STATE EXECUTIVE

The Indian Constitution establishes a federal polity with a dual system of government — Union and States — each
functioning within its constitutionally demarcated sphere. While Part V deals with the Union Executive, Part VI (Articles
153–167) provides for the State Executive. The structure at the state level mirrors the Union and follows the parliamentary
model. The Governor is the constitutional head (de jure executive), whereas the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief
Minister exercises real executive authority (de facto executive). The Advocate General acts as the highest legal officer of
the state. However, unlike the President, the Governor occupies a more complex and politically sensitive position because
of his method of appointment by the Union and the presence of discretionary powers.

THE GOVERNOR: CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION

Article 153 mandates that there shall be a Governor for each state. After the 7th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1956,
one person may be appointed as Governor for two or more states. Under Article 154, the executive power of the state is
vested in the Governor. This vesting, however, is formal and constitutional; in practice, executive authority is exercised on
the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in matters where the Constitution grants discretion.

Thus, constitutionally speaking, the Governor is the de jure executive, while the Chief Minister is the de facto executive.
The Governor performs a dual role: first, as the constitutional head of the state; and second, as the link between the
Union and the State. It is precisely this dual character that renders the office politically sensitive and often controversial
within India’s federal structure.

APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNOR (ARTICLE 155)

Article 155 provides that the Governor is appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal. In practical
terms, this means that the appointment is made on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers. Unlike the President, the
Governor is not elected, either directly or indirectly. There is no electoral college, and the state legislature has no role in
the appointment process.

Why an Appointed Governor?

During the Constituent Assembly debates, there was considerable discussion on whether the Governor should be directly
elected. Ultimately, the Assembly rejected this proposal for several reasons. First, a directly elected Governor would have
possessed an independent popular mandate, which could potentially clash with the Chief Minister and disturb the
principle of collective responsibility under the parliamentary system. Second, it would have created dual power centres
within the state, thereby undermining cabinet government. Third, holding elections for a nominal head would have
imposed unnecessary financial burdens. Fourth, the appointment system was seen as a mechanism to maintain national
integration by ensuring that the Governor functioned as a constitutional bridge between the Centre and the State. Finally,
an elected Governor would likely be partisan, whereas an appointed Governor was expected to maintain political
neutrality.

Thus, India adopted a model closer to the Canadian system rather than the American one.

TERM AND THE PLEASURE DOCTRINE (ARTICLE 156)

Article 156 provides that the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President. Although the normal tenure is
five years, the Governor can be removed at any time, transferred to another state, or may resign by addressing a
resignation to the President. No reason is required to be assigned for removal. This arrangement creates an inherent
insecurity of tenure.

Judicial Evolution of the Pleasure Doctrine

In Hargovind Pant v. Dr. Raghukul Tilak, the Supreme Court clarified that the Governor is not an employee of the Central
Government but occupies an independent constitutional office. Later, in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, the Court held that
although the President may remove a Governor without assigning reasons, such removal cannot be arbitrary, capricious,
or mala fide. Judicial review of removal is permissible. Thus, while the pleasure doctrine exists, it is not absolute but
constitutionally controlled.

However, politicisation of removal has frequently occurred when governments changed at the Centre, with Governors
appointed by previous regimes often being replaced, thereby raising questions about federal fairness.

QUALIFICATIONS

Articles 157 and 158 prescribe that a Governor must be a citizen of India and at least 35 years of age. He must not be a
member of Parliament or of a state legislature and must not hold any office of profit under the government. If such a
person is appointed Governor, he is deemed to have vacated his seat. The Constitution does not prescribe educational
qualifications or political neutrality, though by convention Governors are often appointed from outside the concerned
state.

IMMUNITIES (ARTICLE 361)

Article 361 grants constitutional immunities to the Governor similar to those available to the President. The Governor
enjoys absolute immunity for official acts and is not answerable to any court for actions taken in the exercise of official
duties. In respect of personal acts, however, immunity is limited: no criminal proceedings can be initiated during the term
of office, civil proceedings require prior notice of two months, and no arrest can be made during tenure.

