of energy, and the weapons-usable plutonium would be
field, should be known to every American and every per-
destroyed in producing pollution-free electricity.
son interested in the future of mankind. The reader should
Reprocessing, integrated with mixed uranium-plutonium fuel also be aware of a point, not addressed in this article, that
fabrication in a well-designed, well-managed fuel recycle com- more advanced scientific techniques, such as plasma iso-
plex, would assure that weapons-usable materials would re- tope separation, based on new physical principles, will
main inaccessible until they were transmuted to non-weapons some day be applicable to both nuclear fuel enrichment
usable materials. Reprocessing and recycle are thus essential and reprocessing. Although these more modern methods
components of good nonproliferation practice. have not yet been brought to the development stage, that
I would like to explain how loss of reprocessing is largely the is only because of the continuing opposition to scientific
result of many years of mismanagement, misinformation, and innovation, which is part of the design for world popula-
misdirection by the Department of Energy and its predecessors, tion reduction and zero technological growth from pow-
erful political and financial forces.
beginning in 1944. I would also like to set the record straight
One of these methods, atomic vapor laser isotope sepa-
and make the case for restarting U.S. reprocessing on the suc-
ration (AVLIS), developed in the 1980s for uranium en-
cessful model of the Savannah River Plant, which was operated richment, was brought to fruition; a pilot facility was
for the U.S. government by DuPont, from 1950 to 1989. completed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
1997, which demonstrated industrial capability, using
Savannah River vs. the Laboratory Model full-scale hardware over a several-month period. But un-
The Savannah River Plant had a successful, safe, and efficient der privatization, the program was shut down on the basis
reprocessing history, on an industrial level, operated by the Du- that the old enrichment technology would provide larger
Pont Company (Bebbington 1990). DuPont had also successfully shareholder dividends in the immediate term. Another
managed reprocessing for the nuclear materials production pro- technology, the fusion plasma torch, conceived in the
grams of the Manhattan Project (Hewlett and Anderson 1972). 1960s, despite great promise, has met a similar fate.
Those experiences provide full assurances that reprocessing of
used fuels from nuclear power plants in the United States, and
those in other nations, could be done safely, successfully, cost- tists, DuPont left Oak Ridge to build and operate the Hanford
effectively, and without a credible threat of proliferation. Engineering Works in Washington, which included three large,
DuPont became involved in reprocessing in October 1942. canyon-type reprocessing plants.
Manhattan Project director, General Leslie Groves, recognized The plant design was called a “canyon” because of the very
that the complexities of reprocessing needed to support a large large—60 feet high, 700- to 1,100-feet long—thick-walled,
nuclear program would be a difficult challenge even to the most heavily reinforced concrete structure, in which remotely oper-
experienced chemical engineering organization. He asked E.I. ated and maintained equipment was installed at the bottom to
DuPont de Nemours and Company to design, build, and carry carry out the chemical processing. A large crane for rapid re-
out experiments in a reprocessing pilot plant, and to design, moval and replacement of failed equipment was at the top of the
build and operate production-scale reprocessing facilities. canyon, and there was room to move failed equipment out of
Manhattan Project scientists were disappointed with the deci- the canyon space. From above the processing equipment, the
sion to use industrial corporations. They believed that they had structure looks like a canyon.
earned the right to carry out their work to completion and were The canyons and processing equipment, piping, and instru-
able to do so. But most of these scientists had no experience op- ments were configured for safe and high capacity operation;
erating complex technology on an industrial scale. containment of radioactivity under all credible conditions, in-
Recognizing the importance of the Manhattan Project effort, cluding fires and explosions; good material accountability; rap-
DuPont accepted General Groves’s request, but insisted that Du- id, remote removal and replacement of failed equipment; and
Pont provide corporate management for the activity and engi- rapid move to full productivity after the start of operations.
neering design for major projects, similar to those for its commer- The “T” canyon at Hanford was operated safely, successfully,
cial activities. DuPont also requested that Manhattan Project and with minimal radiation exposure to workers to recover plu-
scientists who had developed reprocessing processes participate tonium from irradiated natural uranium by a precipitation pro-
in pilot plant experiments. cess (Hewlett and Anderson 1972).
The reprocessing pilot plant built at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, The “U” canyon was used shortly after World War II to recov-
was not configured for extended operation or maintenance; it er uranium not recovered earlier, using a solvent extraction pro-
was intended for only a few experiments to assure success in cess (Bastin A). The “B” canyon was used many years later to
scaling up for production facilities. After a few experiments to recover isotopes from nuclear waste.
confirm and improve process concepts developed by the scien- After the war, in 1946, the General Electric Company as-

21st Century Science & Technology Summer 2008 11

sumed responsibility for operations at Hanford, but did not pro- difficult during the initial attempt to start operations after com-
vide corporate management of the activity. Significant problems pletion of construction, in 1956, and resulted in a two-year delay
developed, particularly in the PUREX reprocessing plant. in operations. In 1972, Hanford PUREX was shut down because
(PUREX stands for Plutonium and Uranium Recovery by Extrac- it could not be operated without large releases of nuclear waste
tion.) Among the most severe problems was close coupling of to soils, which was then a violation of AEC rules (Bastin E).
process systems, which resulted in the plant taking a long time The Oak Ridge Pilot Plant. After DuPont left Oak Ridge, Man-
to reach full productivity after the start of operations. hattan Project scientists who had participated in experiments
There was also a lack of storage capacity for nuclear waste continued to operate the pilot plant and recovered 326.39 grams
generated during startup, which resulted in the need to dispose of plutonium (Jolley et al. 1994). However, the pilot plant manag-
of large amounts of nuclear waste to soils. This problem was most ers believed they had recovered several kilograms of plutonium.

