TEAM CODE: TC-07

5th JUSTICE N. SANTHOSH HEGDE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,

2026

Before

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF NORLAND

In the matter of

CENTRE FOR HUMAN DIGNITY PETITIONER

Vs.

UNION OF NORLAND RESPONDENT

WRIT PETITION U/ARTs. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

NORLAND

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………………..03

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS …………………………………………………….05

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ………………………………………………………..06

STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………………………………………….....07

STAEMENT OF ISSUES ….………………………………………………………………08

STAEMENT OF ARGUMENTS………………...…………………………………….......09

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………………………………………11

PRAYER…………………………………………………………………………………….28

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

BOOKS REFERRED

1. V.N. Shukla, Constitution of Norland,

2. Pandey J.N., The Constitutional Law of Norland, $9th Edition, Central Law
Agency, Allahabad
3. Justice C.K. Thakker, Commentary on Constitution of Norland, Vol. 1 & 2, Whytes &
Co.
4. Paul Craig – Administrative Law
5. Malcolm N. Shaw – International Law

STATUTES REFERRED

1. Constitution of Norland, 1950.

2. Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025
3. Administrative Procedure and Regulatory Framework Act, 2012

CASES REFERRED

[Link] CASE
1. Mr. Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, [1991] INSC 163; AIR 1991 SC 1886
2. GVK Industries v. Income Tax Officer, (2011) 4 SCC 36,
3. State of Bombay v. RMDC 1957 SCR 874
4. Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, [1955]
INSC 7; [1955] 1 SCR 1284
5. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420
6. Ramchand Santumal Bhatia v. Tarun Roy (1987) 100 LW 476
7. Bankovic v. Belgium (2001) 11 BHRC 435
8. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18
9. In re Delhi Laws Act 1951 SCR 747
10. Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353
11. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1
12. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCR 457

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13. State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy (2006) 4 SCC 517

14. Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463
15. Mohammed Salimullah v. Union of India, AIR 2021 SC 1789

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

[Link] TERMS MEANING

1] & And

2] Art. Article

3] AIR All India Reporter

4] SC Supreme Court

5] v. Versus

6] SCC Supreme Court Cases

7] Ors Others

8] HON’BLE Honourable

9] Const. Constitution of Norland

10] UOI Union Of Norland

11] HPZs Humanitarian Processing Zones

12] NSC National Security Council

13] UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

13] MHA Ministry of Home Affairs

14] UNHCR United Nation High Commission on Refugee

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondent submits that the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court is invoked by the Petitioner
under Article 32 of the Constitution of Norland. The Respondent does not concede the
maintainability of the Petition or the exercise of jurisdiction by this Hon’ble Court.

It is respectfully submitted that the present matter involves constitutional questions arising
from the challenge to governmental action.

The Respondent reserves all rights to raise preliminary objections regarding jurisdiction,
maintainability, and the existence of any enforceable fundamental right.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Republic of Norland is facing a complex situation arising from environmental degradation
in Belvaria, including erosion, saline ingress, and cyclones, which has led to a substantial influx
of Belvarian nationals. Simultaneously, political disturbances in Ardonia resulted in individuals
entering Norland through unmonitored routes, citing humanitarian, economic, and
environmental concerns. The increasing influx created administrative and security challenges,
particularly in coastal and border districts.

In response, Norland invoked the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, to regulate the entry,
stay, and removal of non-nationals. The Ministry of Home Affairs introduced a digital
classification system, VIGIL, to analyse data inputs and classify individuals based on security
indicators, and these classifications formed the basis for further administrative action.

Norland subsequently entered into an executive arrangement with Azuria to establish

Humanitarian Processing Zones (HPZs) within Azurian territory. Individuals classified as
“unauthorized presence” were relocated from Norland’s Transit Centres to HPZs, where
housing, ration, schooling, and medical facilities were provided, subject to movement
regulations and administrative supervision. Although periodic assessments are conducted, the
procedural framework governing such review has not been formally codified or made publicly
accessible.

The arrangement drew criticism regarding living conditions, access to services, and
transparency in the relocation process; however, the government maintained that the HPZs
provide temporary humanitarian support and are subject to review.

In July 2027, a cyclone struck the coastal region of Azuria, affecting an HPZ facility and raising
humanitarian concerns, which civil society reports highlighted but were dismissed by the
governments of Norland and Azuria.

