Justice

UNIT 17 RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP

Structure
17.0 Objectives
17.1 Introduction
17.1.1 Origin of the Idea of Citizenship
17.1.2 Development of the Ideas on Citizenship: Four Historical Periods
17.2 Historical Developments: Citizenship from Classical to Modern Times
17.2.1 Ancient Greece
17.2.2 Ancient Rome
17.2.3 The Late Medieval and Early Modern Periods
17.2.4 Modern Notions of Citizenship: The Nineteenth and the Twentieth Century
Developments
17.2.5 Significance and Limitation of the Liberal Framework
17.2.6 New Contexts and Changing Concerns: Multiculturalism
17.3 Citizenship Theory Today: Dividing Lines
17.3.1 Civic Republicanism and the Liberal Tradition
17.3.2 Dividing Lines: Individual Vs the Community
17.3.3 Dividing Lines: Duties Vs Rights
17.4 Critiques and Alternatives: Marxist, Feminist and Gandhian
17.4.1 Redefining Citizenship: Marxist Critique of Liberal Citizenship
17.4.2 Feminists redefine Citizenship
17.4.3 A Gandhian Notion of Citizenship
17.5 Let Us Sum Up
17.6 Key Words
17.7 Some Useful References
17.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

17.0 OBJECTIVES

In the present unit, we shall study the idea(s) of rights and citizenship in terms of
(a) their historical development and (b) as a terrain where various contesting views
are presented regarding their form and substance. We shall also focus on criticisms
of dominant understandings of rights and citizenship and the alternative understandings
provided by such criticisms. As the structure of the unit laid out in the beginning
shows, each section explains a specific theme and follows it with questions to facilitate
understanding. Certain keywords are explained at the end of the unit.

17.1 INTRODUCTION

Citizenship is commonly understood as referring to the relationship between the

individual/collective and the state. This relationship is understood as being made up
of reciprocal rights and responsibilities. The most commonly accepted definition of
citizenship comes from the English sociologist T.H. Marshall who describes it as ‘full
and equal membership in a political community’. Citizenship, according to this definition,
denotes membership in a political community, which in our present context is the
nation-state. Citizenship would, thus, signify a specific aspect of the relationship
among people who live together in a nation. It emphasises political allegiances and
civic loyalties within the community rather than any cultural/emotional identity. 5
Rights, Equality, Liberty 17.1.1 Origin of the Idea of Citizenship
and Justice
The origins of the idea of citizenship are generally traced to the ancient Greek and
Roman republics. The word itself is derived from the Latin word ‘civis’ and its Greek
equivalent ‘polities’, which means member of the polis or city. However, the manner
in which citizenship is understood today as a system of equal rights as opposed to
ascriptive privileges deriving from conditions of birth, took roots in the French Revolution
(1789). With the development of capitalism and liberalism, the idea of the citizen as
an individual bearing rights irrespective of her/his caste, class, race, gender, ethnicity,
etc., became entrenched. Since the nineteen eighties however, globalisation and
multiculturalism have provided the contexts within which this notion of citizenship has
been challenged. Thus, the nation is no longer being seen as the sole unit of membership
and the ideas of world citizenship and human rights are being earnestly talked about.
Similarly, the individual has been displaced as the core of citizenship theory and rights
of cultural communities and groups have started gaining ground. Thus, it may be said
that the idea of citizenship has developed over several historical periods. Its form and
substance have not remained the same, but changed according to specific historical
contexts. The various forms which citizenship took historically have not, however,
disappeared entirely. They have not only influenced the modern meanings of citizenship,
they also exist as different strands within the bundle of meanings surrounding citizenship.

17.1.2 Development of the Ideas on Citizenship: Four Historical

Periods
The development of the ideas which surround citizenship can be attributed to four
broad historical periods: (a) classical Graeco-Roman periods (fourth century B.C.
onwards), (b) late medieval and early modern periods including the period of the
French and American Revolutions, (c) the developments in the nineteenth century
corresponding to the growing influence of liberalism and capitalism and, (d) the
contests over the form and substance of citizenship in the late twentieth century with
increasing preoccupation with multiculturalism and community rights. Two dominant
strands or traditions of rights and citizenship can be seen to have developed over
these periods: (a) civic republicanism characterised by the ideas of common good,
public spirit, political participation and civic virtue and, (b) liberal citizenship with an
emphasis on individual rights and private interests. The Marxists and the Feminists
have criticised both these traditions and have suggested radical ways of rethinking
citizenship. The criticism of liberal/imperial citizenship by Gandhi and his vision of
citizenship based on notions of duties rather than rights constitute another way of
thinking about citizenship.

In the following sections, we will discuss the historical development of the ideas of
rights and citizenship, the modifications which the changing contexts of the late
twentieth century have necessitated, the divisions among theories on the nature and
substance of citizenship and rights, and finally, the alternatives which have been
offered to the dominant framework of rights and citizenship.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.
1) What do you understand by citizenship?
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2) What are the main strands/traditions in the development of the idea of citizenship?
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17.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS: CITIZENSHIP

FROM CLASSICAL TO MODERN TIMES

In this section, we shall see how the idea of citizenship has evolved at different
historical stages.

17.2.1 Ancient Greece

Greek republics like Athens and Sparta were closely knit, self-governing political
communities characterised by small populations, minimum social differentiation and
simple political organisations, based on notions of familiarity and trust. The idea of
citizenship in Greek republics or city-states was based on the principle of active
political participation. The political and public aspects of a person’s life were seen as
more important than the private and familial. Citizenship, therefore, required active
participation in political and public affairs. It may be pointed out, however, that not
everybody could participate in the process of governance and not everybody, therefore,
was a citizen. Aristotle described the Greek citizens as ‘all who share in the civic
life of ruling and being ruled in turn’. This sharing was confined only to those having
the capacity to participate in the process of governance, i.e. only the ‘free native-
born men’. Thus, women, children, slaves, and resident aliens were excluded from
citizenship. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, the citizens constituted only a small
part of the population.

17.2.2 Ancient Rome

In the Roman tradition, the Greek idea of citizenship as active participation was
modified by the needs of holding together the Roman Empire. The need to incorporate
the conquered peoples into the empire led to the idea of citizenship as a legal status.
Thus, a larger and more heterogeneous population was integrated into the Roman
Empire by subjecting them to the protection of a uniform set of laws. Women and
the lowest classes (chiefly rural) were, however, denied the status of citizens. Thus,
citizenship could now be imagined not primarily as participation in the making and
7
Rights, Equality, Liberty implementing of laws (as was the case in the Greek tradition), but as a legal status
and Justice involving certain rights and equal protection of the law. It may, however, be pointed
out that these new elements of citizenship while making possible a degree of
inclusiveness (i.e., including non-Romans within the Roman citizenship), added also
a hierarchy of status by introducing the second-class category of ‘civitas sine suffragio’
(citizenship without franchise, i.e. legal but not political rights).

The increase in the scale of administration (city-state as different from the empire)
also meant that it was not possible for all who had the status of citizens to participate
in the affairs of governance. The characteristics of a citizen, however, continued to
be marked in a way so that citizenship denoted activity. The citizens were required,
thus, to develop qualities of ‘civic virtue’, a term derived from the Latin word ‘virtus’
which meant ‘manliness’ in the sense of performing military duty, patriotism, and
devotion to duty and the law.

17.2.3 The Late Medieval and Early Modern Periods

The sixteenth century absolutist states were also concerned with imposing their
authority over heterogeneous populations. In this context, a citizen came to be defined
by Jean Bodin as ‘one who enjoys the common liberty and protection of authority’.
The citizen in this view was unlike the Greek citizen, not himself an authority, but
following the Roman tradition, someone who was under the protection of the state.
Unlike the Greek and Roman traditions, however, citizenship was a passive idea.
Citizenship in this period did not stand for common (shared) public responsibilities and
civic virtues. Instead, the notion of ‘common (shared) liberty’ became the primary
concern of citizenship. This concern embodied a ‘passive’ or ‘negative’ notion of
citizenship. It indicated claims for ‘security’ or protection, which was to be provided
by the authorities. What needed to be protected was one’s physical life (as in
Hobbes), the family and home (as in Bodin and Montesquieu) or conscience and
property (as in Locke). This principle of a ‘common shared liberty’, thus, established
the primacy of the individual and his private/ familial world. The protection of authority
was needed primarily to preserve this private world/domain. Citizens were, thus, not
political people, the political community was not the predominant core of their lives
but rather the other framework, in which each citizen enjoyed the liberty of private
pleasures and pursuit of happiness and, as mentioned earlier, the protection and
security of the private/familial domain in which these pleasures were realised.

Thus, the principle of imperial inclusiveness can be seen to have brought about in this
period a passive notion of citizenship as a legal status. Alongside, however, there
remained nostalgia or a longing for the classical notion of citizenship as activity, with
an emphasis on civil virtue and public duty.

The French Revolution (1789) can be seen as a revolt against the passive citizenship
of the late medieval and early modern times. The revolution attempted to resurrect
the ideals of active participation against the claims of the monarchical/ imperial state.
Apart from attempting to change the apolitical/ passive lives of citizens, the French
revolutionary tradition introduced an important element to citizenship, which changed
the way in which rights were incorporated into the notion of citizenship. The
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens which followed in the wake of the
revolution, brought in the notion of the citizen as a ‘free and autonomous individual’
who enjoyed rights equally with others and participated in making decisions which all
had agreed to obey. The manner in which citizenship is understood today as a system
of horizontal (equal) rights as against the hierarchical (unequal) privileges which
accrued to a person by reason of higher birth, has its roots in the doctrines of the
French Revolution. The Declaration was influenced by the ideas of Jean Jacques
Rousseau (1712-78) who in his famous work ‘The Social Contract’ (1762) wrote
not only about the ‘free and autonomous’ citizen and the right of the citizen to
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participate equally with others in decision making, but also established the primacy of Justice
the common good over private interests. Thus, the conception of the citizen established
by the French Revolution, combined strands of modern liberal individualism with the
classical connotation of citizenship as civic participation.

17.2.4 Modern Notions of Citizenship: The Nineteenth and the

Twentieth Century Developments
The growing influence of liberalism in the nineteenth century and the development of
capitalist market relations, however, saw the classical republican understanding of
citizenship slip to the background. The liberal notion of citizens as individuals bearing/
enjoying certain rights in order to protect and promote private interests gained
precedence. Citizenship as a legal status, which gave the citizen certain rights assuring
protection from state interference, was integral to the liberal understanding of state
and politics.

It would be appropriate to discuss here T.H. Marshall’s account of the development

of citizenship in Britain as outlined in his influential work ‘Citizenship and Social
Class’, published in 1950. In this work, Marshall studies the growth of citizenship
alongside capitalism and the peculiar relationship of conflict and collusion which
citizenship shares with it. He describes the development of citizenship over a period
of 250 years as a process of expanding equality against the inequality of social class,
which is an aspect of capitalist society. Marshall distinguishes three strands or bundles
of rights, which constitute citizenship: civil, political and social. Each of these three
strands has, according to Marshall, a distinct history and the history of each strand
is confined to a particular century. Civil rights which developed in the
eighteenth century have been defined by Marshall as ‘rights necessary for individual
freedom’. These were ‘negative’ rights in the sense that they limited or checked the
exercise of government power and included freedoms of speech, movement, conscience,
the right to equality before the law and the right to own property. Political rights viz.,
the right to vote, the right to stand for elections and the right to hold public
office, developed by and large in the nineteenth century and provided the individual
with the opportunity to participate in the political life of the community. Social
rights, which were largely a twentieth century development, guaranteed the individual
a minimum economic/social status and provided the basis for the exercise of both
civil and political rights. Social rights, says Marshall are ‘positive’ rights ‘to live the
life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society’. These
standards of life and the social heritage of society are released through active
intervention by the state in the form of social services (the welfare state) and
educational system.

