Sources in Chinese History

Sources in Chinese History, now in its second edition, has been updated to include re-translations of over
a third of the documents. It also incorporates nearly 40 new sources that work to familiarize readers
with the key events, personages, and themes of modern China.
Organized thematically, the volume examines China’s complex history from the rise of the Qing
dynasty in the mid-seventeenth century through the formation of the People’s Republic of China up to
the present. Each chapter begins with an annotated visual source followed by a chapter introduction and
analysis of textual sources, allowing students to explore different types of sources and topics. Sources
in Chinese History contextualizes the issues, trends, and challenges of each particular period. Special
attention has been made to incorporate a variety of viewpoints which challenge standard accounts.
Non-traditional documents, such as movie dialogues, are also included which aim to encourage
students to reconsider historical events and trends in Chinese history.
This volume includes a variety of sources, such as maps, posters, film scripts, memorials, and
political cartoons and advertisements, that make this book the perfect introductory aid for students of
Chinese history, politics, and culture, as well as Chinese studies after 1600.
David G. Atwill teaches Asian History at Pennsylvania State University. He is the author of two
monographs, The Chinese Sultanate (2005) and Islamic Shangri-la (2018), and has been the recipient of
several fellowships, including two Fulbright fellowships and an Andrew W. Mellon New Directions
Fellowship.
Yurong Y. Atwill is the Asian Studies Librarian at Pennsylvania State University and received her PhD
from Yunnan University. She is the author of Yunnan Knowledge and Outsiders’ Impressions: Culture,
Transportation and Botantical Resources (in Chinese) and has published numerous articles on Chinese
librarianship.
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 Second Edition

Sources in Chinese History

DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES FROM 1644
TO THE PRESENT

David G. Atwill and Yurong Y. Atwill

Second edition published 2021
by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2021 Taylor & Francis

The right of David G. Atwill and Yurong Y. Atwill to be identified as authors of

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trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

First edition published by Pearson 2009

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Atwill, David G., editor. | Atwill, Yurong Y., editor.
Title: Sources in Chinese history : diverse perspectives from 1644 to the present / David G. Atwill, and
Yurong Y. Atwill.
Description: Second edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references
and index. | Contents: Rise of the Qing (1644–1799) — The Opium War — Nineteenth-Century Society,
Rebellions and Reform — The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism in China (1856–1890) — Seeking to Solve
China’s Ills — Revolution, Warlordism, & Intellectual Transformation — China in the Twenties: The
Struggle for Unity — Fractured Visions: Manchuria, Nanjing, and Yan’an in the 1930s — China at War
(1937–1949) — New China - Finding a New Way — China in the 60s — Making Revolution in the Modern
World (1980s, 1990s & 2000s) — China in the 21st Century.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020040525 | ISBN 9780367210939 (paperback) | ISBN 9780367210922 (hardback) |
ISBN 9780429265327 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: China—History—Sources.
Classification: LCC DS703 .S68 2021 | DDC 951—dc23
LC record available at [Link]

ISBN: 978-0-367-21092-2 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-21093-9 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-26532-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Palatino
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
For Peter 杨维康 and Kate 杨维馨 whose love of China enhanced our own
and whose willingness to maintain their ties with China gives us hope for the future.
 CONTENTS CONTENTSCONTENTS

Preface xv
A Note on Romanization, Names, and Dates xvii
Acknowledgments xix

PART I
Late Imperial China (1644–1911) 1

Chapter 1 Early to Mid-Qing 2

Rise of Qing: Conquest, Consolidation, and Preservation

1.1 Shunzhi’s Head-Shaving Decree (1645) 5
1.2 Sacred Edict of the Kangxi Emperor (1670) 6
1.3 Kangxi’s Edict Regarding Wu Sangui (1674) 7
1.4 Qing Rulers Promoting and Preserving Manchu Identity (1635–1850) 8
1.5 Qing’s 29 Regulations for Reorganizing Tibet (1792) 9

Qing China and Relations With Europe

1.6 Kangxi’s Edict of Toleration (March 20, 1692) 12
1.7 Open Letter From Kangxi to Pope Clement XI (October 31, 1716) 12
1.8 Letter From King George III to the Emperor of China (1792) 13
1.9 Journal Entries of Lord Macartney During His Journey to China
(1793–1794) 15
1.10 Qianlong’s Edict to King George III of England (September 23, 1793) 18

Education, Examinations, and Literature

1.11 Pu Songling’s “Three Genii” (c. 1679) 20
1.12 Eight-Legged Essay Civil Service Examination (1818) 21
1.13 Description of the Provincial Examination (c. 1845) 23
1.14 Lan Dingyuan on Female Education (1712) 26

Chapter 2 The Opium War 28

Trade in Early Nineteenth-Century Guangzhou

2.1 Description of European Factories in Guangzhou (1825–1844) 31
2.2 Deqing’s Memorial on the Responsibilities of the Gonghang
(March 23, 1813) 33
2.3 Rules Regulating Foreign Trading in Guangzhou (1832–1835) 34

Opium in Early Nineteenth-Century Guangzhou

2.4 Opium and Tea Trade With China 36
2.5 Huang Juezi on the Evil of Opium (June 2, 1838) 38
2.6 The Opium Question Among Westerners in China (1836–1837) 40

Commissioner Lin Zexu and the Opium War

2.7 Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu’s Pronouncement to the Foreigners
(March 18, 1839) 43
2.8 Charles Elliot’s Public Notice to British Subjects (March 27, 1839) 45
viii Contents

2.9 Letter From Lin Zexu to His Wife (1839) 46

2.10 Letter From Lin Zexu to Queen Victoria (July 19, 1839) 47

Popular Responses and Diplomatic Resolutions to the Opium War

2.11 Guangdong Residents’ Denunciation of the British (1841) 50
2.12 British Parliamentary Discussion of the Resolution on the
“Suppression of the Opium Trade” (April 4, 1843) 52
2.13 Treaty of Nanjing (1842) 53

Chapter 3 Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions and Qing Responses 56

Taiping Rebellion
3.1 Taiping Anti-Manchu Proclamation (1852) 59
3.2 Brief Record of the Taiping’s Arrival in Nanjing (March 1853) 61
3.3 Taiping Ten Commandments (1852) 63
3.4 Taiping Plan for Reorganizing Chinese Society (1853) 67
3.5 Land System of the Heavenly Dynasty (1853) 68

Muslim Rebellions
3.6 Panthay Rebellion Summons to Arms (1868) 70
3.7 Rumors of a Tungan Massacre (1864) 71
3.8 Robert Shaw’s Visit to Yarkand and Kashgar (March 3, 1870) 73

Self-Strengthening Movement
3.9 Feng Guifen on the Adoption of Western Learning (1860) 75
3.10 Zeng Guofan on Founding the Shanghai Arsenal (1868) 76
3.11 Li Hongzhang’s Memorial Advocating Foreign Language Training
(March 11, 1863) 77
3.12 Woren’s Memorial Objecting to Western Learning (1867) 79

Chapter 4 The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism in China (1856–1890) 82

The Second Opium War, the Treaty of Tianjin, and the Burning of Yuanming Yuan
4.1 Harry Parkes’ Letter to Commissioner Ye Mingchen (October 8, 1856) 85
4.2 Reflections of Lord Elgin on the Treaty of Tianjin (June 29, 1858) 87
4.3 Treaty of Tianjin (June 26, 1858) 88
4.4 A Narrative on the Looting and Prize Money at the Yuanming Yuan
(October 7, 1860) 92

Sino-Japanese War
4.5 China’s Declaration of War (1894) 94
4.6 Japan’s Declaration of War (1894) 95
4.7 Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) 96
4.8 Li Hongzhang, “Afterthoughts of the Japanese War” (June 30, 1895) 99
4.9 John Hay’s Open Door Note (September 6, 1899) 101
4.10 Description of Chinese Family Life (1883) 102
4.11 Legal Case Study: Fraudulent Sale of Land (1889) 104
4.12 Legal Case Study: Marriage (1882) 106
 Contents ix

Chapter 5 Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 108

100 Days Reform Movement

5.1 Kang Youwei’s Memorial on Institutional Reform (January 29, 1898) 111
5.2 China Mail Interview With Kang Youwei (October 7, 1898) 114
5.3 Guangxu’s Three Secret Decrees (1898) 115
5.4 Cixi and the Trial of the Reformers (1898) 116

Boxer Uprising
5.5 Malan Boxer Proclamations (1900) 118
5.6 Spirit Boxer Possession (1900) 119
5.7 Imperial Edict to “Declare War” (June 21, 1900) 120
5.8 Boxer Protocol (September 7, 1901) 121

Post-Boxer Reform and the Push for Revolution

5.9 Qing Officials’ Joint Proposals for Post-Boxer Reform (1901) 125
5.10 Qiu Jin’s Address to 200 Million Fellow Countrywomen (1904) 126
5.11 Abolition of the Competitive Examinations in China (1905) 128

PART 2
Republican China (1911–1949) 133

Chapter 6 Revolution, Warlordism, and Intellectual Transformation 134

1911 Revolution
6.1 Three People’s Principles and the Future of the Chinese
People (1906) 138
6.2 Demands of the National Assembly, Submitted in a Memorial
to the Throne (November 3, 1911) 141
6.3 First Provisional President’s Inaugural Address
(January 2, 1912) 142
6.4 Last Emperor’s Abdication Edict (February 12, 1912) 144
6.5 Sun Yat-sen’s Reply to Yuan Shikai and Resignation
(February 12, 1912) 145

May Fourth Movement

6.6 Japan’s 21 Demands (January 18, 1915) 146
6.7 May Fourth Manifesto (May 4, 1919) 149
6.8 Chen Duxiu’s “New Youth” Manifesto (December 1, 1919) 150
6.9 Hu Shi’s Literary Revolution and Renaissance in China (1926) 151

Warlord Era
6.10 Zhang Xun’s Reasons for Restoring the Monarchy (1917) 153
6.11 Warlord Politics: The Game of Playing One Against the
Other (1925) 154
6.12 Remembering the Brutal and Corrupt Warlord Zhang
Zongchang (1936) 156

Chapter 7 China’s Struggle for Unity 160

Ideologies and Realities of a Fractured Republic

7.1 Three Principles of the People (March 6, 1921) 164
7.2 Manifesto on the Northern Expedition (September 18, 1924) 166
x Contents

7.3 Sun Yat-sen’s Last Wills and Testament (March 11, 1925) 168

Rise of the Kuomintang

7.4 “Qingdang”: Purge the Party of all Undesirable Elements (April 1927) 170
7.5 KMT’s Purge the Party Slogans (May 1927) 171
7.6 Proclamation From the Headquarters of the 26th Army
(April 22, 1927) 172
7.7 Chiang Kai-shek’s Marriage Proposal to Song Meiling (1927) 173

Origins of the CCP

7.8 First Manifesto of the CCP on the Current Situation (June 15, 1922) 175
7.9 Mao Zedong’s Reports on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement
in Hunan (March 1927) 177
7.10 Land Law of the Jiangxi Soviet (1931) 180
7.11 Three Main Rules of Discipline and Six Points for Attention (1928) 181

Literary Currents in 1920s China

7.12 Yang Zhihua’s “Love and Socializing Between Men and Women”
(July 1922) 182
7.13 Ding Ling’s “Miss Sophie’s Diary” (1928) 184
7.14 Ba Jin’s “Family” (1931) 186

Chapter 8 Fractured Visions: Manchuria, Nanjing, and Yan’an in the 1930s 190

Manchukuo: Japan in Manchuria

8.1 British Consulate Report on the Death of Zhang Zuolin (June 15, 1928) 194
8.2 Principles for the Organization of the “Manchukuo” Government (1932) 196
8.3 Lytton Commission Report (October 2, 1932) 198
8.4 Japanese Declaration and Withdrawal From the League (March 27,
1933) 200

The Nanjing Decade

8.5 Emergency Law for the Suppression of Crimes Against the Safety
of the Republic (1931) 202
8.6 Song Meiling on the New Life Movement (1934) 204
8.7 FILM: Plunder of Peach and Plum (1934) 206

CCP: From a Long March to the United Front

8.8 The Long March and Ethnic Borderlands: Two Perspectives (1935) 209
8.9 Zhang Xueliang’s Xi’an Incident Speech (December 13, 1936) 211
8.10 Mao Zedong’s Statement on Chiang Kai-shek’s Statement
(December 28, 1936) 213
8.11 Communist Co-operation by the Central Committee of the CCP
(July 15, 1937) 215

Chapter 9 China at War (1937–1949) 218

Facing the Enemy

9.1 Letter to the Japanese Embassy From the Nanjing Safety Zone
(December 18, 1937) 221
9.2 Song Meiling’s “Only the Sword is Left” (July 17, 1938) 223
9.3 FILM: Devils on the Doorstep (2000) 224
 Contents xi

Occupied China
9.4 Wang Jingwei’s Telegraph to Chiang Kai-shek Indicating His Collaboration
With the Japanese (1938) 228
9.5 [Occupied] China–Japan: Treaty Concerning Basic Relations—Annexed
Protocol (November 30, 1940) 230
9.6 Chiang Kai-shek, “China’s War, a World War” (July 7, 1942) 231

Life in Yan’an
9.7 Ding Ling’s “Thoughts on March 8, Women’s Day” (1942) 233
9.8 Wang Shiwei’s “Wild Lilies” (1942) 236
9.9 Mao’s “Talk at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” (May 1942) 239

The KMT’s Road to Defeat and Taiwan

9.10 Wen Yiduo’s “Last Speech” (July 15, 1946) 243
9.11 Republic of China’s Declaration of Martial Law in Taiwan
(May 20, 1949) 245
9.12 FILM: Crows and Sparrows (1949) 246

PART 3
Post-1949 China (1949–Present) 251

Chapter 10 New China: Finding a New Way 252

Shaping a New China: External and Internal Challenges

10.1 Proclamation of the Central People’s Government of the People’s
Republic of China (October 1, 1949) 256
10.2 Two Telegrams Relating to the Korean War (1950) 257
10.3 US Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger (July 14, 1956) 260
10.4 Seventeen-Point Plan for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (1951) 262

A New Society in a New China: Farther, Further, Faster

10.5 Marriage Law (1950) 264
10.6 Birth Control and Planned Families (March 7, 1957) 267
10.7 Lu Dingyi, “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, a Hundred Schools
of Thought Contend!” (May 26, 1956) 269
10.8 FILM: Blue Kite (1993) 271

A Great Leap Forward

10.9 Liu Shaoqi’s Blueprint for the Great Leap Forward (1958) 274
10.10 People’s Daily “Red-flag Commune Dining Halls” (November 6, 1958) 275
10.11 Close Planting (1950s) 277
10.12 Peng Dehuai’s Letter to Chairman Mao (July 14, 1959) 278

Chapter 11 China in the 1960s 282

Pursuing New Loyalties

11.1 The Khrushchev Revisionists Are Betrayers of the People’s War
(September 3, 1965) 286
11.2 Lei Feng, Chairman Mao’s Good Solider (1963) 288
11.3 What Is Dazhai Spirit? (1969) 290
xii Contents

The Great Proletariat Revolution

11.4 Song Binbin, “I Put a Red Guard Army Band on Chairman Mao”
(August 1966) 292
11.5 Mao’s Bombard the Headquarters—My Big Character Poster
(August 5, 1966) 294
11.6 The Sixteen Points: Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP
Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (August 8, 1966) 295
11.7 Chairman Mao Joins a Million People to Celebrate the Great
Cultural Revolution (August 18, 1966) 299
11.8 The Road for China’s School Graduates (1976) 301
11.9 Mao’s Statement in Support of Black Americans’ Struggle Against
Violent Repression! (April 16, 1968) 303

Music, Operas, and Plays—Creating a Culture Befitting a Revolution

11.10 Jiang Qing Discussing Peking Opera’s Revolution (July 1964) 305
11.11 Revolutionary Song Lyrics 306
11.12 FILM: Pine Ridge (1973) 308

Chapter 12 China Reemerges: Political Trends in the 1970s 314

Shifting Alliances: The Two Chinas and the United States

12.1 Resolution on the Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s
Republic of China in the United Nations (October 25, 1971) 318
12.2 Chiang Kai-shek’s Declaration to Compatriots Regarding the Republic of
China’s Withdrawal From the United Nations (October 26, 1971) 319
12.3 Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s
Republic of China (Shanghai Communiqué) (February 28, 1972) 320
12.4 Transcripts of the First Meeting Between Nixon, Mao, Kissinger,
and Zhou (1972) 322

Who’s Next?: Choosing a Successor

12.5 Official Announcement of Mao’s Death (September 1976) 326
12.6 Editorial in Support of Hua Guofeng’s “Two Whatevers” Policy
(February 7, 1977) 328
12.7 Deng Xiaoping on the Four Modernizations (May 7, 1978) 329
12.8 Wei Jingsheng’s Fifth Modernization: Democracy
(December 5, 1978) 330
12.9 Trial of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Cliques (November 1980) 333

Life in the 1970s

12.10 University Entrance Examinations (1977) 335
12.11 FILM: At Middle Age (1982) 338
12.12 Zhang Jie’s “Love Must Not Be Forgotten” (1979) 340

Chapter 13 Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 344

Political Currents
13.1 Deng Xiaoping’s Building Socialism With a Specifically Chinese
Character (June 30, 1984) 348
13.2 Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents (July 1, 2001) 349
13.3 Hu Jintao Proposes Scientific Outlook on Development for Tackling
China’s Immediate Woes, Challenges (October 15, 2007) 351
 Contents xiii

Shifting Roles and Representation of Women in Policy, Cinema, and Literature

13.4 One Couple, One Child (1980) 352
13.5 FILM: The Story of Qiu Ju (1992) 354
13.6 Fudan University Relaxes Sex Rules for Students (July 19, 2005) 357
13.7 The “Two Children” Dilemma (2018) 358

Tiananmen
13.8 Seven-Point Petition (April 18, 1989) 360
13.9 Transcript of May 18 Meeting Between Premier Li Peng and Students
(May 18, 1989) 361
13.10 The Truth About the Beijing Turmoil (1989) 365
13.11 Songs and Tiananmen (1989) 368

Hong Kong Handover

13.12 Sino-British Joint Declaration (December 19, 1984) 370
13.13 Christopher Patten’s Handover Speech (June 30, 1997) 372
13.14 Jiang Zemin’s Speech at the Handover Ceremony (1997) 373

Chapter 14 China in the Twenty-First Century 376

Rise of Xi Jinping
14.1 Xi Jinping’s Socialist Core Values (2012) 380
14.2 Xi Jinping’s Speech at the Opening of the Belt and Road Forum
(May 14, 2017) 381
14.3 Xi Jinping’s Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Founding
of the PRC (2019) 383

Developmental, Social, and Environmental Issues in Contemporary China

14.4 A Roundtable Discussion: Why Is There Still Flooding in the Yangtze River
Basin With the Three Gorges Dam? (July 20, 2020) 386
14.5 China’s Hydropower Moving West (2020) 388
14.6 FILM: Still Life (2006) 390
14.7 FILM: The Wandering Earth (2019) 393
14.8 Why Are Chinese High-Speed Trains Leading the World? (2019) 395

Movements and Challenges to the State

14.9 Open Letter Protesting the Decision on Freezing Point Weekly
(January 25, 2006) 397
14.10 Ma Ying-jeou’s Speech at the Society of Publishers in Asia (SOPA)
(June 15, 2016) 400
14.11 Hong Kong Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance
Legislation (2020) 403
14.12 COVID-19: Li Wenliang’s Letter of Admonition (2020) 405

Glossary 409
Sources 421
Index 429
 PREFACE PREFACEPREFACE

There is no avoiding China in the world today. China’s role in global politics, economics, and culture
is undeniable. The number of Americans and Europeans studying the Chinese language has soared in
recent years. Foreign investment in China and Chinese exports to the world are increasing at a record
pace. Western political leaders ponder how to join or combat the country’s expanding influence. Yet,
this emerging “discovery” of China should more correctly be described as a “re-discovery.” European
and American churches have sent missionaries to China for more than five centuries. Western trad-
ers and businesses have sought Chinese products, and pursued new markets for their own goods, for
a commensurate period. Still, this newfound interest in China suggests there is a need for a source-
book that goes beyond the narrow boundaries of political and intellectual thought; a sourcebook that
explores the broad cultural, social, and ethnic trends that are the foundation of a twenty-first-century
China.
Compiling a selection of documents accurately reflecting China’s complex history was not an easy
task. The greatest challenge was choosing diverse sources that reflect the various directions the fields
of study have taken in recent years. While nearly every chapter contains conventional documents, such
as speeches, treaties, or imperial communications, we sought to pair such traditional offerings with
other documents that would provide for a broader interpretation of their consequences for Chinese
society. We also sought to pick documents that would pique students’ and instructors’ interests with
such selections as the “Taiping Ten Commandments,” and the recent “sex rules” for students at Fudan
University.
Topically, this collection includes a broad spectrum of perspectives and ideas. Within the scope
of documents included, we have chosen to emphasize three categories that are all significant but also
often underemphasized. First, we have included an array of sources on women’s topics, like the educa-
tion of women in late imperial China, women’s roles in China’s revolutions, and the evolving notions
of “modern love” and dating in twentieth-century China. Second, there is a significant sampling of
Chinese literature that permits comparisons both across time and within a single era. Finally, we have
given popular culture an important place among the documents by including translations of advertise-
ments, movie dialogues, and wall posters.
One of our main goals when we set out to create a new sourcebook was to highlight inherent
historiographical issues. As we compiled the documents, we paid considerable attention to the types of
documents and, in numerous instances, the manner in which we sequenced them in order to promote a
greater awareness of the different ways history can be told and interpreted. For example, propaganda
from various periods of the People’s Republic of China and culturally prejudiced sources—both West-
ern and Chinese—from the nineteenth century are included. By incorporating such obviously “loaded”
source material, an immediacy and intimacy is brought to China’s contentious past that is otherwise
lost to the modern student.
One of the hardest aspects of creating a sourcebook is making difficult decisions about which doc-
uments to include and which to leave out. In general, we focused on maintaining breadth over depth,
and in several instances, we sought to group documents into meaningful themes so an instructor could
sequence them across a particular course. Similarly, while it was often tempting to include complete
documents, we chose to abbreviate, excerpt, and otherwise shorten documents.
This sourcebook is designed primarily for a single or two-semester course on Chinese history after
1600. The format of this sourcebook assumes the use of outside readings or a textbook, but for the more
adventurous it could also be used as a standalone sourcebook with the instructor offering crucial infor-
mation and context. Each chapter begins with a short introductory essay that examines a key event, per-
sonage, or theme from the period covered by the chapter. These are written to supplement, not replace,
the accompanying textbook narratives. We have selected perspectives that help to orient the student to
the issues, trends, and challenges of each period. We hope the different viewpoints presented will lead
students to rethink the ways in which historical events are commonly understood.
Every document included in the sourcebook is preceded by a short headnote. The headnotes serve
different purposes: some offer basic background information, others introduce key personages, and
still others seek to highlight the significance of the document. They are not meant to be exhaustive or
xvi Preface

comprehensive. Rather, they attempt to set a tone so the reader may correctly place the document in its
historical context.
To encourage students to move beyond simply reading about history, each chapter is introduced
by a visual document from the era to be examined. We have selected a variety of sources—including a
Qing memorial to the throne, Cultural Revolution–era posters, as well as political cartoons and adver-
tisements. Each visual source includes eight to ten comments that offer translations of any Chinese text,
background information, and information that should allow students to begin to tease out significant
issues “embedded” in the document.
Given the inherent limitations of any sourcebook, for instructors and students alike, we hope this
sourcebook is only the beginning of one’s exploration of modern Chinese history, culture, and society.
To that purpose, we have included several guides at the end of each of the three main parts of the book
with suggested readings and websites.

NEW TO THE SECOND EDITION

In this second edition, in response to reader and student feedback, we have updated and re-translated
over a third of the documents, introduced nearly 40 new sources, and restructured many of the chap-
ters. Although one chapter from the first edition was removed, much of that material was redistributed
to the appropriate chapters to contextualize it more appropriately to the period in which it occurred.
Our greatest hope is that these images, documents, and introductions aid in many students’ first intro-
duction to China. With this goal in mind, we have added more Chinese film scripts to this edition to
allow students to know the scene in advance and be able to appreciate the acting, directing, and visual
action. Finally, the entire last chapter has been updated to account for the many manifold transforma-
tions China has undergone and undertaken in the first decades of the twenty-first century.
 A NOTE ON ROMANIZATION, NAMES, AND DATES A NOTE ON ROMANIZATION, NAMES, AND DATESA NOTE ON ROMANIZATION, NAMES, AND DATES

Most Chinese terms, people, and places in this book are romanized according to the pinyin system. In
some instances where the term or name might be better known by another romanization system, we
have included its non-pinyin form in brackets after its first usage. While the decision to employ only
pinyin is not without its own set of problems, we believe its use provides for consistency across all the
documents and removes a hindrance to understanding China’s past.
Chinese names are given with their family name first, followed by their given name. Mao Zedong’s
family name is Mao, and his given name is Zedong. Only in rare instances do Chinese use only their
first name. Chinese in the late Imperial and Republican eras often had multiple names or sobriquets
(Sun Yat-sen was known by at least six different names). If a document employed a lesser-known name
for an individual, we have included the more common name in brackets. Emperors during the Qing
dynasty are referred to by their reign name.
Prior to 1911, China adhered almost exclusively to a lunar calendar. All dates have been converted
to the solar calendar, though in some instances the original date remains with the solar date in brackets
to retain the flavor of the document.
Following are a few hints for pronouncing Chinese words that are romanized using pinyin. Most
of the consonants are close to the corresponding English letter, with the following exceptions:

CONSONANTS
C = ts (fits) X = sh (sheer)
G = g (good) Z = ds (woods)
Q = ch (cheat) ZH = j (joe)

UNITS OF MEASUREMENT
Weight: Area:
1 liang (tael) = 1.1 ounces 1 li = 0.36 mile
1 jin (catty) = 1.1 pounds 1 mu = 0.1647 acre
1 dan (100 jin) = 110 pounds
1 chest = 132 pounds

CURRENCY
tael (liang): This was the common unit of measure for uncoined silver money in circulation prior to
1932. It was of varying weights and purity, which affected its value.
yuan (dollar): Refers to a silver coinage first issued in the late nineteenth century and the term to
denote the national currency following the demonetization of silver in 1935.
Mexican dollar: A silver coin minted in the Spanish Empire (often in Mexican mints) and the
source of nearly all silver on the global markets during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth cen-
turies. The Mexican dollar was the preferred international currency, and thus most Chinese treaties that
indicate “dollars” referred to this currency.
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTSACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are delighted to be able to thank for this edition our editor, Laura Pilsworth, and our editorial assis-
tant, Isabel Voice, who were patient, insightful, and light-hearted throughout the entire project. Thanks
to E. Ferguson our copyeditor who saved us from errors of grammar, logic, and fact. Also on our list
of heroes is Ben Pease, who took our ideas for maps and rendered them far exceeding our expectations
at every turn. At our home institution of Penn State, numerous people made the writing of this book
a far more enjoyable process. Our supervisors, Michael Kulikowski and the Penn State Libraries, both
provided us with the time and the funds to help us carry out the research for this book. Liu Fang and
Li Kai assisted us with excitement and insights preventing embarrassing mistakes. Chinese librarians
from across the United States assisted in innumerable ways: Xue Zhaohui (Stanford), Xue Yan (Berke-
ley), Zhou Luo (Duke), Chen Yao (UCSB), Zhang Haihui (Pitt), Shen Zhijia (University of Washington),
Xu Hong (Duke), Li Guoqing (Ohio State), and Zheng Liren (Cornell). David Faust at University of
Minnesota proved both helpful and efficient in helping us track down essential images. Both Maura
Cunningham and Brian Elyer helped direct us in our search for new ideas and directions. Friends Elea-
nor and Steve Schiff listened to us far too many times with (apparent) interest, and we are indebted to
them for their friendship and many bottles of excellent wine. In China, no two people have shaped our
engagement with the country more than Lin Chaomin and Li Donghong, while Wang Chunqiao helped
with many last-minute requests.
Once again, no two people have lived with this book more than our son and daughter, Peter and
Kate. Carly Derstine and Kate Atwill served as amazingly efficient and tolerant assistants who helped
us not only catch many lapses in style, grammar, and tone but served as wonderfully engaged sound-
ing boards. Last, we must mention our large Chocolate Lab, Neville, who ably guided us from room to
room and document to document—and forced us outside for much-needed fresh air and long walks.
While we are all pleased to see this labor of love re-emerge as a second edition, it is particularly reward-
ing to see our children read it for themselves and see their own input on the written page. It is once
again our deep love for them that we dedicate this book and with the hope that they will continue to
visit, study, and enjoy China for many years to come.
 PART 1
Late Imperial China (1644–1911)
Late Imperial China (1644–1911)Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

TIMELINE

WORLD CHINA

1368–1644 Ming dynasty

British East India Company 1600
established
1644 Qing dynasty founded
1692 Kangxi issues Edict of Toleration
1720 Gonghang guild system established
Papal bull ends Jesuit mission in 1740s
China
c. 1740 Pu Songling’s Strange Tales first published
1757 All Western trade restricted to
Guangzhou
Boston Tea Party 1799
1799 Qianlong emperor dies and Heshen
sentenced to death
c. 1805 Shen Fu publishes Six Chapters of a
Floating Life
Queen Victoria ascends British throne 1837
1839–1842 Opium War
1842 Treaty of Nanjing
Communist Manifesto published 1848
1851–1864 Taiping Rebellion
1860 Convention of Beijing signed/Yuanming
Yuan burned
American Civil War 1861–1865
1861 Zongli Yamen founded
1865 Jiangnan Arsenal created
Japan’s Meiji Restoration 1868
1884–1885 Sino-French War
1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War
1898 Hundred Days Reform
1900 Boxer Uprising
1905 Sun Yat-sen forms Revolutionary Alliance
Henry Ford builds first Model T 1908 Cixi and Guangxu Emperor die
1911 Wuchang Uprising
1912 Republic of China established
 CHAPTER 1
Early to Mid-Qing
Late Imperial China (1644–1911)Early to Mid-Qing

1 4

3 6
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 3

1. SHUNTIAN (BEIJING) EXAMINATION HALL: The Shuntian Examination Hall (first built in the
early Ming dynasty [1368–1644]) had more than 50 rows of low buildings with over 17,000 exami-
nation cells. It was one of the largest in the whole of China (only Nanjing’s was larger). The larger
buildings behind the gate at the center and upper portion of the compound were walled off and
separated from the rest of the compound and were where the administrative staff and officials (who
graded the exams) resided.

2. EXAMINATION SYSTEM: Using exams to select imperial officials began in China as early as 165
BCE. A three-tier system with each tier conferring to a more prestigious degree (and access to a
higher office) began around 1370. The examination hall shown here held the provincial level (juren)
exams. While the notion of an examination to select officials may sound quite conventional, the first
record of any similar civil service exams in European countries did not occur until the early eigh-
teenth century.

3. EXAMINATION CELLS: Each cell contained two boards that could be arranged to form a bench, a
table, and a bed. The cell itself was a little over three feet wide and four feet deep. When sitting, they
faced north toward the front to allow guards to monitor their actions. Given the open nature of the
cells, the exam experience was highly dependent upon the weather.

4. LIFE and DEATH WITHIN THE EXAMS: Typically held in early autumn, the exams were often
hot, dirty, and uncomfortable affairs. Exam candidates, upon arriving at the examination hall, had
to provide proof of their identity and status (to prevent others from taking the exam in their place).
With the stress and minimal amenities, it is no surprise that candidates (some were in their 60s and
70s) died during the exam. In such cases, their bodies were wrapped, labeled with their name, and
thrown over the wall for municipal authorities to collect and notify their next of kin.

5. CHEATING: Despite the many efforts to prevent cheating, there are many stories of examinees
bringing in cheat sheets, study aids, and other guides to help them construct their “eight-legged
essays” (1.1). Those caught cheating would be dismissed and forbidden from taking the exam for
the next two cycles, which for many students would mean the end of their dreams of ever becom-
ing an official. Equally, to prevent collusion between local exam takers and exam graders, no local
officials were allowed to serve as graders.

6. A TYPICAL DAY AT THE EXAMS: The question for the day would be received at 10 a.m. The
exam candidates would remain in their cells until dusk writing a draft 600–700 characters long and
then carefully copy out a final version. Simply copying the essay in the correct and elegant calli-
graphic style could, even for a rapid writer, take many hours. After handing in their exam papers,
they would be provided with a meal and then attempt to get a night’s rest in preparation for the next
day’s exam (the exam would usually have at least three days of testing).
4 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

QING DYNASTY Walking along Beijing’s trendy downtown shopping district today, there
(1644–1911)—The is little to distinguish it from a modern Western city. Glass-faced office
last Chinese imperial buildings dominate the skyline, and popular American restaurant chains,
dynasty, founded in such as Pizza Hut, KFC, and Starbucks, crowd the main streets. Given
1644 by Manchus from these superficial similarities, one might assume that modern China is
northeastern China. It fell unconcerned with its own past in its race to adopt the global trends of the
in 1911 after the Wuchang twenty-first century. Yet this illusion is quickly dispelled by the imposing
Uprising. presence of the Forbidden City in the very center of the city. As the former
residence of the Qing emperors (1644–1911), the Forbidden City occupies
LATE IMPERIAL over 250 acres of prime real estate in downtown Beijing. Now a museum,
CHINA—A period the 600-year-old palace is a sprawling complex of some 800 halls and 9,000
of Chinese history rooms. Its presence offers a potent reminder of China’s imperial past.
traditionally defined as The Forbidden City is not merely a dusty relic retained out of a mis-
beginning with the end of placed nostalgia for a bygone era. The Qing emperors and their accom-
Mongol rule in 1368 and plishments are well known to most contemporary Chinese. The popularity
concluding with the fall of and interest in the Qing dynasty is illustrated by the numerous television
the Qing dynasty in 1911. series fictionalizing the lives of the emperors and court life. Often more
than 50 episodes long, the series are immensely popular among all age
GATE OF HEAVENLY
groups. Similarly, at most major tourist sites one can dress up in impe-
PEACE (TIANANMEN)—
rial costumes and have a souvenir picture taken. Numerous restaurants
The main gate and
in many major cities have also adopted “imperial” themes where the staff
entrance to the Forbidden
dress in late imperial clothing, and specialty dishes from recipes adapted
Palace, erected during the
from the imperial kitchen are served.
Ming dynasty and rebuilt
The symbolic power of the Qing is not limited to entertainment and
in 1651. Over 100 feet tall,
tourism. Mao Zedong clearly sought to tap into the symbolic power of
the gate has five arched
the Qing when he stood atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace on October 1,
portals through the base,
1949, and declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China. For
the middle and largest
decades, China’s top leaders have (in an explicitly symbolic move lost on
being exclusively for the
no Chinese) lived in Zhongnan Hai, the former imperial gardens adjacent
emperor.
to the Forbidden City. Why does a country that has so fervently sought to
ZHONGNAN HAI—An
sever itself from its pre-revolutionary past continue to celebrate its impe-
official walled compound
rial roots?
just west of the Forbidden
The allure stems, in some part, from the sheer success of China’s last
City in the center of Beijing,
dynasty, the Qing dynasty. In comparison to the long succession of dynas-
which in the first decades
ties that preceded it, the Qing stands out as one of China’s most accom-
of the PRC housed its top
plished imperial dynasties of the early modern world. The Qing emperors
leaders and today serves
ruled an empire of roughly 4.6 million square miles that, by the end of the
as the headquarters of the
Qing dynasty in the early nineteenth century, contained nearly one-third
party and top government
of the world’s population.
officials.
The Qing’s rise to power was not without challenges. The Qing
emperors were ethnically Manchu, not Han Chinese. The Manchus
HAN CHINESE—The stormed into Chinese history as a powerful military presence out of the
term Han Chinese today Northeastern Asian steppes in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
refers to the ethnic majority centuries. It was their ability to co-opt Chinese culture and attitudes—
of China’s population. while retaining their ties and control of the Asian steppes—that helped to
In imperial times, “Han secure their rule over China.
Chinese” often referred The Qing dynasty also marked an era of increased contact between
to individuals viewed China and Europe. Western accounts of China have tended to exagger-
as culturally Chinese ate the insularity of late imperial China and the Qing ruler’s disdain
regardless of their for European ideas. Although the average Chinese remained generally
ethnicity. unaware of Europe, to suggest that this meant China had no interest in
things non-Chinese over-simplifies the global ties of the era. Documents
JESUITS (SOCIETY OF in this chapter reveal that the Qing court had considerable contact with
JESUS)—A Christian many Europeans, including Jesuit priests, diplomatic envoys, and mer-
religious order of the chants. Still, Qing China remained quite selective in what they sought
Roman Catholic Church from Europe. China dominated much of Asia, politically, culturally, and
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 5

commercially. As a result, the Qing rulers focused, for the first century that first established
and a half of their rule, on consolidating and expanding their power over Chinese missions in the
China and in Asia rather than worrying about the shifting global, political, sixteenth and seventeenth
and military balances of power occurring in Europe at the time. centuries. Successfully
operating in the Ming
and early Qing era, the
RISE OF QING: CONQUEST, CONSOLIDATION, Jesuits actively transmitted
AND PRESERVATION European knowledge to
It is tempting when reading any history of China to accept the begin- China and Chinese learning
ning and ending dates of an imperial dynasty as absolute. In the case of to Europe. Their influence
the Qing dynasty, 1644 marks the year the Qing dynasty was founded, ended when Pope Clement
but it would take several more decades of Qing military campaigns and XI decided that Chinese
conquests before China completely submitted to Manchu rule. Qing Confucian practices and
forces continued to battle Ming loyalists and other renegade forces for offerings to the emperor
over 40 years (1.3). Not surprisingly, most Chinese commoners did not constituted idolatry.
immediately accept the new dynasty. As a result, the early Qing emper-
ors expended considerable effort to sway and coerce the Chinese popu-
lace into accepting their new rulers (1.1 and 1.2). At the same time, the
Manchu elite agonized over how best to preserve their own Manchu
identity (1.4).

1.1 SHUNZHI’S HEAD-SHAVING DECREE (1645)

In 1644, the Manchu armies surged out of northeast Asia, captured Beijing, and
founded China’s last imperial dynasty (1644–1911). Large swathes of China
continued to oppose Qing rule, giving the Manchu leaders the awkward task of
separating those Chinese who supported them from those who did not. To clarify
this process, Dorgon, the uncle of the Shunzhi emperor (r. 1644–1661), issued
an imperial edict to the Board of Rites requiring all Chinese males to shave their
forehead and wear a queue in the Manchu style. This decree was especially loath-
some to most Chinese because Confucian beliefs dictated that “one’s body, hair
and skin are inherited from one’s parents, one should not dare to mutilate them.”
The stark choice faced by most Chinese is caught in a popular saying of the day
“lose your hair and keep your head or keep your hair and lose your head” [liutou
bu liufa, liufa bu liutou].

Questions
1. How did the typical Chinese male react to Shunzhi’s decree?
2. Why might Qing officials be reluctant to enforce such a decree?

On the fifteenth day of the sixth month [July 7, 1645] this decree was sent
to the Board of Rites:
In the past, the head-shaving mandate has not been consistent,
and been left unspecified. It had been planned to issue a decree once the
empire had been firmly established. Now that the inner and outer [China
and Inner Asia] has become one family, with the emperor as the father
and all the people as the sons, how can the father and sons be different
from each other? If they were not of a single body and had two hearts,
then would they not be like foreigners to one another. Such matters do
not need further elaboration, every official and person in the empire is
undoubtedly already aware of it.
From today forward, with this proclamation, all residents of the capital
and its adjacent regions must within ten days—and Zhili with the other prov-
inces within ten days of receiving this proclamation—abide by this order to
shave their heads. Those who abide by the order belong to our empire. Those
who hesitate will be considered traitorous rebels and be severely punished.
6 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

SACRED EDICT—A All who attempt to evade this order trying to keep their hair, and disputing
list of Confucian rules of it, will not be dealt with lightly. All local civil and military officers shall rigor-
moral conduct and social ously enforce this. Those who respond to this matter by impudently petition-
relations compiled by the ing to ask to be allowed to retain the Ming traditions, and not recognize the
Kangxi emperor in 1670. authority of this empire, will be immediately executed. A reasonable interval
will be allowed for the clothing, hats, and apparel to conform to the authority
of this dynasty—exceptions will not be allowed.
KANGXI (1654–1722)—
The Board of Rites is hereby ordered to make known this decree to
The second emperor of
the capital and its adjacent regions, all provinces, prefectures, counties,
the Qing dynasty. His
and administrative offices, to ensure that the decree is observed by all offi-
61-year reign oversaw the
cials, officers, teachers and students, soldiers and civilians.
consolidation of Qing rule
over China, including the
defeat of the renegade 1.2 SACRED EDICT OF THE KANGXI EMPEROR (1670)
General Wu Sangui and
Cognizant of their distinct ethnic and cultural background, the Qing emperors
other rebel generals of the
sought to portray themselves as overseers of Confucian values. Kangxi’s Sacred
Three Feudatories.
Edict (later amended and expanded by his son, Yongzheng) is a recapitulation
of imperial precepts from earlier dynasties. The edict presents the Qing rulers
as concerned about the moral health of their subjects and thus promotes them as
ideal Confucian rulers. The Confucian tenets included by Kangxi reflect his own
concern with the stability, legitimacy, and morality of his rule. The edict sought
to spell out the moral underpinnings of the empire for its subjects. To this end, the
Sacred Edict was often posted or read by local officials to foster the Confucian ideal
of each individual serving their own role in society.
Questions
1. In an era well before newspapers, television, or the Internet were
common, what purpose do you believe the Sacred Edict served in
Qing society?
2. Why do you imagine the emperor would order his officials to read
the Sacred Edict in places where disturbances had occurred?

1. Uphold one’s filial duties as a son and a brother, so as to strengthen

familial relations.
2. Revere kinship structure and ties, so as to demonstrate harmony.
3. Strive to create good relations within local communities, so as to pre-
vent disputes and litigation.
4. Focus on agriculture and silk production, so as to ensure an ample
supply of food and clothing.
5. Adhere to a frugal lifestyle, so as to prevent lavish waste.
6. Foster and support education, so as to cultivate scholarly habits.
7. Eliminate heterodoxy so as to promote orthodoxy.
8. Extol the law, so as to warn the stupid and stubbornly wrong-headed.
9. Demonstrate courteousness so as to strengthen proper traditions.
10. Devote oneself to one’s proper vocation, so as to satisfy one’s ambition.
11. Guide the younger generations, so as to prevent wrong-doing.
12. Prevent wrongful accusations, so as to protect the innocent.
13. Abstain from sheltering criminals, so as to avoid being implicated as
an accomplice.
14. Promptly and fully pay taxes, so as to avoid being penalized for late
payment.
15. Uphold the neighborhood mutual security system [baojia], so as to
thwart theft and robbery.
16. Resolve hatred and animosities, so as to value life.
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 7

1.3 KANGXI’S EDICT REGARDING WU SANGUI (1674) WU SANGUI

(1612–1678)—A Ming
With the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) in free fall, Chinese General Wu Sangui, general who allowed the
in 1644, made the fateful choice to allow Manchu forces free passage through Manchu army to pass
the Shanhaiguan Pass, a pivotal gateway in the Great Wall northeast of Bei- through the Great Wall
jing. This deed has forever since marked Wu Sangui as one of China’s greatest and capture Beijing. He
traitors. Having proven his allegiance to the Qing court, he joined the Qing later revolted against
in a series of military campaigns against Ming loyalists and rebel armies. In the Qing and declared
return, the Qing rewarded Wu Sangui with numerous high titles, monetary himself emperor of the new
payments, and ultimately a command over the southwestern provinces of Yun- Zhou dynasty. He died of
nan and Guizhou as one of the Three Feudatories. While there, his growing dysentery in 1678.
dissatisfaction with the central court led to his slow appropriation of power. The
young Kangxi emperor was skeptical of Wu Sangui’s loyalty, but there were
few officials willing to step into the breach and challenge Wu. Few people were THREE FEUDATORIES—
surprised then, when Wu Sangui, in 1674, dropped all pretense and openly Areas granted by the
revolted against the Qing. The following edict reflects the Kangxi emperor’s early Manchu emperors
resolve to swiftly and completely overwhelm Wu Sangui’s kingdom. Before the in southern China to three
Qing armies could defeat him, however, Wu Sangui died a painful death from Chinese generals—Wu
dysentery. Soon thereafter, the Qing armies defeated the last of the rebel armies Sangui, Geng Jingzhong,
and finally incorporated southwest China into the Qing empire—nearly four and Shang Zhixin—who
decades after its founding. aided in the Manchu’s
early conquest of China.
Questions All three later rebelled
against the Qing rulers
1. What does the emperor suggest motivated Wu Sangui to rebel?
with the last rebel forces
2. How does the edict seek to show the strength of the Qing (and
defeated in 1683.
conversely the weakness of Wu Sangui)?

To the civil and military officials, people, indigenous chieftains, and the
ethnic peoples of Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou:
Rebel Wu Sangui initially surrendered to us due to his father’s unnat-
ural death. The late emperor rewarded his military service by bestowing
a noble title for him and his decedents. What an honor. I bestowed upon
him the title of prince due to his military successes in Yunnan. Such a pro-
motion and imperial reward was rare in history.
Unfortunately, Wu Sangui was sly and untrustworthy. Such impe-
rial honors and favors gave rise to total arrogance and betrayal. In the sev-
enth month of Kangxi’s twelfth year [September 1673], he asked to retire.
Accepting his request at face value, and considering he was old and had
fought long and over great distances, I allowed his retirement. I ordered
offices to prepare the proper transfer of power while specifically sending
officials to carry out my orders. I treated Wu Sangui considerately and
honorably. But Wu Sangui rebelled and readily turned his back on the
court’s gracious treatment establishing an independent center of power.
He collaborated with the Zheng Jiaolin to rebel together, disturbing peo-
ple lives, which angered gods and people.
As a result, I have now stripped him of his noble titles and dis-
patched generals and armies to wipe him out. If Wu Sangui attempts to
flee, Mongolian soldiers will be sent to capture and return him. I am now
ordering the Dalai Lama to send soldiers into border areas in Sichuan.
When the soldiers arrive, local officials and people ought to surrender
and shave their foreheads [in submission], and quickly prepare supplies
for the soldiers. Those who voluntarily lay down their arms and surrender
their cities should be reported to military leader Dalai Batulu Taiji who
will record and compensate them for their actions. Those who refuse to
8 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

surrender or to offer supplies will be vanquished. When the [Qing] gener-

als arrive, the [Dalai Lama’s] military accomplishments should be clearly
recorded and rewarded before returning home.
I am dispatching this edict to clearly inform my loyal subjects that
even those who might have previously been forced into rebelling will be
pardoned without fear of further prosecution as long as they show remorse
for their crimes and wholeheartedly surrender. The Dalai Lama’s military
forces must implement strict discipline and prevent any disturbance. You
all should remain law-abiding and your actions not raise any suspicions
and cause regrettable behavior.
Announce and follow my orders!
Imperial decree
3rd day, 8th month, 13th year of the Kangxi reign.

1.4 QING RULERS PROMOTING AND PRESERVING

MANCHU IDENTITY (1635–1850)
The Manchu rulers faced a complex set of issues as they conquered China and
established the Qing dynasty. On one hand, they sought to adopt Chinese methods
of imperial rule. On the other, they simultaneously sought to retain their distinc-
tive cultural identity. Beginning with Hongtaiji (1592–1643) the founder of the
Qing dynasty, Manchu rulers aggressively sought to maintain their own ethnic
identity while preventing the assimilation of Han Chinese cultural practices. With
frequent threats and harsh enforcement, the Manchu leadership aggressively pro-
moted their distinctive language, dress, and martial skills among the Manchus.
As part of their Manchu identity, they cultivated the notion that they shared
an affinity with Mongol and Tibetan peoples and actively promoted themselves
as patrons of Mongol and Tibetan culture. These measures helped to preserve
Manchu unity while advancing the Manchu’s desire to create a multiethnic and
cosmopolitan empire.
Questions
1. Why did the Qing emperors place such a premium on Manchu
identity? What elements did they most cherish?
2. Are pro-Manchu sentiments implicitly anti–Han Chinese?

Hongtaiji on the Adoption of the Term

Manchu (1635)
Our gurun (tribe, state) originally had the names Manju, Hada, Ula, Yehe,
and Hoifa. Formerly ignorant persons have frequently called [us] jušen.
The term jušen refers to the Sibo and Chaomergen barbarians and has
nothing to do with our gurun. Our gurun establishes the name Manju. Its
rule will be long and transmitted over many generations. Henceforth per-
sons should call our gurun its original name, Manju, and not use the previ-
ous demeaning name.

Hongtaiji on Maintaining Manchu

Traditions (1636)
Nowadays sons are only acquainted with roaming the streets and plan-
ning plays and music. In the old days when everyone was poor, we were
happy if a hunt was announced. Very few had servants; everyone looked
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 9

over their horses, cooked food, and saddled up to go. Even with hard- XIUNÜ—A selection
ship everyone still unceasingly put forth their best effort. . . . Nowadays process used by the
when there is a hunt, many youngsters say, “My wife or son is sick,” or imperial household to
“I’m busy with affairs at home.” If they’re clinging to wife and babies select Manchu women
and don’t know how to exert themselves, how can the nation not be as partners for the Qing
weakened? emperors and princes.

BANNERMEN (QIREN)—
Qianlong on Manchu Women Adopting Chinese Style
“Banners” were large civil-
Clothing (1759)
military units, organized
When I inspected the xiunü [marriage draft] this time, there were girls who along ethnic (Manchu,
emulated Han Chinese clothing and jewelry. This is truly not the Manchu Mongol, or Han) and
custom. If they do this before me, what is willfully worn at home? . . . hereditary lines, though
Although this is a small matter, if we do not speak to correct it, there must during the Qing, the term
gradually be a change in our customs, which are greatly tied to our old “bannermen” became
Manchu ways. Take this and have the banner high officials proclaim it to synonymous with being
the bannermen. Manchu.

Qianlong on Manchus Adopting Chinese JUELO (GIORO)—Imperial

Names (1767) kinsmen who, because of
their relationship to the
Recently the Board of Rites nominated Manjishan, the son of Mamboo. imperial line, received
The name Manjishan is really using “man” as a surname. I have changed special treatment and titles.
Manjishan’s name to Jishan. Jishan is a juelo, which is very prestigious.
But Jishan doesn’t honor this, instead he takes “man” as a surname, like
DALAI LAMA—
Han people. Where’s the principle in this? The Imperial Clan Court ought
Conventionally viewed
to pay attention to prevent this kind of thing.
as one of the two highest
reincarnated lamas of
A Reminiscence by Yihuan (Prince Chun) on the Royal Tibet’s main Buddhist
Family’s Skill at Archery (c. early 1850s) order (Gelugpa). Since the
seventeenth century, the
During the Xianfeng reign [1851–1861], I accompanied eighth brother . . . Dalai Lama has been
and ninth brother . . . to reside in the Agesuo. We would be summoned to the head of the Tibetan
test our literary and martial skills for glory or shame. One day the emperor government based
ordered me, followed by fourth elder sister . . . to compete in archery. in Lhasa. In 1959, the
Eighth brother put four arrows into the cloth target, ninth brother thirteen Fourteenth Dalai Lama
arrows, and the emperor gave each of them a jade piece. I hit the target fled China and established
three times, but I was not rewarded. Instead, he ordered a tiny pigeon a government in exile in
five cun [inches] in size to be hung and said to me, “if you hit this pigeon, neighboring India.
you’ll get a reward.” At this point fourth sister bent her bow and took her
first shot, hitting the target. I then shot and with my second arrow I hit it.
I was summoned in front of the emperor and he personally handed me a PANCHEN LAMA—A
jade lion. reincarnated Tibetan
Buddhist religious leader in
Tibet’s Gelugpa Buddhist
1.5 QING’S 29 REGULATIONS FOR REORGANIZING order, second only to the
TIBET (1792) Dalai Lama. The Panchen
Lama is traditionally
By the mid-seventeenth century, the Qing extended their political and military based at the Tashilhunpo
influence over Tibet. The depth, nature, and precise extent of Chinese control in Monastery near Shigatse.
Tibet waxed and waned over time, but there was almost continuous military and
political presence in many areas of Tibet. The following document denotes the
high-water mark of Chinese imperial influence (and aspirations). The document
was drafted by Fukang’an (a Manchu general), Lama Kyiron Hutuktu (represent-
ing the Dalai Lama), and a representative of the Panchen Lama. The document
10 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

reveals both the frustration of the Qing court with Tibet and the court’s efforts to
standardize Tibetan practices through the offices of the Qing Amban (sometimes
known as the Resident Official).

Questions
1. What reforms does Fukang’an seek to implement through the 29
Regulations for Better Government?
2. Is there any indication that the Qing imperial government has
direct rule over any Tibetans? Why or why not?

1. Tulkus [reincarnated lamas] and Hutuktus [reincarnated senior

lamas] are customarily determined by divinations of the Four Guard-
ians of Dharma. Such a practice may be open to misuse, so to show
the throne’s favor of the Gelugpa [dominant school of four branches
of Tibetan Buddhism], the emperor presented them with a Golden
Urn. In the future, when selecting from among the identified tulku
AMBAN—A Manchu term candidates, . . . the tulku candidates’ names and dates of birth will be
generically meaning high written in Manchu, Han, and Tibetan languages on metal slips and
official but in the Tibetan then placed in the Golden Urn. Following this procedure, a seven-
context referring to the day prayer session conducted by learned lamas. Then, the reincarna-
Qing imperial residents tion will be officially confirmed before the statue of Sakyamuni in the
first assigned to Lhasa Jokhang Temple by the Hutuktus and the Ambans in Tibet. When
in 1727. Typically, two there is only one tulku candidate, a blank metal slip will be placed
Ambans were assigned in the urn in addition to one with the tulku candidate’s name. If the
to Tibet to guide and blank slip is drawn, that tulku will not be recognized as the reincarna-
supervise the political tion, and a new one shall be sought. The reincarnations of the Dalai
situation of the region. Lama and Panchen Lama, who have a close relationship, will be con-
firmed in the same manner with tulkus candidate names and dates
of birth written in Manchu, Han and Tibetan languages on metal
slips. This new procedure is intended by the emperor to promote the
Gelugpa and to prevent deception by the Guardians of Dharma. The
Golden Urn should be kept clean and placed in front of Tsongkhapa’s
[Founder of Gelugpa branch of Tibetan Buddhism] statue at all times.
[. . .]
3. The Tibetan thanka currency is known to contain many impurities.
Hereafter, the government shall use pure Han silver containing no
impurities to mint coins. . . . The new Tibetan coin will be imprinted
with the words Qianlong Baozang [Emperor Qianlong’s Treasury]
on the front, with the year around its rim; the reverse side will be
imprinted in Tibetan.
4. There has never been a standing army in Ü-Tsang and soldiers have
been drafted only when Tibet has been threatened. Improperly
trained, these soldiers have become a nuisance, harming the Tibetan
people instead of protecting them. With the approval of the emperor,
a standing army of three thousand men will be mobilized, with one
thousand soldiers to be stationed in Ü [central Tibet], one thousand
soldiers in Tsang [western Tibet], five hundred soldiers in Gyantse [a
town in central Tibet], and another five hundred in Dingri [near the
Nepal border].
[. . .]
8. Previously, the finances of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama
have not been overseen by the Amban. Since the Dalai Lama and
Panchen Lama are wholly engaged with their religious duties, they
tend to leave the detailed financial matters largely in the hands of
relatives and attendants making it difficult to prevent abuses. Thus,
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 11

the emperor instructed the Amban to audit their budgets and send a TASHILHUNPO—One of
report twice annually in the spring and fall. Any misappropriation of Tibetan Buddhism’s four
funds will be subject to immediate punishment. great monasteries of the
[. . .] Gelugpa schools located in
10. The Amban shall have the same level of power and authority as the the central Tibetan city of
Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama in Tibetan administrative affairs. Shigatse. It was founded
All officials under the kaloons [council ministers], including the tulkus, in 1447 by the First Dalai
shall be subordinate to the Amban regardless of their position or rank. Lama and is traditionally
While the Panchen Lama is still under-aged, the sopon khenpo [Master the seat of the Panchen
of Religious Ceremonies] is responsible for the affairs of Tashilhunpo. Lama.
To prevent favoritism, any significant decisions shall be reported to
the Amban in advance so that he can offer his verdicts during his for-
mal visits to Tashilhunpo. MACARTNEY, GEORGE
[. . .] (1737–1806)—Served as the
22. All tulkus and lamas living in monasteries under the jurisdiction of the British envoy to China in
Dalai shall be registered with the list being given to both the Amban 1793, where he met with
and the Dalai Lama. A second list is to be prepared by the kaloons, reg- Emperor Qianlong and
istering the village residents living under each hutuktus throughout controversially refused to
Tibet. The khenpos [heads of monasteries] and dzasas [lower-rank offi- kowtow before him. The
cials] shall be punished if the lamas in their charge are caught trave- mission failed to achieve
ling without permits. a permanent embassy in
[. . .] Beijing or a reduction of
29. In Tibet, each village is required to pay taxes, land rent and tribute. In restrictions on British trade
villages that lie close to the monasteries these payments are collected with China.
by monastic officials. In more distant villages secular officials are sent
to collect it. Recently, it has been discovered cases in which a hand-
ful of dishonest monastic and secular officials . . . have been caught
stealing tax money and land rents which have resulted in government
tax revenues going astray and resulting in numerous instances of tax
arrears. These investigations have also uncovered the practice of tax-
ing a year or more in advance. As well, unpaid taxes owed by absen-
tee laborers were arbitrarily transferred to those bound to their land.
Such excessive taxes and practices made the people’s life extremely
onerous. In the future, all tax collectors will be appointed by chan-
zods [high officials] and shall abide to the designated taxable period.
Monastic and secular officials, and zhongpons shall collect only the
taxes and rents due that year; collecting one year in advance shall be
prohibited. The taxation of runaway households shall be exempted
until their return.

QING CHINA AND RELATIONS WITH EUROPE

China’s interactions with Europeans and other Westerners in the centu-
ries prior to the Qing dynasty were sporadic. In the last decades of the
Ming dynasty, Jesuit missionaries had made considerable inroads with
the ruling elite. After the Qing dynasty wrested power from the Ming, the
Jesuits continued to play a prominent role in the newly established impe-
rial court. Their influence can be measured to some extent by Kangxi’s
edict officially permitting the practice of Christianity in China (1.6). Soon,
merchants and envoys began to arrive from European countries seeking
to formalize ties with China. One of the most famous of these diplomatic
efforts was the Macartney Embassy of 1793. Although the embassy did
not obtain many of the goals desired by Lord George Macartney, it did
mark the beginning of increased contact between China and the West
(1.7, 1.8, 1.9).
12 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

1.6 KANGXI’S EDICT OF TOLERATION (MARCH 20, 1692)

The notion that China remained hostile to outside influences prior to the nine-
teenth century is a common one. However, the Qing court often welcomed for-
eign visitors and actively pursued non-Chinese knowledge. Jesuit missionaries
arrived in China several decades prior to the founding of the Qing and remained
well into the mid-Qing era, serving at the highest levels of the Qing court. The
Jesuits’ introduction of Western technology and manufacturing would later
temper the court’s “astonishment” over gifts presented by European embassies.
The Jesuit presence and deft explanation of Christianity helped it be tolerated by
Kangxi.

Questions
1. What value does Kangxi see in allowing Christianity to be
practiced?
2. Does Kangxi’s characterization seem to view Christianity as dif-
ferent than Chinese religions?

Following the emperor’s instructions, a group of ministers met to discuss

and report [on the status of Christianity in China]: Admiring our civiliza-
tion, the Europeans (xiyang ren) sailed several tens of thousands li to come
[to China]. Currently they oversee the calibration of the calendar. In times
of war, they have manufactured weapons and cannons. When we sent
a mission to Russia they joined the delegation, proving their allegiance
[to China] and their support produced considerable achievements. The
Europeans living in the provinces have perpetrated no evil behaviors, nor
fomented any unrest. They have not deceptively enticed the common peo-
ple with heretical ideas. Since we allow people to pray and burn incense
in Tibetan, Buddhist and Daoist temples, and since the Europeans have
violated no laws, it seems unreasonable to prohibit their religion.
We should order that Catholic churches throughout the empire be
preserved as before. All believers should be permitted to carry out their
religious practices as usual. With your Majesty’s approval and order, this
pronouncement is to be sent to Zhili and every province.
[Dated] 3rd day of the 2nd month of 31st year of the Kangxi reign
[March 20, 1692]

1.7 OPEN LETTER FROM KANGXI TO POPE

CLEMENT XI (OCTOBER 31, 1716)
In the decades after Kangxi’s edict of toleration, there continued to be a con-
troversy within the Catholic Church over the worship of ancestors by Chinese
Christians. Pope Clement XI ended the debate in 1704 when he forbade all wor-
ship of Chinese gods or ancestors and would excommunicate any Christian (or
priest) who failed to obey. When a papal delegation presented the pope’s decision
to Kangxi in 1706, the emperor remained unmoved, demanding that all Chinese,
of any religion, be allowed to practice Chinese rituals. Over the next decade, the
emperor had dispatched several Jesuit priests back to Rome to explicate and clarify
the emperor’s position. Finally, in 1715, the emperor received Clement XI’s papal
bull, unambiguously declaring “No Chinese Catholics are allowed to worship
ancestors in their familial temples.” Angered and hinting that he would only rec-
ognize documents sent via China’s appointed envoys (often Jesuit priests), he had
the following letter printed in red ink, written in three languages (Chinese, Latin,
and Manchu), and signed by 16 Jesuit priests working in the Chinese imperial
court.
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 13

Questions QIANLONG
(1711–1799)—The fourth
1. What attitudes toward Christianity, Rome, and the West does the emperor of the Qing
emperor’s open letter signal? dynasty. He officially
2. How do you think such a letter might have been received by the abdicated in the 60th year
pope and other Europeans? of his reign in order to
not surpass the 61-year
In accordance with his imperial emperor’s desires, we the imperially reign of his grandfather,
appointed staff of the Imperial Wuyingdian Printing Press and Bindery, the Kangxi emperor,
Yi Duli, Wang Daohua and Zhao Chang et al., respectfully order those though he retained de
people who have come from the West to follow the emperor’s orders: facto power until his
In the 45th year of the Kangxi reign [1706], the Westerners (xiyang death in 1799. Under
ren) Long Anguo [Antonio de Barros], Bo Xianshi [Antoine de Beauvol- his reign, Qing armies
lier], were appointed as imperial envoys. In the 47th year of the Kangxi enlarged the empire to its
reign [1708], the Westerners Ai Ruose [Giuseppe Provana] and Lu Ruose greatest territorial scope,
[José Raimundo de Arxo] were also appointed as imperial envoys. All Qing scholars compiled
received imperial directives to travel to the West [Rome]. the 36,000-volume Four
Despite the many passing years, there has been no written commu- Treasuries, and the
nication from them; although other letters, not easily identified as authen- emperor’s artisans greatly
tic or counterfeit, were received. Consequently, another letter was sent by expanded the Yuanming
Russians which hopefully arrived [in Rome]. Yuan.
As we cannot be certain of any news until the envoys that we sent
return, and if they fail to return, we have no clear evidence nor can have
any confidence in the true meaning of the other missives we receive.
Thus, concerned that our letters were not received, we have writ-
ten this open letter that includes a translation written in “western letters”
[Latin]. Copies of the open letter were printed and delivered to the Gov-
ernor of Guangdong so that it can be shared with those Westerners travel-
ling back and be widely distributed.
[Dated] 17th day of the 9th month of the 55th year of Kangxi reign
[October 31, 1716]

1.8 LETTER FROM KING GEORGE III

TO THE EMPEROR OF CHINA (1792)
King George III (r. 1760–1810) and the Qianlong emperor (r. 1735–1796) were
two of the eighteenth century’s longest-reigning and most powerful monarchs in
the world. Although the impetus for the British mission, led by George Macart-
ney in 1793, is often cast in largely economic and diplomatic terms, the embassy
reveals the divergent cultural frameworks guiding each empire’s actions. Unable
to speak Chinese, Macartney relied on Jesuit priests serving in the Qing court
and other Qing translators to put the carefully crafted letter of King George III
(with considerable input from Macartney himself) into Chinese. Unbeknownst
to Macartney, the Chinese version of the letter viewed by Qianlong adopted a
much more submissive tone quite different from the English version submitted by
Macartney, included next.
Questions
1. What goals does King George set out in this letter to Qianlong?
2. Does King George III’s letter exhibit an understanding of China
and Chinese diplomacy?

His Most Sacred Majesty George the Third, by the Grace of God King of
Great Britain, France and Ireland, Sovereign of the Seas, Defender of the
Faith and so forth, To the Supreme Emperor of China Qianlong worthy
14 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

to live tens of thousands and tens of thousands thousand Years, sendeth

Greeting.
The natural disposition of a great and benevolent Sovereign, such
as is Your Imperial Majesty, whom Providence has seated upon a Throne
for the good of Mankind, is, to watch over the peace and security of his
dominions, and to take pains for disseminating happiness, virtue and
knowledge among his subjects, extending also the same beneficence with
all the peaceful arts, as far as he is able, to the whole human race.
We have been still more anxious to enquire into the arts and manners
of Countries where civilization has been perfected by the wise ordinances
and virtuous examples of their Sovereigns through a long series of ages;
and, above all, Our ardent wish had been to become acquainted with those
celebrated institutions of Your Majesty’s populous and extensive Empire
which have carried its prosperity to such a height as to be the admiration
of all surrounding Nations—And now that We have by prudence and jus-
tice avoided the calamities of War into which discord and ambition have
plunged most of the other Kingdoms of Europe, and that by engaging
Our Allies in Hindostan [India] to put an end to hostilities occasioned by
the attack of an ambitious Neighbor, even when it was in Our power to
destroy him, We have the happiness of being at peace with all the World,
no time can be go as propitious for extending the bounds of friendship
and benevolence, and for proposing to communicate and receive those
benefits which must result from an unreserved and amicable intercourse,
between such great and civilized Nations as China and Great Britain.
Many of Our subjects have also frequented for a long time past a
remote part of Your Majesty’s dominions for the purpose of Trade. No
doubt the interchange of commodities between Nations distantly situated
tends to their mutual convenience, industry and wealth, as the blessings
which the Great God of Heaven has conferred upon various soils and cli-
mates are thus distributed among his Creatures scattered over the surface
of the Earth. But such an intercourse requires to be properly conducted,
so as that the newcomers may not infringe the laws and custom’s of the
Country they visit, and that on the other hand they may be received on
terms of hospitality and meet the Justice and protection due to Strangers.
We are indeed equally desirous to restrain Our Subjects from doing evil or
even of showing ill example in any foreign Country, as We are that [they]
should receive no injury in it. There is no method of effecting so good a
purpose, but by the residence of a proper Person authorized by Us to regu-
late their conduct and to receive complaints against them whenever they
should give occasion for any to be made against them, as well as any they
might consider as having just cause to make of ill treatment towards them.
By such means every misunderstanding may be prevented, every
inconvenience removed, a firm and lasting friendship cemented and a
return of mutual good offices secured between our respective Empires.
We rely on Your Imperial Majesty’s wisdom and justice and gen-
eral benevolence to Mankind so conspicuous in Your long and happy
reign that You will please allow Our Ambassador and Representative
at Your Court to have the opportunity of contemplating the example of
Your virtues and to obtain such information of Your celebrated institu-
tions as will enable him to enlighten Our People on his return; He, on
Our part being directed to give, as far as Your Majesty shall please to
desire it, a full and free communication of any art, science, or observa-
tion, either of use or curiosity, which the industry ingenuity and experi-
ence of Europeans may have enabled them to acquire: And also that You
will be pleased to allow to any of Our Subjects frequenting the Coasts
of Your dominions, and conducting themselves with propriety a secure
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 15

residence there and a fair access to Your Markets, under such laws and KOWTOW—From the
regulations, as Your Majesty shall think right, and that their lives and Chinese term ketou or
properties shall be safe under Your Imperial protection: that one Man koutou, meaning to ritually
shall not suffer for the crime of another, in which he did not participate, prostrate and bow one’s
and whose evasion from justice he did not assist, but that every measure forehead to the ground.
shall be taken on the part of Your Government as Our Ambassador is A gesture of respect and
instructed strictly to direct to be taken on the part of Our People to seize deference used in China
and bring to condign Punishment, any of Our Subjects transgressing the before the Emperor,
laws or good order of Your Empire, or disturbing the Peace and friend- one’s elders, or when
ship subsisting between Us. worshiping.
We have particularly instructed Our Ambassador to take every
method in his Power to mark Our regard and friendly disposition to Your
MACARTNEY’S
Imperial Majesty, and it will give Us the utmost satisfaction to learn that
ESCORTS—Of these three
Our wishes in that respect have been amply complied with and that as
officials, only Zhengrui
We are Brethren in Sovereignty, so may a Brotherly affection ever subsist
was a high official (and a
between Us.
Manchu). The other two,
May the Almighty have you in his holy protection!
Wang Wenxiong and
Given at Our Court at St. James’s in London and in the 32nd Year
Qiao Renjie, were local
of Our Reign. Imperator Augustissime Vester bonus frater et Amicus
officials (military and civil,
GEORGIUS R
respectively) assigned to
Augustissimo Principi
accompany Macartney
Qianlong
while traveling overland
Sinarum Supremo Imperatori
to their audience with the
Emperor.
1.9 JOURNAL ENTRIES OF LORD MACARTNEY DURING
HIS JOURNEY TO CHINA (1793–1794)
Lord George Macartney (1737–1806) was appointed as the first British envoy
to China in 1793. He kept an extensive record of his visit to China, including a
personal journal (which he likely hoped would be published upon his return, as it
was). Most accounts of the embassy’s time in China focus on Macartney’s insis-
tence on an audience with the emperor and his refusal to kowtow in the presence
of the emperor. His journal offers a fuller view of his travels and thoughts on
China. Specifically, Macartney writes that he was impressed with many things
in China, even as he sensed there were few British goods that might trade with
China. It is equally clear that Macartney was bothered by Chinese efforts to make
him conform to Chinese etiquette, though less bothered by the consequences such
refusals may have on his negotiations. Macartney, it should be noted, was far
more concerned than the Dutch and Portuguese envoys who proceeded him who
willingly kowtowed before the emperor as requested.

Questions
1. What about China surprised Macartney? What intrigued him?
2. To what degree might have cultural or language barriers hin-
dered Macartney’s mission?

Tuesday, September 10—This day the Legate [Zhengrui], Wang [Wenx-

iong] and Qiao [Renjie] renewed the conversation of yesterday relative
to the ceremony, in the course of which I told them it was not natural to
expect that an Ambassador should pay greater homage to a foreign prince
than to his own Sovereign, unless a return were made to him that might
warrant him to do more. Upon which they asked me what was the cere-
mony of presentation to the King of England. I told them it was performed
by kneeling upon one knee and kissing His Majesty’s hand. “Why then,”
cried they, “can’t you do so to the Emperor?” Most readily, said I; “the
same ceremony I perform to my own King I am willing to go through for
16 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

RUYI—A Chinese scepter your Emperor, and I think it a greater compliment than any other I can
made of jade, or other pay him.” . . . Soon after the Legate arrived and declared that it was finally
precious material, given determined to adopt the English ceremony, only that, as it was not the cus-
as a sign of respect. tom in China to kiss the Emperor’s hand, he proposed I should kneel upon
Traditionally, it has a both knees instead of it. I told him I had already given my answer, which
stylized head of a cloud was to kneel upon one knee only on those occasions when it was usual
and a long, curved handle. for the Chinese to prostrate themselves. “Well, then,” said they, “the cer-
emony of kissing the Emperor’s hand must be omitted.” To this I assented,
saying, “As you please, but remember it is your doing, and, according to
your proposal, it is but half the ceremony, and you see I am willing to
perform the whole one.” And thus ended this anxious negotiation, which
has given me a tolerable insight into the character of this Court, and that
political address upon which they so much value themselves.

Saturday, September 14—This morning at four o’clock a.m. we set out

for the Court under the convoy of Wang and Qiao, and reached it in
little more than an hour, the distance being about three miles from our
hotel. I proceeded in great state with all my train of music, guards, etc. Sir
George Staunton and I went in palanquins and the officers and gentlemen
of the Embassy on horseback. Over a rich embroidered velvet, I wore the
mantle of the Order of the Bath, with the collar, a diamond badge and
a diamond star. Sir George Staunton was dressed in a rich embroidered
velvet also, and, being a Doctor of Laws in the University of Oxford, wore
the habit of his degree, which is of scarlet silk, full and flowing. I men-
tion these little particulars to show the attention I always paid, where a
proper opportunity offered, to oriental customs and ideas. . . . We alighted
at the park gate, from whence we walked to the Imperial encampment,
and were conducted to a large, handsome tent prepared for us on one
side of the Emperor’s. After waiting there about an hour his approach
was announced with drums and music, on which we quitted our tent and
came forward upon the green carpet.
[The emperor] was seated in an open palanquin, carried by sixteen
bearers, attended by numbers of officers bearing flags, standards, and
umbrellas, and as he passed we paid him our compliments by kneeling on
one knee, whilst all the Chinese made their usual prostrations. As soon as
he had ascended his throne I came to the entrance of the tent, and, holding
in both my hands a large gold box enriched with diamonds in which was
enclosed the King’s letter, I walked deliberately up, and ascending the
side-steps of the throne, delivered it into the Emperor’s own hands, who,
having received it, passed it to the Minister, by whom it was placed on
the cushion. He then gave me as the first present from him to His Majesty
the ruyi as the symbol of peace and prosperity and expressed his hopes
that my Sovereign and he should always live in good correspondence and
amity. It is a whitish, agate-looking stone about a foot and a half long,
curiously carved, and highly prized by the Chinese, but to me it does not
appear in itself to be of any great value.

Sunday, September 15—The Emperor, having been informed that, in the

course of our travels in China, we had shown a strong desire of seeing
everything curious and interesting, was pleased to give directions to the
first Minister to show us his park or garden at Rehe. It is called in Chinese
Wanshou Yuan, which signifies the paradise of innumerable trees. . . .
Where any things particularly interesting were to be seen we disembarked
[from the palanquins], from time to time, to visit them, and I dare say that
in the course of our voyage we stopped at forty or fifty different palaces or
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 17

pavilions. These are all furnished in the richest manner, with pictures of YUANMING YUAN—An
the Emperor’s huntings and progresses; with stupendous vases of jasper immense garden with
and agate; with the finest porcelain and japan, and with every kind of massive lakes, islands, and
European toys and sing-songs; with spheres, orreries [model of the solar sprawling palaces begun
system], clocks, and musical automatons of such exquisite workmanship, in 1709 and expanded over
and in such profusion, that our presents must shrink from the comparison several decades. The Jesuit
and “hide their diminished heads”. And yet I am told that the fine things priests serving in the Qing
we have seen are far exceeded by others of the same kind in the apart- court helped design one
ments of the ladies and in the European repository at Yuanming Yuan. section that had elaborate
fountains and Baroque
Thursday October 3—It is now beyond a doubt, although nothing was palaces. Sometimes
said upon the subject, that the Court wishes us to be gone, and if we don’t referred to as the “Old
take the hints already given, they may possibly be imparted to us in a Summer Palace.”
broader and coarser manner, which would be equally unpleasant to the
dignity of the Embassy and the success of its objects. FATHER MARIA AMIOT
That no time might be lost, or advantage taken, I have dispatched to (1718–1793)—A Jesuit
the Minister the note which he desired me this morning to send to him. It missionary born in France
consists of six principal articles extracted from my instructions, and com- and sent to China in 1740,
pressed into as narrow a compass as possible. he quickly won the trust
The first is a request to allow the English merchants to trade to of the young Qianlong
Zhoushan Island, Ningbo, and Tianjin. Second, to allow them to have a emperor and learned to
warehouse at Beijing for the sale of their goods, as the Russians had for- speak Manchu and Chinese
merly. Third, to allow them some small, detached, unfortified island in fluently.
the neighborhood of Zhoushan as a magazine for their unsold goods, and
as a residence for their people to take care of them. Fourth, to allow them
a similar privilege near Guangzhou, and some other trifling indulgences.
Fifth, to abolish the transit duties between Macau and Guangzhou or at
least to reduce them to the standard of 1782. Sixth, to prohibit the exaction
of any duties from the English merchants, over and above those settled by
the Emperor’s diploma, a copy of which is required to be given to them
(as they have never yet been able to see it) for their unequivocal direction.

Friday, October 4—[Father Amiot] is of opinion that the Chinese consider

embassies as mere temporary ceremonies, sent on particular occasion
only, none of those from Europe having been of any considerable dura-
tion, and the last from Portugal, though very well received, of less than
six weeks; that they have as yet no favorable ideas of treaties with distant
powers, but that they might be rendered sensible of them if applied to and
solicited without precipitation, and managed with caution and adroitness,
for nothing was to be expected as attainable on the sudden.
[. . .]
From living half a century in this country, possibly from well-
grounded knowledge and experience, [Father Amiot] is become a very
warm admirer of the Chinese nation, and has taken much pains, and in
some instances, not without success, to remove several false ideas enter-
tained in Europe of their character, customs, and policy. I have been but
so short a time in the country, and he has been so long in it; I have seen so
little of it, and he has seen so much; he is, besides, a man of such probity
and universal charity that his opinion is entitled to considerable respect
from me. Nevertheless, from the great deference and veneration which
the Chinese have long paid to his acknowledged virtue and abilities, he
may have insensibly contracted too great partiality for them, and may
view their Government through a flattering medium. His apostolic zeal
too, which is a predominant feature in his character, may tend to tender
him sanguine.
18 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

1.10 QIANLONG’S EDICT TO KING GEORGE III

OF ENGLAND (SEPTEMBER 23, 1793)
Many Western observers have taken Qianlong’s response to the Macartney
Embassy as evidence of a deluded and isolated empire intent on remaining closed
to outsiders. It is more likely that the Qianlong emperor saw little benefit to
acquiesce to his demands. Qianlong’s judgment was guided primarily by China’s
desire to control and limit access to outsiders. The court had explicit (and func-
tional) guidelines in place, and the emperor saw little advantage in China in
breaking with the practice of allowing British embassies permanent residence in
Beijing. It is significant that the original letter was written in Manchu, Chinese,
and Latin but not English. The following English translation was made many
years later.

Questions
1. What reasons does the emperor give for rejecting Macartney’s
proposals?
2. Is the edict a rejection of any exchange with European countries
or empires?

We by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor, instruct the King of England to take

note of our charge. Although your country, O King, lies in the far oceans,
yet inclining your heart towards civilization you have specially sent an
envoy respectfully to present a state message, and sailing the seas he has
come to our Court to kotow and to present congratulations for the Impe-
rial birthday, and also to present local products, thereby showing your
sincerity.
We have perused the text of your state message and the wording
expresses your earnestness. From it your sincere humility and obedience
can clearly be seen. It is admirable, and we fully approve. As regards the
chief and assistant envoys who have brought the state message and tribute
articles, we are mindful that they have been sent from afar across the sea,
and we have extended our favor and courtesy to them, and have ordered
our ministers to bring them to an Imperial audience. We have given them
a banquet and have repeatedly bestowed gifts on them in order to show
our kindness. Although the officers, servants and others, in charge of the
ships more than six hundred in number, returned to Zhoushan and did
not come to the capital, yet we have also bestowed gifts on them generally
so that all should receive favors equally.
As to what you have requested in your message, O King, namely to
be allowed to send one of your subjects to reside in the Celestial Empire
to look after your country’s trade, this does not conform to the Celestial
Empire’s ceremonial system, and definitely cannot be done. Hitherto,
whenever men from the various Western Ocean countries have desired
to come to the Celestial Empire and to enter the Imperial service, we have
allowed them to come to the capital. But once having come, they were
obliged to adopt the costume of the Celestial Empire, they were confined
within the Halls, and were never allowed to return home. These are the
fixed regulations of the Celestial Empire, and presumably you also know
them, O King. Now, however, you want to send one of your subjects to
reside at the capital. But he could neither behave like a Western[er] . . .
who comes to the capital to enter our service, remaining at the capital
and not returning to his native country, nor could he be allowed to go in
and out, and to have regular correspondence. So, it would really serve no
purpose.
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 19

Moreover, the territories ruled by the Celestial Empire are vast, and YAMEN—Yamen refers to
for all the envoys of vassal states coming to the capital there are definite the compound that houses
regulations regarding the provision of quarters and supplies to them the local administrative
and regarding their movements. There never has been any precedent for office of the magistrate,
allowing them to suit their own convenience. Now, if your country retains his judicial court, and his
someone at the capital his speech will not be understood and his dress will official residence. It also
be different in style, and we have nowhere to house him. If he is to resem- less frequently refers to the
ble those Westerners who come to the capital to enter the Imperial service, magistrate himself.
we must order him, without exception, to change his dress to that of the
Celestial Empire. However, we have never wished to force on others what
is difficult. Besides, if the Celestial Empire desired to send someone per-
manently to reside in your country surely you would not be able to agree
to it? Furthermore, there are a great many Western countries altogether,
and not merely your one country. If, like you, O King, they all beg to send
someone to reside at the capital, how could we grant their request in every
case? It would be absolutely impossible for us to do so. How can we go as
far as to change the regulations of the Celestial Empire, which are over a
hundred years old, because of the request of one man—of You, O King?
If it is said that your object, O King, is to take care of trade, men
from your country have been trading at Macao for some time and have
always been treated favorably. For instance, in the past Portugal and Italy
and other countries have several times sent envoys to the Celestial Empire
with requests to look after their trade and the Celestial Empire, bearing
in mind their loyalty, treated them with great kindness. Whenever any
matter concerning trade has arisen which affected those countries it has
always been fully taken care of. When the Guangzhou merchant Wu Zha-
oping owed money to foreign ships, we ordered the Governor-General
to advance the money out of the Treasury and to pay his debts for him at
the public expense, and to have the debtor-merchant severely punished.
Presumably your country has also heard about this. Why, then, do foreign
countries need to send someone to remain at the capital? This is a request
for which there is no precedent and it definitely cannot be granted. More-
over, the distance between Macao, the place where the trade is conducted,
and the capital is nearly ten thousand li [miles], and if he were to remain
at the capital how could he look after it?
If it is said that because you look up with admiration to the Celestial
Empire you desire him to study our culture, yet the Celestial Empire has
its own codes of ritual which are different from your country’s in each
case. Even if the person from your country who remained here was able to
learn them it would be of no use since your country has its own customs
and regulations, and you would certainly not copy Chinese ones.
The Celestial Empire, ruling all within the four seas, simply con-
centrates on carrying out the affairs of Government properly, and does
not value rare and precious things. Now you, O King, have presented
various objects to the throne, and mindful of your loyalty in present-
ing offerings from afar, we have specially ordered the Yamen to receive
them. In fact, the virtue and power of the celestial Dynasty has penetrated
afar to the myriad kingdoms, which have come to render homage, and
so all kinds of precious things from “over mountain and sea” have been
collected here, things which your chief envoy and others have seen for
themselves. Nevertheless we have never valued ingenious articles, nor do
we have the slightest need of your country’s manufactures. Therefore, O
King, as regards your request to send someone to remain at the capital,
while it is not in harmony with the regulations of the Celestial Empire, we
also feel very much that it is of no advantage to your country. Hence, we
20 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

EXAMINATION have issued these detailed instructions and have commanded your tribute
DEGREES—The three envoys to return safely home. You, O King, should simply act in confor-
imperial exam degrees mity with our wishes by strengthening your loyalty and swearing per-
relate to the modern system petual obedience so as to ensure that your country may share the blessings
as follows: the shengyuan of peace.
(or “Budding Genius”) is Besides giving both the customary and extra gifts, as listed sepa-
a bachelor’s degree (BA), rately, to the chief and assistant envoys, and to the various officials under
the juren (or “Promoted them as well as to the interpreters, soldiers and servants, now, because
Gentleman”) is a master’s your envoy is returning home we have issued this special edict, and confer
degree (MA), and the jinshi presents on you, O King, elaborate and valuable things all, in accordance
(“Achieved Scholar”) is with the usual etiquette. In addition, we have bestowed brocades, gauzes,
a doctorate (PhD). The and elaborate curios; all precious things. These are listed separately.
average age for passing Let the King reverently receive them and know our kind regard for him.
was 24 years old for the This is a special edict.
shengyuan degree, 31 for the [Qianlong promulgated September 23, 1793 and Latin translation delivered
juren, and 35 for the jinshi. on October 3, 1793]

SHENGYUAN—Lowest
of the three degrees of the
EDUCATION, EXAMINATIONS, AND LITERATURE
imperial civil service exam, By the eighteenth century, China had the largest civil service system in the
which granted holders the world. Despite the centrality of examinations to the Chinese government
status of “lower gentry.” and the prestige that came with the degree-holders, instruction remained
Examinations were held by and large in the private sphere. While the wealthiest families might
every three years in one’s hire a private tutor for their children, most Chinese students attended vil-
native district or prefecture. lage schools. The teachers, usually low- or non-degree holders, charged
according to their ability, reputation, and track record of producing suc-
EXAMINATION cessful examination candidates.
QUOTAS—Unlike modern While highly precocious students might contemplate taking exams
university entrance or SAT in their early teens, most would be 17 or 18 when they could compe-
exams on which the test tently write the requisite eight-legged (1.12) essay to became “qualified
taker is given an objective candidates” (tongsheng) when they could attempt the lowest, or licentiate
score, each sitting of the (shengyuan), degree. Until these individuals passed the provincial level,
imperial exams had a juren (“Promoted Gentleman”), exam, they could not expect an official
specific quota of degrees to appointment. By the nineteenth century, the number of test takers far out-
be offered that year, with numbered the examination quotas. Until the time the candidates could
each province designated a pass the provincial exam, most would remain part of the over-educated
pre-determined number of but under-employed sub-class of China’s intellectual elite.
degrees to be issued to those For the era, although Chinese women rarely held any public office,
candidates who scored elite women could and did receive education with an increasing num-
highest on the examination. ber of essays and primers written specifically for women (1.14)—even as
footbinding remained a conspicuous aspect of Chinese society. The most
FOOTBINDING—By fertile area for the common attitudes of (and about) the lower classes are
the nineteenth century, in the immensely popular tales of Pu Songling (1.11). His short stories
footbinding for women had remain in favor even today, with many having been converted into widely
been practiced within China popular television series.
among the rich and the poor
for many centuries. The
1.11 PU SONGLING’S “THREE GENII” (C. 1679)
foot was bound by breaking
the bones in the foot’s arch, Ghosts (gui), spirits (shen), and other deities (ling, yao, guai, mo, or hunpo)
then curling the outer toes played an integral part of the living in Chinese society. Tales and stories of these
underneath by wrapping supernatural creatures existed throughout China’s rich literary history. Confu-
long cloth bindings tightly cius himself is credited with saying “Respect the ghosts and spirits but keep them
around the foot. If done at a distance.” The following story written (some say “collected”) by Pu Songling
correctly, this produced in the early Qing was known to virtually all Chinese. It typifies a category of
feet three to five inches in these stories in which the other-worldly creatures influence this world (in this
length. instance in a positive manner). Quite characteristically, the story suggests that
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 21

the spirits have similar interests and diversions (like writing test essays as a type
of drinking game).

Questions
1. Why do you think stories like this were popular among all classes
of Chinese?
2. What does the following story suggest that the relationship
between “this world” and the “other world” is?

There was a certain scholar who, passing through Suqian on his way to
Nanjing, where he was going to try for his master’s degree, happened to
fall in with three other gentlemen, all graduates like himself, and was so
charmed with their unusual refinement that he purchased a quantity of
wine and begged them to join him in drinking it. While thus pleasantly
employed, his three friends told him their names. One was Jie Qiuheng;
the second, Chang Fenglin; and the other, Ma Xichi. They drank away and
enjoyed themselves very much, until evening had crept upon them unper-
ceived, when Jie said, “Here we, who ought to have been playing the host,
have been feasting at a stranger’s expense. This is not right. But, come, my
house is close by; I will provide you with a bed.” Chang and Ma got up, and,
taking our hero by the arm, bade his servant come along with them. When
they reached a hill to the north of the village, there before them was a house
and grounds, with a stream of clear water in front of the door, all the apart-
ments within being beautifully clean and nice. Jie then gave orders to light
the lamps and see after his visitor’s servant; whereupon Ma observed, “Of
old it was customary to set intellectual refreshments before one’s friends;
let us not miss the opportunity of this lovely evening, but decide on four
themes, one for each of us; and then, when we have finished our essays, we
can set to work on the wine.” To this the others readily agreed; and each
wrote down a theme and threw it on the table. These were next divided
amongst them as they sat, and before the second watch [from 7 p.m. to 5
a.m.] was over, the essays were all completed and handed round for gen-
eral inspection; and our scholar was so struck with the elegance and vigor
of those by his three friends, that he [made] a copy of them and put it in
his pocket. The host then produced some excellent wine, which was drunk
by them in such bumpers that soon they were all tolerably tipsy. The other
two now took their leave; but Jie led the scholar into another room, where,
so overcome was he with wine, that he went to bed in his boots and clothes.
The sun was high in the heavens when our hero awaked, and, looking
round, he saw no house or grounds, only a dell on the hillside, in which
he and his servant had been sleeping. In great alarm he called out to the
servant, who also got up, and then they found a hole with a [small stream]
of water trickling down before it. Much astonished at all this, he felt in his
pocket, and there, sure enough, was the paper on which he had copied the
three essays of his friends. On descending the hill and making inquiries,
he found that he had been to the Grotto of the Three Genii—namely, Crab,
Snake, and Frog, three very wonderful beings, who often came out for a
stroll, and were occasionally visible to mortal eyes. Subsequently, when
our hero entered the examination hall, lo! The three themes set were those
of the Three Genii, and he came out at the top of the list.

1.12 EIGHT-LEGGED ESSAY—CIVIL SERVICE

EXAMINATION (1818)
Unlike the modern-style civil service examinations composed of multiple choice,
essays, and interviews, the Qing imperial tests were based on specific texts of the
22 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

Confucian classics. Moreover, the essay had to be written in a rigidly proscribed

configuration known as an “eight-legged essay” [bagu wen]. Highly formalized,
limited to between 600 and 700 characters, the essay structure put severe struc-
tural limitations on how the author composed his essay. The eight-legged form
consisted of an introductory analysis and amplification of the theme, immediately
followed by an explanation. The body would be divided into eight paragraphs in
two parallel parts (but not necessarily of equal length). There existed a host of
other rules that the examinees must keep in mind: avoiding “forbidden charac-
ters” (names of early sages and emperors), writing only 25 characters per line,
and not having more than 100 errors/corrected characters (or be banned for the
next three examinations, typically nine years).

Questions
1. What attributes does such an essay show about a candidate’s abil-
ity to be an official?
2. Do you find it an effective means to select government officials?
Why did the exam system remain so popular with most Chinese?

EXAM QUESTION: When persons in high stations are sincere in the

performance of relative and domestic duties, the people generally will be
stimulated to the practice of virtue.
EXAM CANDIDATE’S RESPONSE: When the upper classes are really
virtuous, the common people will inevitably become so. For, though the
sincere performance of relative duties by superiors does not originate
in a wish to stimulate the people, yet the people do become virtuous,
which is proof of the effect of sincerity. As benevolence is the radical
principle of all good governments in the world, so also benevolence is
the radical principle of relative duties amongst the people. Traced back
to its source, benevolent feeling refers to a first progenitor; traced for-
wards, it branches out to a hundred generations yet to come. The source
of personal existence is one’s parents, the relations which originate from
heaven are most intimate; and that in which natural feeling blends is felt
most deeply. That which is given by heaven and by natural feeling to all
is done without any distinction between noble or ignoble. One feeling
pervades all. My thoughts now refer to him who is placed in a station
of eminence and who may be called a good man. The good man who is
placed in an eminent station begins with his own relations, and performs
his duties to them.
In the middle ages of antiquity, the minds of the people were not yet
dissipated—how [did it pass] that they were not humble and observant of
relative duties, when they were taught the principles of the five social rela-
tions? This having been the case, makes it evident that the enlightening of
the people must depend entirely on the cordial performance of immedi-
ate relative duties. The person in an eminent station who may be called
a good man, is he who appears at the head of all others in illustrating by
his practice the relative duties. In ages nearer to our own, the manners of
the people were not far removed from the dutiful, how [did it pass] that
any were disobedient to parents, and without brotherly affection, and that
it was yet necessary to restrain men by inflicting the eight forms of pun-
ishment? This having been the case, shows that in the various modes of
obtaining promotion in the state, there is nothing regarded of more impor-
tance than filial and fraternal duties. The person in an eminent station who
may be called a good man, is he who stands forth as an example of the
performance of relative duties.
The difference between a person of a high station and one of the
common people, consists in the department assigned them, not in their
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 23

relation to heaven; it consists in a difference of rank, not in a difference

of natural feeling; but the common people constantly observe the sincere
performance of relative duties in people of high stations. In being at the
head of a family and preserving order amongst the persons of which it
is composed, there should be sincere attention to politeness and deco-
rum. A good man placed in a high station says, “Who of all these are
not related to me, and shall I receive them with mere external forms?”
The elegant entertainment, the neatly arranged tables and the exhilarating
song, some men esteem mere forms, but the good man esteems that which
dictates them as a divinely instilled feeling, and attends to it with a truly
benevolent heart. And who of the common people does not feel a share
of the delight arising from fathers, and brothers, and kindred? Is this joy
resigned entirely to princes and kings?
In favors conferred to display the benignity of a sovereign, there
should be sincerity in the kindness done. The good man says, “Are not
all these persons whom I love, and shall I merely enrich them by lar-
gesse?” He gives a branch as the scepter of authority to a delicate younger
brother, and to another he gives a kingdom with his best instructions.
Some men deem this as merely extraordinary good fortune, but the good
man esteems it the exercise of a virtue of the first order, and the effort of
inexpressible benevolence. But have the common people no regard for
the spring whence the water flows, nor for the root which gives life to the
tree and its branches? Have they no regard for their kindred? It is neces-
sary both to reprehend and to urge them to exercise these feelings. The
good man in a high station is sincere in the performance of relative duties,
because to do so is virtuous, and not on account of the common people.
But the people, without knowing whence the impulse comes with joy and
delight are influenced to act with zeal in this career of virtue; the moral
distillation proceeds with rapidity, and a vast change is affected.
The rank of men is exceedingly different; some fill the imperial
throne, but everyone equally wishes to do his utmost to accomplish his
duty; and success depends on every individual himself. The upper classes
begin and pour the wine into the rich goblet; the poor man sows his grain
to maintain his parents; the men in high stations grasp the silver bowl, the
poor present a pigeon; they rouse each other to unwearied cheerful efforts,
and the principles implanted by heaven are moved to action. Some things
are difficult to be done, except by those who possess the glory of national
rule; but the kind feeling is what I myself possess and may increase in an
unlimited degree. The prince may write verses appropriate to his vine
bower; the poor man can think of his gourd shelter: the prince may sing
his classic odes on fraternal regards; the poor man can muse on his more
simple allusions to the same subject, and asleep or awake indulge his rec-
ollections; for the feeling is instilled into his nature.
When the people are aroused to relative virtues, they will be sincere;
for where are there any of the common people that do not desire to per-
form relative duties? But without the upper classes performing relative
duties, this virtuous desire would have no point from which to originate,
and therefore it is said, “Good men in high stations, as a general at the
head of the armies, will lead forward the world to the practice of social
virtues.”