The Centre for Human Dignity thereafter filed a petition before the Supreme Court of Norland
challenging the relocation process and administrative measures on behalf of individuals in
HPZs and those issued relocation notices. The petition questions the applicability of
fundamental rights to non-citizens, the arbitrariness of the VIGIL system, and the compliance
of the relocation process with the principle of non-refoulement and the right to life.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE – I

WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE, HAVING REGARD TO THE

APPLICABILITY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO NON-CITIZENS RELOCATED TO
AND RESIDING WITHIN THE HUMANITARIAN PROCESSING ZONES SITUATED IN
THE TERRITORY OF AZURIA?

ISSUE – II

WHETHER THE VIGIL DIGITAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM ESTABLISHED IN

PURSUANT TO THE IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGNERS ACT, 2025 IS ARBITRARY,
UNREASONABLE, OR EXCESSIVE?

ISSUE – III

WHETHER THE RELOCATION OF NON-CITIZENS TO THE HUMANITARIAN

PROCESSING ZONES IN AZURIA VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
REFOULEMENT AND THE GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL
LIBERTY UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF NORLAND?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE – I

WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE, HAVING REGARD TO

THE APPLICABILITY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO NON-CITIZENS
RELOCATED TO AND RESIDING WITHIN THE HUMANITARIAN PROCESSING
ZONES SITUATED IN THE TERRITORY OF AZURIA?

It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the writ petition is not
maintainable, having regard to the applicability of fundamental rights to non-citizens
relocated to and residing within the Humanitarian Processing Zones situated in the territory of
Azuria

ISSUE – II

WHETHER THE VIGIL DIGITAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM ESTABLISHED IN

PURSUANT TO THE IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGNERS ACT, 2025 IS
ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE, OR EXCESSIVE?

It is respectfully submitted that VIGIL is a lawful administrative mechanism introduced under

the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, and falls within the executive’s sovereign authority
to regulate the entry and stay of non-nationals. The system merely facilitates identity
verification and classification already contemplated by statute and does not create new offences
or operate as an automated determinative process. It serves a legitimate national objective,
incorporates mandatory human oversight, and satisfies the constitutional test of proportionality.
Accordingly, the challenge to VIGIL is unsustainable in law.

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ISSUE – III

WHETHER THE RELOCATION OF NON-CITIZENS TO THE HUMANITARIAN

PROCESSING ZONES IN AZURIA VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
REFOULEMENT AND THE GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND
PERSONAL LIBERTY UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
NORLAND?

It is respectfully submitted that the relocation of non-citizens to Humanitarian Processing

Zones does not violate the principle of non-refoulement or the guarantee of life and personal
liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of Norland. The State retains sovereign authority
to regulate the entry, presence, and movement of foreign nationals, particularly where
migration occurs without lawful authorization. The relocation framework is a regulatory and
humanitarian measure undertaken pursuant to the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE – I - WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE, HAVING

REGARD TO THE APPLICABILITY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO NON-
CITIZENS RELOCATED TO AND RESIDING WITHIN THE HUMANITARIAN
PROCESSING ZONES SITUATED IN THE TERRITORY OF AZURIA?

It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the writ petition is not
maintainable, having regard to the applicability of fundamental rights to non-citizens
relocated to and residing within the Humanitarian Processing Zones situated in the territory of
Azuria

1.A.) THE TERRITORIAL LIMITATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE

NORLAND CONSTITUTION:

The petitioners seek to invoke the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution on behalf of individuals residing in the HPZs, which are situated in the territory
of Azuria. This extraterritorial invocation of constitutional remedies finds no support in the
constitutional scheme.

The Supreme Court of Norland has consistently held that constitutional rights cannot be
claimed by persons residing outside Norlandian territory. In Mr. Louis De Raedt v. Union of
India, [1991] INSC 163; AIR 1991 SC 1886,1 the Court held that foreigners residing in
Norland are entitled only to the protection of Article 21, and this protection is explicitly tied to
their presence within Norlandian territory. The logical corollary is that persons outside
Norlandian territory cannot claim even this limited protection.

The Humanitarian Processing Zones are established on the islands of North Ellan and Varo,
which are indisputably part of the territory of Azuria. Paragraph 11 of the Proposition explicitly
states that Norland entered into "an executive arrangement with the island State of Azuria" and
that "Azuria would provide land and maintain external perimeter security."