Marshall’s scheme of historical development of rights in England since the eighteenth

century cannot, however, be held true for other societies. Civil rights for example,
were not fully established in most European countries until the early nineteenth
century. Even where they were generally achieved, some groups were omitted. Thus,
although the constitution granted such rights to Americans well before most European
states had them, the Blacks were excluded. Even after the Civil War, when the
Blacks were formally given these rights, they were not able to exercise them. Rights
were also denied to the colonised peoples of Latin America, Africa and Asia. Women
did not have the right to vote in most countries, including England, till the first quarter
of the twentieth century.

The modern notion of citizenship as pointed out earlier, seeks to constitute free and
equal citizens. This freedom and equality, which underlies modern citizenship, is
sought to be achieved by eliminating ascriptive inequalities and differences (of culture,
caste, gender, race etc.). Thus, citizens are conceived as bearing rights and exercising
their rights equally with other citizens. Conditions of equality i.e., conditions in which
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Rights, Equality, Liberty citizens are able to exercise their rights equally are ensured by making circumstances
and Justice of inequality i.e. race, ethnicity, gender, caste etc., irrelevant for the exercise of the
rights of citizenship. The citizen, thus, is the right bearing individual whose caste,
race, gender, ethnicity etc. are seen as unrelated to the status of citizenship. Seen in
this manner, citizenship constitutes an overarching identity concealing all other identities
to produce what are called masked/unmarked (and therefore) ‘equal’ citizens of the
nation. In much of liberal theory till most of the twentieth century, the bias in favour
of the individual rights bearing citizen pursuing private interests, persisted. The idea
of citizenship as outlined in this (liberal) framework, has a distinctive significance as
well as some obvious limitations.

17.2.5 Significance and Limitation of the Liberal Framework

The generalisation of modern citizenship across the social structure means that all
persons are equal before the law and no group is legally privileged. Understood in
this manner, citizenship is an inclusive category. It regards all differences (of race,
class, caste, gender, religion etc.) as irrelevant in order to create free and equal
citizens.

Limitation

The provision of citizenship across social structures without regard to differences

may in effect, mean overlooking actually existing inequalities. Thus, whereas formal
legal equality may be assured by the liberal framework, this equality is unlikely to
translate itself into substantive equality, unless the practical ability to exercise rights
or legal capacities imparted by citizenship, are actually available to all. In other words,
the liberal framework disregards the fact that those disadvantaged by the existing
structures of inequality viz., class, caste, race, gender etc., are unable to participate
in the community of citizens, on an equal basis, despite the fact that as citizens they
are (equal) legal members of the community.

17.2.6 New Contexts and Changing Concerns: Multiculturalism

Till most of the twentieth century, the dominant understanding of citizenship continued
to place the individual at its core, and citizenship was seen as a legal status indicating
the possession of rights which an individual held equally with others. This dominant
liberal model of citizenship has, as seen above, some practical limitations. Contemporary
debates on citizenship and rights have, therefore, questioned the idea that the (individual)
citizen can enjoy rights independent of the contexts/circumstances to which s/he
belongs i.e., class, race, ethnicity, gender etc. Since the nineteen eighties
multiculturalism, plurality, diversity and difference have become significant terms of
reference in thinking about citizenship. Given that modern societies are increasingly
being recognised as multicultural, the dominant liberal understanding of the idea of
citizenship has been opened up for debate. The specific contexts, cultural, religious,
ethnic, linguistic etc. of citizens are now seen as determining citizenship in significant
ways. This ongoing contest aims to make visible those differences which liberal
theory saw as irrelevant for understanding citizenship. In most western societies
ethnic, religious and racial communities have pressed for rights which would look at
their special cultural contexts and substantiate the formal equality of citizenship. A
notion of differentiated citizenship has, therefore, gained currency within citizenship
theory to accommodate the needs of specific cultural groups. The term ‘Differentiated
Citizenship’ was first used by Iris Marion Young in 1989. It advocates the incorporation
of members of certain (cultural) groups not only as individuals, but also as members
of groups, their rights depending in part on this group membership catering to their
special needs. (Iris Marion Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the
Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, Ethics, 99, 1989.)

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Check Your Progress 2 Justice

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.
1) What are the broad historical periods over which the idea of citizenship can be
seen to have developed?
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2) What are the significant features of the modern notion of citizenship? What are
its limitations?
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17.3 CITIZENSHIP THEORY TODAY: DIVIDING LINES

Since the nineteen eighties, as we saw in the previous section, attempts have been
made to dislodge the rights-bearing individual from the core of citizenship theory. The
notion of individual rights has been counterbalanced by the claims of cultural
communities to special rights catering to their distinctive needs. The centrality of
rights in citizenship theory has also been questioned in some quarters and there
appears to be a revival of interest in the republican tradition of citizenship with its
emphasis on the primacy of common good and civic duties over individual/private
interests. We shall take up these two contests over the nature of citizenship in this
section.

17.3.1 Civic Republicanism and the Liberal Tradition

Before that, however, let us recollect here what we learnt in the earlier sections
about the two main strands in the theory of citizenship as they emerged in its
historical evolution viz., the classical tradition or civic republicanism, and the modern
liberal tradition. The dividing lines in citizenship theory today, in effect, emerge from
these two traditions of citizenship, each of which signifies two different understandings
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of what it means to be a citizen.
Rights, Equality, Liberty The first i.e. the republican tradition, describes citizenship as an office, a responsibility,
and Justice a burden proudly assumed; the second i.e. the liberal tradition, describes it as a status
and entitlement, a set of rights passively enjoyed. The first makes citizenship the core
of human life, the second makes it its outer frame. The first assumes a closely knit
body of citizens, its members committed to one another: the second assumes a
diverse and loosely connected body, its members (mostly) committed elsewhere.
According to the first, the citizen is the primary political actor, for the second, law-
making and administration is someone else’s business, the citizen’s business is private.
In the remainder of this section, we shall see that contests among citizenship theorists
today emanate from these two basic differences in the conceptualisation of the form
and substance of citizenship. (See Michael Walzer, ‘Citizenship’ in Terence Ball,
James Farr and Russell [Link] ed., Political Innovation and Conceptual Change,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989).

17.3.2 Dividing Lines: Individual Vs the Community

One set of division among citizenship theorists today can be seen along the lines of
the question, who or what forms the core of citizenship- the individual or the wider
context of which s/he is a part i.e., the cultural (ethnic, religious etc.) community. We
have seen that the liberal (individualist) notion of citizenship emerged as a strand in
the French revolutionary tradition and strengthened with the growth of capitalism.
The citizen in liberal theory is the free floating individual and citizenship is a legal
status which enables citizens to enjoy rights equally with other citizens each of whom,
however, pursues distinct personal interests. In this view, the conditions for an equal
enjoyment of rights is laid out by making irrelevant the particular contexts of individuals
i.e., their special circumstances defined by factors of birth viz., race, caste, culture,
ethnicity, gender etc.

This view is counterpoised by the Communitarians who, in the civic republican tradition,
assert the importance of the contexts of individuals in determining the extent to which
rights can be enjoyed equally with others. These theorists emphasise that instead of
masking these differences in the allocation of rights, effort must be made to take
account of the specificity of the different circumstances of citizens. An increasing
number of theorists referred to as ‘Cultural Pluralists’ argue that a large number of
ethnic, religious and linguistic groups feel excluded from the ‘common’ rights to
citizenship. These groups can be accommodated into common citizenship only by
adopting what Iris Marion Young calls ‘differentiated citizenship’ which means that
members of certain groups should be accommodated not only as individuals, but also
through the group and their rights would depend in part upon their group membership.
Young, among the most influential theorists of cultural pluralism, asserts that the
attempt to create a universal conception of citizenship which transcends group
differences is fundamentally unjust to historically oppressed groups: ‘In a society
where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that as citizens
persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences and adopt a
general point of view serves only to reinforce the privileged for the perspective and
interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public, marginalising or
silencing those of other groups’. (Young, 1989, p. 257)

17.3.3 Dividing Lines: Duties Vs Rights

The second set of divisions follows the same lines as the first. The contest here is
in terms of what are the defining premises of citizenship viz., the primacy of the
public/political and civic life or the primacy of individual interests and differences.
The concept of ‘civic virtue’ and ‘good’ citizenship which emerged in the classical
Graeco-Roman world forming part of the republican tradition and revived later in
Renaissance Italy and eighteenth century America and France, forms an integral part
of the notion of the citizenship which affords primacy to civic and public life. Those
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who subscribe to these ideas give importance to the notion of active citizenship. Justice
Citizenship in such a formulation becomes constitutive of civic duties, civic activity,
public spiritedness and active political participation. Where civic republicanism stresses
a stern adherence to the citizens’ duties towards civic life, the liberal notion gives
priority to individual interests and differences and stresses the citizens’ entitlement to
justice and rights. For them, the richness of private life is of primary importance and
citizenship is constitutive primarily of some fundamental rights. Rights are primary in
this formulation and their purpose is to protect the inner personal world and to provide
the freedom for private pursuits and individual creativity without encroachment from
conflicting interests. It may be noted here that in the civic republican tradition, rights
would be regarded as conditions which follow the exercise of a citizen’s duty to
participate in the political process rather than being the prior condition. Since the
nineteen eighties, this issue has been taken up in the growing debate between liberalism
and communitarianism. Communitarian theorists such as Alisdair MacIntyre (1981)
and Michael Sandel (1982) for example, dismiss the idea of the ‘unencumbered self’
or the de-contextualised individual of liberal theory. They argue that the ‘politics of
rights’ should be replaced by the ‘politics of common good’ by an ‘embedded self’.
In this view liberal individualism, by focussing on individual rights and entitlements,
weakens the bonds that give cohesion to society.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.
1) What are the main lines of division in citizenship theory and how do they follow
from the historical divide between civic republican and liberal traditions?
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17.4 CRITIQUES AND ALTERNATIVES: MARXIST,

FEMINIST AND GANDHIAN

While discussing the modern liberal notion of citizenship in an earlier section (17.2),
we also talked of its limitation. We mentioned primarily that the ability to exercise
rights or legal capacities, which constitute citizenship, are not available equally to all.
In other words, even when all individuals are formally invested with equal rights by
virtue of being citizens, these rights cannot in effect be enjoyed equally by all. The
specific contexts of individuals, their class, gender, their religious, ethnic and racial
identities, influence the extent to which rights are actually available. It is this inability
of liberal citizenship to take into account the contexts, which condition the exercise
of rights, which has been the focus of Marxist and Feminist critiques of citizenship.
In the following paragraphs, we shall see the flaws which Marxists and Feminists see
in the basic premises of citizenship. These flaws, according to them, make citizenship
a system, which mitigates some inequalities while perpetuating others. 13
Rights, Equality, Liberty 17.4.1 Redefining Citizenship: Marxist Critique of Liberal
and Justice
Citizenship
Citizenship was clearly outlined in the 1840s by Karl Marx in his study of the
Constitutions of the American and French Revolutions, from which modern citizenship
emerged. Marx’s objection to modern democratic or bourgeois citizenship can be
seen in his words, which follow:
‘The state in its own way abolishes distinctions based on birth, rank, education and
occupation when it declares birth, rank, education and occupation to be non-political
distinctions, when it proclaims that every number of people is an equal participant in
popular sovereignty regardless of these distinctions, when it treats all those elements
which make up the actual life of the people from the point of view of the state.
Nevertheless, the state allows private property, education and occupation to act and
assert their particular nature in their own way, i.e., as private property, education and
occupation. Far from abolishing these factual distinctions, the state presupposes them
in order to exist’. (‘On the Jewish Question’ in his Early Writings, Harmondsworth,
Penguin, 1975, p.219)
Marxist criticism of bourgeois citizenship has focussed, thus, on its failure to address
itself to inequalities in modern capitalist societies. In an inherently unequal system,
which thrives on producing and perpetuating class inequalities, rights, asserts the
Marxist critique, can only be ‘superficial trappings’ of equality. Civil and political
rights were the products of bourgeois revolutions, and developed, as shown by Marshall
in his historical study, alongside capitalism. While these rights alleviated some ill-
effects of capitalism, they did not intend to, and could not therefore, dismantle the
structures of inequality, which constitute capitalist societies.
Attacks in recent decades by a strand of liberal opinion on social rights, citizenship
rights which Marshall shows to have developed in the twentieth century catering to
the claims of marginalised sections of the population to welfare benefits from the
state, prompted some writers on the left to defend rights. Scholars like Amy
Bartholomew have put forward a case to show that the notion of ‘rich individuality’
and ‘self development’ in Marx’s notion of ‘human emancipation’, shows Marx’s
commitment to rights. Bartholomew argues that Marx’s criticism of rights is basically
directed towards the understanding of rights which identifies it with the ‘right of
man’- the so-called natural rights- which act as ‘boundary markers’ separating man
from man and the larger community of which he is a part. Rights for Marx contribute
to ‘rich individuality’ i.e., to the making of the creative individual whose potential is
realised most fully within and in harmony with the community.