1.13 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROVINCIAL EXAMINATION

(C. 1845)
If the examination itself was not difficult enough, the conditions in which the
examinations themselves were held must have been particularly nightmarish for
24 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

XIUCAI—Literally the examinees. The provincial exams were held simultaneously across the empire
meaning “cultivated in each of the provincial capitals once every three years. The test-taker composed
talent,” it was the lowest of a total of 13 essays over the course of three day-long sessions. By the mid-nine-
the three imperial degree teenth century, in the most populous provinces, often more than 10,000 candi-
levels that made up the dates flooded the provincial capitals for the triennial exam. On those days, with
imperial civil service officials, examinees, as well as all sorts of merchants, hawkers, and entertainers
examination system. attracted by the massive crowds, the town would take on a fair-like atmosphere.
The following is a description of a provincial examination by a visiting British
observer who captures nicely the flavor of the whole affair.

Questions
1. What aspect of these examinations do you think the examinees
found most difficult?
2. Do you think the manner in which the examinations occurred
(held triennially, in a provincial capital, with thousands of candi-
dates, etc.) increased or decreased the stature of the examination
system?

The candidates for this degree are narrowly examined when they enter the
hall, their pockets, shoes, wadded robes, and inkstones, all being searched,
lest pre-composed essays or other aids to composition be smuggled in.
When they are all seated in the hall in their proper places, the wickets,
doors, windows and other entrances are guarded by men, and pasted over
with strips of paper. The room is filled with anxious competitors arranged
in long seats, pencil in hand, and ready to begin. The theme is given out,
and everyone immediately writes off his essay, carefully noting how many
characters he erases in composing it, and hands it up to the board of exam-
iners; the whole day is allotted to the task, and a signal-gun announces
the hour when the doors are thrown open and the students can disperse.
The first two trials thin off the crowd amazingly, and the examiners easily
reduce the number of hopeless competitors, so that not one-tenth of those
who appear at the first struggle are seen at the third. A man is constantly
liable to lose his acquired honor of xiucai, if at a subsequent inspection
he is found to have discarded his studies, and he is therefore impelled to
pursue them in order to escape disgrace, even if he does not reach the next
degree.
[. . .]
This examination is held at the same time in all eighteen provincial
capitals, on the 9th, 12th, and 15th days of the 8th moon [lunar month],
or about the middle of September; while it is going on, the city appears
exceedingly animated, in consequence of the great number of relatives
and friends assembled with the students. The persons who preside at
the examination, besides the imperial commissioners, are ten provincial
officers . . . who jointly form a board of examiners and decide upon the
merits of the essays. The number of candidates who entered the lists
at Guangzhou in the two years 1828 and 1831 was 4800; in 1832 there
were 6000 which is nearer the usual number. In the largest provinces
it reaches as many as 7,000, 8,000 and upwards. The examinations are
held in Gongyuan, large and spacious building built expressly for this
purpose, and which contains a great number of cloisters and halls, where
the candidates can write their essays, and the examiners look at them.
The hall at Guangzhou is capable of accommodating over ten thousand
persons, and in some of the northern cities they are still larger, and gen-
erally filled with students, assistants and other persons connected with
the examinations.
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 25

Before a candidate can enter the hall, he must give an account of him-
self to the chancellor, stating all the particulars of his lineage, residence,
birthplace, age, etc., and where he received his first degree. He enters the
establishment the night before and is searched on entering, to see that no
manuscript essay or miniature which can assist in the task he is to under-
take. If anything of the sort is discovered, he is punished with the cangue,
degraded from his first degree, and forbidden again to complete at the
examination; his father and tutor are likewise punished. The practice is,
however, quite common, notwithstanding the penalties, and one censor
requested a law to be passed forbidding small editions to be printed, and
booksellers’ shops to be searched for them.
The hall at Guangzhou contains 7500 cells, measuring four feet
by three, and high enough to stand up in; the furniture consists of two
boards, one for sitting, and the other contrived to serve both for an eating
table and a writing-desk; all these things as well as the writing materials,
cooking apparatus, and every officer, porter and menial about the estab-
lishment are carefully searched. The cells are arranged around a number
of open courts, receiving all their light and air from the central area, and
exposed to the observation of the soldiers who guard the place, and watch
that no one has the least intercourse with the imprisoned students. Con-
finement in this cramped position, where it is impossible to lie down, is
exceedingly irksome, and is said to cause the death of many old students,
who are unable to go through the fatigue, but who still enter the arena in
hopes of at last succeeding. Cases have occurred where father, son, and
grandson, appeared at the same time to compete for the same prize. The
unpleasantness of the [small] cell is much increased by the smoke arising
from the cooking, which is all done in the court, and by the heat of the
weather. Whenever a student dies in his cell, the body is pulled through a
hole made in the wall, and left there for his friends to carry away. When-
ever a candidate breaks any of the prescribed regulations of the contest,
his name and offence are reported, and his name is “pasted out” by plac-
arding it on the outer door of the hall, after which he is not allowed to
enter until another examination comes around. More than a hundred per-
sons are thus “pasted out” each season, but no heavy disgrace seems to
attach to them in consequences.
[. . .]
Twenty-five days are allowed for the examining board to look over
the essays, and few tasks can be instanced more irksome to a board of
honest examiners than the perusal of between fifty and seventy-five thou-
sand papers on a dozen subjects, through which the most monotonous
uniformity must necessarily run, and out of which they have to choose
the seventy or eighty best—for the number of successful candidates can-
not vary far from this, according to the size of the province. . . . When
the graduates are decided upon, their names are published by a crier at
midnight, on or before the 10th of the 9th moon; he mounts the highest
tower in the city, and, after a salute, announces them to the expectant city;
the next morning lists of the lucky scholars are hawked about the streets,
and rapidly sent to all parts of the province. The proclamation which con-
tains their names is [posted . . . with] a salute of three guns; his Excellency
comes out and bows three times towards the names of the promoted men,
and retires under another salute. The disappointed multitude must then
rejoice in the success of the few, and solace themselves with the hope of
better luck next time; while the successful ones are honored and feasted
in a very distinguished manner, and are the objects of flattering attention
from the whole city.
26 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

1.14 LAN DINGYUAN ON FEMALE EDUCATION (1712)

The Confucian underpinnings of Qing China were overwhelmingly patriarchal.
Young boys were instructed from an early age through the memorization of Con-
fucian texts that men were superior to women. The roots of women’s education in
China were not an abrupt break with this tradition, but rather an offshoot from
the main tenets of Confucian. As a result, the dialogue surrounding women’s
education and literacy emphasized learning for moral refinement and nourishing
a woman’s virtue. The author of the following essay, Lan Dingyuan (also known
by his sobriquet Lu Zhao), is careful not to contravene basic Confucian teachings,
but he seeks to acknowledge the need for women’s education, even if it is only with
the ultimate goal to better serve the men in her life.

Questions
1. In what ways does Lan suggest women differ from men?
2. What type of education does Lan indicate is appropriate for
women?

The basis of the government of the empire lies in the habits of the people,
and the surety that their usages will be correct is in the orderly manage-
ment of families, which last depends chiefly upon the females. In the good
old times of Zhou, the virtuous women set such an excellent example,
that it influenced the customs of the empire—an influence that descended
even to the times of the Zheng and Wei states. If the curtain of the inner
apartment gets thin or is hung awry [if the sexes are not kept apart], disor-
der will enter the family, and ultimately pervade the empire. Females are
doubtless the sources of good manners; from ancient times to the present
this has been the case. The inclination to virtue and vice in women differs
exceedingly; their dispositions incline contrary ways, and if it is wished to
form them alike, there is nothing like education. In ancient times, youth
of both sexes were instructed. According to the Ritual of Zhou, “the impe-
rial wives regulated the law for educating females, in order to instruct
the ladies of the palace in morals, conversation, manners, and work; and
each led out their respective classes, at proper times, and arranged them
for examination in the imperial presence.” But these treatises have not
reached us, and it cannot be distinctly ascertained what was their plan of
arrangement.
[. . .]
The education of a woman and that of a man are very dissimilar.
Thus, a man can study during his whole life; whether he is abroad or at
home, he can always look into the classics and history, and become thor-
oughly acquainted with the whole range of authors. But a woman does
not study more than ten years, when she takes upon her the management
of a family, where a multiplicity of cares distract her attention, and having
no leisure for undisturbed study, she cannot easily understand learned
authors; not having obtained a thorough acquaintance with letters, she
does not fully comprehend their principles; and like water that has flowed
from its fountain, she cannot regulate her conduct by their guidance. How
can it be said that a standard work on female education is not wanted!
Every profession and trade has its appropriate master; and ought not
those also who possess such an influence over manners [as females] be
taught their duties and their proper limits? It is a matter of regret, that
in these books no extracts have been made from the works of Confucius
in order to make them introductory to the writings on polite literature;
and it is also to be regretted that selections have not been made from the
commentaries of Cheng, Zhu and the other scholars, who have explained
 Chapter 1 • Early to Mid-Qing 27

his writings clearly, as also from the whole range of writers, gathering
from them all that which was appropriate, and omitting the rest. These
are circulated among mankind, together with such books as the Juvenile
Instructor; yet if they are put into the hands of females, they cause them
to become like a blind man without a guide, wandering hither and thither
without knowing where he is going. There has been this great deficiency
from very remote times until now.
Woman’s influence is according to her moral character, therefore
that point is largely explained. First, concerning their obedience to her
husband and to his parents; then in regard to her complaisance to his
brothers and sisters, and kindness to her sisters-in-law. If unmarried, she
has duties towards her parents, and to the wives of her elder brothers; if
a principal wife, a woman must have no jealous feelings; if in straitened
circumstances, she must be contented with her lot; if rich and honorable,
she must avoid extravagance and haughtiness. Then teach her, in times
of trouble and in days of ease, how to maintain her purity, how to give
importance to right principles, how to observe widowhood, and how to
avenge the murder of a relative. Is she a mother, let her teach her children;
is she a step-mother, let her love and cherish her husband’s children; is
her rank in life high, let her not be condescending to her inferiors; let her
wholly discard all sorcerers, superstitious nuns, and witches; in a word let
her adhere to propriety, and avoid vice.
In conversation, a female should not be forward and garrulous, but
observe strictly what is correct, whether in suggesting advice to her hus-
band, in remonstrating with him, or teaching her children; in maintaining
etiquette, humbly imparting her experience, or in averting misfortune.
The deportment of females should be strictly grave and sober, and yet
adapted to the occasion; whether in waiting on her parents, receiving or
reverencing her husband, rising up or sitting down, when pregnant, in
times of mourning, or when fleeing in war, she should be perfectly deco-
rous. Rearing the silkworm and working cloth are the most important of
the employments of a female; preparing and serving up the food for the
household, and setting in order the sacrifices, follow next; each of which
must be attended to; after them, study and learning can fill up the time.
 CHAPTER 2
Late Imperial China (1644–1911)The Opium War The Opium War

3 2

Guangzhou
Pea
Foreign Pa Mac rl
Factories ss au Whampoa Island
ag
e G UANG Z HOU
Pearl
Rive
r
River

De OLD CITY
lta

5 CIT
Y

6
W
NE
Pearl River

navy yard
Foreign ses
Shamian Factories hou
ck rice fields
pa
Humen
Boca Tigris ou ses
Pa Ma reh 0 .5 1 mile
sto

7
(The Bogue)
ss cau
ag
e 0 .5 1 kilometer

Lintin
Island

New Territories
(1898)

Macau Lantao Kowloon

(Lantau) (1860)
0 10 20 miles
Hong Kong
(1842)
0 10 20 kilometers
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 29

1. GUANGZHOU (CANTON): The Thirteen factories were located just outside the city walls of
Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province. The older English designation for the city, “Can-
ton,” is likely a Portuguese corruption of the term Guangdong (2.1). The woodprint of Guangzhou
was made in 1820.

2. CHINESE HANG MERCHANTS: Each “factory” hang was run by a Chinese family. Westerners
tended to identify each factory by the founding patriarch to which they added an honorific term
(guan, or “qua” in Cantonese). These merchants were hardly minions of the state; rather some, like
Wu Bingjian [Houqua], were reported to have a personal worth of more than $26 million in the early
1830s.

3. THIRTEEN FACTORIES: Guangzhou’s Thirteen Factories [gonghang] were located just south of
the city walls. The factories functioned as the warehouse, administrative offices, and residence all
rolled into one. The term “factory” came from the fact that the European factors (or merchants)
occupied the business premises. While the traders typically only occupied the buildings during the
winter months every year, after repeated seasons of usage, each factory became associated with a
particular nationality.

4. FOREIGN PRESENCE: Guangzhou’s commercial linkages to Asia and the Middle East date back
to the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). Even before the rise of the Qing in the 1600s, it was not uncom-
mon to find Swedish, Hungarian, Portuguese, English, French, and other traders from outside Asia
anchored downriver from Guangzhou, their vessels laden with goods to trade with China.

5. HONG KONG: Hong Kong (pronounced “Xianggang” in Mandarin Chinese today) was a deep-
water port that was ceded to the British as part of the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 (2.2). Prior to the
arrival of the British, the island was a rather barren island home mainly to several thousand people
who made a living from fishing and local trading.

6. BOCA TIGRIS: The mouth of the Pearl River was traditionally referred to by the local Chinese as
“Tiger’s Mouth” (from the Chinese “Tiger Gate” [humen]). The Portuguese translated the term liter-
ally into Portuguese as “Boca Tigris,” which was in turn shortened by the English corruption of the
term to “the Bogue.” It was the site of several Chinese forts and the location where Lin Zexu chose
to destroy the confiscated opium in 1839 in two massive trenches filled with lime and seawater.

7. MACAU: A Portuguese enclave first leased from China in 1557. Macau remained a significant port
of call for all European traders (and where many Europeans would stay when not in Guangzhou)
until China ceded Hong Kong to Great Britain in 1847. Geographically about one-sixth the size of
Washington, DC, Macau returned to Chinese control in 1999 and today earns more from gambling
than even Las Vegas.

8. TEA: Guangzhou served as the exclusive port for most European trade with China, as well as the
bulk of maritime trade with Southeast Asia and the Middle East. European demand for tea had
steadily increased in the 1700s, but a relaxation of British taxes from over 100 percent to roughly
12 percent led to a massive increase in the consumption of tea with no reciprocal increase in Chinese
demand for British goods. This economic trade imbalance only was rectified with the illegal impor-
tation of opium from British India (2.4).
30 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

HONG KONG—An island In June 1997, prominent Chinese director Xie Jin premiered his film The
south of Guangzhou, Opium War in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Costing over $10 mil-
ceded to Great Britain in lion dollars to make and employing more than 50,000 extras (3,000 of them
1842 after the Opium War Westerners), the film marked the latest Chinese motion picture to depict
as part of the Treaty of China’s nineteenth-century confrontation with Great Britain. The opening
Nanjing and returned to night gala with Beijing’s most famous stars and top political leaders was
China in 1997. timed to highlight Britain’s actions in the Opium War just days before the
return of Hong Kong from Great Britain to China.
OPIUM WAR
The scope, scale and cost of Xie’s Opium War was only the most
(1839–1842)—A war
recent in a long line of films that used the war as an impassioned back-
between China and Great
drop underscoring just how potent a symbol the war remains in mod-
Britain fought over the
ern perceptions of China’s past. Even today in China, the Opium War
importation of opium
is cast as the demarcation between the pre-modern and modern eras
into China by British
in most state-approved Chinese textbooks. From elementary through
merchants. Following
high school, Chinese schoolchildren learn about arrogant Westerners
imperial orders, Lin Zexu
and brave Chinese peasants. The Opium War also remains a popular
seized and destroyed some
topic of scholarship outside of China, with more than five books on the
1,300 tons of opium stored
Opium Wars being published in English in the last decade or so. Most
in Guangzhou, resulting
of these recent books were written for a popular, non-scholarly audience
in military hostilities. The
with an emphasis on telling (and re-telling) the story from the British
conflict came to an end in
perspective.
1842 with the signing of
Despite this extended scrutiny of the war by both Chinese and
the Treaty of Nanjing. The
Westerners, it is surprising how rarely a full picture of the opium debate
war was a military disaster
is heard within either Western or Chinese societies. Only recently have
for China and marked the
scholars begun asking in earnest how Britain could possibly have justi-
beginning of a century of
fied peddling a highly addictive drug at gunpoint to China for well over
Western imperialism in
a century. When one ponders the sheer volume of opium imported by
China.
the British to China—amounting to 5.6 million pounds in 1839 alone—it
boggles the mind.
The logic behind the opium trade, while not terribly complex, did
reflect Western biases against the Chinese. A typical expression of this is
given by John Crawfurd, a prominent British official who characterized
the Chinese as “a jealous and unsocial people” because they retain “their
antipathy to strangers,” thus failing “to perceive the benefits of a foreign
commerce.” Another motivation for the British was the drug’s role in sub-
sidizing their expenses as the colonial rulers in India. There were, how-
ever, voices of dissent—several of which are included in the following
documents.
The debate surrounding the opium trade within China—surpris-
ingly similar to the debates over how to best address opiate abuses in
the United States today—divided British politicians. Some adopted an
anti-drug stance insistent on curbing the amount of drugs imported into
China. Others argued that the government should take more aggressive
steps to control the drug distribution networks and punish opium addicts.
Both sides agreed that, given the empire’s strong Confucian beliefs, the
Qing court and government officials were morally responsible for the
well-being of the people under their supervision. The opium problem and
how to handle it dominated political discussions of the era and fueled the
already heated factional politics being played out in the Qing court.
When examining these documents, it is important to note that allow-
ing Europeans open access to China was not in China’s best interest if
it meant that China could not prevent the importation of opium. Nor
was China’s decision to resist opium in any way reflective of an inherent
anti–free trade stance. China fully understood and profited from trade,
particularly in tea, with the broader world. While the exact knowledge
China had about Britain’s control of India or about the Dutch and Spanish
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 31

in Southeast Asia is unclear, it is fairly certain that the court understood

Europe’s territorial interests in Asia, and thus it treated Europeans very
cautiously.

TRADE IN EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY GUANGZHOU

Attitudes toward maritime exploration and expansion by Europeans and
by the Chinese while hardly identical were not that dissimilar. While it is
tempting to identify one state as more “modern” than the other, it is risky
to over-generalize the deeper meaning of Britain’s ability to enforce its
opium trade with China as being representative of Europe’s superiority
over Asia. A more constructive way to make sense of China’s relations
with Europe is to consider the different realities, needs, and ambitions
shaping the actions of each empire.
By the mid-1700s, most European maritime ventures were monop-
olies (such as the Dutch East India Company or the British East India
Company), heavily underwritten by their respective governments. These
companies were given exclusive rights to the trade within specific regions
and for specific goods (and thus were far from being natural extensions
of “free trade” as many Europeans would later suggest). Qing China had
little interest in pursuing similar trading activities because of the colonial
and military expenditures such ventures demanded. A significant reason
for this difference is based on the simple fact that more than 90 percent of
the “everyday luxuries” the European companies were pursuing in Asia
(sugar, silk, and tea) were goods China markets could secure from domes-
tic sources.
This is not to say that the Qing court was heedless of the broader
world. The fact that large numbers of Chinese living along the south
China coast relied on overseas trade with Southeast Asia, Japan, and
India—and that conversely many Chinese communities existed across
Asia—all demonstrate an active international presence. The court’s pri-
mary concern over the opium trade was its impact on China’s domes-
tic security. With the imperial government only very rarely initiating
military, colonial, and commercial ventures outside the empire, it could
quickly restrict Chinese trade in ways that protected Chinese security,
experiencing little or no immediate consequences. The following docu-
ments relate the ways in which the Qing court’s notions of security were
inextricably tied to perceived or real threats to China’s domestic, social,
and political stability.

2.1 DESCRIPTION OF EUROPEAN FACTORIES

IN GUANGZHOU (1825–1844)
For the modern reader, one of the most confusing aspects of the interaction
between Westerners and the Chinese in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century is the vocabulary. Some words (like “chop-chop” from kuai kuai
to mean “faster”) are of indeterminate origin and were likely borrowed from
Chinese or perhaps Cantonese, the dialect spoken by most of the local popula-
tion in the southern port city of Guangzhou. Other words were frequently
borrowed from European languages. In the case of the factories at Guangzhou,
many of the terms have their origins from the Portuguese, whose contact with
China began with their enclave in Macao (south of Guangzhou) in the late
1500s. A useful example of this is the title “compradore” given to a native-born
agent in China. This term originated from the Portuguese compra (“to buy”).
However, it is the term “factory” that most often confuses modern readers.
32 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

BOARD OF REVENUE A factory in this historical context referred to the warehouses and living quar-
(HUBU or HOPPO)— ters assigned to the foreign traders and regulated by the Board of Revenue.
Nineteenth-century The author of the following piece, American William Hunter, was one of the
Western accounts of foremost experts on the European presence in China. Arriving in China in
trade in Guangzhou 1824, he remained there for several decades and published numerous books on
refer to any customs life in China.
officer (and sometimes
to the Superintendent of Questions
Maritime Customs) as the
1. What was the function of the factory for foreign merchants?
“hoppo.” The term is a
2. What benefits did China gain by limiting foreigners to the
corruption of the Chinese
factories?
designation for the Board
of Revenue (hubu) to
which all revenue from The word “Factory” was an importation from India, where the commer-
maritime customs was cial establishments of the East India Company were so designated, and
remitted. synonymous with “agency.” It is well to explain this, as it is now being
confounded with “manufactory.”
The space occupied by the foreign community at Canton was about
HUANGPU—A deep-
300 feet from the banks of the Pearl River, eighty miles from Macau,
water anchorage 12
sixty miles from Lingting [Island], forty miles from the Humen Forts,
miles downstream from
and ten miles from the Huangpu anchorage. In breadth from east to
Guangzhou, serving as the
west it was about 1,000 feet. On it stood the Factories, which comprised
primary port for sailing
the dwellings and places of business of each nation originally under
vessels involved in the
one roof. The line of frontage was uniform, all looking due south. The
China trade during the
distinction of new given to one of the two buildings occupied by the
nineteenth century.
“[East India] Company” applied to that one which was rebuilt after
the great fire of 1822, which destroyed all the others, with a few excep-
BRITISH EAST INDIA tions, as well as, according to official accounts, 12,000 Chinese houses,
COMPANY—Founded shops, and temples in the western suburb. Each Factory consisted of
in 1600, the East India a succession of buildings, behind one another, separated by narrow
Company was granted a spaces or courtyards, and running north. The front ones were num-
monopoly on all British bered 1, those back of them, nearly all of three stories, No. 2, 3, and so
trade from western India on. The least numerous Factories were then in the American Hang, the
to eastern China. The greatest number were in the Danish and Dutch Hangs, which contained
company lost its exclusive seven and eight respectively.
monopoly on Asian trade [. . .]
in 1813 and was dissolved The Factories were the individual property of the Hang merchants,
in 1874. and were hired of them. . . . Entrance to the rear Factories was by arched
passages running through those in front. The lower floors were occupied
COMPRADORE—The top by counting-rooms, go-downs, and store-rooms, by the rooms of the Com-
Chinese agent serving in pradore, his assistants, servants and coolies, as well as by a massively built
the factories in Guangzhou. treasury of granite, with iron doors, an essential feature, there being no
The term was also used banks in existence. In front of each treasury was a well-paved open space,
to apply to Chinese with table for scales and weights, the indispensable adjuncts of all money
representatives on foreign transactions, as receipts and payments were made by weight only, except
sailing vessels. in some peculiar case. The second floor was devoted to dining and sitting
rooms, the third to bedrooms. As almost all were provided with broad
verandahs and the buildings put up with care, they were quite comfort-
able, although in every respect devoid of ornamental work. In front of
the middle Factories between Old China Street and Hog Lane ran a broad
stone pavement, and this bordered an open space running down to the
banks of the river, a distance of about three hundred feet. On the east side
it was bounded by the wall of the East India Company’s landing place
and enclosure, and on the west by the wall in front of the landing and
enclosure.
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 33

2.2 DEQING’S MEMORIAL ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES GONGHANG

OF THE GONGHANG (MARCH 23, 1813) (COHONG)—A merchant
guild authorized in 1720
In 1759, seeking to better control the increasing number of Western merchants by the central government
initiating trade all along the coast of China, the Qing court mandated that as the only organization
Guangzhou would be the only port open for European (and American) traders. through which Western
The government granted a group of Chinese merchant families the power to act merchants were allowed
as the intermediaries between the foreign traders and Chinese merchants. Each to trade with China and
family acted as a separate “company” within the larger guild, or gonghang. designated to collect duties
Within the gonghang, those dealing exclusively with merchant vessels from on Western trade. It was
Europe (as distinct from those from other parts of Asia) were referred to as the abolished by the Treaty
Yanghang. The various financial exigencies required to succeed as a merchant of Nanjing in 1842. This
in the guild (enormous amounts of capital, good political ties, and good busi- merchant guild was the
ness sense) made the appointment as one of the officially designated merchants sole venue through which
a dicey commercial venture. Throughout its history, the efficacy of the entire foreign merchants could
merchant guild (gonghang) system (described next) was of key concern to the legally carry out trade
court and its officials. with China. The gonghang
merchants were overseen
Questions
by the superintendent of
1. What concerns prompted Deqing to restructure the guild mer- maritime customs and
chant system? duties (appointed by the
2. Deqing suggests that it is “better not to focus our energies on Board of Revenue).
replacing merchants but instead to focus on bad practices early
in order to prevent deeper problems later on.” Do you think the
TAEL—Technically, a
emperor would agree?
Chinese ounce of silver,
but, in reality, there were
Report by Superintendent of Yue (Guangdong) Customs on investigation of cus-
numerous different forms
tom affairs and request to establish Gonghang general office
of taels, of unequal values.
Jiaqing 18th year, 2nd month, 21st day [March 23, 1813]
In international treaties,
I, Deqing, deferentially submit my investigation on custom affairs,
the most commonly used
and request your guidance. Foreign traders coming by ship [to China]
tael was the “customs tael”
rely on the Yanghang guild merchants to supervise and assist their com-
[haiguan tael], equivalent to
mercial dealings. Through these semi-officially recognized merchants,
37.68 grams of silver. The
the foreign traders can successfully carry out trade and at the same time
other commonly used tael
are exposed to a more civilized culture than their own barbarian culture.
was the “kuping tael” or
Since I was granted this position, I have followed the imperial regula-
“treasury tael,” equivalent
tions at all times and encountered no matters needing investigation. Only
to 37 grams.
when I reviewed old files, did I discover that legal cases involving unpaid
debt to foreigners were transferred to the offices of the Governor and
Governor-General. The indebted merchant’s assets would be confiscated
to pay off the balance. If their assets were insufficient, the merchant who
then took control of that business would be ordered to pay off the differ-
ence. If the company attracted no buyers, all the other guild-merchants
would have to make contributions to pay off the debt. If none of these
measures cleared the debt owed to the foreigners, then [the superinten-
dent] would meet with the governor-general and governor to submit a
special memorial asking for severe punishment. This has been the proce-
dure in the past.
[. . .]
Humbly I propose to you my thoughts on this matter. The Yang-
hang merchants oversee an exchange of foreign goods that often exceeds
hundreds of thousands taels [of silver]. As a result they must pay tens of
thousands of taels in duties. In reality, only but the most wealthy and reli-
able merchants have the financial means to bear such a financial burden.
Yet, to become a Yanghang merchant is relatively easy, only needing to
34 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

have one or two senior merchants pledge on one’s behalf, and no further
details are given to the Board. Such a procedure is simply not adequate.
Every time a merchant fails, the other Yanghang merchants also suffer. In
addition, when foreign ships arrive at port, deceitful Yanghang merchants
secretly sell their goods too cheaply to the foreigners while buying the
foreign goods at too high a price. These immoral merchants simply want
to buy the lion’s share of foreign goods so as to corner the trade in foreign
goods. Those who adopt this strategy rarely take into consideration the
mounting debts they incur as a result. In the end, unable to pay off their
debt and with taxes mounting they go bankrupt. All of this happens, sim-
ply because their actions are not regulated. Unhealthy practices prolifer-
ated when other merchants had to follow the other’s example to obtain
more [foreign] goods.
[. . .]
Now, with regards to how to straighten out foreign trade, it is nec-
essary to alter the procedures while clarifying the responsibilities of the
merchants. We have to find one or two wealthy and morally upright local
merchants in each guild, order them to take charge of the Yanghang mer-
chants and to represent the guild’s interests in negotiations with foreign
merchants. They must not arbitrarily raise or lower prices, rather they
ought to adhere to the going market price, conduct trade with fairness.
If anyone secretly disobeys these rules, the head merchants must report
them for prosecution.
I frequently encourage the merchants to live simple instead of lav-
ish lives, to protect their reputation, and to eliminate evil customs. Only
in this way will the merchant guilds become robust. In the future, when
a new merchant is to be selected, the Head Yanghang merchant should
notify all the wealthy and honest Yanghang merchants who should in turn
jointly recommend a qualified candidate. Such a pledge will be reported
to and registered at the Board [of Revenue]. If the recommendation is
deliberately false and they fall into debt, the debt will be the responsibility
of those who recommended him. Similarly, when merchants retire from
business for various reasons, a report must be sent to the Board of Rev-
enue immediately to terminate their membership of the guild. At the end
of each year, the list of registered Yanghang merchants will be reported to
the Board of Revenue.
Should such a regulation be approved and incorporated, trade will
improve quickly and the likelihood of employing unsuitable merchants
into the Yanghang guild can be diminished and foreign trade will be
improved.
Your slave’s foolish proposal may be completely inappropriate; it is
merely stating the situation. With my forehead on the floor, [I] report this
memorial, to Your Majesty, for his judgment.

2.3 RULES REGULATING FOREIGN TRADING

IN GUANGZHOU (1832–1835)
Concerned about Westerners attempting to settle permanently in China,
foreigners in Guangzhou were obliged to adhere to a list of eight rules that
defined where they went, what guests could accompany them, and even how
many servants they could have. The list of regulations was first handed down
in 1760 by the Qianlong emperor, revised by his son the Jiaqing emperor in
1810, and confirmed again by edict in 1819. These rules were not idle threats.
In 1829, one Yanghang vouched for a boat that clandestinely brought the wife
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 35

of a powerful British merchant to the factories. When the governor-general HUMEN—The mouth of
learned of this transgression, the head merchant was sent to prison, and the the Pearl River, known in
guild was fined so severely that it teetered on the brink of bankruptcy for the Chinese as “Humen” or,
next ten years. literally, “Tiger’s Gate.”
Early European sailors
Questions labeled it “Boca Tigris”
or “Mouth of the Tiger,”
1. Why would the Qing emperor be concerned with regulating the
which was later called the
lives of the European traders and sailors?
“Bogue” by British sailors.
2. Do the rules appear intent on keeping the foreign merchants
away from local Chinese or the reverse?

Regulation 1—All vessels of war are prohibited from entering the Humen
Vessels of war acting as convoy to merchantmen must anchor outside at
sea till their merchant-ships are ready to depart, and then sail away with
them.
Regulation 2—Neither women, guns, spears, nor arms of any kind
can be brought to the Factories.
Regulation 3—All river-pilots and ships’ Compradores must be
registered at the office of the assistant magistrate at Macau. That officer
will also furnish each one of them with a license, or badge, which must
be worn around the waist. He must produce it whenever called for. All
other boatmen and people must not have communication with foreign-
ers, unless under the immediate control of the ships’ Compradores; and
should smuggling take place, the Compradore of the ship engaged in it
will be punished.
Regulation 4—Each Factory is restricted for its service to eight Chi-
nese (irrespective of the number of its occupants), say two porters, four
water-carriers, one person to take care of goods, and one shop merchant
who originally performed all the duties of the “House Compradore,” as
he is styled today.
Regulation 5—Foreigners are prohibited from rowing about the
river in their own boats for “pleasure.” On the 8th, 18th, and 28th days
of the lunar month “they may take the air,” as fixed by the government
in the 21st year of Jiaqing (1819). All ships’ boats passing the Custom-
houses on the river must be detained and examined, to guard against
guns, swords or firearms being furtively carried in them. On the 8th, 18th
and 28th days of the lunar month these foreigners may visit the Flower
Gardens and Buddhist Temple on Henan Island, but not in groups of
over ten at a time. When they are “refreshed” they must return to the
Factories, not be allowed to pass the night “out,” or collect together to
carouse. Should they do so, then, when the next “holiday” comes, they
shall not be permitted to go. If they should presume to enter villages,
public places, or bazaars, punishment will be inflicted upon the linguist
who accompanies them.
Regulation 6—Foreigners are not allowed to present petitions [to the
emperor]. If they have anything to represent, it must be done through the
Hang merchants.
Regulation 7—Hang merchants are not to owe debts to foreigners.
Smuggling goods to and from the city is prohibited.
Regulation 8—Foreign ships arriving with merchandise must not
loiter about outside the river; they must come directly to Huangpu]. They
must not rove about the bays at pleasure and sell to rascally natives goods
subject to duty, that these may smuggle them, and thereby defraud His
Celestial Majesty’s revenue.
36 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

OPIUM IN EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY GUANGZHOU

Given the attention lavished on this era, it is perhaps surprising to
learn that for the first several decades of intensive British and Chinese
contact, the empires’ relationship revolved around tea, not opium. To
the Qing court, this seemed perfectly natural. Tea was of central con-
cern in the court’s management of both maritime and overland trade.
But with the emergence of Britain’s massive demand for tea in the
late 1700s—from 6.8 million pounds per year in the 1770s to 19.7 mil-
lion pounds in the 1790s—the relationship between the two empires
changed dramatically. The steady growth of the tea trade caused the
Chinese to redouble their efforts to regulate the maritime trade. In
Great Britain, the British mania for tea, and the imbalance in trade that
resulted, precipitated a frantic search for a corresponding habit for the
Chinese.
Opium, while not unknown within China prior to the eighteenth cen-
tury, had been used primarily as a quasi-medicinal product often mixed
with tobacco and eaten rather than smoked. Around 1700, this began to
change. The British discovery of new methods for refining opium greatly
heightened its addictiveness while facilitating its transportability. As the
following documents indicate, by the 1830s, tea was no longer the pri-
mary concern of either government. Great Britain had become addicted
to the profits gained by the opium trade to such an extent that at least one
scholar has suggested that Britain’s global supremacy in the nineteenth
century was directly tied to its ability to continue selling opium to China.
For the Qing government, however, the opium problem became, as the
usage and cultivation spread to many parts of China, a problem affecting
the entire empire.

2.4 OPIUM AND TEA TRADE WITH CHINA

In 1668, the British East India Company ordered that 100 pounds of “goode
tey” [good tea] be sent to Great Britain. By 1793, imports had risen roughly
40,000 percent. The burgeoning trade deficit forced the British government to
seek a product they could sell to China to offset their mounting debt. Although
the British were producing numerous textiles and woolen goods, such products
did not fit the needs or desires of the Chinese market. In the early 1700s, the Brit-
ish East India Company began exporting small amounts of opium from India. By
1839, enough Indian opium entered China to supply 10 million users, and more
importantly, enough silver flowed out to turn the trade deficit back to Britain’s
favor. As the following charts indicate, the opium trade only soared after the
Opium War and played no small part in allowing Britain to maintain its position
as a global powerhouse.

Questions
1. Does Chart 1 support the claim made by many of Great Britain’s
officials, politicians, and merchants that if China had granted
Britain the free trade they demanded, they could have avoided
the forced importation of opium?
2. Given that supply and demand are only part of the equation in
the opium trade, what other factors might you suspect influenced
the rise in the amount of opium into China?
 Opium Imported From India to China

80,000

70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000

Number of Chests
30,000

20,000

10,000

Year

Chart 1: British Opium Imported to China

Chapter 2 • The Opium War
37
38 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

China–Britain Trade (1816–1833)

16000000
Opium Imported (dollars)
Tea Exported (dollars)
14000000

12000000

10000000
Value (dollars)

8000000

6000000

4000000

2000000

Year

Chart 2: British Opium Imports Versus Chinese Tea Exported to Britain

HUANG JUEZI 2.5 HUANG JUEZI ON THE EVIL OF OPIUM

(1793–1853)—A powerful (JUNE 2, 1838)
Qing official and leader of
a prohibition faction that By the early nineteenth century, the Qing state of financial affairs were in dire
promoted the outlawing straits. After a century of budget surpluses, internal spending had risen precipi-
of opium enforced by tously, and the outflow of silver to pay for the importation of opium rocketed
harsh penalties instead of upward. As is often the case in economic recessions, while the immediate cause
the legalization sought by of inflation is relatively clear, discovering a solution to reverse such a trend is far
other officials. less simple. In addition, Qing officials felt morally obliged to improve the situa-
tion for the common people. Qing officials tended to gravitate toward two basic
positions. The first group advocated legalization to produce revenue and avoid
DAOGUANG
war with Great Britain. The second group, headed by Minister of Rites Huang
(1782–1850)—Seventh
Juezi, advocated the prohibition of opium as well as the introduction of the death
emperor of the Qing
penalty for all opium users. The following memorial, written by Huang Juezi
dynasty, ruling from 1821
and other unnamed associates, won over the Daoguang emperor, who, within
to 1850, during a period
months, would appoint another prominent official, Lin Zexu, to head the prohibi-
of tremendous internal
tion efforts in Guangzhou.
turmoil and external
threats to the empire. Questions
1. What factors does Huang consider in his evaluation of the opium
problem? How do officials like himself figure in his plan?
2. Why does Huang suggest that attempting to curb foreign trade is
a bad strategy?

Your Majesty’s unflagging devotion and unrelenting efforts to improve

the empire for the ten thousand generations to come is boundless. How-
ever, the state’s revenue is insufficient and the standard of living remains
substandard. The overall situation is bleak and getting worse each year.
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 39

What are the causes? During the Qianlong reign, the empire’s revenue
more than covered the massive financial outlay on border defense, impe-
rial inspection tours, and construction projects. That era can surely be
considered one of the most wealthy and prosperous. Even during the
Jiaqing period [1796–1819], the economy was healthy enough that gen-
try families and wealthy merchants still enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle—
a lifestyle quite distant from which they lead today. It seems that they
believed the wealthy could become wealthier by spending more even as
the poor become poorer by being thrifty! Your humble servant noticed
that recently the price of silver has steadily increased. A single liang of
silver is now more than 1600 copper coins. This rise in the cost of silver is
not a result of domestic consumption. Rather, it is primarily a result of the
steady outflow of silver to foreign barbarians.
Since opium first began to arrive in China, the Jiaqing emperor
understood the harm it could cause China and expressly forbid it. How-
ever, officials at that time did not fully realize the detrimental impact of
opium on the empire. If they had, strict laws with severe consequences for
those who disobeyed would have been enacted from the outset. Accord-
ing to well-established regulations, foreign ships arriving at Guang-
dong wishing to trade with China must obtain the proper permit from
the [Head] Hang merchant. He must guarantee there is no opium on
board before they enter the port of Guangzhou. But such regulations are
often treated as a mere formality with foreign ships continuing to import
opium. As a result, by 1823, the annual outflow of silver exceeded several
millions liang. At the beginning, opium consumption was limited to the
wealthy and noble families who smoked it simply as part of their immod-
erate but lavish lifestyle still displaying a degree of self-control. Later,
people of all backgrounds, including government officials, gentry, mer-
chants, servants, women, Buddhist monks and nuns, Daoist priests, took
up the opium habit and smoking opium publicly and purchased smoking
equipment. Recently the opium smoking fad has reached even Beijing, the
political center of the empire!
[. . .]
By now everybody has begun to recognize a central cause of the
empire’s economic downturn is the outflow of silver caused by the demand
for opium. Different people have put forward a wide array of solutions for
this problem. Some people suggest a system of strict inspections at the
port-of-entry as a dual deterrent: to stop both the influx of opium and
the outflow of silver. On the surface this makes sense, however, who will
guarantee that every inspector is honest? Annual trade today has reached
a level that exceeds several tens of millions liang. Even a modest cut in
trade would result in a reduction of several millions liang of silver. With
such huge potential profits, which inspector would seriously implement
the regulations? Even if occasionally a few smugglers could be detained,
[China’s] coastline is over ten thousand li long, which would allow smug-
glers an almost endless number of harbors to enter or leave, easily evad-
ing any efforts to deter them. That’s the first reason of why the outflow of
silver cannot be stopped.
Some people have suggested we should attack the source of the
problem by simply eliminating all foreign trade. This too seems to make
sense on the surface, but individuals who suggest this overlook the fact
that the legitimate portion of foreign trade consists primarily of woolens,
clocks and watches in exchange for tea, rhubarb, and silk and accounts
for no more than ten million liang with a profit for those involved of only
several million liang. Thus, lawful trading contributes only 2 to 3 percent
of the profit made from the opium trade. Even if we set aside the tariff
40 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

revenues collected by Guangzhou’s maritime customs by banning foreign

trade, opium ships could instead choose to anchor off the coasts while the
price and demand for opium would undoubtedly rise. As demand from
the inland opium smokers increases, miscreants will realize the profits to
be made and will willingly engage in smuggling. Thus the second reason
for stemming the outflow of silver is that it is harder to control deceitful
opium smokers than foreigners.
Some people suggest harsh action against dealers through the
enforcement of the strict prohibition of opium dens. Though such steps
would not cure the root of the problem, it could reduce its traffic. Those
who propose such an idea seem to be unaware that rules and regulations
already exist. Convicted opium dealers can be punished with exile to the
distant border frontiers. If it can be proved that the opium den owners
coaxed innocent young people to smoke, the penalty is death by hang-
ing. Yet while both the numbers of opium dealers and dens are countless,
very few officials are able to handle the cases. The major Guangdong
opium dealers have established extensive networks with contacts in
every province along their supply routes guaranteeing safe delivery any-
where they wish. Officers responsible for land and water passes tolerate
and assist the smugglers’ trafficking. Instead, under the guise of carrying
out opium inspections, officials often harass lawful merchants forcing
them to pay bribes. . . . This is the third reason the outflow of silver can-
not be stopped.
Some suggest stopping the ban on opium and legalizing domestic
production so that local opium would curb the need of foreign import.
Gradually, the outflow of silver would be controlled. They are unaware
of the fact that domestic opium is not strong enough for domestic
addicts. Smugglers only use it to mix with foreign opium to raise their
profits. Therefore, legalizing domestic opium will not stop the outflow
of silver. This is the fourth reason.
[. . .]
If foreign barbarians can resist and prohibit the use of opium through
legal statutes, Your Majesty’s authority can certainly allow us to do the
same. . . . When the imperial edict is first issued, it has to be strict. Only
when the imperial edict is strict, will the officials implement it seriously;
only when the officials are serious will the people not violate the law.
Within a year of the law being enacted 80 or 90 percent of the smokers will
end their addiction before any penalty is imposed upon them. In this way
the law, will not only cause smokers to end their addiction and live out
the rest of their lives in peace, but since nonsmokers will never be enticed
to take up the habit they will live healthy normal lives. Exercising your
Majesty’s supreme power in this way is virtuous. I beg for your edict to
order governor-generals and governors of all provinces to publicize the
regulations and proscription on smoking opium.

2.6 THE OPIUM QUESTION AMONG WESTERNERS

IN CHINA (1836–1837)
In 1836, the Chinese Repository—one of the most influential and widely circu-
lated English-language periodicals in China—published an anti-opium pamphlet
with a preface written by Thomas Dealtry. Dealtry served as the Anglican Arch-
deacon of Calcutta, India, and chaplain to the East India Company. The pamphlet
(only the conclusion is included next) posed two basic questions: 1) Is a healthy
person justified in using opium? 2) How far can such a person, if not justified
in using it himself, be justified in encouraging its use by others? The following
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 41

document offers a small indication of the broad range of opinions on the question
of opium trade such a column elicited among its European readers.

Questions
1. From the perspectives given, was the opium trade a moral or eco-
nomic activity?
2. How would you counter the arguments raised by “a Reader”?

Conclusion of a Pamphlet Titled “Remarks

on the Opium Trade with China” (c. 1836)
I leave the question here. I wish I could utter one warning whisper that
could be attended to. I wish that ministers of the gospel especially those at
the seat of government, would work the problem out for themselves, and
having brought it to a point, would step forward with the boldness that
becomes them, and drag down this hideous national sin from the place
where she sits in state; expose her more than Duessa-like foulness and
deformity and warn all, high and low, of the guilt that attaches to every
individual who knows the law, “as he hath opportunity to do good unto
all men,” and yet directly disobeys that command by countenancing a
trade which has been more instrumental in killing souls and bodies than
any curse ever inflicted on a people. . . . Our sin is growing, and encour-
aging the trade in opium is, indeed, one of the darkest that ever invoked
the wrath of the most high God upon a people. Where are the preachers
of the gospel, where is the spirit of the common humanity fled, that this
sin should till this moment exist unrebuked? Oh what a wail of misery
would awaken your remorse and compassion, could the dying agonies of
one poor opium-victim reach your soul! Think then of THE MILLIONS
who have already thus perished, and then ask yourself how long is this to
continue and no man in a Christian land regard it? How long is a British
government to be seen drawing revenue from this source, admitting the
misery, and excusing itself for abetting, by a fallacy the most contemptible
and insulting even to common sense? How long is a whole community of
British merchants to be content with earning the price of blood, because if
they do not, others will in their stead?

A Letter To the Editor of the Chinese Repository

in Response to Archdeacon Dealtry:
Sir,
An article appeared in your last number condemnatory of those engaged
in the culture of opium, and of those supplying the Chinese with this lux-
ury. The attack of archdeacon Dealtry on the produce of India which pro-
vides the government (perhaps in the least oppressive way to the subject)
with means to pay his, and such like salaries as his, is beyond doubt, not
a selfish argument. How far it is expedient, or necessary, for morals to put
down opium will be the subject of this letter. The attack might have come
at a fitter moment than when the emperor of China was fulminating his
edicts on this subject against individuals, and to which his celestial majes-
ty and his viceroys have been pleased to shut their eyes for the last twenty
years as entirely on this side of Asia, as the Church of England has on the
other side of Asia: still, if it is true that opium is solely a hateful poison,
and those who deal in it are poisoners, truth will prevail, and it will be put
down. If on the other hand—and this is the opinion here argued for—opium
42 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

is a useful soother, a harmless luxury, and a precious medicine, except to

those who abuse it, then opium will increase and its merchants be freed
from an unjust prejudice, and truth prevail!. . .
The archdeacon in his crusade against opium, forgets a principle,
which, however lost sight of by him, has been acknowledged and acted on
by the two most civilized governments of Europe—France and England;
and it is this, that in administration of any article likely to stimulate the
passions to crime, the dealers in it should be kept not only as much as pos-
sible respectable, but even under the power of the police by license: so in
France, as to gaming houses: so in England, as to wine houses and gin pal-
aces: yet seeing this clear before him, the archdeacon without the shadow
of a chance of stopping the trade in opium whether he is wrong or right
in his tirade against it, is for holding the present dealers in it, up to odium
and infamy; thus throwing its supply into hands of desperadoes, pirates,
and marauders, instead of a body of capitalists, not participating certainly
in what they carry, but in fact supplying an important branch of the Indian
revenue safely and peaceably.
I leave the matter to the judgment of your distant readers, and I do
so confidently. Were the appeal to be made to those here, as many partici-
pate in the profits, it might be considered a partial one. The safe test of
experience has shown that sovereigns and moralists are powerless against
a pervading taste of a whole people. The proclamations of Elizabeth of
England did not put down hops. The blast and counter blasts, are only
to be found in the library of the curious collector of books, but tobacco is
cultivated and used all the world more extensively than any other luxury.
Muhammad by prohibiting wine only forced drunkards to use rakee, and
opium: he was powerless to stop intoxication. What Temperance Societies
may yet accomplish remains to be seen.
Very Faithfully,
A Reader
Canton 10th December 1836

A Letter To the Editor of the Chinese Repository

in Response to “A Reader”:
Sir,
Being a well-wisher to all free discussion, and convinced that a patient
hearing of both sides of a cause is the best way to arrive at a fair conclu-
sion, I have been glad to see that you have commenced a discussion as to
the merits of the opium trade. . . . I have looked in vain throughout the
letter of your Correspondent, “A Reader,” for any more cogent argument
than that of the hired bravo, “I do not see that I am doing any harm: if I did
take the profit, some one else, not so thin skinned, would”—which may be
broadly pronounced the most mischievous, false and dangerous principle
to morality that has ever been invented. . . .
Suppose, by any chance, that Chinese junks were to import into Eng-
land, as a foreign and fashionable luxury, so harmless a thing as arsenic,
or corrosive sublimate—that, after a few years, it became a rage—that
thousands—that hundreds of thousands used it—and that its use was, in
consequence of its bad effects, prohibited. Suppose that, in opposition to
the prohibition, junks were stationed in the St. George’s channel, with a
constant supply, taking occasional trips to the Isle of Wight, and the mouth
of the Thames, when the governmental officials were sufficiently attentive
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 43

to their duty, at the former station, to prevent its introduction there. Sup- LIN ZEXU (1785–1850)—A
pose the consumption to increase annually, and to arouse the attention of scholar-official who passed
government, and of those sound thinking men who foresaw misery and the highest (jinshi) civil
destruction from the rapid spread of an insidious, unprofitable and dan- exam at age 26, he was
gerous habit. . . . a favorite of the young
If the purveyors of opium said nothing, or did they only defend the Daoguang emperor
practice on the ground that it gave a profit, which they coveted, not much (r. 1821–1850) and a
need be said; but sophistication is a bad substitute for truth. The trade member of Huang Juezi’s
may be a profitable one—it may be of importance to the Indian govern- “prohibition faction.”
ment, and to individuals—but to attempt a defense on the ground of its In 1838, he headed the
not having a dangerous and pernicious influence on health and morals, empire’s anti-opium
is to say what cannot be borne out, by fact or argument; and what I, who efforts, until he was
reason on the subject, cannot but feel to be an important attempt to defend banished to Xinjiang after
what is, in itself, manifestly indispensable. failing to resolve China’s
confrontation with Britain.
I am, sir, your humble servant,
Another Reader

COMMISSIONER LIN ZEXU AND THE OPIUM WAR

Virtually every historical overview of nineteenth-century China men-
tions one man: Lin Zexu. Following the emperor’s decision to imple-
ment Huang Juezi’s recommendations, few officials were surprised by
Lin’s appointment as special commissioner to Guangzhou. Many West-
erners, however, were caught flat-footed. While they had been follow-
ing the debates closely, they had wrongly speculated that the legalized
opium faction was ascendant. In anticipation, the European traders had
been building up stockpiles of opium in the Guangzhou factories. Thus,
the merchants were doubly shocked when Lin Zexu, upon his arrival in
Guangzhou, demanded their entire stock of opium be surrendered to Chi-
nese authorities.
When reading the following documents, pay particular attention to
the different ways in which the Chinese and British justified their actions.
The Chinese tended to limit the scope of their actions specifically to the
opium trade, while the British preferred to speak of defending their com-
mercial and diplomatic rights by “opening China” to “international” trade
guidelines. In an age when Adam Smith’s economic policies prevailed,
many British felt their economic superiority simply reflected a “natural”
economic outcome. Of course, Adam Smith’s economic policies did not
factor in Britain’s not so invisible military advantage.

2.7 IMPERIAL COMMISSIONER LIN ZEXU’S

PRONOUNCEMENT TO THE FOREIGNERS (MARCH 18, 1839)
Lin Zexu’s pronouncement to the foreign merchants trading in Guangzhou is
traditional in tone and form. While it may seem patronizing in places, Chinese
officials (and the emperor) sought to give all non-Chinese the benefit of the doubt
regarding any transgressions of etiquette, customs, or laws. Equally characteris-
tic was the fact that Lin publicly posted and delivered the edict to the offending
parties. Lin’s confidence that the top merchants would assist him in enforcing the
laws is also quite typical (if misplaced). These actions reflect Lin’s efforts to appear
outwardly magnanimous and merciful. In other words, his edict to the foreigners
demonstrates Lin’s decision to employ tried-and-true Chinese methods in his ini-
tial step to stem the flow of opium. When the British merchants initially handed
over their stocks of opium, Lin Zexu’s measures won the day for the Chinese. His
44 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

decision to publicly destroy these stocks by placing them in two massive trenches
that were then filled with lime and seawater sealed his reputation, at the time, as
one of the most popular Chinese officials of the era.

Questions
1. Do you think that Lin Zexu displays a clear understanding of
international relations and the regulations that govern such
relationships?
2. How would you characterize Lin’s approach? Do you find his
demands reasonable?

Edict to notify all foreigners:

Foreign ships that have come to Guangdong for trade have profited heav-
ily. No matter what merchandise was imported, it all sold. No matter
what merchandise was desired, it was procured. For this reason, the num-
ber of ships arriving annually has steadily increased from several dozen
ships initially to several hundred of ships today. Our Great Emperor
treats everyone equally, permitting all to trade and make a profit. If we
were to close the port, how would that benefit your countries? How can
you do without items such as tea and rhubarb which are necessities for
foreigners’ livelihood. Allowing you to trade them every year without
tight control is a grace upon you. To show your gratitude you should
respect our laws.
You should not harm others simply to benefit yourself. How come
in your own country, smoking opium is forbidden, but you bring it to
China, imposing it on people for money and harming their lives. You have
seduced Chinese people with opium for several tens of years, making a
shameful profit. Such behavior has caused common resentment, and can-
not be tolerated by justice. Previously, the Imperial Kingdom’s regulations
have been generous and not overly strict but many ports had leaks [to
allow smuggling]. Having learned about these transgressions, the Great
Emperor is angered and determined to eliminate [opium] once and for all.
All Chinese who sell or operate a smoking den are to be judged, sentenced
to death and immediately executed. Coming to our Imperial Kingdom,
you ought to abide by our laws in the same manner as the local people do.
I, the specially appointed commissioner, am from the coast of Fujian and
familiar with all the tricks employed by foreigners. Therefore, I have been
repeatedly credited for the successful handling of frontier issues and was
appointed by the Great Emperor to investigate the matters. If we were to
prosecute the crimes [of smuggling opium] committed by foreigners, it
would be hard to avoid punishment. In the past, [we] would have taken
into consideration that you came from afar and were unaware of the strict
restrictions. But now we have sought to clarify the laws and regulations
so that there is no confusion. We do not wish to harm you without proper
warning.
[. . .]
Now I publicly declare the following edict and all foreign merchants
should, upon receiving the edict, abide by its instructions without delay
and to surrender to the imperial officials all the opium on your ships.
The Hang merchants are responsible for inventorying how many cases
are confiscated, examined, registered and destroyed. Eliminate the harm-
ful substance with absolutely no exception. In the intervening time, an
agreement declaring that [foreign] ships will never carry any opium again
will be written up in both Chinese and Western languages. If anyone is
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 45

found to be importing opium, their merchandise will be confiscated and

the guilty individuals executed.
[. . .]
If you continue to pursue the wrong course—continuously indulging
in smuggling; having sailors smuggle it in, falsely claiming it is not yours;
pretending to take [opium] back to your own country to be destroyed in
sea [but actually smuggling it]; seeking opportunities to sell in other prov-
inces; or try to play for time by only turning in only 10–20 percent of your
opium—all such behavior will be considered a deliberate violation and no
leniency shown. Even though our empire has been kind to people from
afar, but we cannot allow you to continue to flaunt our laws. New regula-
tions must be implemented to punish the guilty.
I went to the capital myself in order to receive the imperial edict. As
the imperial commissioner I bear the responsibility of coastal affairs and
I will fully investigate this matter. I will not depart until the day the opium
problem is fully resolved. I swear I will pursue it to the end and not accept
half measures.
I have also discovered that the local populace is indignant over those
foreigners who feel no regret and who only pursue their profit. We have
powerful military forces on land and in the sea. But by simply calling
upon the common people I could gather more than enough people to put
a stop to those [illicit] traders. Also, if need be, we could close the ports
indefinitely. How hard it would be to stop the [opium] traffic then! Our
great empire spans ten thousand li with abundant resources. We do not
depend on foreign products to survive. I am afraid it will be the livelihood
of your countries that will be in trouble. . . .
As for the wicked foreigners among you who have persistently
smuggled opium, I, the commissioner, have made a list of your names. We
will ensure those foreigners who do not trade opium are clearly acquitted.
Anyone who can first identify the dishonest foreigners and then convince
them to surrender their opium and agree to sign an agreement [to not sell
opium in the future] will be considered good foreigners. I, the commis-
sioners, will reward them. It is up to you to choose whether to honor or
disgrace yourselves. Now I order the chief yanghang merchant Wu Sha-
orong and others to report back to me with the signed agreement in hand
within three days. Then I will hold a meeting with governor-general and
governor to settle a date on which all opium will be confiscated. Do not
indulge in idle expectations or seek to postpone matters that will only
result in further regret.

2.8 CHARLES ELLIOT’S PUBLIC NOTICE TO BRITISH

SUBJECTS (MARCH 27, 1839)
Ten days after receiving Lin Zexu’s declaration, the Chief superintendent of the
trade, Charles Elliot, posted the following response. With communication to Brit-
ain (or even India) taking months rather than weeks, Elliot had no hope for an
expedient guidance, response, or intervention by his superiors. Consequently, he
had little choice but to turn over the opium. This document reflects his strategy
to placate the Chinese (and his fellow traders) by initially offering to compensate
all losses yet still declaring Lin’s acts as unlawful. Despite his assertion of unjust
treatment at the hands of the Chinese, he never acknowledges his own transgres-
sions. Instead, adopting a tactic that British officials would employ repeatedly
over the next several decades, Elliot avoids entirely the issue regarding the ille-
gality of opium he wished to import. Instead, he attempts to make Lin’s forced
46 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

ELLIOT, CHARLES acquisition of the opium the issue, even going as far as to suggest that this action
(1801–1875)—A British flouts the more universal rules of “free trade.”
diplomat serving as Chief
Superintendent of Trade Questions
and British Minister to 1. What specific charges does Elliot level against the Chinese?
China from 1835 until 1841, 2. Would you portray Elliot’s efforts as conciliatory or provocative?
when recalled from his
position for not extracting I, Charles Elliot, chief superintendent of the trade of British subjects in
harsh enough concessions China, presently forcibly detained by the provincial government, together
in the Convention of with all the merchants of my own and the other foreign nations settled
Chuanbi (1841). here, without supplies of food, deprived of our servants, and cut off from
all intercourse with our respective countries, (notwithstanding my own
official demand to be set at liberty so that I might act without restraint,)
have now received the commands of the high commissioner, issued
directly to me under the seals of the honorable officers, to deliver into his
hand all the opium held by the people of my country. Now I, the said chief
superintendent, thus constrained by paramount motives affecting the
safety of the lives and liberty of all the foreigners here present in Guang-
zhou, and by other very weighty causes, do hereby, in the name and on
the behalf of her Britannic majesty’s government enjoin and require all her
majesty’s subjects now present in Guangzhou forthwith to make a surren-
der to me for the service of her said majesty’s government, to be delivered
over to the government of China, of all the opium under their respective
control: and to hold the British ships and vessels engaged in the trade of
opium subject to my immediate direction: and to forward to me without
delay a sealed list of all the British owned opium in their respective pos-
session. And I, the said chief superintendent, do now, in the most full and
unreserved manner, hold myself responsible for, and on the behalf of her
Britannic majesty’s government, to all and each of her majesty’s subjects
surrendering the said British owned opium into my hands, to be delivered
over to the Chinese government. And I, the said chief superintendent, do
further specially caution all Her Majesty’s subjects here present in Guang-
zhou, owners of or charged with the management of opium, the property
of British subjects, that failing the surrender of the said opium into my
hands at or before six o’clock this day, I, the said chief superintendent,
hereby declare Her Majesty’s government wholly free of all manner of
responsibility in respect of the said British-owned opium.
And it is specially to be understood that proof of British property and
value of all British opium surrendered to me agreeably to this notice shall
be determined upon principles and in a manner hereafter to be defined by
Her Majesty’s government.
Given under my hand and seal of office at Guangzhou in China, this
twenty-seventh day of March, one-thousand-eight-hundred-and-thirty-
nine, at six of the clock in the morning.
[L.S] (Signed) Charles Elliot,
Chief superintendent of the trade of British subjects in China.

2.9 LETTER FROM LIN ZEXU TO HIS WIFE (1839)

In many accounts of the Opium War, Lin Zexu comes across as a rigid man
adhering to outdated ideas. Yet, his personal correspondence offers insight
into his broader awareness of the impact of opium across China, even within
his extended family. In this letter to his wife, we gain insight into his own
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 47

personal concerns about the possibility that his own son might be using
opium and his heartfelt efforts to share such feelings with his wife. Such sen-
timents reveal a man who is balancing his duties as an official and as a father
and husband.

Questions
1. How might the fact that many of Lin’s relatives were opium
addicts color his views on the opium trade in Guangzhou?
2. How does this letter show us a different facet of Lin’s personality
from that of his more official persona?

The day before yesterday I sent you a letter and yesterday received two
from you. . . . Here [in Guangzhou] the scenes of opium are astonishing.
Over half of all households are using it and many local officials also are
addicted. So detestable! I am determined to put a stop to it. I have just
ordered the Guangzhou Intendant to inform the British [Trade Represen-
tative] that from today forward the trade [of opium] is forbidden. All who
violate this order will lose their trading rights. I am not sure if the order
will have the desired outcome or not.
Our oldest son is now in the capital [Beijing] and I have heard he
often stays up late and goes out to meet with many friends. I do not know
whether or not he has become addicted [to opium]. I have been meaning
to write to caution him. If you are in touch with him, please also mention
it, so that I will not worry. With our second and third sons at home under
your oversight, they should be alright. I have heard that many relatives
have become addicted. Once they become users, their health is perma-
nently damaged and never able again to handle serious duties.
Many in the [extended] Lin family also suffer this misfortune. I am
unsure how their families allowed such a thing to happen. Unconscio-
nable! My cousin Zhongchang wrote earlier and mentioned that you were
troubled by your aching [bound] feet. How come you did not mention it
to me yourself? I hope you are feeling better now. I worry about you. . . .
What are your finances like at home? Try to be careful if possible, but
do not be overly frugal. Spend where you must—do not scrimp like the
proverb of “Stingy Wang Rong” instead follow the model of “Gong Sun”
who lived a simple but good life. It is more important to keep the bigger
picture in mind and being overly stingy is not path I would choose for
you to take.

2.10 LETTER FROM LIN ZEXU TO QUEEN VICTORIA

(JULY 19, 1839)
Perhaps the most famous of all the extant Opium War documents, Lin Zexu’s
letter to Queen Victoria likely never reached her. Copied and given to the captain
of the “Thomas Coutts” in February 1840, Lin’s letter was also openly circulated
and shared with many foreign merchants out of fear that if only sent via the
British his policies would not be made public. On many levels, Lin is reiterating
many of the same points he made in 2.7, but the letter displays a more developed
internal logic and a fuller awareness of the international economic and political
situation. It has been suggested many times among Western commentators that
this letter was never viewed by Queen Victoria—and it may be true that she
never viewed the actual letter Lin Zexu addressed to her—but only the most
willfully unapprised could have missed its publication in the London Times on
June 11, 1840.
48 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

Questions
1. It is often suggested by Western historians that China needed
to be opened because it did not follow proper diplomatic proce-
dures. How does the following document support or contradict
such a perspective?
2. What do you think Lin hoped to achieve by writing directly to
Queen Victoria?

Letter to Queen Victoria from Lin Zexu, Deng Tingzhen

and Qialiang
The rule of your distinguished country has been passed down for genera-
tions. Each ruler has been known for their respectfulness, with their trib-
utes [to China] accompanied by declarations such as, “When those people
of our country conduct trade in China, they received gracious and fair
treatment from your Emperor.” We are delighted that rulers from your
distinguished country understood the great principles of right and are
grateful for our Emperor’s kindness. Our imperial dynasty cherishes even
more [this relationship] and has redoubled its kindness towards you by al-
lowing profitable trade, extended to you over the past two hundred years.
This is the reason your country has become known for its wealth.
During this long period of trade, there were good and bad foreign-
ers, some of them brought in opium to seduce Chinese people and dis-
seminated this poison to every province. They only focused on their own
profits and cared nothing of the damage caused. The laws of heaven and
the feelings of the people cannot tolerate such behavior. The Emperor,
upon hearing of this, was filled with rage, and has specifically sent me, his
commissioner, to Guangdong. There he has charged me together with the
governor-general and governor, to investigate and settle this matter.
Any Chinese subject who is convicted of selling or smoking opium is
punished to death. If we were to charge every foreigner for the years of their
involvement in selling opium and the deep harm they have caused in their
pursuit of colossal profits, they would have been punished with the death
penalty as well. Nevertheless, we took into consideration the fact that many
foreigners regret their crimes, have asked for forgiveness, and relinquished
the opium from their ships in an amount of 20,283 chests to your representa-
tive Elliot; which has been confiscated and destroyed. I, [along with] the Gov-
ernor-General, and the Governor, in a memorial to the Emperor have faith-
fully reported this information. The Emperor was exceptionally kind and
pardoned the foreigners as a result of their cooperation. But, in the future,
if anyone repeats the crime, it will be hard to avoid punishment. With new
regulations established, we presume the ruler of your distinguished country
who favored our civilized culture, will instruct all foreigners to observe these
new laws with care. The benefits and punishments of our imperial laws must
be explained to all [who travel to China] and they must understand that un-
der no circumstances will opium be allowed to cross our borders.
Having investigated the matter, we have determined that your coun-
try is sixty to seventy thousand li away from China, and that foreign ships
compete for our lucrative trade. The foreigners have all profited from the
wealth of China. Put another way, the large profits made by the foreigners
are achieved only by the people of China seeking to share it with them.
In return how could the foreigners use the poisonous drug to harm the
Chinese people? Even though the foreigners may not necessarily intend
to do any harm, in order to maximize their profit, they disregard the dam-
ages they impose on people. May I ask where is your conscience? We have
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 49

heard that the smoking of opium is strictly forbidden in your country be-
cause the harm caused by opium is clearly understood. If your country
does not wish such harm upon your own country, you should not impose
it upon others, especially not China. Every single article exported from
China whether it is to be eaten, used or resold, is for the good of foreign
countries. Is there anything that China has done to harm foreign coun-
tries? This is not even mentioning the daily necessities, such as tea and
rhubarb, that China provides to foreign countries.
[. . .]
The goods imported to your country from China are not only con-
sumed by your own people, but also sold to other countries, which triple
your profits. You can earn these threefold profits without selling opium.
Yet, you still engage in a trade that is based on selling harmful products
to others simply to fulfill your greedy desire. What if people from other
countries sold opium to England, enticing your people to purchase and
smoke opium? Certainly, a ruler of your distinguished stature must de-
spise and forbid it.
We have always heard that the ruler of your distinguished country
is kind and benevolent. Naturally you would not wish to do unto others
what you yourself do not want. We have also heard that the ships coming
to Guangdong have all been given regulations and orders clearly outlin-
ing that forbidden goods are not permitted to ship to China. This indicates
that the administrative orders by the ruler of your distinguished country
are strict and clear. Only because the trading ships are numerous, hereto-
fore perhaps they have not been examined with care. Now with this com-
munication and a clear understanding of the strict laws by the imperial
kingdom, certainly you will not let your subjects to violate the law again.
[. . .]
The current penalty for Chinese who sell, or smoke, opium is death.
Clearly, if foreigners do not bring opium in, then Chinese could not sell
and smoke opium. It is really the evil foreigners who cause the death of
those Chinese. Why should opium smugglers be allowed to live? Anyone
who takes a life has to pay with one’s own life. Opium’s harm is much be-
yond one life. Therefore, the new law states foreigners who bring opium
to China must be punished by decapitation or hanging. This is to elimi-
nate the evils of the world.
Upon further investigation, we discovered that Elliot in the second
month of this year [April 9, 1839], petitioned for an extension of time as a
result of the legal restrictions. He requested an extension of five months
for Indian merchants and ten months for England proper, after which new
regulations will be enacted. Now we, the commissioners and officials, have
memorialized to the Great Emperor and have received the extraordinary
mercy from His Majesty, who has granted Elliot’s petition with extraordi-
nary consideration and compassion. Within a year [England proper] and
six months [Indian areas], anyone who mistakenly brings in opium, but
voluntarily surrenders themselves and all opium will be pardoned. After
the deadline, anyone who violates the law does so deliberately and will
be executed with no clemency. This truly demonstrates the height of kind-
ness and the perfection of justice.
Our imperial dynasty rules over and supervises numerous states and
possesses unforeseen divine power. But we cannot bear to put people to
death without giving them proper guidance. Therefore, we take great care
to announce regulations openly and clearly. If the merchants of your coun-
try seek a long-term trade relationship, they must obey our statue: they
must permanently stop the importation of opium. By no means should
they test the law with their lives.
50 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

May you, the Ruler, restrain your evil people in order to assure the
peace of your nation, to demonstrate further the sincerity of your submis-
siveness, and enjoy the blessings of peace. How fortunate, how fortunate
indeed! Upon receiving this letter, we entreat you to provide a prompt
reply regarding the details and circumstances of your opium ban. Do not
delay. . . .
Included in this letter is a copy of the new law: If foreigners import
opium for sale in China, the ringleader will be immediately beheaded, and
all others involved hanged. All merchandise is to be confiscated. Within
the one year and six months granted clemency period, those who surren-
der all opium will be pardoned.
Daoguang 19th year, 6th month, 9th day [July 19, 1839]. Since the edict
arrived belatedly, the clemency period ends on Daoguang 20th year, 12th
month, and 9th day [March 12, 1840].

POPULAR RESPONSES AND DIPLOMATIC

RESOLUTIONS TO THE OPIUM WAR
The Opium War (1839–1842) was far from a popular war among either
the Chinese or the British. There exist numerous instances in both coun-
tries of popular discontent over the way the war was entered into and
carried out. While the British lower classes were inevitably less aware of
the war than their Chinese counterparts, several of the following docu-
ments reveal that the commoners in both countries shared strong moral
objections to the opium trade. Such reactions are almost entirely forgot-
ten in many histories of the war today. Instead, many Western accounts
seek to suggest that Britain’s actions were entirely instigated by Chinese
attacks on British goods or that the British uniformly approved of such
ventures.

2.11 GUANGDONG RESIDENTS’ DENUNCIATION

OF THE BRITISH (1841)
The following anonymous document was likely hand-written, copied, and then
posted in several locations where the author felt it would have the greatest
impact. It was almost certainly written by a local scholar living in the south
of China or near Guangzhou. The language is colloquial, complete with crass
terminology used in daily conversations. Pay particular attention to how the
denunciation employs common themes like the benevolence of the emperor, reli-
ance on China for specific goods, etc., but turns them on their head to insult the
British. The inclusion of rhubarb (here and by Lin in 2.7) reflects the short-lived
misunderstanding that the British required the vegetable to prevent constipa-
tion. The defense of the emperor and attack on Qishan (Lin’s replacement) are
also quite typical, since it was often assumed that the emperor was at the mercy
of his officials.

Questions
1. How do the popular sentiments expressed in the document
diverge from that of the emperor and Lin Zexu?
2. Do you think the language employed is more reflective of the
lower classes (and thus an attempt to curry favor among them) or
intentionally provocative to anger the British?
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 51

Public announcement from all loyal and patriotic people of Guangdong to

you, the barbarian dogs and sheep.
We have noted that you English barbarians are practiced in the plun-
dering actions of animals, such as, hyenas and wolfs, similar to the Japanese
pirates and bandits during Ming Dynasty. Our imperial kingdom has pre-
viously defeated the likes of you. Because other overseas countries ask our
Emperor to permit them to trade, our Emperor has benevolently tolerated
trade between your dog-country and our own. You simply come for profit,
what expertise do you have! Your greed for profit is just like an animal’s
pursuit of food. You have no knowledge of law and rites. Look at your-
selves in the mirror! What is the difference between you and an animal? You
are simply an animal who can talk. How can you understand loyalty, filial
piety, and etiquette? How can you understand ritual manners and shame?
Although you have feather [down] and woolen goods, without our
raw silk, how could you weave? Although you have your tricks, without
our silver and white lead, how could you make your currency? Everything
else was also following our imperial dynasty’s rules. Your dog-country
depends on our empire’s tea, rhubarb and other medicine to survive. If
our empire refuses to supply these goods, how are you going to live?
Instead of having a sense gratitude for the great favor of our empire, you
repay us by harmful acts. You use opium to injure our people and cheat
us of our silver. Your animal-country does not consume such products, so
why poison our empire with them?
Enraged by what he learned [about your actions], our Emperor sent
Commissioner Lin to eliminate the harmful opium. Initially, he announced
that you would be pardoned if you surrendered your opium. As an ani-
mal, you understood enough to be afraid and surrender the opium. It was
reported to the Emperor, who gave you rhubarb and tea as a reward. But
you animals were not grateful. You refused to accept and sign the agree-
ment. You have claimed to be powerful, why did you dare not to attack
Guangdong where Commissioner Lin was posted? Instead, you snuck
up the coast to Zhejiang, massacred civilians in Dinghai, and then went to
Tianjin, attempting to present a petition to the emperor. If you were really
wronged, why not present your petition earlier, why first attack Dinghai
and only then go to Tianjin? It was obvious you understood your crimes
were much too great to be forgiven, so you came up with another plan to
deceive our officials. The corrupted minister Qishan was fooled by you,
and passed the petition to the emperor for you. The Great Emperor was
benevolent, and believed in it. [He] ordered the withdrawal of provincial
military forces, pardoned your dog-lives, and ordered his soldiers not to
open fire. If you were truly obedient, why did you not give up Dinghai, and
return to Guangdong to await an investigation? Instead you continue to dis-
rupt towns in the Guangdong area, and roam the seas. You duped Qishan,
the corrupt minister, who withdrew soldiers from Shajiao and Hengdang
[along the Pearl River]. He ordered soldiers not to fire their weapons, which
encouraged you to go further inland. You colluded with the collaborators
who had no respect for their Emperor or their fathers, and you paid them to
create a disturbance. What kind of strength was that? You claim to be excep-
tional fighters, why not just use your English barbarians to fight. To use
Chinese collaborators does not show your full talents, you English-dogs.
[. . .]
Our hatred towards your brutal behavior is so fanatical, that if we
do not exterminate you pigs and dogs completely, we cannot consider
ourselves true men who support the weight of the sky on earth. We have
52 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

made our pronouncement and we will not take it back. We are determined
to kill you, cut off your head, and burn you to a crisp. Even if you implore
people to stop us, nothing will cause us to change our minds. We will
peel off your skins and eat your flesh. Only then you will you understand
just how tough we are. We are the first to announce to your Yilü [Elliot],
Malixun, Diandi, and Danju, and the other Chinese collaborators who
show no respect to their fathers and the emperor. We should have written
in a more delicate style, but animals do not understand written words,
therefore we have used vulgar language for you animals to understand
in the simplest terms possible, to quickly confess your crime, surrender
yourself and beg [for forgiveness]. Differentiate between the leaders and
followers, as we are too kind to kill you all. If there is any delay, there will
be no time for regret.

2.12 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION

OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE “SUPPRESSION
OF THE OPIUM TRADE” (APRIL 4, 1843)
Similar to the debate that raged within the pages of the Chinese Repository (2.4),
many British were unconvinced by the rationale given for an expensive war
halfway around the world against the Chinese over the importation of a highly
addictive drug. Lord Ashley delivered an impassioned anti-war speech before
the British Parliament that lasted for several hours and when transcribed was
more than 60 pages long. Even when several members of Parliament attempted
to stop discussion due to the late hour (after midnight), debate continued until
after 2 a.m. The motion was ultimately withdrawn by Lord Ashley so as not
to prejudice the diplomatic negotiations going on between China and Great
Britain.

Questions
1. How does Ashley’s line of reasoning parallel that employed by
Dealtry (in 2.6)?
2. Why does Sir Robert Stanton claim “we did not subvert the com-
plicated and ancient fabric of the Chinese government”? On what
grounds does he make such a claim?

Lord Ashley: Sir, although I may be animadverted upon and perhaps

rebuked for having presumed to handle so important a matter, I shall ever
be thankful that I have acted as an instrument to lay this abominable evil
before the eye of the public. I shall deeply regret to have given offence to
this House, or to any individual; nevertheless, I shall rejoice in the disclo-
sure and the possible removal of the mischief. Sir, the condition of this
empire does demand a most deep and solemn consideration; within and
without, we are hollow and insecure. True, it is that we wear a certain
appearance of power and majesty, but, with one arm resting on the east,
and the other on the west, we are in too many instances trampling under
foot every moral and religious obligation. I confess I speak most sincerely,
though few, perhaps, will agree with me; but I do say—it is in my heart
and I will bring it out—if this is to be the course of our future policy; if thus
we are to exercise our arts and arms, our science and our superiority of
knowledge over the world—if all these are to be turned to our advantage
of mankind, I should much prefer that we shrink within the proportions
of our public virtue, and descend to the level of a third-rate power. But a
great and a noble opportunity is now offered to us, of being just and gen-
erous in the height of victory. In such a spirit, and with such an aim, there
is hope that we may yet be spared to run a blessed, a useful, and a glorious
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 53

career; directing all our energies and all our vows—all that we have and TREATY OF NANJING
all that we shall receive—to that one great end of human existence, “Glory (1842)—Treaty ending
to God in the highest; on earth peace, good-will towards men.” The noble the Opium War between
Lord [Ashley] concluded by moving— China and Great Britain. It
opened five treaty ports,
That it is the opinion of this House, that the continuance of the trade in opium and
ceded the island of Hong
the monopoly of its growth in the territories of British India, is destructive of all
Kong, and imposed a
relations of amity between England and China, injurious to the manufacturing
21 million taels indemnity.
interests of the country by the very serious diminution of the legitimate com-
merce, and utterly inconsistent with the honor and duties of a Christian kingdom;
and that steps be taken as soon as possible, with due regard to the rights of Gov-
ernment and individuals, to abolish the evil.”
RESPONSE: Sir George Stanton: However pernicious and impolitic
the traffic in opium may be, and whatever opinion this House may pro-
nounce tonight against its further continuance, we ought to recollect that
these persons engaged in this traffic under the full sanction and indeed
encouragement, both of the Indian and the home Government; and that
they were deprived of their property by an act of violent and unjustifi-
able outrage on the part of the Chinese authorities . . . . . The House has
heard a good deal about the revenue which is hazarded by the adoption
of my noble Friend’s motion; it should also hear something of the nature
and extent of those great interests which the adoption of his motion will
tend to maintain and preserve. I trust I shall not say much regarding the
advantages we derived from our position in China previous to the war.
It is well known that we had long derived from China exclusively, our
supply of the article of tea; that the China trade had yielded an annual
revenue to the Exchequer of nearly four millions sterling, and that, even
under the much reprobated monopoly of the East India Company, it was
the medium by which the disposal was effected above a million sterling in
value of the manufactures and productions of this country. . . .
Our present great commercial advantages in China, which I have
perhaps, detailed at too much length, have been obtained by the vigor-
ous employment of our united sea and land forces in the proper quarter,
and with the advantage, I must say, of considerable good fortune; for a
single untoward casualty, either on land, or in that unexplored naviga-
tion, might have marred the whole campaign. We were also fortunate, not
only in what we accomplished, but in what we did not accomplish; we
did not subvert the complicated and ancient fabric of the Chinese govern-
ment; we did not spread anarchy and confusion over its fine provinces.
We subdued the government to that extent only which was requisite to
dispose it to make the necessary reparation for the injuries which we had
received, and to grant to us those commercial concessions which, I doubt
not, will prove as beneficial to them as to ourselves.

2.13 TREATY OF NANJING (1842)

The Treaty of Nanjing is a representative (if unjust) coda to the Opium War.
Defeated by the most powerful navy in the world at the time, China was forced
to accept the continued importation of opium, pay a massive indemnity, and cede
the island of Hong Kong “in perpetuity” to Great Britain. Symptomatic of the
way Britain treated the affair from the beginning, the treaty mentions opium only
obliquely in reference to China’s large indemnity. The treaty speaks of free trade
and “opening” China, thereby suggesting that opium was incidental to the larger
issues at hand. Despite Great Britain’s insistence that the treaty marks China’s
entrance into “western style diplomacy,” it is highly unlikely the Qing court
thought that much would change because of it. Hong Kong was a barren island,
54 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

undesirable to most Chinese. Opening designated places for trade had long been
a concession given to appease aggressive neighbors along China’s inland borders.
And the court had long worried about the effectiveness of the Yanghang guild sys-
tem so was not likely troubled by its demise. What most aggrieved Qing officials
was the fact that they could not stop the only component of their relationship with
Great Britain that mattered, opium.

Questions
1. In what ways is the Treaty of Nanjing more a continuation of Brit-
ain’s efforts begun in the Macartney Mission (1792–1793) than a
reaction to China’s efforts to terminate the opium trade?
2. Aside from the heavy indemnity, what aspects do you think most
affected China?

Peace Treaty between the Queen of Great Britain

and the Emperor of China
HER MAJESTY the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, being desirous of putting
an end to the misunderstandings and consequent hostilities which have
arisen between the two countries, have resolved to conclude a Treaty for
that purpose . . . and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed
upon and concluded the following [selected] Articles:

I. There shall henceforward be Peace and Friendship between Her Maj-

esty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
and His Majesty the Emperor of China, and between their respective
Subjects, who shall enjoy full security and protection for their persons
and property within the Dominions of the other.
II. His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees, that British Subjects, with
their families and establishments, shall be allowed to reside, for the
purposes of carrying on their Mercantile pursuits, without moles-
tation or restraint, at the Cities and Towns of Guangzhou, Xiamen,
Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai; and Her Majesty the Queen of Great
Britain, etc., will appoint Superintendents, or Consular Officers, to
reside at each of the above-named Cities or Towns, to be the medium
of communication between the Chinese Authorities and the said Mer-
chants, and to see that the just Duties and other Dues of the Chinese
Government, as hereafter provided for, are duly discharged by Her
Britannic Majesty’s Subjects.
III. It being obviously necessary and desirable that British Subjects should
have some Port where at they may careen and refit their ships when
required, and keep stores for that purpose, His Majesty the Emperor
of China cedes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., the
Island of Hong Kong, to be possessed in perpetuity by Her Britannic
Majesty, her heirs and successors, and to be governed by such laws
and regulations as Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., shall
see fit to direct.
IV. The Emperor of China agrees to pay the sum of Six Millions of Dollars,
as the value of the opium which was delivered up at Guangzhou in
the month of March, 1839, as a ransom for the lives of Her Britannic
Majesty’s Superintendent and subjects, who had been imprisoned and
threatened with death by the Chinese High Officers.
 Chapter 2 • The Opium War 55

V. The Government of China having compelled the British Merchants TREATY PORTS—Any
trading at Guangzhou to deal exclusively with certain Chinese city in which foreigners
Merchants, called Hang merchants (or gonghang), who had been were to be allowed to trade
licensed by the Chinese Government for that purpose, the Emperor and conduct business
of China agrees to abolish that practice in future at all ports where within China. In addition
British Merchants may reside, and to permit them to carry on their to treaty ports, foreign
mercantile transactions with whatever persons they please; and His settlements and foreign
Imperial Majesty further agrees to pay to the British Government the concessions were carved
sum of Three Millions of dollars, on account of debts due to British out of existing Chinese
subjects by some of the said Hang merchants (or gonghang), who cities. These were under the
have become insolvent, and who owe very large sums of money to direct control and rule of
Subjects of Her Britannic Majesty. resident foreign consuls.
VI. The Government of Her Britannic Majesty having been obliged to
send out an expedition to demand and obtain redress for the violent
and unjust proceedings of the Chinese High Authorities towards
Her Britannic Majesty’s Officer and subjects, the Emperor of China
agrees to pay the sum of Twelve Millions of Dollars, on account of
the expenses incurred; and Her Britannic Majesty’s Plenipotentiary
voluntarily agrees, on behalf of Her Majesty, to deduct from the said
amount of Twelve Millions of Dollars on account of the Expenses
incurred, and Her Britannic Majesty’s plenipotentiary voluntarily
agrees, on behalf of Her Majesty, to deduct from the said amount of
twelve millions of dollars, any sums which may have been received
by Her Majesty’s combined Forces as Ransom for Cities and Towns
in China, subsequent to the 1st day of August, 1841.
[. . .]
XIII. The ratification of this Treaty by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Brit-
ain, etc., and His Majesty the Emperor of China, shall be exchanged
as soon as the great distance which separates England from China
will admit; but in the meantime, counterpart copies of it, signed
and sealed by the. Plenipotentiaries on behalf of their respective
Sovereigns, shall be mutually delivered, and all its provisions and
arrangements shall take effect.

Done at Nanjing, and Signed and Sealed by the Plenipotentiaries on board

Her Britannic Majesty’s ship Cornwallis, this 29th day of August, 1842,
corresponding with the Chinese date, twenty-fourth day of the seventh
month in the twenty-second Year of Daoguang.
(L.S.) HENRY POTTINGER.
[SIGNATURES OF THE THREE CHINESE PLENIPOTENTIARIES]
 CHAPTER 3
Mid-Nineteenth-Century
Late Imperial China (1644–1911)Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions

Rebellions and Qing Responses

2
1 3

5 6
4
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 57

1. HEAVENLY KING STATE SEAL [yuxi]: Made in 1860 or 1861, the largest characters on this seal
identify it as the official seal of the Heavenly King. In Chinese society (even today), a seal serves as
a crucial confirmation of any document’s authenticity. In this case, it not only would certify that any
document bearing this mark was indeed from the Taiping government. All Chinese would have
understood that the Taiping seal explicitly indicated the Taipings no longer perceived themselves
to be subject to Qing rule (3.1).

2. HEAVEN [tian]: Heaven is one of the most fundamental concepts within Chinese ideas about death
and the afterlife (whether it be Confucian, Daoist, or Buddhist). Chinese emperors portrayed them-
selves as the Song of Heaven and ruling with the Mandate of Heaven (that is to say, heaven had
given them the right to rule). The Taiping leader, Hong Xiuquan, was not the Son of Heaven; rather,
he was receiving orders from Heaven.

3. EIGHT KINGS or EIGHT DIRECTIONS [bawei]: How do you interpret a historical terminology
when the authors of the text left no precise explanation? Some historians suggest that the seventh
line of the seal refers to the top kings in the Taiping hierarchy along with Heaven, the Holy Spirit,
and Jesus Christ, while still others simply propose it is an allegorical reference to the Taiping King-
dom by indicating the cardinal directions. It remains a mystery.

4. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: The jade seal measures eight inches along each side and is one inch
high. The handle rises nearly three inches above the top. The seal handle, top, and underside are
each adorned with carvings of two phoenixes facing a sun, dragons, and stylized clouds. These
symbols are also carried over to the imprint visible here to which is also added stylized water.

5. HOW TO READ: Scholars have long disputed the correct way to read this seal. The general con-
sensus suggests that one should begin with the larger characters in the top-center. Then, moving to
the smaller characters in the lower half of the seal, read each row from the center out. The largest
characters (at the upper left and upper left) simply read “Jade Seal.”

6. TRANSLATION OF THE HEAVENLY KING SEAL:

UPPER HALF
1) God the Father (top center)
2) Peace [taiping] The two characters form the term from which the movement takes its name
3) Eternally maintaining Heaven and earth
4) In gracious harmony
5) [and] convivial peace
LOWER HALF
1) Heavenly Elder Brother Jesus Christ
2) Heavenly King, Hong [Xiuquan], the Sun
3) Ruler of the Bountiful Earth
4) Savior and Young Monarch
5) True King, Guifu (the Crown Prince)
6) Long live the eight Kings
7) Eternally granted Heaven’s favor
58 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

HONG XIUQUAN Students of American history are often surprised when they learn that
(1814–1864)—Leader of the war in which the greatest number of Americans died was not World
the Taiping Rebellion War I or World War II but the American Civil War (1861–1865), in which
(1851–1864). Born in the more than 600,000 people perished. In China, the mid-nineteenth century
southern Chinese province cast a similar shadow of loss across its history but on a much larger scale.
of Guangdong and of Between 1851 and 1864, conservative estimates suggest that 20 million
Hakka ethnicity. Failed to Chinese lives were lost because of the Taiping Rebellion. Its destruction
pass the civil service exam cut a swath across the wealthiest and most prosperous areas of southern
in four attempts before he and central China, from Guangxi province in the south to Shanghai on the
formed the Society of God eastern seaboard. The Taipings’ charismatic leader, Hong Xiuquan, chal-
Worshippers in Guangxi. lenged the imperial court with a movement based on Christian teachings.
He proclaimed himself His ideology was shaped by visions in which he claimed to have visited
the Heavenly King of heaven. In this heavenly visit, he learned he was the younger brother of
the “Heavenly Kingdom Jesus Christ and was told by God to rid the earth of “demons.” Hong’s
of Great Peace,” leading message quickly garnered acceptance in the ethnically diverse province of
his followers in a failed Guangxi (to the west of Guangdong) where many Hakka lived. Simulta-
rebellion against the Qing. neously, it attracted the less desirable attention of the Qing government,
Died, likely from suicide, which sought to squelch Hong’s heterodox teachings. Extraordinarily,
on June 1, 1864. the Taipings strung together several victories against government troops,
which prompted Hong Xiuquan in January 1851 to announce the founding
HAKKA (KEJIA)—An of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace [Taiping Tianguo] and to declare
ethnic minority prominent himself the Heavenly King.
in southern China. Many The ideological teachings of the Taipings stimulated political and
of China’s most prominent social changes unrivaled in China’s 2,000-year imperial history. Many
leaders were Hakka, historians suggest the Taiping movement, with its emphasis on land
including Taiping leader redistribution and gender equality, foreshadowed the sweeping changes
Hong Xiuquan, the Song ushered in under the Communist revolution a century later. Despite its
sisters, and Deng Xiaoping. name, in many ways, the Taiping Rebellion was just as much a civil war
as the American “War between the States.” Many contemporary Western
eyewitnesses referred to it as the “Chinese Civil War,” pitting the Qing
imperialists (and their primarily northern supporters) against the Taip-
ings (and their southern core of support). Other historians suggest that,
given the radical social, religious, and political changes advocated by the
Taipings, it is far closer to a “revolution” than a civil war. The Taiping
movement, as seen in the following documents, proposed a radically dif-
ferent vision of society and of the world in which they lived.
Despite the massive scale of the Taiping Rebellion and its radical the-
ology, Hong Xiuquan’s Heavenly Kingdom was not alone in its attempt
to topple the Qing dynasty. The Qing court faced five other full-scale
rebellions in virtually every corner of the empire between 1851 and 1877.
There was the Miao (1854–1873) and Panthay Rebellions (1856–1873) in
southwestern provinces of Guizhou and Yunnan, the Yakub Beg Rebel-
lion (1864–1877) in the northwestern province of Xinjiang, the Hui Rebel-
lion in the bordering provinces of Gansu and Shaanxi (1862–1873), and the
Nian Rebellion (1853–1868) in the eastern province of Shandong. To con-
tinue the analogy with the American Civil War, it would be as if President
Lincoln in 1861 faced not only a secessionist government of the southern
states lasting for over a decade but also had to cope with full-scale upris-
ings (with functioning rebel regimes) in California and Arizona, another
in Washington and Oregon, as well as a pesky revolt somewhere in Mary-
land. Such a comparison is imperfect since many of the Chinese rebellions
were in remote regions along China’s distant frontiers. In these regions,
large numbers of indigenous peoples had strong transnational relations,
especially the ties between Muslim groups in northwestern China with
their Islamic Central Asian neighbors.
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 59

Nonetheless, the ultimate Qing military victories over all these rebel- SELF-STRENGTHENING
lions reveal the enduring effectiveness of the Qing court. The six mid- MOVEMENT
nineteenth-century Chinese rebellions at their peak controlled broad areas (c. 1861–1894)—A
of China challenging Qing rule in the northwest, southwest, and the Yang- movement beginning in
tze valley. Only the extreme southern and northern parts of the empire 1861, largely stemming
escaped severe loss of life and property. from the urgent need
Needless to say, such a pervasive wave of rebellion pushed the Qing to counter the mid-
government to its fiscal, military, and operational limits. Yet, it also com- nineteenth-century Chinese
pelled the Qing government to innovate by instituting non-traditional rebellions. Initially, the
solutions to the widespread agitation in what has come to be referred to campaign consisted of
as the “Self-Strengthening Movement.” military reforms adopted
by Zeng Guofan and
later broadened to adopt
TAIPING REBELLION Western methods in
education, industry, and
Making sense of a foreign society, culture, and religion is difficult under
diplomacy.
any circumstances. Deciphering meaning from events that occurred over
a century and a half ago in the volatile circumstances present in nine-
teenth-century China is especially arduous. The Taiping Rebellion adds TAIPING REBELLION
yet another layer of complexity to this task since many of the Taiping (1851–1864)—The largest
doctrines were adapted from Christianity yet retained a distinctly Chi- of China’s mid-nineteenth-
nese character. The fusion of these two make it is easy to dismiss Hong century rebellions, it was
Xiuquan’s revelations as the confused ramblings of a delusional madman led by Hong Xiuquan, who,
who misinterpreted fundamental Christian teachings. Yet, his writings at the rebellion’s height,
offer important insights into the Taiping movement’s success within a ruled over 30 million
Chinese context. For example, we might be tempted to view the poems people and lasted 13 years
that follow each of the Taiping’s Ten Commandments (3.3) as a super- before finally being
fluous departure from the Commandments of the Old Testament. But to suppressed by Qing
do so would miss their interpretative function, a function that enabled military forces.
Taiping adherents to make sense of this radically different set of ethical
beliefs. To use his reading of the Bible—one that challenges traditional
Western interpretations—as a litmus test for the validity of the Taiping
Rebellion as a whole, would be deeply flawed. This is particularly the
case since Hong Xiuquan’s quasi-Christian views were only one part of
the Taiping’s appeal. The Taiping leadership deftly tapped into the deep
(and widespread) ethnic prejudice against the Manchu Qing court, as is
seen in their strong anti-Manchu stance (3.1). They also drew on a pro-
found desire for social change in their land and social policies (3.5, 3.4).
However, there is no doubt that the trajectory of the Taiping movement
followed that of many other utopian political movements. Extravagance
and infighting among the leadership quickly followed its early success
and led ultimately to its downfall.