Judicial decisions have clarified the scope of these immunities. In Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, the Supreme
Court held that although the Governor enjoys immunity from personal liability, his actions are subject to judicial review if
mala fide. In State of UP v. Kalyan Singh, it was held that criminal proceedings may resume once the individual demits the
office of Governor. Thus, while the dignity of the office is protected, constitutional accountability remains intact.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNOR

The Governor’s powers broadly parallel those of the President but operate within the state sphere.

I. Executive Powers

Under Article 166, all executive actions of the state are taken in the name of the Governor. He makes rules for the
convenient transaction of business and allocation of portfolios among ministers.

The Governor appoints the Chief Minister and, on the latter’s advice, other ministers. He also appoints the Advocate
General, members of the State Public Service Commission, the State Election Commissioner, and district judges in
consultation with the High Court. Additionally, he acts as the Chancellor of state universities.

During President’s Rule under Article 356, when constitutional machinery in a state is deemed to have failed, the
Governor acts as the agent of the President and assumes extensive administrative authority.

II. Legislative Powers

The Governor is an integral part of the State Legislature. He has the power to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the
Legislative Assembly. Under Article 176, he addresses the Legislature at the commencement of the first session after
general elections and at the beginning of each year. He may send messages to the House and nominate one-sixth of the
members to the Legislative Council in states having bicameral legislatures.

Assent to Bills (Article 200)

When a bill is presented, the Governor may assent, withhold assent, return it for reconsideration (except Money Bills), or
reserve it for the consideration of the President. The power of reservation has often generated political controversy,
particularly when Governors delay assent to state legislation.

III. Ordinance-Making Power (Article 213)

When the Legislature is not in session, the Governor may promulgate ordinances if immediate action is necessary. An
ordinance has the same force as an Act of the Legislature but must be approved within six weeks of reassembly. The
scope of this power is confined to subjects in the State and Concurrent Lists. Unlike the President, the Governor has no
powers relating to emergency proclamation or armed forces. Importantly, the ordinance power is not discretionary; it must
be exercised on the advice of the Council of Ministers.

IV. Financial Powers

No demand for grant can be made except on the Governor’s recommendation. No Money Bill can be introduced without
prior recommendation. The Governor administers the Contingency Fund of the State and constitutes the State Finance
Commission every five years to review the financial position of local bodies.

V. Judicial Powers (Article 161)

The Governor may grant pardons, reprieves, respites, remissions, or commute sentences for offences against state laws.
However, unlike the President, the Governor cannot pardon a death sentence nor grant pardon in cases of court-martial.
This marks a constitutional distinction between state and union clemency powers.

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DISCRETIONARY POWERS

The most debated aspect of the Governor’s office relates to discretionary powers under Article 163.

Constitutional Discretion

The Governor may act in discretion in matters such as reserving bills for the President, recommending President’s Rule,
administering a Union Territory if so assigned, matters under the Sixth Schedule, and special responsibilities under Article
371.

Circumstantial Discretion

In situations not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, discretion arises from political circumstances — such as
appointing a Chief Minister in a hung assembly, dismissing a ministry that has lost majority support, or dissolving the
Assembly. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that majority must be tested on the floor of the
House, thereby limiting arbitrary discretion.

GOVERNOR: FEDERAL SENTINEL OR POLITICAL AGENT?

The Governor is expected to act as a constitutional sentinel — protecting the Constitution, maintaining neutrality, and
upholding federal balance. However, controversies frequently arise in matters of government formation, delays in granting
assent to bills, reservation of bills for the President, and recommendations for President’s Rule.

Thus, the office of the Governor remains one of the most debated institutions in Indian federalism — situated at the
intersection of constitutional morality, political practice, and Centre-State relations.

POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR

The Governor occupies a complex constitutional position in India’s federal structure. Though designed as the
constitutional head of the state within a parliamentary system, the Governor also functions as the representative of the
Union. This dual role — state head and central link — makes the office structurally delicate and politically sensitive. While
intended to be neutral and detached, political developments, especially after 1967, have made the office a frequent site of
Centre–State tension.