17.4.2 Feminists redefine Citizenship

Feminists of all strands have criticised the gender neutrality and gender blindness of
citizenship theory i.e., its failure to take into account, (a) the patriarchal character of
modern societies and, (b) the manner in which gender determines access to citizenship
rights.
Feminists have pointed out that most historical conceptualisations of citizenship have
been inimical to women, either excluding them from citizenship altogether as in the
classical tradition, or integrating them, as in the French Revolutionary tradition, indirectly
and unequally as citizen consorts or companions of citizens (i.e., men). Carole Pateman
suggests that modern liberal citizenship while not entirely excluding women, incorporates
them on the basis of their socially useful/biologically determined (determined that is,
by their biological constitution and corresponding roles viz., child bearing and rearing).
(See Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract, The Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988;
Carole Pateman, ‘Equality, Difference, Subordination: The Politics of Motherhood
and Women’s Citizenship’ in Gisela Book and Susan James ed., Beyond Equality
and Difference, Routledge, London, 1992) Incorporation in this manner slots women
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into dependent roles as mothers and wives, placing them outside the sphere of Justice
politics, and distancing them from resources like education, property, job opportunities
etc., which, equip individuals for political participation.
The gender blindness of citizenship theory has been so pervasive, feminists argue,
that any account of the evolution of citizenship, can retain is coherence only by
moving women to the margins as aberrations in the general trend. Ursula Vogel
illustrates this with reference to Marshall’s study of citizenship. Marshall’s ‘main
story’ of the unfolding of citizenship as the gradual generalisation/universalisation of
rights, Vogel points out, can remain intact only by ‘including’ women as historical
anomalies i.e., as individuals whose position was ‘ peculiar’ and not relevant to the
main story. (See Ursula Vogel, ‘Is Citizenship Gender Specific’ in Ursula Vogel and
Michael Moran eds., The Frontiers of Citizenship, St. Martin’s Press, New York,
1991, pp.58-85).
Feminists have not only criticised the gendered conceptualization of citizenship, they
have also appealed for a broadening of the concept so as to include activities which
are seen as belonging to the private sphere. The idea is not only to focus on the
power relations which permeate the domain of private (marriage, family, sexuality),
but also to question the devaluation of the activities of the private realm. Maternalists
like Sara Ruddick and Jean Elshtain would, thus, like to see citizenship based on male
personalities and characteristics dismantled. They advocate the development in its
place of a new moral and ethical notion of citizenship based on ‘feminist ethics of
care’ i.e., feminine characteristics of love and compassion, dissolving in the process,
the distinction between male (public) and female (private) facets of life.

17.4.3 A Gandhian Notion of Citizenship

A Gandhian notion of citizenship can be seen as consisting of elements of civic
republicanism, identified as a commitment to the ‘common good’, civic duty and
active citizenship. The commitment in Gandhi to a community of interests is
interspersed, however, with an equally strong faith in individual autonomy and distrust
of the oppressive potential of state power. Distrust of the oppressive structures of the
modern state, much of which emanated from Gandhi’s experiences with the colonial
state in South Africa and India, shaped his commitment to a moral right of the
individual to rebel. Resisting an unjust government was an important element of
Gandhi’s ‘duties of citizenship’. This is brought out clearly in his enunciation of the
rules of ‘civil disobedience’ which obliged the civil resister to follow certain codes of
conduct while voluntarily breaking law and when imprisoned.
The rational (individual) citizen is at the core of Gandhi’s notion of active citizenship.
This citizen is, however, constrained by the commitment to ‘common good’. The main
elements of Gandhi’s notion of the ‘common good’ are: (a) societal interests are
above individual interests; (b) spiritualism is above materialism; (c) duties towards
society are prior to individual rights against the state or individual interests against
other members of society; (d) trusteeship of common possession of production; (e)
sarvodaya or the uplift of all abolishing distinctions of class, caste, religion, gender
etc., (f) faith in ‘shram’ or bread labour so that no one is dependent on another for
the fulfillment of their basic needs; and (g) a moral duty to create a just society
catering to human dignity.
Check Your Progress 4
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.
1) How have the Marxists and Feminists redefined the frontiers of citizenship?
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2) How does the Gandhian notion of citizenship combine individual autonomy with
the ideal of collective good?
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17.5 LET US SUM UP

Citizenship, in its modern understanding, refers to full and equal membership in the
political community, which refers in the present global context to the nation-state.
Citizenship, however, also provides a terrain where a number of views contest each
other over its form and substance. Historically, civic republicanism formed the most
influential understanding of citizenship. The dominant understanding of citizenship
today comes from the liberal tradition, which sees it as constituting a set of individual
rights. Cultural pluralists and communitarians, however, regard these rights as
meaningless, unless they also take into account the specific contexts of the rights
bearing individuals. The Marxists and Feminists would rather like to see citizenship
emerge from structures, which dismantle repressive social, economic and political
relationships of class and gender respectively. Another strand of thinking, following
the civic republican tradition, would like to see citizenship as a measure of activity,
as a manifestation of civic virtue and duties, which in turn would create an egalitarian
society/community. These diverse understandings of citizenship make it an important
concept and significant for understanding modern democratic societies.

17.6 KEY WORDS

Active citizenship : The notion of citizenship as a function of

‘responsible’ participation transcending its
passive connotation to become also a
measure of activity. The basis of a citizen’s
sense of belonging to the national community
would come, then, from the attitudes and
qualities of responsibility and virtues, which
distinguish her/him as a ‘good’ citizen.
16
Ascriptive hierarchies : A hierarchy denotes a pyramidal system of Justice
inequality- a vertically organised structure-
where those at the top dominate the rest.
Ascriptive hierarchies would refer to systems
where conditions of birth would determine
the hierarchical organisation of people. Caste
system is an example of ascriptive hierarchy.
Citizens : Citizens are full and equal members of a
political community, which in the present
global political structure takes the form of
the nation-state.
Citizenship : A relationship between the individual/
collectives and the state based on reciprocal
rights, duties and responsibilities.
Common Good : The idea of common good is based on the
premise that there may be numerous
differences in individual interests. But beyond
these, lies also an agreement over some basic
issues, which are generally seen as promoting
the interests and welfare of all. Thus, it may
be said that there exists beyond individual
interests, a substantive interest which caters
to all and where all the private interests are
seen to meet. This meeting point is the idea
of common good.
Community : A collection of people or social groups
distinguished by a strong collective identity
based on bonds of comradeship, loyalty, duty
as well as by ties of emotion and kinship.
Differentiated Citizenship : The concept advocates the incorporation of
members of certain (cultural) groups not only
as individuals, but also as members of groups,
their rights depending in part on this group
membership catering to their special needs.
Gender : Unlike sex, which points at biological
difference, gender refers to social and cultural
distinction between men and women.
According to feminists, gender discriminations
take place when biological differences
become the basis for different, dependent
and subservient social roles and positions for
women.
Globalisation : It refers to the web of interconnections/
interdependence between the local, regional,
national and international events, processes
and decisions which conditions the lives of
individuals worldwide.
Passive Citizenship : A political community’s emphasis on political
allegiances and civic loyalties within the
community rather than cultural/ emotional
identity. Citizenship has frequently been seen
as a manifestation of this allegiance, which
holds people together in a shared identity as
citizens. 17
Rights, Equality, Liberty Race : A scientifically and politically controversial
and Justice category, race refers to biological (genetic)
differences which supposedly distinguish one
group of people from another. For long, race
has been used to explain cultural differences
among people, and the attribution of
civilisational inferiority and backwardness to
some and superiority to others.

17.7 SOME USEFUL REFERENCES

Carole Pateman, ‘Equality, Difference, Subordination: The Politics of Motherhood

and Women’s Citizenship’ in Gisela Book and Susan James ed., Beyond Equality
and Difference, Routledge, London, 1992

Dawn Oliver and Derek Heater, The Foundation of Citizenship, Harvester

Wheatsheaf, New York. 1994.

J.M. Barbalet, Citizenship, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1988.

17.8 ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1

1) See Section 17.1

2) See Section 17.1 and especially, sub-section 17.1.2

Check Your Progress 2

1) See sub-section 17.1.2 and Section 17.2

2) See sub-sections 17.2.4 – 17.2.6

Check Your Progress 3

1) See Section 17.3

Check Your Progress 4

1) See sub-sections 17.4.1 and 17.4.2

2) See sub-section 17.4.3

18
 Justice
UNIT 18 EQUALITY

Structure
18.0 Objectives
18.1 Introduction
18.2 Different Types of Equality
18.2.1 Formal Equality
18.2.2 Equality of Opportunity
18.2.3 Equality of Outcomes
18.3 Some Basic Principles of Equality
18.4 Some Arguments Against Equality
18.5 Liberal Justification of Inequality
18.6 Equality and Feminism
18.7 Equality and Liberty
18.8 Let Us Sum Up
18.9 Some Useful References
18.10 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

18.0 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this unit is to understand the meaning of equality and address
some of the important theoretical issues connected with this concept. As you go
through this unit, you should be able to:
• Explain the concept of equality;
• Discuss some of the basic principles of equality;
• Explain formal equality, equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes;
• Examine some of the anti-egalitarian positions;
• Discuss the liberal justification of inequality; and finally
• Evaluate the relationship between equality and liberty.

18.1 INTRODUCTION

The idea of equality seems to be the central concern of modern politics and political
thought. Hierarchy in society based on birth was accepted as natural. This is no
longer the case, infact modern political thinking starts from the assumption that all
human beings are equal. The French Revolution in 1789 and the American Civil War
remain two very historically significant landmarks in the articulation of the idea of
democracy, equality and freedom. Medieval hierarchies were challenged by one, and
the other drew attention to inequalities based on race. However, the acceptance of
the idea of equality was not easy. Writing in 1931, R.H. Tawney lamented what he
described as the ‘Religion of Inequality’ in British society. What seems to have
bothered him was not just the existence of inequalities in society, but its acceptance
as natural and inevitable. In the post-second world war period, many changes have
taken place and the idea of equality has gained a much wider currency. The upsurge
in the colonized world added another significant dimension to the debate on equality,
as has the women’s movement.
19
Rights, Equality, Liberty In today’s context, we could say that equality has been accepted as a very important
and Justice principle of organizing human life; however, intense battles rage about where and
how should equality be applied? A much more contentious field is the application of
the principle of equality to the distribution of wealth and income in society. In this
context, it would be useful to mention that in recent years there has been a serious
resurgence of anti-egalitarian thinking reinforced by the growing popularity of that
school of political economy which argues that egalitarian measures stifle market
efficiency and in the long run, make everyone worse off.

Egalitarians are, thus, required to sharpen their arguments in response to a new set
of challenges; they usually set to do this by establishing clearly the fact that they are
not demanding absolute equality and hence, uniformity is not a part of their scheme
at all. On the contrary, what they seek to preserve, is variety.

18.2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF EQUALITY

18.2.1 Formal Equality

John Locke, the English philosopher remains one of the most eloquent defenders of
the idea of equality based on the natural equality of men. (Needless to add that in
Locke’s scheme of affairs, women did not feature at all!) Kant reinforced this
position further by talking about universality and equality as a consequence of this
universal humanity. Thus, formal equality came to imply that by virtue of their common
humanity, all individuals should be treated equally.