Completing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The concept of used nuclear fuel as “nuclear waste” is a called waste that remains—2,500 metric tons—consists of
fiction created by the opponents of nuclear energy. Used nu- highly radioactive materials, but these are also usable. There
clear fuel isn’t waste at all, but a renewable resource that can are about 80 tons each of cesium-137 and strontium-90 that
be reprocessed into new nuclear fuel and valuable isotopes. could be separated out for use in medical applications, such
When we entered the nuclear age, the great promise of as sterilization of medical supplies.
nuclear energy was its renewability, making it an inexpensive Using isotope separation techniques, and fast-neutron bom-
and efficient way to produce electricity. It was assumed that bardment for transmutation (technologies that the United
the nations making use of nuclear energy would reprocess States pioneered but now refuses to develop), we could sepa-
their spent fuel, completing the nuclear fuel cycle by recy- rate out all sorts of isotopes, like americium, which is used in
cling the nuclear fuel after it was burned in a reactor, to ex- smoke detectors, or isotopes used in medical testing and treat-
tract the 95 to 99 percent of unused uranium in it that can be ment. Right now, the United States must import 90 percent of its
turned into new fuel. medical isotopes, used in 40,000 medical procedures daily.
This means that if the United States buries its 70,000 met- The diagram shows a closed nuclear fuel cycle. At present,
ric tons of spent nuclear fuel, we would be wasting 66,000 the United States has no reprocessing, and stores spent fuel
metric tons of uranium-238, which could be used to make in pools or dry storage at nuclear plants. Existing nuclear re-
new fuel. In addition, we would be wasting about 1,200 met- actors use only about 1 percent of the total energy value in
ric tons of fissile uranium-235 and plutonium-239, which uranium resources; fast reactors with fuel recycle would use
can also be burned as fuel. Because of the high energy den- essentially 100 percent, burning up all of the uranium and
sity in the nucleus, this relatively small amount of U.S. spent actinides, the long-lived fission products.
fuel (it would fit in one small house) is equivalent in energy In a properly managed and safeguarded system, the pluto-
to about 20 percent of the U.S. oil reserves. nium produced in fast reactors would remain in its spent fuel
About 96 percent of the spent fuel the United States is now until needed for recycle. Thus, there need be no excess build-
storing can be turned into new fuel. The 4 percent of the so- up of accessible plutonium. The plutonium could also be
fabricated directly into new reactor fuel assemblies to
be burned in nuclear plants.—Marjorie Mazel Hecht
(6)
Nuclear reactor
(5)
Back end
Fuel fabrication
of cycle
Recovered
(4) Plutonium
Enrichment Interim storage

(3)
Recovered
Conversion (7)
Uranium
Spent fuel reprocessing

(2)
Milling Recovered isotopes
from 3% high level waste

Front end (1)

of cycle Mining
Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan

Ninety-seven percent of spent nuclear fuel is reusable!

12 Summer 2008 21st Century Science & Technology

Relying on the statements by Oak
Ridge National Laboratory manag-
ers about their successful produc-
tion campaign in the Oak Ridge pi-
lot reprocessing plant, Atomic
Energy Commission managers
asked ORNL scientists and engi-
neers to direct the design, construc-
tion, and start-up operation of the
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant
(ICPP), which was configured like
the Oak Ridge pilot reprocessing
plant. The ICPP was built to repro-
cess all highly enriched uranium ir-
radiated in U.S. nuclear reactors, in-
cluding those operated at the
Savannah River Plant for production
of tritium for the weapons program. W.P. Bebbington, History of DuPont at the Savannah River Plant
Problems at the Idaho Plant were Aerial photo of the Savannah River Plant, which operated from the early 1950s until 1989.
apparent during early attempts at
start-up, in 1952. Ventilation filters to pre-
vent the release of radioactivity became
plugged and were removed. Productivity
for many years was only a few percent of
rated capacity. The American Cyanamid
Corporation had been selected to operate
the Idaho Plant, but realized that the facil-
ity could not be operated safely or success-
fully, and left. Phillips Petroleum Company,
which operated the Materials Test Re­ac­tor
at the Idaho site, agreed to operate the
Idaho Plant, but did not provide adequate
corporate management (Jolley et al. 1994).
W.P. Bebbington, History of DuPont at the Savannah River Plant