I. Dual Role of the Governor

1. Constitutional Head of the State

Under Article 154, executive power of the state is vested in the Governor, but it is exercised on the aid and advice of the
Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. All executive actions are taken in his name. In normal circumstances,
the Governor performs a ceremonial role, while real authority lies with the elected government.

The framers envisioned the Governor as a constitutional sentinel — preserving parliamentary democracy and ensuring
governance within constitutional limits. However, discretionary powers under Article 163 and provisions like Articles 200
and 356 introduce areas of potential conflict.
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2. Representative of the Union

The Governor also acts as the link between the Centre and the State. This role becomes significant in situations such as:
• Recommending President’s Rule (Article 356)
• Reserving bills for Presidential consideration (Article 200)
• Reporting constitutional breakdown

This creates a structural tension: whether the Governor should prioritise state autonomy or Union authority.
Most controversies surrounding the office arise from this dual responsibility.

II. Evolution of the Office

1. Pre-1967: Limited Controversy

During one-party dominance (1950–1967), Centre and states were politically aligned. Governors largely acted as
ceremonial heads, and discretionary powers were rarely invoked.

2. Post-1967: Political Contestation

With the rise of regional parties, coalition governments, and fractured mandates, Governors began playing a decisive role
in:
• Government formation in hung assemblies
• Testing majority claims
• Recommending President’s Rule
• Reserving controversial legislation

This period saw allegations of partisan conduct and increasing Centre–State friction.

Discretionary Powers of the Governor

Scope, Criticism and Safeguards

Article 163 provides that the Governor may act in his discretion in certain matters. While some discretionary powers are
expressly mentioned (e.g., Article 356, Article 200), others arise from political circumstances such as hung assemblies.
The controversy surrounding the Governor largely stems from the exercise — and alleged misuse — of these discretionary
powers.

1. Appointment of Chief Minister in Hung Assembly

Scope
When no party secures an absolute majority, the Governor must decide whom to invite to form the government.
Constitutionally, the majority must ultimately be tested on the floor of the House.

Criticism
• Preference given to the single largest party over a stable coalition.
• Unequal or insufficient time granted to prove majority.
• Subjective satisfaction replacing objective legislative test.
• Allegations of favouring ruling party at the Centre.

Safeguards
• S.R. Bommai (1994): Majority must be tested on the floor.
• Rameshwar Prasad (2005): Governor cannot reject claim based on suspicion of immoral alliances.
• Punchhi Commission (2010): Clear order of preference in hung assembly to reduce arbitrariness.

2. Dismissal of Chief Minister & Dissolution of Assembly

Scope

If the Chief Minister loses majority, the Governor may dismiss the ministry or dissolve the Assembly.

Criticism
• Asking CM to resign without allowing floor test.
• Using subjective assessment of majority.
• Premature dissolution without exploring alternative government formation.

Safeguards
• Floor test principle mandatory.
• Dissolution should be last resort.
• Governor’s action subject to judicial review.

3. Recommendation of President’s Rule (Article 356)

Scope

Governor reports breakdown of constitutional machinery.

Criticism
• Historically misused for partisan purposes (especially 1970s–80s).
• Failure to explore alternatives like floor test.
• Used to dismiss opposition-ruled state governments.

Safeguards
• S.R. Bommai (1994):
• President’s Rule subject to judicial review.
• Majority must be tested in Assembly.
• Mala fide proclamation can be struck down.
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4. Assent to Bills & Reservation (Article 200)

Scope

Governor may:
• Assent
• Withhold assent
• Return (except money bill)
• Reserve for President

Criticism
• Indefinite delay (pocket veto).
• Withholding assent without clear reasons.
• Excessive reservation of politically sensitive bills.

Safeguards
• State of Punjab v. Governor (2023): Governor cannot indefinitely delay assent.
• Sarkaria Commission: Reservation should be rare and only in cases of clear unconstitutionality.

5. Nomination to Legislative Council (Article 171)

Scope

Governor nominates 1/6th members in bicameral states.

Criticism
• Used for political rehabilitation.
• Backdoor entry of defeated leaders.

View

Experts argue this is not discretionary and must be exercised strictly on advice of Council of Ministers.