The most important expression of this idea is the principle of legal equality or equality
before the law. All individuals should be treated equally by the law irrespective of
their caste, race, colour, gender, religion, social background and so on. While this was
a welcome step in the fight against special privileges based on race, gender, social
background and other similar criterion, it remained a very limited notion on its own.
This principle ignores the fact that handicaps imposed by caste, gender or social
background could be so overwhelming that individuals would not be able to benefit
from the formal equality that the law bestows upon all individuals.

In this context, it would be appropriate to note that it was this inadequacy that led
Marx to examine this question in his essay ‘On the Jewish Question’. He contended
that formal equality while being a significant step forward could not bring about
human emancipation. While the market did free people from the barriers imposed by
social rank and other similar categories, it did nevertheless create differences based
on class that were upheld by the existence of private property. This implied that
individuals had starkly different market values and hence, Marxists describe formal
equality in this context as market equality, which is little more than a façade to
disguise the deeply unequal nature of society.

Today, egalitarians have moved away from the notion that all human beings are
created equally and hence, must have equal rights; this is so because of the fact that
in most of the important aspects, human beings are not equal. Therefore, today, the
word equality is used more in a prescriptive rather than a descriptive sense; those
policies would be backed that promote the ideal of equality without having to depend
upon some descriptive properties of human beings.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) Check your answer with that given at the end of the unit.

20
1) What was it that disturbed R.H. Tawney about the British society?
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2) What is the basic philosophy guiding the principle of formal equality?

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18.2.2 Equality of Opportunity

Understood very simply, equality of opportunity means the removal of all obstacles
that prevent personal self-development. It means that careers should be open to
talent and promotions should be based on abilities. Status, family connections, social
background and other similar factors must not be allowed to intervene.

Equality of opportunity is an extremely attractive idea that is concerned with what

is described as the starting point in life. The implication is that equality requires that
all individuals begin from a level playing field. However, the consequences of this
need not be egalitarian at all. Precisely because everyone started equally, unequal
outcomes are acceptable and legitimized. This inequality would then be explained in
terms of differing natural talents, ability to work hard or even luck.

Constructed like this, it seems that equality of opportunity provides the equal opportunity
to compete in a system that remains hierarchical. If so, then it does not appear to
be a substantially egalitarian principle. Equality of opportunity, thus, points to an
inegalitarian society, albeit based on the exalted ideal of merit. This idea rests itself
on the distinction between nature and convention, the argument being that distinctions
that emerge on the basis of different natural qualities like talents, skills, hard work
and so on are morally defensible. However, differences that emerge out of conventions
or socially created differences like poverty, homelessness are not. The fact, however,
is that it is a specific societal predilection that makes a natural distinction like beauty
or intelligence a relevant ground for making distinctions in society. Thus, we see that
the distinction between nature and convention is not as clear-cut as egalitarians imply.

Equality of opportunity is institutionalized through the acceptance of keeping careers

open to talents, providing fair equal opportunity, and the many variations on the
principle of positive discrimination. All of these work to make the system of inequality
21
Rights, Equality, Liberty seem reasonable and acceptable. The underlying assumption is that so long as the
and Justice competition has been fair, advantage itself is beyond criticism. There is no doubt that
a system such as this would create people, who concentrate only on their talents and
individual attributes. This robs them of any feeling of community with their people,
because they can only think in terms of competing. Perhaps, the only community this
can create is a community of the successful on the one hand, and a community of
the unsuccessful on the other which blames itself for its supposed failure. Yet another
problem with equality of opportunity is that it seeks to create an artificial disjunction
between the successes and failures of one generation and the next.

Thus, it is seen that the liberal position on equality is based on equality of opportunity.
This advocacy is contrary to any substantive idea of equality because these are
opportunities which lead to unequal outcomes. This principle is, thus, unconcerned
with the outcomes and is interested only in the procedure. This is entirely in keeping
with the liberal idea that individuals are the basic unit of society and society must
make it possible for individuals to satisfy their own interests.

Does this mean that egalitarians would ignore equality of opportunity? The answer
is clearly no. However, they would work with a wider definition of equality of
opportunity that would give everyone the means to develop their capacities in a
satisfying and fulfilling way. An egalitarian society would not deny to some people
the genuine opportunity to develop their capacities. The genuine egalitarian use of this
opportunity would be to lead a worthwhile life. Since it is not possible to ensure that
each individual leads a worthwhile life, what egalitarians would try for would be the
creation of social conditions that give the opportunity to all individuals to lead
worthwhile lives.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) Check your answer with that given at the end of the unit.
1) What is the basic liberal idea about individuals, which makes them defend
equality of opportunities in a largely unequal context?
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2) Explain the egalitarian position on equality of opportunity.

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22
18.2.3 Equality of Outcomes Justice

Yet another articulation of the idea of equality would be in terms of the equality of
outcomes, moving away from the starting point in life to look at the outcome. Marx,
for instance, was of the opinion that any right to equality circumscribed by a bourgeois
economy can only be partial. He, thus, argued for absolute social equality, possible
only if private property was abolished. Defenders of equality of outcome believe that
the guarantee of all other equalities would be inadequate so long as equality of
outcome is not ensured.

Critics of equality of outcome point out that such a pursuit would only lead to
stagnation, injustice and worse of all tyranny. Hayek, for instance, has argued people
being very different have different aspirations and goals and any system that treats
them equally actually results in inequality. The drive for equality, it is argued, is at the
cost of individual liberty. The imposition of socialist egalitarian measures, it is argued,
undermine the dignity and self-respect of the individual and the inherent paternalism
accompanying such measures denies the ability of the individual to be a rational
chooser.

18.3 SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY

Egalitarians do not believe that everybody is same or should be the same. It is not
a simple mathematical idea. It would help us to put down some of the core principles
that egalitarians would be committed to. The first commitment is to the idea that
every individual has a right to the satisfaction of his or her basic needs and a society
characterised by wide disparities in the standard of living is not acceptable to them.
They are committed to a society where living conditions are not just bearable, but are
capable of providing a satisfying and fulfilling life to all.

Another significant principle is that of equal respect, which implies opposition to any
form of degrading treatment or circumstances; ideally, a society based on fellow
feeling. An egalitarian position would oppose huge differences in income and wealth
not only between individuals, but even between nations. It would also involve democratic
control of the economy and the workplace, apart from the possibility of dignified,
interesting and safe work for everyone. Political equality, needless to add, is not just
the right to vote or to stand for any public office, but a wide network of civil rights
and a democratic participation in all aspects of life so that individuals are enabled to
control and shape their lives in a more significant way.

Sexual, racial, ethnic and religious equality are some of the other components of the
complex idea of equality. Needless to add that one cannot aim at a totally exhaustive
list of equalities, and in that lies the reforming potential of the concept of equality.

18.4 SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST EQUALITY

Equality, it is argued, is a concept that is untenable in reality because society and

social processes are likened to a competition in which not everyone can end up being
a winner. We have already noted such objections earlier in the context of our discussion
or equality of outcomes. What one could say in response is that this objection
emerges out of a specific construction of the nature of society and the individual.

In recent times, the names of Hayek, Friedman and Nozick are associated with the
position that holds egalitarianism as a threat to freedom. Nozick is particularly critical
of liberals like John Rawls and Dworkin for their commitment to welfare provisions
in order to enlarge equality of opportunity. In response to those who say that inequality
in society undermines self-respect, libertarians like Nozick argue that on the contrary, 23
Rights, Equality, Liberty it is egalitarianism that robs people of their self-respect. Nozick claims that inegalitarian
and Justice societies show more respect for individuals by acknowledging the distinctiveness of
each individual and the difference between individuals. Since an egalitarian society
would be bereft of any differences based on power, rank, income or social status,
there would be no basis for self-esteem, because self-esteem is based on criteria that
differentiate people.

A very strong objection comes from those who believe that any attempt to establish
equality results in the strengthening of the state and thereby, weakens individual
freedom. This is at the heart of the well known question in western political theory
of the relationship between equality and liberty which we will address a little later.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) Check your answer with that given at the end of the unit.
1) Explain how according to Nozick an egalitarian society robs people of their
self-respect.
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18.5 LIBERAL JUSTIFICATION OF INEQUALITY

Liberals reject sex, race, or class as the relevant criteria for treating people differently,
but they do believe that it is just and fair if inequalities are earned and deserved by
virtue of their different desert or merit. Thus, liberal theory holds stubbornly that so
long as inequality can be justified on the basis of rewards or desert for special
qualities and abilities or special contribution to society, it is acceptable. One cannot
help note here that what is meritorious, special or a contribution to the society are
all circumscribed by the specificities of the society in question. Moreover, it is very
difficult to isolate the worth of an individual’s contribution, and if one takes back after
contributing, then is one really contributing anything at all? This whole position seems
to contradict the basic liberal position that all individuals have equal worth and respect
and reduces people to a bundle of talents and abilities.
In recent times, however, modern liberals such as Rawls and Dworkin have rejected
merit and desert as a criteria for justifying inequality. Instead, they advocate an
equality of consideration based on the equal moral worth of all individuals, irrespective
of their differing individual talents or skills. They base this equality on the idea that
all human beings are equally endowed with the ability to make choices and formulate
life plans. Rawls, for instance, rejects as morally arbitrary the distribution of rewards
according to ability or effort, for differences in abilities and skills he contends, are
simply facts of nature and no one is to gain or suffer because of the presence or an
absence of these skills or abilities. Hence, he advocates the treatment of these
natural abilities as a social asset so that the ‘basic structure of society can be
arranged so that these contingencies work to the good of the least fortunate’.
The so called ‘Difference Principle’ that Rawls enunciates, is to his mind, the best
24 principle for ensuring that natural assets do not lead to unfair advantages. The
principle requires that social and economic inequalities should be so arranged that Justice
they are both a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and b) attached to
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. This,
thus, unlike the traditional liberal rights is a much wider understanding of equality.
Unequal rewards are justified not on the basis of differing abilities, but as incentives
so that they benefit the least advantaged. Dworkin also expresses displeasure with
the traditional liberal ideas on equality and accepts the need for some redistribution
and welfare polices.

Macpherson has criticised Rawlsian equality on the grounds that it assumes the
inevitability of institutionalized inequalities between classes. In doing this, Rawls ignores
the fact that class based inequalities create unequal power relationships among individuals
of different classes and would thus, impinge on other aspects of equality.

18.6 EQUALITY AND FEMINISM

Feminists try to look at the issue of equality through the gender lens. An important
book in this respect is Susan Okin’s Justice, Gender and the Family (1980). It has
been argued that equal opportunities legislation or redistributive justice through the
extension of equality principles to different areas, in essence, cannot create equality
as these rules and principles operate in an environment which is already contaminated
by the inequality between the sexes: an inequality brought about by social practices.
Many of these practices are not directly discriminatory toward women, but their
overall effect is to reinforce inequality and give it a veneer of legitimacy. Thus,
although the law may not formally differentiate between the sexes, it is the case that
women tend to get segregated into particular occupations and married women who
have careers are especially disadvantaged in a gender-biased society.

Feminists point out that the position of women’s substantive inequality – their weak
voice in familial decision making, their duty of child rearing and the subsequent
withdrawal from the labour market – has nothing to do with natural and spontaneous
operation of choices, but because roles are socially constructed.

However, at the same time, it would perhaps be resented even by the feminists, if
the state is involved, especially in family life, for eradicating gender differentiation.
It is, perhaps, easier, to be aware of gender inequality and to locate into the social
practices and the socially structured roles, but it is difficult to go for a remedial
measure. Unless the women themselves become aware of their inequality, of their
subordinate role in family, and come forward to re-orient the social constructions,
nothing concrete with respect to gender equality can be achieved.