3.1 TAIPING ANTI-MANCHU PROCLAMATION (1852)

The non-Chinese origins of the Manchu Qing dynasty remained a common
rallying cry among many Chinese rebels and would remain so even through
the 1911 Revolution (6.1). This attitude resulted from the pervasive animos-
ity among the Han Chinese toward the Manchu ruling class. In the following
document, two of Hong Xiuquan’s deputy kings, Yang Xiuqing and Xiao
Chaogui, appeal to the strong anti-Manchu sentiments of the Chinese popu-
lace with a level of vitriol typical of the era. In the original document, they
employ a highly derogatory, centuries-old term of “foxes” [hu] when refer-
ring to the Manchus. In accordance with Hong’s vision, Yang Xiuqing and
Xiao Chaoqui refer to the Manchus as demons who need to be expunged from
60 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

MANCHURIA—An area the earth. Aside from the unrelenting insults heaped on the Manchus, the
roughly coterminous two deputy kings cleverly employ well-known historical precedents, familiar
with northeastern China even to their likely illiterate audience, to bolster their claims of the Taiping’s
and the ancestral lands righteous actions.
of the Manchu peoples
that established the Qing Questions
dynasty. Japan occupied 1. What acts are the Manchus charged with committing?
the territory in the 1930s 2. How might the average Chinese have received this proclamation?
and established the puppet Why?
state of Manchukuo.
Oh people, listen to our words! It is our belief that the empire is God’s
empire, not the Manchu’s empire; that food and clothing are God’s food
and clothing, not the Manchu’s food and clothing; sons, daughters, and
commoners are God’s sons, daughters, and commoners, not the Manchu
barbarians’ sons, daughters, and commoners.
The Manchus crept in and threw China into turmoil. China, with
its vast territory and immense population, shamefully tolerated the Man-
chus’ barbarous actions, without considering them improper. Can the
Chinese still consider themselves human? Ever since the Manchus spread
their poisonous influences throughout China, the flames of oppression
have risen up to heaven, the vapors of corruption have defiled the celestial
throne, the filthy odors have spread over the four seas, and their devilish-
ness exceeds that of the Five barbaric tribes of old. Yet the Chinese deject-
edly lowered their heads and willingly became their servants. Is China
devoid of people [prepared to stand up]?
China is the head, and Manchuria is the feet; China is the land of
spirits and Manchuria the land of demons. Why is China called the land
of spirits? Because the Heavenly Father, the majestic God, is the true
Spirit; heaven and earth, mountains and seas are his creations, therefore
from time immemorial the land of spirits has been called China. Why
are the Manchus considered demons? Because the demonic serpent—the
demon of Hell—is a wicked demon and the Manchu demons worship
only him. Thus, we should from now on treat the Manchus as if they are
demons.
But so how have the feet assumed the place of the head? How did
the demons steal the land of spirit; driving Chinese to turn into demons?
Using all the bamboo from the South Mountain cannot completely record
all of the Manchus’ wickedness; and using all the waves of Eastern Sea
cannot wash off their vast sins.
We shall enumerate the facts, which are known to all, and discuss
them briefly:
The Chinese have Chinese characteristics; but now the Manchus
have ordered them all to shave their hair, leaving a long tail in the back,
thus making the Chinese appear like animals. The Chinese have Chinese
dress and hats; but now the Manchus have ordered us to wear different
style barbarian clothes and monkey caps, abandoning the robes and head-
dresses of ancestors. All with the purpose to make Chinese forget their
roots.
The Chinese have Chinese family relationships. A previous false
demon, Kangxi, secretly ordered each Manchu to take control of ten
families and rape the Chinese women hoping that the Chinese would all
become Manchu barbarians. The Chinese have Chinese wives, but now
the Manchu demons have accosted all the beautiful girls of China to be
their concubines and slaves. The Manchu dogs have tarnished three thou-
sand beautiful women; one million beautiful young women have been
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 61

forced to sleep with the stinking foxes. Thinking of it hurts our hearts; FANG FENG (c. 2150
speaking of it pollutes our tongue. The reputation of all Chinese women BCE)—A local ruler
has been put into question. summoned by Emperor Yu
[. . .] of the Xia dynasty. Vexed
The Manchu barbarians are like dogs and pigs. There are those of at his late arrival (perhaps
you who are educated and know your history, yet you do not feel the seeing it as an indication
slightest shame. There was a time when Wen Tianxiang and Xie Fangde of his tepid support), the
preferred to die than serve the [Mongol] Yuan dynasty; Shi Kefa and Qu emperor had Fang Feng
Shisi would rather die than to serve the [Manchu] Qing. You, our esteemed executed.
listeners, are all well aware of these precedents. We estimate that Man-
chu’s population is no more than a hundred and thirty or forty thousand,
while we Chinese number no fewer than fifty million. How humiliating
it is for some fifty million to come under the oppression of one hundred
thousand.
Fortunately, divine virtue has now returned and China has revived
its senses. As men’s hearts lean towards order, there are signs that the
Manchu barbarians are surely to be soon destroyed. The demon’s pre-
ordained two-hundred-and-ten-year long rule has come to an end, and
the rightful sovereign has already appeared. The Manchu’s crimes have
reached their just end.
[. . .]
The beneficent God has bestowed a great favor on the Chinese
empire and ordered our Supreme ruler, the Heavenly King, to reign. How
could the Manchus be allowed to occupy and misrule China for any lon-
ger? You, our esteemed listeners, have lived in China for generations; who
is not God’s child? If you can follow Heaven’s order in destroying the
demons, rise up and avoid Fang Feng’s mistake of belatedly rallying to
the cause. An official in this life, you will be a hero beyond compare; in
Heaven you will enjoy eternal glory. If you are stubborn and refuse to
change [your allegiances]; if you defend that which is false and reject that
which is true, in life you will be a Manchu demon and in death a Manchu
ghost. The line between right and wrong is clear; Chinese and barbarians
are each clearly distinguished and have their distinct reputation. One and
all should follow Heaven’s destiny and emancipate themselves from the
demons so you can once again be human.
You, our esteemed listeners, have long suffered from the Manchu
calamity; if you are still unable to make up your mind to unite and sweep
away the Manchu, how will you face God high above in Heaven? We have
begun the righteous fight. For Heaven, we wreak vengeance [on the Man-
chus] in God’s name. For those on earth, we liberate China’s sufferings.
We must clear away the Manchus entirely to enjoy the happiness of peace
[Taiping—pun on the meaning of peace and the label of their movement].
Those who obey Heaven’s order will be abundantly rewarded. Those
who disobey Heaven will be executed. Make this proclamation known
throughout the empire—let all hear and obey it.

3.2 BRIEF RECORD OF THE TAIPING’S ARRIVAL

IN NANJING (MARCH 1853)
Zhang Runan, a pro-Qing scholar official, wrote the following eyewitness account
of the Taiping capture of Nanjing. He remained in the city for over a year until the
autumn of 1854 and published his observations three years later to considerable
public interest. His description is unique for the level of detail it gives about the
Taiping’s early reforms, such as segregation of the men and women, communal
dining halls, and daily prayers. While Zhang paints these in a rather negative
62 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

light, including insisting on referring to them as “bandits,” many Chinese com-

moners, who prior to the Taiping’s rise to power could not expect a daily meal,
embraced the reforms with more enthusiasm.

Questions
1. How do you think the Taipings were received after taking control
of Nanjing?
2. What elements of Zhang’s report would have most shocked the
Qing scholar officials who read it?

Upon entering the city, the bandits loudly ordered all residents to close
their doors and threatened anyone who dared to venture out with death.
They also instructed the residents to paste the word “obedience” on a piece
of paper on the front door and to set an alter with three cups of tea inside
their home. All men and women were required to remove any head cov-
erings. Panic-stricken, all residents followed the orders, kept their doors
shut, and did not dare to utter even a word.
Promptly, all the [Taiping] bandits gathered around the Manchu
Quarter of the city. The thunderous noise of rifles and cannons being
fired along with the bandit soldiers hollering “kill” was so loud, it could
be heard for miles around. The Manchu Quarter was the old Ming-era
Inner City encircled by very high and well-fortified city wall. The Man-
chu women, like the males, were skilled in both riflery and archery, and
stationed themselves along the walls to assist in the defense of the city.
The bandits rallied together in a mass offensive, suffering heavy losses,
with countless dead bodies piling up, higher and higher, at the base of the
city wall. Pouring in from all four directions, the bandits surged forward
climbing up over the bodies, and overwhelming the wall. All the Manchu
generals and commanders, including Gushan died. The remaining Man-
chu soldiers counter-attacked against the bandits with some 400 Manchu
soldiers managing to break through and survive the battle. Even women
and children joined the fighting, killing many bandits, but also dying in
large numbers. In the end, several thousand Manchu women were beaten
back out through the Chaoyang Gate. There, completely surrounded, they
were killed and burned to death. From dawn to mid-day, smoke blocked
the sun from view and the aura of death blanketed the city. Even the resi-
dents of the outer city appeared lifeless so that once the Manchu City suc-
cumbed, not a soul stirred across the entire city.
On the twelfth day of the second month [March 21, 1853], in groups
of three or five, the bandits began knocking on residents’ front doors in
order to “search for demons,” the term they used for imperial soldiers and
Manchus. In the houses where they discovered official hats, boots, clothes,
imperial seals or documents hidden away, there was no escape. Before
entering a house, the bandits would place their long rifles outside the door
and enter only carrying their short knives.
They would first ask, “Are you a demon?” If you replied “no,” they
would then ask, “Are you hiding any demons?” If the answer was still
negative, they would not ask again. Instead they would enter, order resi-
dents to open their trunks or boxes, and remove all things such as silk,
gold, and other valuable items. It also occurred that some bandits did not
request residents to open their trunks and boxes. . . .
Soon, [the bandit government] issued and enforced an order to seg-
regate all men and women from each other, and house them in separate
dormitories. Whenever [a bandit] saw a child he liked, he would force the
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 63

parents to allow him to adopt the child, which was called a “daizai” [rais-
ing a child]. Families—parents and children, brothers and sisters, hus-
bands and wives—were suddenly separated, and entire families broken
apart. Some families would ask for permissions to postpone their move
to the next day, then in the middle of the night the whole family would
commit suicide: setting the house on fire, hanging themselves, or jump-
ing into a nearby river or pond. Countless families died in this manner.
When the bandits first entered the city, they forced residents to serve as
night wardens. When fires flared up, they made these night wardens fight
the fire, which they suspected were started by soldiers hidden in the city.
The next day, desperate men and women began to slip away from the
dormitories at night returning home to commit suicide. Such acts lasted
for days causing the bandits to tighten the control measures even further.
In women’s dormitories, no matter their ages, they were called “new sis-
ters.” Every twenty of them were clustered into a single dorm, supervised
by a single “elder sister” called a “squad leader” [paizhang]. The “elder sis-
ters,” always from Guangxi [where the Taiping Uprising began], were not
necessarily of old age. Most of the women’s dormitories were located near
the Xihua Gate, called the “women’s camp,” which was divided into five
armies: the front, the rear, the left, the right, and the center. Each army had
one commander, a woman from Guangxi, and a male bandit as the inspec-
tor. No male was permitted to enter the female dormitories. Separating
mothers from sons, and husbands from wives, and only able to talk with
one another at a distance with the males always remaining outside of the
camp. The bandits strictly prohibited adultery. Violation of this Heavenly
Commandment resulted in immediate execution. . . .
In the morning and evening before meals, everyone was summoned
together with the sound of a gong. A table was set up in the center of the
hall with three cups of tea and three bowls of rice on it, lamps were lit
but no incense was burned. People were seated along both sides of the
table, and with their eyes closed, chanted loudly, in the manner as a monk
chanted.
After completing the chanting, all would kneel-down, facing out-
ward. The dormitory clerk would pray silently: “This humble son (or
daughter, in the female dormitory) kneeling down, prays, Heavenly
Father God-on-High, bestow upon us all Your infinite blessing,” etc. At
the very end, raising his (or her) voice, the clerk would shout “Death to all
demons!” before sitting down and all would proceed to eat their meal; the
[Taiping] Court and [Taiping] military followed similar practices.

3.3 TAIPING TEN COMMANDMENTS (1852)

It is difficult not to contrast the Taiping Ten Commandments with their Old
Testament counterpart. Though undeniably similar, the Taiping version serves
the broader purpose of introducing the Taiping followers to Hong Xiuquan’s ver-
sion of Christianity. The following translation of the Taiping Commandments has
deliberately attempted to avoid a falsely “biblical”-sounding translation. Rather,
it is rendered in the manner a Chinese, unfamiliar with the Bible, might have
understood it. In particular, the Taipings consistently translated “God” using the
Chinese term “God on High” [Huang Shangdi], a term that appeared in Chinese
texts some 2,000 years prior to the rise of the Taipings. A reader of the Taiping
Commandments must pay special attention to the explanations and poems that
offer insight into how the Taiping leaders hoped their followers would understand
the Commandments. These provide essential clues to the Taiping leadership’s
64 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

concern over how a deeply Confucian and Buddhist populace should adopt the
new teachings. Western observers also indicated that many of the Taiping rebels
could recite the Taiping Commandments from memory.

Questions
1. What commandments do you sense the Taipings placed more
stress upon?
2. Given that Chinese society has a deep tradition of polytheism,
how might Chinese who came under Taiping rule react to the fol-
lowing commandments?

The Ten Heavenly Commandments, As Created by the

God-On-High, are to be Observed at All Times:

First Heavenly Commandment: Honor and worship

God-on-High [huang shangdi].
Explanation: God-on-High is the Father of all people; every life is given
and nurtured by Him; everyone is blessed by Him; every morning and
night each person shall pray and be grateful for His grace. As a common
proverb states: “Created by Heaven, nourished by Heaven and protected
by Heaven.” As another common saying goes: “Provided with food, we
must not deceive Heaven.” Therefore, all who do not worship God-on-
High violate the Heavenly commandment.
The God-on-High is the true God,
Worship Him morning and night so as to be forgiven.
The Ten Heavenly Commandments must be followed,
You must not let demons mislead and confuse your true nature.

Second Heavenly Commandment: Do not worship

false gods [shen].
Explanation: God-on-High says: “There are no other gods besides me.”
Therefore, except God-on-High, all others are demons that confuse and
harm people and must not be worshipped; whoever worships such gods
violates the Heavenly Commandment.
People are easily deluded by demons,
To misguidedly have faith in them will eventually lead you to Hell,
We urge you valiant ones to awaken yourselves,
The Heavenly Father [Tianfu] is urgently waiting to be close to you.

Third Heavenly Commandment: Do not use God-on-High’s

name inappropriately.
Explanation: The name of God-on-High is Jehovah, which must not be
taken in vain. Whoever uses God-on-High’s name as a curse is violating
the Heavenly Commandment.
The Heavenly Father is infinitely respected,
Those who offend His name will eventually be led to a bad end.
If you are not on the right Way [tiandao], you must rouse yourself.
Those who wantonly behave irreverently are conducting colossal crimes.
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 65

Fourth Heavenly Commandment: On the seventh day,

praise God-on-High for his grace and virtue.
Explanation: At the beginning, the God-on-High created heaven and the
earth, the mountains and the seas, humankind and things, all in six days.
On the seventh day, it was done and it is called the day of rest. Everyone
benefits from the God-on-High’s grace, and therefore, everyone who ben-
efits should on the seventh day praise him for his goodness.
All happiness enjoyed on earth comes from the Heaven,
It is only appropriate then to praise His virtue and sing His merits.
Every morning and evening meal, one should give thanks,
On the seventh day, you shall pray with special devotion.

Fifth Heavenly Commandment: Show filial obedience

to your father and mother.
Explanation: God-on-High says: “Be filial and honor your parents, then
the days will be prolonged.” Any disobedience to one’s parent is violating
the Heavenly Commandment.
It is recorded that the legendary emperor Youyu dutifully cared for his
parents,
Bringing both his parents the greatest happiness.
As Heaven is boundless, you should care for them.
Meet the expectation that you are worthy of being full person.

The Sixth Heavenly Commandment: Do not kill

or harm people.
Explanation: To kill others is the same as killing oneself; to harm others is
the same as harming oneself. Anyone who kills or harms people is violat-
ing the Heavenly Commandment.
All under Heaven are one family, and all are brothers,
How can killing and harming one another be tolerated!
One’s outer physical form and inner nature are Heaven-given,
Let all live and enjoy a peaceful life.

Seventh Heavenly Commandment: Do not be

devious or promiscuous.
Explanation: There are many men on earth, all are brothers; there are
many women on earth, all are sisters. For sons and daughters under
Heaven, men have their place; and women have their place; they shall not
be allowed to intermix. Men and women who conduct adultery or licen-
tious acts are demons. Such acts are the greatest violation of the Heavenly
Commandment. Flirting with enticing glances, thinking lustful thoughts,
smoking opium and singing provocative songs all violate the Heavenly
Commandment.
Adultery is the biggest source of every evil,
The offenders become pathetic demons and monsters.
To enjoy the true happiness of Heaven,
You must begin with restraining and cultivating yourself.
66 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

Eighth Heavenly Commandment: Do not steal or loot.

Explanation: Poverty and fortune are both given by the grace of
God-on-High. Whomever steals or robs others violates the Heavenly
Commandment.
One shall be satisfied with poverty and your status, and not steal.
Theft and violence represent the basest behavior.
Harming others can only harm yourself.
Those who are truly daring, why not turn yourself around now!

Ninth Heavenly Commandment: Do not tell lies.

Explanation: All who speak wild, monstrous, cunning words, and those
who use coarse and loathsome language, are all in violation of the Heav-
enly Commandment.
Lies and groundless talk must be forsaken,
Treachery and perversity are crimes against Heaven.
Too much sinful chatter will only result in harming yourself.
It is better to be cautious and focus your thoughts.

Tenth Heavenly Commandment: Do not be covetous.

Explanation: Those who yearn for someone else’s wives or daughters; or
who crave someone else’s possessions; or who gamble or buy lottery tick-
ets are all in violation of the Heavenly Commandment.
One must not be greedy,
To get caught up in the sea of lust can only end in disaster.
These Commands are issued before Mt. Sinai,
Every Heavenly Commandment is in force to this day.
Repent and be loyal to our Heavenly Father, and God-on-High will
obtain happiness;
Disobey or act against our Heavenly Father, and God-on-High will
surely make you weep.
Obey the Heavenly Commandments and worship a true god, and
when it is time to depart you will easily ascend to Heaven;
Engage in worldly desires and continue to believe in demons, and
when it comes to an end you will have a hard time escaping hell.
Those who continue to believe in demons will turn them into de-
mon’s slaves,
Those who are involved with ghosts while living, will be taken by
ghosts when they die.
Those who worship God are the sons and daughters of God; since
you came from Heaven, you will ascend to Heaven.
God-on-High has His plan and you need not worry;
Devote all your heart to him and you will go to Heaven.
Truly respect God-on-High and do not believe other’s words,
Abandon all worldly attachments and you will go to Heaven.
Up in Heaven there is one true god, God-on-High,
Mortal people often behave immorally and are ignorant;
You prostrate before molded clay, wood, and stone [statues]
I ask you, when was it that you lost your heart and soul?
To follow Heaven, it is wrongfully said, is to follow barbarians,
Truly mortal people are stupid and stubborn.
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 67

Since ancient times, rulers and people believed in God-on-High,

Valiant individuals swiftly overpowered the demon’s gate.
Follow Heaven and achieve happiness, defy Heaven and you will
perish.
Why do mortal people discuss the arguments for and against
[God]?
Looking at you, none of you appear to be Buddha’s children,
Why do you not want to turn towards the Heaven?

3.4 TAIPING PLAN FOR REORGANIZING

CHINESE SOCIETY (1853)
The Taiping plan for reorganization sought to regulate, systematize, and classify
Chinese society in fundamentally new ways. The plan contained both incentives
(especially for the lower classes) for adhering to the new Taiping principles as
well as disincentives for those who did not. Deliberately shunning the easier path
of retaining or only minimally altering the Qing administrative structure, the
Taiping plan reveals sweeping changes and an attempt to establish an intricate
bureaucracy to oversee their reforms. The plan demonstrates a desire to completely
displace the traditional regime of landed wealth with an uncompromising devo-
tion to Taiping-style Christian faith. The Taiping plan, however, should not be
mistaken for a portrait of Taiping society. The Taiping kingdom experienced few
periods of outright peace, leaving little time for the plan to be fully implemented.
Questions
1. Based on your reading of the earlier documents, what aspects of
the plan do you think would have been implemented first?
2. In the Taiping Plan, why do you think there is such an emphasis
on the precise detail of the hierarchy and the chains of command?

All the people under heaven are one big family with the Heavenly
Father [tianfu], the Supreme Ruler [shangzhu] and God-on-High [huang
shangdi]. Within the empire, no one should have private possessions.
Everything should be submitted to the Supreme Ruler. He can make
use of it and distribute it equally to all places across the empire. In this
way, everyone is properly fed and dressed. This is the specific order
from the Heavenly Father, the Supreme Ruler, and God-on-High to the
true Taiping Ruler to save the world. The Squad Leader must keep a
record of all money and grain collected and then accurately report [the
totals] to the Director of Revenue and the Director of Remittance and
Disbursement.
For every twenty-five families, one treasury and one church should
be organized and overseen by a Squad Leader. All events for the twenty-
five families, such as weddings and birthday celebrations, are funded by
the treasury. Limits are fixed and no excess spending will be allowed. So,
if each family is paid 1,000 cash and 100 jin of grain for a wedding or a
birthday, everyone within the empire should be given the same amount.
Expenses must be monitored carefully, in order to be prepared for pos-
sible military shortfalls. In this way, all marriage matches should not be
based on wealth.
For every twenty-five family unit, the pottery-making, blacksmithry,
carpentry, masonry and other such tasks will be conducted by Team Lead-
ers and soldiers, when free from farming duties. When the Squad Leader
performs wedding and birth celebrations for the twenty-five family unit,
they must always offer prayers and sacrifices to the Heavenly Father, the
68 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

Supreme Ruler and God-on-High. All other old impure customs must be
abolished. Every boy in the twenty-five family unit must attend church
every day where the Squad Leader will teach them to read the Old and
New Testaments, and Sacred Decrees. Every Sunday, the Team Leader
is charged with leading all men and women to church, dividing men and
women to sit separately, to listen to preaching, praising and paying tribute
to the Heavenly Father, the Supreme Ruler and God-on-High. . . .
Every three years, all officials in the empire will be re-assessed for
promotion, or demotion, to demonstrate the equanimity of the Heavenly
Kingdom. Those who irresponsibly promote, or demote, others, will be rel-
egated to the status of farmer [nong]. At the triennial period of promotion
and demotion, every leader is responsible for promoting or demoting those
under them. The Regiment Commander should carefully evaluate their
Squad and Team Leaders. Note the achievements of those who truly exceled
and list the shortcomings of those who performed poorly. Record the name
of each individual, include your own name with the recommendations for
promotion or demotion to your Brigade Commander. Those who are not
promoted or demoted, will continue in their current positions. . . .
For every 13,156 families there is one army, headed by a General.
Each General supervises five Division Commanders. Each Division Com-
mander supervises five Brigade Commanders, totaling twenty-five Brigade
Commanders. Each of the twenty-five Brigade Commanders supervises
five Regiment Commanders, totaling 125 Regiment Commanders. Each
of the 125 Regiment Commanders supervises four Squad Leaders, with a
total of 500 Squad Leaders. Each of the 500 Squad Leaders supervises five
Team Leaders, for a total of 2,500 Team Leaders. Each of the 2,500 Team
Leaders leads four soldiers, totaling 10,000 soldiers. Each Army totals to
13,156 men. . . .
Every Sunday, all officials and people must attend a service, faith-
fully listen to the prayers and praises of the Heavenly Father, the Supreme
Ruler, and God-on-High. Every seventh Sunday, every forty-nine days,
the Division, Brigade and Regiment Commanders should attend the
church of a Squad Leader under their command on a rotating basis, teach-
ing the sacred texts to educate people, quizzing them to see if the regula-
tions are being obeyed or neglected. For example, on one Sunday of the
seventh week, the forty-ninth day, the Division Commander could visit
the church of one Squad Leader, the next Sunday of the seventh week,
forty-nine days later, the Division Commander will visit the church of
another Squad Leader. Such a rotation is to be followed and repeated. The
same is true for the Brigade and Regiment Commanders.
For each man who has a wife, with three or four children—or five,
six, seven, eight, or nine—one should be drafted to become a soldier. All
widows, widowers, single, or disabled people are exempted from con-
scription, and will be supported by the treasury.
Each Sunday, every official across the empire must contribute sac-
rificed goods, according to their ranks, to praise the Heavenly Father,
the Supreme Ruler and God-on-High, and to study the Sacred Texts.
Anyone who neglects this will be relegated to the status of farmer [as a
punishment].

3.5 LAND SYSTEM OF THE HEAVENLY

DYNASTY (1853)
The Taiping’s Land System sought to fundamentally change society through the
redistribution of land, an idea that would be replicated by both Sun Yat-sen (6.3)
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 69

and Mao Zedong (7.9) decades later. By any measure, such an idea was revolu-
tionary. No government anywhere in the world had contemplated reorganizing
society on such a scale or in such an equitable manner. Given the chaotic and
relatively short Taiping rule, the Land System was never fully implemented.
However, it was widely discussed and broadly disseminated fueling interest by
many of China’s impoverished poor, as well as staunch opposition by the schol-
arly landed elite. Reading the document, it does make one wonder what the Chi-
nese landscape might have looked like if the Taiping government had defeated the
Qing.

Questions
1. Why would such a division of land appeal to a large majority of
the Chinese populace?
2. What circumstances might you foresee that are not anticipated in
the following documents?

For every Army: two people should be assigned to oversee land issues,
two should oversee law issues, two should oversee cash and grain, two
should oversee income, two should oversee expenditures. For every pair
assigned, one will serve as the director and the other as the associate
director. The individuals assigned should be at the rank of Division and
Brigade Commanders. Those in charge should oversee the affairs, while
those not appointed should assist in the implementation. . . .
All land is divided into nine grades. Each mu of land is graded by its
total production from early and late harvests in one year:
• SUPERIOR (GRADE A): those fields that produce 1,200 jin of crops
• SUPERIOR (GRADE B): those fields that produce 1,100 jin of crops
• SUPERIOR (GRADE C): those fields that produce 1,000 jin of crops
• STANDARD (GRADE A): those fields that produce 900 jin of crops
• STANDARD (GRADE B): those fields that produce 800 jin of crops
• STANDARD (GRADE C): those fields that produce 700 jin of crops
• INFERIOR (GRADE A): those fields that produce 600 jin of crops
• INFERIOR (GRADE B): those fields that produce 500 jin of crops
• INFERIOR (GRADE C): those fields that produce 400 jin of crops

EACH MU OF SUPERIOR (GRADE A) LAND EQUALS:

• 1.1 mu of Superior (Grade B) land and 1.2 mu of Superior (Grade C)
land;
• 1.35 mu of Standard (Grade A) land, 1.5 mu Standard (Grade B) land,
1.75 Standard (Grade C) land;
• 2 mu Inferior (Grade A) land, 2.4 mu Inferior (Grade B) land, 3 mu
Inferior (Grade C) land.
All land is distributed according to the number of residents, regard-
less of gender. By tallying the individuals, those households with more
members will be allotted more land; those with fewer members will be
given less land, the quality can be a mix of all nine grades. For example,
for a family of six, three of the plots could be good land, three could be
poor land, evenly divided between good and poor. All land in the empire
is equally shared and cultivated by all people. If there is not enough land
here, then move over there. If there is not enough over there, move here.
All land in the empire is cultivated and shared by all. If land is uncultivat-
able here, move over there where the land is more cultivatable, to solve
70 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

HUI—A Chinese ethnic the disaster here; if land over there becomes inarable, then move here
group largely defined where the land is arable to solve the disaster over there. We must ensure
by their practice of Islam all in the empire are blessed by the Heavenly Father, the Supreme Ruler
and often referred to and God-on-High, collectively cultivating the land, collectively eating the
as “Chinese Muslims,” food, collectively having clothes to wear, collectively having money to
though the label does not spend. Everything is shared, and everyone is properly fed and dressed.
include other Muslim Every man and woman who is over sixteen-years old will receive double
groups within China, such the amount of land than those who are under sixteen years of age. In this
as the Uigur, Kazakhs, or way, for example, if those who are sixteen-years old or older receives one
Kyrgyz peoples. mu of Superior (Grade A) land, then, those under sixteen will receive half
of it—half a mu of Superior (Grade A) land. Similarly, if those who are
DU WENXIU sixteen-years old or older receive three mu of Inferior (Grade C) land, then
(1823–1872)—Hui leader those under sixteen will receive half of that allotment, getting 1.5 mu of
of the Yunnan Panthay Inferior (Grade C) land.
Rebellion from 1856 to
1872. Born in western MUSLIM REBELLIONS
Yunnan, he passed the
civil exam at age 16. In While the Taiping Rebellion struck at the heart of the Qing empire, several
1856, after helping capture other uprisings broke out in quick succession. This was, in no small part,
the western Yunnan city a result of the Qing’s attention being diverted from its border regions to
of Dali, he was selected fend off the fierce Taiping assault. The longest, most organized, and—
to rule the new rebel from the Qing perspective—menacing of these were the Muslim rebel-
regime. He died in 1872 lions that occurred in the southwestern and northwestern corners of the
after surrendering to Qing empire. The Panthay Rebellion (1856–1873) took place in the multi-ethnic
troops. southwestern province of Yunnan. This rebellion followed a series of offi-
cially condoned massacres in which over 10,000 Muslim men, women,
and children were slaughtered. Although the catalyst of the rebellion
was the anti-Muslim sentiment of many Han Chinese, the rebellion itself
reflected the multi-ethnic context in which it took place. Similarly, the
Yakub Beg Rebellion of the newly annexed Xinjiang (New Dominions)
region in northwestern corner of China underscored the Qing’s tenuous
hold on a decidedly un-Chinese and transregionally positioned territory.
That rebellion, unlike the Panthay Rebellion, reflected the lingering and
complex transregional religious and ethnic ties that many of its new sub-
jects shared with China’s Central Asian neighbors. Both rebellions, like
the Taiping Rebellion, were notable in that effective independent govern-
ments were established, ruled over large areas of territory for more than
a decade, and hinted at ethnic and cultural differences that would remain
to the present day.

3.6 PANTHAY REBELLION SUMMONS TO ARMS (1868)

Written at the height of the rebel regime’s powers, the following document
sought to bolster the already popular rebel government’s efforts to wrest control
of the provincial capital from the last remnants of Qing rule. The Hui (Muslim
Chinese), although not indigenous to Yunnan, had first settled in large num-
bers during the thirteenth century. Central Asian Muslims arrived as part of
Kublai Khan’s Mongol army in the thirteenth century and provided many of its
subsequent civil officials. A half millennium later, by the nineteenth century,
the Hui had become highly acculturated, spoke Chinese, and often dressed in a
manner that was indistinguishable from their Han Chinese counterparts. The
author of the following document, Du Wenxiu (1823–1872), was the leader
and strategist of the multi-ethnic rebel government. From the inception of the
rebellion, he sought to be inclusive of all ethnic groups, including the Han
Chinese. By 1868, he had fashioned a tolerant and effective government that
tapped into the potent non-Chinese desire for a government that permitted
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 71

greater local autonomy. In structuring this government, he did not abandon

his Hui and Islamic identity. His state seal (like that of Hong Xiuquan’s pic-
tured at the beginning of this chapter) included his titles in Chinese but also
his Arabic titles.

Questions
1. Does Du Wenxiu seek to promote Islamic culture and Muslims
over the Chinese culture and the Han?
2. What similarities exist between Du’s grievances against the Man-
chu Qing regime and those leveled by the Taipings (Doc 3.1)?

Wuchen year 7th month 5th day [August 22, 1868]

General Du Wenxiu is leading an expedition along five fronts to recover
the whole realm of Yunnan to expel cruelty and to improve the fortunes
of the good and lawful.
Ponder for a moment the fact that the three peoples of Yunnan—
Hui, Han and the indigenous peoples—have lived peacefully together for
thousands of years. Friendly towards each other and helping one another
in times of need, how could there be profound divisions amongst us? But
since the Manchus usurped the throne for more than two hundred years,
we have been mistreated. Evil officials carrying out unfair policies caused
the Shiyang Mine massacre and triggered suffering amongst us all. Those
who were strong turned more violent and oppressive. Those who were
weak and vulnerable had nowhere to hide. At that time, people were in
such danger, but the evil Qing officials still insisted nothing was wrong,
expressing no concern for the lives of the common people. What was
worse, when the Han Chinese were strong they assisted the Han to kill
the Hui; and then when the Hui were powerful helped the Hui to kill Han.
Facing such misfortune the people’s thoughts were unsettled.
Witnessing such hardships and caring for the people, I cannot toler-
ate innocent Hui being killed by Han. I am even less tolerant of innocent
Han being mistreated by Hui. I began the rebellion in order to eliminate
the Manchu demons. My goal is to save people, and resolve the strife
between the Hui and Han. When the mission is accomplished, I will obey
Heaven’s orders.
Incompetent Qing officials, using every ploy in their bag of tricks,
made policies up as they went. . . . Now employing a new strategy, we
already achieved reports of three victories within a month; mobilizing half
of the military force [we] gained control over quite a few towns. But we
have yet to rid ourselves of the demon officials and so the root of the disas-
ter remains. Millions of people cannot live peacefully if we do not take full
control of Yunnan. How can we allow others to sleep right next to our bed!
We have mobilized our entire military force, maintaining a steady
flow of supplies with millions spent on expenditures. Opening five offen-
sive fronts, each with the guns and cannons in front, followed by bow and
arrows, and then long swords and short knives, all are eager to fight for
the people. Swords drawn and in high spirits, our flags stretch for over a
thousand li and the sounds of our shouts and drums reach the heavens.
Equipped in this way, what enemy can withstand our attack? What goals
can we not achieve?

3.7 RUMORS OF A TUNGAN MASSACRE (1864)

Throughout history, we encounter the power of rumors. Rumors are, for the
historian, extremely difficult to verify or even quantify. Yet, key historical
72 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

TUNGAN junctures are often rife with rumors that shape people’s actions. As the fol-
(DONGGAN)—An lowing document indicates, the rumor of a massacre was the likely catalyst
ethnic label for Muslim for the inception of the Yakub Beg Rebellion (1864–1877). In this instance, we
Chinese employed only in know from the Qing emperor himself that rumors of a massacre did circulate.
northwestern China. Also What we cannot discern is if it was more than a rumor. The essential element
referred to in late imperial of this rumor is the mutual distrust felt toward the Tungans by both the Cen-
documents as Han-Hui. tral Asian peoples living in Xinjiang (who felt they were overly Chinese) and
the Chinese (who felt the Tungans were overly Islamic). The author of this
document, historian Mulla Musa Sayrami (1836–1917) wrote his History of
Kashgar Rulers around the turn of the century, offering one of the few indig-
enous perspectives of the uprising. In the following document, the original
Uyghur terminology remains in place to highlight the fact that the document
was not written in Chinese, so the “Great Khan” mentioned next was, in fact,
referring to the Qing emperor.

Questions
1. How do we assess the responsibility for a rebellion largely incited
by false rumors?
2. What exactly are the Tungans accused of doing? According to the
rumor, who is afraid of them?
At the time English Christians overpowered the country of Chinese
emperor and conquered seventy-two large cities in the region called
Burma. They even destroyed some of them. At this juncture, a group
of people called Usūnggūī Chanmūzū [i.e., Taipings] arose contending
sovereignty on the one hand, and the Tungans caused troubles on the
other. In the end when the Great Khan [Ulūgh Khān] [meaning Chi-
nese emperor] heard the news that Tungans, not being able to stay at
Chingchūfā [i.e., Jinjibao], consulted with each other and moved to the
west in order to take the nearby areas, he sent the following edict to
the chiefs of the provinces in this direction. “Several Tungans defied the
submission, so we gave them advice and promise. However, because
they were worried and afraid of their crime and unruly behavior, they
could not stay and went to the west. If they go to that region, it is pos-
sible that the Tungans in that area will become friendly with them, and
the common people will become disorderly. As soon as you read this
edict, exterminate the Tungans in [the] city and, then, report the result
to me, the Great Khan!” In this way, he sent the edict to the General of
Ili. The General was also startled at this and, after consultations, said,
“Tungans are the people of a large number, and their nature and behav-
ior are different [from us]. If they got a scent of [our weakness], we
would become like evening and they would become like morning. There
is still a long distance for the Tungans to come from the inland (ichkiri),
so if we invite the Tungans living here and, giving them advice with
friendly words, conclude an agreement, then would they not be calmed
down and devote themselves to their own livelihood?” . . . However,
they did not become calm. Every night they did not go to sleep, spend-
ing nights in holy tombs (mazār) [to show their religious fervor]. They
vowed and vowed, and even those who had not performed an ablution
once a month now did it several times a day. Their sorrow and anxiety
grew deeper day by day. The [Ili] General, having found out such activi-
ties of these Tungans, became very anxious. Then he ignored the agree-
ment and, executing the emperor [khān]’s edict, sent letters to ambans in
every city: “On such and such time of such and such day, massacre the
Tungan people!”
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 73

3.8 ROBERT SHAW’S VISIT TO YARKAND

AND KASHGAR (MARCH 3, 1870)
A common aspect of the mid-nineteenth-century rebellions was the attempt by vir-
tually all the rebel regimes to garner European support for their conflict with the
Qing. Although Western powers often considered supporting the rebel regimes,
in most instances, they decided it was more advantageous to have a weakened,
but still unified, Qing empire rather than a fractured and warring China. For
the British, Yakub Beg’s regime proved especially tempting, given the emergent
interest of their rivals in Central Asia, the Russians. The British believed that
a Russian presence in Central Asia might threaten their India colonies. Yakub
Beg (1820–1877) proved as equally adept as the Europeans in political intrigue,
negotiating with and gaining some degree of support from Russia, Britain, and
the Ottoman Empire. In the end, however, Yakub Beg’s unstable multi-ethnic
alliance proved untenable, and the Chinese imperial army too powerful. Yakub
Beg would die in 1877, and his independent kingdom collapsed very soon after.
The following article was printed in the London Times reporting on a paper
delivered by Robert B. Shaw, who had recently returned from meeting with Yakub
Beg in 1869.
Questions
1. Why would Robert Shaw be interested in painting a particularly
rosy picture of Yakub Beg’s rule to his British audience?
2. Why would the Qing court be so interested in bringing the area
ruled by Yakub Beg back under imperial control? Why would
Yakub Beg and the people of western Xinjiang be so reluctant to
return to Qing rule?

Mr. Robert B. Shaw, lately arrived in England after his adventurous jour-
ney in Chinese Tartary . . . said that the common idea of Tartary was that
of a succession of vast plains, over which hordes of barbarians wandered
at will with their cattle and tents. He had found the reality widely differ-
ent. It is a well-cultivated country, containing flourishing cities of more
than 100,000 inhabitants, where many of the arts of civilization are carried
on. Security of life and property exists; commerce is protected; the roads
are full of life and movement, and markets are held on a fixed day of the
week, even in the smallest villages. In the towns, extensive bazaars, cov-
ered in against the rage of the sun, contain rows of shops, where goods of
every kind and from every country are exhibited. In Yarkand alone there
are 60 colleges, with endowments in land, for the education of students
of Muslim law and divinity, while every street contains a primary school
attached to the mosque, where turbaned rows of boys may be seen daily at
their first lessons in reading and writing. There are special streets for the
various trades. In one street will be found spread out the silks of China, in
another the cotton goods and prints of Russia, while a third will contain
robes made of both materials, three or four of which make up the ordinary
dress of the Turkic inhabitants. In some streets all kinds of groceries are
sold; others are set apart for the butchers, who offer a choice of horseflesh,
camel, beef, or mutton; the first is rather a luxury, but the last two are
most abundant, selling at about one penny a pound. The bakers make
most excellent light loaves by a process of steaming the bread. The green-
grocers present abundant supplies of vegetables in great variety, besides
cream nearly as thick as that of Devonshire, and delicious cream cheeses.
Everywhere sherbet made of fruit is sold, which you can get cooled at any
street corner where there are stalls for the sale of ice. There are tea-shops,
74 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

where the great urns are ever steaming and the eating-houses in abun-
dance. Such is the manifold life of this little-known nation, living a life
of its own, making history very fast and looking upon European politics
with the same indifference with which its own have been regarded by us.
The author, who is well known, made his journey with the view of
opening the way for trade, especially in tea, between India and Eastern
Turkistan, described the manner of his reception by the Governor of Yar-
kand and by the Ataliq ghazi, the ruler of the country, who was then resi-
dent in Kashgar. The Ataliq, under his former title, Yakub Beg, wrested
this flourishing country from the Chinese five or six years ago, but the
blow to Chinese domination was struck by the Tooras, a family claiming
descent from Genghis Khan, who had formerly been disposed by the Chi-
nese. These, assisted by a force of Andijanis from Kokand, who were led
by Yakub Beg, expelled or destroyed the Chinese garrisons in 1864; but
the fruits of victory were gathered by Yakub Beg, who now seems firmly
established as King over a productive region containing a population
variously estimated at from 20 to 60 millions. The Andijanis now occupy
the chief places in the Administration and form the strength of the army;
but their attitude towards the native Yarkandis is very conciliatory, and
they are looked upon not as conquerors but as brothers in faith and blood,
who have delivered them from the yoke of unbelievers and idolators.
The Yarkandis are naturally addicted to commerce and the arts of peace,
while the Uzbeks of Andijan find their most congenial occupation in the
administration and arms. Both peoples speak the same language, which is
essentially that of the Turks of Istanbul. Yakub Beg impressed Mr. Shaw
as a man of remarkable intelligence and energy. After the expulsion of the
Chinese he overawed the unruly population of Turkistan by acts of sever-
ity and cruelty, but secured by these means perfect order and security,
without alienating the mass of his subjects. He sits every day in the gate-
way of Kashgar for two or three hours to hear complaints and administer
justice. Mr. Shaw’s first presentation to him was an effective scene. . . . At
an inner quadrangle he was left to proceed alone to the inner chamber
with one official and he there saw the King sitting in expectation at the
farther end. When he approached he put out his hands to greet his guest,
smiling pleasantly and invited him to sit down on a cushion opposite to
him. Mr. Shaw found him to be a man of about 45 years of age, short and
stoutly built, with a very broad forehead. He bid him welcome as the first
Englishman that had ever been in his country, and said God put it into his
heart to accept this arrival as a favorable omen to himself. In subsequent
interviews Yakub expressed his great desire to be friendly with the Eng-
lish. He said often, “Your Queen is like the sun which warms everything
it shines upon; I am in the cold and desire that some of its rays should fall
upon me. I am very small (showing the tip of his finger), a man of yester-
day; in these few years God has given me this great country. Whatever
services I can render you here you may command, and you must do the
same for me.”

SELF-STRENGTHENING MOVEMENT
In the years following the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), China obtained only a
temporary respite from the demands of Western imperialist powers who
wanted ever-increasing commercial, diplomatic, and religious privileges.
As these calls reached a fever pitch in the 1850s, the Qing court was simul-
taneously faced with widespread internal rebellions, which required
the expenditure of considerable military, political, and fiscal resources.
Lacking the means to combat both challenges to its authority, the Qing
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 75

court acquiesced to a series of “unequal treaties” to confront the inter- FENG GUIFEN
nal threats to their rule more ably. Even as Chinese officials began using (1809–1874)—A
Western military technology to suppress the Taiping and other rebellions, precociously bright
a small group of Chinese literati suggested that Western learning should scholar, he achieved
also be employed to address China’s domestic problems. The advocates his jinshi degree at
of this “self-strengthening” were not wholesale advocates of Western the age of 32 and was
ideas and technology; rather, many of them believed they could graft the immediately appointed
“substance” [ti] of Confucian culture to the “utility” [yong] of Western to the prestigious Hanlin
technology. Regardless, the root of Qing reform efforts emerged from Academy. A reformer who
the dynasty’s efforts to suppress the numerous mid-nineteenth-century advocated using Western
rebellions. methods within a Chinese
context, he is best known
for championing a school
3.9 FENG GUIFEN ON THE ADOPTION OF WESTERN to teach Western languages
LEARNING (1860) and sciences.

An immensely talented scholar, Feng Guifen fled his hometown of Suzhou in the
face of the Taiping Army and sought refuge in Shanghai. By this time, Shanghai
had become the metropolitan base for Western interests in China. Although he
remained there for less than a year, Feng became familiar with Western political
theory and began to contemplate how such theories might be adapted to aid China
in suppressing the domestic threats it faced. The following document is part of
Feng’s 40 Essays of Protest, initially written during his time in Shanghai and
then circulated among influential scholar-officials of the day. They delineate spe-
cific reforms he felt the Qing dynasty should implement to gain greater internal
control and international stature.

Questions
1. Why would Feng Guifen’s proposals seem radical to the more
conventional minds of mid-nineteenth-century China?
2. What areas of China’s domestic political scene does Feng hope to
improve with his proposal?

Currently those who are aware of Western affairs are called tongshi [trans-
lators]. All are people who engage in trivial affairs, and are not valued
by the community. Simply looking for a way to feed and clothe them-
selves they begin to work for Westerners. Their character is rough and
shallow, their intentions despicable. All they lust for is profit. In addition,
their knowledge of Western languages is limited mostly to merchandise,
commerce and slang. How could they be expected to pay attention to
scholarly topics? Since there was a need, we established special schools
to enroll children from poor families to study both Chinese and Western
languages. However, most of those village children are misbehaved and
not very intelligent (for several decades I have even tried to find smart
students from my own villages and found none). Even worse, they slowly
adopted the bad habits of Westerners. What we achieved is no better than
previous ones.
If we want to use Western learning, it is necessary to create transla-
tion academies at Guangdong and Shanghai. We should select gifted chil-
dren younger than fifteen-years-old from the nearby areas and offer them
a small living allowance along with room and board. Westerners from a
variety of countries should be hired to teach their spoken and written lan-
guages. Famous scholars from within China should be hired to teach the
classics, history, and other subjects. The students should at the same time
be taught mathematics. (All Western learning derives from mathematics.)
[. . .]
76 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

ZENG GUOFAN After three years, all those students who can smoothly read and
(1811–1872)—A strict recite foreign books should be licensed. The especially gifted students who
Confucian who nonetheless practically apply their learning should be recommended by the Minister
championed progressive of Trade to receive the juren degree as a reward. As I previously indicated,
fiscal and military reforms China has many talented minds. Certainly, there are those who having
in the early 1860s, helping learned from Westerners can surpass them. One of the main responsibili-
the Qing to suppress the ties of government is education.
Taiping Rebellion. [. . .]
Since the expansion of trade over the past 20 years, many foreigners
have learned our language and studied our literature. Some of them can
RONG HONG
even read our classics and history, recognize our statutes and administra-
(1828–1912)—More
tion, and know our geography and customs. Our officials under the rank
familiar to Western readers
of Military Commander [duhu] level know nothing about other countries.
as Yung Wing, Rong Hong
By comparison should we not be ashamed? As a result, we have to rely
traveled to the United
on dull-witted translators to communicate. The tone and basic meaning
States in 1847, became a US
were transmitted, much of the original significance is lacking—and many
citizen in 1852, graduated
small inaccuracies have caused big disputes. I lament the fact that our
from Yale in 1854, and
foreign affairs, the key concern for our government, are dependent upon
served as an early emissary
such people. No wonder, we do not understand each other thoroughly,
between China and the
and cannot distinguish the truth from lies. Negotiations for peace or war
United States.
are carried out without fully understanding the matters at hand. These
unresolved issues are our country’s unseen peril. If this proposal is imple-
mented, if many more people study foreign languages surely many more
people with high standards and character will appear among them. After-
wards, we will understand the crucial elements of our foreign policy and
manage them more appropriately.

3.10 ZENG GUOFAN ON FOUNDING THE SHANGHAI

ARSENAL (1868)
The primary architect of the “Self-Strengthening Movement,” Zeng Guofan
(1811–1872) combined a strong adherence to traditional Confucian beliefs with
an openness to Western methods. His rise coincided with the court’s willing-
ness to allow more candid discussion amongst Chinese literati about Western
techniques as the empire searched for solutions to its deepening crises. Initially,
Zeng Guofan focused on the immediate Taiping threat by advocating a combina-
tion of military and fiscal reforms. Turning away from the traditional central-
ized mechanisms, he created a provincially based and funded army known as the
Hunan (Xiang) Army. In 1865, Zeng Guofan established China’s first Western-
style arsenal. The following memorial was written to provide a brief account of
the arsenal’s evolution and as a deliberate prod to the Qing court to implement
further reforms.

Questions
1. Why does Zeng differentiate between using Western methods
and using foreign products, tradesmen, and teachers?
2. What is the primary motivation for Zeng Guofan’s reforms? What
outcomes are foremost in his mind?

In 1862–63, when I was encamped at Anqing [Anhui], where I established

a factory to try to make foreign weapons, I used Chinese exclusively and
did not employ any foreign mechanics. Although a small steamboat was
built, its speed was very slow. The knack of building it was not completely
acquired. In the winter of 1863 I sent the expectant sub-prefect Rong Hong
abroad to purchase machinery, since I intended to make a gradual expan-
sion. Your minister, Li Hongzhang, now Governor-General of Huguang,
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 77

had paid attention to foreign weapons since the beginning of his tenure DAOTAI—A sub-
or the governorship of Jiangsu [1862]. At the time Ding Richang was the provincial-level civil
daotai of Shanghai. Both he and Li discussed the strategy of resisting for- official, often translated as
eign aggression and the method of manufacturing weapons. In the fifth “intendant,” he oversaw
month [May 25–June 22] of 1865, I purchased a set of machines in Shanghai various sections (or
and sent the prefects, Feng Junguang, Shen Baojing, and others to open “circuits”) of a province
a machine shop [lit., tiechang, iron factory]. At this juncture the machines or particular waterways,
bought by Rong Hong, having also arrived at Shanghai, were combined monopolies, and
with the others into one arsenal. At first, because it was at the height of the transportation networks.
attack on and suppression of the Taipings, guns and cannons were made.
Also, on account of the shortage of funds, it was difficult to start shipbuild-
ing until the fourth [lunar] month of 1867, when your minister memori-
alized and requested the assignment of twenty per cent from the foreign
customs revenue, using ten per cent particularly for the expense of build-
ing steamships. Fortunately, we are indebted to the Sacred Empress [Cixi]
for her acceding to the request. Thereupon both the funds appropriated
and the materials purchased gradually became more abundant.
[. . .]
It has been learned that in building steamships the boiler, the engine,
and the hull are the three most important parts. Formerly when the steam-
ship was built by ourselves in the foreign factory at Shanghai the boiler
and engine were both bought from foreign countries and brought to
China to be fitted into the hull. There has never been a case where we
ourselves designed the blueprint and made the whole set of heavy engine
and boiler. This time, when we began construction, we employed our own
ingenuity in the study of the blueprint. . . . During the first ten days of the
seventh month [August 18–27, 1868], the building of the first ship was
completed. Your minister named her the S.S. Tianji [lit., peaceful and aus-
picious], meaning that she will be in calm waves within the four seas, and
the factory business will be secure and prosperous. Two parts, the boiler
and the hull, were both made by ourselves in the factory, but the engine
was an old one which was purchased and repaired. . . .
The said arsenal was formerly at Hongkou, Shanghai, where a for-
eign workshop was temporarily rented, located in the midst of Chinese
and foreigners. This caused much inconvenience. Moreover, the number
of machines had daily increased, so that the factory became too small to
contain them. During the summer of 1867, we began to build a new arse-
nal south of the city of Shanghai. . . .
In addition a school should be established in which to learn transla-
tion, because translation is the foundation for manufactures. Foreign man-
ufacturing is derived from mathematics, all the profound mysteries of
which can be discovered through diagrams and explanations. It is simply
because the languages are mutually incomprehensible that, even though
every day we practice on their machines, after all we do not understand
the principles underlying their manufacture and operation. This year the
commissioners in the arsenal have paid great attention to translation. At
different times we have invited three persons, Wei-lie-ya-li [Alexander
Wylie] of England, Fu-lan-ya [John Fryer] and Ma-gao-wen [John Mac-
Cowan] of America, who have devoted their energies to selecting and
carefully translating books which would be beneficial to manufacturing.

3.11 LI HONGZHANG’S MEMORIAL ADVOCATING

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING (MARCH 11, 1863)
Grand statesman of the late Qing period, Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) came to
prominence under Zeng Guofan as a commanding officer in the Hunan Army.
78 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

LI HONGZHANG Shortly thereafter, he organized a separate Huai Army utilizing the same model
(1823–1901)—A major of organization in the neighboring Anhui province to combat the Taiping rebel
figure in the Self- forces in the region. During the 1860s, he came into substantial contact with
Strengthening Movement, Western military advisors (notably, Charles “Chinese” Gordon) As a result
Li Hongzhang rose to of these associations, Li Hongzhang became increasingly convinced of China’s
prominence under the need to adopt Western technology. A major force in the Self-Strengthening Move-
tutelage of Zeng Guofan ment, Li oversaw the building of military academies and naval bases and was an
and commanded the Anhui important proponent of other progressive reforms. In the following proposal to the
(Huai) Army. In the 1870s, emperor, Li Hongzhang discusses his efforts to build up a body of able translators
he promoted the adoption through a network of translator schools similar to those proposed by Feng Guifen
of Western technology, several years earlier.
such as railways and
arsenals, as well as Questions
Western-style education. In
1. What rationale does Li Hongzhang offer for the creation of the
the last decades of his life,
Tongwen Guan?
Li Hongzhang became the
2. Does Li Hongzhang envision the students of the Tongwen Guan
Qing empire’s preeminent
being different from those who are taking the imperial civil ser-
(if unappreciated)
vice exams?
diplomat.
Previously I allowed the Foreign Office [zongli yamen] to explore and dis-
GORDON, CHARLES cuss establishing an institute for studying foreign languages like the For-
“CHINESE” eign Languages College [tongwen guan]. When dealing with foreigners,
(1835–1885)—A British in order to be treated equally, China first needs to be aware of their inten-
officer serving in China tions and desires, to understand if they are sincere or deceitful. As a result
during the Taiping of twenty years of frontier trade [hushi], many foreigners have learned
Rebellion. He initially our language, can read our classics and histories, are familiar with impe-
fought with British forces, rial statutes and laws, acquainted with our local governance and customs.
then was appointed Yet, very few of our officials and gentry are equally familiar with foreign
to head a joint force of languages. Many foreign countries have established translation offices
Europeans and Asians with one or two translators in Shanghai, so when Chinese and foreign offi-
known as the “Ever cials meet, all translations are conducted by foreign translators from their
Victorious Army.” translation office. It is difficult to ensure an absence of bias. Translation
clerks [tongshi] are the only Chinese who are able to speak foreign lan-
ZONGLI YAMEN— guages. When dealing with administrative or military affairs, we have no
Established in 1861, choice but to employ these clerks to serve as intermediaries, and as a result
following the Convention they themselves are harming the reform movement. In an investigation
of Beijing, its primary goal of the Shanghai translation office, it was discovered that the translation
was to handle China’s clerks charged exorbitant fees. It is a profession formed entirely outside
foreign relations in a the traditional pursuits of gentry, farmers, artisans and merchants. Almost
more systematic manner. all children of Guangdong and Ningbo merchants, these clerks fall into
Often simply called the two groups: those who prefer leisure life or those who can find no other
“Foreign Office,” the career path, so they end up training to be translation clerks. . . .
office’s full title—Zongli The best approach would be to set up a Foreign Languages College in
Geguo Shiwu Yamen— Beijing. After a period of time, proper men of honor will emerge, who will
translates as “Office for the have learned all the essentials of the Westerners [xiren] and how to engage
Management of the Affairs with them. Our ability to control distant and far-flung borders lays here.
of All Foreign Countries.” Yet, most foreigners are concentrated in Shanghai and Guangdong. . . .
For this reason, I suggest that we follow the example of the Foreign Lan-
guages College by setting up an institute for the study foreign language
TONGWEN GUAN school in Shanghai. Then, we select upright fourteen-year old who have
(Foreign Languages innate intelligence. There Westerners can teach them [foreign languages],
College)—Founded in and Chinese degree holders with good character and well-learned to teach
1862 to systematically them the classics, history and arts. . . .
begin foreign language As an incentive, once students successfully complete their studies,
instruction under they will be appointed to a position by Superintendent of Customs office
government oversight,
 Chapter 3 • Mid-Nineteenth-Century Rebellions 79

with continuous imperial oversight. Within three to five years, the well- the college taught
educated and bright students will have mastered the foreign languages, English, French, German,
all governors, governors-general, and Superintendent of Customs will Russian, and Japanese
have created translator positions, and foreign affairs will be regulated. By as well as courses in
selecting individuals from the new foreign language institute, the customs science, philosophy, and
tariffs and military munitions can be verified, and the rogue Translator international law. In 1902,
Clerks will be brought under control. . . . How can our Chinese learning it was consolidated into
be inferior to that of the Westerners? If we have individuals who are pro- the Imperial University
ficient in Western languages and learn from one another, we can gain the (which later became Beijing
skills needed to construct steamships and weapons. In this way, China University).
will be helped along the road of self-strengthening.
WOREN (1804–1871)—A
3.12 WOREN’S MEMORIAL OBJECTING TO WESTERN powerful Qing official
LEARNING (1867) who served as head of
the influential Hanlin
In 1862, the Qing court founded the Tongwen Guan (Foreign Languages Col- Academy. Woren espoused
lege), the first imperially sponsored institution of Western learning. Originally strong Neo-Confucian
designed to teach Western languages as subjects, the school quickly added courses views and vigorously
in geometry, chemistry, law, physics, economics, and astronomy to their multi- opposed the Westernized
year program. It quickly became a flashpoint between conservative and liberal curriculum advocated by
officials. The conservatives, led by Woren, the powerful head of the Grand Sec- the Self-Strengthening
retary, vigorously opposed such a Westernized focus and the use of foreigners as Movement.
teachers. The following document is significant as a reminder that while the mid-
nineteenth century marked a period of reform, traditionalists remained hostile to
Western subjects, believing they undermined the classical teachings that formed
the basis of imperial China’s culture and society.
Questions
1. Is Woren objecting to the subjects taught, or is he objecting that
they are from the West?
2. Is Woren’s primary point, that Westerners in China have done
more harm than good, a valid one in the 1867 context?

I read Censor Zhang Shengzao’s memorial yesterday stating that astron-

omy and mathematics were unnecessary topics by which to select can-
didates from the civil service examination. Your Majesty has issued an
edict on establishing the Foreign Languages College [tongwen guan] to
recruit students through official channels to study, and thus astronomy
and mathematics should be understood by Confucian scholars as more
than just technical skills and should not be excluded.
As Your Majesty correctly indicates, mathematics is one of the Six
Arts for Confucian scholars to study and so should not be considered
improper. However, in my humble perspective astronomy and math-
ematics are of little use. Allowing foreigners to teach would cause con-
siderable harms. Such decisions should not be made without considerable
scrutiny. Please allow me to elaborate for Your Majesty.
I have heard that the foundation of a nation lies in its righteousness
and propriety, instead of force and trickery. A country’s true foundation
is the will of the people rather a single skill. Today, in order to learn a
single skill, we invite foreigners to serve as our teachers. Putting aside the
foreigners’ treachery, they may simply not teach us to a degree we can
master the skills. Even if the teachers are sincere and students complete
their studies, it will only be enough for them to become technically pro-
ficient. Since ancient times, it has never been said that a state has become
strong and dominated the weak through their technical skills alone. Our
80 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

empire is vast and does not lack of talented people. If we desired to teach
astronomy and mathematics, we could certainly search far and wide in
order to find men knowledgeable enough to instruct us. Must we use for-
eigners? Why must we have foreigners serve as our teachers?
What is more, foreigners are our enemies. In the tenth year of Xian-
feng’s reign [1861], they attacked us without provocation, ravaged our
capital, and shook the very foundation of our empire. They set fire and
destroyed our Summer Palace [Yuanming Yuan], recklessly killing both
officials and civilians. In the 200-year history of our dynasty, never has
there been such a humiliation. The pain and hatred felt by scholars and
officials foments resentment to this day. The court had no choice other
than to negotiate peace with them. Not a day goes by that we are able to
forget this hate and humiliation. Since the peace treaty was signed, Chris-
tianity began to spread far and wide, with many ignorant people being
deceived. If there are learned scholars teaching people righteousness, their
minds and hearts might be saved. Yet, today we are asked to direct our
intelligent and talented students, whom we have educated and prepared
for the nation, to follow [the teachings of] the foreigners. Righteousness
will be weakened, and evil will spread. In a few years, all Chinese people
will be become devoted to foreign ways if we do not put a stop to it.
I read the collected works of late Emperor Kangxi [r. 1661–1722]. His
edict issued to the Grand Councilors and the Nine Ministers and Censors,
stated that after several hundred years China will suffer at the hands of
the Western countries [xiyang geguo]. How very prescient! Even though
he had adopted their methods, He truly loathed them. Now, the empire
suffers at their hands, why would we assist them to increase their influ-
ence and fan their arrogance. It has been said that foreign missionaries
often resented our learned scholars because they refused to accept their
[Christian] faith. But now, we order talented students to learn from for-
eigners. Instead of learning anything of essence, I fear the students might
be deluded and fall into their traps.
It is my hope that your Majesty alone can thwart the previous pro-
posal in order to preserve the overall situation and avoid the hidden per-
ils. Only then will the empire benefit.
 CHAPTER 4
The Deepening Crisis of Late Imperial China (1644–1911)The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism

Imperialism in China (1856–1890)

3
Treaty Ports
Opened 1842-44
Opened by 1865
Opened by 1900
Opened by 1920 Qiqihar
Uliassutai Örgöö Manzhouli (Tsitsihar) Yilan (Sansing)
Khovd (Urga)

4
(Kobdo) Harbin
Tacheng Suifenhe
(Tarbagatai) Tumen
Ili MONGOLIA (Hunchun)
Yining (Kuldja) Kucheng Changchun
Jilin (Kirin)
Urumqi
Turfan Shenyang (Mukden)
Hami Yingkou (Newchang)
Zhangjiakou Dandong (Andong)
Kashgar (Kalgan) Qinhuangdao Dadongkou
Jiuquan Lüda (Port Arthur/Darien
(Suchow) Tianjin
(Tientsin) Yantai (Chefoo)
Longkou
Weihaiwei
er

Qingdao
iv

r
ve
R

Ri Jinan (Tsingtao)
Ye l l ow
Ye l
lo w CHINA
TIBET Zhenjiang
Gartok

6
Ya Nanjing
Wusong
Wuhu Suzhou Shanghai
ng

Wanxian Yichang Hankou Hangzhou

t ze

Gyantse Ningbo
Chongqing Shashi Jiujiang
River

Yadong Yueyang
(Chungking) Changde Wenzhou
Changsha (Yochow)

5
Funing (Santuao)
Fuzhou
Xiaman (Amoy) Taibei (Taipei)
Tengchong (Tengyue) Guangzhou
Sanshui (Canton)
Mengzi Wuzhou Shantou Tainan
Nanning Jiangmen (Swatow)
Simao (Szemao) Hong Kong (ceded 1842)
(Kongmoon)
Longzhou Kowloon (ceded 1860)
0 250 500 miles
Beihai (Pakhoi) Zhanjiang (Kwangchouwan)
0 250 500 kms
Qiongzhou (Kiungchou)
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 83

1. FIRST FIVE TREATY PORTS: From 1757 until 1842, all Western merchants were restricted to
Guangzhou, but with the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), the Yanghang Merchant Guild was abolished,
and trade opened at five ports: Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai. The Treaty
of Tianjin (1860) opened 11 more ports, and by the turn of the century, the number (some of them
thousands of miles inland) had risen to nearly 50. Pictured to the left (top) is the port of Xiamen.

2. WHAT IS A TREATY PORT?: The original impetus for the treaty ports came very much out of
the frustrations experienced by foreign merchants in Guangzhou. Thus, the original five Chinese
treaty ports sought to resolve their key concerns: 1) extend the number of ports where foreign trad-
ers could carry out their business, 2) allow for year-round residency, and 3) provide extraterritorial
rights (that is to say, only subject to their own consular jurisdiction). Often, the term was used more
broadly to mean any foreign concession, settlement, or military base, though technically speaking,
a treaty port was simply a city open to foreign trade.

3. LIFE IN A TREATY PORT: Westerners living in the treaty ports often had a lifestyle that far sur-
passed that which they could have experienced in their home country. Large homes, servants, social
clubs, and a sense of privilege often led to what many called the “Shanghai mind.” Many Western
residents felt socially, culturally, and racially superior to the Chinese. Few foreigners were interested
in China, and learning Chinese was seen as something only done by missionaries, consuls, or lower-
class Westerners who depended upon their daily interaction with Chinese for their livelihood.

4. SPHERES OF INTEREST: In the wake of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), many of the West-
ern imperialist powers in China perceived their political, commercial, and even religious activities
within specific regions, or “spheres.” In large part, these spheres were shaped by geographical con-
tiguity: with France most interested in southwestern China (which bordered on French Indochina),
Russia pouring their resources all along China’s northern border, the British primarily focused from
Shanghai up the Yangzi River, Germany on the Shandong peninsula, and Japan in northeast China.

5. ONE PLACE, MULTIPLE NAMES: During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, there
existed no commonly agreed upon way to romanize Chinese city names. The variety of languages
spoken by the Western imperialist powers further complicated this problem. As a result, there often
were large variances in spelling and thus multiple romanizations for a single city. For example,
the Shandong port of Qingdao (青岛) was known variously as Ch’ing-tao, Tsingtau, or Tsingtao (a
spelling that remains on the popular beer still brewed in the city).

6. SHANGHAI: While already a burgeoning river town during the Qing dynasty, its designation as
a treaty port in 1842 propelled Shanghai as the preferred meeting point for Western and Chinese
merchants. Numerous foreign banks and corporations set up branch offices along the bank of the
Huangpu River, in an area known then, and today, as Bund.
84 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

SUMMER PALACE [YIHE For many years, a large billboard on the road to the Imperial Summer
YUAN]—An imperial Palace on the outskirts of Beijing read, “Do not forget the national shame;
garden constructed in rebuild the Chinese nation.” The sign marked the entrance to the ruins of
1888 for the Dowager a former imperial garden, the Yuanming Yuan. The meaning of the sign
Empress Cixi. In some was probably lost on most Western tourists, if any even noticed it. Its mes-
English language sources, sage, though, would have been immediately apparent to most Chinese. In
the Yuanming Yuan is 1860, the Yuanming Yuan was deliberately looted and then systematically
also referred to as the burned to the ground by an Anglo-French military force.
“Old Summer Palace” to Begun in 1709 as a garden for the Kangxi emperor by his fourth
distinguish it from the son (and future Yongzheng emperor), it was extended, developed, and
newer summer palace embellished so that when completed in the 1740s it was a massive impe-
known as the Yihe Yuan. rial retreat. The garden’s construction coincided with the period of great-
est Jesuit influence within the court. A section of the garden contained
BEIJING CONVENTION buildings and fountains based on Western architectural designs and engi-
(1860)—A set of three neering. Part park, part garden, and part imperial retreat, the Yuanming
separate treaties signed by Yuan at its height covered nearly 900 acres of lakes, islands, and palaces.
China with Great Britain, (By comparison, the famous Versailles gardens of Louis XIV covered 250
France, and Russia after the acres.) Those who witnessed its splendor found it awe-inspiring.
Second Opium War. As the following documents attest in graphic detail, in 1860, Brit-
ish and French forces methodically pillaged the imperial grounds, then
set fire to the entire area. In the wake of such destruction, the Qing court
SECOND OPIUM WAR
quickly signed the Beijing Convention (1860). Western papers hailed the
(1856–1860)—Known
treaty as ushering in a new era, writing glowing accounts of the “civi-
by a variety of names,
lized” methods of the West in comparison to the “barbarity” of China.
including the Arrow War,
While such acts are hardly defensible, the question presents itself as
the Second Anglo-Chinese
to why the burning of the Yuanming Yuan remains a focus of “national
War, as well as the Second
shame” for the Chinese today. The answer lies in a rigorous exploration of
Opium War, the war is
the path of Western imperialism in nineteenth-century China. Many West-
traditionally understood as
ern textbooks on the topic have, until recently, focused on the diplomatic
taking place in two parts:
process, rather than the often violent mechanisms, that allowed Western
the first began with the
powers to elicit an ever-rising number of concessions from China. Chinese
Arrow Incident in 1856
historians, who see these mechanisms for the coercion they were, often
and ended with the signing
label the conflict that led up to the destruction of the Yuanming Yuan as
of the Treaty of Tianjin
the Second Opium War (though opium was not the focus of the war for
in 1858. The second part
either side). It was a process that one American scholar scathingly, and
began with the attack on
with deliberate irony, described as “English Lessons.” The Western pow-
Tianjin and Beijing and
ers justified their actions by suggesting they were spreading “civilized
ended when the Qing
practices.” They simultaneously made free use of violent and distinctly
acquiesced and signed the
“uncivilized” tactics to secure their demands. When reading firsthand
Conventions of Beijing in
accounts of the burning of the Yuanming Yuan, one wonders what “les-
1860.
son” was being taught. The documents below do not absolve the Qing
government of responsibility. Their reactive and often clumsy attempts
to stymie Western aggression did little to resolve the diplomatic situa-
tions that were presenting themselves. These reports do reveal a pattern
among the Western imperialist powers of repeatedly looking for, creating,
or concocting incidents by which they could leverage greater concessions
from the Chinese.
The last decades of Qing rule are a disheartening tale. A quarter cen-
tury of internal rebellions, along with the predatory practices of the West,
impeded China’s reform efforts. The Qing empire’s reduced status within
East Asia and in world trade became more evident. China’s downward
trajectory was humiliatingly clear when Japan defeated China in the Sino-
Japanese War (1894–1895). With that devastating defeat, the last vestiges
of Qing China’s claim to be an imperial power were lost. The Western
powers (along with Japan) began to think of how to divide China’s riches
(if not the actual country [4.4]).
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 85

On many levels, the Qing dynasty’s decline and China’s global SAILING UNDER A
humiliation can be traced to the burning of the Yuanming Yuan. Today, FOREIGN FLAG—In
when Chinese hear the words “Yuanming Yuan,” it is the destructive- a tactic common in the
ness of Western imperialism that immediately comes to mind. The havoc mid-nineteenth century,
wreaked on the Yuanming Yuan by Westerners not only obliterated a Chinese smugglers would
stunning element of their past but also ushered in one of the darkest eras hire Europeans to serve as
of China’s history. Today, as European and American chain stores pro- the ostensible captains of
liferate across China, the Chinese still wonder aloud if the burning of the their vessels. Often unable
Yuanming Yuan is indicative of the dangers posed by unbridled Western to speak Chinese and
influence in China today. unfamiliar with the waters
in which the ship sailed,
these “captains” were little
THE SECOND OPIUM WAR, THE TREATY OF TIANJIN, more than a maneuver to
AND THE BURNING OF YUANMING YUAN secure the protection of the
British flag.
How does an incident that seems of little consequence at the time evolve
into a war between two massive empires? This is the question that arises
when trying to pinpoint the events leading to the sack of the Yuanming ELGIN, LORD JAMES
Yuan and all that came after. The answer lies in paying attention not (1811–1863)—Britain’s
only to the broader picture but also to how a sequence of small choices, High Commissioner
decisions, and biases can propel a succession of events to a conclusion and Plenipotentiary to
completely out of proportion to the original actions. On October 8, 1856, China accompanied by an
the sequence began when Chinese authorities, following a tip, seized the expeditionary force of 5,000
Arrow, a Chinese vessel, and her crew in the waters off Guangzhou. The men during the Second
Arrow was built in China, sailed by a Chinese crew, owned by a Chi- Opium War and ordered
nese subject, and sailed under an expired colonial certificate of registry. the destruction of the
The Arrow’s captain, a British citizen, was on an outlying vessel having Yuanming Yuan.
breakfast at the time of the crew’s arrest. The captain claimed to have
witnessed the event when he later notified British authorities. When he
heard of the incident, Guangzhou British Consul Harry Parkes insisted
the vessel was flying the British flag at the time of seizure and was thus
under British jurisdiction (4.1). Over the next months, based on the
belief that national honor and trade depended on retaliation (and virtu-
ally no evidence), British officials attacked Chinese naval defenses, then
bombarded, looted, and occupied Guangzhou. The British eventually
established an allied provisional government to rule over the provincial
capital. In response to the bombardment, Chinese mobs attacked the old
factory area of the city, burning the entire factory district to the ground
and destroying both buildings and warehoused trade goods. Outraged,
the British deemed these mob attacks worthy of a military response. In
quick order, the British Prime Minister sent Lord Elgin as head of an
expeditionary force to China. Upon his arrival, Lord Elgin immediately
diverged from his government’s clearly delimited instructions by dog-
gedly pursuing the appointment of a British representative (ambassador)
in Beijing (4.2). When, in 1858, Qing officials balked at ratifying the treaty
that Lord Elgin had presented, Britain embarked on its second military
engagement (often labeled the Second Opium War) and eventually to the
burning of the Yuanming Yuan.

4.1 HARRY PARKES’ LETTER TO COMMISSIONER YE

MINGCHEN (OCTOBER 8, 1856)
The following letter was written only hours after Harry Parkes learned of the
arrest of the Arrow crew and was immediately followed by a similar letter to
his superiors in Hong Kong. It is unclear whether at the time Parkes wrote the
letter he was simply misinformed or deliberately untruthful. First, the English
86 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

captain was not on the boat at the time of the arrest. Second, as attested to by
British witnesses, when ships were at anchor, they did not fly their national flag,
so it was difficult to see how the Chinese “dishonored the flag.” Third, given that
Parkes had not proven either of the first two points, the Chinese authorities were
completely within their rights not to hand over the (Chinese) prisoners. Yet when
Commissioner Ye Mingchen did attempt to hand over the crew, stating, “this is a
trivial affair not worthy to be disputed,” Parkes refused to receive them, insisting
that Ye Mingchen’s decision to not personally escort them was a deliberate slight
intended to dishonor Parkes.

Questions
1. What crimes does Parkes suggest have occurred? What is his pri-
mary intention in pursuing the case?
2. What precisely does Parkes want Commissioner Ye Mingchen to
do to resolve the matter?

No. 69. British Consulate, Canton,

October 8, 1856
Sir,
I hasten to bring to your Excellency’s notice an insult of a very grave char-
acter, which calls for immediate reparation.
This morning shortly after eight o’clock a Chinese war boat boarded
an English lorcha, the Arrow, lying at anchor in the river near the Dutch
Folly, and regardless of the remonstrances of her master, an Englishman,
seized, bound and carried off twelve of her Chinese crew, and hauled
down the English colors which were then flying.
Hesitating to rely solely on the master’s account of so gross an out-
rage, I at once dispatched people to make enquiries and found that the
facts were as he had stated, and that the war boat, said to be under the
command of Liang Guoding, a captain in the imperial service, after leav-
ing the lorcha, had dropped down the river, and was lying off the Yong-
qing gate, with the crew of the lorcha still on board as prisoners.
On receiving this intelligence, I proceeded in person to the war boat
accompanied by Her Majesty’s Vice-Counsel, and explained to the officer
whom I found in charge called Li Yongxing the gravity of the error com-
mitted by the said war boat in boarding and carrying off by force of arms
the crew of an English vessel and the gross indignity offered to the nation-
al flag by hauling down the lorcha’s ensign. I also required him to bring
his prisoners to the British Consulate, there to await examination; but this
he refused to do, and upon my claiming them and insisting upon their be-
ing delivered to me, he made a display of force, and threatened me with
violence if I attempted to take them with me.
I hasten therefore to lay the case before your Excellency, confident
that your superior judgment will lead you at once to admit that an insult
so publicly committed must be equally publicly atoned. I therefore re-
quest your Excellency to direct that the men who have been carried away
from the Arrow be returned by the Captain Liang Guoding to that vessel
in my presence; and if accused of any crime, they may be conveyed to
the British Consulate, where in conjunction with proper officers deputed
by your Excellency for the purpose, I shall be prepared to investigate the
case.
At the same time that I address your Excellency on this subject,
I am submitting both to Her Majesty’s Plenipotentiary and Commo-
dore in command of H.M. naval forces in this river, a report of what
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 87

has occurred, and I should add that the said lorcha being at present TREATY OF TIANJIN
detained here, in consequence of the seizure of her crew, has a claim (1858)—Treaty ending the
upon your Excellency’s Government for the expenses which this delay first phase of the Second
occasions her. Opium (Arrow) War. Its
terms forced the Qing
I have &c.
court to accept a British
[signed] H.S. Parkes, Consul. ambassador in Beijing, as
well as the addition of ten
cities as treaty ports, and
4.2 REFLECTIONS OF LORD ELGIN ON THE TREATY the opening of interior
OF TIANJIN (JUNE 29, 1858) China to travel, trade, and
Christian proselytizing.
Lord Elgin arrived in Hong Kong in 1857 as Britain’s High Commissioner and The treaty was ratified in
Plenipotentiary, accompanied by an expeditionary force of 5,000 men. While the Beijing Convention by
not wholly in agreement with Parkes’ decision regarding the Arrow, Elgin and the emperor in 1860, only
the other British officials on the scene decided to press the matter on principle. after British and French
On December 24, the British delivered an ultimatum, giving the ranking offi- forces looted and burned
cial, Commissioner Ye Mingchen, 48 hours to respond to their demands. The the Yuanming Yuan.
ultimatum insisted that the Chinese agree to face-to-face negotiations, repair the
destroyed factories, re-establish trade, allow foreigners to enter the city, and pay
6 million taels in compensation. When they received no response, they attacked
the city’s forts, then bombarded and captured the city. Commissioner Ye Min-
gchen, who sought to avoid a military conflict in a futile attempt to save the city,
was arrested and eventually transported on a British vessel to India. He departed
from Guangzhou on February 23, 1858, and died the following spring in a Cal-
cutta prison. When the occupation of Guangzhou still did not move the Qing
court to action, Elgin sailed north up the coast of China and threatened the Dagu
forts outside of Tianjin. Finally, in May 1858, imperial officials drew up terms for
the Treaty of Tianjin. It is the end of this negotiation process that Elgin refers
to in the following document.

Questions
1. What is Lord Elgin’s opinion of the Chinese officials with whom
he is negotiating?
2. Why is he disturbed with the attitude of the French and American
ministers?

Lord Elgin’s diary.

June 29th—I have not written for some days, but they have been busy
ones. . . . We went on fighting and bullying, and getting the poor com-
missioners to concede one point after another, till Friday the 25th, when
we had reason to believe that all was settled, and that the signature was
to take place the following day. . . . On Friday afternoon, however, Baron
Gros came to me with a message from the Russian and American minis-
ters to induce me to recede from two of my demands—1) a resident min-
ister at Beijing, and 2) permission to our people to trade in the interior
of China; because, as they said, the Chinese plenipotentiaries had told
them that they had received a decree from the Emperor stating that they
should infallibly lose their heads if they gave way on these points. . . .
The resident minister at Beijing I consider far the most important matter
gained by the treaty; the power to trade in the interior hardly less so. . . . I
had at stake not only these important points in my treaty, for which I had
fought so hard, but I know not what behind. For the Chinese are such
fools that it was impossible to tell, if we gave way on one point, whether
88 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

EXTRATERRITORIALITY they would not raise difficulties on every other. I sent for the admiral;
—A legal practice that gave him a hint that there was a great opportunity for England; that all
gives individuals from the powers were deserting me on a point which they had all, in their
foreign countries immunity original applications to Beijing, demanded, and which they all intended
from local laws. In theory, to claim if I got it; that, therefore, we had it in our power to claim our
an individual’s home place of priority in the East by obtaining this when others would not
country would try the insist on it. Would he back me? . . . This was a forenoon of Saturday,
person for a crime under 26th, and the treaty was to be signed in the evening. I may mention, as a
their country’s laws, but proof of the state of people’s minds, that Admiral Seymour told me that
in practice this rarely the French admiral had urged him to dine with him, assuring him that
occurred. no treaty would be signed that day! I sent Frederick to the imperial com-
missioners to tell them that I was indignant beyond all expression at their
having attempted to communicate with me through third parties; that
I was ready to sign at once the treaty as it stood; but that if they delayed
or retreated, I should consider negotiations at an end, go to Beijing and
demand a great deal more, etc. . . . Frederick executed this most difficult
task admirably, and at six P.M. I signed the Treaty of Tianjin. . . . I am now
anxiously awaiting some communication from Beijing. Till the Emperor
accepts the treaty I shall hardly feel safe. Please God he may ratify with-
out delay! I am sure that I express the wish just as much in the interest of
China as our own. Though I have been forced to act almost brutally, I am
China’s friend in all this.

4.3 TREATY OF TIANJIN (JUNE 26, 1858)

One of Lord Elgin’s primary goals in negotiating the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin was
to gain the right to post a consular representative to Beijing. Britain had pursued
this diplomatic goal since Lord Macartney first traveled to China three-quarters of
a century earlier (1.9). The treaty also addressed several of Britain’s and France’s
outstanding and unresolved issues, namely, to further open China religiously and
commercially. The treaty also established the central legal concept of extrater-
ritoriality that would shape interactions between China and Westerners for the
next 50 years. In practice, extraterritoriality meant that those Westerners who
committed a crime in China would be judged not by local Chinese officials but by
the laws and officials of their own country (usually the consular officials posted
in the nearest treaty port). Although initially signed by representatives from each
country in 1858, China refused to ratify it. This led to further hostilities against
China in 1860.

Questions
1. In what way(s) does the Treaty of Tianjin differ from that of the
Treaty of Nanjing, which it is seeking to replace?
2. Why do you think the British (and other Western powers) sought
to include Article LI, which prohibited the use of a specific Chi-
nese term in reference to them?

[Ramifications exchanged at Beijing, October 24, 1860.]

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire-
land, and his Majesty the Emperor of China, being desirous to put an end
to the existing misunderstanding between the two countries, and to place
their relations on a more satisfactory footing in future, have resolved to
proceed to a revision and improvement of the treaties existing between
them; and, for that purpose, have named as their plenipotentiaries, that
is to say:
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 89

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, the right honour-
able the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, a peer of the United Kingdom, and
knight of the most Ancient and most noble Order of the Thistle;
And his Majesty the Emperor of China, the High Commissioner
Guiliang, a senior Chief Secretary of State, styled of the East Cabinet, Cap-
tain-General of the Plain White Banner of the Manchu banner force, Super-
intendent-General of the administration of criminal law; and Huashana,
one of his imperial Majesty’s Expositors of the Classics, Manchu President
of the Office for the regulation of the Civil Establishment, Captain-Gen-
eral of the Bordered Blue Banner of the Chinese Banner Force, and Visitor
of the Office of Interpretations;
Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full
powers, and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon
and concluded the following articles:—

Article I

The Treaty of peace and amity between the two nations signed at Nanjing
(1842) . . . is hereby renewed and confirmed.
[. . .]

Article III

His Majesty the Emperor of China hereby agrees, that the ambassador,
minister, or other diplomatic agent, so appointed by her Majesty the
Queen of Great Britain, may reside, with his family and establishment,
permanently at the Capital, or may visit it occasionally, at the option of
British Government. He shall not be called upon to perform any ceremony
derogatory to him as representing the sovereign of an independent nation,
on a footing of equality with that of China. On the other hand, he shall use
the same forms of ceremony and respect to his Majesty the Emperor as are
employed by the ambassadors, ministers, or diplomatic agents of her Maj-
esty towards the sovereigns of independent and equal European nations.
It is further agreed that her Majesty’s Government may acquire at
Beijing a site for building, or may hire Houses for the accommodation of
her Majesty’s mission, and that the Chinese Government will assist it in
so doing.
Her Majesty’s Representative shall be at liberty to choose his own
servants and attendants, who shall not be subjected to any kind of moles-
tation whatever.
Any person guilty of disrespect or violence to her Majesty’s repre-
sentative, or to any member of his family or establishment, in deed or
word, shall be severely punished.
[. . .]

Article VIII
The Christian religion, as professed by Protestants or Roman Catholics,
inculcates the practice of virtue and teaches man to do as he would be
done by. Persons teaching or professing it, therefore, shall alike be entitled
to the protection of the Chinese authorities, nor shall any such, peaceably
pursuing their calling, and not offending against the law, be persecuted
or interfered with.
90 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

Article IX

British subjects are hereby authorized to travel for their pleasure or for
purposes of trade, to all parts of the Interior, under passports which will
be issued by their consuls, and countersigned by the local authorities.
These passports, if demanded, must be produced for examination in the
localities passed through. If the passport be not irregular, the bearer will
be allowed to proceed, and no opposition shall be offered to his hiring
persons or hiring vessels for the carriage of his baggage or merchandise.
If he be without a passport, or if he commit any offence against the law,
he shall be handed over to the nearest consul for punishment, but he must
not be subjected to any ill-usage in excess of necessary restraint. No pass-
port need be applied for by persons going on excursions from the ports
open to trade to a distance not exceeding one hundred li, and for a period
not exceeding five days.
The provisions of this article do not apply to crews of ships, for the
due restraint of whom regulations will be drawn up by the consul and the
local authorities.

Article X
British merchant-ships shall have authority to trade upon the Great River
[Yangtze]. The upper and lower valley being, however, disturbed by out-
laws, no port shall be for the present opened to trade, with the exception
of Zhenjiang, which shall be opened in a year from the date of the signing
of this Treaty.

Article XI
In addition to the Cities and Towns of Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou,
Ningbo, and Shanghai, opened by the Treaty of Nanjing, it is agreed that
British subjects may frequent the Cities and Ports of Niuzhuang, Deng-
zhou, Taiwan, Chaozhou, and Qiongzhou.

Article XII
British subjects, whether at the ports or at other places, desiring to build
or open houses, warehouses, churches, hospitals, or burial-grounds, shall
make their agreement for the land or building they require, at the rates
prevailing among the people, equitably, and without exactions on either
side.

Article XIII
The Chinese Government will place no restrictions whatever upon the
employment, by British subjects, of Chinese subjects in any lawful capacity.

Article XIV
British subjects may hire whatever boats they please for the transport of
goods or passengers, and the sum to be paid for such boats shall be settled
between the parties themselves without the interference of the Chinese
Government.
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 91

Article XV
All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising
between British subjects, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British
authorities.

Article XVI

Chinese subjects who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British
subjects shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities accord-
ing to the Laws of China.
British subjects who may commit any crime in China shall be tried
and punished by the consul or other public Functionary authorized
thereto, according to the Laws of Great Britain.
Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.
[. . .]

Article L
All official communications, addressed by the diplomatic and consular
agents of her majesty the Queen to the Chinese authorities, shall, hence-
forth, be written in English. They will for the present be accompanied by a
Chinese version, but it is understood that, in the event of there being any
difference of meaning between the English and Chinese text, the English
Government will hold the sense as expressed in the English text to be the
correct sense. The provision is to apply to the treaty now negotiated, the
Chinese text of which has been carefully corrected by the English original.

Article LI
It is agreed that, henceforward, the Character “yi” (夷) [barbarian], shall
not be applied to the Government or subjects of her Britannic Majesty, in
any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese Authorities either in
the capital or in the provinces.

Article LII

British ships of War, coming for no hostile purpose of being engaged in the
pursuit of Pirates, shall be at liberty to visit all Ports within the Dominions
of the Emperor of China, and shall receive every facility for the purchase
of provisions, procuring water, and, if occasion require, for the making of
repairs. The commanders of such ships shall hold intercourse with the
Chinese authorities, on terms of equality and courtesy.
Done at Tianjin, this twenty-sixth day of June, in the year of our Lord
one Thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight; corresponding with the Chi-
nese date, the sixteenth day, fifth month, of the eighth year of Xianfeng.
(L.S.) Elgin and Kincardine.
Signatures and Seal of Chinese Plenipotentiaries
Separate article annexed to the Treaty concluded between Great Britain
and China, on the twenty-sixth day of June, in the year one thousand eight
hundred and fifty-eight.
92 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

It is hereby agreed that a sum of two millions of taels on account of the

losses sustained by British subjects, through the misconduct of the Chi-
nese authorities at Guangdong, and a further sum of two millions of taels
on account of the military expenses of the expedition which her Majesty
the Queen has been compelled to send out for the purpose of obtaining
redress, and of enforcing the due observance of Treaty provisions, shall
be paid to her Majesty’s representative in China by the authorities of the
Guangdong province.
The necessary arrangements with respect to the time and mode of
effecting these payments, shall be determined by her Majesty’s represen-
tative, in concert with the Chinese authorities of Guangdong.
When the above amounts shall have been discharged in full, the Brit-
ish forces will be withdrawn from the city of Guangzhou.
Done at Tianjin, this twenty-sixth day of June, in the year of our Lord
one Thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight; corresponding with the Chi-
nese date, the sixteenth day, fifth month, of the eighth year of Xianfeng.
(L.S.) [Earl of] Elgin and Kincardine.
Signatures and Seal of Chinese Plenipotentiaries

4.4 A NARRATIVE ON THE LOOTING AND PRIZE MONEY

AT THE YUANMING YUAN (OCTOBER 7, 1860)
The Allied forces of France and Britain marched to the Chinese capital in early
October 1860. However, neither army occupied Beijing. Instead, they marched to
the Yuanming Yuan, 12 miles north of the city. While French accounts accuse
the British of starting the looting, and British reports blame the French, there is
absolutely no doubt that both armies were heavily involved in pillaging the impe-
rial garden. What is often misunderstood or overlooked is how the two armies
organized and carried out the collection and distribution of plundered goods. The
items seized by the British were collected, cataloged, and auctioned off. Each Brit-
ish soldier received a share of the total public sale proceeds. Within a year, British
auction houses were offering “the emperor of China’s Great Seal of State” and
other items clearly listed as having originated from the Yuanming Yuan. Gar-
net Wolseley, who served as a quartermaster-general in the British armed forces,
offered the following account.

Questions
1. Why do you think the two European armies chose the imperial
garden as their target of their military operation?
2. What attitudes does Wolseley express with regard to the looting?

[At the Yuanming Yuan palace gates] about twenty badly-armed eunuchs
made some pretense at resistance but were quickly disposed of, and the
doors burst open, disclosing the sacred precincts of his Majesty’s resi-
dence, to what a Chinaman would call the sacrilegious gaze of the barbar-
ians. A mine of wealth and of everything curious in the empire lay as a
prey before our French allies. Rooms filled with articles of vertu [fine art]
both native and European, halls containing vases and jars of immense
value, and houses stored with silks, satins, and embroidery, were open
to them. Indiscriminate plunder and wanton destruction of all articles
too heavy for removal commenced at once. Guards were placed about in
various directions; but to no purpose. When looting is once commenced
by an army it is no easy matter to stop it. At such times human nature
breaks down the ordinary trammels which discipline imposes, and the
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 93

consequences are most demoralizing to the very best constituted army.

Soldiers are nothing more than grown-up schoolboys. The wild moments
of enjoyment passed in the pillage of a place live long in a soldier’s
memory. . . .
Officers and men seemed to have been seized with a temporary insanity;
in body and soul they were absorbed in one pursuit, which was plunder,
plunder. I stood by whilst one of the regiments was supposed to be parad-
ing; but although their fall in was sounded over and over again, I do not
believe there was an average of ten men a company present. Plundering
in this way bears its most evil fruit in an army; for if when it is once com-
menced an effort is made to stop it, the good men only obey; the bad sol-
diers continue to plunder, and become rich by their disobedience, whilst
the good ones see the immediate effect of their steadiness is to keep them
poor.
[. . .]
Our allies were so busy in the collection of their plunder that they did
not move upon Beijing until the 9th October. Numbers of our officers had
consequently an opportunity of visiting the palaces and securing valu-
ables; but our men were carefully prevented from leaving camp. Those
officers who were fortunate enough to have carts and time for amusement,
brought into camp large collections of valuables. It was naturally most ril-
ing to our soldiers to see their allies rolling in wealth, and even their own
officers all more or less provided with curiosities whilst they themselves
got nothing. It would have been very easy for the Commander-in-Chief
to have allowed our regiments to go out there one by one; but the state
in which the French army was then in, and the recollection of what ours
had been after the capture of Dehli were cogent reasons for avoiding such
an arrangement. Subsequent to Sir Hope Grant’s visit to the palaces upon
the 7th October, a room of treasure was discovered there, a small share of
which was secured for our army by the active exertions of Major Anson,
A.D.C., who had been appointed one of our prize agents. The treasure
chiefly consisted of golden ingots, the portion falling to our lot amount-
ing about eight or nine thousand pounds sterling. To have permitted our
officers to retain what they had personally taken from the palaces, whilst
the private soldier received nothing, would have been very hard upon
the latter. The Commander-in-Chief therefore issued an order directing
all officers to send in everything they had taken to the prize agents, who
had been nominated to receive all such property, for the purpose of hav-
ing it sold by public auction upon the spot and the proceeds distributed
immediately amongst the army.
The sale took place in front of the large joss-house at headquarters,
realizing 123,000 dollars, which enabled the prize agents to issue seven-
teen dollars (nearly four pounds sterling) to every private belonging to
our army. The officers were divided into three classes and received in
the same proportion. The Commander-in-Chief whose share would have
been considerable, renounced his claims; the Major-Generals, Sir John
Michel, K.C.B. and Sir Robert Napier, K.C.B., following his example. One
third went to the officers, two-thirds to the non-commissioned officers
and men.
Prize money is a subject well understood but seldom received by
our soldiers. . . . Any who have ever been present at the assault of a town
will, I am sure, agree with me in thinking that no price is too high which
we can pay for the prevention of those dreadful scenes of riot and conse-
quent insubordination which have upon several occasions followed such
an event. Discipline once relaxed as it must be when plunder is permitted,
94 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

its entire fabric of regulations breakdown in one moment, which it takes

many months of subsequent reorganization to reassert. If Sir Hope Grant
had contented himself with promising that the question of prize money
should be referred to the Home Government, after their recent Indian
experience, our men would have been very dissatisfied, seeing every
French soldier going about with his pockets filled with dollars and Sycee
silver. Indeed, I fear that the temptation would have been too great for
many of our men who knew that the Yuanming Yuan was only a few
miles off. The plan which he adopted, although novel, was thoroughly
successful, and all were pleased with its results.