Structural Issues Behind Controversy

• Ambiguity in defining “discretion.”
• Appointment and removal at pleasure of President.
• Strong unitary bias in Indian federalism.
• Weak convention-based restraints.

Discretionary Power in Withholding Assent to Bills (Article 200)

Under Article 200, when a bill is presented to the Governor, he may:

1. Give assent → Bill becomes Act.
2. Withhold assent (Pocket veto).
3. Return bill (Suspensive veto) – if passed again, must give assent.
 4. Reserve bill for President.

Emerging Controversy

In recent years, Governors have been accused of:

• Sitting on bills for 2–3 years (e.g., Tamil Nadu NEET Bill).
• Exercising pocket veto without justification.
• Acting at the behest of the Union Government.
• Frustrating the legislative will of elected state governments.

Issues Arising

1. Affects Federal Scheme

Indefinite delay or partisan reservation of bills deepens Centre–State friction and weakens cooperative federalism.

2. Against Parliamentary Democracy

Governor acting against advice of Council of Ministers undermines responsible government — a part of the Basic
Structure.

3. Jeopardising Democratic Fabric

An unelected authority effectively stalls functioning of elected legislature.

4. Erosion of Constitutional Sanctity

Partisan conduct damages perception of Governor as neutral constitutional head.

Judicial Curtailment of Misuse

1. Shamsher Singh v. Union of India (1974)

• Governor must act on aid and advice of Council of Ministers.
• Discretion is not absolute.
• Reinforced principle of responsible government.

2. Nabam Rebia (2016)

• Discretion under Article 163(2) is “limited”.
• Governor is not an “all-pervading super-constitutional authority”.
• Power cannot be arbitrary or fanciful.
• Echoed Sarkaria Commission’s views.

3. State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to Governor (2023)

• Governor cannot indefinitely withhold assent.
• If withholding, must return bill for reconsideration.
• Must act “as soon as possible”.
• Curtails misuse of pocket veto.
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Lingering Loophole: Reservation for President

Even after the 2023 judgment, a major concern remains:

• Governor can reserve bill for President.
• No clear timeline.
• Can be used as indirect substitute for withholding assent.

Therefore, it is argued that Supreme Court must lay down:

• Clear guidelines for reservation.
• Defined time limits.
• Strict grounds of unconstitutionality.

Kerala (2023) has approached Supreme Court on this issue.

Issue of Appointment and Tenure

Structural Weakness
• Appointed by Union.
• Holds office at pleasure of President.
• No fixed security of tenure.
• Basic qualifications only (citizenship, 35 years).

This has led to politicisation.

Evidence of Politicisation
• First ARC: Many Governors failed expected standards.
• Sarkaria Commission:
• Over 60% had active political background.
• Less than 50% from non-political fields.

Sarkaria Commission Recommendations

Governor should:
• Be eminent in public life.
• Be from outside the state.
• Be detached from local politics.
• Not be active politician before appointment.
• CM should be consulted.

Punchhi Commission Recommendations

 • No active politics for at least 2 years before appointment.
• Eminent, non-partisan person.
• Fixed 5-year tenure.
• Removal not arbitrary.
• Appointment committee: PM, HM, Speaker, CM (possibly VP).
• Avoid treating Governors as “political football”.

Is the Governor’s Office an Anachronism?

Critics argue:
• Colonial legacy of Government of India Act, 1935.
• Used for political manipulation.
• Ceremonial redundancy.
• Tool of central control.

Some even suggested abolition (e.g., Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit).

Why Was Office Retained?

Constitution makers feared:

• Secession after Partition.
• Weak democratic institutions in states.
• Need for a constitutional “brake” on populist excesses.
• Need to maintain national integrity.

Thus, Governor was visualised as a stabilising federal link — not as political agent.

Core Debate

Is the Governor:
• A federal sentinel ensuring constitutional governance?
or
• An instrument of central dominance?

The answer lies not in abolishing the office, but in:

• Strengthening conventions,
• Clarifying discretion,
• Ensuring transparent appointments,
• Enforcing judicial timelines.