1
Mr. Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, [1991] INSC 163; AIR 1991 SC 1886,

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Critically, the arrangement does not involve any cession of territory, any lease that transfers
sovereignty, or any agreement that would transform these zones into Norland territory. Azuria
retains: Sovereignty over the land; External perimeter security; Ultimate territorial jurisdiction.

Norland's role is limited to "administering and operating the internal functioning of the HPZs."
This administrative arrangement does not, and cannot, extend Norland's constitutional
jurisdiction into Azurian territory.

1.B.) THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS IN

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:

The petitioners rely heavily on Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and personal
liberty. While it is true that Article 21 extends to "persons" and not merely "citizens," this
extension is territorially conditioned. The Article protects persons within Norland's jurisdiction.
It cannot be read to protect persons outside Norland's territory.

The Supreme Court of Norland has authoritatively settled this position. In Louis De Raedt
2(supra), the Court held:

"The fundamental right of the foreigner is confined to Article 21 for life and liberty and does
not include the right to reside and settle in this country, as mentioned in Article 19(1)(e), which
is applicable only to the citizens of this country."

The individuals on whose behalf the petition is filed are: Non-citizens of Norland; Nationals
of Belvaria and Ardonia; Residing outside Norland's territory; Present in Norland originally
without lawful status. The right to reside and settle in Norland, guaranteed by Article 19(1)(e)
to citizens, is explicitly unavailable to non-citizens. The petitioners cannot claim this right
indirectly through Article 21 or through procedural challenges to their relocation.

2
Mr. Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, [1991] INSC 163; AIR 1991 SC 1886,

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1.C.) THE DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL NEXUS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL

JURISDICTION:

The doctrine of territorial nexus is well-established in constitutional jurisprudence. It provides

that a State may exercise jurisdiction over matters connected to its territory, but this connection
must be real and not illusory. Conversely, where no territorial nexus exists, the State's
jurisdiction cannot extend.

In GVK Industries v. Income Tax Officer, (2011) 4 SCC 36,3 the Supreme Court of Norland
held that Parliament cannot enact laws with "no nexus to Norland whatsoever." The Court
upheld Parliament's power to legislate on extraterritorial aspects only where such aspects have
"an impact, effect, or consequence within Norland either on its territory or on the interests,
welfare, or security of its inhabitants."

The doctrine of territorial nexus operates differently in different contexts. In State of Bombay
v. RMDC,4 the doctrine was applied to tax legislation because there was a clear economic
connection: income earned and financial transactions conducted within the State had effects
within the State.

Applying this principle here, the connection between Norland and individuals relocated to
Azuria is, at best, that they were formerly present in Norland. This historical connection is
insufficient to establish a continuing territorial nexus that would justify the extension of
constitutional protections across international borders.

1.D.) THE SOVEREIGN COMPETENCE IN IMMIGRATION MATTERS:

The regulation of entry, stay, and removal of non-nationals is a core attribute of State
sovereignty. This principle is recognized in international law and municipal jurisprudence
alike. The Supreme Court of Norland has repeatedly affirmed that the Executive has
"unrestricted right to expel a foreigner."

In Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, [1955] INSC

7; [1955] 1 SCR 12845, the Court held that, "The power of the Government in Norland to expel
foreigners is absolute and unlimited and there is no provision in the Constitution fettering this

3
GVK Industries v. Income Tax Officer, (2011) 4 SCC 36,
4
State of Bombay v. RMDC 1957 SCR 874
5
Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, [1955] INSC 7; [1955] 1 SCR 1284

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discretion. The legal position on this aspect is not uniform in all the countries but so far the law
which operates in Norland is concerned, the Executive Government has unrestricted right to
expel a foreigner."

The Proposition states that individuals classified as "unauthorised presence" under the VIGIL
system were relocated to the HPZs. These individuals were found to be in Norland in
contravention of the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025. Paragraph 13 explicitly states that
relocation applied to "persons who did not meet criteria of lawful presence under Norland's
domestic law."

The Government's decision to relocate such persons rather than deport them directly to their
countries of origin was a policy choice within its sovereign discretion. It cannot be that the
Government's exercise of discretion in a more humanitarian direction (relocation to HPZs
rather than immediate deportation) exposes it to greater constitutional scrutiny than the harsher
alternative would have attracted.