18.7 EQUALITY AND LIBERTY

It is often claimed that liberty and equality are anti-thetical, and that this conflict
therefore is irreconciliable. De Tocqueville saw equality as posing a likely danger to
liberty, fearing as he did mass conformity and the tyranny of the majority. Friedman,
Nozick and Hayek are some of the more recent names associated with this position.
What such a position does is to deliberately pose a contradiction between liberty and
equality by suggesting that attempts to establish equality immediately imply coercion
and loss of liberty. They imply that since individuals are different in terms of their
skills and abilities, differences in their lives are bound to exist, and thus there is bound
to be a natural tendency towards inequality. Any attempt to correct this will have to
be accompanied by authoritarian suppression and hence, loss of liberty.

There is here a deliberate attempt to equate equality with uniformity; an egalitarian

society is not a uniform society. It would be a society where every individual given 25
Rights, Equality, Liberty her or his individual and differing talents could enjoy an equally worthwhile and
and Justice satisfying life.
Those who argue that equality and liberty are irreconcilable begin with a specific
understanding of liberty; what has been described as the ‘negative conception’ of
liberty. Infact, they contend that positive concept of liberty is not liberty at all, but
something masquerading as liberty. The negative picture of liberty sees liberty as the
absence of deliberate interference in an individual’s life.
On the contrary, they see freedom as the availability and the ability to make choices
that are meaningful and effective. Such an understanding of liberty would immediately
link it to the issues of access to structures of social and institutional power, fulfillment
of material and economic requirements, and of course, the possession of education
and knowledge. Therefore, egalitarians hold that equality in terms of social power,
economic wealth and education is essential to ensure that everyone has an equally
worthwhile and satisfying life. In doing this, egalitarians are pursuing equality
stifled by social and institutional structures of power. Liberty is seriously hampered
by the wide disparities of wealth. Education, by opening our minds and educating us
with various skills is undoubtedly a liberating factor. Therefore, any inequality in
access to any of these elements would, it can be argued, limit the individual’s ability
to lead a meaningful and satisfying life, which to the egalitarians is the essence of
the idea of liberty.
Egalitarians are arguing that human beings do not become free simply by being left
alone. They argue that power, wealth and education are the basic sources of liberty
and a society that cannot ensure equality in these aspects cannot be a free society.
Thus, we see that liberty and equality far from being anti-thetical are actually not just
compatible, but dependent on one other.
Most of the twentieth century was a time when equality barely stood in need of
justification. It was seen as the central principle around which nations and societies
were to organise themselves. However towards the close of this century, there is a
serious intellectual as well as a political attempt to present equality as morally
undesirable. The inviolable nature of the right to property and the essentially plural
nature of society, the anti-egalitarians claim, would be severely threatened by a
pursuit of equality.

18.8 LET US SUM UP

In this unit, we tried to examine what the concept of equality means. It is particularly
significant given the fact that we live in a society that is battling against various kinds
of inequalities. Equality in its most restricted sense is formal equality, which subscribes
to the notion of universal humanity of all human beings. Equality of opportunity, which
we saw, can be used to ultimately justify inequality. Equality of outcomes stretches
the meaning of the term equality. We also took stock of the modern liberal defense
of equality and how it justifies inequality, only if it works to the maximum advantage
of the worst off in society. We also took note of the feminist critique of equality.
Finally, we examined the debate about the relationship between equality and liberty,
and saw that a negative conception of liberty makes the two concepts appear
conflictual.

18.9 SOME USEFUL REFERENCES

David Held, Political Theory Today
N. P. Barry, Norman, An Introduction to Modern Political Theory, Macmillan,
London, 2000
26 Robert M. Stewart, Readings in Social and Political Philosophy
 Justice
18.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS
EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1

1) Tawney was disturbed not just by the existence of inequality, but the acceptance
of this inequality as natural and inevitable.

2) The basic philosophy guiding formal equality is that since all human beings have
been created equally, they should be treated as equals.

Check Your Progress 2

1) It is the liberal idea that individuals are the basic unit of society and society must
make it possible for individuals to satisfy their own interests.

2) An egalitarian society would not deny to some people the genuine opportunity
to develop their capacities. The genuine egalitarian use of this opportunity
would be to lead a worthwhile life. Since it is possible to ensure that each
individual leads a worthwhile life, what egalitarians would try for would be the
creation of social conditions that give the opportunity to all individuals to lead
worthwhile lives.

Check Your Progress 3

1) Nozick claims that inegalitarian societies show more respect for individuals by
acknowledging distinctiveness of and difference between individuals. Since an
egalitarian society would be bereft of any differences based on power, rank,
income or social status, there would be no basis for self-esteem, because self-
esteem is based on criteria that differentiate people.

27
Rights, Equality, Liberty
and Justice UNIT 19 LIBERTY

Structure
19.0 Objectives
19.1 Introduction
19.2 The Meaning of Liberty
19.3 [Link]’s Notion of Liberty
19.4 Isaiah Berlin and the Two Concepts of Liberty
19.5 Marxist Critique and the Idea of Freedom
19.6 Other Contemporary Ideas on Liberty
19.7 Let Us Sum Up
19.8 Keywords
19.9 Some Useful References
19.10 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

19.0 OBJECTIVES

Liberty is considered a core concept and a fundamental democratic value in modern

political and social theory. The notion of liberty emerged in the context of the formation
of modern civil society and political authority. While the concept is intimately associated
with liberal thought, liberals have looked at the notion in different ways. Marxists are
critical of liberal notions of liberty and would refashion the concept on entirely
different assumptions of individual and society. In this unit, we shall look at different
perspectives on liberty, and try to understand the meanings, justifications and limits
of the notion. The unit has been divided into different sections, each dealing with a
specific aspect of the notion. There are a set of questions at the end of the unit for
self-assessment, and a list of readings to help enhance your understanding.

19.1 INTRODUCTION

The idea of liberty as a core principle of liberal thought, is most commonly understood
as ‘absence of restraints’. The notion of liberty emerged in the context of the
establishment of new socio-economic and political relationships in modern Europe. At
the basis of the notion was the idea of a rational individual, capable of taking reasoned
decisions. The rational individual, it was thought, was capable of self-determination;
in other words, capable of taking decisions which concerned his or her self. In order
to develop his capacities, the individual required freedom from all kinds of social,
political and economic constraints. Thus, the idea of liberty as absence of restraints,
or a sphere of autonomy of the individual, developed. At the same time, however, the
fact that within a social organization the individual is not alone and exists in relation
with other individuals, required that an equal claim of other individuals to their spheres
of autonomy should be recognized. In order that the respective claims of all individuals
to autonomy can be realized with minimum conflict, it was imperative that a system
of restraints and regulation was worked out and adhered to by everyone. The theories
of social contract put forward by philosophers like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau put
forth the idea of liberty as absence of constraints. At the same time, they also
proposed the framework within which individual freedom was to unfold. Thus, the
idea of political community was based on a simultaneous recognition of the capacities
and autonomy of individuals and the imperatives that all should be subjected to a
common set of constraints on their liberty.
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Thus, it must be understood that liberty, which in common understanding means Justice
freedom, or absence of constraints and obstacles to individual action, and is considered
a democratic ideal, has always been conceived as occurring within a set of specific
constraints in social relationships. There are always limits to what is seen as acceptable
forms of liberty in modern democratic societies. In the section which follows, we
shall look at the meaning of liberty, focussing on its elements and the justifications for
constraints on liberty.

19.2 THE MEANING OF LIBERTY

As mentioned in the introduction, liberty means freedom from, or absence of restraints.

A person may be considered free or at liberty to do something when his or her
actions and choices are not hindered or constrained by those of another. It is important
to understand that constraints refer to impediments imposed by political and other
authorities. Thus, imprisonment, bondage or slavery, subjection to laws, etc., may be
seen as referring to conditions of unfreedom or absence of liberty. While states of
unfreedom like imprisonment or subjection to laws may appear as constraints on
liberty, we know that modern democratic social and political organisations are founded
on legal and institutional structures, which aim at ensuring equal consideration of each
individual’s liberty. No society will, therefore, have an unlimited ‘right to liberty’. Each
society will have a set of restrictions on liberty, which are justified by the fact that
people accept those restrictions as the best possible conditions in which liberty could
be maximised.

The understanding of liberty as ‘absence of restraints’ or ‘absence of external

constraints’ is generally described as ‘negative’. The ‘negative’ nature of liberty
appears in two different senses:

a) In the first, law is seen as the main obstacle to freedom. Hobbes, for instance,
described freedom as the ‘silence of the laws’. Such a view sees freedom as
limited only by what others deliberately prevent individuals from doing. This
understanding would, therefore, appear to imply a definite limit upon both law and
government. Philosophers like John Locke have, however, pointed out that a
commitment to liberty does not mean that the law should be abolished. Rather,
it means that law should be restricted to the protection of one’s liberty from
encroachment by others. Locke suggested therefore, that law does not restrict
liberty, it rather enlarges and defends it.

b) The second view sees liberty as ‘freedom of choice’. Milton Friedman for
example in his work, Capitalism and Freedom (1962) proposes that ‘economic
freedom’ consists of freedom of choice in the marketplace – the freedom of
consumer to choose what to buy, the freedom of the worker to choose his job
or profession and the freedom of the producer to choose what to produce and
whom to employ. ‘To choose’ implies that the individual can make unhindered
and voluntary selection from a range of different options (See Andrew Heywood,
Political Theory, pp.259-261).

While talking about liberty, a distinction is often made between negative and positive
notions of liberty i.e., between the idea of ‘absence of external constraints’ and ‘the
existence of conditions which enable or facilitate’. In other words, the distinction
between ‘freedom to do’ something and actually being able to do it. To be free
or at liberty to do something is not to be restrained or prevented from doing it. While
to be able to do is to have the capacity, financial or otherwise, to do something. For
example, one may be free or unrestrained to take up any job, yet, one may not have
the qualifications or the economic resources which may make one’s candidature
worthwhile. Political theorists often make this distinction between liberty as an absence
29
Rights, Equality, Liberty of restraints and the conditions which make liberty worthwhile. A starving person
and Justice who is legally free (not prevented from) to eat in an expensive restaurant, may in
fact, enjoy no liberty on the basis of the legal freedom. The freedom to eat in this
case will require some positive action by the state. It is this reasoning that has been
used to justify social legislation designed to increase opportunities for individuals. By
such positive action, the state is said to be not only decreasing inequality, but increasing
liberty (Norman Barry, An Introduction to Modern Political Theory, Macmillan,
London, 2000, p.194)

The negative conception of liberty is a characteristic of a strand of English political

thought represented by Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick,
Herbert Spencer and the classical and neo-classical economists who supported the
claims of individuals to break free from unnecessary restraints of arbitrary government.
The main political axiom of negative liberty was that ‘everyone knows his own
interest best’ and that the state should not decide the individual’s ends and purposes.
Essential to the doctrine was the sanctity of the contract. Implicit in this assumption
of sanctity was the understanding that the act of entering into a contract, even if the
terms of the contract were restrictive of individual freedom, was an expression of
liberty, of the exercise of individual choice. Thus, to this strand of thinkers, a person’s
liberty was a function of that area in which he was left alone and not related to the
quality of action. The concept of negative liberty is best understood as a doctrine
about the meaning of liberty. Although negative liberty is often condemned as the
‘freedom to starve’, this understanding is somewhat misleading. It does not necessarily
put a prohibition on state intervention, but merely holds that this cannot be justified
on the ground that it increases freedom, although arguments from the arena of
inequality may be called into force for justification. However, the historical connection
between negative liberty and the lasseiz-faire economics cannot be denied, and most
of its advocates favoured a minimal state. The concept is neutral in the sense that
it is compatible with a wide range of politics, and describes a condition of liberty
without indicating whether it is good or not.

Criticisms of the negative notion of liberty have come from modern liberals, social
democrats and socialists. The liberals in the nineteenth century, primarily [Link]
and to some extent [Link], developed some of the earliest critiques of negative
freedom. They felt that capitalism had done away with feudal hierarchies and legal
restrictions (especially of economic pursuits), but it had also subjected large masses
of people to poverty, unemployment and disease. Such circumstances were seen as
hindering liberty as much as legal restraints and social controls. One of the first
liberals to embrace the positive notion of liberty was [Link] (1836-82), who
defined freedom as the ability of people ‘to make the most and best of themselves’.
This freedom consisting not merely of being left alone, but in having the power to act,
shifting attention thereby to the opportunities available to each individual. (Andrew
Heywood, Political Theory, p.262) The concept of positive liberty has been at the
basis of the Welfare State. The idea has acted as the moving force behind social
welfare provisions taken up by states, combining thereby freedom with equality.