The Savannah River Success A “canyon” reprocessing building in construction at the Savannah River Plant operated
In 1950, President Harry S. Truman by DuPont. The key to the plant’s success was the industrial production methods which
focussed on safety and high capacity operation.
emphasized DuPont’s success in design,
construction, and operation of the Han-
ford Engineer Works in a July 25 letter requesting that DuPont canyons, reached full-capacity operation within a few weeks af-
design, construct, and operate the Savannah River Plant (Beb- ter completion of construction, reprocessing irradiated natural
bington 1990, Bastin C). uranium for production of plutonium for the weapons program.
Again, operations by DuPont were highly successful. The The plants used the PUREX system (see box, p. 14). Highly en-
Atomic Energy Commission reported that the company had riched uranium fuels irradiated in Savannah River reactors to
achieved the best-ever safety for both construction and operation produce tritium for weapons use were shipped to the Idaho
(USAEC 1975). Factors critical to successful operation in the Du- plant for reprocessing.
pont reprocessing plants were the plant configuration, equip- But by 1957, the low productivity of the ICPP resulted in large
ment and piping layout, type of equipment, remotability features, accumulations of irradiated highly enriched uranium fuels from
remote maintenance system, intersystem tankage, sampling sys- Savannah River reactors. To avoid a threat to tritium and nuclear
tems, ventilation, containment, safeguards and accountability, weapons production, a decision was made to increase the ca-
and so on. It was demonstrated that significant differences in pacity of the “F” reprocessing plant at the Savannah River Plant
these non-process components could make as much as two or- for reprocessing of natural and low enriched uranium fuels for
ders of magnitude difference in operability or unit cost of opera- production of plutonium, and to convert the “H” reprocessing
tions—and could in some cases preclude operations. plant to reprocess highly enriched uranium.
The two reprocessing plants at Savannah River, “F” and “H” In October 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission issued its

21st Century Science & Technology Summer 2008 13

summary report, “AEC Reference Fuel-Processing Plant (WASH used fuel of U.S. origin or from reactors supplied by the United
743),” which it presented as a model for nuclear power plant States (Bastin B).
fuel reprocessing. The model was based on the ORNL-built Ida-
ho Plant, which the report indicated had operated not at less The ICPP: A Failed Model
than 3 percent, but at 80 percent productivity—an overstate- The use and export of ICPP reprocessing technology also led to
ment by a factor of 30 (Bastin F)! The Atomic Energy Commis- the failure of commercial reprocessing in the United States, in-
sion proposed to use the ORNL/ICPP technology for reprocess- stead of the success it could have been, and to problems with re-
ing U.S. nuclear power plant fuels, and also began to transfer the processing worldwide. The failure of nuclear and political leaders
ORNL/ICPP reprocessing technology to many other nations, in- to recognize the difference between successful and failed repro-
cluding India (Bastin I). cessing led to the myth that reprocessing was a proliferation threat
Earlier, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, as the first sup- and should be deferred. Its deferral precluded responsible dispos-
ply of “Atoms for Peace,” had provided heavy water for use in al of nuclear wastes, an argument used to justify the long morato-
reactors supplied by Canada. These reactors were similar to the rium on new nuclear power plants in the United States.
one operated by Canada, under a mutual security agreement, to A good understanding of experience provides a basis for a
produce plutonium for U.S. nuclear weapons. Supply of the better approach for reprocessing that will lead to more viable
ORNL/ICPP reprocessing technology permitted recovery of the nuclear programs. Particularly important in reprocessing are:
plutonium produced in these reactors. India used its plutonium • differences between laboratory-type reprocessing and that
from one of these reactors for a nuclear explosive test, in 1974, needed for nuclear power,
and later for nuclear weapons (Bastin I). Supply of the ORNL/ • the basis for decisions that led to successful and unsuccess-
ICPP reprocessing technology also undermined America’s most ful reprocessing, and
important nonproliferation initiative, the policy for return of • the DuPont design for a “Spent LWR Fuel Recycle Com-

PUREX: How Reprocessing Works

Separation of uranium and plutoni-
um from high-level waste and from
each other in a nuclear fuel reprocess-
ing plant is accomplished using mixer-
settler chemical process equipment.
Think of this operation as like a bottle
of Italian dressing. The vinegar/water
mixture on the bottom simulates the ni-
tric acid/water solution of uranium,
plutonium, and fission products in the
feed to a mixer-settler. The salad oil on
top simulates the tri-butyl-phosphate/
kerosene mixture used to extract the
uranium and plutonium.
Add the proper chemicals to the ker-
osene (oil) in the top of the bottle, shake
thoroughly, and the plutonium and
uranium are extracted into the kero-
sene, leaving the fission products (high-
level waste) in the nitric acid/water at
the bottom of the bottle. Pour off the
kerosene containing the plutonium
and uranium, add some different chem-
W.P. Bebbington, History of DuPont at the Savannah River Plant
icals, then mix the kerosene with con-
centrated nitric acid. The plutonium is Looking down on a 60-foot high canyon cell, showing typical process vessels and
extracted into the nitric acid, leaving connectors that separate uranium and plutonium from spent fuel.
the uranium in the kerosene.
Simple. Except not so simple in a radiation field where ex- over a period of time, the radiation is reduced, and after a few
posure for about 20 seconds would be a lethal dose of radia- hundred years the process becomes almost as simple as de-
tion. As the short-lived fission products in spent fuel decay scribed here.