If the Government had deported these individuals directly to Belvaria or Ardonia, they would
clearly be outside Norland's territory and beyond the reach of Norland's constitutional
protections. The fact that the Government chose the more humane option of establishing HPZs
in Azuria pending further decisions cannot place them in a better position for claiming
constitutional rights.

1.E.) PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY:

Private international law recognizes that jurisdiction is primarily territorial. A State's laws
operate within its borders, and its courts exercise jurisdiction over persons and things within
its territory. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is exceptional and requires clear legislative intention
and constitutional authority.

The maxim "extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur" (one who exercises jurisdiction
outside the territory is not obeyed with impunity) reflects this fundamental principle.

Even if the Norland Parliament could, under some theory of protective or nationality
jurisdiction, legislate with respect to Norland citizens abroad, the same cannot apply to non-
citizens. The petitioners are not Norland citizens. They owe no allegiance to Norland. Norland
owes them no protection once they are outside its territory.

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The Supreme Court of Norland in Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 14206 has
held that "there is only one domicile of the country and there is no separate domicile for a
State". Extending this principle, there is no concept of "constitutional protection following the
person" for non-citizens who leave the territory.

1.F.) THE VIGIL SYSTEM AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: A DISTINCT ISSUE:

The petitioners' challenge to the VIGIL classification system suffers from the same
jurisdictional defect. The individuals challenging VIGIL are either:

1. Residing in HPZs in Azuria (outside Norland), or

2. Persons who received relocation notices but have been relocated

For those in Azuria, the territorial objection applies with full force. For those who received
notices but have not yet been relocated, the challenge is premature. The VIGIL system is
described in Paragraph 8 as generating classifications that officers are instructed to "review
independently before issuing any order." The system is a decision-support tool, not a final
decision-maker. Any challenge to its operation should await an actual decision affecting a
person within Norland's territory.

B. Non-Disclosure of Methodology is Justified

The Government's non-disclosure of VIGIL's methodology is justified on grounds of "data

integrity and system security" (Paragraph 9). This is consistent with established principles that
methods of security screening and immigration control may legitimately remain confidential
to prevent circumvention.

1.G.) THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT: INAPPLICABLE AND NOT BINDING:

A. Norland is Not Bound by International Refugee Instruments

Paragraph 5 explicitly states that Norland "did not consider itself bound by the 1951 Refugee
Convention or the 1967 Protocol." In the absence of incorporation into municipal law,
international treaty obligations do not create enforceable rights before municipal courts.

6
Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420

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The Supreme Court of Norland has consistently held that international law does not
automatically become part of domestic law unless Parliament so legislates. Norland's position
is even clearer: it has explicitly stated its non-adherence to these instruments.

B. Non-Refoulement Does Not Create Extraterritorial Rights

Even assuming arguendo that the principle of non-refoulement has some status in customary
international law, it does not create rights enforceable by individuals outside the territory of the
State. The principle operates between States, not between States and individuals, and certainly
not between States and individuals who are outside the State's territory.

1.H.) THE PRINCIPLE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION:

A. Constitutional Provisions Must Be Read Harmoniously

The petitioners seek to read Article 21 expansively to cover non-citizens outside Norland's
territory. This interpretation would create serious conflicts with other constitutional provisions
and principles:

1. Article 19 explicitly limits certain rights to citizens. Reading Article 21 to give non-citizens
rights equivalent to citizenship would circumvent this carefully drawn distinction.

2. Immigration power: The Constitution implicitly recognizes the State's power to control
immigration. Reading Article 21 to limit this power would create constitutional conflict.

3. Territorial limits: The Constitution operates within Norland's territory. Reading it to operate
extraterritorially would conflict with this fundamental assumption.

The principle of harmonious construction requires that courts interpret provisions to avoid
conflict. As observed in Ramchand Santumal Bhatia v. Tarun Roy (1987)7, "Different
provisions of the Constitution have to be read reasonably, and, where there be an apparent
conflict, Courts should try to so interpret the provisions as to bring about a harmonious
construction."

7
Ramchand Santumal Bhatia v. Tarun Roy (1987) 100 LW 476

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B. The Basic Structure Doctrine Does Not Assist the Petitioners

The basic structure doctrine, developed in Norland constitutional jurisprudence, protects

essential features of the Constitution from amendment. It does not create new rights or extend
existing rights beyond their constitutional limits. The petitioners cannot invoke basic structure
to claim rights that the Constitution does not grant.