SINO-JAPANESE WAR
Despite China’s many military encounters in the nineteenth century,
no military loss affected the Qing court and Chinese populace quite as
much as their defeat at the hands of the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese War
(1894–1895). For centuries, China had sat at the center of a vast tributary
network, with neighboring countries acknowledging China’s dominant
military, political, and commercial importance. These neighbors demon-
strated their fealty by sending periodic tribute missions to China’s court.
China, and most European observers, continued to give strong credence to
China’s traditional position as the East Asian powerhouse. Contemporary
observers all assumed Japan would be defeated quickly. It was a horrible
shock to China when Japan not only routed the Chinese troops dispatched
to Korea but with devastating precision demolished China’s navy. These
defeats dealt a savage blow to China’s national pride and were a shock to
many Western observers.
If the war eroded China’s confidence, the peace was excruciating.
With the Treaty of Shimonoseki (4.7), Japan proved itself fully as capable
as its European counterparts at extracting concessions, indemnities, and
territories. The Chinese public, who had been sheltered from the Qing mil-
itary’s lack of modernization, were whipped into a frenzy over the defeats
and were further enraged at what they perceived as Li Hongzhang’s sub-
missive acceptance of Japan’s peace terms. While the Qing dynasty sur-
vived for another 15 years, it would never recover psychologically from
the humiliation it received at the hands of the Japanese.

4.5 CHINA’S DECLARATION OF WAR (1894)

China’s Declaration of War on Japan is the first formal declaration of war ever
made by the Qing. Oddly casual while courteous in tone, China’s Declaration of
War underscores its discomfort over treating Japan as either an equal or as a trib-
utary. Despite its succinctness, one can sense the Zongli Yamen’s confidence that
Japan will regret their action. Perceiving Korea’s request for military assistance
as conforming to the centuries-long tributary relationship and having already
agreed to terms with Japan regarding Korea’s special rapport, China was stunned
by Japan’s forceful response.

Question
1. Why do you think China chose to go to war with Japan rather
than seeking a more diplomatic resolution?

The Prince Gong and the ministers of the Zongli Yamen issued a commu-
nication to Mr. Komura Japanese charge d’affaires at Beijing:
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 95

We had long hoped to settle by negotiation, without a rupture of our

friendship, the disagreements that existed between China and your coun-
try with reference to the affairs of Korea. On the 25th of July, however, at
the seaport of Yashan in Korea, your forces made an attack upon our ships.
Hostilities have therefore now begun, the treaties between our countries
are henceforth void and this Yamen, to its great regret, will in future treat
of no matters with you. Mr. Komura,
Chargê d’affaires of Japan
On the 29th day, 6th month, of the 29th year of the Guangxu reign [July 31,
1894].

4.6 JAPAN’S DECLARATION OF WAR (1894)

Japan’s desire to bring Korea within a more formal sphere of influence had long
been known to the Chinese. The speed with which Japan took the offensive after
Korea’s request for Chinese troops to defend their capital from a rebel attack
shocked many nations (not just the Chinese). Prior to the military engagements,
most European observers quietly assumed that China would make quick work
of the Japanese. Take special note of Japan’s awareness of the language of inter-
national law and how they lay the groundwork, prior to the war, for a post-war
settlement.
Questions
1. How does the Japanese declaration differ from that of China?
2. What points does Japan’s declaration seek to delineate regarding
Korea and Japan’s positions vis-à-vis China?

We, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on a Throne occu-

pied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make procla-
mation to all our loyal and brave subjects, as follows:
We hereby declare war against China, and we command each and
all our competent authorities, in obedience to our wish and with a view
to the attainment of the national aim, to carry on hostilities by sea and by
land against China, with all the means at their disposal consistently with
the Law of Nations.
During the past three decades of our reign, our constant aim has
been to further the peaceful progress of the country in civilization, and,
being sensible of the evils inseparable from complications with foreign
states, it has always been our pleasure to instruct our Minister of State to
labor for the promotion of friendly relations with our Treaty Powers. We
are gratified to know that the relations of our Empire with those Powers
have yearly increased in goodwill and in friendship. Under the circum-
stances, we were unprepared for such a conspicuous want of amity and of
good faith as has been manifested by China in her conduct towards this
country in connection with the Korean affair.
Korea is an independent State. She was first introduced into the fam-
ily of nations by the advice and guidance of Japan. It has, however, been
China’s habit to designate Korea as her dependency, and both openly and
secretly to interfere with her domestic affairs. At the time of the recent
insurrection in Korea, China dispatched troops thither, alleging that her
purpose was to afford a succor to her dependent State. We, in virtue of the
treaty concluded with Korea in 1882, and looking to possible emergencies,
caused a military force to be sent to that country.
96 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

TRIPLE Wishing to procure for Korea freedom from the calamity of perpet-
INTERVENTION— ual disturbance, and thereby to maintain the peace of the East in general,
Germany, France, and Japan invited China’s co-operation for the accomplishment of the object.
Russia, ostensibly seeking But China, advancing various pretexts, declined Japan’s proposal. There-
to help the Qing empire but upon Japan advised Korea to reform her administration so that order and
acting more in self-interest, tranquility might be preserved at home, and so that the country might be
forced Japan to return able to discharge the responsibilities and duties of an independent State
territory in northeastern abroad. Korea has already consented to undertake the task. But China has
China in exchange for secretly and insidiously endeavored to circumvent and to thwart Japan’s
an additional payment purpose. She has further procrastinated and endeavored to make war-
to Japan of 30 million like preparations both on land and at sea. When those preparations were
taels. Quickly thereafter, completed she not only sent large reinforcements to Korea, with a view
Russia, Germany, and to the forcible attainment of her ambitious designs, but even carried her
France each demanded a arbitrariness and insolence to the extent of opening fire upon our ships
territorial concession in in Korean waters. China’s plain object is to make it uncertain where the
exchange for their role in responsibility resides of preserving peace and order in Korea, and not
the intervention. only to weaken the position of that state in the family of nations—a posi-
tion obtained for Korea through Japan’s efforts—but also to obscure the
significance of the treaties recognizing and confirming that position. Such
conduct on the part of China is not only a direct injury to the rights and
interests of this Empire, but also a menace to the permanent peace and
tranquility of the Orient. Judging from her actions it must be concluded
that China from the beginning has been bent upon sacrificing peace to the
attainment of her sinister object. In this situation, ardent as our wish is to
promote the prestige of the country abroad by strictly peaceful methods,
we find it impossible to avoid a formal declaration of war against China.
It is our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valor of our faithful subjects,
peace may soon be permanently restored and the glory of the Empire be
augmented and completed.
Given this 1st day of the eighth month of the 27th year of Meiji.
(His Imperial Majesty’s Sign-manual)
Counter-Signatures of the Minister President of State of the other Minis-
ters of State.

4.7 TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI (APRIL 17, 1895)

Surprising even the Western powers, it was Japan’s demands for territorial
acquisitions and a sizable indemnity in the Treaty of Shimonoseki that pushed
Japan’s imperialist aspirations to new heights and achieved a new low for
Qing China. With a vision far more strategic than any of the previous trea-
ties with European or American governments, Japan aggressively staked out
a sphere of control that stretched from the Qing Manchurian homelands in
northeast China to the eastern Chinese province of Taiwan. This territorial
conquest, combined with the implicit acknowledgement that Korea would fall
under Japan’s influence, meant that, with one treaty, Japan had moved from
a seemingly peripheral power to one that became a major threat to China’s
autonomy. Several of the European powers would, in what is referred to as the
Triple Intervention, force Japan to return much of the northeastern Chinese
territory (Fengtian).

Questions
1. In what ways does the Treaty of Shimonoseki mirror the earlier
treaties China signed with the Western powers? In what ways
does it differ?
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 97

2. Looking at the visual source at the beginning of this chapter, how

do Japan’s territorial demands strengthen Japan’s presence in
East Asia?

Article I
China recognizes definitively the full and complete independence and
autonomy of Korea, and, in consequences, the payment of tribute and the
performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China, in dero-
gation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the
future.

Article II

China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following ter-
ritories, together with all fortifications thereon:
The southern portion of the province of Fengtian within the follow-
ing boundaries:
The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and
ascends that stream to the mouth of the River Anping, from thence the
line runs to Fenghuang, from thence to Haicheng, from thence to Yingkou,
forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The
places above named are included in the ceded territory. When the line
reaches the River Liao at Yingkou, it follows the course of that stream to
its mouth, where it terminates. The mid-channel of the River Liao shall be
taken as line of demarcation.
This cession also includes all islands appertaining or belonging to
the province of Fengtian situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Lia-
odong and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea.
The island of Formosa [Taiwan], together with all islands appertain-
ing or belonging to the said island of Formosa.
The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the
119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and
24th degrees of north latitude.

Article IV
China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000
Kuping Taels [Treasury taels]; the said sum to be paid in eight installments.

Article V

The inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, who wish to take up their
residence outside of the ceded districts, shall be at liberty to sell their real
property and retire.
For this purpose, a period of two years from the date of exchange
of the ratifications of the present act shall be granted. At the expiration of
that period, those of the inhabitants who shall not have left said territories
shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed Japanese subjects.
Each of the two Governments shall immediately upon the exchange
of the ratifications of the present act send one or more commissioners to
Taiwan to effect a final transfer of that province, and within the space of
two months after the exchange of the ratification of this act such transfer
shall be completed.
98 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

Article VI

All treaties between China and Japan having come to an end, in conse-
quences of war, China engages immediately upon the exchange of the
ratifications of this act, to appoint plenipotentiaries to conclude with the
Japanese Plenipotentiaries, a treaty of commerce and navigation and con-
vention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade.
The treaties, conventions, and regulations now subsisting between
China and European powers shall serve as a basis for the said treaty and
convention between China and Japan. From the date of the exchange of the
ratification of this Act until the said treaty and convention are brought into
actual operation, the Japanese Government, its officials, commerce, navi-
gation, frontier intercourse and trade industries, ships, and subjects, shall
in every respect be accorded by China most-favored-nation treatment.
China makes, in addition, the following concessions, to take effect
six months after the date of the present Act: —
First. The following cities, towns, and ports, in addition to those
already opened to the trade, residence, industries, and manufactures
of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same
privileges and facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns, and
ports of China:
Shashi, in the province of Hubei.
Chongqing, in the province of Sichuan.
Suzhou, in the province of Jiangsu.
Hangzhou, in the province of Zhejiang.
The Japanese Government shall have the right to station consuls at
any or all of the above-named places.
Second. Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag, for
the conveyance of passengers and cargo, shall be extended to the
following places:
On the Upper Yangtze River, from Yichang to Chongqing.
On the Wusong River and the canal, from Shanghai to Suzhou
and Hangzhou.
[. . .]
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed
the same and affixed thereto the seal of their arms.
Done at Shimonoseki, in duplicate, this 23rd day of the 3rd
month of the 21st year of Guangxu, corresponding to the 17th day of
the 4th month of the 28th year of Meiji.
Li Hongzhang, [L.S.]
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China
Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent
Senior Grand Secretary of State
Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China
Viceroy of the Province of Zhili
Earl of the First Rank
Count Ito Hirobumi, [L.S.]
Junii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 99

Minister President of State

Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan
Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu
Junji, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan.

4.8 LI HONGZHANG, “AFTERTHOUGHTS

OF THE JAPANESE WAR” (JUNE 30, 1895)
With virtually no leverage to negotiate with Japan, elderly and ill, Li Hongzhang
traveled to the country to hammer out the peace treaty. Faulted at home for the
military defeats, Li was unprepared for the aggressive negotiation tactics adopted
by the Japanese. Only after Li was shot through the cheek in a failed assassina-
tion attempt by a Japanese ultra-nationalist did Japanese negotiators scale back
their demands. Upon his return to China, Li faced almost universal condemna-
tion from the Chinese public, who had been badly misled by conservative Qing
officials about China’s prospects at war and in peace negotiations. While Li lays
the bulk of the blame at the feet of the Japanese, his comments also show a remark-
able degree of self-delusion regarding Japan’s own intentions and China’s abilities
to defend itself.

Questions
1. Why does Li feel betrayed by Japan’s military actions in Korea?
2. While Li Hongzhang is often portrayed as a progressive reformer
in late imperial China, how do his comments reflect a lingering
traditional outlook?

It was the Empress [Cixi] herself, for His Majesty, who commanded me
to go. For the first time in all my acquaintanceship with Her Glorious and
Illustrious Majesty, I had occasion to feel a sense of pity. I had always
revered, or, at least, happily and loyally obeyed her; but now it seemed as
if the aged Viceroy was her only hope. And I left for Japan with these cruel
words ringing in my ears:
“You made the war; now see if you can unmake it without humiliat-
ing your country before the dogs of Nippon.” . . .
When I arrived in Japan, and the usual formal courtesies were
over with, Count Ito personally called upon me at my place of tempo-
rary abode, and we chatted as old-time friends rather than peace ambas-
sadors of two neighboring nations that were thirsting for each other’s
blood. There can be no question but that the people in north and central
China and the entire people of the Japanese Empire were feverish for a
continuation of the war. What poor fools the populace at times make of
themselves, more especially when they do not have even a fair inking of
what is at stake! . . .
My very first proposition to the conference was that an immediate
armistice be declared. I urged that inasmuch as we, the fully accredited
representatives of our respective nations, were there assembled for the
avowed purpose of arranging a peace protocol, it was extremely strange
if the very governments which had sent us upon our missions should at
the same moment and hour be issuing orders to generals in the field and
admirals on the sea.
100 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

I spoke for some time upon this phase, one of the longest addresses
of the kind I ever made; and when I had finished there was silence for
many minutes. This was followed by the retiring of Count Ito and his col-
leagues to a part of the room by themselves; after which they took their
places, and Count Ito said:
“Your Excellency’s proposal is agreeable to us as representatives
of Mutsuhito, His Imperial Japanese Majesty; but we are compelled to
demand that during at least the period of the armistice the Chinese Gov-
ernment shall turn over for safe keeping the fortress and munitions per-
manent at Dagu and Shanhaiguan, the railway and rolling stock of the
Tianjin line, free of every interference, and the fort and munitions, perma-
nent at the city of Tianjin.”
“Are those your best and only terms?” I asked as calmly as I could of
the Mikado’s chief ambassador.
“They are the only terms for an armistice,” he replied.
“Then let the war go on while we talk peace,” I answered.
When I was again in my abode and alone, I went over the situation
phase by phase and step by step, and reluctantly I am to the conclusion
that the Japanese Government meant to impose about the hardest condi-
tions possible to any terms of peace. . . .
But China was wholly unprepared for a conflict with Japan, and
it is with no sense of personal boasting that I say that no one knew this
terrible fact better than myself. Yet I had been in favor always of main-
taining our position in Korea, for that country had been for centuries
the vassal of China; and had she not been a lone long peninsula run-
ning down in isolation from Manchuria, the Japanese would never have
deemed themselves as possessed of any more rights there than in Shan-
dong, or my native Anhui. But for the sake of peace with her neighbor
China had agreed, in the Convention of 1884, at Tianjin, when Count Ito
also represented his country, that both our nations should withdraw their
troops from the country, and allow the King of Korea to look after all
internal disturbances of that realm. And it was further agreed, to this
solemn effect: “that in case of any grave disturbance occurring within the
kingdom of Korea, of great moment or concern to China or Japan, such
as might of necessity call for troops from the outside for the suppression
thereof, it is hereby understood and agreed that they shall give, each to
the other, previous notice in writing of their intention to send a force;
and that after the matter which made the call for such troops necessary
is settled, such troops shall forthwith be withdrawn, and other troops
shall not be further stationed at any place or point within the recognized
kingdom of Korea.” . . .
Had not the Japanese Government been determined to possess Korea
at any cost, some time or another, it would not have hastened to dispatch
an army corps to that country immediately—immediately, I repeat—upon
receiving the bare information that Chinese troops had gone to Seoul
in response to the appeal of the King of Korea. China did not force her
troops upon Korea, nor did she seek for an opportunity nor an excuse
to do so. On the contrary, the Throne and Government were quite will-
ing, even anxious, that Korea attends to her own affairs. That country had
long been a considerable burden upon China, and while there was, and
is, and always will be, the kindliest and most sympathetic bonds between
the Hermit Kingdom, so called, and the Chinese Empire, the latter country
had nothing to gain, even by substantially and politically incorporating
Korea as a province to be governed from a vice-regal yamen in Seoul or
more directly from the Northern Capital.
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 101

4.9 JOHN HAY’S OPEN DOOR NOTE (SEPTEMBER 6, 1899) SPHERES OF INTEREST
(SPHERES OF
In the wake of the Sino-Japanese War and the ensuing Triple Intervention of INFLUENCE)—Areas of
Germany, France, and Russia (into the settlement of the war), there was a grow- China in which a specific
ing sense that China could be divided up into spheres of interest. In 1899, US Western power was said to
Secretary of State John Hay, worried that the United States would be denied hold particular interest but
commercial access to China, sought to forge an agreement among the Western no specific powers during
powers present in the country. Hay’s agreement would allow an “open door” to the late nineteenth century.
all countries in all areas. Quite indicative of the period, China was not consulted,
much to the chagrin of the increasingly impotent Chinese diplomatic corps. Far
from exhibiting an anti-imperialistic tone, as is often asserted, the agreement
simply suggested the empire should remain open to all foreign nations on an
equal basis.
Questions
1. What are the key elements of the Open Door Note?
2. Why do you think the granting of Germany’s holdings at Jiaozhou
(Qingdao) was the catalyst for such an agreement?
John Hay, U.S. Secretary of State to Andrew D. White, US Ambassador to
Germany
Washington, September 6, 1899
Sir: At the time when the Government of the United States was in-
formed by that of Germany that it had leased from His Majesty the
Emperor of China the port of Jiaozhou [Qingdao] and the adjacent
territory in the province of Shantung, assurances were given to the
ambassador of the United States at Berlin by the Imperial German min-
ister for foreign affairs that the rights and privileges insured by treaties
with China to citizens of the United States would not thereby suffer or
be in anywise impaired within the area over which Germany had thus
obtained control.
More recently, however, the British Government recognized by a
formal agreement with Germany the exclusive right of the latter coun-
try to enjoy in said leased area and the contiguous “sphere of influence
or interest” certain privileges, more especially those relating to railroads
and mining enterprises; but as the exact nature and extent of the rights
thus recognized have not been clearly defined, it is possible that serious
conflicts of interest may at any time arise not only between British and
German subjects within said area, but that the interests of our citizens may
also be jeopardized thereby.
Earnestly desirous to remove any cause of irritation and to insure
at the same time to the commerce of all nations in China the undoubted
benefits which should accrue from a formal recognition by the various
powers claiming “spheres of interest” that they shall enjoy perfect equal-
ity of treatment for their commerce and navigation within such “spheres,”
the Government of the United States would be pleased to see His German
Majesty’s Government give formal assurances, and lend its cooperation
in securing like assurances from the other interested powers, that each,
within its respective sphere of whatever influence—
First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested
interest within any so-called “sphere of interest” or leased territory it may
have in China.
Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply
to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said
“sphere of interest” (unless they be “free ports”), no matter to what na-
102 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

tionality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the
Chinese Government.
Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another
nationality frequenting any port in such “sphere” than shall be levied on
vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines
built, controlled, or operated within its “sphere” on merchandise belong-
ing to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such a
“sphere” than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own
nationals transported over equal distances.
[. . .]
In view of the present favorable conditions, you are instructed to
submit the above considerations to His Imperial Germany Majesty’s
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to request his early consideration of the
subject.
Copy of this instruction is sent to our ambassadors at London and at
St. Petersburg for their information.
I have, etc. JOHN HAY.

Daily Life and Culture

Historians of China typically place considerable emphasis on the signif-
icance of the imperial court, emperor, and China’s interaction with the
West in describing late imperial China. This is in large part do the plethora
of written documents available to the historian from (and about) these
sources. Yet, such sources by definition tell us less about what life was
like for the typical Chinese subject during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries while projecting idealized concepts about the society as a whole.
Although few non-elite (and usually non-literate) Chinese accounts sur-
vive, there remain several avenues to obtain insight into the lives of the
common Chinese subject. This is particularly important since the Chi-
nese populace were overwhelmingly non-elites. China during the Qing
dynasty was effectively a land-based economy and so the procurement
(and maintenance) of land was of preeminent importance. The law code
as well as individual aspiration often revolved around the buying, selling,
and controlling of land (4.11). Together such snapshots can offer a fuller (if
still incomplete) portrait of Chinese society.

4.10 DESCRIPTION OF CHINESE FAMILY LIFE (1883)

What does a typical nineteenth-century Chinese family look like? With statis-
tics thin on the ground in late imperial China, first-person descriptions offer one
of the few opportunities to get a better picture of Chinese society. The follow-
ing life history recorded in the English-language periodical China Review is
offered by an “expectant official”—one of tens of thousands who had passed the
lowest rung of the examination and still attempting to pass the next level—who
lived in the central Chinese province of Hunan. While deceptively simple, the
document contains a wealth of cultural and social norms that defined life in late
imperial China.

Questions
1. How representative do you think this description of a Chinese
family is of traditional China more broadly?
2. Would you think this man is well off, just getting by, or poor?
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 103

I am a Hunan man from the District of Baling, in the Yuezhou prefecture.

Our family has been in Hunan since the Song Dynasty, when my ancestor
from Jiangxi, who held office in Hunan, [was] moved there. We have of
course a genealogical register, but I know no more than that there have
been from 20–30 generations of us since our immigration. We have lost all
trace of our Jiangxi relatives, and of our tombs there. Our modern cem-
eteries are in several places, and not in one spot. My mother is still alive,
aged 68, but my father died in the year of 1855, at the age of 41. I was then
20 years of age; and, being the eldest of three sons, left the management
of our property to my mother. If my mother had married again it would
not have been respectable, but under such circumstances, what can a son
do? He cannot throw her over; for, whatever principle is involved, she is
still his mother. My next younger brother died young. Then comes a sis-
ter, aged 40, with two sons and two daughters. Then another sister with
two daughters. Then another brother, aged 35, with five sons: he has no
particular occupation beyond looking after family interests. Then comes a
brother aged 30, still studying: he has one son and one daughter. Lastly a
sister, aged 28, with one son and two daughters. Of course, the sisters no
longer belong to our family. I myself have had four sons and five daugh-
ters. The two eldest children, girls, died at the ages of 20 and 7 respec-
tively. My eldest son, now 20, was married last year. The next child is a
girl, aged 17, unengaged. Then a girl, aged 14, engaged to an old playmate
of hers. Then sons, aged 10 and 8; then a daughter; and lastly a son aged 4.
We have between us three brothers about 1,000 tiao of land. . . . On
the death of a brother, his share goes to his male children, but no division
is necessarily made. Our mother, if she chooses, can exercise great influ-
ence in matters of property. In cases of difference of opinion, our mother’s
would probably prevail. My father had no occupation; neither had my
grandfather. My great grandfather was an educational officer. Beyond his
father (my paternal grandfather [gaozu]) I know nothing in detail. Wills
are not in vogue where I come from; but adoptions, i.e. by uncles, are
common. So also is it not uncommon for one man to serve as son to two
brothers. If he is rich, he has two wives, the sons of each wife calling the
other wife “elder brother’s wife” [bomu] and “younger brother’s wife”
[shenniang] respectively, and, in matters of mourning, treating them as
aunts, although wives of the same man, their father. If he is not rich, his
eldest son will be grandson to his father, and the next to his uncle. With
us concubines are not common, unless the wife has no children. My wife
is now 44 years of age.
About 20 years ago I purchased a degree [ligong] for 200 taels, and
since then I have been a sort of secretary or scribe, but not an official. Two
years ago I purchased an Assistant District Magistrate [xiancheng] for 500
taels; and, as I have friends in the border province where I am serving,
I hope to make money some time or other. At present there are 200 expect-
ants of my class for 16 vacancies. Before the sale of office was abolished last
year, I could have purchased a second-class sub-prefect [tongban] for 300
taels or more, or a district [xian] for 2000 taels. Though the former ranks
above the latter, he is only an auxiliary office [zuoza]; hence the anomaly.
I would gladly abandon officialdom and go home; but, during these years
of expectancy, I have been borrowing right and left and must pay off my
liabilities. If I get office, I must take with me a harpy called a “daduzi”, who
will watch my gains, and gradually obtain repayment of advance. I may
either pay him 3 per cent a month interest, or pay off the principal. These
fellows are very dangerous if you let them interfere in public business.
We expectants are miserably off, many of us literally beggars of our food.
104 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

With us in Hunan the head of the family [zuzhang], is not an institution.

Each branch arranges its own affairs, or leaves them to the ablest relative.

4.11 LEGAL CASE STUDY: FRAUDULENT SALE

OF LAND (1889)
Land constituted, for most Chinese, the most valuable commodity obtainable. In
addition, Confucian prejudice against commercial ventures predisposed many
Chinese toward purchasing land as an investment to be handed down through
the generations. Chinese law reflected this predisposition protecting landown-
ers and inclined to protect the landowner rights over that of a renter, lessee, or
even buyer. Government lands, especially those in the Manchu “homelands”
of northeastern China, were protected and afforded a special status. As the
following cases point out, any attempt at land fraud was dealt with extremely
harshly.

Questions
1. What role does intent play in the penalty/sentencing the imperial
officials meted out?
2. Why would land be of significant interest to the imperial state?

Sale of Land (Case #1)

Li Sheng, the proprietor of a coal mine in the Beijing district, being on

account of illness unable to look after it himself, appointed Zhang Yong-
sheng to manage it for him. The latter asked for some written authority
that he might produce, if called on to do so, and fraudulently induced Li
to sign a document giving him the mine. He then inserted his own name
in the contract with the workmen, who duly appended their signatures
thereto.
As he had received instructions from Li to look after the mine and
in addition had written authority to that effect, his offence is not quite so
aggravated as that of wrongfully taking possession of the estate of others,
and he was accordingly sentenced to a punishment on a degree less severe
than that for the latter crime, namely one hundred blows and banishment
for three years.

Sale of Land (Case #2)

A Qisuo held, on lease from one of the Imperial Princesses, 99 mu of land,
which had been allotted to her by Imperial Decree and was thus Govern-
ment property, so to speak. He was repeatedly called upon by the Prefect
to give up the land and pay the due rent and on being arrested made his
escape. After a few years he returned and again took possession of the
land, alleging it to be his own property and refusing to pay rent for it, at
the same time inducing the other tenants to pursue a similar course. In
accordance with the punishment due to all those who take possession of
land in a Government settlement, if it be over 50 mu in extent, he was sen-
tenced to transportation to the nearest frontier.

Sale of Land (Case #3)

Dong Wu, a small official in the Neiwufu [Qing imperial Household
Agency], had a piece of ground which he gave up to the Government by
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 105

whom it was entered on the Banner Roll as public property, and as such
it could not, of course, be disposed of by private sale. It was lent to him
shortly afterwards to build a house on, when he took the opportunity of
selling, alleging it to be people’s land [mindi]. For this he was punished in
accordance with the number of stripes allotted to all who fraudulently dis-
pose of other people’s property, increased by two degrees, as the property
he had disposed of belonged to the Government.

Sale of Land (Case #4)

Huang Tianrong, a soldier who had been dismissed of service, although
well aware that all uncultivated ground (the expression used is tantang)
is Government property on which no trespassing is allowed, forcibly took
possession of a piece of such land and let it out to a tenant, who paid him
rent, as if it were his own. It appeared, however, that his late grandfather
had been the first to cultivate the ground and raise a crop on it, so that he
could hardly be punished to the full extent for his offence, and his punish-
ment was reduced by one degree, but as he was an ex-soldier, this reduc-
tion was counterbalanced by the increase of one degree which falls to be
inflicted on such individuals.

Sale of Land (Case #5)

Xian Yiyue took possession of land which had formed in the middle of
a river and proceeded to sell the land. On the appearance, however, of
a proclamation by the District Magistrate forbidding such practices, he
discontinued the sales. As his case differed from that of those who fraud-
ulently take permanent possession of Government and other people’s
property, his punishment is reduced by one degree.

Sale of Land (Case #6)

Xu Baozhou bought a piece of land from Hu Juewen, although at the time
aware of the fact that his ground was part of a lot which had descended by
inheritance to the whole of the Xu family, and which Juewen had no right
to sell, notwithstanding his statement to the effect that it was “re-formed
land” which had been duly entered on the register. There is no provision
made in law regulating the punishment of those who buy land although
aware of the fraudulent nature of the transaction; but in the law of mort-
gages it is laid down that if the mortgagee is aware that the mortgagor is
raising a second mortgage on a piece of land and notwithstanding such
knowledge closes the transaction, his guilt shall be held equal to that of
the mortgagor, so in the present case Xu Baozhou’s, the buyer’s guilt, was
held to be equal to that of Xu Juewen, the seller.

Sale of Land (Case #7)

Wang Chaozuo mortgaged a piece of land to Zhou Pingfu, reserving to
himself the right of redemption. As the soil was extremely fertile, Zhou
tried to get possession of it in the following way. He made an exact copy of
the deed of mortgage, fraudulently however inserting the flowing clause:
“should the mortgagor through lack of funds be unable to redeem the land,
the mortgagee is permitted to pay the land tax on it in his stead,” hoping
that if his payment of the land tax had been officially sanctioned, he would
be able to debar Wang from redeeming the property. In summing up the
106 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

case, it was held that as he, as a matter of fact, had an interest in the land,
his conduct was not so reprehensible as if he had taken possession by a
fictitious agreement, without due pecuniary consideration, of the land of
another, and his punishment was accordingly reduced by one degree.

4.12 LEGAL CASE STUDY: MARRIAGE (1882)

It was expected that all young Chinese girls—aside from those prominent
exceptions who chose to become a Buddhist nun, concubine, or courtesan—
would be married by their mid-to-late teens. According to the Confucian ideal,
women should only ever marry one man. Although, in practice, widows were
permitted to re-marry after a mourning period (usually three years), late
imperial Chinese political culture esteemed those widows who remained chaste
while educating her children. Memorial arches were erected for them, and biog-
raphies of them placed in local histories. As the following legal cases indicate,
however, life as a widow was rarely easy and economically often a burden on
close relatives. The Qing legal code firmly sided on moral, not economic, inter-
ests of families.
Questions
1. From the following legal cases, what benefits did women receive
from the strict legal interpretations of the Confucian model of
widowhood?
2. How did the Qing government treat those who forced widows to
remarry against their will?

Case #1: Remarriage of a Widow While in Mourning

A man named Yang Zhangchun belonging to Beijing had gone to Guang-
dong in the delegation of an official and there died. As the family were
poor and as the deceased had left no children it was arranged by the
mother of the widow, in consultation with the mother of deceased, that
the widow should return to her old home and be re-married. This was
done and she was forthwith married to a man named Ren Dongxin.
A brother of the deceased, who had never been satisfied as to the circum-
stances of the death, laid a plaint against the widow on the ground of the
premature re-marriage—and the Provincial Courts held that the marriage
having taken place before the expiry of the legal period of mourning for
the first husband, was contrary to law and void, and decreed that the par-
ties should be separated. Against this decree the husband Ren Dongxin
appealed. The Board reversed the decision on the ground that, though
in accordance with the letter of the law, yet considering that this second
marriage was arranged by the woman’s mother, that the husband was in
ignorance of the fact of her being a widow in mourning, and that there
was no prior illicit intercourse between the parties, it would be doing vio-
lence to the woman’s feelings if she were now compelled to change her
condition a third time. Moreover, it would be unreasonable to remove her
from the husband’s family who were innocent parties for the benefit of the
family of her mother who was the person really to blame in the transac-
tion. The Board further adds that in cases where a man had sold his wife
through extreme poverty as wife to another man, they have upheld such
unions under the particular circumstances, notwithstanding that they are
forbidden in the code, and on the same principle Ren Dongxin may keep
his wife.
 Chapter 4 • The Deepening Crisis of Imperialism 107

Case #2: Marriage with a Woman Who Has Been Betrothed to

One’s Brother
Su Zongde betrothed his niece Su Dage with due formalities to one Liu
Ba. Before the marriage was completed Liu Ba absconded and was never
afterwards heard of again. After a lapse of 8 years Su Zongde, fearing his
niece should lose her chance of matrimony, engaged her to a brother of the
first intended—another brother—Liu Mei acting as negotiator on his side.
This engagement was afterwards carried out and the marriage completed.
On the case coming before the authorities, it was held that the marriage
was illegal, and that the parties must be separated. The negotiators on
both sides were sentenced to banishment. This decision was upheld on
reference to the Supreme Authorities at Beijing, on the principle that a
formal betrothal was sufficient to constitute the relationship of man and
wife between the parties, and inasmuch as no one can marry the widow or
divorced wife of a brother or other relation within the degrees of mourn-
ing, so neither can he marry one who has legally put herself in the position
of a wife. It would have been quite competent for Su Zongde, after appli-
cation to the authorities, grounded on the undue absence of the intended
husband, to have married his niece to a stranger, but under no circum-
stances could she have been married to one of that family. As the case was
novel and there was no precedent to be found like it, it was directed to that
a circular of instructions should be sent to all the provincial authorities
enclosing a copy of the Decision for their guidance.

Case #3: Brother-in-law Seeking Remarriage of Sister-in-Law

to Procure Property
The prisoner Guo Shina was the [paternal cousin] of Guo Shilou who had
died long ago leaving a widow and a son. He left also some nine mu of
land and some houses which the widow was in possession of. Her young
son and only child having died she, with the assent of her mother’s family,
got a nephew by the mother’s side (a son of a her brother’s) to come over
and live with her—a young lad named Fu Geliang. Guo Shina being hard
up and wishing to get possession of the property left by his brother, went
one evening along with another relation of the family to visit the widow,
and told her he wished her to remarry. She cried and swore, and Guo
Shina lost his temper and said “he would find a master and they would
force her to marry,” whereupon she cried and stormed all the more until
the neighbors came in and persuaded the visitors to go away. After they
had gone, she said to her nephew with tears that having kept her widow-
hood for so long, she would rather die than remarry, and although she
retired to rest pacified, that same night she put an end to her existence.
The provincial court held that this case differed from that of actually using
violence to compel remarriage, inasmuch as the woman had only been
frightened with empty words. The penalty for compelling a remarriage of
a widow in the degree of relationship in which they stood to each other is
strangulation after the usual term of imprisonment, and under the circum-
stances this was mitigated to banishment for life. This sentence, though at
first queried by the Board, was afterwards upheld and confirmed.
 CHAPTER 5
Seeking to Solve China’s Ills
Late Imperial China (1644–1911)Seeking to Solve China’s Ills

1 3

2 4

7
5

6
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 109

1. WHO WAS A BOXER?: Boxers were typically young and male. Many were around 19 or 20 years
of age, but some were as young as 12 or as old as 40. Most of the Boxers were poor peasants, though
many landowners also joined. The term “Boxer” was used by Westerners at the time to describe any
anti-foreign violence. The Chinese term for the movement itself was “Boxers United in Righteous-
ness” [Yihetuan] and delimited to uprisings confined to northern China.

2. BOXER MAGIC: Boxer magic was a unique blend of ritual and theater that was based on mass
spirit possession. The Boxers believed that, with a specific combination of spells and series of spe-
cific gestures, spirit deities would possess their bodies. These deities tended to be individuals from
works of popular fiction, like Sun Wukong (“Monkey”) from The Journey to the West or Guan Gong
from The Three Kingdoms—both epic tales with which virtually every Chinese from the age of four
was familiar. Boxer spirit masters also plied a variety of other spells, amulets, and incantations to
provide them with extra strength, speed, and even the ability to fly (5.6).

3. NORTH CHINA PLAIN: The Boxers emerged largely out of the North China Plain, though anti-
foreign massacres occurred in many other areas of China. North China in the years leading up to
the Boxer Uprising experienced several years of repeated droughts, crop failures, and general hard-
ship. This coincided with a surge in the presence of Western missionaries, the extension of railroads
and telegraphs, and new foreign concessions. The top picture was likely taken in 1900 in the North
Chinese cities of Beijing and Tianjin.

4. BOXER WEAPONS: While there are some instances of Boxers using matchlock style rifles, most
Boxers shunned the usage of guns, perceiving them as foreign. Instead, most Boxers were armed
with spears, swords, or even knives, believing that spirit possession would protect them. Across
their chests, they would wear chest coverings with magical protective qualities.

5. BOXER ANTI-FOREIGNISM: Boxers renounced all foreign things and classified all Chinese who
interacted with foreigners and used foreign items into three categories: 1) “Hairy ones” [maozi]
referred to the foreigners themselves, 2) “Secondary Hairy ones” [er maozi] were Chinese Christian
converts and Chinese who worked for foreigners, and 3) “Tertiary Hairy ones” [san maozi] were
those Chinese who sold or used foreign books, fountain pens, matches, or foreign-style umbrellas.
Boxers renounced all foreign things and all Chinese who interacted with foreigners and used for-
eign items.

6. EIGHT NATION ALLIANCE [baguo lianjun]: The Boxers’ focus on, and killing of, foreigners
attracted considerable international attention and ultimately an alliance of eight nations (Britan,
Germany, France, Austro-Hungry, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the United States). The largest force, by
a considerable margin, was that of Japan, who had to wait for several months for the other allied
nation forces to arrive, greatly delaying any military action.

7. FOREIGN INTEREST: The progress of this eight-nation force was closely followed by the home
nations, and often accounts were serialized with highly detailed, and often highly imaginative,
engravings. As indicated in this Japanese illustration, the forces, though allied, fought as separate
units, allowing many nations to see up close how other nations were modernizing their troops
and altering their strategies. Global public outrage also fueled the Eight Nation Alliance to pursue
highly punitive conditions, including an indemnity that amounted to twice the Qing government’s
total budget (5.8).
110 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

DOWAGER EMPRESS— On November 14, 1908, the Guangxu emperor died at the age of 37. His
Dowager indicates the life ended in much the same way as it had been lived, in the shadow of
empress is widowed. In his aunt, the Dowager Empress Cixi (1834–1908). She would die within
Cixi’s case, the term is an hours of his death. From her deathbed, she orchestrated her third and final
oversimplification since she installation of a child emperor on China’s imperial throne. For 48 years,
was the widowed mother her decisions had, for better or worse, defined Chinese domestic and exter-
of the Tongzhi emperor, nal policies. There remains today an image both shadowy and sinister of
the aunt of the Guangxu this woman who reigned from behind the curtain [chuilian tingzheng].
emperor and the great-aunt Such a characterization simultaneously exaggerates her sinister powers
of the Xuantong emperor and diminishes her productive accomplishments in China’s history. While
(better known as Puyi, the Chinese imperial customs stipulated that only male heirs could sit on the
last emperor). throne, there were historic precedents for a woman to take the reins of
power when exigency, expediency, and personal ambition converged. In
BEHIND THE CURTAIN 1861, with the Taiping Rebellion raging, Western imperialism at its height,
[chuilian tingzheng]— and a budding reform movement taking shape in China, the ambitious
During both of Cixi’s mother of the new emperor found her moment in history.
regencies, to the Tongzhi Born in 1834 to Manchu parents, Cixi entered the Forbidden City at
and Guangxu emperors, the age of 16 as an imperial courtesan. She caught the attention of the Xian-
when the young emperor feng emperor (1851–1861) and soon gave birth to his only son, elevating her
sat on the throne for any status to imperial consort and secondary wife. In 1861, after the emperor’s
audience with his officials, sudden illness and demise, her six-year-old son ascended the throne as the
the empress would sit Tongzhi emperor (1862–1875). Because her son was too young to rule on
behind a silk curtain his own, Cixi, with the Xianfeng emperor’s widow Ci’an, and Prince Yixin
(or, by some accounts, a became the young emperor’s regents and prevented other challengers to
decorative screen), where the throne. When the Tongzhi emperor died 14 years later (some say as the
she could hear everything result of syphilis, others small pox), Cixi engineered the selection of her
said to and by the four-year-old nephew as the Guangxu emperor (1871–1908), assuring her
emperor as well as issue continued role as regent.
instructions. Despite many popular claims to the contrary, Cixi did little that
many men had not already done before her. Why is it, then, that Cixi is
CIXI (1834–1908)—An portrayed to this day as the epitome of the Chinese “dragon lady” within
imperial courtesan of the both Chinese and Western historiographic traditions? The answer lies in
Xianfeng emperor, she the complex politics of the period and diverse challenges facing the Qing
gave birth to his only son, court.
the Tongzhi emperor. After The Forbidden City—the heart of China’s imperial bureaucracy—
the Xianfeng emperor’s even in the best of times, was a secretive, guarded, and conservative entity
death, she served as regent run by an all-male bureaucracy. Opponents of her vision could (and did)
to the Tongzhi emperor offer equally viable all-male alternatives to her proposals. Her path to
and, after his death, to power was not only difficult but also singular and without precedent.
the Guangxu emperor. She entered the Forbidden City as one of many young women selected to
She remained a driving, if serve as low-level concubines. Within a few years, she had secured herself
controversial, force within a preeminent position by giving birth to the future heir to the throne. She
the Qing government until also became highly educated and mastered the administrative intricacies
her death in 1908. of the Qing civil service, which readily enabled her to parry the numerous
conspiracies and intrigues against her.
YIXIN (1833–1898)—The There can be little doubt that her success was the source of unending
sixth son of the Daoguang fascination, slander, and scorn by both Chinese and Western observers.
emperor, often referred to The speculation surrounding her exploits runs the gamut from perverse
as Prince Gong. He served to outrageous. If we are to believe all that has been written about her, the
as regent for the young misdeeds include terminating the lives of two emperors, one consort, and
Tongzhi emperor and numerous officials. It is also said she encouraged her son’s early initiation
became a strong proponent into Beijing’s brothels and diverted the entire Navy’s budget to build the
of the Self Strengthening Summer Palace [Yihe Yuan].
Movement and the If the more lurid conjecture is set aside, however, it is apparent that
establishment of the Zongli Cixi’s legacy is chiefly tarnished, not by rumors or palace intrigue, but
Yamen. by her actions in 1898 and 1900. As China emerged from the numerous
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 111

mid-century rebellions and fended off challenges from Western imperial- GUANGXU (1871–1908)—
ists, many officials and advisors pressed for faster-paced reform. As calls The ninth emperor of
for reform (and even revolution) mounted in the late 1890s, Cixi made two China, selected at the age
ill-advised decisions. In 1898, several of China’s leading reformers per- of four by his aunt, Cixi.
suaded the Guangxu emperor to initiate a slate of much-needed reforms He initiated the Hundred
(known as the Hundred Days of Reform). Cixi intervened and orchestrated Days’ Reform of 1898,
a conservative counterattack by removing the emperor from the decision- which was abruptly halted
making process, reversing many of his reforms, and summarily executing by Cixi, who stripped him
six top reformers. Two years later, Cixi made matters worse when she of all power, privileges,
catastrophically sided with the anti-foreign Boxer [Yihetuan] Movement. and honors. He died on
She hoped that her support would thwart the deep inroads being made by November 14, 1908, a day
foreign governments, religious groups, and trading companies into Chi- before Cixi.
nese affairs and culture. Her support of the Boxer movement resulted in
an invasion by an eight-nation foreign expeditionary force, the occupa- EIGHT NATION
tion of Beijing for over a year, and the imposition of a massive $330 mil- ALLIANCE—An alliance
lion indemnity. of eight nations (Austria-
Cixi, in the last decade of her life, did attempt to counter her earlier Hungry, France, Germany,
missteps. Specifically, she became a forceful champion of the “New Poli- Italy, Japan, Russia, the
cies” [xinzheng] focused on educational reform, constitutionalism, and United Kingdom, and the
institutional reorganization. While her patronage of the reforms is Cixi’s United States) who came
finest legacy, her efforts did not keep pace with the “revolution of rising together to quell the Boxer
expectations.” Many Chinese then (and today) felt that her actions in the Rebellion.
late 1890s tipped the scales in favor of reactionary conservatism precisely
when the empire desperately needed aggressive reform. The efforts in NEW POLICIES
the last years of her life were too little and too late. As a result, the last (1901–1910)—A series
emperor of China, Puyi, inherited a politically diminished and socially of political reforms Cixi
deeply traumatized empire. set in motion to erect a
modern administrative
bureaucracy.
100 DAYS REFORM MOVEMENT
The year 1898 was a tumultuous year in a chaotic era. In the wake of the PUYI (1905–1967)—More
Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), a group of liberal advisors and confi- formally known as the
dantes (the so-called “Emperor’s clique” [didang]) wielded increasing Xuantong emperor, he was
influence over the young Guangxu emperor. Among this group, Kang the tenth and last emperor
Youwei, a pro-reformist scholar, became particularly influential. Seeking of the Qing dynasty. He
to capitalize on the growing popular discontent over the Treaty of Shi- became emperor at the
monoseki and on the rising resentment resulting from concessions given age of three, abdicated
to the Western powers, Kang Youwei flooded the emperor and other high at the age of seven in
officials with calls for urgent reforms (5.1). In the period between June 11 1912, and was the titular
and September 21, 1898 (now known as the “Hundred Days Reform head of Manchukuo, the
Movement”), the Guangxu emperor issued, in quick succession, a series Japanese puppet state in
of edicts that attempted to usher in an unparalleled era of reform (5.3). northeastern China at the
The response from the Dowager Empress Cixi and her more conservative age of 27 in 1932.
allies was swift. In under a week, six officials were arrested, judged, and
hastily executed (5.4). Kang Youwei fled China to pursue his reformist KANG YOUWEI
ideals amongst the vast (and quite wealthy) Chinese overseas population. (1858–1927)—A prominent
late-Qing classically trained
scholar who advocated
modernization and reform
5.1 KANG YOUWEI’S MEMORIAL ON INSTITUTIONAL
within a Confucian
REFORM (JANUARY 29, 1898)
framework. His influence
The following document was Kang Youwei’s sixth memorial to the emperor urging peaked during the 100
major institutional changes. Despite the influence he ultimately attained, Kang Days Reform, when the
Youwei would not be invited to have an audience with the emperor until almost Guangxu emperor selected
six months later. Nor would his recommendations become the rule of the land in his proposals as the
the form of an imperial edict until June 1898 (described in 5.3). Kang Youwei’s framework for reforms.
112 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

He was forced to flee intellectual make-up, though perhaps staid by modern standards, was typical for
China when Empress the scholar-official reformers of the day. His logic and reasoning (using past his-
Dowager Cixi abruptly torical examples and Chinese classics to support his views) reflect the reform-
seized power and executed ers’ classical orientation. Despite the traditional veneer, Kang Youwei’s reforms
Kang Youwei’s younger sought to alter the foundation of Chinese society. He championed reforms that
brother and five other top fell between the conservative traditionalists who sought to preserve a traditional
reformers. interpretation of the Confucian classics and the revolutionaries who advocated
ending the examination system, the modernization of the police and military, and
HUNDRED DAYS the creation of new institutions to modernize China.
REFORM (1898)—A Questions
period that lasted from
June 11 to September 21, 1. What reasons does Kang provide for China’s lack of reform? How
1898, when the Guangxu does he suggest the emperor resolve these problems?
emperor, on advice from 2. Does Kang favor or resist “Western” reform?
Kang Youwei and other
top reformers, issued a Since our defeat at the Battle of Fuzhou [1884], the French have occu-
series of decrees instituting pied Vietnam, I have worried about the situation and boldly presented
far-reaching reforms. The my views, identifying Japan’s conspiratorial designs and the expanding
reform movement ended threat they posed in Korea. I believed that if we did not take immediate
when Cixi, Dowager actions through reform, we would not be able to stand as a nation. The
Empress, staged a coup, ensuing humiliation we suffered [losing the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–
executed several reformers, 1895], ceding Taiwan, and being forced to pay an indemnity, resulted in
and effectively removed the global humiliation, and domestic discord. Worried, I presented a pol-
the emperor from power. icy, I begged for the government to reform immediately, in order to prop-
erly defend the country. I audaciously suggest that it is only if actions
are taken now, that we might still have a chance to rectify the situation.
If we continue to dither, let time slip by, adhere to old ways of life, and
continue to miss opportunities, then external troubles and internal con-
flicts will grow, and everything will be lost. By then regret will be futile,
no matter the number of talented people nothing whatever you do will be
in vain. . . .
It is clear from global events over the past one hundred years, all
countries who try to cling to the past, perish. Some have been divided
up in a single maneuver, like what [Western] countries have done in
Africa; some have been divided up in a series of maneuvers, as happened
to Poland by Russia, Germany and Austria; others have fallen in one fell
swoop, like Annam to France; and still others have used ocean and land to
their advantage, and conquered one step at a time, like Great Britain has
done in India. These are just a few recent examples of Western countries
following a successful strategy who were victorious while those who fol-
low a disastrous policy of clinging to past are destroyed. . . .
After years of translation and research, I wrote the book The Meiji
Restoration in Japan, that analyzed Japan’s reform process. . . .
Japan’s Meiji Restoration started with three events: First, all officials
were publicly informed of the reforms, public opinion monitored, and the
legal framework of [modern] nations implemented. Second, a “Ministry of
Institutions” was established within the court [to administer the reforms], by
inviting twenty talented figures who deliberated on the policies that were then
systematically agreed upon. Third, establish an Initiatives Ministry [daizhao
suo], allowing all subjects to submit proposals, including, when appropriate,
with the emperor in attendance; with the Ministry of Institutions adopting
approved proposals. This is the principle of reformation and the bureaucratic
procedure to be followed, which should not be irresponsibly altered.
[. . .]
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 113

Specific ministries should be set up to implement reform:

1. Ministry of Law: Negotiations should be carried out as equals based

on the laws of all nations: to be used when drafting and implementing
new laws regarding treaty ports. This is how to become a member of
law-abiding nations.
2. Internal Revenue Ministry: Supervises establishing tax guidelines in
line with other nations, to determine property taxes, the household
registration, legal tariffs, salary system, statistical methods, the matter
of industrial development, the law of public debt, and the system of
litigation.
3. Ministry of Education: Oversees affairs from the capital. Within each
province there are institutes and Buddhist academies, divided into
sciences, mathematics, political science, medicine, agriculture and
mining, manufacturing, history, and foreign languages. The size of
these academies can vary in size, can be public or private, teacher and
girls’ schools are particularly favored. Will reward those who produce
new books, new methods, and new tools.
4. Ministry of Agriculture: Supervises method of planting, matters of
land and cultivation, holds agricultural expositions, holds workshops
comparing yields, examines local products, calculates prices, deter-
mines rates, establishes the law of businesses, and encourages busi-
ness guidance.
5. Ministry of Industry: Supervises the establishment of factories,
mechanical industries, and civil engineering.
6. Ministry of Mining: Oversees all mineral-related affairs, including
the development of mining science, determining mine procedures,
and enforces all mining personnel to follow its regulations.
7. Ministry of Railways: Supervises the construction of railways.
8. Ministry of the Postal System: Supervises the building of roads and
the delivering of letters and telegrams.
9. Ministry of the Mint: Oversees the minting of gold, silver, and copper
currency, establishes banks, and makes paper money accordingly.
10. Ministry of Travel: Organizes sending students to study abroad,
learning methods and techniques in depth, and facilitates the study-
abroad process.
11. Ministry of Public Organizations: The advantage of western political
system does not lay in its officials specifically, but in its social organi-
zations more broadly. Officials are few, but membership in societies
and organizations is quite large, thus while official matters is numer-
ous, the concerns of organizations is more diffuse. Therefore, there are
societies for academics, agriculture, commerce, disease prevention,
astronomy, geography, philosophy, engineering, medical science, for-
eign languages, law, anatomy, flora and fauna, technology, painting
and calligraphy, sculpture, expositions, clan groups, charity societies.
This ministry encourages people to participate in social organizations.
Regulations and members of societies are submitted to the ministry
for supervision.
12. Ministry of Military Affairs: Oversees the military affairs, pur-
chases iron ships, carries out foreign-style military exercises,
teaches navigation techniques, and studies the tactics of naval
warfare.

Establishment of the twelve ministries marks the inception of new system.

114 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

5.2 CHINA MAIL INTERVIEW WITH KANG YOUWEI

(OCTOBER 7, 1898)
No individual played a greater role in the Hundred Days Reform Movement than
Kang Youwei. Because of the rigid rules of addressing and communicating with
the emperor, it took many months for him to get his proposals on educational and
administrative reform to the Guangxu emperor. It is not an exaggeration to say
that only with Kang’s ideas did the Guangxu emperor embark on the 1898 reforms
during the heady summer of 1898. The following interview with Kang Youwei
was given after the end of the Hundred Days Reform, but it offers a succinct and
first-hand account of how Kang presented his ideas to the emperor. The following
account is taken from an interview with the Hong Kong paper China Mail after
Kang had been forced to flee China.

Questions
1. Which of Kang Youwei’s proposals were most significant in
swaying the Guangxu emperor to embark on his campaign of
reform?
2. The Guangxu emperor is often described as a weak leader. How
does this interview reinforce or alter such a perception?

The gist of my memorial was as follows: I told the Emperor that all the
customs and ways and manners of this ancestors must be removed. Noth-
ing could be usefully followed so far as Chinese history was concerned.
I advised the Emperor to follow in the footsteps of Japan or in the foot-
steps of Peter the Great. . . . I was told the emperor was highly pleased
and said he had never seen a better memorial nor such a good system as
I proposed. . . . To this memorial, the Emperor replied with an Edict. On
the 16th of June, I was granted an audience with the Emperor. It lasted for
two hours. I was received at 5 a.m. in the Renshou Throne Hall [Renshou
Dian]. . . . The Emperor was thin, but apparently in good health. He has
a straight nose, round forehead, pleasant eyes, is clean shaven and has a
pale complexion. He is of medium height. His hands are long and thin. . . .
He wore the usual official dress, but instead of the large square of embroi-
dery on the breast worn by the high officials the embroidery in his case
was round, encircling a dragon, and there were two smaller embroideries
on his shoulders. He wore the usual official cap. He was led in by eunuchs
and took his seat on a dais on a large yellow cushion, with his feet folded
beneath him. He sent his attendants away and we were left alone, but all
the time we were conversing his eyes were watching the windows as if to
see that no one was eavesdropping. There was a long table in front of him
with two large candlesticks. I knelt at one of the corners of the table and
not on the cushions in front of the table which are reserved for the high
officials. I remained kneeling during the whole of the audience. We con-
versed in the Mandarin dialect.
The Emperor said to me: “Your books are very useful and very
instructive.”
“I practically repeated what I said in my memorial about the weak-
ness of China being owing to the lack of progress”
The Emperor said to me: “Yes, all these Conservative Ministers have
ruined me. . . . I am very sorry; I have practically no power to remove any
high Ministers. The Empress Dowager wants to reserve this power in her
own hands.”
I said: “If your Majesty has no power to remove Ministers, what you
can do is to employ young and intelligent officials about you. That would
be a step better than nothing.”
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 115

The Emperor said: “I know it perfectly well that all the Ministers YANG RUI (1857–1898)—
have paid no proper attention to Western ideas and do not care to study One of the key reformers
the progress of the world.” in the Guangxu emperor’s
I said to the Emperor: “Perhaps it is their wish to get a knowl- inner circle during the
edge of Western ideas but they have too much to do under the pres- Hundred Days Reform. He
ent system, and they are much too old. Their energy is gone. Even if was one of six reformers
they are willing they cannot do it. The chief education of China in the arrested and executed by
study of the classics is useless, and the first thing the Emperor must do Dowager Empress Cixi
is to abolish these examinations and establish a system of education upon her return to power.
on the lines of Western countries. Can you do away with this kind of
examination?”
The Emperor said: “I have realized that whatever is learned in West-
ern countries is useful, but whatever is learned in China is practically use-
less, and I will carry out your recommendations.”
I advised the Emperor to send his own relations to travel in foreign
countries in order to learn from them, and that he might be surrounded
by men who had experience of the world. In conclusion, I said: “There are
many other things I should like to say, but I can memorialize you from
time to time. I advised him to strongly to cement his relations with foreign
countries.”
The Emperor replied that the foreign countries nowadays were not
like the insignificant States of former times. They appeared to be highly
civilized countries, and it was a pity his own Ministers did not realize that
as he did. A good deal of the trouble seemed to arise from their failure to
recognize this fact. In December last, I had advised his Majesty to form an
alliance with Great Britain.
Before parting I said to him: “You have given decorations to Li Hon-
gzhang and Chang Yin-huan. That is a Western act. Why do not you put
in your Edict that you intend to introduce Western customs?”
The Emperor only smiled.

5.3 GUANGXU’S THREE SECRET DECREES (1898)

As the Guangxu’s reform effort entered its third month, intense pressures
began to build between the pro- and anti-reform factions within the Forbid-
den City. The following secret imperial decrees sought to circumvent the
conventional delivery system to avoid detection by Cixi and her allies. They
offer a rare insight into the decision-making process of the Guangxu emperor.
They also underscore the limits of the emperor’s authority over the entire
empire. Note the types of relationships the emperor developed and found nec-
essary to implement his vision, given his isolated position within the imperial
bureaucracy.

Questions
1. What do the following secret imperial decrees reflect about the
nature of the Hundred Days Reform Movement?
2. What was the relationship between the Guangxu emperor and
Dowager Empress Cixi?
On the 27th of the 7th month in Year of Wuxu [Sept. 12, 1898], Emperor Guangxu
issued a decree to Yang Rui, which reads:
Recently, I have been trying to understand the thoughts of Her Maj-
esty, the Dowager Empress. Uninterested in pursuing reforms she
does not want to dismiss elderly and incompetent ministers or bring in
bold and enterprising young men. She opposes such measures fearing
116 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

such a move would cost her the confidence of the people. I have issued
numerous decrees to clarify the situation in an effort to persuade Her
Majesty. But her mind remains unchanged and nothing more can be
done. For example, the Dowager considered the decree of the 19th
[September 4, 1898] too extreme and [forced] me to amend it. This is
the challenging situation in which we presently find ourselves. How
can I fail to recognize that China’s deficiencies and instability are due
to the actions of this [conservative] group of ministers? If you are ask-
ing me to issue immediate decrees to abolish the old laws and dismiss
these incompetent officials, then I can only reply I truly do not possess
such power. If we persist along these lines of action, then, my posi-
tion as emperor will be in danger, not to mention everything else. Now
I am asking you for any constructive proposals that would allow us
to slowly revise the old statutes and gradually dismiss all the old and
incompetent ministers. I am asking for proposals to attract spirited and
sophisticated men to participate in the government and to steer China
away from danger and toward stability; away from weakness and
toward strength. All must be accomplished without violating Her Maj-
esty’s wishes. You must immediately confer with Lin Xu, Tan Sitong,
Liu Guangdi and other associates to draw up an appropriate proposal
and have it delivered to me in a sealed envelope via the Grand Council.
The implementation will be conducted only after I have thoroughly
considered the plan. I am extremely uneasy and anxiously await your
proposal. Respect this.
On the same day, an imperial decree was issued to Kang Youwei which reads:
I feel that the situation is very precarious, and that reform is the only way
to save China; the only way to reform is to first dismiss those conservative
and inept ministers, and then replace them with knowledgeable and bold
men. However, the Dowager Empress disagrees. I tried to engage her on
this topic numerous times, which only enraged her. Now I am about to
lose my position as the emperor. You along with Yang Rui, Lin Xu, Tan
Sitong, and Liu Guangdi must immediately secretly discuss with to come
up with a rescue plan. I am extremely worried and anxiously awaiting
your response. Respect this.
On the 2nd day of the 8th month [September 17, 1898], a decree was issued to
Kang Youwei, which reads:
It is hard to explain in words how reluctant I was, but it seemed that I had
no other choice but to appoint you to be in charge of the publication of the
official newspapers. You must leave the country immediately without any
delay. I am profoundly aware of your loyalty and devotion to the throne.
Take good care of your health and yourself so that someday in the future
we can attain this great accomplishment together. I have great hope in
you. Respect this.

5.4 CIXI AND THE TRIAL OF THE REFORMERS (1898)

In late September, the Dowager Empress and her supporters brought the
Hundred Days Reform Movement to an abrupt and definitive end with the
execution of six of the Guangxu emperor’s advisors. Many Chinese followed
the reforms with great interest through newly established newspapers, like
Xinwen. Founded only years earlier, in 1893, by a trio of three businessmen
(an American textile trader, a British journalist, and a Chinese merchant) in
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 117

Shanghai, the paper made its reputation by its detailed and timely reporting HANLIN ACADEMY—
on the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). Through a well-connected network of Physically located within
sources and a team of able translators, the paper emerged as one of the most the Imperial Palace,
influential sources of news in the late nineteenth century with a daily circula- the Hanlin Academy
tion well over 3,000—perhaps second only to their Shanghai rival, the Shen- served the emperor,
bao newspaper. central government, and
associated ministries.
Questions Often, newly minted jinshi
1. How would the arrest, judgment, and execution of six reform- would be appointed to the
minded high officials been viewed by the readers of the Xinwen academy to both familiarize
newspaper? themselves better with
2. How would such actions have shaped public opinion of the Dow- the inner workings of the
ager Empress Cixi? government and prepare
them for future postings.
Yesterday we received a letter from a friend in Beijing relating that last
month [on September 22], the following prisoners had been questioned
before a joint tribunal composed of members from the Grand Council
and Ministry of Justice: Xu Zhijing [Junior Vice-President of the Board of
Rites], Yang Shenxiu [Censor], Yang Rui [Hanlin Compiler] and [the Sec-
retaries of the Grand Council] Lin Xu, Tan Sitong, Liu Guangdi, and Kang
Guangren [the younger brother of Kang Youwei]. It was proved that Xu
Zhijing was guilty of nothing more than recommending Kang Youwei to
serve the emperor [and so was released]. Aside from Xu Zhijing, all were
charged with illegal conduct.
Then, on September 28th, just as the joint tribunal was deliberating
which punishments to give the guilty prisoners, a secret edict [from the
Empress Dowager Cixi] suddenly arrived ordering the Ministry of Jus-
tice to immediately behead all six prisoners. The executions took place at
dusk, with Tan Sitong and Lin Xu notably demonstrating a fearlessness
in the face of their fate. In the growing darkness, the six bodies were then
each collected by their families in order for the head to be resewn to the
body and placed in coffins for burial.
Initially, when the officials had come to arrest Yang Shenxiu he fled
to a nearby temple, only to soon be found and arrested. Tan Sitong who
was ill and Yang Rui who was sleeping in were discovered in their beds,
and easily brought into custody. Xu Zhijing had still not returned home
from a night on the town when the authorities came to arrest him [though
he was arrested later]. He had been targeted because Xu’s son had been a
classmate and friend of Kang Youwei when serving in Hunan. His son’s
warm praise of Kang Youwei had resulted in Xu recommending Kang
Youwei to the Emperor. . . .
It is stated that over 240 men knew of or had had contact with
Kang Youwei. Included among them were sixty who were members
of the exclusive Hanlin Academy. Some ministers advocated investi-
gating every single one of these men in order to make an example of
their behavior. But when Rong Lu arrived in Beijing, and the Empress
Dowager asked him how they should be dealt with, he said, “it is very
natural for officials in the capital to be familiar with Kang Youwei,
it does not necessarily follow that all officials there belonged to his
inner group of supporters. If we too thoroughly investigate and accuse
everyone even remotely associated with him, it is not good for the
imperial bureaucracy.” Seven imperial censors also jointly wrote to say
that if there were people lured in by Kang Youwei they should not be
punished.
118 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

BOXER UPRISING BOXER UPRISING

(1900)—Originating in
Shandong province, the In the spring of 1900, an anti-foreign insurrection began among the largely
Boxer movement was rural populace of the North China Plain. The English appellation for this
anti-foreign, anti-Christian, movement, “Boxers,” is derived from the group’s Chinese name, “Boxers
and dedicated to expelling United in Righteousness” [yihequan]. The leaders claimed to have special
all foreigners from China. rituals to bestow special powers—such as being impervious to bullets, fly-
Boxers combined martial ing, and extraordinary strength—on their followers. Tapping into the rising
art techniques (“boxing”) anti-foreign sentiments (particularly within Shandong province), the upris-
with beliefs in traditional ing was virulently xenophobic. The resentment against Christianity—par-
spirit possession. ticularly of missionaries and their converts—was based both on its foreign
origins and that Christianity sought to displace many traditional Chinese
beliefs and practices (5.6). Chinese converts to Christianity were commonly
BOXER PROTOCOL
instructed to cease “worshiping” their ancestors and praying to the large
(1901)—An extremely
pantheon of smaller gods that regulated everyday life in China.
harsh peace treaty imposed
Despite considerable ambivalence among many senior Qing offi-
by the Eight Nation
cials, the success of the Boxer’s anti-foreign movement emboldened the
Alliance upon the Qing
Dowager Empress Cixi, who was not unsympathetic with their anti-West-
government, including
ern actions. In the year 1900, she declared war on all the foreign powers
a 450 million taels
present in China. The Qing court sought to follow up on the Boxer’s initial
($333 million) indemnity,
victories against Western forces with several edicts supporting the Box-
almost twice the annual
ers’ efforts to kill all foreigners as well as all Chinese Christians. The reac-
Qing budget of 250 taels,
tion by the imperialist powers was swift and devastating. An Eight Nation
and with interest totaling
Allied army marched inland from Tianjian to rescue the besieged foreign
nearly 1 billion taels over
community. After gaining control of Beijing from the Boxers, the Allied
33 years.
leaders argued amongst themselves for nearly a year over the demands to
be made of China. They finally presented China with the Boxer Protocol
on September 7, 1901 (5.8), which imposed a devastating 450 million taels
($333 million) indemnity on an already impoverished empire.

5.5 MALAN BOXER PROCLAMATIONS (1900)

As with many popular uprisings, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly where, when,
and how the Boxer revolt began. The following proclamation was posted in a vil-
lage outside Beijing. It is typical of placards that appeared in villages between
Shandong and Beijing in the spring of 1900. The Boxers reflect one of the few
popular Chinese movements of the nineteenth century that openly supported the
Manchu Qing dynasty. The primary focus of their rage was the foreign presence
reflecting the deep animosity toward Western imperialism among a growing por-
tion of the Chinese populace. The one central point of contention for virtually
all Chinese was the extension of extraterritoriality to converts given by foreign
missionaries and clergy that protected these converts from legal lawsuits. The
following document conforms to a somewhat traditional listing of grievances and
appeals from a Confucian cultural outlook.

Questions
1. Why, according to this notice, are foreigners the focus of the Box-
ers’ anger?
2. What are the main objectives of the Boxers?

Public Notice of Malan Village by the Kan Army

(Wanping County in Beijing Suburb)
Since the Xianfeng reign [1851–1861], Catholics have been conspiring
with foreigners; causing chaos in China; squandering the state’s revenue;
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 119

tearing down temples and monasteries; destroying Buddhist statues; and

taking over people’s graveyards. Such evil acts have aroused hatred far
and wide. They have also caused swarms of locusts and droughts which
harm the trees and plants. Our country is no longer harmonious, and the
Chinese people are no longer secure. This has angered Heaven.
Blessed by the great god in Heaven, all the spirits have descended to
set up an altar. They will teach our young men how to support the Qing,
eliminate the foreigners, and implement virtuous principles on behalf of
Heaven. We want to contribute to the country so that it will be at peace;
and to help the peasants so that the villages and neighborhoods are safe.
In the end, misfortune will come to an end while prosperity returns. Yet,
we worry that ignorant people and hooligans will use the support of the
foreigners to mistreat the weak. All such behavior should be reported to
the local leaders to be dealt with publicly and in accordance with the laws
and regulations. It is forbidden to resolve the matter in a purely selfish
manner. The eyes of the gods are as sharp as lightning and will see those
who are pursuing the cases purely with selfish motives and will punish
them accordingly.
The false methods perpetrated by the deluded foreign missionaries
have angered Heaven who has ordered the spirits to descend to the divine
altar in order to teach the youth. The meaning of Yihetuan [Boxer] is as fol-
lows: yi means benevolent, and he means unified. Benevolence and unity
keep villages and neighborhoods peaceful and harmonious. Virtue is the
foundation of living. Agriculture is the means by which we make a living.
Buddhism is the religion that we should follow. Public matters should not
be handled with selfish aims of revenge. It is not allowed to mistreat the
poor and the weak. No one should mistake wrong for right.

5.6 SPIRIT BOXER POSSESSION (1900)

The Boxers’ success spread primarily from the group’s teachings that resonated
with China’s large peasant class. One distinguishing characteristic of the Boxer
movement was that the Boxer teachings offered spells and incantations that per-
mitted spirits to possess all the initiated. Such egalitarian spirit possession made
the Boxers an extremely engaging movement. The spells typically gave the initi-
ated some form of protection. The final poem or incantation of invulnerability at
the end of the document is typical of many magic charms, amulets, and enchanted
objects prevalent during the Boxer movement. There were many slight variations
on the wording, and they were often written on paper that would be burned, the
ashes mixed in water and then drunk by the initiate.

Questions
1. Why would the Boxers emphasize tearing down railways and rip-
ping up telegraph wires?
2. Why might the common Chinese farmer find it appealing to join
the Boxers?

The Spirit Boxers United in Righteousness arose in reaction to the for-

eign devils’ invasion of China. They persuaded people to believe in their
religion, in their God, to abandon [Chinese] gods, and ignore our ances-
tors and spirits. Their men are amoral and their women licentious, all the
devil children are born from mothers and sons. If you do not trust this,
look carefully at all foreigners, their eyes are blue. There is no rain coming
from above and down below only drought, all because the churches are
120 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

WHITE LOTUS blocking the sky. Spirits are angry and the fairies are mad, together they
SOCIETY—A secret come down the mountain to show us the correct way. [Our teaching] is
society based on a mixture not heretical, it is not the White Lotus Teachings. It is nothing but reciting
of Buddhist, Daoist, and spells and reading incantations; learning the true words, burning yellow
local spiritual beliefs prayer paper and burning incense; inviting spirits and fairies from all their
prevalent since the caves. Fairies leave their caves, spirits come down from mountains, and
seventeenth century, it possess one’s body allowing them to perform the “boxing movements.”
was declared heretical and All martial arts are wholly understood. Defeating the foreigners will not
prohibited by the Qing be difficult at all. We tear down the railways, rip up the electric poles, rush
government. to destroy the steam ships. France is terribly scared; Britain, America, Ger-
many and Russia will all disappear. All foreigners will be wiped out. The
Great Qing will unite once more.
Incantation of Invulnerability:
United brothers will give it their all,
Each blade of grass and every tree become our warriors.
When ordinary bodies are possessed by magic,
All foreigners will surely be exterminated.

5.7 IMPERIAL EDICT TO “DECLARE WAR” (JUNE 21, 1900)

After several weeks of vacillation and indecision, the Qing court issued this
declaration of war against all foreigners residing in China. As irrational as the
Dowager Empress Cixi’s support of the Boxers may seem, the edict captures the
profound fear and loathing felt by many Chinese citizens for the imperious style of
foreigners in China. Very few of the assertions made in this declaration are made
without any basis. It more significantly underscores the pent-up frustration over
the inability to develop ways to contain the foreign powers. The Dowager Empress
and her advisors did not, however, have the complete support of Qing officials,
many of whom implored them not to offer another pretext for foreign aggression
against China.

Questions
1. What factors led the Dowager Empress to declare war?
2. Who is the primary audience for the edict?
On the 25th day of 5th month, Guangxu 26th year. [June 21, 1900]
Ever since the foundation of the Dynasty over two hundred years ago,
foreigners coming to China have been treated kindly. In the Daoguang
(1821–1850) and Xianfeng (1851–1861) reigns, they were allowed to trade.
They also asked to propagate their religion, a request that the Throne
reluctantly granted. At first, they were amenable to Chinese control, but
for the past thirty years they have taken advantage of China’s forbear-
ance to encroach on China’s territory, trample on the Chinese people
and to demand China’s wealth. Every concession made by China only
heightened their reliance on violence. They oppressed peaceful citizens
and insulted our gods and religious leaders. Their actions provoked a
burning fury within the people, hence the burning of chapels and slaugh-
ter of converts by patriotic warriors. The Throne was anxious to avoid
war, like previous protectors, we worried about harming our people.
Therefore, time and time again we issued edicts protecting the legations
and defending the [Christian] converts. The earlier decrees stating that
the Boxers and converts are all our children were issued with the hope of
ending the feud between commoners and converts. Exceptional kindness
was shown towards the “people from afar” [i.e., foreigners]. But these
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 121

people knew no gratitude and increased their pressure. A dispatch was

yesterday sent by George Du Chaylard, calling us to turn over the Dagu
Forts to them, otherwise they would be taken by force. These threats
only serve to reveal their aggressive intentions. In all matters relating
to international intercourse, we have never been wanting in civility. But
while styling themselves as “civilized states” they continue to act with
complete disregard to what is right, depending solely on their military
force. I have now reigned for nearly 30 years and have treated the people
as children, and the people in return have treated me as their divinity.
In the midst of our reign we have been the recipients of the gracious
favor of the Dowager Empress. Furthermore, our ancestors have come
to our aid, the gods have answered our call, and never has there been
so universal a manifestation of loyalty and patriotism. With tears have
I announced war in the ancestral shrines. Better to enter the struggle and
do our utmost than seek some measures of self-preservation involving
eternal disgrace. All our officials, high and low, are of one mind, and
there have assembled without official summons several hundred thou-
sand patriotic soldiers [Boxers]. Even children are carrying spears in the
service of the State. Those others [foreigners] rely on devious schemes,
our trust is in Heaven’s justice. They depend on violence, we on human-
ity. Not to speak of the righteousness of our cause, our provinces number
more than twenty, our people over 400,000,000. It will not be difficult to
vindicate the dignity of our country.
We conclude this decree by promising heavy rewards to those who
distinguish themselves in battle or subscribe funds, and threatening pun-
ishment to those who show cowardice or act treacherously.

5.8 BOXER PROTOCOL (SEPTEMBER 7, 1901)

From the moment the eight allied nations decided upon the need for a multi-
national force, disagreements between them emerged. Fearful of Japan’s intentions
in China, the European and American governments refused Japan’s proposition
to send 20,000–30,000 troops to relieve the siege of Beijing, effectively postponing
the relief mission for six weeks, until the other nations could transport their forces
to China. The allied troops entered Tianjin in early July and reached Beijing in
early August. Once the troops had occupied the city, they plundered and looted
the Yihe Yuan in a grim repeat of the 1860 Anglo-French destruction of the Old
Summer Palace (Yuanming Yuan) four decades earlier. It took nearly a year for
the various governments to agree upon demands to impose on China. The final
protocol required China to pay an indemnity of 450 million taels (or roughly
333 million US gold dollars at 1901 exchange rates). It was the largest indemnity
in China’s history and effectively bankrupted the imperial treasury, already in a
state of financial crisis.

Questions
1. What goals does the protocol appear to be pursuing? How does
an indemnity of 450 million taels help or hinder them?
2. What role does the fear of anti-foreignism in China play in the
protocol (specifically Articles IIa, X, and XII)?

Article Ia
By an Imperial Edict of the 9th of June last, Zaifeng, Prince of Chun, was
appointed Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of China, and directed
122 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

in that capacity to convey to His Majesty the German Emperor the expres-
sion of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of the Chinese
Government for the assassination of His Excellency the late Baron von
Ketteler, German minister.
Prince Chun left Beijing the 12th of July last to carry out the orders
which had been given him.

Article Ib
The Chinese Government has stated that it will erect on the spot of the
assassination of His Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler a commemo-
rative monument, worthy of the rank of the deceased, and bearing an
inscription in the Latin, German, and Chinese languages, which shall
express the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China for the murder
committed.
Their Excellencies the Chinese Plenipotentiaries have informed His
Excellency the German Plenipotentiary, in a letter dated the 22nd of July
last that an arch of the whole width of the street would be erected on the
said spot, and that work on it was begun the 25th of June last.

Article IIa
Imperial Edicts of the 13th and 21st of February, 1901, inflicted the follow-
ing punishments on the principal authors of the outrages and crimes com-
mitted against the foreign Governments and their nationals:
Zaiyi Prince Duan, and Zailan Duke Fuguo were sentenced to be
brought before the autumnal court of assize for execution, and it was
agreed that if the Emperor saw fit to grant them their lives, they should be
exiled to Turkestan and there imprisoned for life, without the possibility
of commutation of these punishments.
Zaixun Prince Zhuang, Ying Nian, President of the Court of cen-
sors, and Zhao Shuqiao, President of the Board of punishments, were con-
demned to commit suicide.
Yu Xian, Governor of Shanxi, Qixiu, President of the Board of rites,
and Xu Chengyu, formerly senior vice-President of the Board of punish-
ments were condemned to death.
[. . .]

Article IIb
Imperial Edict promulgated the 19th of August, 1901, ordered the suspen-
sion of official examinations for five years in all cities where foreigners
were massacred or submitted to cruel treatment.

Article III
So as to make honorable reparation for the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama,
chancellor of the Japanese legation, His Majesty the Emperor of China by
an Imperial Edict of the 18th of June, 1901, appointed Natong, vice-Presi-
dent of the Board of revenue, to be his Envoy Extraordinary, and specially
directed him to convey to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the expres-
sion of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of his Govern-
ment at the assassination of the late Mr. Sugiyama.
[. . .]
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 123

Article VI

By an Imperial Edict dated the 29th of May, 1901, His Majesty the Emperor
of China agreed to pay the Powers an indemnity of four hundred and
fifty million of Haiguan taels. This sum represents the total amount of
the indemnities for States, companies or societies, private individuals, and
Chinese referred to in Article VI of the note of December 22nd, 1900.
(a) These four hundred and fifty million taels constitute a gold debt cal-
culated at the rate of the of the Haiguan tael to the gold currency of
each country. . . . This sum in gold shall bear interest at 4 percent per
annum, and the capital shall be reimbursed by China in thirty-nine
years in the manner indicated in the annexed plan of amortization.
[. . .]

Article VIII
The Chinese government has consented to raze the forts of Dagu and
those which might impede free communication between Beijing and the
sea; steps have been taken for carrying this out.

Article IX
The Chinese Government has conceded the right to the powers in the pro-
tocol annexed to the letter of the 16th of January, 1901, to occupy certain
points, to be determined by an agreement between them, for the mainte-
nance of open communication between the capital and the sea. The points
occupied by the powers are: Huangcun, Langfan, Yangcun, Tianjin, Jun-
liangcheng, Tanggu, Lutai, Tangshan, Luanzhou, Changli, Qinhuangdao,
Shanhaiguan.

Article X
The Chinese Government has agreed to post and to have published dur-
ing two years in all district cities the following Imperial Edicts:
(a) Edict of the 1st of February, prohibiting forever, under pain of death,
membership in any antiforeign society.
(b) Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 29th April, and 19th August,
enumerating the punishments inflicted on the guilty.
(c) Edict of the 19th August, 1901, prohibiting examinations in all cities
where foreigners were massacred or subjected to cruel treatment.
(d) Edict of the 1st of February, 1901, declaring all governors-general,
governors, and provincial or local officials responsible for order in
their respective districts, and that in case of new antiforeign troubles
or other infractions of the treaties which shall not be immediately
repressed and the authors of which shall not have been punished,
these officials shall be immediately dismissed, without possibility of
being given new functions or new honors.
The posting of these edicts is being carried on throughout the Empire.

Article XII
An Imperial Edict of the 24th of July, 1901, reformed the Office of For-
eign Affairs [Zongli Yamen], on the lines indicated by the Powers, that is
124 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

to say, transformed it into a Board of Foreign Affairs [Waiwu Bu], which

takes precedence over the six other Ministries of State. The same edict
appointed the principal members of this Board.
An agreement has also been reached concerning the modification of
Court ceremonial as regards the reception of foreign Representatives and
has been the subject of several notes from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries,
the substance of which is embodied in a memorandum herewith annexed.
Finally, it is expressly understood that as regards the declarations
specified above and the annexed documents originating with the foreign
Plenipotentiaries, the French text only is authoritative.
The Chinese Government having thus complied to the satisfaction
of the Powers with the conditions laid down in the above-mentioned note
of December 22nd, 1900, the Powers have agreed to accede to the wish of
China to terminate the situation created by the disorders of the summer of
1900. In consequence thereof the foreign Plenipotentiaries are authorized
to declare in the names of their Governments that, with the exception of
the legation guards mentioned in Article VII, the international troops will
completely evacuate the city of Beijing on the 17th September, 1901, and,
with the exception of the localities mentioned in Article IX, will withdraw
from the province of Zhili on the 22nd of September.
The present final Protocol has been drawn up in twelve identical
copies and signed by all the Plenipotentiaries of the Contracting Coun-
tries. One copy shall be given to each of the foreign Plenipotentiaries, and
one copy shall be given to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries.
Beijing, 7th September, 1901.
A.V. Mumn [Germany]
M. Czikann [Austria-Hungary]
Joostens [Belgium]
B.J. de Cologan [Spain]
W.W. Rockhill [United States]
Paul Beau [France]
Ernest Satow [Great Britain]
Salvago Raggi [Italy]
Jutaro Komura [Japan]
F.M. Knobel [Netherlands]
M. de Giers [Russia]
Signatures and seals of Chinese plenipotentiaries

POST-BOXER REFORM AND THE PUSH FOR REVOLUTION

After the failure of the Boxers and China’s ignominious military defeat,
few Chinese denied that China needed to reform. The debate after 1900
quickly shifted from one of whether to reform to one of what type of
reform was most suitable. Most Chinese reformers were of two minds
over China’s future: 1) a constitutional monarchy (as existed in England
and Japan) or 2) a republic. The Dowager Empress Cixi, seemingly truly
repentant for her role in the Boxer debacle advocated incremental change
and promised a timeline for establishing a constitutional government
and reforming the examination system. There were numerous reformers
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 125

advocating various permutations of these two options, but two of the SUN YAT-SEN
most respected “radicals” seeking to push far beyond simple reform were (1866–1925) (SUN
Wang Jingwei and Sun Yat-sen. While the two men’s specific visions for ZHONGSHAN)—Often
China differed, they agreed that a modern China needed a modern form called the “Father of
of government. In their political treatises on the topic, Sun would actively Modern China,” Sun was
adopt elements from foreign countries and earlier foreign revolutions to a principal revolutionary
make their points (6.1). In recent years, more and more scholars of China’s leader during the last
past have realized that the Qing dynasty’s last decade was not politically decades of the Qing
moribund nor was Chinese society stagnant as long assumed. The follow- Dynasty. He served as the
ing five documents reveal the vigorous and spirited debates that inspired provisional president of
a growing segment of the population. the Republic of China but
resigned in favor of Yuan
Shikai. Over the next two
5.9 QING OFFICIALS’ JOINT PROPOSALS FOR decades, he headed the
POST-BOXER REFORM (1901) Kuomintang party, until
his death in 1925 from
Official and public opinion in China shifted extensively in the years between
cancer.
1895 and 1901. Prior to 1895, many conservative officials and large segments of
the populace remained certain that only minor alterations to China’s traditional
WANG JINGWEI
structure were needed for China to remain a powerful Asian empire. With the loss
(1883–1944)—Born in
of the Sino-Japanese War, Guangxu emperor’s failed effort to implement reform,
Guangdong, he joined the
and the disastrous Boxer Uprising, all but the most ultra-conservative realized
Tongmeng Hui in 1905 and
that fundamental changes needed to be implemented. The fact that the Emperor
attempted to assassinate
and the Dowager Empress remained in the western city of Xi’an, where they had
the last emperor’s father,
fled to from the International Allied Force, offers a stark backdrop to the following
Prince Chun. After his
memorial advocating change. Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong were two prominent
release, he worked closely
Qing reformers and among the earliest to frame and set the agenda for many of the
with Sun Yat-sen and
New Policies [xinzheng] called for by the Guangxu emperor (and the Dowager
challenged Chiang Kai-
Empress) earlier that year.
shek for leadership of the
Questions KMT. In 1940, he became
the head of state for
1. What do Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong identify as the areas Japanese-occupied China.
within China’s government most in need of reform?
2. Given the long list of problems (and their entrenched nature),
which of their reforms would most quickly bring about institu-
tional change?

Your ministers have planned and proposed four items for developing
education and nurturing ability, which have been jointly memorialized
and are on record. . . . In general there are three important factors in build-
ing a good nation: good administration, wealth, and strength. . . . The
reorganization of the Chinese political system is to serve as an instrument
for bringing about better administration. The adoption of Western meth-
ods is for the purpose of attaining wealth and strength. We have care-
fully considered those aspects of the Chinese system which ought to be
reorganized and reformed, and make proposals under twelve heads: (1)
to honor frugality, (2) to break down customary formalities [red tape], (3)
to stop the contributions or payments for the official rank, (4) to examine
the officials and increase their emoluments, (5) to remove the useless cleri-
cal staff, (6) to weed out the government servants and messengers, (7) to
lighten punishments and imprisonments, (8) to reform the method of civil
service examination, (9) to plan for the livelihood of the Manchu Banner-
men, (10) to abolish the military colonies and garrisons, (11) to abolish
the Army of the Green Standard [lüying] and (12) to simplify the docu-
ments and laws. These are reverently prepared for the Court’s selection
and adoption.
126 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

[. . .]
The above twelve items are concerned with the causes of China’s
chronic weakness, which makes her incapable of exerting herself. They
are particularly the hooks on which foreign countries hang their criticisms
and abuse of us. Of the plans proposed by your ministers, some are for cul-
tivating the peoples’ strength, some for cleansing official circles, and some
for arousing the scholars’ spirit. Many people had discussed these matters
before. But because they had such mistaken notions as that among evils
one should remove only the worst, and because they were afraid of being
criticized for changing everything, all the statutes, orders, documents, and
notices have remained mere paper documents. They may have achieved
something but they have lacked long-term and far-reaching plans.
Now foreign aggression is becoming daily more serious. Those who
like to follow tradition and devote themselves to cheating and glossing
things over always say that the peoples’ minds are solidly united. They
do not know that popular feelings are not the same as thirty years ago.
The people admire the wealth of foreign countries and despise the pov-
erty of the Middle Kingdom. Seeing the strength of foreign countries, they
despise the poverty of the Middle Kingdom. Seeing the strength of foreign
soldiers, they are sick of the timidity of their own government’s troops;
delighted at the fair play of the Maritime Customs Service, they hate the
lijin [transit tax] offices which purposely cause them trouble; praising the
stern orderliness of the foreign concessions and settlements, they are tired
of the disorder caused by our official clerks. Therefore, our people believe
in the foreign religion, merchants display foreign flags, and schools reg-
ister in the names of foreign nationals. All has resulted in a disunited
and disillusioned national morale. Insurgents are slowly emerging, and
they take this opportunity to spread subversive doctrines. This concerns
the very foundation of the nation. We cannot overcome our anxiety and
apprehension. We must first entirely wipe out the various defects men-
tioned above before we may expect a permanent unification of the popular
mind. Then we may speak of being affectionate to our superiors, dying
for our elders, opposing humiliation and resisting aggression. We hum-
bly beseech your sacred enlightenment to decide with discrimination and
to put these proposals into practice, and use them as the foundation for
self-strengthening.

5.10 QIU JIN’S ADDRESS TO 200 MILLION FELLOW

COUNTRYWOMEN (1904)
A famous poet and revolutionary, Qiu Jin (1875–1907) typified the earliest
generation of revolutionary women. Born into a family of moderately wealthy
means and liberal sentiments, Qiu’s family made certain she received a mod-
ern education and socialized in progressive social circles. Leaving a short-lived
marriage in 1903, she traveled to Japan, which had pioneered women’s educa-
tion within Asia. Three years later, she returned to China advocating Western-
ization and a democratic (non-monarchical) government. Her activities, illegal
at the time, were discovered, and she was arrested and executed by decapita-
tion on July 12, 1907. Today, she remains a potent symbol of China’s women’s
liberation movement. The following document is her most famous appeal for
women’s rights.

Questions
1. Why would having daughters be considered undesirable in late
imperial China?
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 127

2. Why do you think Qiu Jin believes education is key for the lib-
eration of women?

Alas, the most unfairly treated things on this earth are the two hundred
million who are born as Chinese women. We consider ourselves lucky to
born to a kind father. If we are unlucky, our father will be an ill-tempered
and unreasonable person who repeatedly says, “How unlucky I am, yet
another useless one,” as if at any instant he could pick us up and throw us
to our death. He will resent us and say things like “she’s eventually going
to someone else’s family” and give us cold and contemptuous looks. When
we grow a few years older, without bothering to ask us our thoughts, they
will bind our tender, white and natural feet with a strip of cloth never
loosening them even when we sleep. In the end, the flesh is mangled and
the bones broken, all so that relatives, friends and neighbors can say, “the
girl from so and so’s family has tiny feet.”
When the time comes [for the parents] to select a husband, every-
thing is based on the promises of two shameless matchmakers. The
daughter’s parents will go along with any proposal as long as his family is
rich and powerful. Her parents do not bother to ask if the man’s family is
respectable, or inquire about the groom’s temperament and level of edu-
cation. On the wedding day, one will sit in the brightly decorated bridal
sedan chair barely able to breathe. When we arrive at the new home, if
the husband is found to be unambitious but even-tempered, her family
will say we are blessed with good fortune from a previous life. If he is no
good, her family will blame it “on our wrong conduct in a previous life,”
or simply “bad luck.” If we dare complain, or otherwise try to counsel our
husbands, then a scolding and beating will befall us. Others who hear of
the abuse will say: “She is a woman of no virtue. She does not act as a wife
should!” Can you believe such words! These aspersions are cast without
the chance for an appeal? Further inequities will follow if the husband
dies. The wife will have to wear a mourning dress for three years and will
not be allowed to remarry. Yet, if the wife dies, the husband only needs
to wear a blue [mourning] braid. Some men find even that unbecoming
and do not bother to wear it at all. Even when the wife has only been dead
for three days, he can go out and cavort and indulge himself. A new wife
is allowed to enter the household even before the official seven weeks of
mourning is over. In the beginning, Heaven created all people with no
differences between men and women. Ask yourselves this, could these
people have been born without women? Why are things so unjust? Every-
day these men say, “We ought to be equal and treat people kindly.” Then
why do they treat women so unfairly and unequally as if they were Afri-
can slaves?
A woman has to learn not to depend on others, but to rely on her-
self instead. In the beginning, those rotten Confucianists said things like
“men are superior while women are inferior,” “a woman without talent
is a woman with virtue,” and “a wife should submit to her husband” and
other such rubbish. If women have any ambition, we should call upon
our comrades to oppose them. Chen Houzhu, the ruler of Chen Dynasty,
started the practice of foot binding. If we, as women, feel any shame, then
we should condemn the practice. It is not like our legs were tied while
they bound our feet. Why can’t we reject footbinding? Are they afraid of
women being educated, knowledgeable, and perhaps surpassing them,
men do not allow us to study. We must not simply go along with their
decision without even challenging them. We cannot surrender our own
responsibilities and be content with a lazy and undemanding life while
men control the important matters.
128 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

If men call us useless, we become useless. So why are we are not

bothered when we are called inept? Why do we not even question them
when we are turned into slaves, all in exchange for our comfort? Are we
to enjoy life while contributing nothing? Perhaps we are worried that our
comforts may not last. As soon as we hear that men crave for “small feet,”
we rush to bind our feet to please them. For this sacrifice we earn the right
to live a life in which we contribute nothing. And being forbidden to read
and write, is precisely what we, as women, desire. Why do we disagree?
Remember, there is no such fortune in the world that is just there for the
taking! Power belongs to the learned and knowledgeable men who con-
tribute to society, and we become their slaves. Since we are the slaves,
how can we not be oppressed? We have brought this upon ourselves.
How can we blame others? It is depressing to talk about this. We all have
experienced this type of life, so there is no need for me to go further into
details.
However, from now on I hope we can leave the past behind us and
focus on our future. Assuming we have died in the past and are reincar-
nated into our next life the elders should not say “too old to be of any
use.” If you have a decent husband who wants to establish a school, do
not stop him. If you have a fine son who wishes to study abroad, do not
stop him. The middle-aged wife should not hinder her husband down
causing him to have no ambition and achieve nothing. If you have a son,
send him to school. Do the same for your daughter and never bind her
feet. If you have a young girl, the best choice would be for her to attend
school, but even if she is unable to attend schools, you should teach her
to read and write at home. If you come from a family of officials and
that has money, you should persuade your husband to establish schools
and factories and do good deeds that will help common people. If your
family is poor, you should work hard to help your husband. Do not be
lazy and do nothing. These are my hopes. All of you are aware that we
are about to lose our country. Men can barely protect themselves. How
can we rely on them? We must revitalize ourselves. Otherwise all will be
too late when the country is lost. Everybody! Everybody! Please keep my
hopes alive!

5.11 ABOLITION OF THE COMPETITIVE

EXAMINATIONS IN CHINA (1905)
By 1905, the examination system reformers had gained increasing support since
first proposing reforms in the late nineteenth century. The system was perceived
as antiquated and perpetuating an outmoded style of learning ill-suited for Chi-
na’s modern needs. To many reformers, its abolition seemed well overdue. The
examination system depended on a largely ad-hoc system of private schools and
tutors focused on rote memorization. The exams, while merit-based, required years
of education that only a few children from the wealthiest families could afford.
Although the topics covered in the exam had begun to include more modern top-
ics, the structure of the examinations remained antiquated. The following memo-
rial and edict attempt to provide an infrastructure for a broader-based education
system. With an imperial system on its last legs and a population approaching
a half-billion, the revisions to the throne sought to modernize a system that had
shaped Chinese culture for well over a thousand years. The following is a memo-
rial written by several senior Qing officials within the inner circle of the Dowager
Empress.
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 129

Questions
1. Why does the memorial advocate an immediate rather than grad-
ual abolition of the examination system?
2. Reading through the memorial and the emperor’s rescript, what
factors do they fear the most in adopting a new style of education
system?