14 Summer 2008 21st Century Science & Technology

plex” that would have avoided access to, and accumula-
tions of, separated plutonium and resolved other prob-
lems and concerns (DuPont 1978).
The initial Atomic Energy Commission program for dis-
position of used nuclear power plant fuels was based on
receipt, storage, and reprocessing at Savannah River Plant
facilities, operated by DuPont (Bastin B). But some Atomic
Energy Commission officials promoted the concept identi-
fied in the Atomic Energy Commission Reference Fuel Re-
processing Plant, cited above (USAEC 1957). The Indus-
trial Reprocessing Group, composed of officials of early
nuclear power plant vendors and operators, and Davison
Chemical Company (a division of W.R. Grace and Com-
pany), with consultants from the Idaho plant, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, and Hanford (but not the Savannah
River Plant), endorsed the ORNL/ICPP concept, and com-
mercial reprocessing using this concept was initiated at
West Valley, N.Y., in a facility destined for failure.
Problems at West Valley began immediately after start-
up. Productivity of 30 percent was achieved, but process
losses and radiation exposures to workers were more than
a factor of 10 larger than those at the Savannah River
Plant, and final products often failed to meet specifica-
tions. During the sixth and final year of operation, average
radiation exposures to personnel were well above Federal
standards and rising, and the release of radioactivity to
surface streams exceeded technical specifications. In
1972, Atomic Energy Commission regulatory authorities
DOE
ordered a halt of operations (Low 1972).
Operations at the Idaho Plant, meanwhile, continued The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant was built on the model of the
at very low productivity, and by 1966, inventories of used Oak Ridge National Laboratory pilot plant, and was plagued with fail-
highly enriched fuels at Idaho approached the total stor- ures and low productivity. Here, a view of the interior of the ICPP.
age capacity. The Atomic Energy Commission carried out
a review for reprocessing of these fuels, and some of the fuels Gas-cooled Reactors, which required reprocessing. General
were reassigned to the Savannah River Plant and delivered there Atomics relied on the favorable fuel-cycle economics, based on
(Bastin C). However, ICPP operators published a “Multiple Fuels reprocessing in a conceptual plant designed by the ICPP techni-
Processing Program” report that showed an economic advan- cal staff. Federal funding of $30 million was provided for modi-
tage for reprocessing of certain highly enriched uranium fuels at fication of the Idaho Plant to permit demonstration of HTGR fuel
the ICPP, and the Atomic Energy Commission decided to con- reprocessing (Bastin C, D). (HTGR fuel consists of tiny particles
tinue operations there. of uranium, each encased in layers of graphite and special ce-
Subsequent annual Multiple Fuels Processing Program re- ramics; these fuel particles are then formed into rods or tennis-
ports showed attractive economics for reprocessing at the Idaho ball size “pebbles.”)
Plant (USAEC 1968 and ff.). In 1967, the Allied Chemical Com- In 1974, Allied Chemical and General Atomics officials
pany accepted responsibility for operation of the ICPP. Allied learned that:
Chemical managers reviewed the Multiple Fuels Processing • Statements of production in annual Multiple Fuels Process-
Program reports which had indicated attractive economics for ing Program reports, which indicated favorable economics for
reprocessing, and, in partnership with General Atomics Corpo- reprocessing at the Idaho Plant, were overstated by a factor of 5
ration, as Allied General Nuclear Services (AGNS), decided to (Bastin F).
build the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel (reprocessing) Plant in South • The costs of the conceptual HTGR fuel reprocessing plant
Carolina, at an estimated cost of $40 million (Bastin C). were underestimated by a factor of 10.
• The cost for modification of the Idaho Plant to permit a
More Failed Reprocessing Ideas demonstration of HTGR fuel reprocessing was underestimated
At the same time, the San Diego-based company General by more than a factor of 10.
Atomics was attempting to commercialize its High Temperature The Atomic Energy Commission then abandoned plans to