In the section, which follows, Mill’s notion of liberty will be taken up for study. Mill
appears to endorse a negative conception of freedom, or the individual’s sovereign
control over his/her body and mind. In the ultimate analysis, however, Mill’s notion
of ‘individuality’ brought him closer to a positive notion of liberty.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.
1) Trace the development of the idea of liberty.
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2) Distinguish between positive and negative conceptions of liberty.

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19.3 J.S. MILL’S NOTION OF LIBERTY

[Link]’s On Liberty was influential in the academic debates in the 1960s. Mill’s
work is seen as an exposition of the negative concept of liberty. At the basis of Mill’s
arguments for individual freedom lay a strong sense of contempt for custom, and for
legal rules and norms which could not be rationally justified. It is also sometimes
argued that for Mill any free action, no matter how immoral, had some element of
virtue in it, by the fact that it was freely performed. While Mill considered restraint
on individual’s actions evil, he did not consider restraints to be entirely unjustifiable.
He felt, however, that within the society there was always a presumption in favour
of liberty. Any constraints on liberty, therefore, had to be justified by those who
applied them.

For, Mill, the purpose of liberty was to encourage the attainment of ‘individuality’.
Individuality refers to the distinctive and unique character of each human individual,
and freedom means the realisation of this individuality, i.e., personal growth or self-
determination. It was the property of individuality in human beings that made them
active rather than passive, and critical of existing modes of social behaviour, enabling
them to refuse to accept conventions unless they were found reasonable. Freedom
in Mill’s framework, therefore, appears not simply as the absence of restraints but
the deliberate cultivation of certain desirable attitudes. It is because of this that Mill
is often seen as gravitating towards a positive conception of liberty. Mill’s conception
of freedom is also rooted in the notion of choice. This is evident from his belief that
a person who lets others ‘choose his plan of life for him’ does not display the faculty
of ‘individuality’ or self-determination. The only faculty he or she seemed to possess
was the ‘apelike’ faculty of ‘imitation’. On the other hand, a person ‘who chooses
to plan for himself, employs all his faculties’ (1974, p, 123). In order to realise one’s
individuality, and attain thereby the condition of freedom, it was essential that individuals
resist forces or norms and customs which hindered self-determination. Mill, however,
was also of the view that very few individuals possessed the capacity to resist and
make free choices. The rest were content to submit to ‘apelike imitation’, existing
thereby in a state of unfreedom. Mill’s conception of liberty can be seen for this
reason as elitist, since individuality could be enjoyed only by a minority and not the
masses at large.
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Rights, Equality, Liberty Mill as other liberals, emphasised a demarcation of the boundaries between the
and Justice individual and society. While talking about reasonable or justifiable restrictions on
individual liberty, Mill distinguished between self-regarding and other-regarding actions,
i.e., actions, which affected the individual only, and actions which affected the society
at large. Any restriction or interference with an individual could be justified only to
prevent harm to others. Over actions that affected only himself, the individual was
sovereign. Such an understanding of legal and societal constraints conveys the idea
of a society in which the relationship between individual and society is not ‘paternal’,
i.e., the individual being the best judge of his interests, law and society could not
intervene to promote a person’s ‘best interests’. Similarly, the idea that an act can
be constrained only if it harmed others, rules out the idea that some acts are intrinsically
immoral and therefore, must be punished irrespective of whether they affect anyone
else. Further, Mill’s framework rules out ‘utilitarianism’, as enunciated by Bentham,
which would justify interference if it maximized the general interest. Yet, the
demarcation between the individual and the society is not strict in Mill in the sense
that all acts do affect others in some way, and Mill believed that his principle did not
preach a moral indifference towards the self-regarding behaviour of others, and felt
that it was permissible to use persuasion to discourage immoral behaviour. Also, Mill
strongly believed in the instrumental value of liberty in the promotion of social goods.
This is especially true of his arguments for the complete liberty of thought, discussion
and expression and the right to assembly and association. Mill felt that all restrictions
on free discussion should be removed because truth would emerge from the free
competition of ideas. It may be pointed out that in today’s catalogue of liberties,
freedom of expression is valued perhaps more than economic liberty as a democratic
ideal. Free exchange between individuals is undoubtedly an important exercise of
liberty and a society, which forbade all kinds of liberty and allowed this would still
be relatively free. (See Norman Barry, An Introduction to Modern Political Theory,
Chapter: Liberty)

19.4 ISAIAH BERLIN AND THE TWO CONCEPTS OF

LIBERTY

In his now classic Two Concepts of Liberty (first published in 1958) Isaiah Berlin
tries to reconcile the negative and positive notions of liberty, i.e., the notion of liberty
as the absence of restraints with the various views pertaining to its operation within
the social context. For Berlin, the ‘negative’ notion of liberty can be understood by
addressing the following question: ‘What is the area within which the subject – a
person or group of persons - is or should be left to do or be what he is able to be,
without interference by other persons?’ (1969, p.121). On the other hand, the positive
sense is concerned with the answer to the question: ‘what, or who, is the source of
control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than
that?’ (1969, p.122).

Positive liberty, on the other hand, does not interpret freedom as simply being left
alone but as ‘self-mastery’. The theory involves a special theory of the self. The
personality is divided into a higher and a lower self. The higher self is the source of
an individual’s genuine and rational long-term goals, while the lower self caters to his
irrational desires which are short-lived and of transient nature. A person is free to
the extent that his higher self, is in command of his lower self. Thus, a person might
be free in the sense of not being restrained by external forces, but remains a slave
to irrational appetites; as a drug addict, an alcoholic or a compulsive gambler might
be said to be unfree. The main feature of this concept is its openly evaluative nature,
its use is specifically tied to ways of life held to be desirable. The idea of positive
liberty involves a special interpretation of the self and assumes not just that there is
a realm of activity towards which the individual ought to direct herself/himself.
32
The notion suggests that the individual is being liberated when he or she is directed Justice
towards it. Critics of Berlin’s notion of positive liberty feel that a belief in positive
liberty may involve the idea that all other values, equality, rights, justice etc., are
subordinate to the supreme value of higher liberty. Also, the idea that the higher
purposes of the individual are equivalent to those of collectivities such as classes,
nations and race, may lead to the espousal of totalitarian ideologies.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) See the end of the unit for tips on your answer.
1) Critically examine either J.S. Mill’s or Isaiah Berlin’s views on liberty.
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19.5 MARXIST CRITIQUE AND THE IDEA OF

FREEDOM

The Marxist concept of freedom is different from the liberal views, which have been
discussed above. The main points of difference emerge from the Marxist understanding
of the individual and society, the relationship between the individual and society, and
the Marxist critique of capitalist society. While the liberal view is based on the
centrality of the individual and his freedom of choice, the Marxists would see the
notion of liberty based on the liberal notion of individual and society as conditions of
unfreedom. For Marxists, the individual is not separated from other individuals in
society by boundaries of autonomous spaces for the free exercise of choice. They
are rather bound together in mutual dependence. The notion of individuality is likewise
transformed into a notion of rich individuality, which emphasises the social embeddedness
of the individual, the idea that individuals can reach a state of creative excellence and
develop their capacities only in a society which seeks the development of all its
members. For the Marxists, therefore, freedom lies in the development of creative
individuality, and cannot be achieved in a capitalist society where individuals are
separated by boundaries of self-interest and where they can only imagine themselves
to be free when in reality they are bound by structures of exploitation. It is only in
a society, which is free from the selfish promotion of private interests that a state of
freedom can exist. Freedom, thus, cannot be achieved in a capitalist society.

These views have been articulated in Friedrich Engel’s Anti-Duhring and Karl
Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Engels discusses the
notion of freedom as a state of transition from necessity to freedom. The state of
necessity is defined by a situation in which the individual is subjected to another’s
will. Engels points out that man has the capacity to identify and understand the
forces, which condition and determine his life. Man has, thus, obtained scientific 33
Rights, Equality, Liberty knowledge about the laws of nature, which determine his existence and also learnt
and Justice how to live with these laws in the best possible way. Ironically, man has not been
able to break free from the bondage of the forces of production, which have historically
kept him under subjection, or in other words, confined him to the realm of necessity.
In order to reach a state of freedom, man not only has to have knowledge of human
history, but also the capacity to change it. It is only with the help of scientific
socialism that man can hope to leave the realm of necessity and enter the realm of
freedom. Freedom is a significant component of the idea of the communist society
laid down by Marx and Engels in Communist Manifesto. It was only in a communist
society where there will be no class exploitation that freedom will be achieved.

In his work Manuscripts, Karl Marx avers that the capitalist society is dehumanizing.
It not only alienates the individual from his true self, it separates him from the
creative influences of society. Marx proposes that it is only by transforming those
conditions in which alienation takes place, can freedom be restored. Thus, it was only
in a communist society where the means of production were socially owned, and
each member of society worked in cooperation with the other for the development
of all, that true freedom could be achieved. Thus, in Marx’s framework, freedom is
seen in a positive sense, denoting self-fulfillment and self-realsation, or the realisation
of one’s true nature. Marx described the true realm of freedom as ‘the development
of freedom for its own sake’. This potential could be realised, Marx believed, only
by the experience of creative labour, working together with others to satisfy our
needs. Under this framework, Robinson Crusoe, who enjoyed the greatest possible
measure of negative freedom, since no one else on his island could check or constrain
him, was a stunted and therefore unfree individual, deprived of the social relationships
through which human beings achieve fulfilment. This notion of freedom is clearly
reflected in Marx’s conception of ‘alienation’. Under capitalism, labour is reduced to
a mere commodity controlled and shaped by de-personalised market forces. In Marx’s
view, capitalist workers suffer from alienation in that they are separated from their
own true nature: they are alienated from the product of their labour, alienated from
the process of labour itself, alienated from their fellow human beings, and, finally
alienated from their ‘true’ selves. Freedom is, therefore, linked to the personal fulfilment
which only unalienated labour can bring about (Andrew Heywood, Political Theory,
p.263).

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.
1) Critically examine the Marxist critique of liberty.
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 Justice
19.6 OTHER CONTEMPORARY IDEAS ON LIBERTY

Apart from Berlin whose work is perhaps the most significant among the contemporary
works on liberty, there are other thinkers who have discussed the idea of liberty
elaborating upon the ideas expressed by thinkers on both sides of the ideological
divide. Milton Friedman, like Mill and Berlin was a liberal who in his work Capitalism
and Freedom developed a notion of liberty as a significant aspect of capitalist
society. The freedom of exchange was an essential aspect of liberty. To promote this
freedom, Friedman required the state to give up its concern for welfare and social
security and devote itself to maintaining law and order, protecting property rights,
implementing contracts etc. For Friedman, not only was liberty essential for free and
voluntary exchange among individuals, it was only within a capitalist society that this
freedom could be achieved. Moreover, it was economic freedom that provided the
opportune and essential condition for political liberty.

In his work The Constitution of Liberty (1960), [Link] has propounded a theory
of liberty, which emphasises the negative role of the state. For Hayek, a state of
liberty is achieved when the individual is not subject to the arbitrary will of another
individual. Hayek calls this individual freedom and distinguishes it from other forms
of freedom, establishing at the same time the primacy and independence of individual
liberty from other forms of freedom, including political freedom. Hayek recommends
that the original meaning of liberty as the ‘absence of restraints’ should be preserved.
The enlargement of state intervention in the name of freedom would mean the
demise of real liberty which consists in the freedom of individual from restraints.