Memorial
A Joint Memorial by the Manchu General of Shenyang, Zhao Erxian; the
Governor-General of Zhili, Yuan Shikai; the acting Governor-General of
Liang-Jiang [Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and Anhui] Zhou Fu; the Governor-General of
Hu-Guang [Hubei-Hunan], Zhang Zhidong; the acting Governor-General
of Liang-Guang [Guangdong and Guangxi] Cen Chunxuan; the Governor
of Hunan, Duanfang, respectfully presented for Imperial consideration, in
which the urgent need of national preservation, due to the strenuous diffi-
culties of the times, is pointed out and the proposal to abolish the system of
examinations and to promote the establishment of schools is made, together
with careful and safe plans for the carrying out of the scheme.
The defects of the system of examinations have been spoken of in
detail by men of ancient and recent times, and your memorialists [Yuan]
Shikai and [Zhang] Zhidong have also presented several memorials for
Imperial consideration in which it was shown that this system was a
hindrance to the establishment of schools. The arguments used in these
memorials need not be repeated. Recently an Imperial Edict has been
issued for the gradual abolition of the system of examinations extending
over a period of three triennial examinations, so that after ten years all pro-
motions should be made from schools. . . . Such a system of examinations
has long been considered a source of reproach by foreigners, but schools
are considered to be the chief factor in a reformed government. As soon
as conservative methods are boldly and rigorously abandoned and new
methods adopted, those who see and hear what is being done will all use
their best endeavors to treat with us on a basis of mutual respect, and the
students from China who are pursuing their studies in foreign countries
will also receive encouragement. Emphasizing the importance of schools
will obviate the possibility of being carried away by gross superstition
and idle rumors. The value of men of intelligence equipped with useful
knowledge cannot be over-estimated. The establishment of schools is not
solely for the training of learned men but for the general dissemination of
knowledge among the people, so that all may receive the advantages and
acquired powers of an elementary education. This will result in patriotic
loyalty to the country and in increased ability to earn a livelihood.
[. . .]
Although the examination system may be abolished, there are sev-
eral important matters to be attended to, and the first of these in impor-
tance is that due regard should be paid to classical learning. There are
those who fear that when these examinations are abolished classical learn-
ing will be neglected. . . . In the present system of education, which has
received Imperial sanction, the study of the classics is emphasized. There
will be no lessening of the study or explanation of the Classics either in
the primary or secondary schools, the purpose being that pupils who have
finished the courses of these schools shall have studied Ten Classics so as
to understand them. In the colleges there will be a special department for
130 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

classical study in which history, literature, and philosophy will be stud-

ied. It will thus be seen that all of the ancient learning will be included in
the curricula of the schools and none of it will be lost. . . .
A second important matter which needs attention is that emphasis
should be placed upon personal character. Under the old system students
were only examined as to the quality of their literary attainments, but no
attention was paid to their character, with the result that there was often a
feeling of shame as to the attainment of students in this respect. In the pres-
ent regulations for schools, however, it is provided that in addition to their
examination in literary subjects, they shall also be given marks for con-
duct. These marks will be given to students for six things, viz: good con-
versation, careful personal appearance, attention to etiquette, diligence,
intercourse with friends, and conduct on the street. When students are
examined in their studies an average will be made between these marks
and those for daily conduct. This matter should also form the subject of a
special edict to governors-general and governors of the various provinces.
A third important matter is the immediate establishment of normal
schools. The greatest cause of concern is not that there are no schools or
no funds to establish them, but that there are no teachers. A special edict
should also be issued commanding the provinces to send pupils who have
finished their secondary studies to foreign countries to take courses in nor-
mal studies, some longer and some shorter. The selection of men who have
already taken their first and second degrees would be still more advis-
able. If normal schools are established in all the provinces, teachers will
be trained, and the first step taken toward the advancement of schools. . . .
Another important matter is that a way of preferment should be left
open for scholars of the old school. To this end during the next nine years
students who have already taken their degrees and who also show pro-
ficiency in any one of the following subjects, viz: arithmetic, geography,
science of government, political economy, military science, politics, rail-
roads, mining, police work, or western governmental science, may be sent
from the various provinces to Beijing for examination. . . .
The above five suggestions are all practicable, and we respectfully
beseech Your Majesties to command the Governors-General, Governors,
and literary chancellors or the various provinces to put them into immedi-
ate execution. . . .
Respectfully submitted for Imperial consideration.

Imperial Rescript
September 2, 1905
We have received a Memorial from Yuan Shikai, Governor-General of Zhi-
li Province, and other high officials advocating the summary abolition of
the old style of literary examinations for the juren degree in order to allow
the expansion of the modern modes of education. In this connection the
said Governor-General has also handed up his scheme for the successful
accomplishment of the new regime. . . .
On a former occasion the Ministers of Education memorialized us,
suggesting that the old style of literary examinations should be gradu-
ally abolished by extending by three times the period for them. Governor-
General Yuan Shikai in his present memorial, however, asserts that unless
these old-style examinations be abolished once and for all, the people of
this Empire will continue to show apathy and hesitate to join the modern
schools of learning. Hence if we desire to see the spread of modern educa-
tion by the establishment of a number of schools, we must first abolish the
 Chapter 5 • Seeking to Solve China’s Ills 131

old styles of studying for the examinations. The said memorialist’s argu-
ments on the subjects show the result of experience and knowledge, and
we, therefore, hereby command that, beginning from the Bingwu Cycle
[1906], all competitive examinations for the literary degree of juren and
jinshi after the old style shall be henceforth abolished, while the annual
competitions in the cities of the various provinces for the xiucai or licenti-
ate degree are also to be abolished at once. . . .
We also approve of the other suggestions made by the said Gover-
nor-General in his Memorial on the above subject and command that they
shall be put into force as proposed. In a word, the methods and aims of
our modern schools of learning have the same force as the ancient form
of selection of men for office from the schools, as mentioned above, and
the methods of rewards in rank and degrees are the same as those hith-
erto obtained by the old style of literary competitions. The regulations
and rules for the various modern schools of learning and their various
branches of studies have for their aims the attainment of substantial and
practical knowledge. . . .
We hereby further command our ministers of Education on receiving this
our Imperial Decree, to lose no time in distributing at once to the various
provinces the textbooks for schools that have been prepared, so that we may
have a uniform system of teaching in all our schools. We also command our
Governors-General and governors to insist that their subordinates, the pre-
fects, sub-prefect, and district magistrates, shall make haste to establish pri-
mary schools in all the towns, hamlets, and villages within their respective
jurisdictions, and that the utmost care be taken to select intelligent teachers
for them, so that the minds of all our subjects be open for the reception of
modern knowledge. Let all our officials be earnest and diligent in obeying
these our commands and let there be no lagging and carelessness, so as to
avoid faults and mistakes in the administration of these schools. Let no one
fail in deserving the confidence we have placed in each.

USEFUL WEBSITES AND SUGGESTED READING

FOR PART ONE
Useful Websites
1. RECORDING THE GRANDEUR OF THE QING
[Link]/nanxuntu/[Link]—A visually stun-
ning website organized around illustrated scrolls of the Kangxi and
Qianlong emperors’ Southern Inspection Tours. Includes a variety
of interactive, graphic, and textual features on numerous aspects of
Qing society and governance, including primary sources.
2. VISUALIZING THE FIRST OPIUM WAR
[Link]
[Link]—A deep dive into the broader circumstances sur-
rounding the First Opium War created, by the well-known Chinese
historian Peter Perdue. The site includes information on the opium
trade, the actual hostilities, diplomacy, and first-hand accounts of
the conflict.
3. FORBIDDEN CITY
[Link]
bD3sys/shoukanggongzhan/[Link]—Using VR technology, this
website allows the visitor to “explore” the Forbidden City, wander-
ing through the many courtyards, and even allowing detailed close-
ups of thrones and other
132 Part 1 • Late Imperial China (1644–1911)

4. LIVING IN THE CHINESE COSMOS

[Link] remarkably useful
website that introduces Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism in
historical and cultural contexts. Includes sections on the civil service
examinations, funeral customs, and on religion as it is practiced in
China today.
5. YIN YU TANG—A CHINESE HOME OF QING CHINA
[Link] visually exquisite introduction by
the Peabody Essex Museum to a Qing-era home with information
on the origins, architecture, and daily life surrounding the house
that was home to the Huang family for 200 years.

Suggested Readings
1. Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Impe-
rial Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
An in-depth examination of the Qing court’s customs, rituals,
and worldview. Includes details, vivid examples, and accessible
descriptions of the values, goals, and material culture of China’s
ruling class.
2. Stephen R. Platt, Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the
West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2012). A lively and fast-paced account of the Taip-
ing Rebellion by one of the field’s foremost historians of nineteenth-
century China. Written on a broad canvas, Platt delves into the
personalities and local details to better examine military details and
the imperial court’s complex efforts to defeat the Taipings.
3. Julia Lovell, The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams, and the Making of
Modern China (New York: The Overlook Press, 2015). A beauti-
fully written account of the Opium War and its broad, long-term
implications. Painstakingly delineates the complex background of
British imperialism and Chinese politics that led to an intricate web
of accusations, violence, and long-term diplomatic consequences
that are still at play today.
4. Gene Luen Yang, Boxers & Saints (New York: Macmillan Press,
2013). An elegantly written and visually compelling graphic novel
on the Boxer Uprising from the twin perspectives of a young Boxer
and a young Chinese Christian. Yang offers insights to the motiva-
tions of the Boxers yet never shies away from the harm their actions
caused and the long-term consequences the uprising had on China.
5. Jonathan D. Spence, The Death of Woman Wang (New York:
Viking Books, 1978). A mixture of history, mystery, and social art-
istry, the prodigious historian of China, Jonathan Spence, pieces
together an enigmatic tale of the death of a young woman. In tracing
the known facts of the case, Spence pulls the curtain back on rarely
examined elements of eighteenth-century life in rural China.
 PART 2
Republican China (1911–1949)
Republican China (1911–1949)Republican China (1911–1949)

TIMELINE

WORLD CHINA

1912 Republic of China established

Gandhi returns to India 1914
1915 New Youth (Xin Qingnian) founded
1916 Yuan Shikai dies
Trans-Siberian Railway 1917
completed
1919 May Fourth Demonstrations begin in Beijing
League of Nations founded 1920
1924 Huangpu (Whampoa) Academy opened
1925 Sun Yat-sen dies
1926–1928 Northern Expedition
1927 Nanjing becomes capital of Kuomintang government
1928 Ding Ling’s “Miss Sophie’s Diary” published
All Quiet on the Western Front 1929
published
1931 Mukden (Shenyang) Incident
1932 Manchukuo formally established by Japan
Adolf Hitler appointed 1933
chancellor
1935–1936 Long March
1936 Xi’an Incident
1937 Lugouqiao (Marco Polo) Incident/Beginning of
China’s War of Resistance
Hitler annexes Austria 1938
1940 Wang Jingwei collaborationist government
established
First electron microscope 1941
demonstrated
First atomic bomb detonated in 1945 Japan formally surrenders to China
New Mexico
1946 Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kuomintang formally
re-establish capital in Nanjing
Gandhi assassinated 1948
1949 Beijing is captured by PLA troops
 CHAPTER 6
Revolution, Warlordism, and
Republican China (1911–1949)Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation

Intellectual Transformation

1
7

5
2
4

3
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 135

1. TIANANMEN GATE: Tiananmen Gate (often known in English as the “Gate of Heavenly Peace”)
was the formal entrance to the former imperial palace and Forbidden City. This space, much smaller
than today’s Tiananmen Square, had only been opened to the public several years prior to the May
Fourth protests. Utilized in a manner never anticipated by the government, the space in front of the
Tiananmen Gate quickly became a focal point for most every major demonstration in twentieth-
century China, including the December 1919 anti-Japanese protests following the Fuzhou Incident.

2. MAY FOURTH PLACARDS: The demonstrators in the May Fourth photo carried signs with a
variety of slogans:

a. “If not fight now, when to fight?”

b. “Better to be a broken piece of jade, than to be a full piece of clay tile”
[Better to die in glory than live in dishonor]
c. “Abolish the 21 Demands”
d. “Return Our Qingdao”
e. “Down with the Traitors”
f. “Internationally fight for our sovereign rights, domestically rid the country of traitors”

3. MAY FOURTH DEMONSTRATIONS: On May 4, 1919, roughly 3,000 Beijing students and profes-
sors marched to the front of Tiananmen Gate to protest the news that the Allied Powers would grant
Japan control over Germany’s former holdings in Shandong province (6.6). Later, the protestors,
such as those pictured, marched to the diplomatic quarter intent on attacking the European embas-
sies, only to be turned away by police. Thirty-two students were arrested, and one student later died
as a result of clashes with the police.

4. CLOTHING: The clothing worn by the students and professors reveal the changing social and
political climate of the late 1910s. Most obviously, gone are the long queues common less than a
decade earlier. On the far right, several participants are wearing Western-style hats intermingled
with some participants wearing the more traditional mandarin garb. Others wear the long, padded
gown with vest [changpo magua], which would remain popular into the 1940s.

5. MAY FOURTH GENERATION: The original demonstrators in the May Fourth demonstrations
were almost entirely students and professors from Beijing’s 13 universities and colleges. By the
December demonstrations seven months later, the participants included a far-broader swath of Chi-
nese, including merchants, businessmen, workers, and laborers. As the movement grew, it would
take on broader dimensions and meanings that shaped an entire generation of Chinese.

6. DECEMBER 1919: The December 1919 demonstrations took on a much larger and different flavor
than the earlier May Fourth demonstration. More organized now (with roving food vendors), many
participants prepared speeches and had tidy signage to distribute to fellow marchers. The number
and variety of participants increased as the Chinese populace became increasingly politicized and
similar demonstrations occurred throughout China.

7. FIVE-FOUR [wu-si]: Similar to the manner in which we can simply say the two numbers “nine
eleven” and pick up the reference to September 11 (and automatically know you are referring to
September 11, 2001), in Chinese, you can say “five four” (even today), and no Chinese would mis-
take your meaning for any other date or for any other significant events in China’s past.
136 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

TONGMENG HUI On the morning of October 11, 1911, Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese revolution-
(REVOLUTIONARY ary leader and head of the Revolutionary Alliance, walked downstairs
ALLIANCE SOCIETY)—A from his Denver hotel room to eat breakfast in the grand dining room.
political group forged A wanted man in China with a price on his head, Sun was on a fund-rais-
out of several competing ing tour of the United States, seeking financial support for China’s revolu-
parties in 1910. By joining tionary cause. As he waited for his breakfast that morning, he opened the
forces, they became local newspaper to see the headline: “Chinese Revolt is Menace to Manchu
the largest Chinese Dynasty” (the headline in Denver’s other paper more typically reflected
revolutionary party and the concerns of the era: “Foreigners Throughout Empire in Deadly Peril”).
the forerunner of the Sun scanned the article and quickly confirmed that a group of young revo-
Nationalist party, the lutionaries and sympathetic army units had taken Wuchang, one of three
Kuomintang. cities in the tri-city metropolis of Wuhan. The uprising had been in the
planning stage for some months. After more than ten abortive attempts,
WUHAN—The tri-city area the long-awaited revolution to topple the Qing government had begun,
of Wuchang, Hankou, and and not a single major revolutionary leader was anywhere near Wuhan.
Hanyang, situated at the The revolt had, quite literally, ignited prematurely on October 9,
confluence of the Yangtze 1911. A young activist’s cigarette got too close to a bomb that a group of
and Hanshui Rivers. Site revolutionaries was making and set the entire building ablaze. The ensuing
of the October 10, 1911, explosion attracted the attention of the Qing authorities. In their investiga-
Wuchang uprising, which tion, they discovered a list of pro-revolutionaries, including supportive
sparked the Chinese individuals within the Qing army. Faced with the choice of waiting to
Revolution. be arrested or of going forward with their revolutionary plans, renegade
army units seized the government munitions depot on October 10, 1911.
Faced with an armed uprising, the Qing governor and governor-general
WUCHANG UPRISING
hastily fled, allowing the revolutionaries to gain control of the city. Their
(1911)—The uprising that
success in turn triggered provincial declarations of independence across
began on October 10, 1911
the empire and crippled Qing authority.
as a result of the accidental
Back in Denver, Sun faced a dilemma. At that precise moment, as
detonation of explosives by
he waited for his breakfast, Sun sat 6,000 miles and nearly two weeks’
Tongmenghui members.
travel time away from China. While the unexpected timing of the revolt
It started the Chinese
may have caught Sun unaware, his absence from the center of the Wuhan
revolution, which led to
revolt was not unanticipated. The price on his head and the revolution’s
the fall of the Qing dynasty
need for funds had made it imperative that he seek support abroad. But
and the founding of the
now the situation was different. Sun immediately checked out of his Den-
Republic of China.
ver hotel and headed east. He made several stops in the United States
before traveling to London and Paris. This itinerary suggests a premedi-
NATIONAL DAY— tated plan of action or, at the very least, a clear-headed appraisal of what
The Wuchang Uprising measures he needed to take prior to his return to China.
on October 10 (or Sun had legitimate reasons to be worried about the international
“Double-10”), 1911, response to the actions of the revolutionaries. Given the millions in loans
marked the beginning of and unpaid indemnities owed by the Qing government, it was conceivable
the Chinese Revolution that the Western powers might intervene against the revolutionaries to
and is still celebrated prop up a weak Qing monarchy. With this perspective, Sun’s primary goal
as National Day in was twofold: 1) to assure the Western governments that the new republi-
the Republic of China can government would honor all treaties and debts to foreign powers and
(Taiwan). The anniversary 2) to lay the groundwork for diplomatic recognition and, where possible,
of the founding of the future loans for the fledging government. Sun stopped in Chicago, where
PRC on October 1, 1949, the news of the revolution allowed him to raise more than $10,000 from
is National Day in the Chinese Americans. His efforts with the Western governments were not as
People’s Republic of China. successful. American, British, or French leaders offered no firm financial
or political commitments. The British and French, however, did agree not
to issue any additional loans to the Qing government. After doing what
he could overseas, Sun arrived in Shanghai on December 25, 1911. A week
later, on New Year’s Day, he took the train to Nanjing, the new capital of
China, and that afternoon was sworn in as the provisional president.
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 137

Today, both the People’s Republic of China (mainland) and the YUAN SHIKAI
Republic of China (Taiwan) revere Sun as the “Father of the Nation” (1859–1916)—Staunch Qing
[guofu]. However, there is debate among many scholars over Sun’s actual loyalist and commander
influence, given that the “revolution” involved relatively little military of the powerful Beiyang
conflict and with little guidance from Sun himself. Nor did Sun prove par- Army, which allowed
ticularly adept in guiding the republic through its precarious early phases. him, in 1912, to broker
In the first weeks of 1912, Sun Yat-sen and the provisional govern- the abdication of the
ment in Nanjing faced several unpleasant realities. Their leadership, and Qing in exchange for the
popular support, was almost entirely composed of southerners with virtu- presidency of the new
ally no backing from the north. Nor had the political events compelled the republic. His term as
Qing emperor to abdicate swiftly and recognize the National Assembly president was plagued by
in Nanjing as China’s new government. Rather, the last emperor (or more corruption, extortion, and
correctly the child emperor’s advisors) waited nearly four months before a misguided attempt to
accepting their inevitable fate and agreeing to abdicate their power (6.4). proclaim himself emperor
Adding to the confusion, although the provinces exhibited uniformity in before his death in 1916.
their declarations of independence, there was virtually no agreement on
what form the Republic of China should take or if the Nanjing govern-
ment should assume leadership over the new nation.
At the provincial level, many began to wonder if Sun Yat-sen’s skills
as a revolutionary agitator were sufficient to lead modern China through
its difficult initial phases of nationhood. He had spent most of his adult life
outside China and had no military or political leadership experience. As
a result, many Chinese believed him to be uniquely ill-equipped to han-
dle the serious organizational issues facing the republic. Thus, for several
months, the National Assembly was in the awkward position of asserting
national control over China, while regional power remained unambigu-
ously in the hands of provincial governors and the Qing emperor still pro-
fessing to govern his empire.
With the young republic facing political gridlock, Yuan Shikai, a
political and military official who had broad ties with both the Qing court
and the military forces, emerged as a compromise candidate. Yuan, on the
surface, appeared an odd choice. Ideologically conservative, his political
views were not aligned with many of the revolution’s goals. However,
his decades-long career on the battlefield and in the imperial corridors
of power had given him the real-world connections needed to break the
deadlock by negotiating an end to the Qing dynasty. If nothing else, Yuan
understood an opportunity when he saw it. In exchange for taking on this
critical role, he demanded that he be given nothing less than the presi-
dency. Many Chinese felt he alone could peacefully bring an end to Qing
rule and prevent a civil war. As the pressure mounted, and just six weeks
after accepting the provisional presidency, Sun Yat-sen agreed to resign
from office to make way for Yuan Shikai to become China’s first president.
Sun would never serve as president of a unified China. He would, how-
ever, remain active in China’s political development. Yuan Shikai’s lead-
ership proved to be a political disaster that far from helped China make
the awkward transition from empire to republic, but he hastened China’s
political disintegration, ushering China in a period of deep disunion.

1911 REVOLUTION
The suddenness of the October 1911 revolution surprised virtually every
constituency vying for power within China. Each political group, from
the radical revolutionaries to the conservative constitutional monarchists,
scrambled to position themselves and profit from the Wuchang Upris-
ing. In November, the National Assembly, a body formed by the imperial
138 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

THREE PRINCIPLES OF court in accordance with the Constitutional timetable but not yet given full
THE PEOPLE—A political parliamentary rights, promoted the creation of a political structure like the
philosophy developed constitutional monarchies of Japan and Great Britain (6.2). The revolution-
by Sun Yat-sen grouped aries, who had focused on abolishing the Qing dynasty and forestalling
into the three guiding any monarchy, had no common vision of the future or of how to force the
principles of nationalism, abdication of the Qing emperor (6.4). As a result, even six months after
democracy, and livelihood. the Wuchang Uprising, China’s first attempts to form a solid democracy
faltered and quickly disintegrated into disunity and infighting among the
revolutionaries, provincial leaders, and the former imperialists.

6.1 THREE PEOPLE’S PRINCIPLES AND THE FUTURE

OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE (1906)
Perhaps no single political ideology of early twentieth-century China is better
known than Sun Yat-sen’s “Three People’s Principles: Nationalism, Democ-
racy and Livelihood.” The Three Principles themselves never changed, though
the way Sun described them evolved over time (compare with 7.1). His descrip-
tion often depended on the audience being addressed. The following explication
he gives, written in 1906, five years before the Wuchang Uprising, captures the
key concerns of the Chinese in the twilight of the Qing but before the Republic of
China actually existed. Sun neatly summarizes three main forces that will ulti-
mately fuel the 1911 Revolution: the strong anti-Manchu sentiment, a desire for
a democratic government, and China’s need to modernize. His ideas also reflect a
new generation of political leaders who unabashedly embraced Western political
philosophy. His explanation, unlike many of his predecessors, avoids a defense of
Western methods while revealing that his listeners are quite familiar with com-
peting modes of governance in place around the world. The following appeared in
the official newspaper of the Tongmenghui (the leading revolutionary party of the
period of which Sun Yat-sen was a central figure).

Questions
1. Why does Sun suggest the need for five separate branches of
government instead of the three employed in the American
constitution?
2. Sun’s third principle, livelihood, is often translated as “Social-
ism” because of its emphasis on the redistribution of wealth.
From Sun’s description, why do you think he felt it so crucial to
the republic’s success?

It is not necessary to do research in order to know what nationalism is.

A person always recognizes his parents and never confuses them with
strangers. Nationalism is analogous to this. It has to do with human nature
and applies to everyone. Today, more than 260 years have passed since
the Manchus entered China proper, yet even as children we Han would
certainly not mistake them for fellow Han. This is the root of nationalism.
On the other hand, we should recognize that nationalism does not mean
discriminating against people of a different nationality. It simply means
not allowing such people to seize our political power, for only when we
Han are in control politically do we have a nation. If that political control is
in the hands of people of another nationality, then there is no Han nation.
Let us pause to consider for moment: where is the nation? Where is
the political power? Actually, we are already a people without a nation!
The population of the globe is only one billion, several hundred million; we
Han, being 400 million, comprise one-fourth of that population. Our nation
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 139

is the most populous, most ancient, and most civilized in the world, yet
today we are a lost nation. Isn’t that enormously bizarre? . . . We Han are
now swiftly being caught up in a tidal wave of nationalist revolution, yet
the Manchus continue to discriminate against the Han. They boast that
their forefathers conquered the Han because of their superior unity and
military strength and that they intend to retain these qualities so as to
dominate the Han forever. There is a certain amount of truth in this state-
ment, but it ignores another important factor: the disunity of the Han. Cer-
tainly, once we Han unite, our power will be thousands of times greater
than theirs, and the success of the nationalist revolution will be assured.
On the other hand, I have heard claims that the nationalist revolu-
tion is aimed at exterminating the Manchus as a people. This is utterly
mistaken. The reason for the nationalist revolution is our unwillingness to
let the Manchu extinguish our nation and dominate us politically, and our
determination to restore our nation by liquidating their regime. Thus, we
do not hate the Manchus per se, but only those Manchus who are harming
the Han. . . .
If the Manchus stubbornly continue to hold on to political power
and keep the Han under their yoke, then as long as breath remains in the
Han, the Han will refuse to accept it meekly. I presume you gentlemen
will agree. These are the basic ideas behind the nationalist revolution.
As for the Principle of Democracy, it is the foundation of the politi-
cal revolution. In the future, to be sure, the vicious politics of today will
be swept away after the nationalist revolution triumphs, but it will also
be necessary to eradicate the roots of such politics. For several thousand
years China has been a monarchical autocracy, a type of political system
intolerable to those living in freedom and equality. . . . The study of what
a political revolution entails is a very difficult undertaking. As to prac-
tice, a political revolution must proceed simultaneously with the national-
ist revolution. When we overthrow the Manchu regime, we will achieve
not only a nationalist revolution against the Manchus but also a political
revolution against monarchy. They are not to be carried out at two differ-
ent times. The aim of the political revolution is to create a constitutional,
democratic political system. In the context of the current political situation
in China, a revolution would be necessary even if the monarch were a
Han. Neither the French Revolution nor the Russian Revolution involved
racial issues; the issues were strictly political. A democratic political sys-
tem has been achieved in France, and in Russia the Nihilist party will also
ultimately reach this goal. After the revolution in China, this will be the
most appropriate political system. This, too, everyone knows.
[. . .]
Now, let me begin by discussing the origins of the Principle of the
People’s Livelihood, a principle that began to flourish only in the latter
part of the nineteenth century. Before that it did not flourish because civi-
lization was not as highly developed. The more civilization developed,
the more pressing its social problems became. The reasons are very diffi-
cult to explain, but we can use a simple analogy. As civilization advanced,
people relied less on physical labor and more on natural forces, since elec-
tricity and steam could accomplish things a thousand times faster than
human physical strength. . . . In view of this, everyone in Europe and
America should be living in a state of plenty and happiness undreamed of
in antiquity. If we look around, however, we see that conditions in those
countries are precisely the opposite. Statistically, Britain’s wealth has
increased more than several thousand-fold over the previous generation,
yet the poverty of the people has also increased several thousand-fold
140 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

over the previous generation. Moreover, the rich are extremely few,
and the poor extremely numerous. . . . The reason the Socialist party advo-
cates the Principle of the People’s Livelihood is precisely that it seeks
to remedy the unequal distribution of wealth. As its advocates grew in
number, the principle became a highly complex science that has given rise
to numerous schools. Some of them advocate getting rid of the capital-
ists and replacing them with state ownership. Others want to distribute
wealth evenly among the poor, while still others propose public owner-
ship. There are many opinions, but every informed person knows that a
social revolution is inevitable in Europe and America. . . .
After all, at present it will be much easier to implement the Principle
of the People’s Livelihood in China than in Europe and America because
social problems are caused by the advance of civilization and are corre-
spondingly less serious where civilization is less advanced. . . .
I have heard it said that the Principle of the People’s Livelihood
would entail killing half of our 400 million people and taking the land
of the rich for ourselves. This irresponsible talk is based on ignorance,
and we can ignore it. With respect to a solution, although the socialists
have different opinions, the procedure I most favor is land valuation. For
example, if a landlord has land worth 1,000 dollars, its price can be set
at 1,000 or even 2,000 dollars. Perhaps in the future, after communica-
tions have been developed, the value of his land will rise to 10,000 dol-
lars; the owner should receive 2,000, which entails a profit and no loss,
and the 8,000 increment will go to the state. Such an arrangement will
greatly benefit both the state and the people’s livelihood. Naturally, it will
also eliminate the shortcomings that have permitted a few rich people to
monopolize wealth. This is the simplest, most convenient, and most fea-
sible method. . . .
In short, the objective of our revolution is to promote the well-being
of our people as a whole. Because we are unwilling to let a small num-
ber of Manchus enjoy all the privileges, we want a nationalist revolution.
Because we do not want one man, the monarch, to enjoy all the privileges,
we want a political revolution. And because we do not want a small num-
ber of rich people to enjoy all the privileges, we want a social revolution.
Anything short of these three revolutions will not fulfill our original aims.
When they have been accomplished, our nation of China will be a most
perfect nation.
There remains another issue worth studying: the future constitution
of the Republic of China. Recently, the word constitution has been on every-
one’s lips. Even the Manchu government has been shrewd enough to send
lackeys abroad to inquire into the political situation there so that they can
concoct some imperial edicts having to do with constitutionalism. They’re
only creating a disturbance for themselves. . . . As to the future constitu-
tion of the Republic of China, I propose that we introduce a new principle,
that of the “five separate powers.”
Under this system, there will be two other powers in addition to
the three powers just discussed. One is the examination power. Citizens
have the right to freedom and equality, and officials are public servants of
the citizenry. American officials are either elected or appointed. Formerly
there were no civil service examinations, which led to serious shortcom-
ings with respect to both elected and appointed officials. . . . Therefore,
the future constitution of the Republic of China must provide for an
independent branch expressly responsible for civil service examinations.
Furthermore, all officials, however high their rank, must undergo exami-
nations in order to determine their qualifications. Whether elected or
appointed, officials must pass those examinations before assuming office.
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 141

This procedure will eliminate such evils as blind obedience, electoral

abuses, and favoritism. From the beginning, China selected its officials
according to their qualifications, and those qualifications received great
emphasis. . . .
The other power is the supervisory power, responsible for monitor-
ing matters involving impeachment. For reasons that should be evident to
all, such a branch is indispensable to any nation. The future constitution of
the Republic of China must provide for an independent branch. . . .
With this added to the four powers already discussed, there will be
five separate powers. As such a system is unknown among the nations
of the world and has rarely been mentioned even in theory, it should be
termed a political innovation. I have invented only the foundations of that
system, leaving the details and the rest of the structure to the devoted
efforts of all my comrades, who, by remedying my own inadequacies, will
create the future constitution of the Republic of China. The constitution
will form the basis of the sound government of a nation that belongs to
its own race, to its own citizens, and to its own society. This will be the
greatest good fortune for our 400 million Han people. I presume that you
gentlemen are willing to undertake and complete this task. It is my great-
est hope.

6.2 DEMANDS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, SUBMITTED

IN A MEMORIAL TO THE THRONE (NOVEMBER 3, 1911)
In the weeks after the Wuchang Uprising, the National Assembly sought to
persuade the imperial court to make parliamentary concessions by agreeing to
maintain the monarchy and to establish the emperor as the ceremonial head of
government. For most revolutionaries, however, the time for such half-measures
had already passed. As the following memorial suggests, the National Assem-
bly sought to attain legitimacy through an imperial mandate and not through
popular or “revolutionary” activity. This approach would produce a China with
two competing political bodies: the National Assembly, maintaining a connection
with the Qing, and the provisional government, rooted in revolution and headed
by Sun Yat-sen in Nanjing. The two political groups claimed authority through
radically different processes, and neither was based on an open and comprehen-
sive selection process.

Questions
1. What aspects of the following demands would have been threat-
ening to the throne? Why?
2. Why does the National Assembly seek to retain the emperor?
1. The Qing Dynasty shall be maintained in perpetuity.
2. The person of the Emperor shall be inviolable.
3. The prerogative of the Emperor shall be limited by the Constitution.
4. The succession to the Throne shall be prescribed in the Constitution.
5. The Constitution shall be drafted and determined by the National
Assembly and promulgated by the Emperor.
6. All amendment of the Constitution lies within the province and power
of Parliament.
7. Members of the Upper House of Parliament are to be elected by the
people from specially qualified classes.
8. Parliament will elect but the Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minis-
ter, on whose recommendation the other members of the Cabinet shall
be appointed by the Emperor; but Imperial princes shall be ineligible
for any ministerial office or for the governorship of a province.
142 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

9. The Prime Minister may be impeached, whereupon either he shall ask

for a dissolution of Parliament or shall resign.
10. The Emperor shall be in supreme control of the army and the navy, but
when this control is exercised in respect of domestic matters it shall be
subject to such limitations as may be imposed by Parliament.
11. Imperial Edicts shall not have force of law except in emergencies, and
even then under special provisions and only for the carrying out of
what has already been determined by law.
12. No treaty with a foreign Power shall be concluded without the author-
ity of Parliament, but the conclusion of a peace or the declaration of a
war may be made during the session of Parliament without the con-
sent of Parliament being obtained until afterwards.
13. Standing orders of an administrative character shall be settled by Acts
of Parliament.
14. If the budget should fail to be accepted by Parliament the Government
shall act upon the preceding year’s budget, but no further expendi-
ture shall be added thereto and no special financial measures shall be
adopted.
15. The determination of the revenues and expenditures of the Imperial
Household shall be within the power of Parliament.
16. The Imperial Household Laws shall not violate the Constitution.
17. The two Houses of Parliament shall jointly establish Administrative
Courts.
18. The Emperor shall promulgate all the laws enacted by Parliament.
19. The National Assembly shall exercise all the authority vested in Par-
liament by Articles 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 18, until Parliament is duly
elected and opened.

6.3 FIRST PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT’S INAUGURAL

ADDRESS (JANUARY 2, 1912)
Sun was sworn into office the day before issuing his first proclamation. His
speech clearly sought to remold his Three Principles of the People (6.1) to fit
the immediate exigencies facing the nascent Chinese Republic. While it may seem
a smooth summary of the events, it offered little in the way of concrete measures
to resolve the challenges facing a nation that did not have a consensus for shaping
its political future. Having no public mandate and a non-existent military force
to leverage his position, Sun had no viable means for leading China to accept the
political framework he outlined.

Questions
1. What did Sun see as the major challenges facing China?
2. What actions did he intend to make to resolve these problems?

The Republic of China is newly founded, and as unworthy as I may be,

I have been selected as the provisional president and remain vigilant
day and night, fearing I will not meet the expectations of the people. The
[imperial government’s] autocratic governance has over the past two hun-
dred years become increasingly poisonous. However, once the people
resolved to rid themselves of it, its downfall occurred in just weeks with
more than ten provinces joining our cause. The speed with which success
was achieved is unprecedented in all of history. Now, with no unified
government to administer internal affairs and no entity to handle foreign
matters, the people believe that the nation’s construction must be delayed
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 143

no longer. Therefore, I have been charged with the duty to organize a pro-
visional government. If measured purely in terms of my merit, I would
dare not to take this position, but if measured in terms of my required
service and duty, I dare not to decline. Only after working hard to serve
the people, can we thoroughly wipe out the autocracy’s poisonous influ-
ence, ensure the republic’s revolutionary purpose, and fulfill the people’s
aspirations.
This all begins today with me openly declaring to the people:
The foundation of a nation lies with the people. The land of the
Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Muslims and Tibetans is formed as a single
nation and thus the Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Muslims and Tibet-
ans are formed as a single people. This is called the unity of the people
[minzu].
Wuhan rose first in revolt and was quickly joined by more than ten
provinces; each declaring their independence one after the other. This so-
called independence is a separation of the provinces from the Qing court
and a unification of the provinces with each other, including Mongolia
and Tibet. Unified in action and without dissent, the order of the central
government is needed to preserve our borders. This is called the unity of
the territories.
Once the bloody bell [of revolution] was rung, the banner of revolt
was raised across all four corners of the land, with armed and fitted sol-
ders rising up in over ten provinces. Despite the inconsistent organiza-
tion and the sometimes uncoordinated leadership, the forces all shared a
single common purpose. Out of our common purpose emerges a united
action, and from that a single plan. How hard can this be? This is called
the unity of military authority.
Our country is vast, with each province having its own unique cus-
toms. In the past, the Qing court forcefully implemented its rule through
centralized government and a false constitution. From this point forward,
the provinces are united in their pursuit of autonomy, and the future rela-
tionship between the provinces and central government is established,
whereby adjustments are made accordingly, whereby principals are set,
and whereby regulations are self-determined. This is called the unity of
internal authority.
Under the Manchu dynasty, the Qing court raised taxes in the name
of constitutional [reform], in reality they simply enriched themselves
through miscellaneous taxes making people’s lives unbearable. From this
point forward, national expenses collected from the people must be man-
aged reasonably and in accordance with accepted financial principles,
with a view to improve the economic organization of society, so that peo-
ple can properly enjoy life. This is called the unity of financial authority.
The above provisions are our principal policies and shall be carried
out appropriately and, in this manner, will avoid far-reaching mistakes.
If our revolution proceeds as we have proposed, then nations around the
world will take notice. Although our revolution has had many highs and
lows, the world recognizes our revolutionary purpose. Since the Octo-
ber Uprising [in Wuhan], when we first raised our revolutionary banner
upwards, friendly nations, hopeful for a peaceful result, have maintained
neutrality. Their newspapers and public opinion have showed sympathy
to our cause for which we are deeply grateful.
With the establishment of the provisional government, we shall
do our best to fulfill the duties of a civilized nation in order to enjoy
the rights of a civilized state. The humiliating behavior and xenophobic
mindset of the Manchu Qing must be eradicated. By pursuing peace
144 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

BEIYANG ARMY—A and tranquility and becoming more friendly with our allies, China will
Western-style army forged once again be acknowledged by the international community, and the
from Li Hongzhang’s world can gradually become as one. We must proceed step by step,
Anhui Army in the 1880s without taking anything for granted. This is the basis of our foreign
and led by Yuan Shikai policy.
after Li Hongzhang’s The newly established Republic faces many foreign and domestic
death in 1901. It was matters. How is it that I am the one qualified to take on such duties! Yet,
funded by North China the provisional government is the government of a revolutionary time.
customs’ revenues, first Over the past ten years, those who have agitated for revolution have over-
used to build the Beiyang come difficulties with a sincere and pure spirit. Even if the future holds
(“Northern Ocean”) more difficulties, with our revolutionary spirit, we cannot be denied, and
fleet, hence the name. the foundation of the Republic of China will be firmly laid.
The Beiyang Army Only then will the duties of the Provisional Government be success-
remained intact into the fully concluded and allow us to proclaim our duties fulfilled in the eyes
Republican era, first led of the nation and our people. Today, on this day when I first meet our
by Yuan Shikai, then the nation’s people, I have openly shared my most heartfelt thoughts with my
conservative warlord 400 million compatriots.
general Zhang Xun.

6.4 LAST EMPEROR’S ABDICATION EDICT

(FEBRUARY 12, 1912)
The following is one of several carefully orchestrated exchanges of edicts by which
Yuan Shikai sought to become president of the new Republic. Yuan Shikai had
commanded the Beiyang Armies and been a firm proponent of the imperial
throne. By the end of 1911, as the dominant military leader in northern China,
many revolutionaries believed that only he could prevent the disintegration of
China into competing regional armies. His long service to the throne also posi-
tioned him as one of the few people who could persuade the young emperor (and
his advisors) of the need to abdicate. In exchange for such services, Yuan Shikai
demanded that Sun Yat-sen step aside and that he would replace Sun as the pro-
visional president. Although Yuan Shikai issued a statement pledging loyalty to
the republic, promising not to move the new capital back to Beijing and to allow
China to adopt a full constitutional government, within months, he went back on
each of these assurances.

Questions
1. What reasons does the Qing leadership give for succumbing to
the rising political pressures?
2. What role does Yuan Shikai play as presented in the edicts
below?

I, the emperor, have received an edict from the Empress Dowager Longyu
stating: due to the uprising of the Republic’s Army and subsequent sup-
port of the provinces, the empire flared into action and the people have
suffered. I have commanded Yuan Shikai to send officials to confer with
representatives of the army about the convening of a National Conven-
tion on the future form of government. Two months of deliberations have
passed and yet still no agreement has been found. The north and south
remain at odds with each other. As a result, all commerce and trade has
come to a halt, and ordinary civil life has been interrupted. As long as
the form of the government remains undetermined, people’s livelihood
continues to be precarious. Today the majority of the nation’s people
desire a republic. The southern and central provinces led [the revolution]
with the northern military leaders later also joining in agreement. From
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 145

the people’s wishes we can see Heaven’s Will. How could I go against
the people’s desires, simply for the sake my own family’s continuing
glory. Considering the general situation broadly and understanding the
opinion of the people specifically, I, the Empress Dowager, guiding the
Emperor, transfer the sovereignty to the people and declare that the new
government will be a constitutional republic. Thus, within the nation, [we
can] in the near term avoid disorder and pursue peace, and in the long
term follow the teachings of the old sages that “the whole world is one
community.”
Yuan Shikai, already elected Prime Minister of the National Assem-
bly [at Beijing], is likely to have a solution to unite the northern and south-
ern provinces as one. He should be granted the total power to organize
a provisional Republican government and to confer with the Republic’s
army a method of unification. So, wishing to assure peace for the peo-
ple and the country, and that the integrity of the great Republic is main-
tained by the union of the five peoples: Manchus, Han, Mongols, Hui, and
Tibetans.
The emperor and I will step down, free from public duties, into a
more relaxed lifestyle and enjoy courtesies accorded us by the people, as
we watch with satisfaction the establishment of a new government.

6.5 SUN YAT-SEN’S REPLY TO YUAN SHIKAI

AND RESIGNATION (FEBRUARY 12, 1912)
Sun Yat-sen, on February 12, 1912, resigned his position as provisional presi-
dent. His contradictory feelings toward Yuan Shikai are manifest in the follow-
ing documents. Like many of his revolutionary cohorts, he saw no alternative to
allowing Yuan Shikai to replace him as president. Sun’s fears that Yuan Shikai
had little commitment to a democratic government were quickly validated when
Yuan Shikai failed to honor numerous promises and moved the capital back to his
powerbase in Beijing. Yuan’s presidency was characterized by placing his cronies
in power, by bribing those outside his control and by assassinating those resistant
to his despotic leadership.

Questions
1. What elements of his resignation disturbed Sun Yat-sen?
2. Why do you think Sun only lasted six weeks as leader of China?

Dr. Sun to Yuan Shikai, Dated Nanjing,

12th February, 1912
Tang Shaoyi has telegraphed me that the Qing Emperor has abdicated and
that you will support the Republic. The settlement of this great question is
a matter of the utmost joy and congratulation. I will report to the National
Assembly that I agree to resign the office of President in your favor. But
the Republican Government cannot be organized by any authority con-
ferred by the Qing Emperor. The exercise of such pretentious power will
surely lead to serious trouble. As you clearly understand the needs of the
situation, certainly you will not accept such authority. I cordially invite
you to come to Nanjing and fulfill the expectations of all. Should you be
anxious about the maintenance of order in the North, would you inform
the Provisional Government by telegraph whom you could recommend
be appointed with full powers to act in your place as a representative of
146 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

MAY FOURTH the Republic? Expecting your reply to this telegram, hereby again extend
MOVEMENT—A to you our cordial welcome to Nanjing.
movement narrowly
defined as events sparked
by the student-led Resignation of First Provisional President.
demonstrations of May 4, Dr. Sun to the National Assembly at Nanjing,
1919, against the Treaty of 12th February, 1912
Versailles. More often, it is Today I present to you my resignation and request you to elect a good
used to identify the broad and talented man as the new President. The election of President is a right
intellectual and cultural of our citizens, and it is not for me to interfere in any way. But according
transformations that took to the telegram which our delegate Dr. Wu was directed to send to Bei-
place after Japan’s Twenty- jing, I was to undertake to resign in favor of Mr. Yuan when the Emperor
One Demands (1915) had abdicated, and Mr. Yuan has declared his political views in support
lasting well into the 1920s. of the Republic. I have already submitted this to your honorable Assem-
bly and obtained your approval. The abdication of the Qing Emperor and
the union of the North and South are largely due to the great exertions
CHEN DUXIU
of Mr. Yuan. Moreover, he has declared his unconditional adhesion to
(1880–1942)—A gifted May
the national cause. Should he be elected to serve the Republic, he would
Fourth intellectual who
surely prove himself a most loyal servant of the state. Besides, Mr. Yuan
helped launch and edit the
is a man of political experience, to whose constructive ability our united
New Youth in 1915, was
nation looks forward for the consolidation of its interests. Therefore, I ven-
appointed as Dean to the
ture to express my personal opinion and to invite your honorable Assem-
School of Arts at Beijing
bly carefully to consider the future welfare of the state, and not to miss the
University in 1917, and
opportunity of electing one who is worthy of your election. The happiness
was a founding member
of our country depends upon your choice. Farewell.
and first party secretary of
the Chinese Communist
Party in 1921. MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT
As the military and political crises deepened, intellectually charged move-
NEW CULTURE ments arose. These movements advocated publicly for a unified response
MOVEMENT (c. 1917– by China’s fragmented political and military leaders. The May Fourth
1923)—A movement Movement is best understood as a popular movement unified by a desire
roughly equivalent to intellectually redefine China’s traditional culture and society, even its
to the “May Fourth language (6.7). The catalysts for these changes were varied, such as the
Movement,” though some humiliating political and economic demands imposed on China by Japan,
suggest the New Culture the demeaning treatment China received in the Versailles settlement of
Movement indicates a World War I, and the debilitating effect of the rampant Warlord milita-
more “thought”-oriented rism (6.10). The May Fourth Movement, though a response to these kinds
movement compared to of external pressures, was, first and foremost, an internal, intellectual
the “action” agenda of the movement that sought to alter what it meant for anything or anyone to
May Fourth Movement. be Chinese. Journals such as New Youth, intellectuals such as Chen Duxiu,
The conflation of the Beijing University president Cai Yuanpei, and literary figures like Lu Xun
terms has made them were all part of a broad public dialogue that sought to reshape the basic
interchangeable in popular building blocks of Chinese society as well as promote the New Culture
discourse. Movement. This dialogue covered political ideology, literature, and the
composition of Chinese “national essence” [guocui]. In many of the follow-
ing documents, we see the political, social, and cultural seeds of China’s
future, though the context in which these events took place gave little evi-
dence of their eventual success.

6.6 JAPAN’S 21 DEMANDS (JANUARY 18, 1915)

On January 18, 1915, Eki Hoiki, the Japanese minister in Beijing, handed Presi-
dent Yuan Shikai the following list of 21 demands, grouped into five sections. The
timing of the demands took full advantage of Great Britain’s recent entrance into
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 147

World War I. The Japanese calculated that Britain would be hard pressed to hold
Japan to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905, which stated that both
countries would be bound to the “preservation of the . . . independence, and integ-
rity of the Chinese Empire.” On May 7, the Japanese minister presented an ulti-
matum, including a revised series of demands, in particular, the postponement
of the demands in Group 5 and the threat that if these terms were not accepted
within 48 hours the Japanese government would “take such steps as they deem
necessary.” The next day, Yuan Shikai accepted the demands, and on May 25, he
officially signed treaties and diplomatic notes acknowledging China’s assent to
the terms. His acceptance set off a furor and sparked popular anti-Japanese move-
ments throughout China.

Questions
1. Rank the five groups of demands into what you surmise China
(and the Chinese people) found most to least objectionable?
2. In what ways are Japan’s 21 demands similar to or different from
the unequal treaties China was forced to sign with Western pow-
ers during the nineteenth century?

Group I
The Japanese government and the Chinese government being desirous of
maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening
the friendly relations and good neighborhood existing between the two
nations agree to the following articles:
Article 1 — The Chinese government engages to give full assent to
all matters upon which the Japanese government may hereafter agree
with the German government relating to the disposition of all right, inter-
ests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise,
possesses in relation to the province of Shandong.
Article 2 — The Chinese government engages that within the Prov-
ince of Shandong and along its coast, no territory or island will be ceded
or leased to a third power under any pretext.
Article 3 — The Chinese government consents to Japan’s building
a railway from Yantai or Longkou to join the Jiaozhou-Jinanfu Railway.
Article 4 — The Chinese government engages in interest of trade
and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as possible
certain important cities and towns in the province of Shandong as com-
mercial ports. What places shall be opened are to be jointly decided upon
in a separate agreement.

Group II
The Japanese government and the Chinese government, since the Chinese
government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by
Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the fol-
lowing articles:
Article 1 — The two contracting parties mutually agree that the term
of lease of Port Arthur [Lüshun] and Dalian and the term of lease of the
South Manchurian Railway and the Andong-Shenyang Railway shall be
extended to the period of 99 years.
Article 2 — Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required
either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for
farming.
148 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

Article 3 — Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in

South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business
and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.
Article 4 — The Chinese government agrees to grant to Japanese sub-
jects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened, they shall be decided
upon jointly.
Article 5 — The Chinese government agrees that in respect of the
(two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese Government’s consent
shall be first obtained before action is taken:
(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third power to
build a railway or to make a loan with a third power for the purpose of
building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third power pledging the local
taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as security.
Article 6 — The Chinese government agrees that if the Chinese Gov-
ernment employs political, financial or military advisers or instructors in
South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese government
shall first be consulted.
Article 7 — The Chinese government agrees that the control and man-
agement of the Jilin-Changchun shall be handed over to the Japanese gov-
ernment for terms of 99 years dating from the signing of this agreement.

Group III
The Japanese government and the Chinese government, seeing that Jap-
anese financiers and the Hanyeping Co. have close relations with each
other at present and desiring that common interests of the two nations
shall be advanced, agree to the following articles:
Article 1 — The two contracting parties mutually agree that when
the opportune moment arrives the Hanyeping Company shall be made
a joint concern of the two nations and they further agree that without the
previous consent of Japan China shall not by her own act dispose of the
rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said company nor cause
the said company to dispose freely of the same.
Article 2 — The Chinese government agrees that all mines in the
neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyeping Company shall not be
permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by
other persons outside of the said Company; and further agrees that if it
is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may
directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said Company, the consent
of the said Company shall first be obtained.

Group IV
The Japanese government and the Chinese government with the object of
effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China agree to the follow-
ing special article:
The Chinese government engages not to cede or lease to a third
power any harbor or bay or island along the coast of China.

Group V
Article 1 — The Chinese central government shall employ influential Japa-
nese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs.
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 149

Article 2 — Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior CAI YUANPEI
of China shall be granted the right of owning land. (1868–1940)—Born in
Article 3 — Inasmuch as the Japanese government and the Chinese Zhejiang province, Cai
government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chi- Yuanpei was appointed to
nese police which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason Hanlin Academy in 1894,
necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall joined the Tongmenghui
be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police depart- in 1905, and served as
ments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may President of Beijing
at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police University (1916–1926).
Service. A major proponent of the
Article 4 — China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of muni- May Fourth Movement, he
tions of war (say 50 percent or more of what is needed by the Chinese advocated the progressive
government) or that there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese ideals of Anarchism and
jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and women’s rights.
Japanese material to be purchased.
Article 5 — China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing
a railway connecting Wuchang with Jiujiang and Nanchang, another line
between Nanchang and Hangzhou, and another between Nanchang and
Chaozhou.
Article 6 — If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build rail-
ways and construct harbor-works (including dockyards) in the Province
of Fujian, Japan shall be first consulted.
Article 7 — China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right
of missionary propaganda in China.

6.7 MAY FOURTH MANIFESTO (MAY 4, 1919)

China, like many non–Western European nations, had placed considerable
confidence in President Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Many non-Western coun-
tries took Wilson’s Fourteen Points to mean he advocated equality among all
nations in the World War I peace proceedings at Versailles outside of Paris.
When word finally reached China that Germany’s holdings would be given to
Japan instead of reverting to Chinese control, public outrage boiled over. Stu-
dents in Beijing took to the streets to protest the peace negotiations. One of the
student leaders, Luo Jialun, wrote the following manifesto, which was the only
publication printed that day. The demonstration, by today’s standards, was
small—only 3,000 students from Beijing’s 13 colleges. However, the impact
was immediate and sparked a countrywide reaction against the treaty and
against Japan. The Treaty of Versailles, formally signed eight months after
the war’s end on June 28, 1919, did not include China’s signature. Many of
the signatories of the manifesto were arrested, leading intellectual and Beijing
University president Cai Yuanpei to resign in protest (only returning to office
in September).

Questions
1. At what target is the anger of the May Fourth demonstrations
directed?
2. What political and military contingencies (within China) made
it difficult for the Chinese (Beijing) government to oppose the
Versailles Peace Treaty?
At the Paris Peace Conference, Japan’s request to occupy and control Shan-
dong, is about to be granted! Their diplomacy has triumphed completely
while ours has failed utterly! The loss of Shandong can only denote the
end of China’s territorial integrity. The end of China’s territorial integrity
can only mean China is done for! Therefore today, we, the students, form
150 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

a procession and demonstrate in front of every embassy of every country,

and demand that they defend justice. We hope people in industry, busi-
ness and every walk of life all over the country will hold citizens meetings
to fight; internationally for China’s sovereignty, and domestically to rid
the country of traitors. China’s survival depends on this next move! Today
we take two oaths with all our fellow countrymen:
China’s territory can be conquered, but not given away!
The Chinese people may be killed, but they will not submit!
The country will be lost! Fellow citizens, rise up!

6.8 CHEN DUXIU’S “NEW YOUTH” MANIFESTO

(DECEMBER 1, 1919)
The leading journal of the May Fourth Movement was New Youth [Xin Qin-
gnian]. Founded in 1915, it was in the vanguard of an intellectual movement
promoting science and vernacular Chinese literature and pursued a leftist politi-
cal ideology. In late 1919, the journal issued a novel and idealistic manifesto,
which captured the rapidly shifting political mood in China. This was unlike
anything it had printed before. Among other things, this manifesto exhibited a
far more radical attitude toward political parties than had been previously pub-
lished. It captured the sharp shift in thought that transpired in the post–May
Fourth period, and it asserted that Chinese citizens must begin to participate in
political change.
Questions
1. What segments of society in 1919 would disagree with Chen’s
statement that “politics, ethnic science, the arts, religion, and edu-
cation should meet all practical needs . . . for present and future
social life”?
2. What is the editorial’s final paragraph suggesting? Why?

We believe that the moral progress of mankind should expand to a stan-

dard above the life based on animal impulse (i.e., aggressive and pos-
sessive); therefore, we should extend a feeling of friendship and mutual
assistance to all peoples of the world. But toward aggressive and posses-
sive warlords and plutocrats, we must be hostile.
We advocate mass movement and social reconstruction, absolutely
cutting off any relations with past and present political parties.
Although we do not believe in the omnipotence of politics, we recog-
nize that politics is an important aspect of public life. And we believe that
in a genuine democracy, political rights must be distributed to all people.
Even though there may be limitations, the criteria for the distribution will be
whether people work or not, rather than whether they own property or not.
This kind of politics is really inevitable in the process of introducing the new
era and a useful instrument for the development of the new society. As for
political parties, we also recognize them as a necessary device for political
practice, but we shall never tolerate membership in parties that support the
interests of the few of one class rather than the happiness of the whole society.
We believe that politics, ethics, science, the arts, religion, and educa-
tion should all meet practical needs in the achievement of progress for
present and future social life.
We have to give up the useless and irrelevant elements of the tradi-
tional literature and ethics because we want to create those needed for the
progress of the new era and new society.
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 151

We believe that it is requisite for the progress of our present society HU SHI (1891–1962)—Born
to uphold natural science and pragmatic philosophy and to abolish super- in Shanghai and educated
stition and fantasy. at Cornell University with
We believe that to respect women’s personality and rights is a practi- funds from the Boxer
cal need for the social progress at present, and we hope that they them- Indemnity Scholarship
selves will be completely aware of their duty to society. Program, he returned to
China to become a leading
intellectual luminary, in
6.9 HU SHI’S LITERARY REVOLUTION AND RENAISSANCE particular advocating
IN CHINA (1926) vernacular Chinese. Hu Shi
supported the KMT and, in
While it is possible to see the May Fourth Movement in largely political terms,
1949, retreated to Taiwan,
it is important to recognize its diverse intellectual dimensions as well. Hu Shi’s
where he became the
aggressive promotion of the “vernacular movement” is one of his greatest lega-
president of the Academia
cies. Many intellectuals sought to promote a written language that reflected the
Sinica.
spoken language [baihua]. Up until this point, the bulk of the written literature
was “classical Chinese,” which differed considerably from the type of Chinese
spoken on the street. The foremost proponent of this linguistic revolution was Hu KUOMINTANG
Shi. Educated in the United States on a Boxer Indemnity scholarship, Hu Shi (NATIONALIST
returned to China in 1917 and became a prominent philosophical force among PARTY)—The party
intellectuals. Although liberal in thought, Hu Shi’s focus on language reform founded by Sun Yat-sen
put him at odds with the socialists and anarchists that dominated many of the in 1912 after the founding
May Fourth groups. By the time he delivered this talk, he had become a strong of the Republic of China.
supporter of the Kuomintang (calling it the “only political party worthy of the It ruled China from 1928
name”). His talk offers a forthright assessment of the challenges China faced in the until 1949. Defeated by the
first two decades of the twentieth century. CCP, it retreated to Taiwan,
where it remains an
Questions important political force.
1. In what ways does Hu Shi argue that language is the foundation
of the “Chinese Renaissance?”
2. Why would Hu Shi’s emphasis on vernacular reform be such a
key step in altering China’s education system?

In 1914, 1915, and 1916 there was an all-pervading sense of despair.

A number of young men committed suicide because they could think of
no way out, could see no ray of light ahead. It was not like those last years
of the Manchu Dynasty, when people knew that somewhere and some-
time a rebellion would come. Now it had come, had been swept out of the
path and had left only depression and despair. One of my young friends
jumped into the West Lake at Hangzhou, leaving letters of farewell to
his friends expressing his joy at escape from a situation without hope. In
those years people began at last to realize the futility of superficial politi-
cal change, and to seek some new factor which could be made the corner-
stone of a new age.
May I read to you an extract from a letter of Huang Yuanyong, one
of the leading publicists of the day, written just before leaving the country
in 1915 at the height of Yuan Shikai’s power. “Politics are in such confu-
sion that I am at a loss to know what to talk about. Ideal schemes will
have to be buried for future generations to unearth. . . . As to fundamental
salvation, I believe its beginning must be sought in the promotion of a
new literature. We must endeavor to bring Chinese thought into contact
with the contemporary thought of the world and thus accelerate its radi-
cal awakening. And we must see to it that the basic ideals of the modern
world produce some direct effect upon the life of the average man. The
method seems to lie in using simple language and literature for the wide
152 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

dissemination of ideas among the people. Have we not seen that histori-
ans regard the European Renaissance as the foundation of the overthrow
of medievalism in Europe?” . . .
It was at that time that the new movement began, which forms the
title and topic of my address tonight. In the years 1915 and 1916, groups of
Chinese students in American universities were carrying on a controversy
on problems of literature. The results of the controversy were published
in the early days of 1917 and formed the first declarations of a movement
which has created a revolution in Chinese literature. This literary revo-
lution marks the first stage in the Chinese Renaissance, for here will be
found a spirit essentially different from the earlier stages of moderniza-
tion. . . . We have realized at last that certain things must be given up if
China is to live. If we really want education, general and universal educa-
tion, we must first have a new language, a language which can be used
and understood by tongue and ear and pen, and which will be a living
language for the people. For years and years, we tried to have education,
but we feared to use the spoken language. We tried to compromise in
various ways, but we clung as scholars to the scholarly language. It was
impossible to preach a language, to ask people to accept a language, which
was not good enough for us. China went through a stage of contradictions
and remained unconscious of the fact.
At last the new movement began in earnest, the Literary Revolution.
It advocates the adoption of the spoken language, the vulgar tongue of
the people, as the lay medium for all official and literary composition. Its
aim is to elevate the despised vulgar tongue of the people to the dignified
position of the literary language of the nation. It is a revolution in a sense
because it has involved a reassessment of the vulgar literature of the past
and of the classical tradition. It seeks to introduce the spoken language of
the people as the medium of expression in all textbooks, in all the newspa-
pers, in all the respectable branches of literature.
[. . .]
This Literary Revolution formed the first phase of the Chinese Renais-
sance. It marked a new phase, a new life. It was not a complete breaking
from the past, it was an historical development; it was a conscious effort
to make articulate all the valuable elements we already possessed. At the
same time the methods were modern, the inspirations were modern. It
thus presented to the people a new and living idea.
As language is the most important vehicle of thought and of
expression, any radical and fundamental change in a national language
could not but involve a great change in a national language, could not
but involve a great change in other phases of social and intellectual life.
So during the past ten years, this Literary Revolution has spread and
has affected various phases of Chinese life. I shall not describe those
different phases in great detail. I shall confine myself to two particular
phases: first, the intellectual changes, and secondly, the social and politi-
cal developments.
However multifarious these tendencies may seem, there are cer-
tain general characteristics which unite them more or less into one great
National Movement. The whole movement may be characterized, in the
words of Nietzsche, as a movement of the transvaluation of all values. It
is a movement in a way to make everything upside down; to try to judge,
to criticize, to doubt, to revalue old things according to new standards.
Nothing is too high or too low to be subjected to this process of transvalu-
ation. Marriage, concubinage, widowhood, Confucianism, Christianity—
nothing is too sacred to be allowed to pass without criticism. It is for us an
age of doubt, of criticism, of protest.
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 153

WARLORD ERA WARLORDS (DUBAN):

A term applied to the
Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916, although welcome in many quarters, further military governors and
destabilized China’s already precarious political situation. In the months commanders who battled
after his demise, a power struggle for political control of the government for political control,
in Beijing ensued. There was even one attempt to restore the emperor to usually through the use of
his throne (6.6). The following year, Sun Yat-sen founded the Military regionally based armies,
Government of the Republic of China with its capital in Guangzhou. from 1911 to the late 1920s.
Numerous other provinces instituted various degrees of self-rule, often
headed by military leaders (commonly known as warlords). The political
situation worsened to the point that no political entity could speak for DUAN QIRUI
China as a whole. There was no clear consensus, either domestically or (1864–1936)—A prominent
internationally, as to which of the many governments being established warlord whose power base
during this period held the political authority to act as China’s bona fide was centered in Beijing.
government. He served as China’s
Into this political vacuum arose a class of autonomous military com- premier during Yuan
manders [dujun]. A period of nearly unending military conflict and politi- Shikai’s presidency. His
cal fragmentation lasted from 1916 to 1928 and is loosely referred to as later political activities
“the Warlord era.” These warlords controlled large swaths of China, with were tainted by his close
the tides in their control ebbing back and forth. Warlords sought to por- relationship with Japan,
tray themselves as fighting for the reunification of China (or as one scholar though he continued to
humorously put it, “warlords against warlordism”). The public viewed be active politically in the
the warlords with extreme interest, often using nicknames to remember Beijing government as well
each warlord (e.g., the “Pigtail General,” the “Scholar General,” or the as in the Anhui warlord
“Dogmeat General”). clique.

ZHANG XUN
6.10 ZHANG XUN’S REASONS FOR RESTORING
(1854–1923)—A prominent
THE MONARCHY (1917) warlord during China’s
In 1916, a dispute broke out between China’s President Li Yuanhong and Premier Republican era and a noted
Duan Qirui over China’s entrance into World War One. The parliament voted Qing loyalist known as
for his resignation, and President Li obligingly dismissed Duan Qirui. A sup- the “Pigtail General” who
porter of Duan Qirui, General Zhang Xun (1854–1923), marched with his mili- attempted to restore the
tary forces into the capital on the pretext of reinstating Duan as premier. Zhang last Qing emperor to the
Xun was a fervent monarchist who retained his queue and was known as the throne in 1917.
“Pigtail General.” Instead of assisting Duan, General Zhang decided to rein-
state the former emperor, Puyi. On July 1, 1917, a coronation ceremony officially
restored the emperor to the throne. Within a week, the military tide had shifted
again, and Duan Qirui defeated Zhang Xun’s forces. On July 12, Puyi was, for
the second time in his life, forced to abdicate. Zhang Xun sought and received
asylum in the Dutch consulate. He was eventually pardoned the following year
for his “treasonous” anti-parliamentary acts. The following is a long manifesto
posted by Zhang Xun on July 3, 1917.

Questions
1. What critical characteristics does Zhang Xun attribute to the par-
liamentary system?
2. What does Zhang Xun suggest is as “great as the distance between
heaven and earth”?
Ever since the uprising at Wuchang and the establishment of the repub-
lic peace and order have been cast to the winds and good reliable peo-
ple have been nowhere to be seen. Anarchists have been holding sway
while unscrupulous people have been monopolizing the power. Robber
chiefs are called heroes and dead convicts are worshiped as martyrs.
Parliament relied on rebels for support while Cabinet Ministers used
154 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

biased parties as their protection. Unscrupulous borrowing of foreign

money is called finance; and bleeding the people is termed revenue-
raising. Oppression of innocent people is considered self-government;
and defaming old scholars is considered civilization. Some spread
rumors under the pretext that they are public opinion while others
secretly finance foreigners and call it diplomacy. All these are treason
practiced under the fine name of statesmanship, and corruption under
the mask of legislation. They even advocate the abolition of Confucian-
ism and thus call down the wrath of God. . . . In name we are a Repub-
lic but nothing is known of the citizens. People are called citizens but
they know nothing about their country. Now the people are poor and
financial resources exhausted, the foundations of the country begin to
shake. All this is the result of the bad form of government. . . . Look at
the matter at its root, we find that Republicanism is the source of all the
evil. . . . Compare this with the continuous reign of a monarchy, where-
from the people may enjoy peace for tens or hundreds of years, the
difference is at once seen to be as great as the distance between heaven
and earth. . . . Carefully weighing present conditions and the tendency
of the people it is preferable to expel party politics and establish a firm
monarchy than to invite ruin by adopting the empty name of a Repub-
lic. . . . Our Emperor, who is in his boyhood, has devoted himself to
study and learning to be calm in obedience to the demand of the day.
The country has passed many great upheavals but in the palace there
has always reigned peace and calm. Recently His Majesty has made
marked progress in his sacred studies and his virtuous reputation has
spread far and wide. It can thus be seen that Heaven has smiled on the
Qing dynasty by conferring His Majesty with unusual wisdom so that
he might be able to rise at the proper moment to stop disorder and
revert to right. . . . [Zhang] Xun and others have been accumulating
their energy with their weapons near at hand for the last six years. . . .
On this day we have jointly memorialized His Imperial Majesty to again
ascend the throne in order to establish the foundation of the country
and to consolidate the minds of the people.

6.11 WARLORD POLITICS: THE GAME OF PLAYING

ONE AGAINST THE OTHER (1925)
If the early years of the Chinese republic were colored by a nostalgia for the
imperial throne, the decade after President Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916 was
chaotic, turbulent, and characterized by regional military and political unrest.
The inability of the central government to effectively rule the country resulted
in the rise of military cliques, regional factions, and provincial armies—all in
the name of creating a unified Chinese state—to cause the early republic to
descend into a lawless power grab. Often referred to as the “Warlord Period,”
Chinese and Western observers alike followed with deep concern the ever-
shifting alliances and military campaigns that could upend daily life with
great regularity. The following article appeared in the North China Her-
ald, a popular English-language newspaper demonstrating the broader, even
global, interest in China’s internal hostilities, despite the dozens of different
warlords involved.

Questions
1. What type of rule is in place in China during the period described
in the following article?
2. What outcome does the article anticipate?
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 155

A more sober attitude is now observable among those who a week ago ZHANG ZUOLIN
were freely prophesying a major military clash this spring. Local export- (1875–1928)—Warlord
ers last week were rushing through their shipments in anticipation of nicknamed the “Old
another breakdown of railway communication with the sea. The reason Marshal” who controlled
for this change of mind is hard to divine. It may be because of the present most of northeast China
“jumpy” condition of Beijing. It is understood that Zhang Zuolin intimi- (Manchuria) from 1916
dated to the British and American Consuls last Saturday that he and Feng until 1928, when he was
Yuxiang had agreed on their spheres of influence in northern, if not in assassinated by a Japanese
central, China. Whatever he actually said, however, military maneuver- military officer.
ing proceeds without let or hindrance, and maneuvering is usually just a
preliminary business to a real issue.

A Possible Arrangement
In the special administrative districts, it is quite possible that during the
course of the birthday celebrations in Mukden on March 5, Zhang Zuo-
lin did come to some sort of arrangement with Feng Yuxiang. Hitherto,
they have preserved a very delicate system of checks and balances in these
areas, with Zhang at Rehe, and Feng at Zhangjiakou, farther west along
the Beijing-Suiyuan railway, and north into Inner Mongolia. And yet in
view of recent moves and countermoves between Gubeikou and Rehe,
garrisons respectively of the National and Fengtian armies, even this is
difficult to believe.
As unofficial Duban [warlord] of the Northwestern frontier, Feng
plans to build roads and railways and generally to develop a region
the possession of which would enable him to control the Manchurian
flank. According to his last memorandum on the subject of northwestern
improvements, he plans to pave the way for a railway from Bangjiang
to Taonan. A generous dream, but if it introduces Feng’s soldiers and
influence into the intervening territory, the system of checks and balances
would have to be adjusted to meet the new move. A glance at the map
will show how any extension of Feng Yuxiang’s influence in this direction
would affect Zhang Zuolin, viewed strategically.

Chang Re-arming Vigorously

In Mukden, Zhang Zuolin is bending his efforts toward the repairing
of the breaches made in his own army and military organization by the
secession of Zhang Zongchang and Li Jinglin. Both these latter have with
them a good deal of material, and thousands of the men, that helped
Zhang to win the last war. The old machine must therefore be repaired.
Zhang Xueliang is engaged in training additions to the first and third
Divisions, while the 27th Division, Chang’s crack corps has been stationed
at Jinzhou. The arsenal is working overtime in turning out a new 3-inch
gun, and in the far-famed trench mortars are being improved. According
to recent visitors, the Fengtian General Staff are not content to celebrate
any holidays after their victory; it is rather their aim to keep their military
machine constantly oiled and repaired. This they are apparently doing
with a great show of efficiency.
All this “war news” seems to be significant of another bout before
very long. Although this view is popular in Chinese circles, and being
eagerly debated, especially by women whose eyes are now fixed on Beid-
aihe, the writer hazards the opinion that the present portents do not pres-
age any immediate danger. As long as China continues to disguise itself as
an armed camp, and as long as its rulers are allowed to play their game of
156 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

checks and balances with hordes of more or less disciplined armed coolies,
so long of course will warfare be a constant menace. But there are several
reasons which would incline one to scout the danger signal of the present
wars and rumors of wars.
First, neither Feng Yuxiang nor Zhang Zuolin is really anxious to
come to grips until the situation actually forces them into such close quar-
ters. Wu Peifu would always meet his adversary more than half-way, but
the present duo are more likely to dally with the game before indulging
in any spectacular move. Though renowned in the west as a redoubtable
soldier, and notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, his unique skill in
military strategy according to the Chinese textbooks, Feng has never dis-
played too much interest in the actual clash of arms. Neither has Zhang
Zuolin. Secondly, China could not very well support another war so soon,
for the last not only taxed the resources of the country tremendously, but
what was more important, made a big hole in the organization and equip-
ment of all the combatants, even that of the passive resister, Feng Yuxiang.
But the main reason of all, absurd in the West but according to history
quite reasonable in the East, is that what you expect to happen will assur-
edly not happen! That should bar all prophesy, but it rather heightens the
interest of speculation.

6.12 REMEMBERING THE BRUTAL AND CORRUPT

WARLORD ZHANG ZONGCHANG (1936)
In an era known for its ruthless behavior, the brutal exploits of Zhang Zongchang,
the “Dogmeat General,” were conspicuous for their sheer callousness. He ruled
as warlord of Shandong province for nearly three years, from 1925 to 1928, and
was assassinated in 1932 by the son of a man killed in one of Zhang’s assaults.
Among his many nicknames was the “Three-Unknowns General,” a nickname
alluding to rumors that he did not know how many concubines, how many guns,
or how much money he possessed, as they were too numerous to count. The fol-
lowing article was published in a Chinese magazine soon after Zhang’s death. The
editors had publicly invited readers’ contributions in describing his evil behavior.
The selected vignettes appeared in this column specially designated “The Smelly
Tale of the Dead Tiger.”

Questions
1. What aspects of Zhang’s rule most affected the local populace?
2. To what did the phrase “listening to the telephone” refer?

Early Life of Zhang Zongchang

Zhang Zongchang, often teasingly called the “Dogmeat General” or
“Long-Legged General,” was born in Yexian of Shandong province. His
father was a funeral musician and a barber. His mother worked as a
traditional healer. At the age of twelve or thirteen, he accompanied his
father playing the cymbal. At fifteen or sixteen, he followed his mother
to Yingkou [Liaoning Province], working at a gambling house, where he
became friendly with a group of thieves. His reputation caught up with
him and members of the local gentry drove him out of town. He fled to
Manchuria and joined up with the bandits there. His mother remained
in Yingkou, living with a public bathhouse owner, a shoe cobbler and
an itinerant street merchant of cloth. Out of jealousy, the cloth merchant
killed the shoe cobbler and was arrested by the police. Thus Zhang’s
mother was washed up. She had no money left so she prostituted herself
 Chapter 6 • Revolution, Warlordism, and Transformation 157

as payment to a man who drove her back to Yexian where she reunited NORTHERN
with the musician. The musician was too poor to support a family so he EXPEDITION
sold his wife to a grain merchant named Jia. That was why it was known (1926–1927)—A military
that Zongchang had two fathers. campaign led by Chiang
Kai-shek and the
Kuomintang (Nationalists)
. . . Damage to Shandong by Zhang Zongchang (1) in 1926 that began in
Soon after his arrival in Shandong [1925], he wasted little time to dis- southern China and
play his true colors. Under his “rule of iron sword” [gangdao zhengce], the advanced northward,
thriving student associations disappeared and the top students fled. reuniting much of eastern
The provincial parliament, which represented the people, was terrified. China. It brought an end
The clever people turned around quickly and heeded his every whim. to the worst of the warlord
“Living in chaos, why not take the opportunity to thrive and divide the excesses—often by simply
profit?” Thus, a new wave of people took over as prefects, county com- co-opting the warlords into
missioners, etc. acting imperious and haughty. The typical lackeys, when Chiang’s government.
they got to their post, exploited the local people and worked hard to extort
as much profit as possible in order to please their superiors. Soon all one
could see were obese corpulent officials or skinny and emaciated people.
The situation reached such extremes that the rich behind their red gates
had far too much to eat and drink while emaciated bodies lay by the side
of the road. In the three years when Zhang was in power in Shandong,
from the day he arrived June of 1925 to the night of April of 1928 when he
hastily fled under the cover of darkness, he extorted more than 350,000,000
yuan from the people.
[. . .]

Damage to Shandong by Zhang Zongchang (2)

Heavy taxation—In his nearly four years of control in Shandong, Zhang
collected taxes on a daily basis. His method of collection—besides the nor-
mal taxes—was to add taxes and then to add tolls. If today he wanted so
much money, he would simply write a note to several counties to appro-
priate the desired amount. Then he would spend it all as he pleased. Dur-
ing that period, the people of Shandong truly lived in deep hardship and
their suffering was among the greatest in the country. . . . After the suc-
cess of the Northern Expedition, according to the report of the provincial
department of finance: “From Zhang’s arrival until his departure, of all
types of taxations that he collected, some had been collected in advance
through the year of 1939.”
Loans—After Zhang’s period of control came to an end. The formal gov-
ernment (under Chen Diaoyuan in 1930) was established. The provin-
cial department of finance reported the following loans given to Zhang
Zongchang.

1. Under the auspices of the provincial department of finance Zhang

procured loans from the Bank of China (including interest) in the
amount of 563,300 yuan; and from the Bank of Transportation, in the
amount of 377,000 yuan.
2. The provincial department of finance guaranteed a loan to the provin-
cial bank from the Bank of China in the amount of 283,000 yuan and
from the Bank of Transportation in the amount of 283,000 yuan.
[. . .]

Uncontrolled Distribution of Paper Money—Under his authority, his govern-

ment printed the following types of currency: 1) a paper script issued in the
158 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

name of the Bank of Shandong; 2) Military script; 3) Gold-backed Bonds,

issued with a total value of several tens of millions without any actual
gold backing the true value assigned to the money. Due to military fail-
ures, the money often devalued quickly causing further financial disorder.
When soldiers used such money in markets, they became very unreason-
able and rude. They might beat people up if there was any disagreement.
Such fights happened often and caused great hardship on businessmen. It
was said that there was a store that refused to accept military script. When
Zhang heard of it, he ordered the owner arrested and had him tortured
and finally executed.
Firing Cannon towards the Sky—In summer of 1927 there was an extended
drought and all the crops dried up in the fields. Zhang issued an order
that forbid butchering any animal. He then personally conducted a prayer
at the Dragon King Temple for water, which failed. Incensed, Zhang
shook his fists towards the Dragon King and later ordered the cannons at
the Zhangzhuang fort be fired towards the sky every couple of hours to
express his anger towards the heaven. The rains still did not come.
Public Sale of Opium—Zhang ordered that opium be allowed to be sold
publicly. There were opportunists who opened opium shops on the sec-
ond floor of the newly built commercial building in Baotu Fountain dis-
trict [Jinan city], and dubbed it the “Quit Smoking Shop.” Opium sales
taxes were paid directly to Zhang monthly.
Drafting Soldiers—In Jinan, under Zhang’s regime, people would com-
monly be arrested on the street and sent directly to the military front.
There they often ended up being killed. During that period, pedestrians
on the street were under constant threat of being “drafted” in this man-
ner. The captured ones were all healthy men. Students from school were
often detained and could only be released after negotiations to have them
released. To prevent such incidents, schools made a special cloth badge
pinned to their chest for students to wear with their names and school’s
official stamp in order to distinguish them from the non-students.
 CHAPTER 7
China’s Struggle for Unity
Republican China (1911–1949)China’s Struggle for Unity

3 2 1

4 5 6 7 8
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 161

1. BUNEIMEN FERTILIZER: TRANSLATION: Please use Buneimen Fertilizer! (top); Emei yue Brand
sulfate fertilizers work well on all types of plants (right); An excellent Emei Brand fertilizer, an
abundant Harvest and Good Profit (left).

2. GONGPING TOBACCO POSTER: TRANSLATION: China Gongping Tobacco Company (top);

Hoping that our fellow citizens will try to promote (right); Smoking only domestic tobacco (left);
A Top Quality, Low Price product (bottom).

3. NATIONAL GOODS CAMPAIGN: In the 1920s, boycotts against foreign (particularly Japanese)
goods became increasingly common. In 1925, a “national goods campaign” began, which sought to
promote Chinese products over foreign goods. To boost their own sales (over foreign competition),
Chinese companies often prominently included references to the campaign in their own ads.

4. 1930s ADVERTISING: By the 1920s, there existed three primary types of print advertising in Repub-
lican China: wall posters, wall calendars, and in newspapers. The posters and calendars were often
given away to clients and would often serve as an inexpensive way to embellish the home, stores,
or office. Chinese newspapers looked quite different from the typical modern Western papers since
advertisements often exceeded 60 percent of the paper’s total content (and much of the cover page).

5. CORPORATE ADVERTISERS: The main advertisers in Republican China tended to be tobacco,

cosmetic, and pharmaceutical companies. These companies often had their own in-house team of
artists, painters, and draftsmen, who worked full time producing an array of ads. The two advertise-
ments here are typical both in the sponsorship and the fact that the products themselves (and even
the trademarks) are sometimes visually marginalized within the advertisement and at other times a
central part of the poster.

6. WOMEN IN ADVERSTISING: Companies often sought to portray themselves as progressive,

targeting the “liberated” women of the new age. As a result, stylish young women figured promi-
nently in the 1920s and 1930s, reflecting the economic and social reforms of the era. Ads that fea-
tured young faddish women underscore the fact that new and bold femininity rebelling against
traditional norms became a defining feature of modernity in twentieth-century Chinese society,
literature, and politics (7.12, 7.13).

7. CHINESE OR FOREIGN?: Similar to advertisers today, advertising companies sought to create ads
that promoted their product but remained as socially neutral as possible. In the 1920s, the notion of
a product being foreign remained sensitive. Among more conservative segments of society, many
products were still viewed as foreign and not Chinese. Regardless, Japanese companies remained
popular and advertised heavily into the early 1930s, until the creation of Manchukuo 1931 resulted
in increasingly effective boycotts of Japanese products.

8. MODERNIZING CHINA: Advertisements played a pivotal role in changing China’s image of

themselves. The advertisements of the 1920s and early 1930s proved to be a significant vehicle to
alter what society considered to be acceptable. Often taking movie starlets as their models, these
posters became a central mode of promoting and shaping popular notions of what it meant to be
“modern.” But as the fertilizer ad demonstrates, often rustic and traditional images were employed
to find a happy middle ground of defining “China.”
162 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

CHINESE COMMUNIST Sober obituaries announcing the death of another Communist Party
PARTY (CCP)—Founded octogenarian appear with some frequency in China’s daily newspapers.
in 1921 by a small group But in the summer of 2005, the obituary of Gu Yue (1937–2005) was
of intellectuals. Following unusually emotional and reverent. Not a typical party minion, Gu Yue
orders from the Soviet had made a career as an actor starring as one man, Mao Zedong, China’s
Union, the CCP allied most famous revolutionary leader. A household name (even if a second-
themselves with the rate actor), Gu Yue appeared in over 80 movies and television series
KMT during the War of and, aside from one or two forgettable exceptions, always as Mao. The
Resistance Against Japan obituaries inevitably commented on Gu Yue’s uncanny ability to capture
before splitting irrevocably Mao’s unique Hunan accent, mimic his body language, and, of course,
in 1945 and founding the don Mao’s distinctive receding hairline. Although Gu was the first, and
PRC in 1949. arguably the most famous, of the Mao impersonators, today, there exists
a stable of 20 or so actors who make a living off their resemblance to Mao
and other top Chinese leaders from the past. These Chinese-leader-look-
alikes, aside from appearing in feature films and television series, are
available for hire to appear at factory openings, large conferences, and
variety shows, where even an ersatz version of a famous leader lends a
veneer of credibility.
As the prominent and reverent coverage of his death suggests, Gu
Yue and his fellow impersonators are perceived in an entirely different
light than that of Western impersonators, such as the scathing lampoon-
ing of political leaders on NBC’s Saturday Night Live or the kitschy Las
Vegas–style Elvis impersonators. Their representation of the political
leader is done without any irony, humor, or psychological depth. In this
way, Gu Yue is similar to the interchangeable actors who starred in vin-
tage World War II movies, much less a realistic depiction of that country
than a one-dimensional foil to depict a nation’s own heroic view of itself.
The difference, of course, is that Gu Yue starred repeatedly as Mao, seri-
ously eroding the separation of fiction and reality. The cinematic versions
of Mao’s life create a type of selective pastiche. Actors like Gu Yue play
a crucial part, however, since their physical resemblance adds a layer of
authenticity or verisimilitude to the past. That is to say, they also cover up
the messy side of history. And, without a doubt, the history of 1920s China
was messy.
Cinematic representations of Communist China’s earlier years is
particularly fraught with problems. As should be clear from the previous
chapter, the political forces shaping the Republic of China in the 1920s
were more deeply influenced by the intellectual ferment of the May Fourth
Movement than any experiments of rule by the central leadership. Yet,
unlike the many films in which Gu Yue featured, the rise of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) was hardly assured. Rather, the victory of the
CCP was the result of a chain of interlinked but widely unforeseen events.
When examining any event in the 1920s, it is imperative to remember the
broad array of challenges facing China. There are at least four distinct
factors any analysis should take into consideration: 1) China’s emergent
political parties, 2) the continuing control of warlords over most of China
up until 1927, 3) the explicit and implicit threat of Japanese diplomatic and
military actions, and 4) the global post–World War I economic depression.
The intricacy of each of these factors makes tracing the historical trajectory
of China in this period extremely awkward.
The presence of such contingencies is central to any understanding of
1920s China. Given the cultural, political, and military complexity of this
era, it is tempting to adopt the notion of historical inevitability to make
a path through the confusing array of competing events. Is it inevitable
that the Communists would emerge from the 1920s as a major alternative
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 163

to the Nationalists? Can we reduce the events of the 1920s and 1930s to COMINTERN—Founded
a stepping-stone that led only to an invasion of Japanese onto Chinese in Moscow in 1919, the
soil? One antidote to these and other narratives of Republican China is Comintern (short for
to attempt to view the array of possible paths from the viewpoint of Chi- Communist International)
nese of the period (or conversely try and imagine the diversity of Chinese played a guiding role in
viewpoints of the period: peasant, urban worker, soldier, etc.). the global Communist
For example, few Chinese during the 1920s and early 1930s could have movement, including in
identified the main political goals of the CCP, let alone be able to name their China.
top leaders. Indeed, far more meaningful to most Chinese in this period
was whether you were a “revolutionary” at all. To most Chinese, the revo-
HUANGPU (WHAMPOA)
lutionaries occupied such a small portion of the political stage there was
ACADEMY—A military
little point in distinguishing between anarchists, communists, and social-
academy founded by Sun
ists, who were largely in the shadow of the emergent and more dominant
Yat-sen in 1924 (often
Nationalists (except, obviously, for those participants active in such move-
romanized according to
ments). In the 1920s, the average Chinese citizen, regardless of their ideol-
Cantonese pronunciation
ogy, was in general agreement about the daunting challenges China faced:
as Whampoa) outside
anti-imperialist (usually meaning anti-Western imperialist), anti-feudalist
of Guangzhou. Many
(generally interpreted to mean anti-warlord) and anti-Japanese. Yet, even
of China’s top military
as most Chinese were unified in the difficulties facing China, they remained
leaders of the 1920s and
deeply divided over how to bring about those changes.
1930s, regardless of party
What emerges as the most prominent characteristic of the period is
affiliation, were educated
a vast number of false-starts, missteps, and political adjustments taking,
or served at the academy.
which coexisted with an idealism, intuitiveness, and sheer willfulness that
belied the circumstances. Or put much more simply, China in the 1920s is
far more about the complexities (and even the failed efforts) rather than
the ideologies themselves.

IDEOLOGIES AND REALITIES OF A FRACTURED

REPUBLIC
With Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916, most Chinese political activists and rev-
olutionaries had come to the realization that, politically, the 1911 Revo-
lution had failed. Despite this, public opinion repeatedly turned to the
architect of that Revolution, Sun Yat-sen, as the individual they believed
best suited to bring an end to the divisive Warlord Era. Until the end of
his life, Sun remained committed to helping unify China. In 1920, Sun met
with members of the Communist International (more commonly known
as the Comintern), who urged the CCP to forge an alliance with the KMT
so the CCP might begin to exert more influence on the nation’s politi-
cal direction. Sun’s ideology had always tended to be progressive, but
through his interactions with the CCP and Comintern, Sun’s politics took
on a much more militaristic and leftist tone (7.1, 7.3). More to the point, the
Soviet Union proved to be the only nation to both recognize Sun Yat-sen’s
government and provide financial support.
The Kuomintang and Communists jointly cooperated with Comin-
tern oversight from 1923 until 1927. The founding of the Huangpu Mili-
tary Academy in 1924 is perhaps the single most prominent example of
CCP–KMT collaboration, with members of both parties serving in posi-
tions of leadership. In early 1925, even as he prepared for a military expe-
dition to unite northern and southern China, Sun traveled to Beijing.
There, he hoped to negotiate with the break-away warlord officials who
remained adamantly opposed to his unification efforts. Soon after his
arrival, he fell ill and was diagnosed with advanced-stage liver cancer. On
March 12, 1925, he passed away. His death set off a scramble for control of
both his political party and for his ultimate legacy (7.3).
164 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

7.1 THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE

(MARCH 6, 1921)
Sun Yat-sen delivered the following speech on his Three Principles at an executive
meeting of the Kuomintang. His three principles (or at least what he emphasized
within each of the three principles) had evolved considerably over the years. Gone
are the references to ridding China of the Manchus, and in its place are calls to
keep all parts (Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia) of “China” unified. Sun deftly weaves
in the central popular demands of the May Fourth Movement and rising demands
for redistribution of land. His notion of “People’s Livelihood” remains essentially
unchanged from his earlier versions, yet it takes on a much more prominent place
in this speech given at the Kuomintang Party’s office in Guangdong on March 6,
1921.

Question
1. Do you find Sun’s solutions more (or less) realistic than those he
proposed 15 years earlier (6.1)?
2. What does Sun mean by his term “equal appraisal of land” regard-
ing his land reforms?

What are the Three Principles of the People? They are Nationalism,
Democracy and the Livelihood of the People. When the barbaric Man-
chus occupied central China [zhongyuan], most revolutionaries focused
exclusively on achieving a nationalist revolution with no attention given
to democracy and livelihood. A constitution composed of five pow-
ers is a crucial principle to establish a country. Before the Han people
restored rule, our [KMT] Party members assumed that national power
and the people’s welfare would naturally follow the restoration of Han
rule. Only now do we realize this is totally not the case. The reason for
this mistake stemmed from the earlier single-minded focus on national-
ism while neglecting the principles of democracy and the people’s liveli-
hood. This mistake led to our Party’s duties unfulfilled. It is important
to understand that without implementation of the principles of democ-
racy and livelihood, even if nationalism is achieved, stability will not
be achieved. Not to mention, we have not yet fully reached the goal of
nationalism.
What do we mean when we say that we have not fully accomplished
the goal of nationalism? Since the Manchus conquered China, we, the Han
people, were subjugated for over 200 years. Today, even though the bar-
baric Manchus have been overthrown and a Han-rule reinstated [hanzu
guangfu], our people [minzu] have still not achieved complete freedom.
This is because our Party has played only a passive instead of active
role. . . . What are the origins of this? Since Han rule was reinstated, the
former hereditary officials, obstinate conservatives and the revisionist
parties, clustered together and claimed to have founded a Republic of
Five Peoples [wuzu gonghe]. Few fully comprehend that the fundamental
mistake lies precisely here. Speaking of the population of the five peoples:
there are only four or five million Tibetans, less than one million Mon-
golians, several million Manchus, and a large number of Muslims [Hui],
with the overwhelming majority [of China’s population] being the Han
Chinese. Speaking of the current position of the Five Peoples, Manchuria
is under Japan’s sphere of control, Mongolia is under Russian influence;
and Tibet is essentially in the hands of the British. Obviously, since they
are unable to defend themselves, it is only right that we Han should come
to their aid. There are four hundred million or more Han Chinese. With
this many people, if we cannot achieve true independence, establish an
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 165

all-Han nation, it is truly a great disgrace to us the Han people! This is SOCIALISM—A
why our Party has not succeeded in achieving our goal of nationalism. It socioeconomic system in
is for this reason, our Party must continue to work hard to achieve nation- which wealth, services, and
alism, to ensure that the Manchus, Mongolians, Muslims and Tibetans production are controlled
are assimilated [tonghua] into the Han Chinese, in order to create a great by the community or
nationalist country! government. For Karl
[. . .] Marx, socialism would be
As for People’s Democracy . . . direct democracy includes four rights: the socioeconomic system
universal suffrage, the right to recall officials, the right to initiate laws, and that later progressed into
the right of referendum. . . . communism.
People’s Livelihood today means socialism. Gentlemen, reflect for
a moment, when did I first begin to broach the notion of People’s Liveli-
hood? It is only today that our compatriots have begun to discuss social-
ism, which is already too late. Since the theory of socialism only arrived
in China recently, it is quite appropriate for me to have translated “social-
ism” as “people’s livelihood” in the past. . . . What is my solution? It is the
focus on the questions of “land” and “capital.” People who are aware of
the current situation nowadays often say there are no capitalists in China,
and so there is no need to talk about socialism. There are also many that
feel we must have capitalism before we can start to talk about socialism.
This is not the right approach. . . .
In terms of the principle of People’s Livelihood, I already identi-
fied an excellent mechanism, a mechanism of “equal distribution of land”
[pingjun diquan]. At the time the Republic of China was established in
Nanjing, to implement the Party’s People’s Livelihood, I advocated for
the equal distribution of land, which many of our comrades refused to
endorse. I asked them: when you joined the Tongmenghui, have you not
all taken oaths to uphold the Party’s People’s Livelihood to implement
equal distribution of land? From where did the principle of people’s liveli-
hood originate? It emanates from the social inequalities between the rich
and poor. What do we mean by social inequalities between the rich and
poor? In the ancient past, although the distinction between rich and poor
existed, the difference was not as severe as it is now. Today the rich own
all the land, while the poor do not even own a piece large enough to stand
on. The reason for such inequality is the huge difference in manufacturing
capabilities between now and ancient eras. For example, in ancient times
woodworkers used tools, like hatchets and chisels or machetes and saws.
As the ancient adage stated: to do the job right, you need to first sharpen
your tools. Whereas today, industry has developed with machines entirely
replacing human labor, resulting in more products with much less human
effort.
[. . .]
You gentlemen must understand the reason we have to disseminate
our Party’s ideology promptly is, although the Republic is ten years old,
the average person does not understand what a “republic” is. As they see
it, they are still imperial subjects not citizens. They are still waiting for the
Son of Heaven [the emperor] to appear and are prepared to become royal
subjects like officials or slaves in a peaceful world. With this situation,
try to imagine how you would carry out a popular election for a county
commissioner? To avoid future failure, we must actively disseminate the
Three Principles of the People and implement Party rule over Guang-
dong through our Party members. This all requires the utmost effort of
our Party members! Only after the comprehensive implementation of the
Three Principles of the People, can we then implement the Constitution
of Five Powers. The implementation of “Three Principles of the People”
and the “Constitution of Five Powers” is the core value of our Party! It is
166 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

WU PEIFU (c. 1874– my utmost wish that you all can spread and enhance the true spirit of our
1939)—A major figure and Party and spread it throughout all of China!
leader of the Zhili clique
during the Warlord era,
often referred to as the 7.2 MANIFESTO ON THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION
“Scholar General.” In 1924, (SEPTEMBER 18, 1924)
Wu was nearly able to Only months after the Huangpu Academy began teaching its first incoming stu-
broker a peace agreement dents, Sun Yat-sen began to advance his plans for a military reunification of
among the various factions China. A central component of his plan was a military expedition striking north-
but ultimately failed. He ward from Guangzhou to defeat the major warlord armies and finally realize
resisted overtures from the Revolution’s unfulfilled potential. Sun hoped that a unified military action
both the Kuomintang and would force the warlords to agree to his demands and join him within a uni-
Japanese during the 1930s fied Nationalist-led government. Many warlords did join and many, in the end,
and died in suspicious became members of the KMT party. Many, however, would not or only paid lip
circumstances in 1939. service to the Nanjing’s central government. Regardless, Sun’s death in 1925
prevented him from witnessing first-hand the Northern Expedition or a united
China.