21st Century Science & Technology Summer 2008 15

demonstrate HTGR fuel reprocessing, and
General Atomics abandoned plans to commer-
cialize the HTGR (Bastin E). Officials of Allied
General Nuclear Services, aware that the con-
cept adopted for the Barnwell reprocessing
plant was not valid, notified the Atomic Energy
Commission that it would not operate the plant
for commercial reprocessing and proposed that
it be operated as a government demonstration.
During the same time period, General Electric
built the Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant at Morris,
Illinois. In an attempt to reduce size and capital
cost, GE used much more complex processes for
reprocessing than those used at Savannah River.
Numerous equipment failures and problems
were encountered in cold testing that made it
impossible to operate the plant, and GE senior
executives carried out a corporate review of the
technical and operational capability of the plant,
which identified many problems. Among the
most significant was the following:
“It thus appears that the time required to sta-
bilize the process and obtain useful output may
well exceed the mean time between failure. If
this should be the case, it would be difficult to
be able to run long enough to obtain some out- DOE
put, and time operating efficiency (productivi-
Despite the problems known with the Oak Ridge/Idaho Plant concept, the West
ty) would be close to zero.” Valley, N.Y. commercial reprocessing plant was built using this concept, instead
GE decided not to operate that plant (Reed of the successful method of the Savannah River Plant. It was a facility “destined
1974). for failure,” Bastin says. Here, the fuel receiving and storage area at the West Val-
ley plant in 1982.
Reprocessing in Other Nations
Nuclear program leaders in Britain, France, Germany, India, reprocessing, and, in the absence of DuPont reprocessing tech-
Japan, and the Soviet Union were aware of problems with the nology, has dominated world reprocessing activities. However,
Oak Ridge/Idaho pilot plant reprocessing technology and the the high cost and other features of the most recent French-built
success of DuPont technology. In 1970, French reprocessors vis- reprocessing plant, that of Japan at Rokkasho Mura, raise serious
ited the United States with a promise of access to DuPont tech- questions about the French technology.
nology, but after their arrival, the Atomic Energy Commission After a thorough review of reprocessing successes and fail-
denied them access (Bastin C). ures, and particularly of the failures and other problems with
The Soviet Union gained an understanding of DuPont tech- commercial reprocessing, the Atomic Energy Commission in
nology through intelligence efforts, but in its own reprocessing 1974 reassigned responsibility for support of commercial fuel
plants, it did not provide adequate protection against accidents, reprocessing to DuPont with its emphasis on safe, successful,
contrary to the DuPont system (Bastin C). cost-effective reprocessing. At a meeting at its New York offices
Britain had access to DuPont technology through a classified in July 1974, the Edison Electric Institute Nuclear Fuel Cycle
cooperative agreement, but relied on a philosophy of “no main- Committee expressed strong support for this reassignment.
tenance”—again, contrary to the DuPont system—until there
was a severe accident in an early British reprocessing facility in The DuPont Facility That Was Never Built
1973 (Bastin C, E). DuPont carried out its own research and development and
France attempted management of reprocessing by its Atomic supported outside work focussed on conceptual design studies
Energy Commission and encountered serious problems. Its tech- for a licensed fuel recycle complex. The design studies were com-
nology was based largely on the Oak Ridge/Idaho pilot plant pleted in November 1978 and reports issued. Costs for the 3,000
reprocessing concept, with provision for rapid removal of cer- tons/year integrated fuel reprocessing/fabrication facility were es-
tain more sensitive process equipment (Bastin 2007). Since the timated at $3.7 billion. Special features of this facility included:
creation of a state corporation, COGEMA, France has improved • no access to or accumulation of separated plutonium,

16 Summer 2008 21st Century Science & Technology

 • total loss of plutonium to waste for fuel recycle would be ogy with other nations which had large nuclear power programs
about 5 percent of that lost in the U.S. commercial nuclear fuel and with the International Atomic Energy Agency (Bastin H).
recycle program, But in January 1975, under the Ford Administration, programs
• high-level nuclear wastes would be prepared for long-term of the Atomic Energy Commission were transferred to a newly
isolation in a geologic repository and there would be no storage created agency, the Energy Research and Development Admin-
of liquid wastes in underground tanks, istration. Nuclear program leaders in the new ERDA did not un-
• indefinite (hundreds of years) life of facility, derstand the complexities of reprocessing, set aside those who
• flexibility for major changes, including processing other did, and transferred program responsibilities back to the Office
types of fuels, of Nuclear Energy, successor to the Atomic Energy Commission
• costs for reprocessing of about one-fourth of that of current Division of Reactor Development.
reprocessing prices, and Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter carried out major
• other features based on successful reprocessing experienc- policy reviews of reprocessing with no input from persons who
es at the Savannah River Plant (DuPont 1978; Bastin E, G). understood the technology and who knew what had happened
Many problems and concerns about reprocessing worldwide that led to successes, failures, proliferation, and other problems.
would have been resolved, if there had been a continuation of re- The indefinite deferral of efficient use of nuclear energy resourc-
search and development by DuPont, the subsequent construction es and responsible disposal of nuclear wastes resulting from
and operation of the DuPont facility, and a sharing of the technol- these reviews were major factors contributing to the long mora-

