JUSTICE:THE GOOD BEYOND LAW

WEEK 3
Outline
◦ Plato’s approach and overview of 1st book of The Republic
◦ Contrasting Ideas of Justice in Plato's Republic
◦ Thrasymakhos v Socrates
◦ Leibniz
◦ Comparison of Leibniz and Plato
Overview of First book of Republic
◦ ‘’By tradition, Plato’s Republic (R.; Plato 1968), the inaugural work of political thinking in the western
canon, carries the subtitle “Concerning Justice.” Plato does not have, however, a theory of justice.
Instead his inquiry into justice imagines justice as an ideal, a form that can only be in the mind’s eye and
not in the world. Plato is thus the founder of the idealist approach to justice that has its last great
proponent in Immanuel Kant. Plato’s Republic begins with the question: “What is justice?” In response
to Thrasymachus’ challenge that justice is the advantage of the stronger, Socrates offers a series of
refutations, but none convinces. At the end of book 1, Socrates can rightly say that he has learned
nothing about what justice is. He has devoured Thrasymachus, but, as he himself admits, he has “not
dined well”’’
Plato

◦ Socrates imagines justice to be a virtue, the harmonizing of the three parts of the soul so that the
desiring part restrains itself in accord with reason, the rational part rules the desiring part, and the
spirited part helps the rational part enforce its commands on the desiring part. Justice, as the highest
political virtue, is the allocation, to each part of the soul, of its proper role, “exactly like three notes in a
harmonic scale” (R. 443d).