Questions
1. How does Sun Yat-sen characterize the warlords still active in
China in 1924?
2. What goals does Sun suggest will be achieved by this military
reunification?

The People’s Revolution aims at the protection of a free, independent

nation. Such a free, independent nation might have come into existence
after the campaign of 1911, which destroyed the despotic and aristocratic
rule of the Manchus. If, at that time, the members of our party, a party
based upon the interests of the nation and of the common people, had
destroyed all existing counter-revolutionary influences, we would have
had political stability during the last thirteen years, and would have made
considerable progress in the task of national reconstruction along eco-
nomic, educational, and other lines. So, even if the success of the Revo-
lution could not have been instantaneously complete, at least we should
have traveled in the right direction and every day’s work would have
brought us closer to the ultimate goal.
But the counter-revolutionary influences have survived! They have
brought irreparable losses to our nation and to our people due to their
internal maladministration and diplomatic defeats. Inheriting antiquated
despotic ideas, the counter-revolutionists have struggled to maintain
the traditional position of privilege. Yuan Shikai tried to make himself
emperor; Zhang Xun tried to restore the boy emperor to the throne; Feng
Guozhang and Xu Shichang destroyed the Republican Constitution; and
Cao Kun and Wu Peifu came into power through bribery and other illegal
means.
For 13 years there has been one plot after another for destroying the
Republic. Although there were changes of personnel at the head of the
militarist government, the same old feudalistic ideas were handed down
from one to another through the whole line of them. These counter-rev-
olutionaries have used Beijing as their base and from there have spread
their influence throughout the provinces. What is worse, a great many
revolutionists, because of a lack of determination to work for the national
and people’s interests, have fallen in line with these corrupt elements and
consequently have caused the present disintegration and disorganization
within the camps of the revolutionary forces.
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 167

The counter-revolutionaries have been able to survive because of

the support of foreign imperialists; there is abundant evidence to prove the
truth of this statement. In 1913, when Yuan Shikai decided to suppress the
revolutionary movement by force in order to make himself the emperor of
China, the Consortium Loan of two hundred and fifty million dollars was
put through; and so, Yuan was given a huge sum for military expenditure.
Afterward, throughout the regimes of Feng Guozhang and Xu
Shichang, each period of civil war was preceded by huge foreign loan.
Recently, just as Cao Kun and Wu Peifu decided to send a punitive expe-
dition to the southeastern provinces, the Gold France Case, which had
been pending for a long time, was suddenly settled. All these facts serve
to show without the least doubt that the direct cause of our civil wars dur-
ing the last thirteen years has been militarism, and the indirect cause has
been imperialism.
Now our allied armies in Zhejiang have declared war against Cao
Kun and Wu Peifu; and Shenyang is taking a concurrent action with Zhe-
jiang. The Revolutionary Government hereby proclaims that the northern
expedition is being undertaken in order to co-operate with the rest of the
country in destroying Cao Kun, Wu Peifu, and other traitors. But we sol-
emnly declare before the people and the allied forces that the aim of our
punitive expedition is the destruction of not only Cao and Wu, but of all
other persons who choose to follow the example of Cao and Wu. More-
over, this war is not only directed against militarism, but against imperi-
alism, whose support has made the existence of militarism possible. Not
until then will the root of the counter-revolution be permanently eradi-
cated and China elevated from the position of a sub-colony to that of a
free, independent nation.
The ultimate aim of the Chinese Kuomintang is the realization of the
San Min [Three People’s] Doctrine. We, therefore, solemnly declare before
the people and the allied forces that after overthrowing the northern mili-
tary clique, we shall demand the immediate adoption of the first part of
the San Min Doctrine.
We have entered the preset civil war as fighters against militarism.
The first duty after the battle is won will be to use the power of the Revolu-
tionary Government to clean out all sinister influences of counter-revolu-
tion in order to prepare a clear road toward freedom and self-government.
We shall then demand the revision of unequal treaties and the abolition
of all special privileges in order to protect our national interests in foreign
relations and to eradicate the imperialist influence in China. New trea-
ties will be concluded in accordance with the principles of international
equality and mutual respect of sovereignty. After China has achieved her
political equality, we may expect the following developments:

1. National freedom from external restrictions will enable China to

develop her national economy and to increase her productivity.
2. Industrial development and rural reform will improve the livelihood
of China’ farmers and laborers.
3. The increase of China’s productivity and the unionization of the work-
ing class will afford opportunities for improving the living conditions
of the working class.
4. The development of agriculture and industry and the consequent
increase of the people’s purchasing power will give new chances for
the rapid growth of commerce.
5. Economic development and the increase of national dividends will
easily provide sufficient funds for cultural and educational purposes.
168 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

PREMIER’S WILL—The 6. After the abolition of unequal treaties, China’s new laws will be
“Premier’s Will” became a applied throughout her territories, including the existing leased settle-
staple of Chinese life in the ments; and in this way nowhere will the counter-revolutionary influ-
decade after Sun’s death. ences find a strong hold for their sinister activities.
Employed in a manner
similar to the “Pledge of All these developments will, no doubt, lead to the creation of a
Allegiance” in the United sound economic foundation, national unification, and a democratic
States, all schoolchildren political machinery working for the welfare of the common people.
recited the will every We urge, therefore, that our people take a determined stand against
Monday morning militarism in the present struggle and that they help to carry out the
throughout the 1930s and minimum political projects just mentioned as the initial step of the San
1940s. Min Doctrine.

7.3 SUN YAT-SEN’S LAST WILLS AND TESTAMENT

(MARCH 11, 1925)
Given Sun’s own broad political framework, it is not surprising that in his death
there existed considerable efforts on both the right and the left to claim inheri-
tance of his legacy. Upon his death, Sun left three documents: a personal will,
a political will, and a “Letter of Farewell.” It is commonly agreed that Wang
Jingwei drafted the political will (known in Chinese as the “Premier’s Will”)
several weeks before Sun’s death. The “Farewell Testament to the Soviet Union”
was drafted by Chen Youren and approved by Comintern representative Michael
Borodin. All three documents were signed by Sun on the night before his death.
Only the first two wills were published in Chinese papers in the days after his
death, with Sun’s “final farewell” being published in Pravda (the central party
newspaper in the Soviet Union) on March 14, 1925.
Questions
1. How does each of these three documents reflect a different dimen-
sion of Sun’s legacy?
2. What is Sun’s legacy? Why did Sun’s legacy become so important
for all political parties?

Sun Yat-sen’s Personal Will

I have devoted myself to matters of the nation instead of making a fortune.
I bequeath all my belongings, including books, clothing, houses, etc., to
my wife, Song Qingling. My children are fully grown and independent.
I hope each of them will carry on their good behavior and continue my
goals. This is my will.

Sun Yat-sen’s Political Will

For 40 years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolu-
tion, the objective of which is to achieve liberty and equality for China.
The forty years’ experience has convinced me that to realize such goal, we
must awake our people, to unite with peoples of the world who treat us
equally, and together to carry out our common fight.
Today the success of the revolution has not been achieved. All my
comrades must follow my writings, The Plan for National Reconstruc-
tion, The Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, Three Principles
of the People, and Manifesto of the First National Convention, as well
as continue their endeavors and accomplishments. Recent proposals to
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 169

set up a National Convention and to abolish unequal treaties especially CHIANG KAI-SHEK
need to be accomplished in the shortest time possible. This is my heart- (1887–1975)—Born in
felt charge to you. Zhejiang, he attended
numerous military schools
before joining the KMT,
Sun Yat-sen’s Farewell Testament to Soviet Union serving as commandant
Dear comrades of the Central Committee in the Union of Soviet Socialist of Huangpu Military
Republics: Academy in 1924. After
As my body is afflicted with a terminal illness, my mind and heart Sun Yat-sen’s death in 1925,
turn toward you, and the future of my Party and country. You are the Chiang Kai-shek became
leader of this great union of the liberated republics [USSR]. This great the military commander
union of liberated republics is Lenin’s enduring legacy and the oppressed who organized and led the
peoples of the world true inheritance. There the fugitives from imperial- Northern Expedition in
ists powers can find protection and freedom, and liberate themselves from 1927. From 1928 until 1949,
the unjust international system built on unequal wars. he served as President of
With my death, I leave the Kuomintang, a party I hope will continue China. After the KMT’s
to cooperate together with you to liberate China and other countries retreat to Taiwan, he
invaded by imperialists. Fate is forcing me to lay down my uncompleted served as president from
mission, and so I pass to you who would adhere to Kuomintang Thought 1952 until his death in 1975.
and Teachings to organize our faithful comrades. Consequently, I have
asked the Kuomintang to pursue the national revolution, so that China
can break out of the semi-colonial restraints imposed by the imperial-
ists. To fulfill this task, I have already instructed the Kuomintang to
continue our long-term collaboration with you. I have confidence that
your government will also continue the support you have offered us in
the past.
Dear comrades! In bidding farewell to you, I wish to express my fer-
vent hope that the day will soon dawn when the Soviet Union, as a friend
and ally, will welcome a powerful and independent China. And that the
two countries will, hand in hand, move forward to realize the victory in
fighting for the liberation of all the oppressed peoples in the world. Here
as a brother, I wish you peace!

RISE OF THE KUOMINTANG

On the eve of the Northern Expedition, China continued to be ruled not
by politicians from Beijing, but an ever-shifting number of warlords.
The most power of these were by the mid-1920s well-known in China
and even in the West where journalists gave them nicknames in order
for western readers to more easily remember them: Feng Yuxiang (“the
Christian General”), Zhang Zongchang (“the Dogmeat General”), Wu
Peifu (“the Scholar General”) and Zhang Zuolin (“the Old Marshall”)
along with his son Zhang Xueliang (“the Young Marshall”). With Sun
Yat-sen’s death, many wondered if any individual leader could muster
the same level of political, military and popular support to unify the
country once again. However, after months of in-fighting, the party’s
Central Executive Committee elected Chiang Kai-shek chairman and
granted him full control of the 85,000 troops (many trained at Huangpu
Academy). On July 26, 1926 this massive Northern Expedition began its
march moving south to north. Through a combination of military force,
the promise of political office and even large bribes control was slowly
wrested back from the regional warlords. It was a slow and laborious
process, but when, on October 10, 1928, Chiang and his troops entered
Beijing, the nation, more than any time since 1911, was once again under
unified political leadership.
170 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

COMMUNISM—A 7.4 “QINGDANG”: PURGE THE PARTY OF ALL

system of government UNDESIRABLE ELEMENTS (APRIL 1927)
in which the economy,
production, and When the Northern Expedition reached Shanghai in April 1927, Chiang Kai-
governance is controlled shek carried out a bloody purge of Communists and all leftist sympathizers. This
by a single party that rules purge, also known as the “White Terror,” spread from Shanghai to all other major
in the name of the people, urban centers under KMT control in the following days and weeks. Chiang clearly
property is to be held in believed that the alliance between Communists and the Nationalists had run its
common, class divisions course and no longer offered any advantages to KMT leadership. Equally, it sug-
disappear, and society gests that Chiang believed the KMT party no longer needed the financial and
works for the common international prestige offered by relations with the USSR. Although the purge
good of the people. was clearly orchestrated by Chiang (and the threat largely ignored by the Comin-
tern), the following official statement clearly seeks to present the purge as a breach
of faith on the part of the Communists. This despite the obvious fact that the Chi-
nese Communists had aided the Northern Expedition by harnessing the power of
the labor unions and other factory workers to help control cities on the approach
of the Northern Expedition. Yet, Chiang’s purge emerged out of more than simple
political expediency. The purge was intended to send a clear anti-labor and pro-
capitalist message to the Shanghai industrialists and the powerful pro-capitalist
sentiments in the United States and Europe upon whose financial support Chi-
ang’s near-term future depended.

Questions
1. What does the following statement accuse the Communists of
doing?
2. Who besides the Communists does Chiang suggest are being tar-
geted by the purge?

To understand clearly the objects of the movement for the purification of

the Kuomintang Party, it is necessary to know first the actual conditions
of the present time. We have not yet accomplished the aims of the Revolu-
tion. We are only at the beginning of the task; and while victory is already
in sight, it is of the utmost importance at this juncture to carry on the Revo-
lution to a successful end. We must stand together and face the common
cause with a united mind. The slightest neglect on our part will not only
defeat the Revolution, but will also make it impossible to attain the objects
of liberty and equality for the Chinese nation.
Therefore, all members of the party must know the gravity of their
responsibility. At this critical moment, the undesirable elements are
unscrupulously and untiringly doing the work of destruction, and if we
do not check it in an effective manner, it will not only mean the fall of the
Party but also the failure of the Revolution. With this in view, we adopt
the following for the purification of the Party. First, to purge the Party of
the Communists, and secondly, to purge the Party of the opportunists and
other undesirable elements.
It will be remembered that when Dr. Sun Yat-sen admitted mem-
bers of the Communist Party into the Kuomintang, he was quite aware
of the fact that Communism was not fit for China. But as the Communist
Party members were ready to give up their Communistic belief, and will-
ing to be directed by the Kuomintang in order to cooperate in the work of
the Revolution, it was only natural that they should be admitted into the
Party. But since the beginning of the Northern Expedition, while mem-
bers of the Kuomintang have been laboring faithfully either on the field
of battle or elsewhere, and while the militarists of the country have been
gradually eliminated, the Communists, taking advantage of our success,
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 171

have seized important cities as their centers for propaganda and usurped
the power of the Party. Our military successes are being utilized by them
to inflame the undesirable sections of the populace to undermine our for-
ward move and to create disturbances in the rear.
Aside from the Communistic members who are to be condemned,
there are also the opportunists and other undesirable elements in the
Party. It is they who shamefully steal the name of the Party for their selfish
gains, and it is also they who falsely use the power of the Party for their
personal activities and aggrandizement. Theirs is a crime no less serious
than that of the Communists.
For the welfare of the Revolution as well as that of the Kuomintang,
we are forced to adopt this strong measure to purge the Party of all the
undesirable elements.

7.5 KMT’S PURGE THE PARTY SLOGANS (MAY 1927)

In the wake of the “White Terror” purge of Communists in urban centers,
the Nationalist Party (KMT) began to amplify its anti-Communist propa-
ganda. While certainly the KMT had political differences with the Chinese
Communists, the intensity also was based in fact that the CCP posed the big-
gest threat to the KMT. With no other large political parties offering serious
competition (and the Communists now largely lying low in remote areas),
the KMT ruled atop a one-party system. The following slogans were prepared
by the Publicity Committee in Guangdong province and suggest the speed
with which China’s political spirit shifted from one of political unity to one
of political exclusivity.
Questions
1. What relationship do the following slogans suggest the KMT is
seeking with the CCP?
2. What influence does Sun Yat-sen still play in the KMT’s slogans?
May 1927

1. Down with the Chinese Communist Party, which is treacherous to our

late director, Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
2. Down with the Chinese Communist Party, which is against the San-
min Zhuyi, “The Three Principles of the People.”
3. Down with the Chinese Communist Party, which is destroying the
People’s Revolution.
4. Down with the Chinese Communist Party, which is undoing the work
of the Northern Expedition.
5. Down with the Chinese Communist Party, which is utilizing bandits
and labor usurpers to oppress the Peasants and Laborers.
6. Down with the Chinese Communist Party, which is insulting and dis-
gracing our late Director, Dr. Sun.
7. Down with the Chinese Communist Party, which is plotting the down-
fall and destruction of the Kuomintang.
8. To be against “The Three Principles of the People” is to be a
Counter-Revolutionary.
9. To be against the Kuomintang is to be a Counter-Revolutionary.
10. All power and authority belong to the Kuomintang.
11. All true and loyal comrades of the Kuomintang must unite and rise.
12. Down with all Counter-Revolutionaries.
13. Down with all Opportunists.
172 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

14. Concentrate the powers of the Kuomintang.

15. Down with all forms of Imperialism.
16. Down with the Fengtian clique of Militarists.
17. Eradicate all corrupt officials, greedy gentry, and unscrupulous merchants.
18. Purge the Kuomintang of all anti-revolutionists.
19. To call a strike against the Kuomintang is Counter-Revolutionary.
20. Those who refuse to come under the direction and guidance of the
Kuomintang are not Revolutionaries.
21. The masses of the people must rise and clean up the Counter-
Revolutionary Chinese Communist Party.
22. The masses of the people must rise and support the Chinese
Kuomintang.
23. Support the Central Government at Nanjing.
24. Support the advancing Nationalist forces.
25. Down with the bogus governments at Wuhan and Beijing.

7.6 PROCLAMATION FROM THE HEADQUARTERS

OF THE 26TH ARMY (APRIL 22, 1927)
At the wake of the April 12 purge of the Communists in Shanghai, the KMT sought
to solidify their urban base, with a public offensive against labor organizations.
Fearful of the left’s general success among the working class, the KMT moved to
turn public opinion against labor organizers’ greatest weapon, strikes. The author
of the document, Zhou Fengqi (1879–1938) was a graduate of Huangpu Acad-
emy’s illustrious first graduating class and a leading figure in the Northern Expe-
dition. In the decade following the Northern Expedition, Zhou remained a fervent
anti-Communist but was assassinated by KMT agents in 1938 after he agreed to
serve as the Governor of Zhejiang province under the Japanese puppet government.

Questions
1. Why would the KMT fear the ability of the workers to strike?
2. What besides the CCP might have encouraged the KMT to take
such an anti-labor stance?

Our Chinese workmen have been admired by the world for their endur-
ance and obedience, but with the increase in industrial activity there has
come a menace in the form of strikes and walkouts.
When Shanghai was recently taken by our armies, many workmen
were induced or forced by mutineers to leave their employment and to
parade and join various unlawful associations, and to otherwise counte-
nance unlawful activities.
Through my advice to workers and other steps which have been
taken many factories are again running. There are cases, however, where
simple-minded workers are still deluded by agitators. To them I wish to
offer this advice:

1. The manufacturing and commercial conditions of China are quite dif-

ferent from those of Europe and America. Because of this difference
the treatment accorded to workmen must be different. Chinese work-
men, consequently, cannot expect the same treatment as that accorded
to workmen in other countries.
2. Chinese workmen are fortunate in that they can if they wish make
China a real industrial nation by gaining full knowledge of the
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 173

industries with which they are affiliated. This fact has apparently been SONG MEILING
lost sight of in following professional agitators who are very selfish (1897–2003)—The youngest
and who are seeking to sacrifice the laboring classes only for their of the three Song sisters,
own benefit. graduated from Wellesley
3. If, in the following advice of these agitators, and law violators, a strike College in 1917, and
occurs, the loss of valuable time and the money which that valuable married Chiang Kai-shek
time would bring to the workmen is the only result. Although some in 1927. Her familiarity
of the workmen who go on strike have money for the rainy day, oth- with the United States and
ers have not. These last starve themselves and starve their families. American customs helped
It is absolutely foolish to strike, for it is both unlawful and a loss of her play a prominent role
livelihood. as a spokesperson for
4. When a strike is in effect the factories are closed. Consequently, the China during the 1930s and
Nationalist government and the Nationalist armies are forced to buy 1940s.
foreign made goods merely because there are no native productions.
This is death not only to the country’s commerce, but to patriotism
as well. SONG FAMILY—The
Song (often spelled as
From the above four points it is plain that strikes are not only “Soong”) family had an
aura akin to the Kennedy
harmful, but they have not a single advantage.
family in the United
The Nationalist government is now facing and executing the task of
States. Each of the Song
clearing away the bacteria which causes the disturbances in the laboring
sisters married prominent
classes—and making the source of this disturbance clear.
politicians or business
Hereafter when professional agitators or others in the laboring classes
leaders. Due to their
plan to induce otherwise good workmen to strike, commit unlawful acts
American education,
or violence we ask that the factories and the good workmen report them to
their faces became the
the headquarters of this army that they may be severely punished. Only by
face of China for many
doing this may we be able to protect the good workman and see that they
Westerners.
are well treated.
April 22, 1927
Zhou Fengqi
Commander of The Twenty-Sixth Nationalist Army and
Vice-Commander of the Shanghai and Songjiang Defense Area

7.7 CHIANG KAI-SHEK’S MARRIAGE PROPOSAL

TO SONG MEILING (1927)
While Chiang Kai-shek’s political and military accomplishments clearly marked
him as a rising star within the KMT by the 1920s, in many ways it was his
marriage to Song Meiling in 1927 that sealed his status in the eyes of the Chi-
nese public. Song Meiling was the youngest of three sisters of the famous Song
family who held an aura akin to the Kennedy family in the United States. Each
of the Song sisters married prominent politicians or business leaders. With
rumors of Chiang’s impending marriage swirling, his marital status continued
to be a source of concern due interviews given by Chen Rujie (referred to as “the
lady traveling in America” in the following interview), who insisted she and
Chiang remained married. To clarify the situation, Chiang gave an interview
suggesting Chen was merely a “second wife” and thus not in the eyes of the law
or “Chinese customs” officially his wife. While clearly an uncomfortable topic
for Chiang, Song Meiling’s parents did finally offer their blessing, and the two
were married on December 1, 1927, exactly two months after this interview
occurred.
174 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

SONG ZIWEN Questions

(1894–1971)—The third
of six Song siblings born 1. Do you believe Song Meiling and Chiang Kai-shek shared simi-
to Song “Charlie” Jiashu. lar motives in getting married?
Often known in Western 2. Why might the Song family be concerned (or excited) about hav-
sources as T. V. Soong, he ing Chiang as a future in-law?
was Harvard educated
and served as the Finance In view of the many rumors and tales which have gone the rounds in
Minister, Foreign Minister, Shanghai concerning the movements of General Chiang Kai-shek, I called
and President of the on General Chiang and requested him to authorize a statement of his pur-
Executive Yuan in the poses and plans. General Chiang said:
Nationalist government “My present visit to Shanghai has no political significance. I have
between 1928 and 1947. come to this city on purely private business, to arrange, if possible, for my
marriage with Miss Soong May-ling [Song Meiling].”
Miss Soong May-ling is the popular sister of Mme. Sun Yat-sen [Song
Qingling], Mr. T.V. Soong [Song Ziwen], former Minister of Finance and
Mrs. H.H. Kung [Kong Xiangxi], wife of the former Minister of Industries
of the Nationalist government. She is a graduate of Wellesley College in
the United States and is prominent in Shanghai society.
“It would be advisable, General Chiang,” I said, “to explain to the
public through the medium of our newspaper, exactly what your rela-
tionships are, for although such a matter is strictly your own affair, your
prominence and Miss Soong’s connections, have given ride to many
accounts, which if untrue, ought to be corrected.”
General Chiang Kai-shek replied:
“During the 10th moon of the 10th year of the Republic [Novem-
ber 1921] I was duly divorced, in accordance with Chinese customs, from
my first wife, who is now living at Fenhua. Here is a document of divorce
which has been registered with the proper judicial authorities at Fenhua.
According to it, we were divorced for incompatibility. All the details are
in this document.
“Since that divorce, my life has been away from Fenhua, mostly in the
battlefield of the revolutionary cause. Five years ago, in Canton [Guang-
zhou], at the home of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, I met Miss Soong. I felt that in her
I would find the companionship which a man seeks in a wife. Miss Soong,
at that time, however, was not interested. Since then I have been corre-
sponding with her constantly, pressing my suit. Recently, our romance
culminated in her agreeing to a marriage subject to the consent of her fam-
ily, which we now hope to obtain. We shall be married in Shanghai, in the
event of the usual Chinese family arrangements being satisfactorily made,
and then we shall spend a year in travel abroad.”
I then asked General Chiang about the lady who is travelling in
America.
“Foreigners perhaps do not understand all the intricacies of the Chi-
nese family system,” he said. “That lady has been divorced in accordance
with Chinese customs. I am present married to no one and am free to marry
in accordance with the most monogamous practices. Miss Soong would
not consent to a marriage in any other circumstances and I should not dare
ask a lady of her character to marry me in any other circumstances.
“Please make it clear that this marriage is in no [way] a political mar-
riage. It is accidental that we are all so prominent in politics, but not all of
us are in the same camp and curiously enough, the Soong family has not
yet given its consent. I have been courting Miss Soong these many years
without a thought of the political bearing of such a marriage and any sug-
gestion in that direction is unfair to me and unjust to all the members of
the Soong family. Miss Soong’s mother is ill in Japan and as soon as I am
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 175

informed that I may wait upon her at Kobe, I shall go there to inquire after KARAKHAN
her health and to ask for her daughter’s hand. I have no other business in MANIFESTO (1919)—A
Japan than that. And whether I go to Japan or not is entirely contingent manifesto issued on
upon what information we obtain from there with regard to Mrs. Soong’s July 25, 1919, by Russian
health.” Foreign Minister Lev
When interviewed, Miss Soong told me that she was quite surprised Karakhan relinquishing
that so much interest was evidenced in her personal affairs, but she hoped all Tsarist Russian claims
that her friends would realize that in marriage there was no explaining to special rights and
why one takes the step but that sentiment alone must be the guide. She privileges in China. The
ridiculed the idea of a political marriage and said that she only hoped that Soviet Union did, however,
the political members of her family would place no impediments in the continue to pursue special
way of her choice. rights and privileges.

ORIGINS OF THE CCP

In the 1920s, many aspects of Marxism appealed to Chinese revolutionar-
ies across the political spectrum. On a theoretical level, it offered a unified
framework to resolve the social, political, and economic predicaments that
faced China. On a practical level, the success of the Russian Revolution
and the formation of the Soviet Union only years earlier offered hope to
many Chinese that China would benefit from a Marxist revolution. Yet,
when Chinese Communists began to apply the Marxist model to Chi-
nese conditions, several problems emerged. Marxism’s emphasis on an
alienated industrial working class simply had little traction in a country
that remained overwhelmingly agrarian. Famously, Marx once referred
to peasants as a “sack of potatoes” for their inability to throw off their
oppressors. Or, put another way, orthodox (European) Marxists believed
that attempting to start a revolution with peasants as the primary revo-
lutionary catalyst was a non-starter. As a result, an early point of conten-
tion among the Chinese Communists revolved around whether the CCP
should focus its limited resources on the urban centers or concentrate on
the rural countryside.
Regardless of what Marx speculated, the CCP’s most striking suc-
cesses occurred in the countryside, while their most calamitous defeats
uniformly took place in the urban centers. Marxist theory offered little
guidance for an agrarian-based revolution, and the USSR Comintern advi-
sors tended to disparage the CCP’s efforts in the rural areas as misguided.
For these reasons, the CCP objectives in the 1920s and early 1930s comes
across as a bit confused and contradictory, with several branches of the
party focusing exclusively on workers in the cities and others active only
in the countryside. Yet, with the KMT increasingly dominant in the cities,
the CCP progressively turned to the countryside to find support.

7.8 FIRST MANIFESTO OF THE CCP ON THE CURRENT

SITUATION (JUNE 15, 1922)
The spring of 1922 was a confusing period for the CCP. Chinese communists
were intensely interested in the Soviet Union’s emerging international pres-
ence. Many Chinese were inclined to view the Soviet government favorably
since the Karakahan Manifesto (1919) renounced all of Russia’s unequal
treaties with China. Even as the Soviet Union’s popularity rose generally,
many within the CCP took issue with their instructions, demanding all Chinese
Communists join Sun Yat-sen’s Kuomintang (KMT) government. Specifically,
many argued that the KMT, with its plan to establish alliances with warlords
and form an army to unify China, differed little from the warlords themselves.
176 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

Under pressure from the Comintern representative, the CCP ultimately agreed
to the notion of an alliance with the KMT whereby communists on an individ-
ual level could join the KMT. The following declaration is the first public CCP
pronouncement adhering to the notion that the Kuomintang can be considered
“revolutionary.”

Questions
1. What positive attributes does the CCP ascribe to the KMT?
2. How do they describe the warlord situation? How do they sug-
gest it be resolved?
The struggle for democracy is struggle of one class, a struggle which aims
to overthrow the dominance of another class; it is the replacement of one
system by another, and in no event can it be regarded as a struggle of one
individual or one group for the overthrow of another individual or group.
A real democratic party must possess two characteristic elements:
(1) its principles must be correlated with the concepts of democracy; and
(2) its actions must consist in an active struggle against feudalism in the
form of the military. Of all the political parties existing in China, only the
KMT can be characterized as a revolutionary party, yet it possesses only
a relative amount of democratic and revolutionary spirit. The program of
this party has not yet been fully elaborated. But its three principles, “of
the people, for the people, and by the people, in conjunction with plans
for the industrial development of China reflect the democratic spirit of the
KMT. . . .
Not infrequently, however, this party’s actions have been contradic-
tory in nature. On occasion the KMT manifests a friendly attitude even
with respect to . . . monarchists, and an inclination for a rapprochement
“for tactical reasons” with the Beiyang military clique. If the KMT, as a
party, wishes to play a definite role in the revolutionary struggle for the
consolidation of democracy in China, it must renounce once and for all
every policy of vacillation, compromise, and endless zigzags. . . .
The military is the cause of civil war in China. So long as the military
exists and rules, the creation of a so-called “good government” will be out
of the question. In the present circumstances no government in China can
be stable and firm, and the life and property of Chinese citizens are subject
to destruction every time the militarists clash. . . .
Members of the KMT! You were originally revolutionary fighters
for the triumph of democracy. You should also conduct a revolutionary
struggle now for democracy and prefer to perish in this struggle than
to vanish from the socio-political arena in consequence of a policy of
compromise. During the first year [1912] of the existence of the Chinese
Republic you were deceived by Yuan Shikai, who tried his best to dem-
onstrate his loyalty to the republic. You were cruelly deceived also by
Duan Qirui, when he proposed the restoration of parliament and of the
constitution [in 1916–1917]. Do not let yourselves be deceived now by all
this talk about restoring parliament, abolishing the dujun [warlord] sys-
tem, demobilizing provincial troops, for the sake of concluding another
compromise with the military of North China. Does the present constitu-
tional parliament differ in any way from the parliament of the fifth and
the sixth year [1916–1917] of the Republic? Aren’t the hopes for abolish-
ing the dujun system and for demobilization merely hopes that the tiger
may shed its own skin? Does the title of “troop commander” as distinct
from or other than dujun—a phenomenon which can be observed in the
provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan, and Hunan—differ essentially from the
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 177

dujun institution and the conditions which existed prior to the nominal MAO ZEDONG
abolition of the dujun? . . . . (1893–1976)—Born
Workers, peasants, students, soldiers, policemen, and merchants! So in Hunan, he became
long as the authority of the military is not overthrown, there will be no involved in the nascent
hope of disarming the provincial armies and abolishing the dujun system. CCP in Beijing during
So long as the authority of the military is not overthrown, there will be no the May Fourth era. Mao
hope of reducing the demands for national funds, which are used to cover played an increasingly
war expenses and further to disrupt the entire national and local finan- prominent role in the
cial system. So long as the authority of the military is not overthrown, all Jiangxi Soviet in the early
conditions will be present to allow the military to secure new loans from 1930s before rising to
foreigners and thus bring about an intensification of foreign influence in prominence during the
China. So long as the authority of the military is not overthrown, there Long March (1934). He
will be no hope that the military will cease imposing heavy imposts on the successfully guided the
citizens of China; there will be no hope that looting may cease, no hope CCP through the War of
that order may be restored in all regions of China. So long as the authority Resistance Against Japan
of the military is not overthrown, there will be no hope of a broad devel- and the Chinese Civil War
opment of education in China and of industrial progress in our country. before founding the PRC in
So long as the authority of the military is not overthrown, there will be no 1949. His legacy is a mixed
hope that the struggle among militarists for the expansion of their own one of significant social
spheres of influence may cease. Peasants and merchants are always war and economic development
victims. These wars will be inevitable and endless if they are not stopped as well as of policies that
by the people themselves. led to the deaths of tens of
For all of us, the only way by which we can liberate ourselves from millions of Chinese citizens.
the hard yoke of the military is to join the democratic struggle against
the relics of the past—a struggle for freedom and peace. The government
opposition game, played by the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and the
politicians, cannot be trusted. We all want peace, but real peace rather
than false peace. We welcome a war to achieve the triumph of democracy,
to overthrow the military and the militarists and to liberate the Chinese
people.
The CCP, as the vanguard of the proletariat, struggles for working
class liberation and for the proletarian revolution. Until such time as the
Chinese proletariat is able to seize power in its own hands, considering
the present political and economic conditions of China’s development and
all the historical processes now going on in China, the proletariat’s urgent
task is to act jointly with the democratic party to establish a united front
of democratic revolution to struggle for the overthrow of the military and
for the organization of a real democratic government.

7.9 MAO ZEDONG’S REPORTS ON AN INVESTIGATION OF

THE PEASANT MOVEMENT IN HUNAN (MARCH 1927)
Of the Communist writings from this period, the following report by Mao
Zedong on the peasant movement in the province of Hunan is a classic. It repre-
sents Mao’s own emphatic defense of the need for a peasant-based revolutionary
struggle. There is little doubt that Mao, originally from Hunan himself, was in
his element. The CCP party leaders, headed by Chen Duxiu, equally adamantly
believed that only an orthodox revolution following the more traditional urban-
based revolution would succeed. The following are the first four sections from
Mao’s report.

Questions
1. What does Mao suggest is the main target of peasant discontent?
2. What does Mao mean when he states, “It’s terrible!”
178 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

The Importance of the Peasant Problem

During my recent visit to Hunan I made a first-hand investigation of con-
ditions in the five counties of Xiangtan, Xiangjiang, Hengshan, Liling and
Changsha. In the thirty-two days from January 4 to February 5, I called
together fact-finding conferences in villages and county towns, which
were attended by experienced peasants and by comrades working in the
peasant movement, and I listened attentively to their reports and collected
a great deal of material. Many of the hows and whys of the peasant move-
ment were the exact opposite of what the gentry in Hankou and Changsha
are saying. I saw and heard of many strange things of which I had hitherto
been unaware. I believe the same is true of many other places, too. All
talk directed against the peasant movement must be speedily set right. All
the wrong measures taken by the revolutionary authorities concerning the
peasant movement must be speedily changed. Only thus can the future of
the revolution be benefited. For the present upsurge of the peasant move-
ment is a colossal event. In a very short time, in China’s central, southern
and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a
mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power,
however great, will be able to hold it back. They will smash all the tram-
mels that bind them and rush forward along the road to liberation. They
will sweep all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local tyrants
and evil gentry into their graves. Every revolutionary party and every
revolutionary comrade will be put to the test, to be accepted or rejected as
they decide. There are three alternatives. To march at their head and lead
them? To trail behind them, gesticulating and criticizing? Or to stand in
their way and oppose them? Every Chinese is free to choose, but events
will force you to make the choice quickly.

Get Organized!
The development of the peasant movement in Hunan may be roughly
divided into two periods with respect to the counties in the province’s
central and southern parts where the movement has already made much
headway. The first, from January to September of the last year, was one of
organization. In this period, January to June was a time of underground
activity, and July to September, when the revolutionary army was driving
out Zhao Hengdi, one of open activity. During this period, the member-
ship of the peasant associations did not exceed 300,000–400,000, the masses
directly under their leadership numbered little more than a million, there
was as yet hardly any criticism of the associations in other circles. Since
its members served as guides, scouts and carriers of the Northern Expe-
ditionary Army, even some of the officers had a good word to say for the
peasant associations. The second period, from last October to January of
this year, was one of revolutionary action. The membership of the associa-
tions jumped to two million and the masses directly under their leader-
ship increased to ten million. Since the peasants generally enter only one
name for the whole family on joining a peasant association, a membership
of two million means a mass following of about ten million. Almost half
the peasants in Hunan are now organized. . . .

Down with the Local Tyrants and Evil Gentry!

All Power to the Peasant Associations!

The main targets of attack by the peasants are the local tyrants, the evil
gentry and the lawless landlords, but in passing they also hit out against
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 179

patriarchal ideas and institutions, against the corrupt officials in the cit-
ies and against bad practices and customs in the rural areas. In force and
momentum the attack is tempestuous; those who bow before it survive
and those who resist perish. As a result, the privileges which the feudal
landlords enjoyed for thousands of years are being shattered to pieces.
Every bit of the dignity and prestige built up by the landlords is being
swept into the dust. With the collapse of the power of the landlords, the
peasant associations have now become the sole organs of authority and
the popular slogan “All power to the peasant associations” has become
reality. Even trifles such as quarrels between husband and wife are brought
to the peasant association. Nothing can be settled unless someone from
the peasant association is present. The association actually dictates all
rural affairs, and, quite literally, “whatever it says, goes”. Those who are
outside the associations can only speak well of them and cannot say any-
thing against them. The local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords
have been deprived of all right to speak, and none of them dares even
mutter dissent. In the face of the peasant associations’ power and pres-
sure, the top local tyrants and evil gentry have fled to Shanghai, those of
the second rank to Hankou, those of the third to Changsha and those of
the fourth to the county towns, while the fifth rank and the still lesser fry
surrender to the peasant associations in the villages.
“Here’s ten yuan. Please let me join the peasant association,” one of
the smaller of the evil gentry will say.
“Ugh! Who wants your filthy money?” the peasants reply.
Many middle and small landlords and rich peasants and even some
middle peasants, who were all formerly opposed to the peasant associa-
tions, are now vainly seeking admission. Visiting various places, I often
came across such people who pleaded with me, “Mr. Committeeman
from the provincial capital, please be my sponsor!” . . .

“It’s Terrible!” or “It’s Fine!”

The peasants’ revolt disturbed the gentry’s sweet dreams. When the
news from the countryside reached the cities, it caused immediate
uproar among the gentry. Soon after my arrival in Changsha, I met all
sorts of people and picked up a good deal of gossip. From the middle
social strata upwards to the Kuomintang right-wingers, there was not
a single person who did not sum up the whole business in the phrase,
“It’s terrible!” Under the impact of the views of the “It’s terrible!” school
then flooding the city, even quite revolutionary-minded people became
down-hearted as they pictured the events in their mind’s eye; and they
were unable to deny the world “terrible.” Even quite progressive people
said, “Though terrible, it is inevitable in a revolution.” In short, nobody
could altogether deny the word “terrible.” But, as already mentioned,
the fact is that the great peasant masses have risen to fulfill their historic
mission and that the forces of rural democracy have risen to overthrow
the forces of rural feudalism. The patriarchal-feudal class of local tyrants,
evil gentry and lawless landlords has formed the basis of autocratic gov-
ernment for thousands of years and is the cornerstone of imperialism,
warlordism and corrupt officialdom. To overthrow these feudal forces
is the real objective of the national revolution. In a few months the peas-
ants have accomplished what Dr. Sun Zhongshan wanted, but failed, to
accomplish in the forty years he devoted to the national revolution. This
is a marvelous feat never before achieved, not just in forty, but in thou-
sands of years. It’s fine. It is not “terrible” at all. It is anything but “ter-
rible.” “It’s terrible!” is obviously a theory for combating the rise of the
180 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

SOVIET—The term peasants in the interests of the landlords; it is obviously a theory of the
“soviet” [suweiai] in the landlord class for preserving the old order of feudalism and obstructing
Chinese context designated the establishment of the new order of democracy, it is obviously a coun-
CCP bases in Anhui, ter-revolutionary theory. No revolutionary comrade should echo this
Hunan, Fujian, and later nonsense. If your revolutionary viewpoint is firmly established and if
in Shaanxi and Gansu, you have been to the villages and looked around, you will undoubtedly
during the late 1920s and feel thrilled as never before. Countless thousands of the enslaved—the
early 1930s. The term refers peasants—are striking down the enemies who patterned on their flesh.
to areas under the direct What the peasants are doing is absolutely right; what they are doing
control of Communists. is fine!” is the theory of the peasants and of all other revolutionaries.
Western papers at the time Every revolutionary comrade should know that the national revolution
referred to them as “red requires a great change in the countryside. The Revolution of 1911 did
bases.” not bring about this change, hence its failure. This change is now taking
place, and it is an important factor for the completion of the revolution.
Every revolutionary comrade must support it, or he will be taking the
JIANGXI SOVIET—A
stand of counter-revolution.
CCP-controlled area (or
“soviet”) founded in
1931 and governed by a 7.10 LAND LAW OF THE JIANGXI SOVIET (1931)
council headed by Mao
In 1927, the Kuomintang conducted a multi-city round-up executing all Commu-
Zedong. The soviet’s
nists (and suspected Communists). Those CCP leaders who were able escape fled
threat to the KMT led to
to remote areas to set up autonomous areas under direct Communist rule (called
a series of “extermination
soviets). The Communists would not have a substantial urban presence again for
campaigns,” eventually
nearly two decades. Several of the key Communist leaders set up armed bases in
causing the CCP to flee on
the mountainous areas of Jiangxi. There, they experimented with a variety of land
a yearlong “Long March.”
reforms seeking to attract peasant support while maximizing agricultural produc-
tion. The Land Law of the Jiangxi Soviet marks a major shift from an urban to
rural-based revolution. The following Jiangxi Soviet land law was first issued in
1931 and modified over the next two years. The Jiangxi era also marked the emer-
gence of a darker, more radical phase forcefully carrying out a land reclamation
that became extremely violent, killing tens of thousands of land owners. It would
mark a phase of the CCP evolution in which there existed considerable tensions
among the leadership, leading to political campaigns hastily conceived and often
confused in execution.

Questions
1. What aspects of the Land Law do you think were the most popu-
lar among the lower classes?
2. What factors do you think might have led the CCP to halt many
aspects of the reform?
Article 1: All land owned by feudal landlords, rich gentry, warlords,
bureaucrats, and other large private owners, whether managed by them-
selves or leased, will be confiscated with no payment. The confiscated
land will be distributed by the poor and middle-class peasants through-
out the Soviets. The previous owner of the confiscated land has no right
to be allocated any land. Hired laborers and working peasants, regardless
of gender, have the same right to allocate land. Unemployed indepen-
dent rural laborers, with the approval of the peasants, can also allocate
land. The old, weak, disabled, orphans, and widows, who cannot work on
their own, and have no family to rely on, should be provided with social
relief by the Soviet government or be handled separately after the land
distribution. . . .
Article 3: The Chinese rich peasants contain characteristics of both quasi-
landlords or money-lenders, and their land should also be confiscated.
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 181

Land of middle-class peasants should not be confiscated. After confisca-

tion of the land, rich peasants can be allocated with a “tillable land allot-
ment” of poor quality under one condition, that they must cultivate the
land with by themselves. . . .
Article 5: The first [Chinese Communist] congress held that the equal dis-
tribution of all land is the most thorough method to eliminate all feudal
relations of slavery on the land and to break away from landlords’ private
ownership rights. However, under no circumstances should the Soviet
local government implement [this distribution] by force or order. It can
only be implemented through clear explanation to the peasants and only
with the willingness of the basic peasant masses and their direct endorse-
ment—and particularly when there is a willingness of a majority of the
middle class. When a majority is not willing, middle-class peasants can be
exempted from participation in the land re-distribution.
Article 6: The Soviet government must make every effort [to ensure]
that all ancestral halls, temples, and other public lands are transferred to
the peasants unconditionally; however, the peasants’ voluntary support
must be acquired when processing and dealing with these lands, and the
principle of not interfering with their religious feelings must be strictly
followed.
[. . .]
Article 9: At the time when property and land of the landlord and rich
gentry is confiscated, all oral and written tenancy contracts must be
destroyed, the peasants’ obligations and debts to these properties and
land cancelled, and all loans and debts declared invalid. Under the rev-
olutionary law, any attempt by the old landlords to make the peasants
agree to voluntary repayment should be strictly prohibited. Peasants are
not allowed to return any part of the land once owned by the landlord or
rich gentry nor to pay any part of their debt.
[. . .]
Article 12: In the current phase of the revolution, the Soviet regime should
explain to the peasants the benefits of state-owned land and water conser-
vancy; but at present the leasing, buying or selling of land are not yet pro-
hibited. Meanwhile, the Soviet government should strictly prohibit rich
peasants from land speculation and landlords from buying back lands
originally owned by them.
[. . .]
Article 14: This law is not only applicable to the now established Soviet
areas, but also applies to non-Soviet areas and areas newly seized by
the Soviet regime. The land that has been distributed in the Soviet areas
shall not be distributed again if it meets the principles of this law; if it is
found not to be in conformity with the principles of this law, it must be
redistributed.

7.11 THREE MAIN RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND SIX POINTS

FOR ATTENTION (1928)
Mao Zedong first drafted these rules in the spring and summer of 1928 while
in the Jinggang Mountains of Jiangxi. They are rules that all Communists and
Communist troops were expected to follow. Mao made several small revisions in
1929 (changing Rule 2, for example, from “don’t take anything from the workers
182 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

and peasants” to “don’t take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses”).
In later years, he would add two more points to the “Six Points for Attention”:
1) “Don’t bathe within sight of women” and 2) “Don’t search the pockets of cap-
tives.” While these may seem self-evident, one only needs to compare these rules
with the behavior of Zhang Zongchang and other warlord armies to realize the
distinctiveness that such guidelines (and the adherence to them) would have had
upon the people with whom they interacted.

Questions
1. What goal do you believe Mao had in mind when he instituted
the following rules?
2. Why might these rules have made the CCP a popular presence
among the rural populace?
Three Rules of Discipline:
1. Obey all orders;
2. Absolutely no goods should be taken from workers or peasants;
3. Turn in all goods confiscated from “local tyrants” [rich landlords].
Six Points for Attention:
1. Return all doors [that had been used to sleep on];
2. Retie any hay [that had been used to sleep on];
3. Always speak politely;
4. Use a fair price for all goods purchased or sold;
5. Return all borrowed goods;
6. Pay for all damaged goods [that had been borrowed].

LITERARY CURRENTS IN 1920S CHINA

The intellectual and political events (6.6–6.9) of the “May Fourth Move-
ment” cast a long shadow over China’s literature well into the 1920s. In
particular, the literature of this era reflects a wide generation gap between
traditional Chinese beliefs of the late imperial period and the more “mod-
ern” practices of the “May Fourth youth” (6.8). The desire to date and
marry according to one’s own wishes was a common theme not only in
the 1920s but into the 1940s. Although arranged marriages decreased,
they remained common for several more decades. As Ba Jin’s “Family”
so articulately demonstrated, both men and women suffered from such
arrangements (7.14). The advent of daily newspapers, weeklies, and other
periodicals provided ample avenues for the dissemination of these new
beliefs. While novels and short stories might appear quite conventional
from our perspective over 100 years later, it should be remembered that,
in the 1920s, stories written about young love remained quite innovative
and even risqué (7.12–7.14).

7.12 YANG ZHIHUA’S “LOVE AND SOCIALIZING BETWEEN

MEN AND WOMEN” (JULY 1922)
A prominent feminist author of the May Fourth Movement and Communist labor
organizer, Yang Zhihua (1900–1973) wrote many short articles for various news-
papers. Perhaps not surprisingly, Yang’s own love life was particularly open for
her era. Her work promoted a more dominant voice for women in love relationships
and marriage. When she fell in love with Qu Qiubai (a well-known writer), while
married to another man, she orchestrated a meeting between herself, her husband,
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 183

and Qu Qiubai to work out their individual wants and desires. As a result, on
a single day, three announcements appeared side by side in the daily newspaper.
The first announced that Yang and Qu Qiubei had married, the second declared
that Yang and her first husband were divorced, and the third indicated that Qu
Qiubai and Yang’s first husband had become good friends. A stylish dresser and
a striking beauty, she personified the reputation of 1930s Shanghai as the “Paris
of the East.” The following article, published in Women’s Critic as an insert of
the Republican Daily, typifies her mixture of personal experiences with more
generalized changes occurring in Chinese society.

Questions
1. In what ways does Yang Zhihua’s ideas about love break with
those in China’s past?
2. What does Yang Zhihua suggest is the basic problem(s) with the
way dating occurs in 1920s China?

There stood several young men, who all wore new-style clothes, hats and
shoes, and usually spoke and wrote in a brand-new language and fancy
style. Suddenly, one of them came up to me and said: “Your relationship
with so-and-so is already known to us all. Aha, you two are in love!”
I simply laughed. If he had been smart, he would have instantly known
what my laughter meant. What did I laugh at? I simply laughed at his
“newness” and the fact that he was new on the outside but old on the
inside. His mixture of old and new is even older than the old and dirtier
than dirt. Then he continued to ask me: “Why don’t you tell us more about
it, since you two are indeed in love?” Once again, I laughed coldly. He had
no idea.
How many people who are supposedly engaged in the New Culture
movement these days truly mean business? Far too many of them are just
wearing masks! As it is, there are more destroyers than builders; if this
continues, our future is really in grave danger!
Open socializing between men and women is a very important
issue. There has been a lot of public demand for that since the May
Fourth Movement. Unfortunately, it has not been easy to carry out.
Why not? In my opinion, it is due to the obstacles created by the men
and women involved. On the one hand, they advocate open socializing
between men and women; on the other hand, they are doing things to
hinder it. This is a real self-contradiction; it is like blocking one’s own
way with rocks.
This is where the obstacles lie.
First, when a man and a woman start to socialize by speaking and
writing to each other, going to the parks together, or studying together,
people jump to the conclusion that this young man and this young woman
are in love, even though they are actually just friends. Consequently, some
young men and women succumb to these outside pressures and specula-
tions, go ahead and push themselves into the “business of love,” and then
have sex. After that, they break up, agonize, and part ways. The whole
process usually lasts a very short time because their relationship has the
wrong foundation to begin with. This kind of love is caused by outside
pressure, so it is not true love. It is not a personal choice, so it usually does
not last long. It is certainly not a good thing for society when couples sepa-
rate, though divorce is an expedient means to deal with problems caused
by the old marriage system. Any society that allows people to copulate
and then casually separate is a primitive one and exists only in periods of
184 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

barbarism. Now that such things happen in our society, it is no wonder

that those old moralists feel disgusted.
As I have shown, this situation results from the fact that some people
who have been steeped in the old tradition resent and make a fuss about
socializing between men and women. This is an objective obstacle.
The second obstacle—one that is caused by the men and women
themselves. Often, one feels excited when one meets a stranger of the
opposite sex. When this happens, people behave strangely, assuming that
the purpose of socializing with someone of the opposite sex is to “love and
marry.” For the sole purpose of speeding up the game of love, they dis-
card their personal integrity and try all sorts of tricks to seduce the oppo-
site sex. They never question whether love should be achieved that way
and whether this kind of union between the sexes is natural or everlasting.
This is completely wrong! This kind of union has nothing to do with love.
It is nothing but animal desire. With this kind of animalistic socializing
going on, it is no wonder that those old moralists curse the absurdity of
the New Culture Movement and prevent their own children from going
to public gatherings.
Third, there are some who tend to misunderstand the intention of
the other party, assuming that even the slightest agreement in language
and thought signifies “love.” They then seek love without trying to under-
stand the other party. Suffering from “unrequited love,” many of them
end up becoming ill, insane, or suicidal. Those who are smarter may come
back to their senses in time. Observation of these kinds of encounters
may cause pessimism and loneliness in other people, and keep them from
going out and socializing.
The above are the obstacles that hinder the socializing between men
and women.
Love is sacred and should not be spoken of lightly. It is a union of
character. Anybody who misinterprets the concept of character, fails to
distinguish between the part and the whole, or fails to understand the
significance of character is not qualified to talk about “love.”
I respect my own and others’ character. If I actually fall in love with
someone, I will not be afraid to talk about it. If not, however, I will cer-
tainly curse those who don’t respect the character of others. Who can sway
my will? Who can force me? Who would dare to control me? I have the
right to control my own life and would never allow anybody else to con-
trol me. I sincerely advise young people: Raise your consciousness, never
take lightly your own character or others’, never try to destroy our New
Culture Movement, and avoid hindering our progress. It is my hope that
there will be more discussion on socializing between men and women.
I also welcome comments and criticisms.

7.13 DING LING’S “MISS SOPHIE’S DIARY” (1928)

Ding Ling (1904–1986), at first writing under the pen name Jiang Bingzhi,
was perhaps the most prominent female author of twentieth-century China.
Highly influenced by May Fourth thought, and sympathetic to the Commu-
nist cause, she joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1932. Her husband, Hu
Yepin, also a Communist, was detained and executed along with other Commu-
nists by the KMT in the “White terror” purge of 1931. Ding Ling herself was
arrested in 1933 by the KMT and held under house arrest until 1936. The short
story “Miss Sophie’s Diary” was only her second published story, yet it typifies
her highly successful early style and bold expression of her sexual feelings. The
notion that a story would both describe a woman’s desire and flaunt traditional
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 185

behavior shocked (and attracted) many readers. The story takes place in Beijing
with the characters Yufang and Yunlin being the main character’s two closest
friends.

Questions
1. What themes does “Miss Sophie’s Diary” address that might
have been considered innovative literature for the period?
2. Would you describe the relationships as radical? Would many of
the emotions she illustrates still be true today?

12 January
Yufang has moved in, but Yunlin has moved out. Can there be another
couple like them in the universe? They won’t live together for fear of hav-
ing a child. I imagine that they can’t be certain that if they lay in each
other’s arms in bed they wouldn’t do other things too, which is to why
they’re taking this precaution against that sort of physical contact. Hug-
ging and kissing when they’re alone isn’t dangerous, so the occasional
discreet bout doesn’t come within the scope of their ban. I couldn’t help
laughing at them for their asceticism. Why shouldn’t you embrace the
naked love of your beloved? Why repress that manifestation of love? How
can the pair of them think of those irrelevant and worrying things before
they’re even under the same quilt? I don’t believe that love can be so ratio-
nal and scientific.
They didn’t get angry with me for teasing them. They’re proud of
their purity, and they laughed at my childishness. I can understand their
state of mind, but there are so many strange things in the world that I can’t
fathom at all.
I stayed at Yunlin’s (or Yufang’s, as I should now say) till 10 before
coming back. We talked a lot about ghosts.
I got used to talk about ghosts when I was tiny. I often used to sit
on my aunt’s lap listening to my uncle telling stories from Liaozhai [Pu
Songling’s Tales from the Studio (similar to 1.11)], and I loved listening till
late at night. As for being frightened, that was another matter. I’d never
tell anyone about it, because if I’d admitted being frightened, I’d never
have heard the story to the end, my uncle would have gone into his study,
and I’d not have been allowed to get out of bed. When I went to school,
I learnt a little science from the teachers. Because I was completely con-
vinced by our teacher Pockmarked Zhou, I believed the books too, where-
upon ghosts weren’t frightening any more. Now I’m more grown up I still
say that I don’t believe in ghosts, but my disbelief doesn’t stop the goose-
pimples or my hair standing on end. But whenever the conversation gets
on to ghosts other people don’t realize that I’m wanting to change the
subject because I’m afraid of lying alone in my quilt at night being sad at
missing my dead aunt and uncle.
When I came back and saw that dark alley, I did feel a little scared.
I wouldn’t have been at all surprised if a great yellow face had appeared in
some corner or if a hairy hand had stretched out in that alley that seemed
to be frozen solid. But that tall man Ling Jishi seemed a reliable body-
guard to have beside me, so when Yufang asked me I said I wasn’t scared.
Yunlin came out with us and went back to his new place. As he went
south, and we went north the sound of his rubber-soled shoes on the foot-
path died out within three or four paces.
He put out a hand and took me by the waist.
“I’m sure you’re frightened, Sophie.”
186 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

BA JIN (1904–2005)—Pen I tried to struggle but I couldn’t break free.

name of influential May My head rested against his ribs. I wondered what sort of creature I’d
Fourth author Li Feigan, look like in the light, held by the arms of a man over a head taller than me.
who is best known for his I ducked down and got out. He let go and stood beside me as we
novel Family, the first book knocked at the front gate.
in the Torrents Trilogy, The alley was very dark, but I could see very clearly where he was
which also included Spring looking. My heart was pounding somewhat as I waited for the gate to open.
and Autumn. “You’re frightened, Sophie,” he said.
There was the sound of the bolts being drawn as the porter asked
who was there. I turned to him and started to say, “Goodnight.” He seized
my hand fiercely and I couldn’t finish the word. The porter showed his
astonishment as he saw the tall man behind me.
When the two of us were alone in my room my boldness was not
needed any longer. I deliberately tried to make some politely conventional
remarks but just couldn’t. All I could manage was, “Do sit down.” Then
I began washing my face.
Goodness knows how, but I’d forgotten all about ghosts.
“Are you still interested in studying English, Sophie?” he asked
suddenly.
So, he was coming to me, and he was the first to bring up the English.
Of course, he wouldn’t necessarily be pleased at having to sacrifice his
time for nothing to give some extra classes: he couldn’t fool me, a woman
of twenty, about what he had in mind. I smiled, though only in my head.
“I’m too stupid,” I said. “I’m worried that I couldn’t manage it and
would only make a fool of myself.”
He said nothing, but picked up a photograph that was standing on
my table. It was of my sister’s little girl. She’s just one year old.
When I’d washed my face I sat down at the other side of the table.
He looked first at me, then at the little girl, then back at me again. Yes, she
looked very much like me.
“She’s nice, isn’t she?” I asked him. “Do you think she’s like me?”
“Who is she?” His voice clearly showed that he was very serious.
“Don’t you think she’s sweet?”
He kept asking me who she was.
Suddenly I realized what he was driving at. I wanted to lie to him.
“She’s mine.” I snatched the photograph and kissed it.
He believed me. I’d actually fooled him. I felt triumphant in my
dishonesty.
This triumph seemed to make him less charming and handsome.
Why else could I have ignored his eyes and forgotten his mouth when he
showed that naïve astonishment? Otherwise this triumph was bound to
cool my passion.
But after he’d gone, I felt sorry. There’d been so many obvious
chances set in front of me. If only I’d made some other expression when
he pressed my hand and let him understand that I wouldn’t have turned
him down, he’d certainly have made some bolder moves. When it comes
to boldness between the sexes, I’m absolutely certain that as long as you
don’t detest the other person the pleasure you feel must be like the body
melting. So why do I have to be prim and proper with him? After all, what
did I move into this dilapidated room for?

7.14 BA JIN’S “FAMILY” (1931)

Ba Jin came of age in a large wealthy family in Chengdu (the capital of Sichuan
province in western China). The family compound had over 50 family members,
 Chapter 7 • China’s Struggle for Unity 187

with at least as many servants. His most famous novel, Family, is drawn from
many of his own personal experiences (and frustrations). Family is the first book
of a trilogy (the books Spring and Autumn followed). While Ba Jin sought to
paint the traditional family customs in a dark light, the book’s sharper critiques
are often taken as suggestions for ways a new generation could change China. In
this way, his work offers a more mainstream, less ideologically informed, view of
Republican China and is still revered (and read) today in China. This trilogy is
considered one of the best literary works of its era, capturing both the rising gen-
erational gaps and the shifts in attitude toward marriage as a result of the May
Fourth Movement.

Questions
1. How did Juexin’s father’s decision affect Juexin’s future
aspirations?
2. How representative do you think Ba Jin’s portrayal of China in
the 1920s is?

To Juemin and Juehui, Juexin was “Big Brother.” Though born of the same
mother and living in the same house, his position was entirely different
from theirs. In the large Gao family, he was the eldest son of an eldest son,
and for that reason his destiny was fixed from the moment he came into
the world.
Handsome and intelligent, he was his father’s favorite. His private tutor
also spoke highly of him. People predicted that he would do big things,
and his parents considered themselves fortunate to be blessed with such
a son.
Brought up with loving care, after studying with a private tutor
for a number of years, Juexin entered middle school. One of the school’s
best students, he graduated four years later at the top of his class. He
was very interested in physics and chemistry and hoped to go on to a
university in Shanghai or Beijing, or perhaps study abroad, in Germany.
His mind was full of beautiful dreams. At that time, he was the envy of
his classmates.
In his fourth year at middle school, he lost his mother. His father
later married again, this time to a younger woman who had been his
mother’s cousin. Juexin was aware of his loss, for he knew full well that
nothing could replace the love of a mother. But her death left no irrepa-
rable wound in his heart; he was able to console himself with rosy dreams
of his future. Moreover, he had someone who understood him and could
comfort him—his pretty cousin Mei, “mei” for “plum blossom.”
But then, one day his dreams were shattered, cruelly and bitterly
shattered. The evening he returned home carrying his diploma, the plau-
dits of his teachers and friends still ringing in his ears, his father called
him into his room and said:
“Now that you’ve graduated, I want to arrange your marriage. Your
grandfather is looking forward to having a great-grandson, and I, too,
would like to be able to hold a grandson in my arms. You’re old enough to
be married; I won’t feel easy until I fulfill my obligation to find you a wife.
Although I didn’t accumulate much money in my years away from home
as an official, still I’ve put by enough for us to get along on. My health
isn’t what it used to be; I’m thinking of spending my time at home and
having you help me run the household affairs. All the more reason you’ll
be needing a wife. I’ve already arranged a match with the Li family. The
thirteenth of next month is a good day. We’ll announce the engagement
then. You can be married within the year. . . . ”
188 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

The blow was too sudden. Although he understood everything his

father said, somehow the meaning didn’t fully register. Juexin only nod-
ded his head. He didn’t dare look his father in the eye, although the old
man was gazing at him kindly.
Juexin did not utter a word of protest, nor did such a thought ever
occur to him. He merely nodded to indicate his compliance with his
father’s wishes. But after he returned to his own room, and shut the door,
he threw himself down on his bed, covered his head with the quilt and
wept. He wept for his broken dreams.
He had heard something about a match with a daughter of the Li
family. But he had never been permitted to learn the whole story, and so
he hadn’t placed much credence in it. A number of gentlemen with unmar-
ried daughters, impressed by his good looks and his success in his studies,
had become interested in him; there was a steady stream of matchmakers
to his family’s door. His father weeded out the applicants until only two
remained under consideration. It was difficult to make a choice; both of
the persons serving as matchmakers were of equal prestige and impor-
tance. Finally, he decided to resort to divination. He wrote each of the
girls’ names on a slip of red paper, rolled the slips up into the balls, then,
after praying for guidance before the family ancestral tablets, picked one.
Thus, the match with the Li family was decided. But it was only now
that Juexin was informed of the result.
Yes, he had dreamed of romance. The one in his heart was the girl
who understood him and who could comfort him—his cousin Mei. At one
time he was sure she would be his future mate, and he had congratulated
himself that this would be so, since in his family marriage between cousins
was quite common.
He was deeply in love with Mei, but now his father had chosen
another, a girl he had never seen, and said that he must marry within the
year. What’s more, his hopes of continuing his studies had burst like a
bubble. It was a terrible shock to Juexin. His future was finished, his beau-
tiful dreams shattered.
 CHAPTER 8
Fractured Visions
Republican China (1911–1949)Fractured Visions

Manchuria, Nanjing, and Yan’an in the 1930s

2 1

4
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 191

1. LONG MARCH: In response to increased Nationlist (KMT) attacks on the Jiangxi soviet in south-
eastern China, 100,000 members of the Central Red Army (also known as the First Army) left in
October 1934, arriving little over a year later with only 8,000 in the northwestern city of Yan’an due
to attrition, desertion, and deaths.

2. LONG RIDE?: While the overwhelming majority of those on the Long March had to walk with
heavy loads of weapons and supplies on their backs, the top CCP leaders were granted the privilege
of riding on horseback. Mao liked to ride in the front on his white horse (pictured left).

3. LENGTH: The Long Marchers are traditionally said to have traversed a distance of “25,000 li” or
about 8,000 miles, though some have estimated the distance to be as little as 3,700 miles. Regardless,
the Long March was no small feat (like walking from Los Angeles to New York and then continu-
ing down to Miami). But as this map highlights, perhaps it is even more accurate to talk of multiple
“Long Marches” since there were several other Communist forces taking different routes, with all
the veterans considered “Long Marchers.”

4. ZUNYI (January 12–17, 1935): The Central Army marched into Zunyi, a city in northern Guizhou,
in mid-January. It was the first rest from near-constant military pressure since their departure from
Jiangxi several months earlier. Aside from time to clean up their equipment, gather supplies, and
recruit men to join their army, the top ten CCP leaders met to discuss military strategy. Mao Zedong
delivered a strong critique of the leaders’ military tactics, leading to his promotion to the Standing
Committee, thus marking the beginning of his ascent to the leadership of the CCP.

5. KMT PURSUIT and CCP TACTICS: The Kuomintang’s encirclement campaigns (or “blockhouse”
strategy) sought to cut off the Jiangxi soviet economically, politically, and militarily from all outside
contact and aid. Although the Central Army successfully broke out of that encirclement, the KMT
troops harassed, pursued, and outflanked the Communists throughout the retreat. As the Commu-
nists evaded their troops, the KMT called on their allies (often local warlords) to come to their aid,
though most local troops sought to protect the major population centers instead of engaging the
Communists.

6. LONG RETREAT?: Many scholars question Communist glorification of the march, suggesting at
best it should be considered a desperate reaction to a desperate situation. The CCP’s main military
force was reduced by 90 percent; the march took the CCP leadership from a relatively heavily popu-
lated and strategically significant location to a remote and relatively sparsely populated hinterland,
where their position remained threatened by Chiang Kai-shek’s armies.

7. MYTHOLOGIZING OF THE LONG MARCH: The Long March as a watershed event in the his-
tory of the Chinese Communist Party has been embellished in both Chinese and Western accounts.
Today, Chinese schoolchildren still learn about the physical hardships, harrowing victories, and
great distances traveled by the Long Marchers. The term “Long March” is applied as a superlative
to describe revolutionary work units, special express trains, and even China’s latest rockets to the
moon.
192 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

ZHANG XUELIANG In the early morning hours of December 12, 1936, troops under the com-
(1900–2001)—Son of mand of the “Young Marshal,” Zhang Xueliang, entered the guesthouse
Manchurian warlord outside Xi’an, where Chinese president Chiang Kai-shek was sleeping.
Zhang Zuolin and Chiang, awakened by the shots fired by his guards, fled out a back door,
mastermind behind the leaving his dentures, and some say his pajamas, back in his room. He hid
kidnapping of Chiang Kai- behind a large boulder on the hillside for nearly half an hour before he
shek in 1936, convincing was discovered and whisked away to a secret location by Zhang Xue-
him to fight Japan rather liang’s troops. In a telegram sent to the Nanjing government later that day,
than the CCP. Zhang Xueliang demanded: 1) an immediate declaration of war against
Japan; 2) a pledge by the Nanjing government to recover all lost territo-
ries, including Manchuria; and 3) the reorganization of the Kuomintang
Party to allow the readmission of Communists to membership on the
same basis that existed before the anti-Communist purge in 1927. Song
Meiling, and brother-in-law Kong Xiangxi, immediately flew to Xi’an to
negotiate with his captors. Almost two weeks later, on Christmas Day,
Chiang Kai-shek was suddenly released with the announcement that he
had agreed in principle to Zhang Xueliang’s demands. Together with
Song Meiling and Zhang Xueliang, Chiang boarded a plane and returned
to Nanjing.
By joining Chiang, Zhang Xueliang hoped to prove his actions were
guided out of loyalty, not defiance. Immediately upon deplaning in Nan-
jing, Zhang Xueliang issued a public apology, stating: “I am naturally rus-
tic, surly and unpolished. This has led me to commit an impudent and
criminal act.” Zhang’s contrition did little to salve Chiang Kai-shek’s deep
shame over what he believed was a treasonous act that resulted in him
being publicly humiliated. Incensed by Zhang’s defiant deed, Chiang
had Zhang arrested, court-marshaled, and eventually sentenced to house
arrest. It is difficult to overstate just how aggrieved Chiang Kai-shek felt
by Zhang’s act. Zhang would remain under house arrest for the next
53 years—first on the Chinese mainland, and later in Taiwan when the
KMT retreated there—earning him the unwelcome distinction of being the
world’s longest-serving political prisoner. Given his harsh treatment by
Chiang Kai-shek, Zhang Xueliang seems like an improbable candidate to
earn the sobriquet by both the Chinese Communist and Nationalist gov-
ernments as a “hero of history” [qiangu gongchen]. Yet, to this day, Zhang
remains beloved for his efforts to push Chiang Kai-shek to join in a united
front with the Communists and end a policy of appeasement toward ever
more aggressive Japanese encroachment.
Historians have long debated Zhang Xueliang’s motives in kid-
napping Chiang Kai-shek. Zhang Xueliang’s father, Zhang Zuolin, had
controlled Manchuria (northeastern China) and ruled there for well
over a decade until assassinated by Japanese agents in 1928 (8.1). Only
28 years old at the time, Zhang Xueliang struggled with his inherited
role to modernize Manchuria while pursuing a debauched lifestyle of
drugs, mahjong [majiang], and womanizing. In 1931, while Zhang Xue-
liang was in a Beijing hospital attempting to break his opium addiction,
Japanese forces invaded Manchuria and established a puppet state of
“Manchukuo” (installing the last Qing emperor, Puyi, on the throne).
Chiang Kai-shek’s refusal to send Nationalist troops to defend the region
was a major factor in Zhang Xueliang’s hasty departure to Europe the
following month. There, he earned a reputation for fast cars, dancing,
all-night poker games, and an entourage that included scores of beau-
tiful women. His extravagant behavior made him a regular feature in
the European papers’ gossip columns, with the press invariably refer-
ring to him as the “Dancing Despot.” In 1934, determined to start anew,
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 193

he returned to China and adopted a spartan lifestyle. Chiang Kai-shek LONG MARCH
quickly appointed him to the post of Vice-Commander of Nanjing’s anti- (1934–35)—A series of
Communist forces (largely his own former Manchurian army) to defend CCP marches from their
the northwestern city of Xi’an. bases in the southeast to
On his return to China, Zhang Xueliang encountered a politically northwestern China. The
charged situation. Chiang Kai-shek, with the help of German advisors, main route ran 6,000 miles
had launched his fifth (and final) encirclement of Chinese Communists from Jiangxi to Shaanxi and
in Jiangxi. Encountering numerically superior and better-equipped took one year to complete.
troops, the Chinese Communist army embarked on a 6,000-mile-long Casualties and desertions
march across southern and western China to the northwestern province reduced the original
of Shaanxi. Japan continued to edge menacingly toward northern China. 100,000 marchers by more
Chiang Kai-shek claimed that “the Japanese were a disease of the skin, than 90 percent, to fewer
while the Communists were a disease of the heart” and thus needed to than 10,000.
first exterminate the Communist threat to his Nationalist government
and only then to focus his attention on the Japanese. His stance ran coun-
MANCHUKUO—The
ter to the popular sentiment and intense enmity toward Japan that had
puppet government
existed ever since Japan’s Twenty-One Demands in 1915. Forced to choose
formed by the Japanese in
between exterminating fellow Chinese or resisting Japanese advances, the
1932 in northeastern China.
choice for most Chinese was self-evident: confront Japan. Chiang Kai-
The last Qing emperor,
shek’s lingering reluctance to engage Japan, even after the kidnapping,
Puyi, was named its chief
was ultimately decided by Japan’s invasion of China in the summer of
executive and remained
1937.
titular head until the end of
In retrospect, the Xi’an Incident is perhaps the most critical junc-
World War II in 1945.
ture in Republican China (1911–1949). Without such a dramatic turn in
Nationalist policy, Yan’an (the final refuge of the Chinese Communists)
would have almost certainly been eliminated. In 1936, Communist forces
totaled about 20,000 men, while Nationalist forces were at least ten times
that many. Equally significant, the Xi’an Incident galvanized the Chinese
people. It unified the nation behind Chiang Kai-shek and toughened them
for a long battle against the Japanese. Zhang Xueliang, under house arrest
for over five decades, would never again be allowed to play an active
political or military role. Though, in what he must have considered a hol-
low victory, Zhang Xueliang outlived both Chiang Kai-shek and his son
Jiang Jingguo. He was finally released from house arrest in 1990 and spent
his last years living with his son in Honolulu, Hawaii, where he died at
the age of 100.

MANCHUKUO: JAPAN IN MANCHURIA

In the last decades of the Qing, China, Russia, and Japan vied for control
of northeastern China, or Manchuria. After the fall of the Qing, Manchu-
ria had, like many areas of China, come under warlord control—namely,
Zhang Zuolin and then his son Zhang Xueliang. In this decentralized
state, Japan’s sphere of influence began to expand from Korea, which
had become a colony under Japanese control in 1910. Japan invested
heavily in the region, hoping to benefit industrially, agriculturally, and
militarily. In 1931, Japan invaded and assumed total control of north-
eastern China, a region three times the size of Japan’s homeland and rich
in minerals and fertile farmland. They created the puppet state of Man-
chukuo in 1932 and placed Puyi, the last Qing emperor, as the titular
head two years later, they made him emperor of the state, though with
virtually no real control over administrative and political affairs. Out-
raged, the Nationalist Nanjing government took the case to the League of
Nations, forerunner of today’s United Nations, but they refused to take
military action.
194 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

8.1 BRITISH CONSULATE REPORT ON THE DEATH

OF ZHANG ZUOLIN (JUNE 15, 1928)
On the evening of June 3, 1928, the warlord general of Manchuria, Zhang Zuo-
lin, boarded his train in Beijing to make his way back to Shenyang. A power-
ful figure whose territorial base of control was centered in China’s northeast,
he (like many warlords [see 6.11]) controlled the bulk of the rail network in
his region. So, when in the early hours of the next morning a bomb exploded
just as his train passed over a bridge owned by the Japanese-controlled South
Manchuria Railway, the news made headlines around the world. Zhang would
die later that same day due to the severity of his wounds. The incident was met
with confusion and outrage by the international community. Later, it would be
discovered that Japanese officers in the Kwantung Army had planted the bomb
hoping to use his death as justification for the Japanese to make further inroads
in the region. To their surprise, not only did the event not lead to the desired
outcome, it also catapulted Zhang’s son, Zhang Xueliang, into power. The fol-
lowing document written by M. E. Dening, the acting British Consul in Dai-
ren, captures the intense international interest in the days and weeks following
the Zhang’s murder.

Questions
1. How did the British official receive the news of Zhang’s death?
2. Why did the Japanese respond so slowly?

There were two questions while I was in Mukden which everyone was
asking everyone else, and while everyone had a theory no-one knew the
facts. For that matter, the same two questions are being asked in Dairen
[Dalian] with less insistence, for on them the whole situation in Manchuria
appears to hang. The two questions are these: Is Marshal Zhang Zuolin
alive? Who bombed the Marshal’s train?
As far as the first question is concerned no one appeared to be in pos-
session of actual definite proof that the Marshal was alive, though he was
officially stated to be so. Amongst the Chinese population, there appeared
to be current a very strong impression that he was dead. It is fairly obvi-
ous that on the Marshal’s life or death a great deal hangs, and the uncer-
tainty on this point increases the general uneasiness. On the other hand,
the announcement of his death would cause not only a heavy slump in
business but would be more than likely to lead to a panic which would
cause a serious Sino-Japanese clash. It is therefore strange that if the Mar-
shal is alive, some more concrete proof of the fact should not be offered to
the public to restore confidence. Up to the time of writing I have not heard
any direct evidence of this description.
The second question is of equal importance in that it appears to
hold the key to the strange events of the past week. I did not visit the
scene of the outrage for two reasons: firstly because I gathered that the
spot, having been cleared to a certain extent, it was no longer so easy to
reconstruct the situation and secondly because I did not wish to give the
impression, particularly to the Japanese, that I was investigating what
on the surface at any rate is not directly my concern. I did however pur-
chase a series of photographs in a Japanese shop which give quite a clear
impression of what happened, and which I have the honor to enclose
herewith.
There appear to have been five ways in which the fatal bomb might
have been made to do its work. Of these throwing can I think be imme-
diately eliminated, since the charge must have been of such dimensions
that it could not have been thrown. The bomb may then have been placed
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 195

(1) under a car, (2) in a car, (3) on the roof of a car and (4) in or on the
South Manchuria Railway bridge above where the Marshal’s train was to
pass. The argument against (1) is that the bottom of the car directly hit . . .
is comparatively intact. Against (2) there is the fact that the sides of the
car have been blown in and not outwards as they would have been had
the bomb been inside. Evidence therefore goes to prove that the explo-
sion came from above. The difficulties against placing a bomb on the
top of the carriage at some previous spot would be great, and if this was
accomplished, then the fact that the bomb exploded immediately under
the South Manchuria Railway viaduct could have been little more than [a]
coincidence.
The belief seems fairly general therefore that the explosive was a
heavy charge placed under or in the South Manchuria Railway bridge,
taped so that the greatest force should be downwards, by someone who
knew exactly when the train would pass and the carriage in which Mar-
shal Zhang Zuolin should be, and who was probably in the offing and
fired the charge.
Various persons apparently hold various theories, but the Chinese
in general and quite a number of foreigners seem to hold the view that
the Japanese were the perpetrators of the outrage, the idea being that
having eliminated the responsible rulers in Manchuria they could bring
about a coup d’etat. . . . So far only a somewhat feeble explanation has
been given by the Japanese as to how the guard came to be absent at the
moment. If it was guilty of mere negligence than presumably the mili-
tary authorities would immediately hold a court-martial to clear them-
selves. . . . The opinion of one foreigner with whom I spoke who has
a knowledge of explosives and of Chinese methods in handling them
was that the outrage was too accurately planned to have been done by
a Chinese.
If this is so, there remain two nationalities who might have done
it, namely either the Japanese or the Soviets. The argument against the
former being the authors of the outrage is that they would scarcely be so
stupid as to select the one spot where suspicion would most likely rest
upon them. It might be maintained that they blew up their own line in
order to show that the Chinese could not guard it properly, but since this
spot was guarded by Japanese and the absence of the guard has still to be
explained, this argument does not hold. As regards the Soviets it is stated
that two Russian agents known to have been with [Mikhail] Borodin in
Hankou were seen by a Dutch member of the Chinese Maritime Customs
in Mukden. Whether the Soviets would gain, however, by destroying
Zhang Zuolin and Yu Chonghan and by embroiling the Japanese and Chi-
nese is another point to be considered.
I have quoted such evidence as I could assimilate during my short
stay at some length, but I have to admit that most of it is circumstan-
tial, and on it I would personally deliver no verdict whatsoever. As far as
I could gather the Chinese had so far not officially accused the Japanese
of being the authors of the outrage or at least of criminal negligence and
Japan is therefore presumably not called upon to make an official state-
ment. But it appears to me that the Japanese would have furthered their
own cause by making a public statement of a more official nature than the
mere garbled and contradictory notices in the Japanese Press in order to
reassure public opinion, not only here but the world over, and it is to be
hoped that some such statement will eventually be forthcoming, most of
all in Japan’s own interests, but largely to allay feeling among the Chinese.
The statement in the “Japan Advertiser” of the 6th that feeling against the
Japanese as authors of the outrage is evaporating is far from being the
196 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

truth. It is not after all the level-headed persons of impartial views who
have to be considered on such occasions—is it rather the firebrands who
have to be pleased, and they are doubtless fairly numerous on both sides,
while the somewhat ill-considered attitude of a certain section of the for-
eign community, who in this instance should be strictly neutral, does not
render the situation any easier.

8.2 PRINCIPLES FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE

“MANCHUKUO” GOVERNMENT (1932)
As international pressure increased, Japan sought to expand its dominant eco-
nomic, political, and military power within the newly established Manchukuo
state. The League of Nations, as part of its investigation into China’s charges
against Japan, asked Japan to provide statements explicating its presence in
Manchuria. The following document is Japan’s own portrayal of its role in Man-
chukuo and justification of why Japanese oversight was needed in the region. It
must be acknowledged that Japan’s actions in Manchuria were quite successful,
even if not popular with the members of League of Nations. Between 1931 and
1945, nearly 500,000 Japanese emigrated to Manchuria, with most of them work-
ing as farmers in the region’s fertile farmland. It was not just the Japanese who
were attracted to Manchukuo; Japanese Americans frustrated with the limited
opportunities in pre-war America settled in Manchuria in substantial numbers.
The ease with which Japan gained control of Manchukuo, and its subsequent
economic success, led Japan to use it as a model for subsequent puppet states in
China and Asia.
Questions
1. Japan suggests that Manchukuo is an independent state. What
aspects in the following list support that claim?
2. Why would Japan have a greater interest in Manchukuo than
China?
1. Japan, with a view to maintaining and developing her rights in Man-
churia, shall establish organs, to direct the affairs of the “Manchukuo.”
The organ shall, in addition, be given sufficient power so that the new
state may rely upon the Japanese for guidance and follow the lines of
development as laid down by Japan who, on her side, shall exercise
her control with sincerity and goodwill in order that the new state
may not have any feelings of distrust. Our attitude should be just and
fair.
2. The form of the government shall not be republican. Established on
the basis of the “kingly principle,” the new state shall adopt a monar-
chical form of government.
3. The new state shall exercise absolute authority over its internal affairs,
and under the direction of Japan, it shall carry out policies based on
monarchical principles.
4. With a view to realizing the above object, Japan shall provide the royal
family ruling over the new state with sufficient military power to con-
trol Manchuria and Mongolia.
5. The political system of the new state and its various organization shall
be modeled after those of Japan with modifications according to local
conditions in the new state. This principle holds good not only for
organizations of a political nature, but also for social institutions as,
for instance, customs and usages, which should be gradually assimi-
lated with those of Japan. In the execution of this principle, however,
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 197

simplicity and practicability should be emphasized so as to avoid the

complexity of Japanese laws.
6. The Chinese people do not have the same sense of loyalty to the Impe-
rial House as the Japanese. The authorities should therefore be severe
in their rule of the people so that they may have reverence and awe
towards their rulers.
7. If the necessity of drafting the Constitution arises, the Constitution
shall be modeled after that of Japan. The representative assembly
shall be nothing more than an advisory council and an organ to pub-
lish statements respecting the finance of the state. (Toward the last
decade of the Qing dynasty, the evils of the Advisory Council, which
was established to prepare for a constitutional government, were too
obvious).
8. Legislative and executive powers shall reside with the supreme
authorities, but the judicial power shall be respected in accordance
with laws so that its independent spirit may be maintained.
9. With regard to the laws, Japanese laws, and particularly Japanese
procedural laws, shall be made use of. As to the laws of the family,
the authorities shall take into consideration the special customs and
usages of the population. In cases where the foreign nationals are
involved, it seems better that Japan should assume the responsibility
of supervising the final decision.
10. All executive acts shall be performed in accordance with the existing
customs and usages, and simplicity and practicability shall be empha-
sized. The complexity of Japanese local organizations shall be avoided
and the corruption of officials shall be eliminated.
11. The police force of the new state shall be under the control of a strong
organ which shall also be given the power of bandit suppression. The
force shall be organized on a semi-military basis and well distributed
in the state so that under strict supervision and able direction bandit
activities may be eliminated.
12. The national defense of the new state shall be left entirely to Japan.
In order to complete its nationhood, the new state is not yet in a posi-
tion to defend itself from China and Russia under its present condi-
tions. Moreover, the national defense of the state coincides with that of
Japan; therefore, under no circumstance, shall the new state have the
right of defending itself.
13. The foreign relations of the new state shall be entrusted to Japan so
that serious diplomatic blunders may be avoided and national safety
assured.
14. The military forces shall be maintained to a degree sufficient to sup-
press internal disorders. The royal family ruling over the new state
shall directly command the forces so that the symbol of authority
may be deeply impressed upon the imagination of the people. But
the ultimate strength of the new state resides in the military power of
Japan, so that there is no necessity of maintaining a large force. When-
ever the need of suppressing internal disorders arises, the new state
can always apply to Japan for aid, because she has special rights and
duties of maintaining order in Manchuria.
15. The South Manchuria Railway shall have the exclusive right of rail-
way enterprises in Manchuria. The new projected railways shall be
always in the form of joint enterprises so that the spirit of the idea of
“mutual dependence to promote mutual glory” may be realized.
16. As regards the right of existence in Manchuria, the Japanese people
shall enjoy the same rights and privileges at the nationals of the new
198 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

LYTTON REPORT state. Besides concluding treaties with the new state to that effect,
(1932)—A League of Japan shall devise means to facilitate Japanese immigration.
Nations report indicting 17. Because of many complications, Japan will consider carefully the
Japan for its role in desirability of appointment of Japanese people as the officials of
seizing, subjugating, and “Manchukuo.” But in any case, Japan shall exercise actual control and
continuing to manage disciplinary supervision in the execution of the basic policies of the
the northeastern area of government in order to prevent corruption and achieve political suc-
China under the puppet cess. The present organization should be submitted for revision, but
Manchukuo government. in the selection of the personnel, if sufficient care is not taken, there
Japan withdrew from the will be grave consequences. Japan shall therefore take very seriously
League a month after the consideration of the matter.
international body voted to 18. With regard to military organs, there shall be careful selection of Jap-
accept its conclusions. anese people to enforce discipline and supervise the training of the
soldiers. As regards matters relating to the distribution of Japanese
officials in the various executive organs, to their appointment and
dismissal, their control and supervision, the new unified Japanese
organ in Manchuria shall assume full responsibility of deciding upon
them.

8.3 LYTTON COMMISSION REPORT (OCTOBER 2, 1932)

In 1931, the League of Nations sent a commission to China and Manchukuo
headed by Lord Lytton, the former Viceroy of India, to investigate both Japan’s
and China’s claims. The Lytton Report, or, officially, “The Report of the Com-
mission of Enquiry,” ran over 400 pages, including supplementary documents.
The commission initially sought to offer recommendations amenable to both the
Chinese and Japanese. When it realized this would be impossible, in October 1932,
it issued its full report, which was adopted by the League the following Febru-
ary. Upon receiving the report, the General Assembly issued statements of facts
regarding the Sino-Japanese disputes and followed with the adoption of ten prin-
ciples and conditions (such as the evacuation of Japanese troops from Manchu-
ria). Finally, the Assembly approved a recommendation to all League of Nations
members not to recognize the existing Manchukuo regime. Eventually, a total
of ten nations—virtually all wartime allies of Japan—and the Vatican extended
diplomatic relations to Manchukuo.
Questions
1. What does the Lytton Report suggest motivated Japan’s “actions
and policies” in Manchuria?
2. What solutions does the report offer to resolve the situation?

We recognize the great importance of Manchuria in the economic devel-

opment of Japan, nor do we consider unreasonable her demand for the
establishment of a stable government which would be capable of main-
taining the order necessary for the economic development of the country.
But such conditions can only be securely and effectively guaranteed by an
administration which is in conformity with the wishes of the population
and which takes full account of their feelings and aspirations. And equally
it is only in an atmosphere of external confidence and internal peace, very
different from that now existing in the Far East, that the capital which
is necessary for the rapid economic development of Manchuria will be
forthcoming.
In spite of the pressure of increasing over-population, the Japanese
have not as yet fully utilized their existing facilities for emigration, and the
Japanese Government has not hitherto contemplated a large emigration of
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 199

their people to Manchuria. But the Japanese do look to further industrial-

ization as a means to cope with the agrarian crisis and with the population
problem. Such industrialization would require further economic outlets
and the only large and relatively sure markets that Japan finds are in Asia
and particularly in China. Japan requires not only the Manchurian, but the
whole Chinese market, and the rise in the standard of living which will
certainly follow the consolidation and modernization of China should
stimulate trade and raise the purchasing power of the Chinese market. . . .
This economic rapprochement between Japan and China, which is of vital
interest to Japan, is of equal interest to China, for China would find that a
closer economic and technical co-operation with Japan would assist her in
her primary task of national reconstruction. . . .
It may, however, be less economic considerations than anxiety
for her own security which has determined the actions and policy of
Japan in Manchuria. It is especially in this connection that her states-
men and military authorities are accustomed to speak of Manchuria as
“the life line of Japan.” One can sympathize with such anxieties and
try to appreciate the actions and motives of those who have to bear the
heavy responsibility of securing the defense of their country against all
eventualities. While acknowledging the interest of Japan in prevent-
ing Manchuria from serving as a base of operations directed against
her own territory, and even her wish to be able to take all appropriate
military measures if in certain circumstances the frontiers of Manchuria
should be crossed by the forces of a foreign Power, it may still be ques-
tioned whether the military occupation of Manchuria for an indefinite
period, involving, as it must, a heavy financial burden, is really the most
effective way of insuring against this external danger; and whether, in
the event of aggression having to be resisted in this way, the Japanese
troops in Manchuria would not be seriously embarrassed if they were
surrounded by a restive or rebellious population backed by a hostile
China. It is surely in the interest of Japan to consider also other possible
solutions of the problem of security, which would be more in keeping
with the principles on which rests the present peace organization of the
world, and analogous to arrangements concluded by other Great Pow-
ers in various parts of the world. She might even find it possible, with
the sympathy and goodwill of the rest of the world, and at no cost to her-
self, to obtain better security than she will obtain by the costly method
she is at present adopting.
Apart from China and Japan, other Powers of the world have also
important interests to defend in this Sino-Japanese conflict. We have
already referred to existing multilateral treaties, and any real and lasting
solution by agreement must be compatible with the stipulations of these
fundamental agreements, on which is based the peace organization of the
world. The considerations which actuated the representatives of the Pow-
ers at the Washington Conference are still valid. It is quite as much in the
interests of the Powers now as it was in 1922 to assist the reconstruction
of China and to maintain her sovereignty and her territorial and admin-
istrative integrity as indispensable to the maintenance of peace. Any dis-
integration of China might lead, perhaps rapidly, to serious international
rivalries, which would become all the more bitter if they should happen
to coincide with rivalries between divergent social systems. Finally, the
interests of peace are the same the world over. Any loss of confidence in
the application of the principles of the Covenant and the Pact of Paris in
any part of the world diminishes the value and efficacy of those principles
everywhere.
200 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

8.4 JAPANESE DECLARATION AND WITHDRAWAL

FROM THE LEAGUE (MARCH 27, 1933)
On February 24, 1933, the League of Nations Assembly adopted the Lytton
Report on Manchuria, with Japan casting the only dissenting vote. Most damn-
ing was the Lytton Report’s conclusion that it was “indisputable that without any
declaration of war a large part of Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and
occupied by Japanese troops, and that in consequence of this operation, it has been
separated from and declared independent of the rest of China.” Japan’s response to
the League of Nation’s resolutions was swift. On the same day the League Assem-
bly adopted the report, Japan’s entire delegation stood up and ostentatiously made
their displeasure known by immediately walking out of the Assembly chambers.
A month later, on March 27, 1933, Japan officially announced its intention to
withdraw from the League of Nations, citing a failure of the League to grasp the
realities of the East Asia situation.

Questions
1. In what ways does Japan believe the League has misunderstood
its actions in Manchuria?
2. Why would the Japanese Government find it more beneficial to
leave the League than to remain a member?

The Japanese Government believe that the national policy of Japan which
has for its aim to ensure the peace of the Orient and thereby to contribute
to the cause of peace throughout the world, is identical in spirit with
the mission of the League of Nations, which is to achieve international
peace and security. It has always been with pleasure, therefore, that this
country has for thirteen years past, as an original member of the League,
and a permanent member of its Council, extended a full measure of its
high purpose. It is indeed a matter of historical fact that Japan has con-
tinuously participated in the various activities of the League with a zeal
not inferior to that exhibited by any other nation. At the same time, it is
and has always been the conviction of the Japanese Government that in
order to render possible maintenance of peace in various regions of the
world, it is necessary in existing circumstances to allow the operation of
the Covenant of the League to vary in accordance with the actual con-
ditions prevailing in each of those regions. Only by acting on this just
and equitable principle can the League fulfill its mission and increase its
influence.
Acting on this conviction, the Japanese Government, ever since the
Sino-Japanese dispute was, in September 1931, submitted to the League,
have, at meetings of the League and on other occasions, continually set
forward a consistent view. This was, that if the League was to settle the
issue fairly and equitably, and to make a real contribution to the promo-
tion of peace in the Orient, and thus enhance its prestige, it should acquire
a complete grasp of the actual conditions in this quarter of the globe and
apply the Covenant of the League in accordance with these conditions.
They have repeatedly emphasized and insisted upon the absolute neces-
sity of taking into consideration the fact that China is not an organized
State,—that its internal conditions and external relations are characterized
by extreme confusion and complexity and by many abnormal and excep-
tional features,—and that, accordingly, the general principles and usages
of international law which govern the ordinary relations between Nations
are found to be considerably modified in their operation so far as China is
concerned, resulting in the quite abnormal and unique international prac-
tices which actually prevail in that country.
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 201

However, the majority of the members of the League evinced in MUKDEN INCIDENT
the course of its deliberations during the past seventeen months a fail- (September 18, 1931)—
ure either to grasp these realities or else to face them and take them into Japan’s Kwantung Army
proper account. Moreover, it has frequently been made manifest in these blew up a portion of the
deliberations that there exist serious differences of opinion between Japan Southern Manchuria
and these Powers concerning the application and even the interpretation Railway and used the
of various international engagements and obligations including the Cov- incident to justify an attack
enant of the League and the principles of international law. As a result, on the city of Shenyang
the report adopted by the Assembly at the Special Session of 24 February and then on the whole of
last, entirely misapprehending the spirit of peace in the Orient, contains Manchuria.
gross errors both in the ascertainment of the facts and in the conclusions
deduced. In asserting that the action of the Japanese army at the time of
the incident of 18 September and subsequently did not fall within the NEW LIFE MOVEMENT
just limits of self-defense, the report assigned no reasons and came to an (1934—c. 1937)—A
arbitrary conclusion, and in ignoring alike the state of tension which pre- program of moral renewal
ceded, and the various aggravations which succeeded, the incident—for with distinct fascist
all of which the full responsibility is incumbent upon China—the report overtones launched in
creates a source of fresh conflict in the political arena of the Orient. By 1934 by Jiang Jieshi and
refusing to acknowledge the actual circumstances that led to the founda- his wife, Song Meiling, to
tion of Manchukuo, and by attempting to challenge the position taken counter Communism by
up by Japan in recognizing the new State, it cuts away the ground for the promoting Confucianism,
stabilization of the Far Eastern situation. Nor can the terms laid down in Nationalism, and
its recommendations—as was fully explained in the statement issued by Christianity.
this Government on 25 February last—ever be of any possible service in
securing enduring peace in these regions.
The conclusion must be that in seeking a solution of the question the
majority of the League have attached greater importance to upholding
inapplicable formulae than to the real task of assuring peace, and higher
value to the vindication of academic theses than to the eradication of the
sources of future conflict. For these reasons, and because of the profound
differences existing between Japan and the majority of the League in their
interpretation of the Covenant and of other treaties, the Japanese Govern-
ment have been led to realize the existence of an irreconcilable divergence
of views, dividing Japan and the League on policies of peace, and espe-
cially as regards the fundamental principles to be followed in the estab-
lishment of a durable peace in the Far East. The Japanese government,
believing that in these circumstances there remains no room for further
cooperation, hereby give notice, in accordance with the provisions of Arti-
cle 1, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, of the intention of Japan to withdraw
from the League of Nations.