The Reprocessing Facility

The chemical processes used in reprocessing are only one
component of reprocessing “technology.” Also critical to
successful operation are the plant configuration, equipment
and piping layout, type of equipment, remote control fea-
tures, remote maintenance system, intersystem tankage,
sampling systems, ventilation, containment, safeguards and
accountability, and so on.
Significant differences in these non-process components
could make as much as two orders of magnitude difference in
operability or unit cost of operations—and could in some cases
preclude operations.
During the mid-1950s to mid-1970s, the Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant and the reprocessing facilities at the Savan-
nah River Plant used similar processes, but operability (and
many other important parameters) were vastly different.
On-stream time during periods of product demand were
more than 80 percent at Savannah River, and only about 2 to
3 percent at the Idaho Plant. Failure of a major piece of equip-
ment resulted in one day of lost operating time at Savannah
River, and up to one to two years at the Idaho Plant. Return to
equilibrium (that is, productive operation) after shutdown for
maintenance, accountability, or other reasons at Savannah
River would take a few minutes; it would take about 30 days
at the Idaho Plant and about 8 days at the Hanford PUREX
facility.
The DuPont plant was designed with more safety protec-
tions for plant workers. For example, equipment maintenance
at the Idaho Plant resulted in large radiation exposure to per-
sonnel, because personnel were required to enter process
cells for direct maintenance of equipment. Average radiation
W.P. Bebbington, History of DuPont at the Savannah River Plant
exposures to operating and maintenance personnel at the Ida-
ho Plant were about a factor of 3 higher than at Savannah Riv- Looking down on a 60-foot high canyon cell, showing typical
er and Hanford on an overall basis, and a factor of some 50 to process vessels and connectors that separate uranium and plu-
100 times higher on a unit of production basis. tonium from spent fuel.

21st Century Science & Technology Summer 2008 17

torium on new nuclear power plants in the United States. Under cessing concept for separating uranium, plutonium, and other
President Carter, ERDA was dissolved and the Department of En- heavy elements from highly radioactive waste in fast reactor
ergy was organized to take its place in 1977. fuel. The pyrometallurgical process is claimed to be prolifera-
Nuclear program leaders in the DOE set aside information tion-resistant. An evaluation by DOE staff knowledgeable about
from DuPont about reprocessing that would have resolved prob- reprocessing revealed that the concept was neither prolifera-
lems, and instead they supported use and development of labo- tion-resistant nor appropriate for reprocessing (see box, p. 19).
ratory concepts that had no potential for success. No informa- There was no disagreement with this evaluation by Department
tion about the success-based concepts was provided to of Energy or Argonne National Laboratory officials, but support
Presidents Carter or Reagan. for the concept continues.
President Reagan was elected in 1980 on a platform of sup-
port for reprocessing, but was unwilling to support operation of Advanced Reprocessing Technologies
the Barnwell Plant. The DOE now proposes funding for so-called “advanced re-
The DOE funded the development of an Oak Ridge National processing technologies” as part of its Global Nuclear Energy
Laboratory concept for reprocessing with the PUREX process, Partnership (GNEP) initiative, but the processes proposed —
but incorporating a very complex, in-place maintenance sys- UREX+ and pyroprocessing—are neither advanced nor appro-
tem, until a cost estimate based on detailed design indicated an priate for reprocessing of used nuclear fuels.
exceptionally high cost. The ORNL program continued as a col- Decisions of Manhattan Project Director Gen. Leslie Groves
laborative development with Japan, and the complex mainte- in 1942, and President Truman in 1950, that resulted in success-
nance system was incorporated in the very expensive Japanese ful reprocessing in the past provide a model today for successful
reprocessing plant at Rokkasho Mura. reprocessing of nuclear power plant fuels. Similar decisions of
In 1990, the Oak Ridge program was phased out, in order to Atomic Energy Commission leaders in 1959 and 1974 would
fund development of an Argonne National Laboratory pyropro- have led to success and avoided many problems. Note also that

The Cost of Reprocessing

The costs for reprocessing in the DuPont-
designed LWR Fuel Recycle Complex would
have been about $250 per kilogram of ura-
nium. This compares to about $1,000 per ki-
logram charged by the British and French for
reprocessing, and $5,000 to $15,000 per ki-
logram for reprocessing in the French-built
facility at Rokkasho Mura in Japan.
The major reason for the differences in cost
is that there is much higher productivity with
the DuPont design because of its shorter time
for replacement or repair of failed process
equipment, piping, and instruments, and the
shorter time to full productivity afeter the
start-up of operations.
The much higher cost of reprocessing at
the Rokkasho plant is the result of a much
more complex—and expensive—laboratory- Atomic Energy Commission of Japan

type, in-place remote maintenance system. The now-operating Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan, when it was un-
In-place maintenance results in greater loss der construction. Its operating costs are higher, Bastin says, because it did not
of operating time, compared with the much incorporate the successful concepts of Savannah River.
more simple, rapid, remote equipment re-
placement system of DuPont, followed by hands-on repair at assurance of safeguards for weapons-usable materials in the
leisure. used fuel—which is impossible. The moratorium on new nu-
The Cost of Not Reprocessing clear power plant orders in the United States began in the
Of course, the greatest difference in cost is that between same year—1974—that commercial reprocessing stopped.
reprocessing and not reprocessing. This moratorium is the greatest reason for America’s ener-
Without reprocessing, highly radioactive wastes in used gy crisis and resulting economic challenges, including the
fuel cannot be permanently disposed of without indefinite huge budget deficits in California.