◦ Plato applies the harmony model of the individual soul directly to the social order of the city after
Socrates’ engagement with Glaucon. Justice arises both in the soul of the individual and in the city when
each part or class fulfills its own proper role. For this reason, Plato’s definition of justice is both an
individual and a political virtue — in other words, it is both an ethical and a political concept.
Three parts of soul
◦ 1- Reason (Sokrates, Thrasymakhos)
◦ 2- Spirit (Polemarkhos)
◦ 3- Desire(Cephalos)
Contrasting ideas of justice in dialogue:
Cephalus
◦ Cephalus: Justice consists in speaking the truth and paying one's debt
◦ Socrates: ‘’A fine sentiment, Cephalus. But speaking of that thing itself, justice,
are we to say it is simply speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one
has incurred? Or is it sometimes just to do these things, sometimes unjust? I
mean this sort of thing, for example: everyone would surely agree that if a
man borrows weapons from a sane friend, and if he goes mad and asks for
them back, the friend should not return them, and would not be just if he did.
Nor should anyone be willing to tell the whole truth to someone in such a
state.’’
Contrasting ideas of justice in dialogue:
Polemarchus
◦ SOCRATES: So you want us to add something to what we said before about the just man. Then we said that it is
just to treat friends well and enemies badly. Now you want us to add to this: to treat a friend well, provided
he is good, and to harm an enemy, provided he is bad?
◦ POLEMARCHUS: Yes, that seems well put to me.
◦ SOCRATES: Should a just man really harm anyone whatsoever?
◦ POLEMARCHUS: Of course. He should harm those who are both bad and enemies.
◦ SOCRATES: When horses are harmed, do they become better or worse?
◦ POLEMARCHUS: Worse.
◦ SOCRATES: With respect to the virtue13 that makes dogs good, or to the one that makes horses good?
◦ POLEMARCHUS: With respect to the one that makes horses good.
◦ SOCRATES: And when dogs are harmed, they become worse with respect to the virtue that makes dogs, not
horses, good? POLEMARCHUS: Necessarily
Polemarchus
◦ SOCRATES: And what about human beings, comrade; shouldn’t we say that,
◦ when they are harmed, they become worse with respect to human virtue?
◦ POLEMARCHUS: Of course.
◦ SOCRATES: But isn’t justice human virtue?
◦ POLEMARCHUS: Yes, that’s necessarily so, too.
◦ SOCRATES: Then, my dear Polemarchus, people who have been harmed
◦ are bound to become more unjust.
◦ POLEMARCHUS: So it seems.
◦ SOCRATES: Now, can musicians use music to make people unmusical?
◦ POLEMARCHUS: No, they can’t.
◦ SOCRATES: Or can horsemen use horsemanship to make people unhorsemanlike?
◦ POLEMARCHUS: No.
Polemaarchus
◦ SOCRATES: Well, then, can just people use justice to make people unjust?
◦ In a word, can good people use their virtue or goodness to make people
◦ bad?
◦ POLEMARCHUS: No, they can’t.
◦ SOCRATES: For it isn’t the function of heat to cool things down, I imagine,
◦ but that of its opposite.
◦ POLEMARCHUS: Yes.
Polemarchus
◦ SOCRATES: Nor the function of dryness to make things wet, but that of its
◦ opposite.
◦ POLEMARCHUS: Of course.
◦ SOCRATES: So the function of a good person isn’t to harm, but that of his
◦ opposite.
◦ POLEMARCHUS: Apparently.
◦ SOCRATES: And a just person is a good person?
◦ POLEMARCHUS: Of course.
◦ SOCRATES: So it isn’t the function of a just person to harm a friend or
◦ anyone else, Polemarchus, but that of his opposite, an unjust person.
◦ POLEMARCHUS: I think you are absolutely right, Socrates.
Thrasymachus’ Entrance
◦ ‘’What nonsense you two have been talking all this time, Socrates! Why do you act like naïve people,
giving way to one another? If you really want to know what justice is, don’t just ask questions and then
indulge your love of honor by refuting the answers. You know very well it is easier to ask questions than
to answer them. Give an answer yourself and tell us what you say the just is. And don’t tell me it is the
right, the beneficial, the profitable, the gainful, or the advantageous, but tell me clearly and exactly
what you mean. For I won’t accept such nonsense from you.’’
Contrasting ideas of justice in dialogue:
THRASYMACHUS
◦ THRASYMACHUS: Listen, then. I say justice is nothing other than what is
advantageous for the stronger. Well, why don’t you praise me? No, you are
unwilling.
THRASYMACHUS
◦ You think that shepherds and cowherds consider what is good for their sheep and cattle, and fatten
them and take care of them with some aim in mind other than what is good for their master and
themselves. Moreover, you believe that rulers in cities—true rulers, that is—think about their subjects in
a different way than one does about sheep, and that what they consider night and day is something
other than what is advantageous for themselves. You are so far from understanding justice and what is
just, and injustice and what is unjust, that you do not realize that justice is really the good of another,
what is advantageous for the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys and serves.
Injustice is the opposite, it rules those simpleminded—for that is what they really are—just people, and
the ones it rules do what is advantageous for the other who is stronger; and they make the one they
serve happy, but they do not make themselves the least bit happy.
Propositions:

◦ 1- Justice is nothing other than what is advantageous for the stronger.