Another group of thinkers evidently influenced by the Marxist notion of freedom,

emphasised that liberty as practiced in modern capitalist societies breeds loneliness.
Eric Fromm (1900-1980) explained that in modern societies aloofness was brought
about owing to the separation of the individual from his creative capacities and social
relations. This separation generated physical and moral aloofness in the individual
affecting his mental well-being. It was only through creative and collective work that
the individual could restore himself to society. Herbert Marcuse in his work One-
Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (1968),
also explored the nature of alienation in capitalist societies. Marcuse asserts that the
creative multidimensional capacities of the individual get thwarted in capitalist societies.
Man is able to express himself only as a consumer constantly engaged in the satisfaction
of his physical needs.

Check Your Progress 4

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.
1) Discuss some of the other contemporary ideas on liberty.
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Rights, Equality, Liberty
and Justice 19.7 LET US SUM UP

The idea of liberty is at the core of liberal thought, which places the rational individual
at its center and draws a boundary between the individual and his/her sphere of
autonomy, the state and the society. Liberty in its common understanding means an
‘absence of constraints’. In other words, it signifies a condition in which an individual
who is capable of taking reasoned decisions pertaining to his/her own affairs is free
to take any action without and restraints from outside, including state and society. At
the same time, however, the notion of liberty, evolved at the same time as the idea
of a political community and political authority. This simultaneous evolution has meant
an equal recognition of the liberties of all individuals and the understanding that
reasonable restrictions on individual liberty could be justified on the grounds that they
provided the conditions in which individual liberty could be enjoyed without conflict.
The idea of liberty as the absence of restraints is associated with a ‘negative’ notion
of liberty. A ‘positive’ notion of liberty was articulated by thinkers like [Link]
who took into account the conditions, which enabled an individual to actually be free.
Thus, liberty as a positive notion consisted in having the power to act, and the
opportunities which enabled action. The idea of the welfare state was premised on
this idea which required the state to take positive steps to provide the conditions
within which individuals could actually be free to act and develop themselves.
While philosophers like [Link] and Isaiah Berlin attempted to reconcile the two
notions, Marxists felt that freedom could not be experienced in a capitalist society.
A capitalist society, they emphasized separates an individual from his/her social
contexts and from his/her own nature. Liberty as can be seen, has been understood
differently by different strands of thought. It remains, however, a fundamental concept
in democratic thought.

19.8 KEYWORDS

Autonomy : literally means self-rule or self-government. Institutions

or groups are said to be autonomous, if they enjoy
freedom to manage their own affairs. In the case of
individuals, autonomy is linked closely with ‘freedom’,
suggesting not only the idea of being ‘left alone’, but
also the existence of a capacity to take decisions
concerning one’s own affairs.

Social Democrats : endorse a ‘humanised’ capitalist system. Seeking to

strike a balance between the market and the state,
they accept capitalism as the most reliable system
for making profit and at the same time, see the state
as a devise to distribute social rewards in accordance
with moral rather than market principles.

19.9 SOME USEFUL REFERENCES

Barry, Norman, An Introduction to Modern Political Theory, Macmillan, London,

2000 (Chapter 8: Liberty).

Gauba, O.P., Samkalin Rajneeti Siddhant (Contemporary Political Theory), Mayur

Paperbacks, Noida, 1997 (Chapter11: Concept of Liberty)

Heywood, Andrew, Political Theory, Macmillan, London, 1999 (Chapter 9: Freedom,

Toleration and Liberation)
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 Justice
19.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS
EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1

1) See Section 19.1

2) See Section 19.2

Check Your Progress 2

1) See Sections 19.3 and 19.4

Check Your Progress 3

1) See Section 19.5

Check Your Progress 4

1) See Section 19.6

37
Rights, Equality, Liberty
and Justice UNIT 20 JUSTICE

Structure
20.0 Objectives
20.1 Introduction
20.2 Meaning of Justice
20.2.1 Justice and Law
20.2.2 Justice and Discrimination

20.3 Distributive Justice

20.3.1 Distributive Justice and Economic Justice

20.4 Social Justice

20.4.1 Predominance of the Interest of the Comnunity
20.4.2 Reforms or Social Change
20.4.3 Pound’s Illustration of Social Justice
20.4.4 Criticism of Social Justice

20.5 Procedural Justice

20.6 John Rawls’s Theory of Justice
20.7 Justice: A Term of Synthesis
20.8 Let Us Sum Up
20.9 Some Useful References
20.10 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

20.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit discusses one of the most basic and important concepts in political science
in general, and political theory in particular. After studying this unit, you should be
able to:
• Define the meaning of the concept of justice;
• Distinguish between the various aspects of justice;
• Identify and describe the different theories of the nature of justice;
• Describe the relationship between liberty, equality, law and justice.

20.1 INTRODUCTION

By now, you all must be knowing about the concepts like law, rights, liberty and
equality. A prior study of these concepts will help in understanding the concept of
justice. The element of justice, in fact, connects the above mentioned themes.

In this unit, we shall first try to understand the meaning of the concept in its
different aspects. Then, we shall study the different theories of justice. We shall also
try to bring out the relationship between justice on one hand and law, liberty and
equality on the other.

Justice is one of the important aims of the state. One of the earliest treaties on
politics, Plato’s ‘Republic’ was an attempt to construct a just state. Justice was its
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central concept. Therefore, a correct understanding of this concept will help in Justice
evaluating different political systems, their policies and the ideologies on which they
are based. Thus, justice is the reconciler and synthesizer of political values and as
said by Aristotle it is ‘what answers to the whole of goodness’.

20.2 MEANING OF JUSTICE

Any discussion of the concept of justice has to take into account its multi dimensional
character. The answer to ‘what is justice’ can only be given by indicating guidelines
(values) along which men have thought of justice and will continue to do so. It
changes with the passage of time. Thus, what was justice in the past, may be
injustice in the present and vice-versa. Thus, there have been the ‘egalitarian’
perception of justice where the highest place is accorded to the value of equality; the
‘libertarian’ perception in which liberty is the ultimate value; the Divine view in
which justice is the execution of God’s will, the ‘hedonist’ makes ‘the greatest good
of the greatest number’ the criterion of justice; to the ‘harmonizer’ justice is the
harmonizing of different elements and values to produce a satisfactory balance. Some
identify justice with ‘duty’ or with maintenance of peace and order; others view it
as an elitist function. Thus, justice concerns the right of the individual as well as the
social ordering of society. It is legal and moral at the same time. In short, it is an
ethical concept.

20.2.1 Justice and Law

The Roman lawyers integrated the ideas of ‘natural justice’ with the positive law of
the state. As such, the civil law and the law of nations are in conformity with the
law of nature. This, however, is an abstract phase of jurisprudence. Infact, justice lies
in the enforcement of the positive law. Both law and justice seek to sustain social
order. John Austin is the main advocate, who tells that the law has to function as an
instrument of justice, on the one hand, and function as an instrument to suppress
mischief, on the other.

Legally, the administration of justice can be criticised as unjust if it fails to meet the
standard of fairness required by the procedures of the legal system, viz. the accused
should be informed of the charges leveled against him; he should be given a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself etc; while morally, a law can be called unjust for if it
fails to meet the moral ideas of justice. Morality however goes beyond justice.

The symbol of justice is often portrayed as blindfolded because it is supposed to be

impartial. That there should be no discrimination between the two extremes – rich
or poor, high or low. Therefore, impartiality, becomes a precondition to justice. Does
it mean then that justice does not require discrimination at all?

20.2.2 Justice and Discrimination

Plato and Aristotle argued for a different interpretation of justice, “proportionate
equality” with the idea of “righteousness”. The philosophical interpretation of justice
takes an empirical direction at the hands of Aristotle who says: “Injustices arises
when equals are treated unequally”. This means that if in a democracy there is
discrimination on the basis of sex, it would mean treating the equals, unequally. Also,
it would be unfair to pit a heavy-weight wrestler against a lightweight one. Thus,
justice requires discrimination on the basis of differences, which is relevant to the
functions performed. Plato’s theory of justice too implied that the life of people should
conform to the rule of functional specialization. Here, justice becomes another name
for the principal of ‘proper stations’ i.e. a man should practice one thing only to which
his nature is best adapted. This has both individual and social aspects. The highest
good of both the individual and the society is conserved, if we take it for granted that 39
Rights, Equality, Liberty there is nothing better for a man than to do a work that he is best fitted to do, there
and Justice is equally nothing better for the society than to see that each should be filling the
station to which he is best entitled by virtue of the special element of his personality.
For this the three elements of reason, sprit and appetite have been highlighted for the
individual and the state, to keep their proper bounds.

Also, normally the law does not interfere in instances of discriminatory treatment in
private life. But if it causes social harm, the state would be justified in interfering in
it, like in instances of untouchability, where some groups are denied human rights.
Therefore, a law against it would be just. Also, the separate facilities accorded
cannot be truly equal. It is because of this that Dr. Ambedkar demanded the right
of entry to temples for Scheduled Castes and opposed separate temples, schools or
hostels for them.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.
1) What is justice?
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2) How does discrimination fit in the concept of justice?
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20.3 DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The idea of Aristotle came to lay down the foundation of what is called the doctrine
of distributive justice. The essential implication of Aristotle’s explanation is that justice
is either ‘distributive’ or ‘corrective’; the former requires equal distribution among the
equals and the latter applying wherein remedy for a wrong is provided.

The principle that Marx puts forward for distributive justice in the post- revolutionary
socialist society is ‘from each according to his ability to each according to his work.
The idea of distributive justice is reflected in the work of some recent political
economists. In this context, reference to the work of J.W. Chapmen deserves merit,
who seeks to integrate the idea of justice with his principles of ‘economic rationality
of man’ and ‘consumer’s sovereignty’ coupled with the individual claim of ‘moral
freedom’. To him, the first principle of justice appears to be the distribution of
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benefits, which maximise benefits in accordance with the principle of consumer’s Justice
sovereignty. The second principle is that a system is unjust, if the material well being
of a few is purchased at the expense of many. It implies that justice requires that
no one shall gain at the expense of another.

20.3.1 Distributive Justice and Economic Justice

Distributive justice subjects to the condition of general welfare. It demands that the
state of national economy be reshaped in a way that the benefits are made available
to the common man. In this way, the idea of economic justice comes to imply a
socialistic pattern of society.

The first task of economic justice is to provide employment, food, shelter and clothing
to every able-bodied citizen. In regard to this area of satisfying the primary and basic
needs of all, it has been correctly said that freedom is meaningless if it prevents the
achievement of economic justice. Thus, the liberals believe that economic justice can
be attained in society if the state provides welfare services and there is progressive
system of taxation; a fair return for work provision of social security like old age
pension, gratuity and provident fund.

However, the Marxist view of justice has its origins in the area of economics.
According to Marx, the positive law of the state is imposed on its members by the
authority of the class, which controls the means of production. Law is determined by
the economic interest of the ruling class. When private property is abolished and the
working class controls the means of production, then the laws are bound to reflect
the interest of the working class. Therefore, the content of justice depends upon the
class controlling the means of production. When the state withers away, as
contemplated by the communists, there will be justice without an economic origin.

Modern liberals have since long given up the doctrine of economic laissez-faire.
Redistributive justice (of which Aristotle spoke) is an integral part of ‘revisionist
liberalism’ as advocated by J.W. Chapmen, John Rawls and Arthur Okun. These
writers advocate “redistributive justice” with its implication of state intervention in the
economy in the interest of justice and freedom for all.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.
1) What do you understand by distributive justice? How is it related to economic
justice?
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Rights, Equality, Liberty
and Justice 20.4 SOCIAL JUSTICE

Social justice relates to the balance between an individual’s rights and social control
ensuring the fulfillment of the legitimate expectations of the individual under the
existing laws and to ensure him benefits and protection against any encroachment on
his rights. Let us examine the term, ‘social justice’ in terms of the following aspects
of justice, viz. one, the notion of the predominance of the interest of the community
and two, the notion of ‘reform’, or social change.