18 Summer 2008 21st Century Science & Technology

 Pyroprocessing and the Integral Fast Reactor:
A Case Study of So-called Proliferation-Resistant Fuel
by Clinton Bastin
was performed only about every
In 1991, I was assigned by DOE’s year or two in the development fa-
Office of Nuclear Energy to develop cility. Measurement of fully irradi-
criteria for evaluation of a planned ated fuel in a remote environment
demonstration of DOE’s Integral would be far more difficult; thus,
Fast Reactor (IFR) “proliferation-re- material accountability and safe-
sistant,” “pyroprocess-based” fuel guards would be virtually impossi-
cycle. I visited DOE sites in Chicago ble.
and Idaho to inspect process equip- (4) High process losses (10-20
ment and details of planned dem- percent) were experienced, partic-
onstration operation, and learned ularly in the fuel fabrication step,
that DOE plans were for a demon- and high process losses would have
stration of a process, not technolo- been likely in electrorefining. This,
gy, and that questions of operability, combined with measurement diffi-
maintainability, safeguardability, culties, makes significant diversion
and containment of radioactivity— detection impossible.
major problems with commercial (5) Operations in a remote envi-
reprocessing—would not have ronment are about three times as
been resolved. difficult as operations in glove box-
Of greatest concern were great es; operations in an inert environ-
difficulties for material balance ment are similarly more difficult.
DOE
measurements and high plutonium The combination contemplated for
losses. These findings led to a con- Artist’s drawing (1989) of an electrorefiner for the IFR fuel cycle might be ten
clusion that the safeguards chal- the Integral Fast Reactor, which would recycle times as difficult as those in glove
lenge would be difficult and the the reactor’s spent fuel, returning the high level boxes, or about three times as dif-
process as planned would not be wastes to the reactor to be burned as new fuel. ficult as those in aqueous repro-
proliferation-resistant nor viable for Bastin’s evaluation was that the prcess was not cessing, without consideration of
commercial nuclear fuel recycle. commercially viable. the more complex equipment
Concerns about the planned dem- planned for the IFR process. High
onstration were reviewed with DOE and DOE laboratory man- temperatures would further increase difficulties.
agement and technical staff without significant disagreement, (6) The IFR process requires use of exotic materials that are
and are summarized here: not available in forms/shapes needed. Research for materials
(1) Processes to be used were similar to those used for plu- was under way, but there was no experience base for use of
tonium metal processing in the Atomic Energy Commission these materials.
weapon programs. Much greater difficulty was experienced (7) Inter-process transfer of nuclear materials requires
in plutonium metal processing than in properly designed physical movement of containers of nuclear material as op-
aqueous reprocessing. Large accumulations of scrap were posed to transfer through piping in reprocessing plants that
normal at all plutonium metal plants, except for those at the have operated successfully. The containers are not fully
Savannah River Plant where scrap was immediately redis- sealed. Thus, there is significant potential for release of con-
solved and returned to reprocessing. tamination into the cell atmosphere.
In earlier, similar fuel cycle experiments, large amounts of (8) Fissile plutonium is in weapons-usable form and in
scrap were shipped to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant concentrations usable for a significant nuclear explosive.
for recovery. Some reviewers argued that in-process materials may not be
(2) Equipment proposed for the DOE fuel cycle was much directly usable for weapons suitable for military stockpiles,
more complex than that used in aqueous reprocessing (the but clever operators of electrorefining equipment might be
PUREX system) and would have been very difficult to main- able to produce fairly pure plutonium metal directly usable
tain for reasonable on-stream time. In-situ manipulator-type for military type nuclear explosives.
maintenance would be needed. The rapid, remote equip- (9) The requirement for inter-process transfer by physical
ment-replacement system used in successful reprocessing movement by manipulators of containers of nuclear material
would not be appropriate. instead of through pipes would limit applicability of the IFR
(3) Material measurement in the electrorefiner was ex- fuel cycle process to research, or production of small amounts
tremely difficult under cold, development conditions and of plutonium. —July 21, 2008