1.I.) THE POSITION UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW:

A. The European Convention on Human Rights: The Concept of "Jurisdiction"

Even under the expansive European Convention on Human Rights, which has been interpreted
to have certain extraterritorial effects, the concept of "jurisdiction" in Article 1 is primarily
territorial. The European Court of Human Rights has recognized extraterritorial jurisdiction
only in exceptional circumstances, such as effective control of an area as said in Bankovic v.
Belgium8 or State agent authority as laid down in Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom9.

Norland does not exercise "effective control" over Azurian territory in the sense recognized in
international law. It administers internal functions with Azuria's consent, but Azuria retains
sovereignty and external security. This falls far short of the control required for extraterritorial
application of human rights guarantees.

B. United States Jurisprudence: The Insular Cases and Territorial Limits

United States constitutional jurisprudence has long recognized that constitutional rights do not
automatically extend to all persons everywhere. The Insular Cases established that even in
territories under U.S. control, only "fundamental" rights apply, and even then, the application
may be tailored to local conditions. Persons outside U.S. territory altogether have no
constitutional rights.

C. Norlandian Jurisprudence: Consistent Rejection of Extraterritorial Claims

Norlandian courts have consistently rejected attempts to invoke constitutional rights

extraterritorially. In Louis De Raedt10 (supra), the Court's analysis of citizenship and domicile

8
Bankovic v. Belgium (2001) 11 BHRC 435
9
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18
10
Mr. Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, [1991] INSC 163; AIR 1991 SC 1886,

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under Articles 5-8 and the Citizenship Act proceeded on the assumption that constitutional
rights are tied to presence and status within Norland.

1.J.) THE PETITIONERS LACK STANDING (LOCUS STANDI):

A. The Centre for Human Dignity Cannot Represent Persons Outside Norland

The Centre for Human Dignity is a public interest organization registered in Norland. While
public interest litigation has been recognized as a tool for enforcing fundamental rights, it
cannot be used to claim rights on behalf of persons who:

a. Are outside Norland's territory

b. Are not entitled to the rights claimed
c. Have no justiciable connection to Norland

B. No Fundamental Right of the Organization Itself is Violated

The Centre for Human Dignity does not claim violation of its own fundamental rights. It seeks
to represent others. In public interest litigation, the organization must demonstrate that the
persons represented have enforceable rights. For the reasons submitted above, they do not.

1.K.) THE DOCTRINE OF POLITICAL QUESTION AND NON-JUSTICIABILITY:

A. Foreign Affairs and Immigration are Political Questions

The arrangement with Azuria involves "foreign affairs considerations" (Paragraph 11) and was
placed before the Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs. Such matters are classically
within the domain of the Executive and are not readily justiciable.

The relocation of persons found to be in unauthorized presence involves:

a. Assessments of bilateral relations with Azuria

b. Resource allocation decisions
c. Predictions about future conditions in Belvaria and Ardonia
d. Balancing humanitarian and security considerations

These are matters of policy, not law, and are not appropriate for judicial determination.

B. The Absence of Statutory Standards

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The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, authorizes the Government to issue guidelines and
procedures. The VIGIL system and relocation process were implemented under this authority.
In the absence of statutory standards that the Government has allegedly violated, the Court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Executive.

1.L.) THE QUESTION OF BURDEN OF PROOF:

A. The Petitioners Bear the Burden of Establishing Jurisdiction

The burden of establishing that this Court has jurisdiction, that the petitioners have standing,
and that the persons represented have enforceable rights rests on the petitioners. They have
failed to discharge this burden.

In Louis De Raedt11 (supra), the Court held that the burden of proving acquisition of
citizenship lies on the person claiming it. Similarly, the burden of proving that constitutional
rights extend extraterritorially to non-citizens must lie on those asserting such extension. The
petitioners have not met this burden.

B. The Presumption of Constitutionality

Government action is presumed constitutional. The petitioners must rebut this presumption.
They cannot do so by invoking rights that do not exist.

1.M.) THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY DOES NOT ASSIST THE PETITIONERS:

A. Proportionality Presupposes a Violation of Rights

The principle of proportionality, which requires that limitations on rights be proportionate to

the aim pursued, presupposes that a right is engaged. Where no right exists, there is no occasion
for proportionality analysis.