THE NANJING DECADE

The ten-year period between the end of the Northern Expedition in
1927 and the start of the War of Resistance in 1937 is often referred to as
the “Nanjing Decade.” Under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership, the Nan-
jing government unified China to an extent not seen since the fall of the
Qing. Superficially, China seemed to modernize quickly. Chinese cities
across the nation (Shanghai and Nanjing, in particular) emerged as the
vanguard of China’s new cosmopolitanism. Shanghai became the “Paris
of the Orient” with an urban renaissance that seemed to prosper under
KMT rule. Chiang Kai-shek and his wife, Song Meiling, sought to pro-
vide a moral underpinning to this emergent Chinese identity with their
“New Life Movement” (8.6). However, pervasive corruption, runaway
inflation, and only minimal economic aid for the largest, and poorest,
segments of the population made the regime increasingly unpopular
202 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

(8.7). Politically and militarily, Chiang Kai-shek fostered an intense

loathing of Chinese Communists. He stepped up military actions against
both the Communists and remaining warlords in a series of campaigns
that lasted well into the 1930s. In this regard, the Nanjing Decade pre-
served a distinctly military flavor similar to the same period in Italy and
Germany. Looming in the background of all this was the constant threat
of further Japanese encroachment. Undermining this relatively popular
and prosperous era was Chiang Kai-shek’s reluctance to confront the
Japanese militarily.

8.5 EMERGENCY LAW FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF CRIMES

AGAINST THE SAFETY OF THE REPUBLIC (1931)
Between 1929 and 1934, Chiang Kai-shek’s military forces were almost con-
stantly engaged in campaigns against warlords, the Communists, and any
individuals within the KMT who dared dissent. The general public did not com-
pletely embrace Chiang’s new brand of governance. Protests against his passive
stance toward Japan’s aggression in northeast China, denunciations of the gov-
ernment in the press, and political agitation amongst the student and working
classes were all prevalent during the first decade of KMT rule. Chiang Kai-shek
reacted to this by enacting a set of laws severely restricting personal rights.
Promulgated by the National government on January 31, 1931, these Emer-
gency Laws were implemented a month later, on March 1st. As the military tone
of the laws suggests, the KMT government was still attempting to reintegrate
many areas of China under their authority. By 1937, Chiang had only man-
aged to bring two-thirds of China’s territory back under Nanjing’s centralized
administration.

Questions
1. Taking the Emergency Laws as a whole, what are Chiang Kai-
shek’s primary goals in instituting the new regulations?
2. One historian of the Nanjing Decade suggested Chiang’s rule was
neither democratic nor totalitarian but somewhere in between.
If you were to judge his administration by this set of laws, how
would you describe his government?

Article 1. Whoever, with a view to subvert the Republic, commits one of

the following acts, shall be punished by death:
1. Disturbing peace and order,
2. Entering into a secret relationship with a foreign country in order to
disturb peace and order,
3. Associating with rebels in order to disturb peace and order,
4. Instigating a military person to commit a non-disciplinary act or cause
him to fail in the performance of this duty, or to associate with rebels.
Article 2. Whoever, with a view to subvert the Republic, commits one of
the following acts shall be punished with death or life imprisonment:
1. Instigating another person to disturb peace and order or to associate
with rebels,
2. Conducting a campaign of propaganda against the State by writing,
sketching, or speech-making.
Article 3. Whoever, with a view to subvert the Republic, commits one of
the following acts, shall be punished by life imprisonment or imprison-
ment of not less than ten years:
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 203

1. Committing a non-disciplinary act, failing in the performance of his

duty, or associating with rebels on the instigation of the criminal indi-
cated Par. 4 of Article 1,
2. Disturbing peace and order or associating with rebels on the instiga-
tion of the criminal indicated in Par. 1 of Article 2,
3. Conducting propaganda on the instigation of the criminal indicated
in Par. 2 of Article 2.
Whoever, having committed one of the crimes specified in the
preceding paragraphs, on immediately and voluntarily reporting, shall
receive an attenuation or exoneration of the penalty.
Article 4. Whoever, having knowledge that a certain individual is a rebel,
shelters him without giving notification to the competent authorities, shall
be punished by imprisonment of not less than five years.
Whoever, having committed the crime specified in the preceding
paragraph, immediately and voluntarily reports, shall receive an attenua-
tion or exoneration of the penalty.
Article 5. Whoever, with a view to subvert the Republic, commits one of
the following acts, shall be punished with death, or life imprisonment or
imprisonment of not less than ten years:
1. Obtaining or transporting military supplies for rebels,
2. Revealing or transmitting to rebels military and political secrets,
3. Destroying means of communication.
Article 6. Whoever, with a view to subvert the Republic, organizes associa-
tions or unions or spreads doctrines incompatible with the “Three Prin-
ciples of the People,” shall be punished by imprisonment of from five to
fifteen years.
Article 7. Whoever commits one of the crimes specified by the present law
in a region under a state of siege shall be tried by the highest military
organ in that region. If he commits the crime within the limits of the sup-
pression of banditry, he shall be tried by a provisional court composed of
the magistrate of the district and two judicial officials.
The provisional court shall be established in the district and the
magistrate shall be designated as the president of the court.
Article 8. In case a suspect is tried by a military organ in conformity with
the present law, that organ shall submit a statement of the trial to the com-
petent superior military organ and the sentence shall be executed only
after approval by the latter. If the suspect is tried by a provisional court,
the court shall submit a statement of the trial to the superior court and the
sentence shall be executed only after approval by the latter; the case shall
also be reported to the provincial government for reference.
The competent superior military organ or the superior court, if it
doubts the judgment passed by the organ which is its subordinate, can
give to that organ an order for re-examination, or designate a special del-
egate to be present at the reconsideration of the judgment.
Article 9. The military organ or police which arrests a person suspected of
having committed one of the infractions specified by the present law, shall
report the matter immediately to the interested competent authorities.
Article 10. To all offences that do not fall within the limits of the present
law, the provisions of the Penal Code are applicable.
Article 11. The duration of the application of the present law and the date
of its enforcement shall be fixed by ordinance.
204 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

The provisional law suppressing anti-revolutionary plots shall be

repealed from the date of the enforcement of the present law.

8.6 SONG MEILING ON THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT (1934)

Established in 1934, the New Life Movement was a conscious effort by Chiang
Kai-shek (with considerable input from Song Meiling) to instill the government
with an element of traditional Confucianism. Framed in the moral language of
China’s traditional society, the primary tendencies of the New Life Movement
mirrored the social movements popular in the 1930s Fascist Italy and Nazi
Germany regimes, though they were far from identical nor nearly so pervasive.
The program had neither the hefty fiscal backing nor institutional depth of its
European counterparts and, despite extensive propaganda, drew little public
support or widespread interest. Initially, Chiang Kai-shek focused the program
on those segments and areas of the country he felt were most opposed to his
rule: the Communists and labor organizers. Like many such programs, it was
light on substance and heavy on idealism, which left it vulnerable to the criti-
cism that it displayed Chiang Kai-shek’s detachment from the true problems
facing China.
Questions
1. What does Song Meiling identify as the problems facing China?
How does she suggest the New Life Movement will resolve such
issues?
2. How does she respond to the criticism that the government should
first find a solution to feeding people before promoting a program
like the New Life Movement?

China, like almost every other nation during the past few years, has felt
tremendous enervating effects of world depression. Each nation, accord-
ing to its lights, has sought to find a way out of stagnation into normalcy.
Italy has its Fascism, Germany its Nazism, the Soviet Union its first and
second five-year plans, and America its New Deal. The primary aim of
each is to solve the economic problems involved and to bring material
prosperity to the people. China, like the rest of the nations, is confronted
with a similar problem, added to which is the necessity of rescuing the
people from cumulative miseries of poverty, ignorance, and supersti-
tion, combined with the after effects of communistic orgies and natu-
ral calamities, and last but not least, the grave consequences of external
aggression.
To this end, what is known as the New Life Movement has been
launched, to strike at the very roots of the several evils. Conditions obtain-
ing in China are so different from those facing any other country that it
would be impossible for the average foreign mind to comprehend the rea-
sons for the New Life Movement, its program, its actual working result,
and its future, without a brief explanation of the background of the psy-
chological and social state in which China finds herself after some three
hundred years of oppression and neglect by the rulers of the Manchu
Dynasty, followed by the chaos consequent upon the revolution which
overthrew that regime.
[. . .]
Gradually, however, the leaven of the Republic began to work, and
relatively great and far-reaching reforms and improvements took place
though these changes were mostly confined to seaboard cities and to a
number of the larger cities in the interior. But the country at large went
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 205

unchanged, or difficult to change, and because of this fact communist

agents soon discovered that here they had a more fertile field in which to
work than any other country could provide. They seized their advantage
and, before their activities were realized, they had contrived to impose
upon the ignorance of the people to such an extent that they were firmly
established in several regions. Military efforts against them became
necessary.
The idea of the New Life Movement became crystallized in the mind
of General Chiang Kai-shek during the anti-communist campaign. He
realized that military occupation of recovered territory was not enough;
that it must be followed up by social and economic reconstruction in the
devastated areas; and that, to be effective, a national consciousness and
spirit of mutual co-operation must be aroused. He saw that the immediate
need was the development of the vitality of the spirit of the people, which
seemed to have been crushed. He contemplated the perspective of his-
tory in the light of existing conditions about him; he realized how much
depended upon the people’s consciousness of their heritage from the past;
the conviction came to him that the four great virtues of old China, Li, Yi,
Lian, and Chi constituted a remedy that could rescue the country from
stagnation and ruin, because at the time when those principles were prac-
ticed, China was indeed a great nation. He decided then and there to base
a New Life Movement upon them, to try to recover what had been lost by
forgetfulness of this source of China’s greatness. For it has become obvi-
ous that mere accumulation of wealth is not sufficient to enable China to
resume her position as a great nation. There must also be a revival of the
spirit, since spiritual values transcend mere material riches.
What significance lies behind these four principles which hold
so much good in them for China, if they can be carried out in the spirit
intended?
First is Li, which in the ordinary and most accepted form of transla-
tion means courtesy. And by courtesy is meant that which emanates from
the heart—not a formality which merely obeys the law.
The second is Yi, which, roughly translated, means duty or service,
toward the individual’s fellow men and toward himself.
The third is Lian, meaning a clear definition of the rights of the indi-
vidual and of the degree in which those rights may be enforced without
infringing upon those of others. In other words, honesty. A clear demarca-
tion between what is public and what is private, what is yours and what
is mine.
The fourth is Chi, which denotes high-mindedness and honor.
Some people have criticized the New Life Movement on the ground
that, since there is not sufficient food for everyone in the land, it is useless
to talk about or seek spiritual regeneration. We reject the argument by
pointing out the very evident fact that, if everyone from the highest offi-
cial to the lowest wheelbarrow man would conscientiously practice these
principles in everyday life, there would be food for all. If we have the right
conception of Li, we recognize not outward pomp but the sterling native
qualities of our fellow men. If we practice Yi, we feel an obligation not to
hold wealth and enjoy it wastefully while our fellow countrymen may be
on the verge of starvation or suffering from sickness or other misfortunes.
Again, with Lian: If officials recognize the rights of the people under them,
they do not try to benefit themselves at the expense of the people just
because the latter are too powerless and ignorant to fight in their own
defense. And if Chi is a reality no one is shameless or stoops to mean or
underhanded deeds.
206 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

Being a realist, the General recognized that conditions in China are

entirely different from what they were centuries ago when China was a
great nation. At that time China could well afford to stand aloof, shut her-
self within the confines of her own boundaries, and keep out all intruders;
but today she is part of a world-wide scheme of things, and in order to
maintain and improve her present position, she must keep in step with
world progress.
So, the New Life Movement is based upon the preservation of
these four virtues, and it aims to apply them to actual, existing condi-
tions, in order that the moral character of the nation shall attain the
highest possible standard. The General observed that communism
crushed the spirit of the people, in addition to robbing them of material
things; that it struck at all the fundamental principles of moral char-
acter. He found the people bereft of ideas or ideals concerning either
humanity in general or in their fellow men in particular. Communism
was, indeed, the last abrasive in the destruction of a sense of law and
order, unselfishness, loyalty and those other qualities necessary for
the development of human kindness and the maintenance of a high
national consciousness. It tortured and degraded the status of man and
dispossessed human life of value. In the face of this dismal prospect,
the General decided that the New Life Movement could sow the first
seeds of an effort to awaken the people an urge for a more-satisfying
life.

8.7 FILM: PLUNDER OF PEACH AND PLUM (1934)

When we think of blockbuster movies today, we often talk of Hollywood in
California or perhaps Bollywood in Mumbai, India, but few of us think of
China. In the 1920s, Chinese cinematography remained relatively underde-
veloped. By the 1930s, however, with the advent of sound movies, Shanghai
began to produce an ever-larger number of films. Few capture the mood of the
period more than China’s first sound movie Plunder of Peach and Plum
(alternatively known as “The Fate of Graduates”). The title comes from the
fact that the term “peaches and plums” was a traditional phrase to mean “stu-
dents.” But it also happens to be the homonyms of the surnames of the two
main characters (Tao and Li).
Addressing themes of education, relationships, and corruption, not
dissimilar to those of Ding Ling and Ba Jin (7.13–7.14), early Chinese cin-
ema often openly critiqued Chinese society under KMT rule. Told largely
through flashbacks from the present, the film depicts the harsh social forces
facing a just-graduated couple’s youthful idealism. The immensely popular
“Graduation Song” (included in the following scene) was scored by com-
poser Nie Er and lyricist Tian Han. They were a prolific duo who, the follow-
ing year, scored the “March of the Volunteers” [Yiyongjun Jinxingqu], a
song later adopted as the national anthem by the People’s Republic of China.
The movie begins with the headmaster desperately calling to a local prison
upon discovering that Tao Jianping, his former star pupil, will be executed
later that day.

Questions
1. Why would this film be considered anti-KMT or leftist?
2. Although this film was released a year before the Xi’an Incident
(8.9), how does it hint at the audience’s frustrations with Chiang
Kai-shek’s and the KMT’s priorities?
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 207

Headmaster Liu: Please connect me with 67348. Hello. Is this

local prison? I am looking for Section Head
Chen. This is Construction School. . . .
Clerk: Hold on please. Section Head Chen,
your call.
Chen: Hello!
Liu: This is Liu Yuchi.
Chen: Oh, Headmaster Liu!
Liu: Do you have a prisoner by the name Tao
Jianping?
Chen: Yes, yes, we do.
Liu: Is his execution set for today?
Chen: Yes, it is. It is scheduled for this morning.
Liu: Might it be possible that I be allowed to
come and talk with him?
Chen: Yes, yes, that wouldn’t be a problem.
Liu: If that’s alright, then I will come over at
once.
Clerk: Headmaster, are you heading out?
Liu: Yes, I need to leave [for urgent busi-
ness]. In today’s newspaper there was
an alarming piece of news. One of our
former graduates has been convicted of
a serious crime. I am not sure what crime
he’s committed but I am rushing to visit
him in prison.
Clerk: Oh! So, you still remember him?
Liu: Yes, I can remember him quite clearly.
He was among those students of whom
I was very fond. When I left to go abroad,
he accompanied me to the ship in order
to bid me farewell, but upon my return
I never heard another word about him.
(At the prison)
Liu: I was shocked when I saw the news in
the paper!
Chen: Oh, yes. . . . Yes, of course, especially for
a headmaster like yourself who cares so
deeply for the students.
Liu: Have any family members come to visit
him?
Chen: No one has mentioned there being any
visits from family. Perhaps this isn’t the
same person.
Chen [to the guard]: Open the door.
Chen [turning back to Liu]: Here he is. I have some other affairs
I must take care of, please excuse me.
Liu [to Chen]: See you later.
Liu [entering the prison cell]: Are you Jianping? I think you must still
remember me. I came immediately af-
ter I read [about your situation] in the
newspaper. Until then, I had absolutely
no idea [about your situation]. Since I re-
turned from abroad. . . .
208 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

Tao [interrupting Liu]: Go! Go! Go away! I’ve no idea who you
are! You must have mistaken me for
someone else!
Liu: Oh, I do apologize. . . .
(he turns as if to leave, but turns back around)
Liu: But actually, I still remember your voice
very clearly. Do you happen to still re-
member this photo? (shows him a small
photo)
Tao: I have no idea who that is.
(Tao lunges for the photo and struggles to tear it up before Liu grabs it back)
Liu: This is a student that I regarded very
highly. He was [a student] in my school
for a several years. I loved him like he
was my own child. I still remember the
day he graduated, as he shook my hand
to say goodbye with his diploma in his
hand, I could see tears in his eyes.
(Jianping breaks down in tears)
Liu: Jianping! Don’t be sad, my good child.
Tell me what happened.
Tao: That day that I graduated, I had such
aspirations. I never expected, that after
only a few years, it would come to this.
The day I grasped my diploma in my
hand.
(Scene fades and the sound of the students singing the “Graduation Song” and
the next scene opens with Tao’s graduation):
Do we choose to fight or surrender?,
  We want to die in the battlefield as
masters, instead of rising up as slaves.
Today we are peaches and plums in blos-
som, and tomorrow we will become bear-
ers to uphold the weight of the society.
  Today we are singing together, and to-
morrow we will stir up giant waves to
save our own nation!
  Giant waves, giant waves, continue to
swell and rise!
  Classmates, classmates!
  Show the strength, take up the respon-
sibility to save the nation!
(Headmaster Liu gives a short speech. After he finishes, Tao rises and addresses
his graduating class)
Tao: Dear classmates, just like our most be-
loved headmaster, we all feel very sad
today. Not until this very moment, just
as we are about to depart from this
school, have we come to fully appreci-
ate our headmaster’s abiding love for us
over these past few years. From today
forward, as we leave our headmaster,
so. . . .
Li Lilin [interrupts]: But we should control our emotions.
Tao: That is right! . . . We should control our
emotions. All of us are passionate youth.
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 209

We ought to bring our passion for our

school and apply them to the society.
From this point forward, our mission
must be pursued so that it serves and
benefits the society. We should make
our school proud. Because of headmas-
ter’s love for us and our love for him, we
should forever keep in our hearts this
last lesson from our headmaster, forever
and ever.

CCP: FROM A LONG MARCH TO THE UNITED FRONT

As the KMT’s political hold on China strengthened, Chiang Kai-shek
moved to eradicate the last Communist strongholds. Using the popular
“blockhouse strategy,” Chiang Kai-shek established a perimeter around
the Jiangxi soviet and slowly choked off all contact and supply routes. In
the autumn of 1934, the CCP held a series of contentious strategy meetings
over whether to stay or flee. In October, a majority finally agreed it was no
longer viable to remain in Jiangxi. They decided to fight their way through
the KMT lines and join Communist forces in other parts of China. In what
would later be referred to as the “Long March” (8.8), the CCP crossed
southern and western China, arriving a year later in the northwestern
province of Shaanxi a mere shadow of their former strength. It was dur-
ing this period that Mao Zedong rose to the dominant position within the
CCP, and the CCP promoted its popular anti-Japanese policy. This led to
their participation in the Xi’an Incident, which forced Chiang Kai-shek to
promise a similar strategy (8.9, 8.10). Once again united with the KMT, the
CCP sought to promote themselves as the political party most interested
in China’s survival (8.11).

8.8 THE LONG MARCH AND ETHNIC BORDERLANDS:

TWO PERSPECTIVES (1935)
All throughout the Long March, newspapers offered daily updates on the pursuit
of the Communists by Nationalist troops. Written largely for a pro-KMT audi-
ence, these columns were typically accounts from defected soldiers claiming the
CCP was on its last legs, or, like in the first of the following newspaper reports,
snippets of news intended to make them look foolish. From the Communist
perspective, the flight westward and then north was a fight for their survival.
Within months after their successful escape to Yan’an, in a remote northwestern
corner of China, the months-long march began to be shaped into a glorious tale of
the CCP’s rise. The second account reflects just how integrated the story became
many years later into the Communist Party’s account of its origins. Recounted
in highly polished prose, the story is told in the first-person voice of a Yi male
witnessing the arrival of the Communists in the remote mountainous area of
southern Sichuan. By juxtaposing these two accounts, it underscores the man-
ner in which events can quickly become more than just an unvarnished telling
of facts.
Questions
1. Do you find one or the other of the following accounts more reli-
able than the other? Why?
2. Given that Liangshan, even today, remains remote and among
the most impoverished regions in China, why do you think the
Yi figure so prominently in both accounts?
210 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

Lolo [Yi] Tribesmen Take Novel Revenge

on Communists
A group of Red [Communists] remnants numbering about 600, who took
refuge in the mountains near Mianning village recently, hoping to prepare
the way for the reception of Communistic preaching and secure the sup-
port of the Lolo tribesmen against the [Nationalist] Government troops,
had the tables turned on them in an unexpectedly tragi-comic manner.
One of the most popular slogans of the Communists is “down with
modesty.” This apparently so outraged the sense of propriety of the
Lolos, or perhaps stirred their sense of humor, that they determined to
do something about it. They rounded up all the Reds in the vicinity, dis-
armed them and stripped them of all their clothing, and then headed the
naked mob towards the government lines, where the Lolos handed over
to the [Nationalist] Government troops the clothing and equipment of the
Communists.
As the naked Reds approached the Government troops, followed
by the laughing Lolos, Government officers report that the sheer amaze-
ment of the soldiers gave way to the highest hilarity and the surprising
denouement.

Red Army, Red Army, the Yi People’s Family

By 1934, the Yi and the poor Han people of Yuexi County could no longer
bear the cruel rule and exploitation of the reactionary [Nationalist] gov-
ernment and the presence of the Nationalist’s Twenty-Fourth Army. So,
in March, over 4000 of us united together and simultaneously rebelled in
the Haitang, Wangjiatang and Bao’an districts. We wiped out three units
of the Twenty-Fourth Army and encircled the county seat for three days.
On the fourth day, right after we had succeeded in breaking through the
town defenses, enemy reinforcements sent from Xichang arrived and
defeated us. Those of us who survived fled to the forests of Eastern
Mountain outside town. For the next year, we lived off the land like
wild men.
The following spring (1935)—I remember it well because it was the
time of year when worms drop from Chinese Ash tree—we began to hear
rumors of the Red Army’s approach. Some said that the Red Army would
attack the Nationalists and rich, in order to help the poor; others said the
Red Army simply killed and burned. Was there truly an army who would
fight the Nationalists on behalf of the poor? It was impossible for us to
tell. So, we sent three men from the mountain to investigate. When they
returned, they reported that it was entirely true: the Nationalist troops
had retreated, the wealthy had fled and that the Red Army was about to
arrive. . . .
In the morning, just as we were asking if anyone had more informa-
tion about the Red Army, all of a sudden, in the distance, we heard the
distinctive sounds of horseshoes approaching. As we scanned the hori-
zon, five horses appeared. Astride the horses sat five valiant young men
dressed in black uniforms, straw shoes and the characteristic eight-sided
worker caps all bearing the red star above the visor. With rifles on their
shoulders and cartridge belts around their waists they radiated a soldierly
air and daring spirit.
As soon as they noticed us from afar, they quickly dismounted and
approached smiling and greeting us: “Fellow countrymen, we’ve alarmed
you!” We were taken aback for a moment, and then went ahead to greet
them as they looked so friendly. “Folks. Do not be afraid. We are Red
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 211

Army soldiers. We are here to help people of all ethnic groups and wipe
out the Kuomintang’s reactionary army.”
“Ah! The Red Army!” We all said in unison. Noticing their good-
natured expressions, we surrounded them, holding each other’s hands,
and looking at each other closely. They peered at our turbaned headdress
and woolen cloaks while we stared at the red stars on their caps.
“We heard that people, especially you Yi (ah, this is the first time the
Yi people were addressed so friendly), were suppressed by the reaction-
ary [KMT]. When they ran away, they spread rumors [about the Com-
munists] to scare you. We hope you can return to your normal life. We
will only be here for a few days. We guarantee you won’t not suffer any
harm.” Smiling, they shook our hands, and turned to the crowd which
had just gathered, then went on to visit different families in the town.
Gradually the stores along the streets re-opened and people passed along
what they saw and heard to each other. . . .
“Go and look! The Red Army has opened the prison!”
Some people found their family members and grief tears rolling
down their cheeks. Some found their family members been tortured to
death, and they began to wail. The families of the dead got hold on to
the soldiers, asking for revenge. Soldiers, with tears on their cheeks, com-
forted people: “We promise we will remember your request, wipe out the
evil Kuomintang, and revenge for the victims.” Filled with sorrow and
anger, I shouted out loud impulsively, “I want to join you, to fight the
Kuomintang!”
The oppressive atmosphere in the air was interrupted by my sudden
cry. “Yes, I want to join, too. To fight the Kuomintang!” One after another
more people asked to join the Red Army. Red Army soldiers clapped to
welcome us, asking us to register to join.

8.9 ZHANG XUELIANG’S XI’AN INCIDENT SPEECH

(DECEMBER 13, 1936)
In 1935, Zhang Xueliang kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek, who was about to engage
in what Chiang Kai-shek hoped would be the final extermination campaign
against the Communists. Public opinion increasingly desired action against
the increasing threat of Japan rather than against the relatively marginal threat
posed by the CCP. After Chiang Kai-shek’s capture, Zhang Xueliang gave a
speech to the nation outlining his motivation for the kidnapping and the terms
for Chiang Kai-shek’s release. In this way, he hoped to rally the nation (and
Chiang) to the need for unity against the Japanese invaders. The following is a
speech given after news of Chiang Kai-shek’s kidnapping had been made public.
Zhang Xueliang’s tone and his ability to capture the mood of the entire nation
in his plea for Chiang Kai-shek’s resistance seem to support his later claims
that he sought to save the nation through his actions. Regardless, the means by
which he sought to achieve his ends can only be described as highly unorthodox,
as was his willingness to accompany Chiang Kai-shek back to Nanjing to face
trial for his actions. Even Chiang Kai-shek’s own account of the event suggests
that anything less drastic would have failed to alter his strategy toward the
Japanese.
Questions
1. What does Zhang Xueliang suggest motivated him to kidnap Chi-
ang Kai-shek?
2. Does Zhang Xueliang indicate his attitude toward Chiang Kai-
shek? Is he anti-KMT?
212 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

For about a month now, I have not been to my office, nor been able to
address you. The reason of my absences, both from my work and from
seeing you, was my deep-seated resentment regarding my orders to have
to fight the [Communist] bandits at a time when our nation is daily fac-
ing the ever-increasing threat of foreign aggression. Not allowed to take
up arms against the foreigners [the Japanese], we are instead ordered to
attack ourselves [Chinese Communists]. This predicament depresses me
greatly! . . .
I assume you have all already heard about the [Xi’an Incident] that
occurred on December 12th. Let me briefly recount to you what happened.
With regards to my own political convictions, I have numerous times
openly shared my sentiments with the General [Chiang Kai-shek]. The
content of [what was said in] those conversions was confirmed today when
I visited the general’s two private secretaries, Mao Qingxiang and Wang
Rizhang. Both indicated that they recall our conversations [as I remem-
bered them]. Regrettably, due to General Chiang’s arrogance and my own
clumsy delivery, my efforts fell short. Misconstruing my meaning, he told
me I was wrong, yet at the same time he could not point out precisely
where I was mistaken, let alone show me how to correct my mistakes!
Our clash of political positions had in the last days become irrecon-
cilable, and yet neither of us would to yield to the other’s position. And
so, I came up with three possible courses of action: First, I could resign
from my position and part ways with General Chiang. Second, I could
make one final effort to share my thoughts with General Chiang, in the
hope that this last-minute appeal would cause him to change his position.
Third, I could take the action I have just taken; I could attempt to coerce
him [to accept my position] by force. If it wasn’t for the national atrocities
[of Japan’s occupation of Manchuria] and my personal tragedy; If it wasn’t
for my responsibilities for my country and compatriots; if it wasn’t for
my taking suggestions and accepting the criticism from my subordinates,
I would have simply resigned, returned home to the Northeast and joined
the Manchurian Army and have [fought the Japanese] achieving the same
results as the third option.
Taking the first course of action [of resigning], would not have both-
ered me in the least, I could have cared less about the consequences.
Regarding the second option [of changing Chiang’s mind], I had
actively been working for over the past month to put my plan into action.
I tried every means imaginable. My intentions were entirely pure and self-
less. Twice I traveled to Luoyang to make my position clear. To demon-
strate my pure motives, on one of the trips I even traveled there alone!
Regrettably, due to General Chiang’s arrogance and my own clumsy
delivery, my efforts fell short, which I have stated above. It should be
noted that my rank makes me second only to General Chiang himself,
and yet he would neither listen nor even give me the courtesy allowing
me to express myself thoroughly. Instead, he chose to only listen to what
he agreed with. This is wrong. Like the poet Zeng Kuoqing wrote in his
poem, “Mount Hua is very high, but surrounded by fog.” These words
aptly capture how General Chiang himself is encircled by his men [who
only tell him what he wants to hear].
When neither of my first two courses of action yielding results, the
third option became my only viable way forward. [In addition,] there were
several more proximate factors, that in themselves prompted me to act.
First, several leaders of the “Save the Nation” movement were arrested in
Shanghai. What crime did these leaders perpetrate? I don’t think hardly
anyone could tell you. According to Shen Junru, a well-known professor
in his sixties, he committed no crime other than “attempted patriotism!”
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 213

Once, when I raised the issue [of the seven arrested leaders] with General
Chiang, he said, “Of all people in the country, you alone see things in this
way. I am the revolutionary government, and so whatever I chose to do is
the revolutionary way!” Although in the moment I said nothing, I thought
to myself that “the revolutionary government is not just a meaningless
phrase, a revolution must have revolutionary actions.” . . .
I now want to share with you one last reason worthy of mention
that also caused me to pursue this third course of action. Finding the
actions of some men under my command as improper, General Chiang
asked me to punish them. I could not do as he pleased even if the higher
authorities did not agree. To sacrifice myself is one thing, to falsely
accuse those under me who are completely innocent is another matter
entirely.
In taking the action we did, we put aside entirely any personal con-
siderations of glory or shame, life or death. Everything we did, we did for
the nation [guojia minzu]. We have considered our actions from every side,
we dare not take any action that would harm the nation, but equally we
will not hesitate from taking any steps needed to help.
We realize that our actions have, beyond any doubt, had an adverse
impact on the national order, but taking the long view, we are confident
our actions will rescue the country from the dangerous position it finds
itself and by doing this it cannot but have a positive outcome!
Today, General Chiang is utterly free from danger. We hold no per-
sonal grudge or resentment towards him. We are in no way attempting
to repudiate him as an individual, rather we are opposed his policy and
methods. By opposing him, we are offering him [both] the opportunity
to reexamine himself and the opportunity to demonstrate our love and
concern for him. By taking these steps, our actions in no way intended to
harm him. If General Chiang abandons his past policies, and chooses to
steadfastly lead the resistance against Japan, we would immediately sup-
port him! Then, even if he decided that our actions were traitorous and
merited punishment, we would all calmly accept such a decision. Because
what we are fighting for is the adoption of a policy [to resist Japan]. As
long as the policy is implemented our goal will have been achieved. Noth-
ing else matters. . . .
The fate of our nation rides on this incident, I hope you all will try
very hard to carry out our duties! You all need to make up your minds to
sacrifice yourself for the nation! I firmly believe China can rise once again.
I believe that China will be able to break free from the yoke of Japanese
imperialism. We want to admit past mistakes, to prevent us from repeat-
ing the same mistakes over and over. Comrades! The people of China will
one day be liberated and free.

8.10 MAO ZEDONG’S STATEMENT ON CHIANG KAI-SHEK’S

STATEMENT (DECEMBER 28, 1936)
As the days passed after his public remarks following his release on December 26,
Chiang Kai-shek issued no formal statement regarding his promise to attack
Japan. Into this vacuum, Mao Zedong issued the following declaration that high-
lighted Chiang Kai-shek’s reticence and allowed the CCP to claim the moral high
ground as the only major political force pushing for anti-Japanese measures. Mao
Zedong almost surely also sought to highlight Chiang Kai-shek’s promises to
preempt any attempt by Chiang Kai-shek to repudiate them. As a result of their
role in the Xi’an Incident and the adamant (and publicly) anti-Japanese stance,
many Chinese citizens began to adopt a more open and positive attitude toward
the CCP.
214 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

PUNITIVE FACTION—A Questions

group within the KMT lead
by He Yinqin and Dai Jitao, 1. How does Mao characterize Chiang’s behavior and public state-
who some claimed sought ments in the days after the Xi’an Incident?
to kill Chiang Kai-shek in 2. What does Mao mean when he reminds readers of Chiang Kai-
the Xian Incident (1936) shek’s statement: “Promises must be kept and action must be
to destabilize the political resolute”?
situation by promoting
a civil war and delaying In Xi’an Chiang Kai-shek accepted the demand for resistance to Japan put
engagement with the forward by Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng and the people
Japanese. of the Northwest and, as an initial step, he has ordered his civil war troops
to withdraw from the provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu. This marks the
beginning of Chiang’s reversal of his wrong policy in the past decade. It
is a blow to the intrigues conducted by the Japanese imperialists and the
Chinese “punitive” group [taofa pai] to stage-manage a civil war, foment
splits and get Chiang killed in the Xi’an Incident. Their disappointment
is already apparent. The indication that Chiang Kai-shek is beginning to
wake up may be considered a sign of the Kuomintang’s willingness to end
the wrong policy it has pursued for ten years.
On December 26 Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement in Luoyang,
the so-called “Admonition to Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng”, which
is so ambiguous and evasive as to be an interesting specimen among Chi-
na’s political documents. If Chiang really wants to draw a serious lesson
from the incident and try to revitalize the Kuomintang, and if he wants to
end his consistently wrong policy of compromise in foreign affairs and of
civil war and oppression at home, so that the Kuomintang will no longer
stand opposed to the wishes of the people, then as a token of good faith he
should have produced a better piece of writing, repenting his political past
and setting a new course for the future. The statement of December 26 can-
not meet the demands of the Chinese masses.
However, it does contain one praiseworthy passage, in which Chi-
ang asserts that “promises must be kept and action must be resolute”. This
means that, although he did not sign the terms set forth by Zhang [Xue-
liang] and Yang [Hucheng] in Xi’an, he is willing to accept such demands
as are beneficial to the state and the nation and will not break his word on
the grounds that he did not sign. We shall see whether, after he has with-
drawn his troops, Chiang will act in good faith and carry out the terms he
has accepted. The terms are:
(1) to reorganize the Kuomintang and the National Government, expel
the pro-Japanese group and admit anti-Japanese elements;
(2) to release the patriotic leaders in Shanghai and all other political pris-
oners, and guarantee the freedoms and rights of the people;
(3) to end the policy of “suppressing the Communists” and enter into an
alliance with the Red Army to resist Japan;
(4) to convene a national salvation conference, representing all parties,
groups, sections of the population and armies, to decide on the policy
of resisting Japan and saving the nation;
(5) to enter into co-operation with countries sympathetic to China’s resist-
ance to Japan; and
(6) to adopt other specific ways and means to save the nation.
The fulfillment of these terms requires above all good faith, and also
some courage. We shall judge Chiang [Kai-shek] by his future actions.
But his statement contains the remark that the Xi’an Incident was
brought about under the pressure of “reactionaries”. It is a pity that he did
not explain what kind of people he meant by “reactionaries”, nor is it clear
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 215

how the word “reactionary” is defined in Chiang’s dictionary. However,

what is certain is that the Xi’an Incident took place under the influence of
the following forces:
(1) the mounting indignation against Japan among the troops of Generals
Zhang [Xueliang] and Yang [Hucheng] and among the revolutionary
people of the Northwest;
(2) the mounting indignation against Japan among the people of the
whole country;
(3) the growth of the Left forces in the Kuomintang;
(4) the demand by the groups in power in various provinces for resist-
ance to Japan and for the salvation of the nation;
(5) the stand taken by the Communist Party for a national united front
against Japan; and
(6) the development of the world peace front.
All these are indisputable facts. It is just these forces that Chiang calls
“reactionary”; while other people call them revolutionary, Chiang calls
them “reactionary”—that is all. Since he declared in Xi’an that he would
fight Japan in earnest, presumably he will not resume violent attacks on
the revolutionary forces immediately after leaving Xian; not only does his
own political life and that of his group hang upon his good faith, but they
now have confronting them and obstructing their political path a force
which has expanded to their detriment—the “punitive” group which tried
to get him killed in the Xi’an Incident. We therefore advise Chiang Kai-
shek to revise his political dictionary, changing the word “reactionary”
to “revolutionary”, for it is better to use terms corresponding to the facts.
[. . .]
Chiang was set free upon his acceptance of the Xi’an terms. From
now on the question is whether he will carry out to the letter his pledge
that “promises must be kept and action must be resolute”, and strictly
fulfill all the terms for saving the nation. The nation will not permit any
further hesitation on his part or allow him any discount in fulfilling the
terms. If he wavers on the issue of resisting Japan or delays in fulfilling
his pledge, then the nation-wide revolutionary tide will sweep him away.
Chiang and his group should bear in mind the old saying: “If a man does
not keep his word, what is he good for?”
. . . . The people throughout the country have known for fifteen years
that the Communist Party observes the maxim, “Promises must be kept
and action must be resolute.” They undoubtedly have more confidence in
the words and deeds of the Communist Party than in those of any other
party or group in China.

8.11 COMMUNIST CO-OPERATION BY THE CENTRAL

COMMITTEE OF THE CCP (JULY 15, 1937)
In the months after the Xi’an Incident, the CCP, with their anti-Japanese posi-
tion, continually worked to cast themselves as patriotic, thus maintaining the
moral high ground. Significantly, the policy announced by Zhou Enlai is said
to have been drafted on July 4, 1937, three days before the Lugouqiao Incident
(also known in English as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident) on July 7, 1937.
This incident would spark China’s eight-year War of Resistance against Japan.
Although the CCP and KMT were officially united, the distrust between the
two parties created near-constant friction and, at times, unmitigated hostility.
Despite the fact that Japan’s invasion left the KMT with almost no choice other
than to fight Japan, there is equally little doubt that the military contingencies
216 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

CENTRAL on the KMT ultimately allowed the Chinese Communist Party to flourish in a
COMMITTEE—A manner it had not been able to since 1927. Under the United Front, the CCP
committee limited to the established a foothold in northwest China, honed their own military strategies,
highest-ranking CCP and developed military strategies that they would put to devastating effect in the
members, ranging in size future civil war.
from 100 to 300 members
and from which the Questions
powerful Politburo and 1. What aspects of the “co-operation” with the KMT does the CCP
Standing Committee are emphasize?
selected. 2. Why does the statement about co-operations between the CCP
and KMT end with such a forceful condemnation of Japan’s inva-
sion of China?
Dear Fellow-Countrymen,
With the greatest enthusiasm, the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China announces to our elders, brothers and sisters all over the
country that to save our motherland at a time when it is faced with a most
serious crisis and its very fate is at stake, we have reached an understand-
ing with the Kuomintang on the basis of peace, unification and united
resistance to foreign aggression and have joined together with them to
meet the crisis. This has enormous significance for the future of our great
Chinese nation! For, as we all know, with our nation facing extreme peril
today, it is only through internal unity that we can defeat Japanese imperi-
alist aggression. Now that the foundation has been laid for national unity
and the basis created for the independence, freedom and liberation of our
nation, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party salutes
the splendid future of our people.
However, we know that the task of turning bright promise into real-
ity and creating a new China, independent, happy and free, will demand
tenacious, dauntless struggle on the part of our countrymen and, indeed,
of every patriotic descendant of our common ancestor, the Yellow Emper-
or Huangdi. On this occasion, the Communist Party of China would like
to set forth to all our countrymen the general objectives of our struggle.
They are the following:
1. To strive for the independence, freedom and liberation of the Chi-
nese nation. First of all, it is necessary earnestly and speedily to pre-
pare and launch a national revolutionary war of resistance, in order
to recover our lost lands and restore our territorial integrity and
sovereignty.
2. To put democracy into effect and convene a national assembly to
frame and adopt a constitution and draw up a policy of national
salvation.
3. To enable the Chinese people to lead a happy and prosperous life.
Effective measures must first be taken to provide famine relief,
ensure a stable livelihood, develop a defense economy, deliver the
people from suffering and improve their living conditions.
These are China’s urgent needs and they constitute the goal of our
struggle. We are convinced that they will receive the warm support of all
our countrymen. The Communist Party of China wishes to attain these
general objectives by joint effort with all our countrymen.
The Chinese Communist Party is fully aware that in marching
towards this lofty goal, we need to overcome many obstacles and difficul-
ties, and that, first of all, we will encounter obstruction and sabotage by the
Japanese imperialists. To strip the enemy of any pretext for his intrigues
 Chapter 8 • Fractured Visions 217

and to remove any misunderstanding among all well-intentioned doubt-

ers, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China finds it nec-
essary to proclaim its sincere devotion to the cause of national liberation.
Therefore, it once again solemnly declares to the whole nation:
1. That Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles being what China
needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization;
2. That we shall give up our policy of encouraging insurrection to
overthrow the Kuomintang regime, call off the Sovietization move-
ment and discontinue the policy of forcible confiscation of the land
of the landlords;
3. That we shall abolish the present Soviet governments and call for
the practice of democracy in the hope that state power will be uni-
fied throughout the country; and
4. That the Red Army will give up its present name and designation,
that it will be reorganized as part of the National Revolutionary
Army and placed under the Military Council of the National Gov-
ernment and that it will be ready for orders to march to the anti-
Japanese front and do its duty.
Dear fellow-countrymen! Our Party has long since shown in word
and deed before the whole country an open, selfless attitude and a readi-
ness to compromise for the common good, which have won the commen-
dation of all. Now, with a view to uniting with the Kuomintang in good
faith, consolidating the peace and unity of the whole country and carrying
out a national revolutionary war against Japan, we are ready to honor
forthwith those of our promises which have not yet been formally carried
out—for example, to abolish the Soviet areas and to re-designate the Red
Army—so that the united strength of the entire country may be used to
resist foreign aggression.
The Japanese aggressors have driven deep into our country and
disaster is imminent. Fellow countrymen, arise and unite as one! Our
great, ancient Chinese nation is indomitable. Arise and fight for national
unity! Fight to overthrow Japanese imperialist oppression! The Chinese
nation will surely triumph.
For victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan!
For a new China, independent, happy and free!
 CHAPTER 9
China at War (1937–1949)
Republican China (1911–1949)China at War (1937–1949)

3 4
5

6 7 8
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 219

1. CHINESE MANHUA: The term “manhua” (borrowed from the Japanese “manga”) or “cartoon”
was first used in China by Feng Zikai in May 1925. When the war against Japan began in 1937, Chi-
nese cartoonists produced a wave of potent images that profoundly depicted the war as well as the
emotions of the Chinese themselves.

2. FENG ZIKAI: Feng Zikai (1898–1975) was perhaps the best known of the first generation of Chinese
cartoonists (and drew the two top cartoons). He studied and taught fine art before going to Japan
to continue his studies in 1921. He began to publish his own work in 1926, but his fame came from
his deceptively simple cartoons that were sought by a wide array of popular and political journals,
periodicals, and newspapers.

3. MOTHER AND CHILD (upper left): The Japanese bombing of civilian targets stunned and out-
raged the Chinese. Feng’s cartoon depicts the shocking image of a mother’s head exploding as she
breastfeeds her baby. “An aerial bomb raid, on whom do the bombs drop? A baby sucking at its
mother’s breast, but the loving mother’s head is suddenly gone. Blood and milk flow together.”

4. SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND BLIND (upper right): In this image, Feng captures the moment
just prior to the bombs impact. All inside will certainly die. The horror is compounded because the
target is a school for the deaf and blind; so, these students have no way of knowing about the air
raid and their imminent deaths.

5. IRONY: Feng Zikai’s cartoons often played on the conflicting images and the irony of the situations.
Perhaps most indicative of this is the cartoon in the lower right, which captures two bombs about to
destroy a school for the deaf and blind.

6. THEMES and POLITICS: The cartoons during the war against Japan and the civil war addressed
predictable themes of patriotism, wartime atrocities, and corruption. Chinese cartoonists addressed
these themes in ways that print articles were not allowed to during the war. In the post-1945 period,
cartoons became fiercely anti-government, reflecting the Nationalists’ steady loss of popular
support.

7. GERMANS and JAPANESE: The cartoon depicts two figures, one a German (with the head on a
sword sporting a cap that reads “Austria”) and the other a Japanese (with a skull on a sword) that
reads “Occupied China.” Underneath the caption is a well-known line from Confucius’s Analects,
which reads “Virtue will never be left to stand alone, He who practices it will always attract neigh-
bors.” The cartoon puns on the Chinese character for “virtue” [de] and Germany [deguo].

8. CIVIL WAR BOMB: At the end of the eight-year war against Japan, few Chinese welcomed embark-
ing on a new conflict. The KMT’s corrupt and often confused leadership was not improved with
Chiang Kai-shek’s eagerness to launch an all-out offensive against the Communists. In the center of
the cartoon, Chiang Kai-shek is depicted sitting atop a bomb labeled “All out civil war” while light-
ing a fuse labeled “Central China.” The caption (in the upper right corner) reads “Watch Yourself.”
220 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

WAR OF RESISTANCE The beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan is usually dated
AGAINST JAPAN July 7, 1937, with the exchange of shots between Japanese and Chinese
(1937–1945)—Sometimes troops near Lugouqiao Bridge (often referred to as Marco Polo Bridge),
referred to as the “Anti- about 30 miles west of Beijing. By the end of July, Japan had begun a
Japanese War,” fought wholesale invasion of China. The northern Chinese cities of Beijing and
between China and Japan Tianjin fell in quick succession to Japanese forces on July 29 and 31. By
before and during World mid-August, the Japanese opened a second front by attacking Shang-
War II. Beginning in 1937, hai, China’s financial and commercial center. The Kuomintang troops
Japan occupied all major defended the city for 13 weeks before succumbing to the Japanese on
urban and communication November 9, 1937. One month later, the Nationalist capital, Nanjing, sur-
centers in eastern China rendered, with Chiang Kai-shek and his government eventually making
by 1938 and forced the the inland city of Chongqing China’s wartime capital. It marked a swift
Nationalist government to end to the Nanjing Decade.
move its capital inland to The events of this war are well known to most Chinese. In a manner
Chongqing until Japan’s similar to the depiction to the start of World War II in Europe, tracing
defeat in 1945. the rise of Nazi Germany with the reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936),
the annexation of Austria (1938), and the invasion of Poland (1939), a
similar remembering process surrounds the outbreak of Japan’s hostili-
LUGOUQIAO (MARCO
ties toward China in 1937. In China today, just the mention of Japan’s
POLO BRIDGE)
invasion of Manchuria (1931), evokes a well-worn narrative familiar to
INCIDENT—An event
most Chinese of the Lugouqiao Incident (1937), and the retreat of the
outside Beijing near the
KMT to their wartime capital in Chongqing (1940). The problem with
Lugouqiao Bridge on
both of these versions (and the collective memory of any nation about
July 7, 1937, which sparked
its past) is that they are built around a heroic representation of the
the beginning of the War of
nation’s history that often generates a type of “collective forgetting.”
Resistance Against Japan.
Few conventional histories of any country dwell on the unpleasant ele-
ments of wartime occupation, such as shortages, military rule, and the
fraught landscape of collaboration. Yet, as several of the following doc-
uments attest, perceiving the more disreputable side of the war between
China and Japan can help to provide a more balanced understanding of
China’s past.
Typically, nationalistic histories emphasize how China spent the
next eight years courageously resisting Japan’s overwhelming military
machine. This depiction of China’s war with Japan is not inaccurate. How-
ever, such an approach fails to describe what life was like for those Chinese
who remained in China’s heartland under Japanese rule or a succession of
collaborationist governments. It tends to cast the choice as patriotic resis-
tance versus traitorous collaboration. Such a stark depiction overlooks
entirely the mundane yet difficult choices many Chinese made on a daily
basis while under Japanese rule. Nor does it offer any insight into how
Japanese rule was complex and uneven across the occupied areas.
Japan’s Manchukuo regime was formally established in 1932 as
the first of several long-planned collaborationist governments in the
wake of its military victories in eastern China. These plans were real-
ized in December 1939, when Japan successfully persuaded the second
most influential KMT leader, Wang Jingwei, to serve as president of the
Reorganized National Government of China. This new government for
occupied China was formally established in March 1940. While in ret-
rospect such a choice was simply that of a bitter political also-ran who
sold his political soul to the Japanese, Nazi Germany’s victories in Europe
and Japan’s considerable success in Asia led many to believe at the time
that Wang Jingwei was simply acknowledging the inevitable. Although
Wang’s hope for a truly autonomous government, free of Japanese inter-
ference, never came to be (9.4), his government did bring some relief to
the Chinese under his rule.
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 221

FACING THE ENEMY NANJING MASSACRE

(December 1937–
Life under Japanese rule is often treated as a choice between determined January 1938)—A six-
and continuous resistance or cowardly capitulation; the reality was far week assault carried out
more often somewhere between the two. As with any extended foreign in and around the capital
occupation, the local Chinese population was forced to engage with their of Nanjing after it fell to
Japanese occupiers to survive. As famed Chinese director Jiang Wen the Japanese army in 1937.
made apparent in his film Devils on the Doorstep—a poignant and humor- Upwards of 300,000 non-
ous depiction of this period—the Chinese living under Japanese collabo- combatants were killed,
rationist rule were caught between a desire for normality and the reality including tens of thousands
that their country was occupied. In the film, the villagers are forced by of women and children.
Communist insurgents to aid in concealing a captured Japanese officer The army committed
and his translator and eventually to participate in the men’s execution. As numerous atrocities,
the villagers squabble among themselves and seek to avoid detection by including looting, rape, and
both the Japanese army and the Chinese resistance, the claim of constant arson, with the seeming
resistance is exposed as romanticized half-truths (9.3). For most of occu- consent of their officers.
pied China, the occupation was a complex mixture of fear, confusion, and Also referred to as the
hard choices. “Rape of Nanjing.”

9.1 LETTER TO THE JAPANESE EMBASSY FROM

THE NANJING SAFETY ZONE (DECEMBER 18, 1937)
After capturing Nanjing on December 13, 1937, Japanese troops went on a six-
week rampage commonly referred to as the “Rape of Nanjing.” It is estimated
that some 300,000 Chinese civilians and POWs were massacred. These atrocities
were reported in both the Western and Chinese press at the time. In the war trials
after Japan surrendered in 1945, these events became a flash point in Sino-Japanese
relations that have continued to cause friction to the present day. The following
account is one of many letters written by John H. D. Rabe, a German business-
man, director of the Siemens office, and leader of the Nanjing branch of the Nazi
party. He served as the head of a war relief committee known as the International
Committee of the Nanjing Safety Zone that communicated with the Japanese to
protect civilians from robbery, rape, and other atrocities by Japanese troops.

Questions
1. What type of aid did the International Committee of the Nan-
jing Safety Zone attempt to implement? What obstacles did they
encounter?
2. Does Rabe’s letter suggest that some Japanese officials were seek-
ing to impose order?
Dear Sirs:
We are very sorry to trouble you again but the sufferings and needs of the
200,000 civilians for whom we are trying to care make it urgent that we try
to secure action from your military authorities to stop the present disorder
among Japanese soldiers wandering through the Safety Zone.
There is no time or space here to go into the cases that are pouring in
faster than we can type them out. But last night Dr. Bates of our Commit-
tee went to the University of Nanjing dormitories to sleep in order to pro-
tect the 1,000 women that fled there yesterday because of attacks in their
homes. He found no Gendarmerie on guard there nor at the new Universi-
ty library building. When at 8 p.m. Mr. Fitch and Dr. Smythe took Rev. W.P.
Mills to Jinling College to sleep in the house near the gate (as one or more
of us have been doing every night since the 14th in order to protect the
3,000 women and children, yesterday augmented to 4,000 by the panic), we
222 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

were seized roughly by a searching squad and detained for over an hour.
The officer had the two women in charge of Jinling College, Miss Minnie
Vautrin and Mrs. Chen, with a friend, Mrs. Twinem, lined up at the gate
and kept them there in the cold and the men pushed them around roughly.
The officer insisted there were soldiers in the compound and he wanted to
find them and shoot them. Finally, he let us go home but would not let Rev.
Mills stay so we do not know what happened after we left.
This combined with the marching off of the men at the Ministry of
Justice on December 16. . . , among which were several hundred civilian
men to our positive knowledge and 50 of our uniformed police, had made
us realize that, unless something is done to clear up this situation, the lives
of all the civilian men in our Zone are at the mercy of the temperament of
searching captains.
With the panic that has been created among the women who are now
flocking by the thousands to our American institutions for protection, the
men are being left more and more alone. (For instance, there were 600
people in the old Language School at Xiao Taoyuan up till December 16.
But because so many women were raped there on the night of Decem-
ber 15, 400 women and children moved to Jinling College, leaving 200
men.) These public institutional buildings were originally listed to accom-
modate 35,000 people; now, because of panic among the women, this has
increased to 50,000, although two buildings have been emptied of men:
the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court.
If this panic continues, not only will our housing problem become
more serious but the food problem and the question of finding workers
will seriously increase. This morning one of your representatives, Mr. K.
Kikuchi, was at our office asking for workers for the electric light plant.
We had to reply that we could not even get our own workers out to do
anything. We are only able to keep rice and coal supplied to these large
concentrations of people by Western members of our Committee and Staff
driving trucks for rice and coal. Our Food Commissioner has not dared
leave his house for two days. The second man on our Housing Commission
had to see two women in his family at 23 Hankou Road raped last night
at supper time by Japanese soldiers. Our Associate Food Commissioner,
Mr. Sone (a Theological Professor), has had to convey trucks with rice and
leave the 2,500 people in families at his Nanjing Theological Seminary to
look out for themselves. Yesterday, in broad daylight, several women at
the Seminary were raped right in the middle of a large room filled with
men, women, and children! We 22 Westerners cannot feed 200,000 Chinese
civilians and protect them night and day. That is the duty of the Japanese
authorities. If you can give them protection, we can help feed them!
There is another matter that is in the minds of the Japanese officers
searching the Zone: they think the place is full of “plain-clothes soldiers.”
We have notified you several times of the presence of soldiers who, dis-
armed, entered the Zone on the afternoon of December 13. But now we can
safely assure you that there are no groups of disarmed Chinese soldiers in
the Zone. Your searching squads have cleaned out all of them and many
civilians along with them. . . .

Trusting that you will pardon our venturing to make these suggestions,
and assuring you of our willingness to cooperate in every way for the
welfare of the civilians in the city, I am
Most respectfully your,
JOHN H.D. RABE
Chairman
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 223

9.2 SONG MEILING’S “ONLY THE SWORD IS LEFT”

(JULY 17, 1938)
A year after Japan’s 1937 invasion of China, few of the world’s democracies
took meaningful steps to assist China in its fight against Japan. Song Mei­ling
worked tirelessly to bring China’s plight to a global audience. Her fluent Eng-
lish, Christian faith, and familiarity with American culture and political outlook
allowed her to become a charismatic and influential voice of China in Ameri-
can media. As she does in the following document, she often drew unflattering
parallels between Japan and Nazi Germany (years before they officially allied
themselves in the Tripartite Pact in 1940) while adroitly deploying biblical pas-
sages to appeal to core American political values, all with an eye to fostering
American support. The following article is just one of numerous public essays
and speeches published in English—many of which were collected and published
in book form. A strategy that made her a household name. Months earlier, she
and her husband, Chiang Kai-shek, graced the cover of Time magazine, and in
1943 her stature was such that she was invited to give a speech before a joint
session of Congress.

Questions
1. What does Song Meiling mean by her title “Only the Sword is
Left”?
2. Why would Song Meiling serve as a more effective figurehead to
present China’s plight to a Western audience?

Many friends in America have asked me for my views about China’s future.
Generally speaking, my views are unpalatable—sometimes unprintable.
It is a bit difficult, too, to foresee possibilities through the murk caused by
the wrath and welter of a war which is not a war.
Wherever the Japanese have been, they have marked our land with
ruin. They have left scars upon our earth, our hearts, and our minds indel-
ible scars—scars which never can be healed or eradicated. I wonder if
the Japanese people realize that. They should begin to do so quickly, if
they ever hope to recover any semblance of prestige, of even standing, in
China—or in the world, for that matter. The myriads of ghosts they have
made will take a lot of laying—ghosts of men, women and children: of
ancient cities, towns and villages: of workshops and factories: of the little
shops—the places of handicraft of the millions.
You never saw such monstrous criminality. Yet, in this year of
grace 1938—at this alleged advanced period of civilization—there is no
law and no nation or nations to check or punish the criminal; no appli-
cable international instrument of any kind available. Think of it! This
new style of “undeclared war,” permitting any kind of unlicensed inhu-
manity, has superseded all decencies. Only the metaphorical sword is
left. “He who takes the sword will perish by the sword,” will occur in
the minds of many. Is there hope in that? There is some comfort, any-
way. There are many who pray that the metal of our blade will stand the
strain. . . .
To my mind, our destiny is with the democracies, because our people
are inherently democratic in nature and spirit. If we survive, we have the
opportunity to become a great organized democracy. That is, of course, if
democracy itself survives. So far, we, in China, have not had much of an
opportunity to achieve any particular modernized national greatness. We
have been having too much warfare since 1911 to have had the time to
become even an acceptably passable republic. Perhaps we have been too
content, in a way, to live upon the musty reputation of our ancient glory,
224 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

with—as caustic critics may well describe them—intramural intellects pre-

tending to competency in the handling of modern systems and devices.
I have to say “intramural” because we are too big a country to be called
provincial—and, also, we have a wall. Whatever we are, we have to admit
that we found it difficult for many years to march fast toward national
success, though we really had girded up our loins, and had stated, full of
hope, when our progress was stopped by Japanese aggression.
I have expressed the hope that we would tread the democratic path,
but I have to mention that, while the desire to adhere to the democracies
is pretty widespread and substantial at the moment, there is a school of
thought developing which is asking with some impatience, but also with
some pertinence: “What have the governments of the democracies done
for us?” . . .
One disconcerting thing is that, though we have been deserted,
as it were, the democracies seem to be willing to listen with a strangely
attentive ear to the demands of Japan that the powers should remain
neutral.
Those of our people who question the advisability of our keeping in
with the democracies point out that it is the amazing studied neutrality
of the democracies that enabled Japan, without any restraint, to continue
killing our people, violating our women, and making a wilderness of all of
our territory that she has been able to penetrate. . . .
The tragedy is that the governments of the democracies have had
for some time, to bow to the will of Japan because they are afraid of her;
because they are still mesmerized by Japan’s insistence that she is invin-
cible. This is a bit strange to us after what the past ten months of unequal
combat have revealed. However, if Japan proves herself to be invincible,
she will—with the probable unintended acquiescence and indirect help of
the democratic governments—conquer China, and will, eventually, leave
her foot-prints and her bomb-prints not only upon the earth of China and
the sands of time, but upon the soil and character of many accidentally
controlled lands.
However, Shakespeare emphasizes that “reputation is a false
imposition [oft] got without merit,” and we are inclined to wonder
a little if Japan really deserves the reputation for invincibility which
she had continued to acquire. It is rather ironical that we, of China,
should be the ones to be putting that question to the great powers.
They ought, indeed, in the colloquial of American, to be “telling us.”
After all, we are but amateurs in this business of international warfare
on a big scale.

9.3 FILM: DEVILS ON THE DOORSTEP (2000)

Jiang Wen’s film Devils on the Doorstep takes a morbidly humorous look at
the complexities of nationalism in the context of the War of Resistance Against
Japan. The film follows events in a north China village that is suddenly caught
between dealing with the Japanese or with the Communist insurgents. Jiang
Wen’s underlying point is that neither of the alternatives—the Communist resis-
tance or Japanese collaboration—was particularly appealing, as each entailed
considerable risks for those involved. The film, shot in black and white, takes the
well-worn theme of China’s war against Japan and breathes new life into it by
showing the vagaries of politics during wartime. The film’s ambivalent stance
toward the Communist movement led the current Chinese government to ban
the film and forced Jiang Wen into a two-year hiatus from making films. While
the film was not a commercial success, Devils on the Doorstep received critical
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 225

acclaim at the Cannes Film Festival, winning the Jury’s Grand Prize in 2000.
The film begins with the scene described next of two men—a Japanese officer and
his Chinese translator (as they are later identified)—who are unceremoniously
deposited in Ma Dasan’s home.

Questions
1. Why are the villagers at a loss over what to do with the two men
dropped off in the middle of night?
2. What aspects of this scene would make the Chinese censors ner-
vous enough to seek to recall the print of the film from the Venice
Film Festival?
(In 1945 in a village by the Bohai Sea. The scene opens late at night in Ma Dasan’s
home with Ma Dasan and a young widow Yuer engaged in a late-night tryst
when there is a knock on the door. Ma gets up to go to the door.)

Scene I
Ma Dasan: Who is it?
Man: Me.
Ma Dasan: Who?
Man: Me.
Yuer: (speaking to Ma Dasan) Quick, put your clothes on.
Ma Dasan: What about you?
Yuer: I will hide in the usual place.
(Yuer, naked, runs across the room and climbs into a trunk. Ma Dasan throws a
quilt over her and closes the trunk. Ma Dasan walks towards the door.)
Ma Dasan: Who is it?
Man: Me.
(Ma Dasan opens the door and a gun points straight to his forehead as he moves
back into the room.)
Man: Close your eyes. What’s your name?
Ma Dasan: Ma Dasan.
Man: What’s the name of the village?
Ma Dasan: Baojiatai.
Man: So late at night, why is your lamp still lit?
Ma Dasan: I was mulling things over.
Man: Then, you think hard. Listen, we have two
things to leave with you. Neither can go lost
or missing. And don’t let the [Japanese] devils
know about it. If anything goes wrong, you’ll be
dead.
Ma Dasan: Well . . . there is a [Japanese] blockhouse at the
end of the village. It probably won’t work?
Man: What’s not working? It’s called the “dark-spot-
under-the-light.” Understand?
Ma Dasan: Understood. Uh, what if something goes wrong,
who is responsible?
Man: You!
(The man quickly runs off into the dark night. Ma Dasan opens his eyes, seeing
the front door wide open and two large canvas bags on the ground. He closes the
door. Yuer pops open the trunk and gets out.)
Yuer: Who was it?
Ma Dasan: Not a clue.
(They light a match and untie the bag.)
226 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

Yuer (suppressed yell): Yikes! It’s a live person.

(Ma Dasan opens the other bag, inside is another man. Ma Dasan moves quickly
towards the door.)
Ma Dasan: I will go and find them.
(The paper on window next to Ma Dasan is slowly cut through by a blade.)
Man: Ma Dasan.
Ma Dasan: Yes?
Man: Listen! Question those two for us when you
have time. At midnight on New Year’s Eve, we
will come and pick them up. We’ll take them
along with their confession! Understand?
Ma Dasan: Understood! Then . . . who will come to pick
them up?
Man: Me!

Scene II
(In a room with a few villagers, Ma Dasan is describing what has happened.)
Ma Dasan: Like this, this, and this. Zoom! Zoom! Zoom! Jumped
over the wall and ran away.
Village Elder: Then, what was his name?
Ma Dasan: Didn’t say. He just said “Me.”
Village Elder: Then . . . what did he look like?
Ma Dasan: Couldn’t see. My eyes were closed.
Villager I: What was he wearing? How tall was he?
Ma Dasan: My eyes were closed. If your eyes are closed, can you see
me?
Villager II: (squatting on the ground) How many of them?
Ma Dasan: Didn’t I say my eyes were closed? I dared not to look.
Village Elder: Then what exactly did he say?
Ma Dasan: He just said, “We will leave these two at your village.”
They will come back and pick them up on New Year’s Eve
midnight.
Yuer: Yeah, those people sounded very scary.
Ma Dasan: They also said “it’s called ‘the dark spot under the
light.’ ”
Feng Qiye: I’ll kill you, you damn bastard.
 [FENG QIYE—literally means “Crazy Seventh
Grandpa”—Yuer’s father-in-law, who is lying in bed rant-
ing against Ma Dasan, who he reviles for sleeping with
his daughter-in-law.]
Village elder: Deal with your family problems later.
Villager II: The affair between your daughter-in-law and Dasan has
been going on for more than a couple days.
Village Elder: We are discussing something serious.
(Yuer quickly moves the rifle away from the old man and hands him a bowl of
water.)
Feng Qiye: With these two, how can anything be serious?
Villager I: Go to sleep.
Yuer: Dad, have some water.
Feng Qiye: I am not your dad. You shameless slut.
Village Elder: Does that sound like anything a father-in-law should say?
Ma Dasan: (getting excited and trying to hand the rifle to Feng Qiye) Just
shoot me please, elder. I am so worried and have no way
out anyway. Just shoot me.
Feng Qiye: I’ll kill you, damn bastard . . .
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 227

Village Elder: (ordering both) Sit down! Lie down! (continues to talk af-
ter all calmed down) Fortune doesn’t turn into misfortune,
while misfortune cannot be escaped.
Ma Dasan: Then is it fortune or misfortune? Elder, what on earth
shall we do?
Villager II: (squatting on the ground stands up) Well! Let’s take them to
the blockhouse. I know the sensei.
Ma Dasan: What did you say?
Villager II: Hand them over to the Japanese!
Ma Dasan: That won’t work! That . . . then, when those people come
for them on New Year’s Eve, what do we say?
Villager II: Let them go and ask the Japanese. What do they dare do
to the Japanese?
Ma Dasan: The Japanese? The Japanese was tied up and put in the
bag by them! You tell me what they dare to do.
Villager I: (to Villager II) Won’t you be a collaborator?
Ma Dasan: That’s right.
(Villager II squats down)
Feng Qiye: I will choke them both, one with each hand, then dig a
hole to bury them.
Villager I: Eh? That sounds good. Just dig a hole. I’ll dig.
Ma Dasan: You dig? Those people said if we lose or miss one, or let
the Japanese find out, then . . . they would not want them
back, instead they want lives!
Villagers: Want lives? Whose lives?
Ma Dasan: Lives, the lives of our entire village.
Villager II: (standing up) Well? . . . No, that no good! (he squats down
again)
Villager I: What? You tell us, tell us!
Villager II: No.
Village Elder: Tell us!
Villager II: I’ll say it. The entire village should run away. We’ll all run
away, and just leave those two and see whose lives they
will take?
Village Elder: Sit back down!
Villager II: I said it was no good. And you made me say it anyway.
What a waste!
Feng Qiye: (pointing to Ma Dasan) I’d better shoot you now. Other-
wise the whole village is going to die sooner or later be-
cause of you.
Villager I: Stop it! Stop it! Or I will leave!
Village Elder: Come back here! Sit down! Didn’t you hear what he said,
they want to kill the entire village?
Feng Qiye: I will choke them both, one with each hand, then kill’em
both. Dig a hole and bury them . . . dig a hole and bury
them.
Village Elder: What’s coming is no good! Nothing good is coming! Com-
mon people would not do such a thing. We cannot afford
to piss off either side: those who live in the mountains
[the Communists] or by the water [the Japanese]. In five
days, it’ll be New Year’s Eve. On New Year’s Eve, they
will come and take them away. Nobody knows about it.
We’ll send them away, along with the misfortune. San’er
[Ma Dasan], in the next few days, you need be careful and
watchful. This is for the whole village.
(Ma Dasan nods)
228 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

TANGGU TRUCE Village Elder: (to Villager II) Erbozi,

(1933)—An agreement Villager II: Yes, fifth great uncle.
signed on May 31, 1933, Village Elder: Don’t say a word to your mother. She has a big mouth.
between China and Japan Erbozi: I will keep it to myself, OK?
establishing a demilitarized Village Elder: Then . . . let’s go.
zone south from the Great Ma Dasan: Ah? . . . Don’t go. It’s not over yet. Those people asked us
Wall to Beijing. to question those two when we have time.
Village Elder: Question them? What will we ask them?

OCCUPIED CHINA
Japan’s initial invasion of China culminated with the capture of Nanjing
in December 1937. That victory was followed by an extended riot of vio-
lence, murder, and rape that shocked the world (9.1). Within a year, con-
cerns over Japan’s military successes in China were validated when news
emerged that the Japanese had enticed Chiang Kai-shek’s rival, Wang
Jingwei, to serve as the president of occupied China (9.4). Japan hoped
that their move would force Chiang Kai-shek to join the collaboration-
ist government. When Chiang Kai-shek refused their repeated overtures,
Japan secured collaborationist rule by signing a treaty with Wang Jingwei,
designating him as the head of the government (9.5).

9.4 WANG JINGWEI’S TELEGRAPH TO CHIANG

KAI-SHEK INDICATING HIS COLLABORATION
WITH THE JAPANESE (1938)
An early confidant and friend of Sun Yat-sen, Wang Jingwei (1883–1944) entered
the revolutionary fray in 1910 when he attempted to assassinate the last emperor’s
father and regent Zaifeng (Prince Chun) and played a prominent role in advocating
for a republican-style government. Wang’s stature within the party after the 1911
Revolution was such that many assumed that he, not Chiang Kai-shek, would assume
leadership of the KMT after Sun’s death in 1925. Yet, even after Chiang secured
control of the KMT, Wang remained an influential figure. He served as adminis-
trative head of the national government, frequently feuding with Chiang Kai-shek
over government policy. After the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, Wang increas-
ingly questioned China’s ability to maintain a protracted war against Japan. As the
situation deteriorated in late December, he flew to Hanoi (in French Indochina). On
December 29, he issued the following telegram, which was published in turn by the
South China Daily on December 31, making his decision public to the world.

Questions
1. How does Wang Jingwei promise to bring about an end to the
War of Resistance?
2. Why is Wang Jingwei convinced Japan would pursue a policy of
peace?
Dear Comrades of Chongqing Central Party Committee, President Chi-
ang, and Members of Central Executive Committees:
In April, the manifesto of the provisional National Congress explained the
rationale for the War of Resistance and stated:
“Since the Tanggu Agreement our people have born the humiliation
and burden of dealing with Japan, hoping for nothing more than ending
the military combat. Only peaceful means should be employed to secure
the northern provinces; furthermore, actions should be taken to properly
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 229

resolve the issues of the four northeastern provinces; politically the mini-
mal acceptable conclusion of negotiations is to maintain sovereignty and
administrative integrity of China; economically cooperation must be
based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit.”
Since the Lugouqiao Incident in July of last year, China has come to
realize that such aspirations are untenable and has been forced into a war
of resistance. On the 22nd of this month, Japan readjusted the fundamen-
tal policy on Sino-Japanese relations, stating:

I. On Becoming Friendly Neighbors

Japan sincerely declares that it does not demand any Chinese territory nor
does it insist upon payment for military expense. Japan not only respects
China’s sovereignty, but also plans to model their actions on those of the
Meiji Reformation; that is to say in exchange for permission of free trade in
China’s interior, Japan will return all treaty settlements, abolish extrater-
ritoriality, all so that China can achieve her independence.
With such a sincere declaration from the Japanese government, if
we follow the peaceful approach, not only will the northern provinces be
safeguarded, the territory lost since the War of Resistance can be regained,
allowing Chinese sovereignty, administrative independence and integrity
to be maintained. In this way, we ought to have confidence and pursue
[Japan’s] declaration to seek proper resolution for problems involving the
four northeastern provinces.

II. On Mutual Prevention of Communism

For several years, the Japanese government has repeated this proposal.
We worry they will take this opportunity to intervene in military and in-
ternal affairs.
Today the Japanese government has clearly declared Japan should
model its behavior on the united anti-Communist spirit of Japan, Ger-
man and Italy, to create a Sino-Japanese anti-communism agreement. In
this way, our worries can finally be brought to an end. The purpose of
anti-communism is to prevent the Comintern’s internal collusion and in-
terference, which would not alter the relationship with the Soviet Union.
Since the Chinese Communists have declared they would fight for the re-
alization of Three Principles of the People, they should immediately give
up their organization and propaganda, abolish their special government,
military bases, and completely abide by the legal system of Republic of
China. The Three Principles of the People is the highest principle in the
Republic of China. We all must freely and actively punish any organiza-
tions or [Communist] propaganda which violate this highest principle, in
order to fulfill our responsibility of protecting the Republic of China.

III. On Economic Cooperation

For several years, the Japanese government has repeatedly proposed this.
Up until now, we did not accept economic cooperation, as our political
dispute was not resolved. Today, the Japanese government has genuinely
declared to respect China’s sovereignty and administrative independence
and integrity. They have also stated they have no intention of controlling
China’s economy alone, nor are they asking China to restrict their activi-
ties with third party nations. . . .
230 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

China’s and Japan’s lands are connected. It is natural and necessary

for them to become friendly neighbors. The two have gone in opposite
directions in the past years, and so need to explore the reasons and clarify
the responsibilities of each. In the future, although China will implement
an education policy of becoming friends with neighbors, Japan should
specifically order her people to give up their traditional belief that they
need to invade and humiliate China. They should start an education pol-
icy of befriending China, to establish the foundation of long-term peace
between the two nations. This is the effort we ought to make for obtaining
the happiness of East Asia. Meanwhile, together with other nations, we
must strive to secure Pacific and world peace, to maintain and strengthen
friendship and mutual interest.
This is merely a proposal, waiting to be adopted!

9.5 [OCCUPIED] CHINA–JAPAN: TREATY CONCERNING

BASIC RELATIONS—ANNEXED PROTOCOL (NOVEMBER 30,
1940)
Wang Jingwei did not immediately assume leadership of occupied China after
leaving Chongqing in 1938. He spent over a year in negotiations with top
Japanese officials. Not until March 30, 1940, did Japan formally announce
the creation of a new national government, the Republic of China. Negotia-
tions moved slowly because Wang Jingwei was not Japan’s first choice to head
their collaborationist government. Japan originally believed Chiang Kai-shek
himself could be still be coaxed into peace negotiations. As a result, Japan
withheld establishing formal diplomatic relations between Japan and Wang’s
new Nanjing regime until they had exhausted all attempts to negotiate with
Chiang’s Chongqing government. Wang Jingwei remained optimistic that he
had made the right choice through the early 1940s as Japan and Germany’s
military victories mounted. Wang Jingwei never lived to see China’s victory
over Japan. He died in 1944 from the lingering complications of a 1935 assas-
sination attempt. His death allowed him to escape the ignominious fate of the
other collaborationist leaders who were executed within weeks, if not days, of
Japan’s defeat.

Questions
1. What rights in the Annexed Protocol does Japan still retain dur-
ing wartime?
2. Why do you think Japan was interested in consolidating the
collaborationist regimes into a single regime with Wang as the
president?

In proceeding this day to the signature of the treaty concerning the basic
relations between Japan and China, and the plenipotentiaries of the two
countries have agreed as follows:

Article 1
The Government of the Republic of China, understanding that, during
the period in which Japan continues warlike operations it is at present
carrying on in the territory of China, there exists a special state of affairs
attendant upon such warlike operations, and that Japan must take such
measures as are required for the attainment of the object of such opera-
tions, shall accordingly, take the necessary measures.
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 231

Even during the continuation of the said warlike operations, the spe-
cial state of affairs referred to in the preceding paragraph shall, in so far
as there is no obstacle to the attainment of the object of the operations, be
adjusted in accordance with the changing circumstances and in confor-
mity with the treaty and its annexed documents.

Article 2
While the affairs previously administered by the Provisional Government
of the Republic of China, the Reformed Government of the Republic of
China and others have been taken over and temporarily maintained as
they are by the Government of the Republic of China, those which require
adjustment but are not yet adjusted shall be adjusted in conformity with
the purpose of the treaty and its annexed documents through consultation
between the two countries, as promptly as circumstances may permit.

Article 3
When general peace is restored between the two countries and the state of
war ceases to exist, the Japanese forces shall commence evacuation with
the exception of those which are stationed in accordance with the treaty
concerning the basic relations between Japan and China signed today and
the existing agreements between the two countries, and shall complete it
within two years with the firm establishment of peace and order, and the
Government of the Republic of China shall guarantee the firm establish-
ment of peace and order during the period.

Article 4
The Government of the Republic of China shall compensate for the dam-
ages to rights and interests suffered by Japanese subjects in China on
account of the China affair since its outbreak.
The Government of Japan shall with respect to the relief of the Chi-
nese rendered destitute by the China affair, cooperate with the Govern-
ment of the Republic of China.

Article 5
The present protocol shall come into effect simultaneously with the treaty.
In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries of the two countries have
signed this protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, at Nanjing
the 30th day of the 11th month of the 15th year of Showa, corresponding
to the 30th day of the 11th month of the 29th year of the Republic of China.

9.6 CHIANG KAI-SHEK, “CHINA’S WAR, A WORLD WAR”

(JULY 7, 1942)
The following is the text of an address given by Chiang Kai-shek on the fifth anni-
versary of the Lugouqiao Bridge Incident and the start of the War of Resistance
Against Japan (July 7, 1942). In the preceding months (after Pearl Harbor), Chi-
ang had succeeded in allying China with the United States, Great Britain, and
the Soviet Union, bringing in much-needed material support for the beleaguered
nation. Chiang clearly sought to portray this new alliance as a watershed moment
232 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

in China’s battle with Japan. Many scholars have suggested that Chiang’s mili-
tary strategy became increasingly passive as he became convinced American
forces would engage Japan in the Pacific and draw Japan’s main military forces
out of China. Japan’s Ichigo campaign in 1944 came as a bitter shock. With a mas-
sive military build-up, Japan successfully established a corridor allowing uninter-
rupted rail and road connections between Korea and their troops in Indochina.
The campaign underscored the KMT’s military weakness, organizational inef-
ficiency, and Chiang’s poor command of their resources after nearly seven years of
war. It turned out to be Japan’s last, largest, and ultimately futile land campaign.

Questions
1. What reasons does Chiang give that the Chinese people should
feel optimistic on this fifth anniversary of the start of the War of
Japanese Resistance?
2. How does Chiang Kai-shek balance the War of Resistance within
the larger “World War”?

Today we commemorate the fifth anniversary of the beginning of China’s

armed resistance. The struggle of the Chinese Army and people against
aggression has been in progress for five full years. The past year has,
moreover, been a year of extraordinary developments in the world situa-
tion which will determine the final outcome of the war.
On this solemn occasion foremost in our hearts and minds must be
the sorrowing homage we owe to all those who have nobly laid down
their lives for the common cause. At the same time let us take this oppor-
tunity to express our gratification at the achievements of our allies. The
present moment affords me also a fitting occasion to acknowledge Chi-
na’s appreciation of the gallantry of our Allied forces which are fight-
ing shoulder to shoulder with us. To the governments and peoples of
the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Russia, the Netherlands, Aus-
tralia, India, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Mexico and others of the
United Nations I express our warm thanks for the unfailing concern
they have felt for us at every stage of our national trial. Their readiness
to extend collaboration to China has been a constant source of encour-
agement to us. . . .
The present war is a war between good and evil, between right and
might. The difficulties and perils we have encountered have only served to
give proof of the undaunted revolutionary spirit possessed by our people.
Through all these difficulties and dangers a sure path has been found and
our efforts have not been in vain. The guidance we have derived from the
noble principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary teachings has enabled
us to give this demonstration of the invincible and sustaining qualities of
our national character. The moral ascendancy we have acquired is such
that no force or knavery can ever shatter. It is the guarantee for our victory
and an all-important factor in our reconstruction.
Today China no longer stands alone as she has stood for four and a
half years. Our present position imposes greater responsibilities upon us.
I desire today to impress upon you the weight of those responsibilities that
fell to our lot in the present World War. You will, I trust, continue to do
your duty with devotion and endurance. . . .
What we have seen of recent American action in the Pacific, the
bombing of Tokyo and the engagements in the Coral Sea, off Midway
Island and at Dutch Harbor has been sufficient indication that America is
beginning to discharge her supremely important duty in the Pacific. That
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 233

is to say America is bound to deal first with the enemy from which she
has most to fear for the defense of her own soil and for her security as
the arsenal of the Democracies and in order to carry out her mission of
world leadership not only during the present war but also in post-war
reconstruction.
You must be on your guard against giving credence to superficial
speculation that Allied strategy and policy consider the Pacific War to
be of secondary importance, that our allies intend to let Japan have her
own way for the time being or even that there is no comprehensive Allied
strategy and that there is no concrete organization to direct Allied efforts.
All such talk leads to unjustified apprehension. In the near future the col-
lapse of the enemy will be apparent—then the strategy. Organization and
strength of the United Nations will be properly appraised. . . .
Meanwhile, the land, sea and air strength of the United Nations
is daily increasing and already exceeds that of the Axis bloc. By the
end of this winter Japan’s strength will be only one tenth that of the
Allies. I need not elucidate further the significance of this compari-
son. The final defeat of Japan will start on sea and will end on land.
Her depredations in the South Seas will prove to be the prelude of
her disaster. She is meanwhile plunging deeper and deeper into the
morass of her continental adventure wherein for five years she has
pursued a suicidal course dictated by our strategy. She is now beyond
recovery. Our efforts will determine the speed with which she can be
finally overthrown.
At this moment we are at the turning point in our War of Resistance.
Patriotism demands of us sustained sacrifice. Irrespective of age or sex we
must each contribute to the all-important task which when completed will
bring victory and permanent security to a freed world.

LIFE IN YAN’AN
From 1936 to 1947, Yan’an was the political, military, and symbolic cen-
ter of the CCP. Located on the bleak Loess Plateau in northern Shaanxi
Province, the steep Yan’an valley is dominated by the now-famous Baota
Pagoda. This period is often portrayed as the ideologically pure era of the
CCP. Yet, Yan’an was no idyllic Communist paradise. Even famous and
well-respected Communist writers, such as Ding Ling and Wang Shiwei,
learned how quickly the political winds could shift (9.7, 9.8). Even Mao,
seeing the significance that art and literature played in shaping popular
opinion, weighed into the complex nature of such discussions (9.9). Part
of the insecurity of Yan’an came from the CCP leaders’ precarious cir-
cumstances. Engaged in a perilous game of brinksmanship with the KMT,
Japan, and the Soviet Union, they sought to retain a political, ideologi-
cal, and practical footing. This was no simple task, given the demands of
waging a war against Japan, withstanding constant KMT censure, and the
USSR’s constantly shifting directives.

9.7 DING LING’S “THOUGHTS ON MARCH 8,

WOMEN’S DAY” (1942)
Ding Ling’s early success as a leftist feminist writer in the 1920s and 1930s
(7.13) had made her one of the darlings of the May Fourth–era writers. Yet the
traits that might have been admired among the Beijing and Shanghai elite did
not have the same effect in Yan’an. Her caustic portrayal of women at the hands
234 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

CADRE—In the Chinese of Communist cadres in Yan’an reflects her tendency to offer an unsparing (if
Communist context, a term accurate) analysis of life under the CCP. Her column, published in 1942, high-
meaning “functionaries” lights the most common abuses women faced in Yan’an. It hints at a pattern
or “administrators,” often among top CCP leaders (including Mao Zedong) to divorce their aging wives
used as shorthand for and choose younger women available in Yan’an. The following article originally
essential or particularly appeared the day after Women’s Day (March 8) 1942 in the literary section
revolutionary “backbone” of the Liberation Daily, Yan’an’s main newspaper. Soon after its publication,
members of the CCP. Ding Ling was accused of taking an overly feminist line in her writing. She
(and many other writers) immediately offered self-criticisms, and she accepted
the party’s reproach of her writing as “divisive” in order to be rehabilitated by
the party.

Questions
1. What does Ding Ling suggest are the primary problems women
face in Yan’an?
2. In what ways does she suggest there is a double standard for
woman revolutionaries that does not exist for men in Yan’an?

When will it no longer be necessary to attach special weight to the word

“woman” and to raise it specially?
Each year this day comes round. Every year on this day meetings are
held all over the world where women muster their forces. Even though
things have not been as lively these last two years in Yan’an as they were
in previous years, it appears that at least a few people are busy at work
here. And there will certainly be a congress, speeches, circular telegrams,
and articles.
Women in Yan’an are happier than women elsewhere in China. So
much so that many people ask enviously: “How come the women com-
rades get so rosy and fat on millet?” It doesn’t seem to surprise anyone
that women make up a big proportion of the staff in hospitals, sanatoria,
and clinics, but they are inevitably the subject of conversation, as a fasci-
nating problem, on every conceivable occasion. What’s more, all kinds of
women comrades are often the target of deserved criticism. In my view
these reproaches are serious and justifiable.
People are always interested when women comrades get married,
but that is not enough for them. It is impossible for women comrades to
get onto friendly terms with a man comrade, even more so with more
than one. Cartoonists ridicule them: “A departmental head getting mar-
ried too?” The poets say: “All the leaders in Yan’an are horsemen, and
none of them are artists. In Yan’an it’s impossible for an artist to find a
pretty sweetheart.” In other situations, they are lectured at: “Damn it, you
look down on us old cadres and say we’re country bumpkins. But if it
wasn’t for us country bumpkins, you wouldn’t be coming to Yan’an to eat
millet!” Yet women invariably want to get married. (It’s even more of a
sin not to marry, and single women are even more of a target for rumors
and slanderous gossip.) So, they can’t afford to be choosy, anyone will do:
whether he rides horses or wears straw sandals, whether he’s an artist or
a supervisor. After marriage, they inevitably have children. . . . In general,
there are three conditions to observe when getting married. These are (1)
political purity; (2) similar age and comparable looks; and (3) mutual help.
Even though everyone is said to fulfill these conditions—as for (1), there
are no open traitors in Yan’an; as for (3), you can call anything “mutual
help,” including darning socks, patching shoes, and even feminine
comfort—everyone nevertheless makes a great show of giving thoughtful
attention to them.
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 235

And yet the pretext for divorce is invariably the wife’s political back-
wardness. I am the first to admit that it is a shame when a man’s wife is
not progressive and retards his progress. But let us consider how back-
ward they really are. Before marrying, they were inspired by the desire
to soar in the heavenly heights and lead a life of bitter struggle. They got
married partly though physiological necessity and partly as a response to
sweet talk about “mutual help.” . . . But after ten years or so, they inevita-
bly pay the tragic price (i.e., divorce) of “backwardness.” Even from my
point of view, as a woman, there is nothing attractive about such “back-
ward” elements. Their skin is beginning to wrinkle, their hair is growing
thin, and fatigue is robbing them of their last traces of attractiveness. It
should be self-evident that they are caught up in a tragedy. But whereas
in the old society they would probably have been pitied and considered
unfortunate, nowadays their tragedy is seen as something self-inflicted, as
their just desserts. Is there not a discussion going on in legal circles about
whether divorce should be granted simply on the petition of one party or
on the basis of mutual agreement? In the great majority of cases it is the
husband who petitions for divorce. If the wife does so, she must be lead-
ing an immoral life, so of course she deserves to be cursed! . . . But we must
also hope for a little more from our women comrades, especially those in
Yan’an. We must urge ourselves on and develop our comradely feeling.
People without ability have never been in a position to seize all. So,
if women want equality, they must first strengthen themselves. There is
no need to stress this, we all know it. Today there are certain to be people
who make fine speeches about the need first to acquire political power.
I would simply mention a few things that any front liner, whether a prole-
tarian, a fighter in the war of resistance, or a woman, should pay attention
to in his or her everyday life:
1. Don’t allow yourself to fall ill. A wild life can at times appear roman-
tic, poetic, and attractive, but in today’s conditions it is inappropriate.
You are the best keeper of your life. There is nothing more unfortunate
nowadays than to lose your health. It is nearest to your heart. Keep a
close watch on it, pay careful attention to it, cherish it.
2. Make sure that you are happy. Only when you are happy can you be
youthful, active, fulfilled in your life, and steadfast in the face of every
difficulty; only then will you see a future ahead of you and know how
to enjoy yourself. This sort of happiness is not a life of contentment,
but a life of struggle and of advance. All of us should every day do
some meaningful work and some reading, so that each of us is in a
position to give something to others. Loafing about simply encour-
ages the feeling that life is hollow, feeble, and in decay.
3. Use your brain, and make a habit of doing so. Correct any tendency
not to think and ponder, or to swim with the tide. Before you say or
do anything, think whether what you are saying is right, whether that
is the most suitable way of dealing with the problem, whether it goes
against your own principles, whether you feel you can take responsi-
bility for it. Then you will have no cause to regret your actions later.
This is what is known as acting rationally. It is the best way of avoid-
ing the pitfalls of sweet words and honeyed phrases, of being side-
tracked by petty gains, of wasting our emotions and wasting our lives.
4. Resolution in hardship, perseverance to the end. Aware, modern
women should identify and cast off all their rosy, compliant illusions.
Happiness is to take up the struggle in the midst of the raging storm
and not to pluck the lute in the moonlight or to recite poetry among
the blossoms. In the absence of the greatest resolution, it is all too
236 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

easy to falter in mid-path. Not to suffer is to become degenerate. The

strength to carry on should be nurtured through the quality of “per-
severance.” People without great aims and ambitions rarely have the
firmness of purpose that scorns petty advantages and a comfortable
existence. Only those who have aims and ambitions for the benefit not
of the individual but of humanity as a whole can persevere to the end.
Dawn, August 3, 1942

Postscript
On rereading this article, it seems to me there is much room for improve-
ment in the passage about what we should expect from women, but
because I have to meet a deadline, I have no time to revise it. Yet I also
feel that there are some things that, said by a leader before a big audi-
ence, would probably evoke satisfaction. But when written by a woman,
they are more than likely to be demolished. However, since I have writ-
ten it, I offer it as I always intended, for the perusal of those with similar
views.

9.8 WANG SHIWEI’S “WILD LILIES” (1942)

Wang Shiwei (1907–1947) attended Beijing University in 1925 and joined the
CCP the following year. By the 1930s, he had gained a reputation as a talented
translator of world literature and as a fiction writer in his own right. With the
outbreak of the war against Japan in 1937, he fled to Yan’an. There, he translated
a large number of philosophical and political works, including works by Marx and
Lenin. In the spring of 1942, he published several articles painting life in Yan’an
in an unfavorable light. The most famous of these, “Wild Lilies” [Ye Baihehua],
was featured in the literature section of the Liberation Daily on March 13 and
23, 1942. In response to Wang Shiwei’s, Ding Ling’s, and others’ criticisms,
the CCP leaders initiated a political rectification campaign in April and May. It
quickly became clear that Wang Shiwei was a main target. He was publicly criti-
cized, then arrested, and ultimately executed in 1947.

Questions
1. What is Wang Shiwei’s primary criticism of life in Yan’an?
2. Why would CCP officials be upset by Wang Shiwei’s descrip-
tion of Yan’an (and the comparison it made with areas outside
Yan’an)?

While I was walking alone along the riverbank, I saw a comrade wearing
a pair of old-style padded cotton shoes. I immediately fell to thinking of
Comrade Li Fen, who also wore such shoes. Li Fen, my dearest and very
first friend. As usual my blood began to race. Li Fen was a student in 1926
on the preparatory course in literature at Beijing University. In the same
year she joined the Party. In the spring of 1928, she sacrificed her life in
her home district of Baoqing in Hunan province. Her own uncle tied her
up and sent her to the local garrison—a good illustration of the barbar-
ity of the old China. Before going to her death, she put on all her three
sets of underclothes and sewed them tightly together at the top and the
bottom. This was because the troops in Baoqing often incited riff-raff to
defile the corpses of the young women Communists they had shot—yet
another example of the brutality, the evil, the filth and the darkness of
the old society. When I got news of her death, I was consumed with feel-
ings of deep love and hatred. Whenever I think of her, I have a vision of
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 237

her pure, sacred martyrdom, with her three layers of underclothes sewn
tightly together, tied up and sent by her very own uncle to meet her death
with dignity. (It seems rather out of place to talk of such things in tranquil
Yan’an, against the warbled background of [the Beijing Opera] “Yutang
Chun” and the swirling steps of the golden lotus dance; but the whole
atmosphere in Yan’an does not seem particularly appropriate to the con-
ditions of the day—close your eyes and think for a moment of our dear
comrades dying every minute in a sea of carnage.)
In the interest of the nation, I will not reckon up old scores of class
hatred. We are genuinely selfless. With all our might we are dragging the
representatives of old China along the road with us toward the light. But
in the process the filth and dirt is rubbing off on us, spreading its diseases.
On scores of occasions I have drawn strength from the memory of Li
Fen—vital and militant strength. Thinking back on her on this occasion,
I was moved to write a zawen [essay] under the title “Wild Lily.” This
name has a twofold significance. First, the wild lily is the most beautiful of
the wild flowers in the hills and countryside around Yan’an, and is there-
fore a fitting dedication to her memory. Secondly, although its bulbs are
similar to those of other lilies, they are said to be slightly bitter to the taste,
and of greater medicinal value, but I myself am not sure of this.

What is Lacking in Our Lives?

Recently young people here in Yan’an seem to have lost some of their
enthusiasm, and to have become inwardly ill at ease.
Why is this? What is lacking in our lives? Some would answer that
it is because we are badly nourished and short of vitamins. Others, that it
is because the ratio of men to women is eighteen to one, and many young
men are unable to find girlfriends. Or because life in Yan’an is dreary and
lacks amusements.
There is some truth in all these answers. It is true that there is need
for better food, for partners of the opposite sex, and for more interest in
life. This is only natural. But one must also recognize that young people
here in Yan’an came with a spirit of sacrifice to make revolution and not
for food, sex, and an enjoyable life. I cannot agree with those who say that
their lack of enthusiasm, their inward disquiet even, are a result of our
inability to resolve these problems. So what is lacking in our lives? Per-
haps the following conversation holds some clues.
During the New Year holiday, I was walking home in the dark one
evening from a friend’s place. Ahead of me were two women comrades
talking in animated whispers. We were some way apart so I quietly moved
closer to hear what they were saying.
“He keeps on talking about other people’s petty-bourgeois egalitari-
anism; but the truth is that he thinks he is something special. He always
looks after his own interests. As for the comrades underneath him, he
doesn’t care whether they’re sick or well. He doesn’t even care if they
die, he hardly gives a damn! . . . Crows are black wherever they are. Even
Comrade XXX acts like that.”
“You’re right! All this bullshit about loving your own class. They
don’t even show ordinary human sympathy! You often see people pre-
tending to smile and be friendly, but it’s all on the surface, it doesn’t mean
anything. And if you offend them, they glare at you, pull their rank and
start lecturing you.”
“It’s not only the big shots who act that way, the small fry are just the
same. Our section leader XXX crawls when he’s talking to his superiors,
238 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

but he behaves very arrogantly towards us. Often comrades have been
ill and he hasn’t even dropped in to see how they are. But when an eagle
stole one of his chickens, you should have seen the fuss he made! After
that, every time he saw an eagle he’d start screaming and throwing clods
of earth at it—the self-seeking bastard!”
There was a long silence. In one way, I admired the comrade’s sharp
tongue. But I also suddenly felt depressed.
“It’s sad that so many comrades are falling ill. Nobody wants people
like that to visit them when they fall ill, they just make you feel worse.
Their tone of voice, their whole attitude they don’t make you feel they care
about you.”
“Right. They don’t care about others, and others don’t care about
them.
If they did mass work, they’d be bound to fail.”
They carried on their conversation in animated whispers. At this
point our ways parted, and I heard no more of what they had to say. In
many ways their views were one-sided and exaggerated. Perhaps the pic-
ture they drew does not apply widely: but there is no denying that it is
useful as a mirror.
[. . .]