◦ 2- Justice is really the good of another

◦ Outcome of the firs proposition: There is no universal definition of justice, as the concept of justice is variable
◦ Outcome of the second proposition: The life of an unjust person is better than that of a just one—seems
to be of far greater importance
Socrates v Thrasymachus
◦ SOCRATES: ‘’That’s enough of that! Tell me: is a doctor in the precise sense, the one you mentioned
before a moneymaker or someone who treats the sick? Tell me about the one who is really a doctor.
THRASYMACHUS: Someone who treats the sick.
SOCRATES: What about a ship’s captain? Is the true captain a ruler of sailors, or a sailor?
THRASYMACHUS: A ruler of sailors.
SOCRATES: In other words, we should not take any account of the fact that he sails in a ship, and he
should not be called a sailor for that reason. For it is not because he is sailing that he is called a ship’s
captain, but because of the craft he practices and his rule over sailors?
THRASYMACHUS: True.
SOCRATES: And is there something that is advantageous for each of these?’
Socrates v Thrasymachus
THRASYMACHUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And isn’t it also the case that the natural aim of the craft is to consider and provide what is
advantageous for each?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, that is its aim.
SOCRATES: And is anything advantageous for each of the crafts themselves besides being as perfect as
possible?
…
◦ SOCRATES: So no kind of knowledge considers or enjoins what is advantageous
◦ for itself, but what is advantageous for the weaker, which is subject
◦ to it.
◦ He finally agreed to this too, although he tried to fight it. When he had agreed, however, I said: Surely then,
no doctor, to the extent that he is a doctor, considers or enjoins what is advantageous for himself, but what is
advantageous for his patient? For we agreed that a doctor, in the precise sense, is a ruler of bodies, not a
moneymaker. Isn’t that what we agreed?
◦ THRASYMACHUS: Yes.
◦ SOCRATES: So a ship’s captain, in the precise sense, is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor?
◦ THRASYMACHUS: That is what we agreed.
◦ SOCRATES: Doesn’t it follow that a ship’s captain and ruler won’t consider and enjoin what is advantageous for
a captain, but what is advantageous for a sailor and his subject?
◦ He reluctantly agreed.
Thrasymachus Contradictions
◦ Thrasymachus contradicts himself twice by agreeing with Socrates’ question on whether effective cooperation
among the powerful requires them to act justly towards each other.
◦ The first contradiction is that he implicitly admits that justice, not injustice, is advantageous for the individual,
which conflicts with second proposition.
◦ Second contradiction is that, justice does not only apply between the strong and the weak, but also between
equals which directly contradicts first proposition
Leibniz

◦ Justice = "caritas sapientis" (wise charity)

◦ Wise Charity coexistes with universal benevolence
Leibniz
◦ The central idea of Leibniz' universal jurisprudence, which aims to find quasi- geometrical eternal moral
verities equally valid for all rational beings, human or divine, is that justice is "the charity of the wise
(caritas sapientis)", that it is not mere conformity to sovereign-ordained positive law (in the manner of
Hobbes).
◦ The Equal stress on wisdom and charity suggests that Leibniz’ practical thought is kind of a fusing of
Platonism (in which thr wise knows the eternal truths such as absolute goodness, which the gods
themselves also know, love and therefore deserve to rule) and Christianity whose key moral idea is
that charity or love is the first of the virtues.
Parallels between Leibniz and Plato
◦ In Plato’s Republic, and especially in dialogues justice is emphasized as the principle that ensures harmony
among individuals and enables society to live together on the basis of friendship (philia).
Similarly, Leibniz defines justice not merely as the enforcement of laws, but as caritas sapientis (wise love) and
universal benevolence.

◦ Leibniz’s definition of justice as universal benevolence is very close to Plato’s connection between justice, philia
(friendship), and social harmony.

◦ In Plato, justice is the principle that ensures each class in society performs its proper function, just as justice
within the soul ensures harmony between reason, spirit, and desire.
In Leibniz, justice is the divine principle of love and wisdom that ensures universal harmony.
Plato-Leibniz and Modernity
◦ But in modernity all of this has become unfamiliar at best, and alien at worst: Machiavelli urges that in
politics it is more important to be feared than loved, and says that a new prince must be ready to act
"against charity" in the pursuit of his- torical greatness; Hobbes treats charity as thinly veiled lust
masquerading as principle, and argues that "the passion to be reckoned upon is fear"; Rousseau views
Christian ethics of universal love as worthy but as inimical to Spartan-Roman civic virtue ("Christianity
creates men rather than citizens"); Nietzsche interprets Christian ethics (and even Socratic morality as
attacked by Callicles in Górgias) as weakness and plebeian resentment, "rationalized" into charity and
humility; Freud views love as a "libidinal" tie which cannot be stretched beyond a small community, and
which in any case is just "aim-inhibited" sexuality (whose repression leads to neurosis and violence).
Even a supreme early modern Christian such as Pascal, who gives absolute primacy to charity in the
Pensées, views love as transcendent and supernatural ("of another order"), with no bearing whatever
on an earthly politics which is only "fleshly" and force-governed - the realm of illusion and
divertissement. (For Leibniz, by contrast, "true politics cannot be distinguished from the charity, and a
great prince cannot be better served than when the happiness of the people makes up his own)