21st Century Science & Technology Summer 2008 19

DuPont’s exceptional core values of safety, health and the envi- November).
ronment, ethics, and respect for people were major factors in Clinton Bastin, 1999. “Nuclear Technology: Need for New Vision” (Washington,
D.C.: Global Foundation International Energy Conference, November).
the success of reprocessing and other programs for the Manhat- Clinton Bastin, 2007. “Weighing in on U.S.-India,” Letter to the editor, Nuclear
tan Project and Atomic Energy Commission. News (May).
America needs real advanced reprocessing technologies, and Clinton Bastin personal experiences:
a competent chemical engineering organization to manage re- (A) Participant in summer seminar for chemical engineering professors at Han-
ford on fuel reprocessing, including studies for disposal of nuclear wastes in
processing. I propose a “U.S. Energy and Nuclear Technology soils at Hanford, June-August, 1958.
Board,” or a similar organization, that will: (B) Atomic Energy Commission technical leader for the initial, success-based
• implement and support policies and programs on the basis program for disposition of used fuel from nuclear power plants in the United
States and other nations, 1959-1962.
of need, determined through careful, competent assessment (C) Atomic Energy Commission technical leader at the Savannah River Plant
based on lessons learned from experiences, and AEC/ERDA headquarters for reprocessing, plutonium processing, and
studies for disposal of nuclear wastes, 1962-1976.
• provide full and accurate information to Americans about
(D) Participant in monthly design reviews for reprocessing projects, DuPont cor-
energy and nuclear technology, porate offices, Wilmington, Del., 1964-1972.
• carry out collaborative research and development with (E) Technical leader and task force chair at AEC headquarters for resolution of
problems in AEC and commercial reprocessing facilities, and reduction of
other nations for use of the best systems and technology for ben- reprocessing-related proliferation threats, 1972-1974. Effort led to recom-
eficial, efficient, and safe use of nuclear technology. mendations that reprocessing program direction and management be reas-
signed to those who had directed and managed successful reprocessing
The President, leaders of Congress, and leaders of nuclear programs and understood reprocessing technology
power programs should ask DuPont and others with extensive (F) Compared Atomic Energy Commission accountability records with produc-
experience in successful reprocessing and other uses of nuclear tion data in 1968 through 1972 annual reports of Idaho Chemical Processing
Plant Multiple Fuels Processing Program; learned that production was over-
technology to help create organizations to resolve long-neglect- stated in these reports by a factor of 5; and notified Atomic Energy Commis-
ed energy and nuclear technology challenges. Recent French sion and Allied Chemical Company authorities of the discovery, 1973.
(G) Technical leader in Energy Research and Development Administration for
experience in certain reprocessing techniques will be important nuclear power fuel reprocessing and recycle, until ERDA leaders reassigned
for U.S. programs, but the French facility design should be ex- reprocessing program direction and management to those who had direct-
ed, managed, and proposed failed reprocessing, and did not understand
amined carefully by those with experience in the best reprocess- reprocessing technology, 1975-1976.
ing technology. This nation has demonstrated successful repro- (H) Lead technical consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency for its
cessing of spent nuclear fuels in the past, and if we are to move study of “Regional Fuel Cycle Centers,” which had been proposed by the
United States to reduce proliferation threats from reprocessing.
forward as an industrial nation, we need to do it again! (I) Technical leader for major non-proliferation initiative with the Government of
____________________ India.
Chemical engineer Clinton (J) Instructor for “Worldwide Reprocessing Experiences and Plans” for CIA and
NSA, 1968-1996.
Bastin, now retired, was re- (K) Technical leader for U.S. nonproliferation initiatives and proliferation threat
sponsible for the Atomic Ener- assessments, 1970-1983.
gy Commission’s reprocessing (L) U.S. coordinator for reprocessing development and technology exchange
with other nations, 1962-1993.
plutonium, and plutonium (M) Determined that an Argonne National Laboratory pyroprocessing process
scrap operations, plutonium- which was claimed to be proliferation-resistant was neither proliferation-re-
sistant nor appropriate for reprocessing, and advised DOE and ANL officials
238 production, transuranic of that determination, 1991 (see box).
materials processing, tritium W.P. Bebbington, 1990. History of DuPont at the Savannah River Plant (Wilm-
and deuterium production for ington, Del.: E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company).
E.I. DuPont, 1978. “Spent LWR Fuel Recycle Complex.”
weapons programs, radioac-
Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, Jr., 1972. A History of the United States
tive waste management, and Atomic Energy Commission: Volume I: The New World, 1939-1946, (Wash-
related activities at the De- ington, D.C.: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission), a history of the Manhattan
Project.
partment of Energy’s Savan- International Atomic Energy Agency, 1977. Regional Fuel Cycle Centres.
nah River Plant. He was also involved in the diplomatic side of Robert Jolley et al, 1994. “The ORNL Chemical Technology Division: 1950-
U.S. international nuclear efforts, and he was president of the 1994” (October), pp. 1-15.
Lawrence D. Low, 1972. (Director, Division of Compliance, U.S. Atomic Energy
Federal Employees Union at the Department of Energy head- Commission). Letter to R.N. Miller, President, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.
quarters. (March 16).
Upon his retirement, Bastin was recognized by the DOE in a C.E. Reed et al. 1974. (Senior Vice President, General Electric Corporate Stud-
ies and Programs), “Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant Technical Study Report”
Distinguished Career Service Award as “the U.S. authority on re- (July 5).
processing and initiator of total quality management and partner- U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1957. Division of Civilian Application Summary
Report: “AEC Reference Fuel-Processing Plant,” WASH-743 (October).
ing agreements.” Bastin served as a U.S. Marine in World War II
USAEC, 1968 and ff. Idaho Operations Office and Allied Chemical Company:
and was an instructor in chemistry for the Marine Corps Institute. “Idaho Chemical Processing Plant Multiple Fuels Processing Program”
He has many published papers on the topics in this article. (1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973).
USAEC. Official accountability records of enriched uranium reprocessed at the
References ____________________________________________________
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, 1953-1974.
Clinton Bastin, 1996. “United States Nuclear Technology—Need for a New
USAEC, 1975. “Operational Accidents and Radiation Exposure Experience”
Approach” (Miami: Global Foundation International Energy Conference,
(WASH 1192).

20 Summer 2008 21st Century Science & Technology