20.4.1 Predominance of the Interest of the Community

With the decline of the laissez-faire doctrine, a new awareness has developed that
the rights of an individual should be reasonably restricted in the interests of the
community because the ends of social justice require the reconciliation of individual
rights with that of community interest. It also presumes that in the event of a conflict
between the two, the community interest must prevail over individual concerns. Social
justice is, thus, closely linked with the idea of what constitutes public good or community
interest. Today with the penetration of democracy into the social and economic
spheres, community interest has come to encompass not only the political (fair treatment
in political matters) but also the social (non- discrimination in social areas) and
economic (fair distribution of income and wealth) spheres. Thus, social justice ranges
from the protection of minority political rights to the abolition of untouchability and the
eradication of poverty. As such, in the backward countries of the world, the idea of
social justice enjoins upon the state to make concerted efforts for the improvement
of the downtrodden and weaker sections of the community.

20.4.2 Reforms or Social Change

Social justice is used to denote organization of society on the basis of ideas of
fairness and equality current at the time. It seeks a revision of social order so as to
have a more equitable society. Men through the ages, have sought changes in social
order, just as much as they have also sought to preserve a given social order. Social
justice stands for reformative justice, for revision of the social order and a redistribution
of rights to suit current ideas of fairness. When Aristotle spoke of ‘distributive
justice’ he had reformative or what Raphael calls “prosthetic” justice in mind, because
its aims was to modify the status quo.

A hundred years ago, justice did not require governments to take care of the
unemployed. Charity was supposed to do that. Due to the operation of notions of
“reformative” or “prosthetic” justice, today, it is considered the state’s duty to take
care of the unemployed and provide them employment.

20.4.3 Pound’s Illustration of Social Justice

The affirmation of the idea of social justice is very well contained in the
interpretation of Dean Roscoe Pound who presents a six-fold illustration of social
interest and lays down eight jural postulates to ensure social justice. Thus, the idea
of social justice envisages to promote the welfare of the people by securing a just
social order.

Social Justice

Social Interest Jural Postulates

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1) In general security, e.g., peace, public 1) That no wanton aggression is made Justice
health, security of acquisitions, etc.; by others;
2) In security and social institutions, 2) That parties with whom transactions
e.g., marriage, religious institutions, are entered into will act in good faith;
etc.;
3) In general morals, e.g., gambling, 3) That there will be no hindrance in
drinking, immoral traffic, etc.; the enjoyment of one’s acquisitions
and creations;
4) In conservation of social resources, 4) That the person will not be exposed
e.g., food minerals, etc.; to undue risks and that others will
act with due care and caution;
5) In general progress, e.g., freedom of 5) That dangerous things kept by others
trade, encouragement of research, etc.; shall be cautiously and carefully kept
within its bounds;
6) In individual rights, e.g., wages 6) That an employee has a right to
conditions of work, etc. employment;
7) That society will share the
misfortunes which befall on the
individual; and
8) That proper compensation will be
paid to workers for necessary human
wear and tear in an industrial society.
20.4.4 Criticism of Social Justice
Theories of social justice are criticised on three grounds. Firstly, demands for social
justice, by implication, enlarge the activities of the state. The state, then, will have to
decide, “who gets, what, when and how.” Where the officers of the state develop
vested interests, such subjective determination is not likely to serve the ends of social
justice. Secondly, policies of social justice and their implementation require curtailment
of liberty. How much of liberty should be sacrificed for how great/small social justice
becomes a problem difficult to solve. Lastly, it is difficult to assess which are the
basic needs that have to be satisfied to fulfill the criteria of social justice and which
justify departure from equality.

However, when the Indian Constitution announces reservation of seats in legislature,

educational institutions and public employment, it entails departure from equality.
Various justifications are offered for these policies in terms of justice. Firstly, that
such treatment compensates for the hundred years of deprivations. Secondly, that
these measures are necessary for realising ultimate equality to bring them on an equal
footing with society and thirdly, that justice can be done only if the state comes
forward with preferential policies to help them gain social respect, economic viability
and political status.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.
1) What is social justice? On what grounds has it been criticised?
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20.5 PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

A more narrow view of justice is what is known as procedural justice. In this sense,
the term is used not so much to prescribe redistribution of wealth or values as to the
rules and procedures applied to individual actions. Essentially, it seeks to eliminate
arbitrariness in human actions and supports the rule of law. This conception deals
with individuals and not collectivities. In this view, not sticking to rules and procedures,
jumping the queue or giving unfair advantage to some in competition would be unjust.
The procedural theorists (for example Hayek) believe that imposing criteria for
redistribution of wealth would lead to totalitarianism and an unjustified sacrifice of
liberty. It involves constant intervention by the state to maintain the pattern required
by equality. They feel that even if the state follows a policy of welfare, this has little
to do with justice.

Critics of procedural theory of justice argue that mere following of rules does not
ensure a just result. The rules farmed in a social context are weighed in favour of
some groups. Therefore, a free competition may not always be a fair competition.
Secondly, a free market relationship can be equally coercive for individuals who lack
economic power; for them the liberty of a free market would be meaningless.

20.6 JOHN RAWLS’S THEORY OF JUSTICE

Different political theories offer different pictures of what would be a really just
social order. Two of these theories are, the utilitarian theory, and John Rawls’s theory
of justice as fairness. Utilitarian theory asserts that the social order in which the
largest number of people can have the highest satisfaction of their utility is just. But
from its very early days, critics have found great difficulties with utilitarianism. In this
backdrop, Rawls’s theory has offered, an alternative to utilitarianism. Rawls’s book,
Theory of Justice gives a final interpretation of the concept.

To discuss Rawls’s theory of justice, his method of approaching moral problems must
be mentioned first, which is in the contractarian tradition of social philosophy. But at
the same time, Rawls’s method entails that the conclusions of moral reasoning be
always checked and readjusted against intuitive moral notions and this contrasts with
others in the contractarian tradition, who maintain that the rules of justice are those
that would be agreed to in a hypothetical setting.

Rawls places men behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ in a hypothetical original position
where individuals are deprived of the basic knowledge of their wants, interests, skills,
abilities and of the things that generate conflicts in actual societies. But they will have
what Rawls calls ‘a sense of justice’.

Under these circumstances, Rawls argue, people will agree to accept two principles
of justice in the lexical order. First, is the equality principle where each person is to
have an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a similar liberty to
others. Here, equal liberties can be concretised as the familiar rights of liberal
44 democratic regimes. They include the equal right to political participation, freedom of
expression, religious liberty, equality before the law and so on. The second principle Justice
is called the difference principle where Rawls argues that inequalities can only be
justified, if it benefits the least advantaged.

John Rawls’s concept of justice has two aspects to it. Firstly, it postulates a
“constitutional democracy”, that is, government of laws and one, which is restrained,
responsible and accountable. Secondly, it believes in the regulation of the free economy
“in a certain way”. “If law and government”, writes Rawls’s, “act effectively to keep
market competitive, resources fully employed, property and wealth widely distributed
over time, and to maintain the appropriate social minimum, then if there is equality
of opportunity underwritten by education for all, the resulting distribution will be just”.

The “redistributionists” have their critics too. Thus, Mare F. Plattner makes two
arguments against the view of justice. Firstly, he believes that although equality is a
cherished value, it may not be possible to have it at the expense of efficiency.
According to Plattner, this problem of equality versus increased wealth lands Rawls
into an inconsistency. Thus, on the one hand, Rawls “absolutely refuses to allow that
those who make a greater economic contribution deserve greater economic rewards”.
Yet his “difference principle” (which specifies that “social and economic inequalities
are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged”)
nonetheless affirms that it is just to grant them greater economic rewards insofar as
these serve as incentives to increase their contribution in ways that ultimately benefit
the disadvantaged.

The second argument Plattner makes is that the redistributionist wants to refuse to
the individual the reward of his “honest industry “and instead, considers all produce
as the “common asset” of society as a whole. And this Plattner wants us to believe,
undermines the “moral foundations of private property and therewith of liberal society”.

Check Your Progress 4

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) See the end of the unit for tips for your answer.
1) Discuss John Rawls’s theory of justice.
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20.7 JUSTICE: A TERM OF SYNTHESIS

Perhaps, the best approach to justice is to view it as a term of synthesis. The problem
of justice is one of conciliation. The function of justice is the conciliation of different
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Rights, Equality, Liberty liberties (political, social and economic) with each other; the different equalities (political,
and Justice social and economic) with each other as well as the task of conciliating liberty in
general, in all its forms, with equality in general, in all its forms. In brief, justice means
the synthesis of conflicting values and holding these together in some state of equilibrium.

Many eminent writers have chosen to take sides in the liberty versus equality tussle.
Lord Acton had, many years ago, made the memorable pronouncement that “the
passion for equality made vain the hope of freedom” (he was speaking in the context
of the French revolution). The champions of “liberty alone” like W. E. Lecky in his
book Democracy and Liberty claim that, “Equality is only attained by a stringent
repression of natural development”.

Actually, liberty and equality both matter; as Carritt puts it, they involve one another.
Freedom has a better content if there is equality. And, at the same time it is freedom
that enables men to demand equality. Give men liberty and they are sooner, rather
than later, going to ask for equality. The interlinking between liberty and equality can
be brought out in many ways. Take the case of freedom of speech and vote, both
of which can be vitiated by a grossly uneven distribution of wealth. The wealthy are
in a better position not only to contest but also to propagate. The wealthy have easier
access to the propaganda apparatus. Harold Laski’s words still ring true: “Every
attempt of an individual to assert his liberty in a society of unequal will be challenged
by the powerful”. In short, we find that political liberty and economic democracy have
to go hand in hand. And if we examine several political values, we find though
apparently they may appear mutually contradictory, on closer examination, they will
be found to be complementary and interlinked. In any case, it is the function of justice
to synthesize or reconcile the various and often-conflicting values. Justice is the final
principle, which controls the distribution of various rights, political, social and economic
in the interests of liberty as well as equality.

Such a concept of justice grows historically as a process of development of social

thought. In this sense, it is a growing concept reflecting social reality and aspiration.

20.8 LET US SUM UP

What we have seen so far leaves an impression that justice is essentially a normative
concept having its place in various spheres like religion, ethics and law though its
ramifications cover social, political and economic spheres.

Impartiality is a necessary condition of justice. Impartiality does not mean treating

everyone equally without discrimination. One interpretation is to treat equals equally
and unequals unequally. But chiefly discrimination has to be on relevant criteria.

Justice requires discrimination of values on a just basis. Different theories support or

the order of these. Social justice emphasises the needs of the people. It also calls for
preferential policies in the Indian social context. As against this, procedural justice
requires the rule of law and elimination of arbitrariness.

In Rawls’s theory of justice, individuals have to make a choice of social order. They
would naturally prefer an egalitarian society. His theory grants equal basic liberties
for all. Inequalities should be attached to offices open to all. They should benefit the
disadvantaged section the most.

In the end, however, instead of delving deep into the debate over the perplexing
connotations of justice, it shall be worthwhile to say that it is the connecting bond of
all-important political values. For instance, there can be no liberty if the norm of
equality is violated and there can be no equality if there is no justice. Obviously,
justice is integrally connected with the norms of liberty and equality. Likewise, we
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may say that there can be no liberty if there is no right, and there is no protection Justice
of rights, if there is no well organized system of law to ensure the administration of
justice. Obviously, once again, the idea of justice is essentially bound up with the
concepts of rights and law. The most important point to be taken note of at this stage
is that not only the idea of justice is integrally connected with the norms of law,
liberty, equality and rights, but that it constitutes the essential link. Justice in this sense
is the reconciler and synthesizer of political values. Daniel Webster was perfectly
right when he said that justice “is the chiefest interest of man”.

20.9 SOME USEFUL REFERENCES

Allen, C.K., 1955, Aspects of Justice, Steven and Sons, London.

Barry, Norman P., 1981. An Introduction to Modern Political theory, Macmillan,

London.

Ernest Barker, 1967, Principles of Social and Political Theory, London, Oxford
University.

Raphael, D.D., 1976 (2nd ed.). Problems of Political Philosophy, Macmillan, London.

20.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 20.2

2) See sub-section 20.2.2

Check Your Progress 2

1) See Section 20.3

Check Your Progress 3

1) See Section 20.4 and sub-section 20.4.4

Check Your Progress 4

1) See Section 20.6

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