Even assuming some rights were engaged (which is denied), the relocation to HPZs was a
proportionate response to the need to manage immigration while providing basic amenities.
The HPZs include "modular residential units, ration distribution points, primary-level

11
Mr. Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, [1991] INSC 163; AIR 1991 SC 1886,

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schooling, and medical units" (Paragraph 15). International organizations confirmed "the
availability of basic amenities" (Paragraph 16).

B. The Government's Response to the Cyclone

Regarding the July 2027 cyclone, the Government stated that "relief operations were initiated
and essential utilities restored, and the Government was taking all possible measures to mitigate
the damage" (Paragraph 17). Unofficial reports to the contrary are dismissed by both
Governments as "biased and baseless." The Court should not base constitutional relief on
disputed factual allegation from unverified sources.

1.N.) THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY:

A. Exhaustion of Remedies

The petitioners have not demonstrated that they have exhausted remedies available within the
administrative framework. Paragraph 13 refers to relocation occurring "pending further
decision." Paragraph 16 notes the absence of "a clear procedure for individual review" but does
not state that no review is possible. The petitioners should first seek administrative remedies
before approaching this Court.

B. The Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance

Where a constitutional question can be avoided by deciding on other grounds, courts should do
so. Here, the jurisdictional and standing questions are threshold issues that dispose of the
matter. The Court need not reach the merits of the VIGIL challenge or the non-refoulement
argument.

ISSUE – II WHETHER THE VIGIL DIGITAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

ESTABLISHED IN PURSUANT TO THE IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGNERS ACT,
2025 IS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE, OR EXCESSIVE?

It is respectfully submitted that the introduction of VIGIL is fully traceable to statutory

authority under the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, and falls squarely within the
executive competence of the State. The regulation of foreigners is a sovereign function, and
administrative mechanisms adopted to implement such regulation cannot be lightly interfered

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with. VIGIL does not create new substantive liabilities but merely assists in structured identity
verification and classification. The challenge to its validity is therefore misconceived.

I. VIGIL IS AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE AND WITHIN EXECUTIVE COMPETENCE

It is respectfully submitted that the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025 expressly empowers
the Central Government to regulate the entry and stay of non-nationals, undertake identity
verification, and issue procedural guidelines necessary for implementation of the Act. The
statute confers specific authority upon the Government to issue administrative directions to
effectively operationalize these objectives. VIGIL has been introduced as an administrative
mechanism within this statutory framework. It does not create any new substantive offences,
penalties, or disabilities. Rather, it assists in identity verification and classification processes
already contemplated and authorized under the Act. Therefore, it remains intra vires the parent
legislation and squarely within executive competence. In In re Delhi Laws Act (1951 SCR
747), 12this Hon’ble Court held that delegated legislation is constitutionally valid so long as it
operates within the framework of the parent statute. Since VIGIL merely facilitates statutory
verification and classification without expanding legislative scope, it cannot be characterized
as excessive delegation or ultra vires.

II. REGULATION OF FOREIGNERS IS A SOVEREIGN FUNCTION

The regulation of entry, stay, and expulsion of foreigners is a well-recognized sovereign

function of the State. Decisions concerning immigration control fall within the executive
domain, subject to procedure established by law. Foreign nationals do not possess an
unrestricted or fundamental right to reside within the territory of the State except in accordance
with statutory provisions. In Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail
(1955 SCR 1284),13 this Hon’ble Court affirmed that the Government possesses absolute
power to expel foreigners, subject to lawful procedure. Similarly, in Louis De Raedt v. Union
of India (1991) 3 SCC 55414, the Court held that while foreigners are entitled to protection
under Article 21, they do not enjoy a fundamental right to remain in the country beyond what
is permitted by law. VIGIL operates in furtherance of this sovereign function by aiding the

12
In re Delhi Laws Act 1951 SCR 747
13
Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail 1955 SCR (1) 1284
14
Louis De Raedt v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 554

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State in regulating immigration in an organized and systematic manner. The mere use of
technological assistance in performing a sovereign function does not render such action
unconstitutional.

III. VIGIL SERVES A COMPELLING NATIONAL NEED AND SATISFIES THE

PROPORTIONALITY TEST

VIGIL was developed in response to circumstances involving high inflows of individuals,

inadequate documentation, and the need for large-scale processing within a limited time. In
such situations, administrative consistency and efficiency are paramount. The system ensures
uniform classification across regions, minimizes inconsistent individual decision-making,
promotes systematic screening, and enhances administrative speed. In contexts involving mass
migration or crisis situations, technological tools become necessary to maintain order and
ensure rational decision-making.

The doctrine of proportionality, as articulated in Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya

Pradesh (2016)15 and reaffirmed in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)16, requires
that a measure pursue a legitimate aim, be rationally connected to that aim, be necessary, and
incorporate adequate safeguards. VIGIL satisfies each of these requirements. The objective
protecting borders, ensuring national security, and identifying undocumented entrants is
unquestionably legitimate. The use of digital classification is rationally connected to the goal
of standardized and efficient screening. The measure is necessary given the scale of migration
and impracticality of purely manual scrutiny. Importantly, safeguards exist in the form of
mandatory human review before any final order is issued. Therefore, VIGIL represents a
proportionate and constitutionally valid response to administrative exigency.

IV. VIGIL IS A DECISION-SUPPORT TOOL AND NOT AN AUTOMATED

DETERMINATIVE MECHANISM

It is most respectfully submitted that VIGIL does not automatically determine the legal status
of any individual. Government circulars clearly mandate that officers must independently
assess the output generated by the system and exercise discretion before issuing any order. The
final determination rests solely with the competent human authority. There is no automatic

15
Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353
16
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1

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relocation, detention, or removal based purely on algorithmic output. Thus, VIGIL functions
as a decision-support tool rather than a replacement for human judgment. The presence of
human oversight eliminates allegations of arbitrariness and ensures compliance with principles
of natural justice. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 26217, this Court held that
administrative decisions affecting rights must adhere to natural justice. In the present case,
since each decision involves independent human assessment and no mechanical relocation
occurs, natural justice requirements remain intact. The Petitioners’ contention that VIGIL
amounts to impermissible automation is therefore misplaced.

V. LIMITED DISCLOSURE IS JUSTIFIED BY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

The Government has clarified that full public disclosure of VIGIL’s methodology may
compromise data integrity, system security, and the effectiveness of border management.
Sensitive national security systems are not required to be disclosed in exhaustive detail,
particularly when such disclosure could enable manipulation or circumvention. Limited
confidentiality in this context is reasonable and justified. In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of
India (2017)18, this Hon’ble Court recognized that restrictions involving privacy or security
concerns are valid where they pursue a legitimate aim and satisfy proportionality. Absolute
transparency is not a constitutional requirement in matters implicating national security.
Judicial review remains available even where operational details are not publicly disclosed,
thereby preserving constitutional oversight while safeguarding security interests.

VI. THE SYSTEM IS NEITHER EXCESSIVE NOR DISPROPORTIONATE

To determine excessiveness, the system must be examined in light of legitimate aim, rational
connection, and safeguards. In the present case, the aim of border regulation and identification
of individuals is legitimate. Digital processing is rationally connected to efficient screening
requirements. Human review provides procedural safeguards against arbitrary action. The
system does not automatically detain, deport, or penalize individuals; it merely categorizes
them in accordance with statutory classifications. The absence of a finalized external audit does
not ipso facto invalidate administrative action. In State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy

17
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCR 457
18
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1

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(2006) 4 SCC 517,19 this Court held that subordinate legislation may be struck down only if it
is ultra vires the Constitution, ultra vires the parent statute, or manifestly arbitrary. VIGIL
satisfies none of these grounds and therefore remains valid.

VII. ADMINISTRATIVE NECESSITY IN HIGH-VOLUME SITUATIONS WARRANTS

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

In circumstances involving hundreds of thousands of individuals, reliance solely on manual

methods would risk inconsistency, delay, and administrative chaos. Computer-assisted systems
enhance uniformity, reduce district-level disparities, and promote structured decision-making.
When supervised by competent human authorities, technological tools improve rather than
undermine fairness. Executive discretion in matters of administrative implementation deserves
judicial deference. In Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 46320, this Hon’ble
Court held that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the administration unless
the decision is irrational or outrageous in its defiance of logic. VIGIL is neither irrational nor
excessive; rather, it represents a structured administrative response to an unprecedented volume
of migration.

ISSUE – III WHETHER THE RELOCATION OF NON-CITIZENS TO THE

HUMANITARIAN PROCESSING VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF NON
REFOULEMENT AND THE GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND
PERSONAL LIBERTY UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
NORLAND?

It is respectfully submitted that the relocation of non-citizens to Humanitarian Processing

Zones does not violate the principle of non-refoulement or the guarantee of life and personal
liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of Norland. The State retains sovereign authority to
regulate the entry, presence, and movement of foreign nationals, particularly where migration
occurs without lawful authorization. The relocation framework is a regulatory and
humanitarian measure undertaken pursuant to the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025.

19
State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy (2006) 4 SCC 517
20
Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463

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On 8th April 2021, the Supreme Court of India (SCI), in Mohammed Salimullah v. Union of
India, AIR 2021 SC 1789 21ordered the deportation of Rohingya refugees according to the
procedure prescribed for deportation. The decision brings to the vanguard several striking
issues, one being the stance taken by the SCI on the principle of non-refoulement. Non-
refoulement, as defined by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), is
'Protection against return to a country where a person has reason to fear persecution' (1977).
Although the principle of non-refoulement does not bind India as it is not a signatory to the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, it binds India as customary international
law.
International organizations can visit these places. This shows that:

- People are treated with dignity

- They have the things they need to live

- Their right to life is protected

India is not a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention or its 1967
Protocol. However, India hosts a large number of refugees and generally follows many
humanitarian principles of the Convention through administrative and judicial measures,
despite having no specific domestic refugee law. India has not signed the: 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees Reasons
for non-signature: Concerns over national security Fear of increased burden on resources
Desire to retain discretion in refugee matters without binding obligations

People Are Not Being Detained Forever:-

The relocation is temporary until a decision is made. Considering the number of people
involved around 400,000 it is understandable that the government needs time to process their
cases. Just because there is no timeline it does not mean that what the government is doing is
against the law especially when dealing with large-scale migration.

21
AIR 2021 SC 1789

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The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025

Power to issue orders, directions or instructions.

(1)The Central Government may, by an order or direction or instruction, make provisions,

either generally or with respect to all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or
any specified class or description of foreigner, for prohibiting, regulating or restricting the entry
of foreigners into India or, their departure therefrom or their presence or continued presence
therein

(a)shall not enter India, or shall enter India only at such times and by such route and at such
port or place and subject to the observance of such conditions on arrival as may be specified;

(b)shall not depart from India, or shall depart only at such times and by such route and from
such port or place and subject to the observance of such conditions on departure as may be
specified;

(e)shall remove himself to, and remain in, such area in India as may be specified;

(f)shall comply with such conditions as may be specified—

(i)requiring him to present himself for examination, for such information in such manner, at
such time, as may be required;

(ii)requiring him to reside in a particular place;

(iii)imposing any restrictions on his movements;

(iv)requiring him to furnish such proof of his identity and to report such particulars to such
authority in such manner and at such time and place as may be specified;

(v)requiring him to allow his photograph and biometric information, as may be specified,
to be taken and to furnish specimens of his handwriting and signature to such authority
and at such time and place as may be specified;

(vii)prohibiting him from association with persons of a specified description;

(viii)prohibiting him from engaging in activities of a specified description;

The Right to Life Does Not Mean You Can Stay Forever

The law says that "people" are protected but this does not mean foreigners can stay in Norland
forever.

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The people who were moved:

- Were in the country without permission

- Did not meet the requirements to stay

- Are waiting for the government to make a decision

The Supreme Court in "Louis De Raedt v. Union of India"1991 AIR 188622 dealing with a
case of domicile of choice having regard to Art. 5(c) of the Constitution of India, and as to
availability of fundamental rights to foreigner, has taken the view that the fundamental right of
the foreigner is confined to Art. 21 relating to life and liberty and does not extend to a foreigner
the right to reside and settle in India as stated in Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution, and
referring to the case of "Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail,
Calcutta" 1955 AIR 36723 has held that the Executive Government has unrestricted right to
expel a foreigner, and that there cannot be any hard and fast rule so far as the right to be heard
is concerned.

People Are Treated Humanely in the Special Zones

The special zones have:

- Places for people to live

- Food

- Schools

- Medical help

The Cyclone Did Not Violate Any ones Rights:-

The cyclone was a disaster. The government said that:

- They started helping people right away

- They fixed the services

- They took steps to prevent more damage

22
1991 AIR 1886
23
1955 AIR 367

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PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
the counsel humbly and respectfully pleads before your lordship to dismiss the petition or to
pass any other such order which the court may deem fit in the light of justice, equity and in
good conscience to which the counsel shall forever be duty bound to.

Respectfully submitted on behalf of the Respondent,

SD/-

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT

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