Egalitarianism and the System of Ranks

According to what I heard, one comrade wrote an article with a similar
title for his departmental wall newspaper, and as a result was criticized
and attacked by his department “head” and driven half-mad. I hope this
story is untrue. But since there have been genuine cases of madness even
among the “little devils” [orphan children who acted as personal assis-
tants to the Communist cadres], I fear there may be some madness among
adults. Even though the state of my nerves is not as “healthy” as some
people’s, I still have enough life in me not to go mad under any circum-
stances. I therefore intend to follow in the footsteps of that comrade and
discuss the question of equality and the ranking system.
Communism is not the same as egalitarianism, and we are not at
present at the stage of Communist revolution. There is no need for me to
write an eight-legged essay on that question, since there is no cook crazy
enough to want to live in the same style as one of the “heads.” (I don’t
dare write “kitchen operative,” since it sounds like a caricature; but when-
ever I speak to cooks, I always address them in the warmest possible way
as comrade kitchen-operatives”—what a pitiful example of warmth!) The
question of a system of ranks is rather more difficult.
Those who say that a system of ranks is reasonable use roughly the
following arguments: (1) they base themselves on the principle of “from
each according to their ability, to each according to their worth,” which
means that those with more responsibilities should consume more; (2) in
the near future the three-thirds government [the “tripartite system” under
which the Communists nominally shared power with the “petit bourgeoi-
sie and the enlightened gentry” in the areas under their control] intends
to carry out a new salary system, and naturally there will be pay differen-
tials; and (3) the Soviet Union also has a system of rank.
In my opinion all these arguments are open to debate. As for (1), we
are still in the midst of the revolution, with all its hardships and difficul-
ties; all of us, despite fatigue, are laboring to surmount the present crisis,
and many comrades have ruined their precious health. Because of this it
does not yet seem the right time for anyone, no matter who, to start talking
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 239

about “to each according to their worth.” On the contrary, all the more
reason why those with greater responsibilities should show themselves
willing to share weal and woe with the rank and file. (This is a national
virtue that should be encouraged.) In so doing, they would win the pro-
found love of the lower ranks. Only then would it be possible to create
ironlike unity. It goes without saying that it is not only reasonable but
necessary that those with big responsibilities who need special treatment
for their health should get such treatment. The same goes for those with
positions of medium responsibility. As for (2), the pay system of the three-
thirds government should also avoid excessive differentials; it is right that
non-party officials should get slightly better treatment, but those officials
who are Party members should uphold our excellent traditions of frugal
struggle so that we are in a position to mobilize even more non-party peo-
ple to join us and cooperate with us. As for (3), excuse my rudeness, but
I would beg those “great masters” who can’t open their mouths without
talking about Ancient Greece” to hold their tongues.
I am not an egalitarian, but to divide clothing into three and food
into five grades is neither necessary nor rational, especially with regard to
clothes. (I myself am graded as “cadres’ clothes and private kitchen,” so
this not just a case of sour grapes.) All such problems should be resolved
on the basis of need and reason. At present there is no noodle soup for
sick comrades to eat and young students only get two meals of thin con-
gee a day (when they are asked whether they have had enough to eat,
Party members are expected to lead the rest in a chorus of “Yes, we’re
full”). Relatively healthy “big shots” get far more than they need to eat
and drink, with the result that their subordinates look upon them as a race
apart, and not only do not love them, but even. . . . This makes me most
uneasy. But perhaps it is a “petty bourgeois emotion” to always be talking
about “love” and warmth”? I await your verdict.

9.9 MAO’S “TALK AT THE YAN’AN FORUM

ON LITERATURE AND ART” (MAY 1942)
In reaction to the growing number of literary criticisms, Mao Zedong and
other top CCP leaders encouraged a “rectification campaign” in March 1942.
In a pattern that would become quite common in the political campaigns of the
1950s and 1960s, the top leaders first solicited criticism, only to turn it around
to purge those “anti-party elements” who dared criticize the party leadership.
On April 2, a speech delivered by Mao thatsingled out Ding Ling and Wang
Shiwei for their incorrect views and methods of covert attacks was published.
As the criticism moved from small groups to large public meetings, all authors
identified as deviant were punished with demotion, reform labor, and public
confessions. In the case of Wang Shiwei, he was expelled from the party, and he
was held up as a negative example. The following keynote talk by Mao Zedong
was one of many held at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art. In what
would become core themes of Mao’s thought, he advocated literature that was
accessible to the worker, peasant, and soldier classes (the core triumvirate of
Chinese Communist thought), not writings whose audience was primarily the
highly literate.

Questions
1. How might you describe Mao’s vision of art and literature? How
is that different from Ding Ling’s and Wang Shiwei’s visions?
2. What danger does Mao see if art and literature do not properly fit
“into the whole revolutionary machine as a component part”?
240 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

Introduction
May 2, 1942
Comrades! Everyone has been invited to this forum today to exchange
ideas and examine the relationship between artistic work and revolution-
ary work, in order to choose the best path forward for the development
of revolutionary arts and literature in order to better serve revolutionary
work and thus facilitate the defeat of our national enemy and fulfill the
task of national liberation.
There exist a variety of fronts in our fight for the liberation of the Chi-
nese people. We can break them down into two basic categories: the pen
and the sword. This is the cultural front and the military front. If we want
to defeat the enemy, it must be primarily with soldiers armed with guns.
But a military army alone will not suffice. We also require a cultural army
without which we will be unable to unite our ranks and defeat the enemy.
This cultural army has been taking shape since the May Fourth Movement
and has been indispensable in the Chinese Revolution. By weakening
China’s feudal culture and the power of the “comprador bourgeoisie” to
serve foreign imperialist aggression, the cultural army has weakened their
influence. Up until now, the Chinese reactionaries who opposed such new
cultural shifts could only use a strategy of “quantity against quality.” In
other words, even though they produced nothing useful, because these
reactionaries were loaded with money, they could produce junk in large
quantities.
Literature and art have been an important and successful part of
the cultural front since the May Fourth Movement. The revolutionary
arts and literature movement made great advances during the decade-
long civil war period. Overall, this movement and the revolution-
ary war can be said to be heading in the same direction. Yet, the two
forces never connected together in their practical work. This is because
although sharing a common cause at the time, reactionaries discon-
nected [the military and cultural armies] from each other. Since the
War of Resistance Against Japan began, more and more revolutionary
artists and writers have come to Yan’an and other anti-Japanese base
areas. This is a good thing. But to simply reach the base areas, does not
necessarily mean that they have reached the same level of thinking as
those in the base areas. If we are to advance our revolutionary work,
everyone must be unified.
The purpose of our meeting today is to ensure that art and literature
come to serve as an integral part of the revolutionary machine operating to
unite the people, to educate the people, and to defeat the enemy, by help-
ing the people destroy the enemy with one heart and one mind. What are
the problems that must be resolved to achieve this objective? I see several
sorts of problems, problems of writers and artists’ perspective, problems
with their attitude, problems with their audience, problems with their
work and problems with their studies.
The problem of perspective: We must adhere to the perspective of
the proletariat and of the masses. For members of the Communist Party,
this also means adhering to the perspective of the Party, adhering to the
spirit of the Party and adhering to policy of the Party. Are there any of
our artists and writers who are still mistaken or not clear in their under-
standing of this problem? I think there are. Many of our comrades have
frequently departed from the correct perspective.
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 241

Conclusion

May 23, 1942

I
The first problem is: who should art and literature be for?
This problem was solved long ago by Marxists, particularly by
Lenin. Back in 1905, Lenin had already emphatically pointed out that our
art and literature should “serve the millions upon millions of working
people”. Among the comrades engaged in arts and literature work in
the anti-Japanese base areas this problem seemed to have been already
solved, and demanded no further discussion. In fact, that is not the case.
Many comrades have not properly resolved this problem. For this reason,
their morale, their contributions, their actions, and their views on art and
literature have failed to meet the needs of the masses and of the needs
for practical endeavors. Of course, among the many humanists, writers,
artists and other literary and artistic workers engaged in the great strug-
gle for liberation together with the Communist Party, the Eighth Route
and New Fourth Armies, a few may be opportunists who are with us
only temporarily, but the overwhelming majority are working energeti-
cally in this shared undertaking. As a result of these comrades, we have
made great strides in literature, theater, music and fine arts. These writers
and artists, many of whom began their work since the outbreak of the
War of Resistance and many whom did considerable revolutionary work
before the war, have endured many hardships and influenced the masses
through their activities and contributions. Why is it then that I say that
even among these comrades there are some who still have not clearly
understood the problem of who literature and art should be for? Can it
possibly be that there remain those who contend that revolutionary art
and literature are not for the masses but for the exploiters and oppressors
[of the people]?
[. . .]
So, who are the “people?” The overwhelming majority, more than
90 percent of the total population, are workers, peasants, soldiers and
the urban petty bourgeoisie. . . . Our art and literature should be for
these four categories of people. To serve them, we must adopt the class
perspective of the proletariat and not that of the petty bourgeoisie.
Today, those writers who persist in their individualist, petty-bourgeois
perspectives are incapable of serving the revolutionary worker, peasant
and soldier masses. Their focus remains primarily targeted on the small
number of petty-bourgeois intellectuals. Thus, it is precisely here that
we find the reason why a some of our comrades remain unable to cor-
rectly understand the problem of “for whom literature and art should
serve?” . . .
This question of “for whom?” is the fundamental question. It is a
question of principle. Up until now, the controversies and divergences,
the hostility and discord between some comrades were not on this funda-
mental question of principle but on secondary questions, or even on issues
involving no principle. On this question of principle, however, there has
been virtually no divergence between the two contending sides. They
have shown almost complete agreement in their tendency to look down
upon the workers, peasants and soldiers and divorce themselves from the
masses. . . .
242 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

What is the explanation for the problems we still encounter in our literary
and art circles in Yan’an? These problems suggest that within our literary
and art circles seriously incorrect styles of [artistic] work still exist, and
suggest that among our comrades there still remain many defects, such as
idealism, dogmatism, empty illusions, empty talk, contempt for practice
and aloofness from the masses. All of which call for an effective and seri-
ous campaign of rectification.
[. . .]
Since our integration into the new era of the masses is essential, we
must thoroughly resolve the problem of the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the masses. This couplet from a poem by Lu Xun should be
our motto:
Fierce-browed, I coolly defy a thousand pointing fingers,
Head-bowed, like a willing ox I serve the children.
The “thousand pointing fingers” here refer to our enemies, and we
must never yield to them, no matter how vicious. The “children” here
symbolize the proletariat and the masses. All communists, all revolu-
tionaries, all revolutionary literary and art workers should learn from the
example of Lu Xun and be “oxen” for the proletariat and the masses, put
their backs into to the task until their dying day. Intellectuals who seek to
integrate themselves with the masses, who aim to serve the masses, must
go through a process that that familiarizes them with the masses. This pro-
cess may, and indeed very likely will, involve much hardship and strife,
but if you have truly set yourself to the task, you will prevail.
What I have discussed today touches upon only some of the funda-
mental questions regarding the direction of our arts and literature move-
ment. Many specific problems remain and will require further study.
I am confident that you, my comrades, are determined to move in this
direction. I believe that in due course through the rectification movement
and with the long period of study and work to come, you will surely be
able to transform yourself and your contributions. That, in this way, your
many fine contributions will be warmly welcomed by the people, and will
advance to a glorious era the literature and art movement in the revolu-
tionary base areas and throughout China.

THE KMT’S ROAD TO DEFEAT AND TAIWAN

When Japan finally surrendered in August of 1945, the tensions between
the KMT and the CCP were at an all-time high. Despite multiple attempts
to bring about reconciliation, two decades of suspicion and mistrust poi-
soned virtually all efforts to persuade the two sides to govern jointly.
In some ways repeating his mistake of the mid-1930s, Chiang Kai-shek
became fixated on exterminating the CCP while ignoring the economic,
social, and political problems that had built up during the war. Negative
public opinion over his handling of the country’s rampaging inflation,
his harsh repression of any political dissent, and his slow response to the
needs of a country desperately attempting to piece itself back together left
little room for error. Initially, Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT appeared to
have every advantage over the CCP. With the Cold War heating up, the
United States funneled aid almost exclusively to the KMT, which allowed
the KMT an overwhelming advantage in troops, weapons, and financial
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 243

reserves. In the end, though, it was a litany of errors large and small, as DEMOCRATIC
well as inept leadership and a shocking level of corruption by KMT offi- LEAGUE—A political
cials that undermined their initial advantage. The CCP, conversely, swiftly party first formed in 1941
and effectively put to work the lessons they had learned during their eight and officially reorganized
years of warfare. It was by their speedy and decisive military leadership into the Democratic League
that they were able to defeat the Nationalists quickly and emphatically. in 1944. Intellectuals
dominated the league
leadership and espoused
9.10 WEN YIDUO’S “LAST SPEECH” (JULY 15, 1946) national unity, open
Wen Yiduo (1899–1946), an erudite and famed scholar of classical Chinese poetry democracy, and peace. It
and literature, had moved to Kunming with his family to escape Japan’s invasion. remains an active party
After the war ended in 1945 and the KMT’s tactics became increasingly repres- within the PRC today.
sive, Wen became an outspoken activist and joined the Democratic League. His
stance became even more assertive when, on December 1, 1945, after days of stu-
dent strikes, a pro-KMT agent killed three students and one teacher. The violent
response to a peaceful student demonstration sparked national outrage, making
“12/1” shorthand for what Wen Yiduo described as “the darkest day since the
overthrow of the Manchus.”
Wen delivered the following speech extemporaneously at the funeral of Li
Gongpu, a close friend and political activist who had been shot and killed by KMT
agents just days earlier. At the memorial service, Wen stepped onto the stage
when Li’s wife, overcome with grief, could not finish her own remarks. Just hours
later, as he walked home from the service, he too was shot and killed. Wen’s power-
ful words quickly became a rallying cry for the KMT’s political opponents. Given
its impromptu nature, the speech has, in the intervening years, been altered, con-
densed, or otherwise modified (often for explicit political reasons). The following
translation is from the bi-monthly journal Literary Extractions, which published
the speech just two weeks after his death.

Questions
1. Aside from eulogizing his friend’s death, what do Wen Yiduo’s
words tell us about popular attitudes toward Chiang Kai-shek’s
tactics in retaining political control?
2. What do Li Gongpu and Wen Yiduo mean when they suggest that
“daybreak is coming”?

Just a few days ago, as everyone knows, one of the most despicable and
shameless acts of history took place in Kunming! What crime did Mr. Li
[Gongpu] commit that merited he be murdered in such a horrible way? He
simply used his pen and his mouth; what he wrote and said captured what
was already in the hearts of millions of people! Everyone has a pen and
a mouth. Use words to express your ideas! Why resort to beatings! Why
murder! And why would you kill in such a covert manner? [Applause]
Are there any [KMT] secret police here today? Stand up! Stand up
and speak for yourselves! Why did you kill Mr. Li? [sharp voice—fervent
applause] You assassinate people, then throw the blame elsewhere, calling
it a “scandalous affair,” a Communist killing another Communist. How
shameless! Shameless! [fervent applause] The political party’s shameless-
ness glorifies Mr. Li! The very fact Mr. Li was assassinated in Kunming,
glorifies Mr. Li, and it also glorifies the people of Kunming!
Last year’s 12/1 [incident], young Kunming students who opposed
the civil war suffered the fate of being massacred. Now in his fight for
democracy and peace, Mr. Li suffered the fate of being assassinated by the
reactionaries. This is Kunming’s infinite glory! [fervent applause]
244 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

After hearing the news of Mr. Li’s assassination by reactionaries,

everyone shook their heads [in disbelief]. These shameless good-for-noth-
ings, what could they have possibly been thinking? What kind of hearts
did they have? But it’s actually quite simple, they were scared out of their
minds and in sheer panic! An absolute panic! Secret police, dwell on it for
a moment, how many days do you have left? The truth will triumph. The
reactionaries’ shamelessness glorifies Mr. Li! The reactionaries’ judgement
day will be our glory! [fervent applause]
Now there are those who want civil war. This is simply using the
animosity between the United States-Soviet Union to their own ends. Yet,
a war between the Americans and the Soviets is not inevitable. The four
[Allied] ministers have just successfully ended the [Big Four] conference.
Certainly, this is not to say that the Soviet- United States relationship is
not without its problems, yet, they could still compromise. The situation
is complicated and not straight forward. With our access to news being
blocked, it’s unclear how the open-minded public opinion is gaining
ground in Great Britain and the United States. But reflecting on the facts,
we can see [the truth.]
First, now Leighton Stuart has been appointed the American ambas-
sador to China. Leighton Stuart is a friend of the Chinese people. He is
an academic, he grew up in China and received an American education.
He has lived longer in China than in the United States. He is just like a
Chinese student who went to the United States to pursue his studies [and
returned]. He is a sweet old man. Previously, when we were in Beiping
[Beijing], we saw each other often. He truly understands what Chinese
people require. Not that Stuart has superpowers, with American public
opinion more dominant, the American policy could change.
Second, what the KMT did was too shocking. At the Big Four con-
ference, they decided not include China as a convening member of the
twenty-one nations peace conference. It shows there are limits to the peo-
ple’s patience, just as there are limits to international patience.
Mr. Li gave his life, which should get something in exchange. The
four December First Incident martyrs fell, and in exchange for the blood
of the young fighters resulted in the convening of a political consultative
conference. Mr. Li has fallen, and we should also convene a political con-
sultative conference in return! [fervent applause] We have faith in this!
[applause]
The December First Movement glorifies Kunming, and glorifies
the people of Yunnan. The glorious history of Yunnan, from the distant
National Defense Movement, to the more recent December First Move-
ment, all belong to the people of Yunnan. We must carry it forward!
The reactionaries shamelessly attempted to sow discord and stir
up trouble. Did you think simply because Lianda University has left
and the students are on summer vacation that we lack support? Secret
police, look at the more than one thousand youths here today, hand-in-
hand together again. Kunming’s youth will never let you off the hook
so easily!
History has entrusted Kunming with the duty to achieve democracy
and peace. We the Kunming youth must accomplish this duty!
We must prepare ourselves to follow in Mr. Li’s path, when we step
out of the gate, we must be prepared to never step back inside again! [long
fervent applause]
The blood of fighters will not be shed in vain. Reactionaries, you have
seen one fighter fall, but now you will also see thousands more rise-up!
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 245

9.11 REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S DECLARATION OF MARTIAL

LAW IN TAIWAN (MAY 20, 1949)
On May 20, 1949, the Kuomintang government proclaimed a state of mar-
tial law in Taiwan. With this act, the Republic of China suspended the 1947
Constitution and all individual civil rights. The government ordered a per-
manent state of emergency and instituted martial law. Through the 1950s
and 1960s, these extra-constitutional arrangements were expanded, which
effectively rescinded the presidential two-term limit and extended the terms
of incumbent National Assembly members to life terms. In other words, the
declaration of the martial law triggered a series of events that would ensure
Chiang Kai-shek’s re-election as president for five six-year terms and insti-
tuted a one-party authoritarian government over those areas controlled by the
Republic of China.

Questions
1. Why would the imposition of the regulations implemented by
the martial law be necessary in Taiwan?
2. Why did Chiang Kai-shek suspend the 1947 Republic of China
Constitution rather than alter it? How did his legitimacy rely on
his ties to the pre-1949 era?
1. The [Taiwan] Headquarters with the goal to upholding public and
social order of this province hereby declares martial law throughout
the entire province, beginning May 20 at midnight.
2. Effective that same day, all ports are to be closed except for the
three ports of Keelung [Jilong], Kaohsiung [Gaoxiong] and Makung
[Magong, Penghu Island] which will remain open to the public under
the surveillance of this Headquarters, following designated sea traffic
lines within the province (regulations to be announced separately).
Entering or leaving ports is strictly forbidden.
3. Under martial law the following acts are forbidden and enforced:
(1) Effective on that same day, a daily curfew from 1 a.m. to 5 a.m.
will be enforced in Keelung and Kaohsiung. All traffic is forbid-
den without a special permit. Other cities will not be under cur-
few for the time being but will be regulated as deemed necessary
by the martial law commanding officer.
(2) All shops and places of entertainment in Keelung and Kaohsiung
must be closed by midnight.
(3) All shops, and vendors throughout the entire province are forbid-
den from raising prices, closing their businesses, hoarding daily
necessities, or otherwise disrupting the market.
(4) All travelers entering or exiting the province must undertake
the requisite procedures in accordance with the regulations of
the Headquarters and submit to inspection upon entrance and
departure.
(5) Public gatherings, strikes or demonstrations of any kind are
strictly prohibited.
(6) The spreading of rumors via writing, slogans or other methods is
strictly prohibited.
(7) The possession of guns, ammunition, weapons or other danger-
ous items is strictly prohibited.
(8) Residents, at home or in public, must always have their identifica-
tion cards available for inspection. Failure to comply will result in
arrest.
246 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

HONORIFICS—In China, 4. Anyone disturbing social order by committing any of the following
villagers, neighbors, and acts during martial law will be put to death in accordance with the
friends are often addressed law:
by adding “uncle,” “elder (1) Spreading rumors and deceiving the public.
brother,” or “old” to one’s (2) Inciting public riots.
surname. (3) Disturbing financial markets.
(4) Stealing or pillaging of property.
(5) Disturbing public order by going on strike or coordinating a clo-
sure of markets.
(6) Organizing students movements or inciting public criminal acts.
(7) Destruction or theft of transportation and communications
equipment.
(8) Damaging public utilities: water, electricity, or gas services.
(9) Endangering public safety by [deliberately] setting fires, causing
floods or otherwise causing harm.
(10) Possessing firearms, ammunition or explosives without a permit.

20th Day, 5th Month, 38th Year of the Republic [May 20, 1949]

9.12 FILM: CROWS AND SPARROWS (1949)

Directed by left-leaning director Zheng Junli, production on Crows and Spar-
rows began in late 1948 and completed just after the People Liberation Army
entered and “liberated” Shanghai in May 1949 in the last weeks of the Chinese
Civil War. Tracing the life of the tenants, owners, and landlords of a single build-
ing, the film captures the despair, fatigue, and pessimism of many Chinese who,
having survived eight years of war and occupation under the Japanese, had to
then endure another four years of civil war under an increasingly predatory and
dysfunctional Nationalist regime. Scenes were omitted from the script submitted
to KMT censors to receive permission to film, while the completed film had to
be reworked to meet approval of the new Communist government; though, when
finally released in 1950, it was widely praised by the public and new Communist
regime. The following scene captures the cramped living conditions and physical
difficulties the families endured, their use of familiar honorifics but also their
elation over the news of Chiang Kai-shek’s fall from power and the hope for better
days to come.

SCENE: A crowded multi-story home housing the Xiao family, Hua

family and Mr. Kong.
(Lying in bed, Mr Xiao removes a bandage from his face with a feeling of
satisfaction)
MR. XIAO: (turns to his wife, also in bed) How are you doing?
MRS. XIAO: Fine, and are you well too?
CHILDREN: (popping up between them in the bed) Hurrah! We
are all getting better!
(Mr. Kong enters the house from outside)
MR. KONG: Thank you. I’ll close it. I’ll close it.
WEIWEI: ( from the second story window) Uncle Kong! Uncle
Kong!
MR. KONG: Weiwei, you seem to have gotten all better!
MRS. HUA: (joining her mother in the window) Oh, Mr. Kong
you’ve returned home. . .
WEIWEI: (running downstairs to greet their friend closely pur-
sued by her mother) Uncle Kong! Uncle Kong!
MRS. HUA: (turning to Weiwei) Remember, what I told you to
say?
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 247

MRS. HUA: Say thank you to your Uncle Kong.

WEIWEI: (dutifully) Thank you, Uncle Kong!
MRS. HUA: Truly. It’s entirely because of you, Uncle Kong,
that she survived.
MR. KONG: Oh, please, it was nothing.
MR. XIAO: (from another room on the ground floor) Old friend!
Come in so we can chat.
CHILDREN: (children running out to greet him) Uncle Kong!
Uncle Kong!
CHILDREN: (when they see their friend they invite her to go play
with them) Weiwei, get down! Come on let’s go
play! Weiwei, let’s go.
MRS. HUA: (calling off after her daughter) Hey, Weiwei, don’t
forget to be careful.
MR. and MRS. XIAO: (who are still in bed sit up to greet Mr. Kong) Come
in, come in. Welcome.
MRS. HUA: Please don’t get up. Stay in bed.
MR. KONG: The two of you are both in good health. Well
done!
MR. XIAO: The two of us both owe our lives to you, Old Mr.
Kong.
MR. KONG: Oh, please, it was nothing.
MR. XIAO: (taking the newspaper out of Mr. Kong’s hands)
What’s the latest news? Any update on the peace
efforts, hah? (begins to read the front page)
MR. KONG: Eh, peace? (gives a resigned sigh)
MR. XIAO: Hey! Peace is really here! Finally, peace at last.
Look! Old Chiang [Kai-shek] has stepped down.
No more fighting. Haha.
MRS. XIAO: What? Really!
MRS. HUA: Really?
YOUNG MISS: (running in from another room) What’s all this? No
more war?
MR. XIAO: Yeah, it’s true. Old Chiang has stepped down.
MR. KONG: What stepping down! More like his American
boss knew Chiang’s reputation stunk and now
just stuck Li Zongren to fool everyone.
MR. XIAO: You can call it whatever you want, the result is
the same: there’s no more war!
MRS. HUA: If peace finally has arrived, then all those people
who they arrested . . .
MR. XIAO: Of course, they will all be released for sure! Mrs.
Hua, congratulations! Mr. Hua is sure to be re-
leased soon.
MRS. HUA: Oh, that would be great.
MR. XIAO: (turning to the young woman) You, little sister,
will be able to return to your countryside home,
grow crops, and no need to be a maid serving
others any more.
MR. XIAO: (turning to Mr. Kong) And you, old Mr. Kong, we
should congratulate you most of all! Your son
will be back any day, I promise!
MR. XIAO: (turning to his wife) As for us, mother of Big Mao,
with the war over, we can get back to business
once again! Someday soon!
MRS. XIAO: Praise Buddha, peace is finally here!
248 Part 2 • Republican China (1911–1949)

USEFUL WEBSITES AND SUGGESTED READING

FOR PART TWO
Useful Websites
1. VISUALIZING CHINA: HISTORICAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF
CHINA
[Link]—A truly impressive collection of histori-
cal photographs organized and run by the prominent historian of
China, Robert Bickers. Originally comprised of a set of materials
primarily from missionaries and other Westerners in China, the
collection has digitized and made available through a single search
engine other collections from Harvard-Yenching, Cambridge, and
private albums from individuals.
2. 1919—AN INTERACTIVE COMIC MARKING THE 100TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT
[Link]
html—An interactive examination of the events leading up to, and
including, the May Fourth Movement. Created by the China Global
Television Network (a division of CCTV) the “interactive comic”
also offers insights to the way Chinese leaders today seek to repur-
pose the event for more contemporary ideological reasons.
3. THE NANKING MASSACRE PROJECT
[Link]
sensitive, if narrow, treatment of a complex and politically contro-
versial subject. The website is well organized, nicely designed, and
includes a variety of documents and photos as told via materials
held in the Yale University collection.
4. WORLD WAR II: A VISUAL HISTORY
[Link]/sites/default/files/interactive/interactive_files/
WW2/[Link]—A very slick website with considerable visual
appeal. Although not limited to only China, the website offers thor-
ough coverage of events in China as well as related events in Japan,
Southeast Asia, and farther afield.
5. VIRTUAL SHANGHAI
[Link]—A project begun by Christian Henriot
at Institut d’Asie Orientale in Lyons, France, that, alongside pho-
tographs, includes maps and texts. Although the website is primar-
ily focused on Shanghai, it offers a depth of material spread across
more than a century that is rare to find on the Internet today.

Suggested Readings
1. Christopher Rea, Chinese Film Classics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2021). An informative but entertaining guide
to 14 classic films from the early “golden age” of Chinese cinema.
Includes a wealth of images and suggestions for further viewings
and readings. The author has also collaborated to create a Chinese
Film Classics YouTube channel with updated subtitles for all the
films discussed.
2. Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937–1945 (New
York: Mariner Books, 2014). With a storyteller’s eye for detail, Mit-
ter not only breathes new life into the well-known details of China’s
war against Japan but also lays bare the long-term consequences for
the choices made by the KMT and CCP.
3. Germie Barmé, An Artistic Exile: A Life of Feng Zikai (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2002). A biography of one of China’s
 Chapter 9 • China at War (1937–1949) 249

first political cartoonists. Offers a wealth of information about Feng

Zikai as well as the turbulent era in which he lived.
4. Gail Hershatter, Women and China’s Revolutions (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2018). A magisterial account of
China’s rise from 1840 to the present, historian Hershatter traces
both the apparent as well as the often-overlooked roles that women
played in shaping China’s rise from an empire to a republic to a
socialist nation.
5. Alai, trans. Howard Goldblatt and Sylvia Li-chun Lin, Red Pop-
pies (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002). Winner of the prestigious
Chinese Mao Dun literary prize, this novel tells the story of local
Tibetan rulers along the Sino-Tibetan border areas in the 1930s. An
absorbing story that raises knotty questions of ethnic acculturation
and modernization along China’s borderlands.
 PART 3
Post-1949 China (1949–Present)
Post-1949 China (1949–Present)Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

TIMELINE

WORLD CHINA

1949 People’s Republic of China established

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and 1950 New Marriage Law
Friendshi
1953 China’s First Five-Year Plan begins
Viet Minh defeat French at Dien Bien 1954
Phu
USSR launches Sputnik, the first earth 1957 100 Flowers and Anti-Rightist Movement
satellite
1958–1959 Great Leap Forward
1959 Dalai Lama flees Tibet
Krushchev removed from power 1964 East is Red premieres in Beijing
1966 Mao launches the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution
1967 China detonates first H-bomb
Neil Armstrong, first person on the 1969
moon
UN transfers China seat from ROC 1971
(Taiwan) to PRC
1972 President Nixon visits China
1975 Chiang Kai-shek dies and is succeeded by his
son Jiang Jingguo as president of ROC
1976 Zhou Enlai, Zhu De & Mao Zedong die/Tang-
shan earthquake kills over 250,000
United States recognizes PRC 1979
1980 One-child policy officially begins
First personal computer launched by 1981 Gang of Four found guilty and sentenced
I.B.M.
1988 Li Denghui becomes president of ROC (Taiwan)
Dalai Lama awarded Nobel Peace 1989 Tiananmen student demonstrations
Prize
Soviet Union collapses 1991
1994 Three Gorges Dam project begins
1997 Hong Kong returned to China
2000 Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents
Attack on World Trade Center (9/11) 2001
2003 SARS epidemic
2008 China hosts Olympics
Arab Spring 2010
Brexit 2020
 CHAPTER 10
New China: Finding a New Way
Post-1949 China (1949–Present)New China: Finding a New Way

1
3

4
7

5
6
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 253

1. THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD (1958–1959): In January 1958, Mao Zedong called for a rapid rise
in agricultural and steel output through centralized social and economic planning. The government
encouraged the use of “revolutionary” (10.9) methods, such as “close planting” of rice (10.11) and
grain and by building “backyard furnaces” to smelt their own steel and iron to dramatically raise
production.

2. BACKYARD FURNACES: At the urging of Mao Zedong, tens of thousands of “backyard furnaces”
were constructed in communes and cities. The furnaces required a tremendous outlay in labor, both
for the building and to tend them day and night. Where no natural resources of ore (or even those
that did) existed, all non-essential metal (cooking woks, utensils, nails, pitchforks) were collected to
be melted down. The furnaces—often poorly built—produced only low-quality pig-iron and non-
industrial grade steel. The top picture features the smelting works in Yingshuiqiao village in the
Ningxia Autonomous Region in northwestern China.

3. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: The Great Leap Forward had severe environmental consequences.
Whole areas were stripped of trees and brush to feed the furnaces that needed to be kept going
24 hours a day to maintain the constant level of heat. In addition to the backyard furnaces and ques-
tionable agricultural practices, another major campaign “Eliminate the Four Pests” (rats, flies, mos-
quitoes, and sparrows) decimated the sparrow populations in many areas, leading to even worse
insect infestations.

4. SLOGANS: For every political movement, specific slogans became common place and prominent
in public areas. Behind the table in the picture of the communal dining hall, the slogan reads “Food
is free, work vigorously” [chifan buhua qian, nuli gao shengchan].

5. COMMUNES: By December 1958, over 99 percent of all rural families belonged to communes. Pri-
vate ownership of farming equipment, livestock, and even garden plots were forbidden. Communal
kitchens replaced private kitchens to conserve time, energy, and food. The communal dining halls
also greatly augmented the state’s presence at the most basic level of society.

6. COMMUNAL DINING HALLS: In 1958, the Chinese government oversaw the creation more than
2.65 million communal dining halls [gonggong shitang] in order to “liberate” more labor (especially
women) from housework for production. With private kitchens seen as symbols of “individualism,”
personal cooking woks, pots, and utensils were collected and melted down to help communes meet
their iron or steel output (10.10).

7. SUSPENDED DISBELIEF: Throughout the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese people retained an
unshakable confidence in the Chinese top leadership—especially Mao Zedong. Part of this mis-
placed faith came from widespread publications like those seen here. Widely disseminated news
reports convinced people that the much-hailed record harvests were true and that their own experi-
ences were an anomaly in a sea of success.

8. HUMAN CONSEQUENCES: As a result of the Great Leap Forward, China, from 1958 to 1961,
experienced a three-year-long famine that is estimated to have resulted in about 30 million deaths.
Even for those who survived, as a direct result of the famine, many Chinese postponed or were
unable to have children, demographically causing a sharp (if temporary) drop in China’s birthrate.
254 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

POLITBURO—A On a wintery Beijing afternoon in early December 1949, Mao Zedong

shorthand term for boarded an armored train bound for the USSR. It was the first time he
“political bureau,” it was had traveled outside China. He would join hundreds of Communist lead-
the principal executive ers from around the world to celebrate Stalin’s 70th birthday in Moscow.
policymaking committee Mao’s decision to make his first state visit as China’s Party Chairman and
within a Communist President to the Soviet Union seemed an obvious choice. The Soviet Union
Party. The politburo is was the undisputed leader of the Communist world. But despite all out-
centralized within the ward appearances, the two largest Communist powers had not had up
Standing Committee of the to that point a terribly amicable relationship. Up until his 1949 invitation
Communist Party of China. to Mao, Stalin had repeatedly rebuffed Mao’s efforts to meet in Moscow.
Stalin’s hesitancy struck a sensitive nerve within the CCP leadership since
the Soviet Union, from the 1920s onward, had insinuated China was ill
prepared for a Communist uprising and doggedly urged them to work
within the KMT-controlled governments. In addition to these actions,
Stalin signed a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship with Chiang Kai-shek at
the end of World War III then pressured Mao Zedong to negotiate the
Double Tenth Agreement (October 10, 1945) whereby the CCP acknowl-
edged the KMT as China’s legitimate ruling party. Sino-Soviet differences
aside, Mao’s two-month trip was even more striking in light of the fact
that it came within weeks of the founding of the People’s Republic and at a
time when tens of thousands of KMT troops lingered in areas of mainland
China. Bad timing aside, most of China’s leaders realized that the PRC’s
future depended on Mao’s ability to forge a new relationship with Joseph
Stalin and the Soviet Union.
Traveling ten days by train, because of his fear of flying, Mao arrived
in Moscow at the stroke of noon on December 16. That same evening, in a
gesture meant to demonstrate the Soviet’s recognition of Mao’s standing,
Stalin and members of the Soviet politburo received Mao at the Kremlin.
Stalin cautiously questioned Mao Zedong about what he hoped to achieve
during his visit. Mao replied, “For this trip, we hope to bring about some-
thing that not only looks nice but tastes delicious.” As this was translated
into Russian, one of the politburo members burst out laughing. It became
clear that Mao’s tendency to speak in earthy aphorisms resulted in his
meaning being lost in translation. Mao Zedong’s own translator stepped
in and attempted to straighten out the confusion, noting that Mao by
“looking nice” meant something with a good form, and “tasting good”
meant something substantial. It was an inauspicious start to the first meet-
ing between the notoriously brusque Stalin and thin-skinned Mao.
When Mao and Stalin moved on to the more formal discussion, the
subject matter quickly turned to the Sino-Soviet Treaty Stalin had signed
with Chiang Kai-shek after Japan’s defeat four years earlier. Earlier that
year, the USSR had indicated they were willing to nullify the original
treaty and negotiate a new treaty with Mao and his PRC government.
When Stalin raised the matter, however, he appeared to have changed
his mind, suggesting to Mao that to make “a change in even one point
could give America and England the legal grounds to raise questions
about modifying the treaty’s provisions concerning the Kurile Islands,
South Sakhalin, etc.” When Mao asked Stalin whether his foreign minister
Zhou Enlai should come to Moscow to further discuss such matters, Stalin
enigmatically responded, “No, this question you must decide for your-
selves.” Stalin’s surprise position on the treaty and evasive response must
have been a rude welcome for Mao, who had come to the Soviet Union
with high expectations for Soviet support. Mao remained calm, humbly
acknowledging that he had not taken the British and American response
into account. At the end of the two-hour discussion, however, there could
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 255

have been little doubt in Mao’s mind that his priorities of Sino-Soviet rela- YALTA AGREEMENT—
tions differed considerably to those of Stalin. An agreement signed near
Over the course of the next week, national and international delega- the end of World War II
tions swarmed into the Soviet capital to celebrate Stalin’s 70th birthday between the Allies in which
and left Mao few opportunities to broach the issue again with either Stalin the USSR gained the Kurile
or his top ministers. By the end of December, Mao’s exasperation turned Islands, Southern Sakhalin,
to indignation as it became clear that Stalin sought to deliberately chasten Lüshun, and Dalian as well
Mao by leaving him in a dacha outside of Moscow. Several Soviet officials as control of the Chinese
visited Mao and encouraged him to take a trip around the country instead Eastern Railway and the
of remaining in the dacha. Mao replied in his typical off-color style that South Manchuria Railway.
while in Moscow he “only had three tasks: eat, sleep and shit. I did not
come to Moscow to congratulate Stalin on his birthday. . . . If you do not
want to conclude a treaty of friendship, so be it. I will fulfill my three
tasks.”
What happened next is not entirely clear, but several factors con-
spired to prompt Stalin to reconsider his position toward Mao Zedong and
China. For one, India, Burma, Denmark, Sweden, and Great Britain were
all pushing China to establish diplomatic relationships. Stalin realized that
to continue the stalemate with Mao would force the USSR to relinquish
the prestige of being the first country to formally establish ties with the
PRC. The other, more obvious, factor was the embarrassing foreign press
reports stating that Stalin had put Mao under house arrest. Chagrined
at the impression being given to the world, Stalin swiftly ordered TASS
(the official press agency of the Soviet Union) to interview and publish an
article on Mao’s visit to Moscow. Mao, never one to miss such a golden
opportunity, stated in his interview that the foremost goal in his mind was
to sign a new Treaty of Friendship between China and the Soviet Union.
The following day, 17 days after first arriving in Moscow, Stalin
broke the standoff and sent his foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, to
inform Mao Zedong that he should summon Zhou Enlai, China’s Foreign
Minister, to conclude a new treaty between China and the Soviet Union.
The relief for Mao must have been immense. One can sense the levity in
his telegram relaying the news back to Beijing informing them not only of
the new treaty and instructions for Zhou but giddily sharing his plans for
sightseeing (saying that Molotov recommended visiting the subway and
a nearby munitions factory).
When Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai met almost three weeks
later, Stalin opened the conversation by saying that the previous treaty
between China and the Soviet Union was an anachronism and needed
to be changed significantly. When Mao timidly sought to verify Stalin’s
change of heart regarding the impact such a change would have on the
Yalta Agreement, Stalin replied “to hell with it! If we make a decision to
revise treaties, we must go all the way.”
Stalin’s gambit was not without its risks, but for the Soviets it was a
relatively safe compromise. By jettisoning the security offered by the Yalta
Agreement, Stalin knew he had caused China to be deeply indebted to the
Soviet Union. The Chinese were appropriately appreciative and allowed
the Soviets to retain many of the rights from the 1945 treaty (including
considerable authority and supervision over Dalian, Lüshun, and the Chi-
nese portion of the Trans-Siberian, or Changchun, Railroad). Mao, how-
ever, also got what he needed. He could now return to China with a new
Sino-Soviet Agreement, an explicit mutual military commitment (stating
that each country would come to the aid of the other in the event of war)
and the desperately needed Soviet economic aid to rebuild, fortify, and
modernize China.
256 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

And so, on February 14, 1950, the two sides signed the Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in the Kremlin. Three days
later, Mao, after spending more than two months in the Soviet Union,
left Moscow with an unambiguous sign of Soviet support in hand that
demonstrated to any who might have doubted his acumen at forging an
alliance with China’s most potent neighbor. Neither Mao nor Stalin real-
ized the speed with which their goodwill and partnership would be put to
the test. Within six months of Mao’s departure from Moscow, North and
South Korea would be at war and China pressed by both its Communist
Allies (Stalin and Kim Il-Sung) to come to North Korea’s aid.

SHAPING A NEW CHINA: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL

CHALLENGES
At a September 1949 preparatory session of the Chinese Political Consul-
tative Conference, Mao Zedong uttered one of his most remembered state-
ments: “We [the Chinese people] have stood up.” Though many Chinese
mistakenly attribute these words to his speech marking the founding of
People’s Republic of China from atop Tiananmen Gate (10.1), the sim-
ple phrase is still electrifying over 60 years later. Mao’s pronouncement
tapped into the Chinese peoples’ deep humiliation resulting from a cen-
tury of occupation and misgovernment. But even as “China stood up,” the
Communist leadership realized their path to establishing themselves as a
global power would be a precarious one in the highly polarized Cold War
world. There was little question that China and their fraternal socialist
neighbor, the Soviet Union, would remain allies (10.2), but there remained
considerable fear (even by Stalin) whether Mao Zedong would pursue an
independent path like Joseph Tito of Yugoslavia. As North Korean troops
invaded South Korea with Stalin’s blessing, Chinese leaders quickly real-
ized that many choices would be made out of necessity rather than their
own strategic needs (particularly, their desire to mount an invasion of
Tibet and Taiwan) (10.4). China’s relationship with its Communist neigh-
bors emerged over time; however, its relationship with the United States
was preordained, largely as a result of the United States’ unyielding com-
mitment to Chiang Kai-shek and its role in the Korean War.

10.1 PROCLAMATION OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA (OCTOBER 1, 1949)
On October 1, 1949, surrounded by top CCP military and political leaders, Mao
Zedong declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China. This must have
been a sublime sensation for Mao and the Communist leadership, who only years
earlier had been on the verge of political extinction, living in Yan’an on the
borderlands of China. It may seem easy to lampoon Mao’s speech with its heavy
reliance on phrases such as “liberation,” “reactionary rule,” and “counter-
revolutionary.” Even though such terminology may appear timeworn today, at
the time, they linguistically demarcated the end of the economically depressed
and politically fractured world of China’s past and the beginning of a bright,
new world for the CCP’s leadership. For their part, the vast majority of Chi-
nese greeted Mao Zedong’s speech with a celebratory excitement and eagerness
for change not witnessed in a century. After decades of political infighting and
12 years of near continuous war (1937–1949), Mao Zedong’s rise was akin to
that of a savior who had unified China and was about to usher the nation into a
new era.
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 257

Questions PEOPLE’S LIBERATION

ARMY (PLA)—Established
1. Why does Mao qualify some of his statements, saying that the in 1927 as the “Red Army,”
war has been “basically won” and “the majority of the people” the PLA became the official
liberated? name of China’s military
2. Why would most Chinese people be excited by Mao’s speech? forces during the Chinese
Civil War. In popular
Since Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang reactionary government culture and propaganda,
betrayed the motherland, colluded with imperialist, and launched a counter- the army was portrayed as
revolutionary war, the people throughout China have been plunged into an a true “people’s army”—
abyss of suffering. Fortunately, supported by all the people in the nation, our from the people, of the
People’s Liberation Army fought bravely and defeated the reactionary army people, and for the people.
overthrowing the reactionary rule of the Nationalist government, in order to
defend the country’s territorial sovereignty, to protect the people’s lives and
property, and to relieve the people’s suffering and fight for their rights.
Now, the People’s War of Liberation is basically victorious, with the
bulk of the people in the country being liberated. On this basis, the first
plenary session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,
composed of representatives of all democratic parties, people’s organiza-
tions, the People’s Liberation Army, all regions, all ethnic groups, overseas
Chinese, and other patriotic democrats was assembled. Representing the
will of all the people in the nation [the session] created the Organic Law of
the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, elected
Mao Zedong as the chairman of the Central People’s Government, and Zhu
De, Liu Shaoqi, Song Qingling, Li Jishen, Zhang Lan and Gao Gang as the
vice-chairmen. . . . Together they formed the Central People’s Government
Committee, proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and
pronounced Beijing to be the capital of the People’s Republic of China.
Today the Central People’s Government Committee of the People’s
Republic of China took office in the capital and unanimously made the
following resolutions: proclaimed the establishment of the Central Peo-
ple’s Government of the People’s Republic of China; adopted the Guid-
ing Principle of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference as
the Government’s policy guidelines; elected Lin Boqu as the Secretary-
General of the Central People’s Government Committee; appointed Zhou
Enlai concurrently as the Premier of the Central People’s Government
Administration Council and as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mao Zedong
as the Chairman of the People’s Revolutionary Military Committee of the
Central People’s Government, Zhu De as the Commander-in-Chief of the
People’s Liberation Army, Shen Junru as the President of the Supreme
People’s Court of the Central People’s Government, and Luo Ronghuan as
the Procurator General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the Cen-
tral People’s Government Attorney General; and charging them to swiftly
form of various government agencies to implement various government
tasks. At the same time, it was resolved to declare to the governments of
all countries that this government is the only legal government represent-
ing the people of the People’s Republic of China. This government is will-
ing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government that is
willing to observe the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual
respect for territorial sovereignty.

10.2 TWO TELEGRAMS RELATING TO THE KOREAN

WAR (1950)
The Korean War began with the invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops
in June 1950. Within 72 hours, the United States decided to intervene, with the
258 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

PENG DEHUAI UN Security Council voting soon thereafter to send an international force. The
(1898–1974)—A PLA following telegrams from Mao Zedong reveal the hesitant yet progressive steps
general who gained the two sides took to aid Kim Il-Sung. When UN troops crossed the 38th par-
notoriety and prestige for allel on October 7—an act China had indicated would cause them to enter the
his command of Chinese war—Mao decided to mobilize Chinese troops. However, at this crucial juncture,
troops during the Korean Stalin retracted his offer for Soviet air support, causing the Chinese to rethink
War. When he offered their situation and the 1950 Treaty of Friendship. Unbeknownst to the UN troops
Mao Zedong a negative who rushed northward believing the Chinese were vacillating over their decision,
assessment of the Great Marshal Peng Dehuai was amassing Chinese troops along the North Korean
Leap Forward in 1959, he border. In late October, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu, surprising the UN forces
was denounced and never and driving them all the way back to Seoul. While this battle was presented to the
regained his prominent Chinese people as an incontrovertible victory, it came at a cost of over 700,000
position within the Party or Chinese causalities (including the death of Mao’s son Mao Anying) and diverted
the government. critical resources from domestic reconstruction.

Questions
PEOPLE’S VOLUNTEER
1. What factors did the Chinese consider prior to entering the Korean
ARMY OF CHINA—In an
War?
effort to distinguish their
2. Why is Mao’s assessment of the United States so critical to his
actions from what they
decision to aid North Korea?
considered the imperialist
3. Why do you think China went ahead with preparations for the
actions of the United
war even when the USSR appeared less willing to offer support?
States, China’s military
forces in Korea adopted the
name “People’s Volunteer Telegram #1: Telegram to Stalin Concerning
Army.” It suggested China the Decision to Send Troops into Korea
was voluntarily aiding for Combat (Oct. 2, 1950)
their Korean neighbors
and not imposing external 1) We have decided to send part of the armed forces into Korea, under
pressure on Korea’s the title of Volunteer Army, to do combat with the forces of America
domestic affairs. and its running dog Syngman Rhee and to assist our Korean com-
rades. We recognize this course as necessary. If we allow the United
States to occupy all of Korea, Korean revolutionary strength will suffer
a fundamental defeat, and the American invaders will run more ram-
pant, and have negative effects for the entire Far East.
2) We recognize that since we have decided to dispatch Chinese troops
to do combat in Korea, first, they must be able to solve the problems;
they must be prepared to destroy and expel within Korea itself, the
armies of the United States and other countries; second, since Chinese
troops will fight American troops in Korea (even though they will be
using the title Volunteer Army), we must be prepared for the United
States to declare and enter a state of war with China; we must be pre-
pared [for the fact] that the United States may, at a minimum, use its
air force to bomb many major cities and industrial centers in China,
and use its Navy to assault the coastal region.
3) Of these two problems, the primary problem is whether or not the
Chinese Army can destroy the American forces within Korea itself,
and effectively resolve the Korean problem. So long as our forces can
destroy the American forces within Korea itself, most importantly [as
long as they can] destroy the American Eighth Army (an old army
with combat effectiveness), while the seriousness of the second prob-
lem (America’s declaring war on China), will still exist, the situation
will already have turned in favor of the revolutionary camp and China.
This is to say, if the American forces are defeated, the Korean problem
is, in fact, finished ([although] It is possible that formally it may not be
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 259

over; the U.S. may for a long time not recognize Korea’s victory); so,
even if the Americans have already openly declared war on China, the
scope of this war will probably not be great, and the duration will not
be long. We see the least advantageous situation as the Chinese Army
being unable to destroy the American forces in large number, the two
armies becoming mutually deadlocked, and, in addition, the United
States having already entered an open state of war with China, thus
leading to resulting destruction of the economic construction plan we
have already begun, and moreover, arousing dissatisfaction toward
us among the national bourgeoisie and other segments of the people
(they are very afraid of war).
4) Under the present situation, we have decided that on October 15 we
will begin dispatching the twelve divisions that have been trans-
ferred in advance to South Manchuria. They will locate themselves
in appropriate districts of North Korea (not necessarily all the way to
the 38th parallel). While they do combat with the enemy who dares to
advance and attack north of the 38th parallel, in the first period fight-
ing a defensive war to destroy small enemy detachments and gaining
a clear understanding of the situation, they will await the arrival of
Soviet weapons and the equipping of our Army, and then [they will]
coordinate with Korean comrades a counterattack, destroying the
invading American army.
5) According to our intelligence to date, an American Army (two infantry
divisions and one mechanized division) totals 1,500 pieces of artillery
ranging from 7- to 24-centimeter caliber, including tank and anti-air-
craft artillery; one of our armies (three divisions) only has 36 pieces
of that type of artillery. The enemy has control of the air, and the air
force we have begun training will not be able to put 300 planes into
the war until February 1951. Because of this, our forces are still unable
to assure destruction of the American Army in one blow. And, since
we have decided to fight with Americans, we should be prepared so
that, at the point in a campaign that the American command assem-
bles its forces on the battlefield to fight with ours, our troop strength
should be four times that of the enemy (using four of our armies to
counter one of the enemy’s) and our firepower should be one and a
half to two times that of the enemy (using 2,20–3,000 of every type of
artillery piece from seven centimeters and up to counter 1,500 enemy
artillery pieces of the same caliber). Thus they will assuredly, cleanly
and thoroughly destroy the one army of the enemy.
6) Besides the 12 divisions mentioned above, we are also in the process
of transferring twenty-four divisions from south of the Yangtze River
and from the ShaanGan [Shaanxi and Gansu] District to take up posi-
tions in the LongHai, JinPu, BeiNing lines, in order to form the second
and third wave of military forces to assist Korea. We estimate that in
the spring and summer of next year, according to the circumstance at
the time, they will progressively be employed.

Telegram #2: Telegram to Zhou Enlai [in Moscow]

Concerning [Why] Our Troops Should Enter Korea
(October 13, 1950)
1) The result of a discussion on the part of comrades in the Politburo is
that we unanimously believe that having our troops enter Korea is
more advantageous [than the alternatives]. In the first period we can
260 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

focus on attacking the puppet forces; our troops’ countering of pup-

pet forces is certain [of success]; we can open up a base in Korea in
the large mountain region north of the Wonson-Pyongyang line, and
can inspire the Korean people. In the first period, as long as we can
destroy some divisions of the puppet army, the Korean situation can
take a turn to our advantage.
2) The adoption of the active policy above will be extremely advanta-
geous for China, Korea, the Far East, and the world; and on the other
hand, if we do not send troops, allowing the enemy to press to the
Yalu border and [allowing] the arrogance of reactionaries at home and
abroad to grow, then this will be disadvantageous to all sides. Above
all it will be most disadvantageous to Manchuria; all of the North-
easter border defense forces will be absorbed, and South Manchurian
electrical power will be controlled [by the enemy].
In summation, we recognize that we should enter the war, we must
enter the war; entering the war will have great benefits; the harm
inflicted by not entering the war would be great.

10.3 US IMPERIALISM IS A PAPER TIGER (JULY 14, 1956)

By 1953, a truce had been declared dividing Korea along the 38th parallel—the
original 1945 demarcation. The US involvement in the war in tandem with Amer-
ican support of the KMT resulted in the PRC perceiving the United States as their
foremost international adversary. Within China, the United States increasingly
became the focus of numerous political campaigns. Mao’s following speech out-
lines the growing efforts to rally international anti-American support, suggest-
ing that the United States was not as powerful as many made them out to be.
Despite his popularization of the expression, Mao did not coin the phrase “paper
tiger” [zhi laohu]. The term dates back to at least the nineteenth century and
means simply somebody who appears strong but is actually harmless. The follow-
ing document recounts comments in an interview he gave to two Latin American
journalists.

Questions
1. How do you think Mao’s anti-Americanism was received among
the Chinese? Do you think Latin Americans, Asians, and Africans
would agree with his statements?
2. What does he mean when he refers to the United States as a
“paper tiger”?

The United States is flaunting the anti-communist banner everywhere in

order to perpetrate aggression against other countries.
The United States owes debts everywhere. It owes debts not only to
the countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa, but also to the countries
of Europe and Oceania. The whole world, Britain included dislikes the
United States. The masses of the people dislike it. Japan dislikes the United
States because it oppresses her. None of the countries in the East is free
from U.S. aggression. The United States has invaded our Taiwan Prov-
ince. Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam and Pakistan all suffer from
U.S. aggression, although some of them are allies of the United States. The
people are dissatisfied and, in some countries, so are the authorities.
All oppressed nations want independence.
Everything is subject to change. The big decadent forces will give
way to the small new-born forces. The small forces will change into big
forces because the majority of the people demand this change. The U.S.
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 261

imperialist forces will change from big to small because the American
people, too, are dissatisfied with their government. . . .
Now U.S. imperialism is quite powerful, but in reality it isn’t. It is
very weak politically because it is divorced from the masses of the people
and is disliked by everybody and by the American people too. In appear-
ance it is very powerful but in reality it is nothing to be afraid of, it is a
paper tiger. Outwardly a tiger, it is made of paper, unable to withstand
the wind and the rain. I believe the United States is nothing but a paper
tiger.
History as a whole, the history of class society for thousands of years,
has proved this point: the strong must give way to the weak. This holds
true for the Americas as well.
Only when imperialism is eliminated can peace prevail. The day will
come when the paper tigers will be wiped out. But they won’t become
extinct of their own accord, they need to be battered by the wind and the
rain.
When we say U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger, we are speaking in
terms of strategy. Regarding it as a whole, we must despise it. But regard-
ing each part, we must take it seriously. It has claws and fangs. We have to
destroy it piecemeal. For instance, if it has ten fangs, knock off one the first
time, and there will be nine left, knock off another, and there will be eight
left. When all the fangs are gone, it will still have claws. If we deal with it
step by step and in earnest, we will certainly succeed in the end.
Strategically, we must utterly despise U.S. imperialism. Tactically,
we must take it seriously. In struggling against it, we must take each
battle, each encounter, seriously. At present, the United States is power-
ful, but when looked at in a broader perspective, as a whole and from
a long-term viewpoint, it has no popular support, its policies are dis-
liked by the people, because it oppresses and exploits them. For this
reason, the tiger is doomed. Therefore, it is nothing to be afraid of and
can be despised. But today the United States still has strength, turning
out more than 100 million tons of steel a year and hitting out every-
where. That is why we must continue to wage struggles against it, fight
it with all our might and wrest one position after another from it. And
that takes time.
It seems that the countries of the Americas, Asia and Africa will have
to go on quarrelling with the United States till the very end, till the paper
tiger is destroyed by the wind and the rain.
To oppose U.S. imperialism, people of European origin in the Latin-
American countries should unite with the indigenous Indians. Perhaps
the white immigrants from Europe can be divided into two groups, one
composed of rulers and the other of ruled. This should make it easier for
the group of oppressed white people to get close to the local people, for
their position is the same.
Our friends in Latin America, Asia and Africa are in the same posi-
tion as we and are doing the same kind of work, doing something for the
people to lessen their oppression by imperialism. If we do a good job, we
can root out imperialist oppression. In this we are comrades.
We are of the same nature as you in our opposition to imperialist
oppression, differing only in geographical position, nationality and lan-
guage. But we are different in nature from imperialism, and the very sight
of it makes us sick.
What use is imperialism? The Chinese people will have none of it,
nor will the people in the rest of the world. There is no reason for the exis-
tence of imperialism.
262 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

SEVENTEEN POINT 10.4 SEVENTEEN-POINT PLAN FOR THE PEACEFUL

AGREEMENT (1951)—An LIBERATION OF TIBET (1951)
agreement signed in 1951
between representatives After the founding of the Republic in 1912, the central government in Beijing
of the Tibetan government and then the Nationalist government in Nanjing had little or no official pres-
with CCP leaders laying ence in Tibet. Tibet’s autonomy from Chinese rule came to an end with the rise
out the points by which of the PRC, who once again claimed sovereignty over Tibet. With no nations
Tibet would accept Chinese willing to recognize them diplomatically and being no match militarily for the
sovereignty over Tibet. PLA, the Tibetan government sent a delegation to Beijing to negotiate a peaceful
Both sides renounced the resolution. The resulting Seventeen-Point Agreement (largely written by the
agreement in 1959, and the PRC and presented to the Tibetan representatives) established the guidelines by
Dalai Lama established which China and Tibet would engage one another. The document marks the first
a government in exile in time both the Chinese and Tibetan governments explicitly acknowledged that
neighboring India. Tibet was under Chinese sovereignty. Mao Zedong, believing Tibet would soon
see the benefits of the Communist revolution, agreed to allow the Dalai and Pan-
chen Lamas to retain their religio-cultural positions as the top representatives
of the political system. Relative to the political settlements Beijing made with
other ethnically non-Chinese regions, Tibet retained considerable autonomy for
its traditional government. The Dalai Lama, much to his and his close officials’
surprise, only learned of the agreement after it had been signed. After some
months of heated discussion, the Dalai Lama sent Mao Zedong a telegram in
October 1951 indicating his acceptance of the terms laid out in the Seventeen-
Point Plan.

Questions
1. What guarantees did the Seventeen-Point Plan promise Tibetans?
2. What did China gain from such an agreement?

THE AGREEMENT OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S

GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF TIBET ON
MEASURES FOR THE PEACEFUL LIBERATION OF TIBET

23 MAY, 1951
[. . .]
1. The Tibetan people shall be united and drive out the imperialist
aggressive forces from Tibet; that the Tibetan people shall return to
the big family of the motherland—the People’s Republic of China.
2. The Local Government of Tibet shall actively assist the People’s Lib-
eration Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defenses.
3. In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the
Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national
regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central Peo-
ple’s Government.
4. The Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in
Tibet. The Central Authorities also will not alter the established status,
functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks
shall hold office as usual.
5. The established status, functions, and powers of the Panchen [Lama]
shall be maintained.
6. By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and
of the Panchen [Lama] is meant the status, functions and powers of
the 13th Dalai Lama and of the 9th Panchen [Lama] when they were in
friendly and amicable relations with each other.
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 263

7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common

Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
will be protected. The Central Authorities will not effect any change
in the income of the monasteries.
8. The Tibetan troops will be reorganized step by step into the People’s
Liberation Army, and become a part of the national defense forces of
the Central People’s Government.
9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan
nationality will be developed step by step in accordance with the
actual conditions in Tibet.
10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce will be
developed step by step, and the people’s livelihood shall be improved
step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.
11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compul-
sion on the part of the Central Authorities. The Local Government of
Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people
raise demands for reform, they must be settled through consultation
with the leading personnel of Tibet.
12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-KMT officials resolutely
sever relations with imperialism and the KMT and do not engage in
sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of
their past.
13. The People’s Liberation Army entering Tibet will abide by the above-
mentioned policies and will also be fair in all buying and selling and
will not arbitrarily take even a needle or a thread from the people.
14. The Central People’s Government will handle all external affairs of the
area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring
countries and the establishment and development of fair commercial
and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual ben-
efit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.
15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Cen-
tral People’s Government will set up a military and administrative
committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, and apart from
the personnel sent there by the Central People’s Government it will
absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the
work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the military and admin-
istrative committee may include patriotic elements from the Local
Government of Tibet, various district and various principal monas-
teries; the name list is to be prepared after consultation between the
representatives designated by the Central People’s Government and
various quarters concerned, and is to be submitted to the Central Peo-
ple’s Government for approval.
16. Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the mili-
tary area headquarters and the People’s Liberation Army entering Tibet
will be provided by the Central People’s Government. The Local Gov-
ernment of Tibet should assist the People’s Liberation Army in the pur-
chases and transportation of food, fodder, and other daily necessities.
17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures
and seals are affixed to it.
Signed and sealed by delegates of the Central People’s Government with full
powers:
Chief Delegate: Li Weihan (Chairman of the Commission of Nationali-
ties Affairs);
Delegates:
264 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

NEW CHINA—A term Zhang Jingwu

widely employed in Zhang Guohua
China today, suggesting Sun Zhiyuan
a significant demarcation Delegates with full powers of the Local Government of Tibet:
between the traditional Chief Delegate: Kaloon Ngabou Ngawang Jigme (Ngabo Shape)
practices of “old China” Delegates:
and those of the People’s Dzasak Khemey Sonam Wangdi
Republic of China. Many Khentrung Thuptan
Chinese refer to the PRC- Tenthar,
era as “New China.” Khenchung Thuptan Lekmuun Rimshi,
Samposey Tenzin Thondup
MARRIAGE LAW OF
1950—One of the first A NEW SOCIETY IN A NEW CHINA: FARTHER,
laws promulgated after FURTHER, FASTER
the founding of the PRC
In the months after the founding of the PRC, the central government
in 1949, it set a minimum
moved swiftly to transform China’s political, economic, and cultural land-
age for marriage, legalized
scape to create a “New China.” A central promise of the CCP throughout
divorce, made men and
its long period of development was to address China’s engrained patri-
women equal in courts
archal culture—that is, the customary belief that men should hold power
of law, and prohibited
in society (and government) and that women should be excluded from it.
concubinage.
The 1950 Marriage Law (10.5), for the first time in Chinese history, made
men and women equal before the law and allowed women equal rights in
ANTI-RIGHTIST seeking a divorce. Equally significant, China adopted a centrally planned
CAMPAIGN—A political economy that was organized around five-year plans, largely based on
campaign launched in the policies of Stalin’s economic planners. Initially, the reforms brought
July 1959 immediately about rapid change and increased economic output (both industrial and
following the Hundred agricultural). By the mid-1950s, the pace of production slowed, causing
Flowers Campaign to the CCP leadership to look for new ways to reenergize China’s economy.
purge those labeled as In 1956, Mao began a campaign known as the “Hundred Flowers Cam-
rightist and not adequately paign,” which solicited criticisms to improve both the party and country.
supportive of the CCP. Unexpectedly, negative assessments of the CCP’s first five years of rule
began to flood in. Mao and the Central Committee, taken aback, reacted
by accusing counterrevolutionaries of using the campaign to attack the
party and weaken its policies. To root out the rightists, Mao began an
“Anti-Rightist Campaign” to purge the party of dangerous elements.

10.5 MARRIAGE LAW (1950)

On May 1, 1950, the first Marriage Law in the People’s Republic of China’s
went into effect. On many levels, the law was the country’s first introduction
to the methods the CCP sought to employ in its quest to fundamentally alter
traditional Chinese society. Although the KMT government had revised many
laws regarding marriage and family in 1931, both the impact of those laws and
the KMT’s ability to implement them were uneven. The 1950 Marriage Law,
and the numerous campaigns in 1950–1951 to put the laws into effect, radically
altered the previously inviolable patriarchy—particularly in the countryside. The
law set the legal age of marriage at 18 for women and at 20 for men. The law for-
mally outlawed “feudalistic” practices like arranged marriage, concubinage, and
polygamy. Conversely, it encouraged “free choice” in selecting marriage partners
while advocating monogamy within marriage. The greatest impact from the law
was giving both men and women equal authority to initiate a divorce (though
the law mandated mediation prior to granting divorce). After its promulgation, a
wave of divorces occurred (doubling in number from 186,167 in 1950 to 409,500
in 1951), which caused many to suggest the law should be called the “Divorce
Law” of 1950.
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 265

Questions
1. In place of “feudalistic” practices previously practiced in China,
what new guidelines did the PRC government establish before
one could marry?
2. In which ways did the 1950 Marriage Law alter filing for divorce
in China?

Chapter I: General Provisions

ARTICLE 1: Abolish the feudalistic marriage system which is based on
coercion, considers men superior to women, and ignores the interests of
children.
Implement a New Democratic marriage system based on the free
choice between men and women, on monogamy, on equal rights for men
and women, and protects the legitimate rights and interests of women and
children.
ARTICLE 2: Forbid bigamy and concubinary. Forbid child brides.
Forbid interference with a widow’s freedom of marriage. Forbid anyone
to arrange marital relations through the exaction of cash or property.

Chapter II: Marriage

ARTICLE 3: Marriage must be entered into with the full consent of both
the man and the woman and prohibits either party from using coercion or
a third-party interference.
ARTICLE 4: Marriage is only permitted when the male is over
twenty years old and the female is eighteen years old.
ARTICLE 5: Men and women who have any of the following condi-
tions are prohibited from getting married:
1) Are direct blood relatives, brothers and sisters born to same parents,
or half brothers and sisters;
The case of marriage prohibition between collateral blood relatives in the
five generations may follow custom.
2) Suffer from physical defects or unable to have sexual relations.
3) Diagnosed with venereal disease, untreated mental disorders, leprosy
or suffers from other diseases that are medically considered inade-
quate to be married.
ARTICLE 6: Both man and woman must register in person with the
local (district or township) People’s Government. For marriage that com-
ply with the provisions of this law, the local People’s Government shall
immediately issue a marriage certificate.
If marriage does not meet with the provisions of this law, registra-
tion shall not be granted.

Chapter III: Rights and Duties Between Husband

and Wife
ARTICLE 7: Husband and wife are companions living together and enjoy
equal status in family.
ARTICLE 8: Husband and wife are obliged to love, respect, assist
and support each other, to live in harmony and unity, to participate in
productive work, to raise children, and to strive together for the happi-
ness of the family and the construction of a new society.
266 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

ARTICLE 9: Husband and wife independently are free to choose an

occupation, how participate in work and engage in social activities.
ARTICLE 10: Husband and wife each have equal rights in ownership
and management of family property.
ARTICLE 11: Husband and wife both have the right to use their own
names.
ARTICLE 12: Husband and wife both have the right to inherit the
other’s property.

Chapter IV: Relationship Between Parents

and Children
ARTICLE 13: Parents have the duty to raise and educate their children;
children have the duty to support and assist their parents; neither party
may maltreat or abandon the other.
The relationship between adoptive parents and adopted children
shall be governed by the provisions of the preceding paragraph. Infanti-
cide by drowning and similar criminal acts are strictly prohibited.
ARTICLE 14: Parents and children have the right to inherit each oth-
er’s property.
ARTICLE 15: Children born out of wedlock enjoy the same rights as
children born in wedlock, and no one may harm or discriminate against
them.
If the biological mother, and others with material evidence, can prove
the paternity of a child born out of wedlock, the biological father shall bear
all or part of the necessary living expenses and education expenses of the
child until the child is eighteen years old. With the consent of the biologi-
cal mother, the biological father may claim custody and raise the child.
When the biological mother marries another person, the support of
the original child is subject to the provisions of Article 22.
ARTICLE 16: A husband shall not maltreat or discriminate children
from his wife’s previous husband, and the wife shall not maltreat or dis-
criminate against the children of the husband born from his previous
wife.

Chapter V: Divorce
ARTICLE 17: When husband and wife wish to divorce voluntarily, the
divorce shall be granted. If either a husband or wife alone insists on a
divorce, the divorce shall be granted if the mediation by the district peo-
ple’s government and judicial organs fails to achieve reconciliation.
If both men and women seek divorce voluntarily, both parties shall
register with the district people’s government to obtain a divorce cer-
tificate; the district people’s government shall issue a divorce certificate
immediately when confirming it is voluntary from both parties and chil-
dren and property issues are properly handled. If either the husband or
wife alone insists on a divorce, the district people’s government shall con-
duct mediation; if the mediation fails, it will be reported to the county or
city people’s court immediately for decision; the district people’s govern-
ment shall not prevent or hinder either men or women from appealing to
the county or city people’s court. In handling cases of divorce, the county
or city people’s court first shall conduct mediation; if mediation fails, a
verdict will be rendered immediately.
After divorce, if both the man and the woman voluntarily desire
to restore matrimonial relationship, they shall register with the district
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 267

people’s government for the resumption of marriage; the district people’s

government shall register and re-issue a marriage certificate.
ARTICLE 18: The husband is not allowed to file for divorce when
his wife is pregnant; the husband must wait for one year after the birth of
their child to file for divorce. But such restriction does not apply to a wife
who files for divorce.
ARTICLE 19: If a revolutionary soldier, on active service, remains in
communication with his family, the spouse must obtain the consent of the
revolutionary soldier in order to file for divorce.
From the date of promulgation of this law, if a revolutionary soldier
has not communicated with family for two years, and the spouse requests
a divorce, the divorce may be granted. Before the promulgation of this
law, if a revolutionary soldier has not communicated with family for more
than two years, and after the promulgation of this law, there is no com-
munication for one year, and the spouse may request and be granted a
divorce.

10.6 BIRTH CONTROL AND PLANNED FAMILIES

(MARCH 7, 1957)
The 1953 census calculated China’s population to be almost 600 million. Worry
over the economic and social implications of problems such a large (and grow-
ing) population soon paved the way for a birth-control campaign, which gained
momentum in 1955. The campaigns of the mid-1950s tended to stress the medi-
cal, financial, and educational advantages of having fewer children. The follow-
ing excerpts, from a speech given by Ms. Li Dequan, Minister of Health, to the
Third Session of the National Committee of the Second Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference marks the highwater point of early birth-control cam-
paigns. By 1958, as the Great Leap Forward campaign gained momentum, opti-
mism about China’s ability to rapidly develop economically led to the belief that
the profits realized by the added labor would exceed the added costs such a rise in
the population would incur on the nation (and thus the belief that China did not
need to practice birth control). As a result, a confusing period ensued when birth
control for health (e.g., to prevent having too many children in quick succession)
emerged side by side with the belief that China’s rapid progress demanded a larger
population.

Questions
1. What are the main family-planning features Li Dequan advocates?
2. Does Li Dequan suggest there is opposition to birth control?

Our birth-rate is really very high. As reported in the Renmin Ribao, an

investigation of 19 State cotton mills in Shanghai, made by Shanghai pub-
lic health departments, showed that, of the 609 pregnant women workers,
17 percent conceive twice a year, 53 percent once a year on an average,
and 22 percent twice in three years. Such frequent childbirth not only
imposes a heavy burden upon one’s family and affects one’s own health,
work and studies, but also makes it difficult to look after and bring up the
children satisfactorily. Of the 3,213 families in Tongwenchangge and Anfu
Hutong investigated by the comrades of a health center in Beijing, 643,
or 20 percent, each have more than four children. The average monthly
income of each of these families is about ¥80, which means, on an aver-
age, about ¥13 for each person’s living expenses (including adults). The
average living expenses for each person will be ¥10 in a family with five
children and less than ¥5 in a family with many children. Illness caused
268 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

by malnutrition is serious. For example, Zhao, a worker in the Post Office,

who lives in Shuncheng Street, has a monthly income of ¥70. His wife is
28 and has given birth to six children, some of whom are suffering from
rickets while one daughter will become an invalid. Now this woman is
pregnant again. Sun, a worker in a join State-private meat store, who lives
in Jinglou Hutong, has a monthly income of ¥40. His wife, afflicted with
mental disease, has given birth to nine children (one of whom has been
given to another family) and had a miscarriage this year. Although the
State, under the present circumstances, can give some relief to such fami-
lies, they remain in great want and are unable to look after and bring up
their children satisfactorily.
Although the living conditions in rural areas are different, the aver-
age annual income of an able-bodied worker is only ¥40-¥50, and the
problem of frequent childbirth must also be serious. Our 500 million peas-
ant each could have, on an average, three mu [half an acre] of land. Now,
owing to the growth of population, each can have, on average, only a little
over two mu. Thus, it can be seen that birth control, contraception, proper
adjustment of the frequency of childbirth, and planned childbirth are not
only not immoral, but actually indispensable to morality and the State’s
responsibility to the people.
Some people hold that contraception is only women’s business.
There are husbands who do not understand their wives’ points of view
in desiring birth control. They not only fail to co-operate with their wives,
but also quarrel and fight with them; this makes matters even worse.
People who oppose contraception on the ground that we now have
new methods of delivering babies, are obviously wrong. Contraception
is intended to achieve planned pregnancy and childbirth, while the new
method of delivery means that babies are delivered by scientific methods
to keep the mother and the baby healthy. We must satisfactorily protect
and bring up new-born babies according to the Constitution’s provision
that “mothers and children shall be protected by the State.” If we fail to do
so, then we are really immoral and violating the fundamental function of
public health work.
Henceforth, in order further to make a success of this task, we must
develop propaganda on contraception more intensively, so that everyone
fully understands the great significance of planned childbirth to the State,
the families, the individuals and the young generation. We must make this
propaganda achieve the objective of enabling every family, every man and
woman to understand contraception, breaking down all obstacles caused
by misunderstandings about it.
We have still not done enough in regard to contraceptive guidance.
On the one hand, some people regard childbirth after marriage as a “mys-
tery,” which cannot be talked about and is shameful. On the other hand,
some public health and medical personnel hold that contraceptive guid-
ance does not belong to the scope of medical treatment and public health
services, and that they cannot take the initiative to give this guidance ener-
getically. Henceforth we have to abandon these viewpoints. We should
understand that childbirth is a natural physiological phenomenon of mar-
riage and that there is nothing “mysterious” or shameful about it. Proper
birth control and planned childbirth are legitimate demands. Public health
personnel must break away from the narrow scope of merely curing dis-
ease and providing health services and come to regard the giving of guid-
ance in planned childbirth, and the satisfying of this demand of the masses,
as their duty. As to the performance of operations for purposes of induced
abortion and sterilization, all personnel concerned with women’s and
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 269

children’s health services and midwives’ work should henceforth make HUNDRED FLOWERS
the decision whether to perform the operation mainly on the basis of the MOVEMENT
wish of the individuals, and limitations on its discretion should be abol- (1956–1957)—A short-lived
ished. But his does not signify the promotion of induced abortion, which government-sponsored
we are compelled to carry out in certain circumstance. Induced abortion is campaign to encourage
not only harmful to a woman’s health, work and studies, but also cannot suggestions and critiques
achieve the purpose of birth control. In future, we must try to solve such of the government’s
problems as the improvement of the quality of contraceptive medicines performance during its
and instruments, the increase of their quantities, and the lowering of their first Five Year Plan. The
prices, so as to enable us to achieve a close co-ordination between this overwhelmingly negative
supply on the one hand and our propaganda and guidance on the other to criticism led to its swift
satisfy the requirement of planned childbirth. conclusion in the summer
of 1957.

10.7 LU DINGYI, “LET A HUNDRED FLOWERS

BLOOM, A HUNDRED SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
CONTEND!” (MAY 26, 1956)
In the autumn of 1955, the Chinese leadership began to assess the success and
failure of their first Five Year Plan. Initially, the campaign began amongst party
members, only eliciting mild discussions, but by the spring of 1956, Mao sought
to open the discussion more broadly. The following document is part of a speech
given primarily to scientists, social scientists, doctors, writers, and artists in
Beijing on May 26, 1956. Delivered by Lu Dingyi, Director of the Propaganda
Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the
speech conscientiously urges elite intellectuals to join in the discussion. Initially,
many were hesitant to offer their honest opinions, but when Mao and other party
leaders appeared genuinely supportive, more explicit critiques began to pour
forth. In general, critiques were mild, but Mao felt threatened by the common
characterization of party leaders from the village level on up as arrogant and elit-
ist. Worried that such comments sought to undermine the Communist Party, the
Central Committee called for an attack on the rightists. All work units (the rural
sector was exempted) were told to identify a set quota of rightists among them-
selves. Those identified were often stripped of their official posts and demoted to
the lowest positions in their working units, while others were punished by being
sent to work on remote farms.

Questions
1. What do the phrases “let a hundred flowers bloom” and “let a
hundred schools of thought contend” mean? Who is being tar-
geted by the campaign?
2. What type of criticism is Lu Dingyi inviting? What process is he
envisioning?
Mr. Guo Moruo, the president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and
president of the Chinese Federation of Literary and Art Circles, asked me
to talk about the Communist Party of China’s policy towards the contribu-
tions of artists, writers and scientists. The CCP’s policy towards artists and
writers is: “to let a hundred flowers bloom” and to the scientists it is: “to
let a hundred schools of thought contend.” This policy has already been
announced by Chairman Mao at the Supreme State Conference. Towards
[the goal of] implementing this policy, we have some experience, but our
experience is quite limited. What I want to discuss today is my personal
understanding of this policy. Present at today’s meeting are scientists,
social scientists, medical scientists, writers and artists. Some of you are
members of the Communist Party, some are friends from democratic
270 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

parties, and yet others are non-party independents. Of course, you are all
able to see how immensely important this policy is to the development our
country’s art, literature and scientific research and to the work in which
you are all engaged. If my own understanding has flaws, please do not
hesitate to correct me, so our common undertaking can proceed smoothly.

I. Why this Policy? Why the Emphasis on this Policy Now?

For our country to achieve wealth and power, in addition to consolidating

the people’s political power, we must develop our economy and educa-
tion. In addition to strengthening national defense, we must advance the
work of art, literature and science. All are essential.
If we want art, literature and science to flourish, we must adopt the
policy of “let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought
contend.” For art and literature, if “one flower blooms alone,” no matter
how beautiful it is, prosperity will not follow. Let’s take contemporary
drama as an example. A few years ago, people opposed Peking opera. At
that time, the Party decided to implement a policy to “push out the old
and bring in the new, in order to let a hundred flowers to bloom.” Now,
the positive results of this policy shift are clear. Unfettered and allowed to
influence each other, different schools of theater made great progress. Our
country also has a long history in the sciences. Two thousand years ago,
during the Spring and Autumn [770–476] and Warring States [475–221]
periods, the “hundred schools of thought contend” phenomenon resulted
in a golden era of intellectual development. In this manner, history proves
that without encouraging independent thinking or allowing free discus-
sion, intellectual progress will languish. In other words, the encourage-
ment of independent thinking and free discussion is a criteria for rapid
advancement of intellectual thought. Certainly, the circumstances of
today differ greatly from that of Spring and Autumn, and Warring States
periods. At that time society was in turmoil, and “let a hundred schools of
thoughts contend” occurred among intellectuals spontaneously without
conscious or coordinated guidance. Today, people have fought to achieve
their freedom and the people’s democratic dictatorship has already been
established and consolidated. The people’s expectation is for science to
progress swiftly, and so we have consciously created a comprehensive
plan for the advancement of the sciences while adopting the policy of “let a
hundred schools of thought contend” to achieve intellectual advances. . . .

III. Criticism and Study

Regarding criticism, the policy of “let a hundred flowers bloom, a hun-

dred schools of thought contend,” means we have both the freedom to
criticize and the freedom to counter-criticize.
Some of the current criticism has alarmed people. But if it does not
alarm people, it will simply be wishy-washy and bland. In what way can
we deal with this problem?
Criticism comes in several forms. One type is the criticism one directs
against one’s enemy, like the saying “to kill with a single blow,” or the “no
holds barred” style of criticism. The other type is criticism which is directed
towards honest individuals. It is a kindly and comradely style of criti-
cism that seeks unity, [perhaps] confrontational, but that always has unity
as its final objective. This type of criticism must always keep the broader
picture in mind, relying on reasoning and adopting a positive attitude.
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 271

One should not adopt the attitude of the “Imitation Foreign Devil” in The FIFTH GENERATION—A
True Story of Ah Q who tried to “exclude others from the revolution.” group of Chinese
Regardless of which style of criticism one employs, one should filmmakers that emerged
always rely on investigating the facts. The outcome should not be drawn after the end of the
from isolated bits and pieces but only arrived at after considerable exami- Cultural Revolution and
nation and consideration of all the pieces involved. included Zhang Yimou,
One approach to criticism that is inappropriate is criticism that only Tian Zhuangzhuang, and
seeks to attack. During the Yan’an era [1935–1948] there was a counter- Chen Kaige. They ushered
revolutionary named Wang Shiwei, and later another named Hu Feng, in an era of considerable
who used essays and other forms of writing to attack the Party and peo- international acclaim for
ple’s regime. To use the “crack down” style against such counter-revolu- Chinese cinema.
tionary elements, is, of course, appropriate. But to use such an approach
amongst the people would be a mistake. . . .
Honest people often make mistakes. There is no one in the entire
world who has never not made a mistake. We should clearly differenti-
ate such mistakes from those of a counter-revolutionary remarks. Honest
mistakes should be addressed with compassionate criticism, calm rea-
soning, with the broader context fully taken into consideration, and by
understanding that we can only achieve unity by working together. We
should actively help those who have made mistakes. Those being criti-
cized should have no need to be afraid.
Mistakes are easily made. Yet, we must put them right as soon as
possible, as persisting in one’s errors will only compound the errors.
Those being criticized, should stick to the truth. If the criticism is
flawed, divergent opinions can also be expressed. However, mistakes
should be corrected, and other’s criticism should willingly accepted.
Then the mistake should be publicly acknowledged, the causes
revealed, the situation leading to mistakes analyzed, and the correc-
tive measures carefully discussed. For a political party, these steps are
essential gestures; to individuals, they are signs of seeking truth from
facts. Making a mistake and accepting criticism is just a way of accept-
ing help from other. This is good for oneself and for the advancement
of our country’s science and its art and literature, no harm can come
from this.
[. . .]
After this policy “let a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools
of thought contend” has been put forward, many questions will arise
gradually which demand answers. I hope everyone will think about these
questions. Today only issues of principle were brought up. All is open to
criticism.

10.8 FILM: BLUE KITE (1993)

Released in early 1993, the film Blue Kite, directed by Fifth Generation direc-
tor Tian Zhuangzhuang, captures the life of a family by tracing the family
through wave after wave of political campaigns. Beginning in 1953, the story
is told from the perspective of Tietou (or “Iron Head”), and the title comes from
a blue kite that he treasured as a child that became entangled in a tree and his
father promised to replace. But that was before his father chose an inopportune
moment to leave a meeting selecting which members of his work unit should
be labeled as rightists. Blue Kite reflects on the 1950s experiences of the first
generation that encountered a government attempting to put into practice many
of their ideas and promises while staving off what they perceived as internal
threats. The film, however, never seeks to place the blame on any particular
entity (even its critique of the government tends to be oblique). Rather, Tian
272 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

Zhuangzhuang focuses on the consequences of such political movements and

offers little explicit interpretation. The following scenes reveal how quickly all
aspects of living, entire families, and heterogeneous spheres of society (academic,
military, etc.) were affected.

Questions
1. How does the following scene demonstrate a new level of politi-
cal thought, even in the most mundane of activities and with real
consequences?
2. How does the film depict the selection of the quota for rightists?
[Chen Shujuan and her family are having dinner around the table. Among
the family members gathered are her son Tietou (“iron head”), her mother, her
elder sister, her older brother (Chen Shusheng), and her younger brother (Chen
Shuyan)]

Scene I
Tietou: (Standing up making airplane noises) Duh, duh, duh,
duh, flyyyyy!
Chen Shujuan: (To her son) Hey, let’s eat. Sit down.
(Tietou sits down before quickly ducking under the table)
Chen Shusheng: Good boy! (Picking up the boy) Little Iron head.
Chen Shujuan: What did you say?
Chen Shusheng: Oh, nothing!
Elder Sister: Shuyan, I have told you time and again. Young peo-
ple should study hard and pay attention to ideologi-
cal reforms. But you would not listen. You are non-
sensical.
Chen Shujuan: Elder sister, can you possibly just stop talking so
much? I’ve got enough to worry about on my mind.
Mother: What are you worrying about? Not to mention noth-
ing is happening to Shaolong [her husband]. Even if
something happens to him, you still got your son, the
little treasure?
Chen Shujuan: What do you know about anything? These are two
separate and unrelated matters.
Mother: Fine, fine, fine, I am not arguing with you all. There is
more food to eat. (She stands up and leaves the table)
Chen Shuyan: (To her elder sister) You don’t need to be afraid. If some-
thing happens, I won’t let it affect anyone else and
your glorious reputation will remain untarnished.
(Big sister stares at him and quickly slaps him on face)
Tietou: Elder Auntie hit him!!
(Chen Shuyan stands up and angrily leaves the room)

Scene II
(Meeting at a military office where Chen Shusheng works. Officers sitting around
a table)
Official: The following members are being “washed out” of
this department. Staff officer division: Zhang Yun-
ming, Liu Shaofeng; operation division: Yu Jie, Xiao
Jun, Su Changjun; military supplies division: Jiang
Yicheng, Hou Mingxin, Wang Kaiyun. Next is our
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 273

political division: Hu Jinsheng, Wu Shaoquan, Li LIU SHAOQI

Yonggang. (1898–1969)—Born in
(At that moment a gunshot is heard, and an officer whose name was just read Hunan, he joined the CCP
slumps to the ground as the camera pans to the blood slowly spreading on the in 1921, gaining notoriety
floor next to his head) as a key party theoretician.
Anonymous officer: Yonggang! Yonggang! In the 1960s, he fell out of
favor with Mao Zedong,
who denounced and
Scene III stripped him of all his
(In a big meeting room where Lin Shaolong works several dozen people are sitting positions then expelled him
around a long table with their leader positioned at the head of the table. He knocks from the party in 1968.
his knuckle on the table to start the meeting)
Leader: Comrades! I ask you to reconsider once again more carefully.
How could such a big library of ours have only one “rightist,”
Liu Yunwei? And while I do not agree with the method of as-
signing the responsibility of discovering a specific percentage of
“rightists” we must be responsible towards our Party’s course
and treat this political campaign seriously.
(He pauses and looks around. People remain silent or whisper to one another in
very low voices with few willing to make direct eye contact with their leader. Lin
Shaolong stands up and quietly walks out of the meeting room to use the bath-
room next door. The sound of water flushing is heard in the background before he
returns wiping his hands dry walking into the meeting room. As he stands by the
door, all eyes turn towards him without anyone saying a word. He closes the door
behind him and returns to his seat. It is clear that Lin Shaolong chose the wrong
moment to leave the meeting and that in his absence was selected as a rightist.)

Scene IV
(Children playing in the courtyard they live. Chen Shujuan and Lin Shaolong are
at home talking to one another immediately after Lin Shaolong returned from the
meeting. She was washing clothes and he was watching the pot on stove.)
Chen Shujuan: Go and talk to your leader once more. . . . Ohhh, why did
you have to go to the bathroom at that moment?

A GREAT LEAP FORWARD

The ideological campaigns of 1956 and 1957 were followed in quick suc-
cession by an even more aggressive effort, the 1958 “Great Leap For-
ward,” a mass movement to accelerate China’s economic growth and to
catch up with the world’s global powers. Overseen by Vice Chairman
of the Communist Party Liu Shaoqi, second only to Mao in the national
hierarchy, China calamitously sought to double (and then triple) agricul-
tural and industrial production (10.9). By the following spring, however,
famine and environmental degradation caused Marshal Peng Dehuai to
write a note to Mao, begging him to reverse his policy (10.12). Furious
at what he took to be a personal attack, Mao attacked Peng by stripping
him of his office as Defense Minister and continued the disastrous poli-
cies for another two years. In the wake of the Anti-Rightist Campaign of
1957, the CCP launched the Great Leap Forward, China’s ambitious eco-
nomic development plan. Intended to expand on the PRC’s first Five Year
Plan—which had elevated China back to pre-1937 production levels—
Mao sought to push production to even higher levels. Specifically, Mao
wanted to put China on pace to achieve self-sufficiency in grain output
274 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

COMMUNE—Seeking to and to produce enough steel and iron to pass outputs in Great Britain,
reduce the state economy the United States, and the Soviet Union. To do this, Mao consolidated the
through consolidation, 750,000 cooperatives (with an average population of 768) into some 24,000
China merged, as part of communes (with an average population of 23,600).
the Great Leap Forward,
750,000 cooperatives into
10.9 LIU SHAOQI’S BLUEPRINT FOR THE GREAT
24,000 communes, which
became the highest of three
LEAP FORWARD (1958)
administrative levels in Self-reliance was the key impetus for the communes, wherein each commune’s
rural areas from 1958 until education, medical, and production systems would be independent of the others.
1983. The drawback with such a system was that it required each commune to produce
their own basic necessities, even if they did not have the appropriate resources or
raw materials to do so. This flaw dramatically hindered Mao’s goal for communes
to increase both their iron and grain production. Such defects were greatly exac-
erbated by the communes’ efforts to prove their loyalty to Mao by attempting to
exceed the already excessively high quotas. Liu Shaoqi’s speech reveals the central
government’s inclination to set impossibly high goals and of being disconnected
from actual harvest and industrial production levels.
Questions
1. What were the key targets of the Great Leap Forward?
2. What does Liu Shaoqi suggest should occur for the Great Leap
Forward to succeed?
The spring of 1958 witnessed the beginning of a leap forward on every
front in our socialist construction. Industry, agriculture and all other fields
of activity are registering greater and more rapid growth.
To begin with industry. The total value of industrial output for
the first four months of this year was 26 percent higher than in the same
period last; the April increase was 42 percent. According to estimate made
on the basis of the present situation, China’s steel output this year will
be over 7.1 million tons; coal output will reach 180 million tons; 60,000
machine tools will be produced and irrigation machinery with more than
3.5 million horsepower; the output of chemical fertilizers will amount to
1.35 million tons. . . .
An upsurge is shaping up in capital construction in industry this
year. Nearly one thousand above-norm projects will be under construc-
tion this year; this is more than the total number of such projects under
construction in the first five-year plan period. In addition, construction
work has already started on thousands of medium and small-sized coal
mines, power stations, oil refineries, iron and steel plants, nonferrous
mines, chemical fertilizer plants, cement plants, engineering works, and
agricultural and animal products processing plants.
The output of local industry this year will show a considerable
increase as a result of widespread industrial capital construction under-
taken by local authorities. Take iron and steel for example. The amount
of iron to be produced by local enterprises this year will reach 1,730,000
tons (as against the 593,000 tons produced last year) and that of steel will
reach 1,410,000 tons (as against the 790,000 tons of last year). The rapid
growth of the local industries is one of the outstanding features of this
year’s industrial upswing. . . .
In agriculture, the most striking leap took place in the campaign of
the cooperative farmers to build irrigation works. From last October to
April this year, the irrigated acreage throughout the country increased
by 350 million mu, that is, 80 million mu more than the total added dur-
ing the eight years since liberation and 110 million mu more than the
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 275

total acreage brought under irrigation in the thousands of years before CULTURAL
liberation. At the same time, more than 200 million mu of low-lying and REVOLUTION (GREAT
easily waterlogged farmland was transformed and irrigation facilities PROLETARIAN
were improved on another 140 million mu of land. The loss of water and CULTURAL
soil was brought under control over an area of 160,000 square kilome- REVOLUTION)—A
ters. This gives proof of the power to conquer nature which the masses political movement
of the people have demonstrated in the field of agriculture following launched by Mao Zedong
the great socialist revolution on the economic, political, and ideological in 1966 to rid China of
fronts and the release on a tremendous scale of our social productive “liberal bourgeoisie” and
forces. . . . to abolish the Four Olds.
Based on the requirements of this general line, what are the main tasks Though Mao Zedong
facing the party and the people in the technical and cultural revolutions? officially ended its most
The main tasks of the technical revolution are as follows: radical phase in 1969, it
To put the national economy, including agriculture and handicrafts, continued to affect China
systematically and in a planned way on a new technological basis, that is, until his death in 1976.
the technological basis of modern, large-scale production, so that machin-
ery can be used wherever feasible and electrification is brought to all the
cities and villages of the country;
To turn all big and medium-size cities throughout the country into
industrial cities; and to build up new industrial bases in those places
where the necessary conditions exist, to enable all the county towns and
many townships to have their own industries, and to increase the value of
industrial output of all the provinces and autonomous regions and even
most of the special administrative regions and counties so that it exceeds
the value of their agricultural output;
[. . .]
To wipe out illiteracy, to institute compulsory primary education
and step by step to bring secondary schools to the townships in general,
and higher educational institutions and scientific research bodies to the
special administrative regions in general and to many counties;
To complete the work of devising written languages for the national
minorities or improving those already in existence and to make energetic
efforts to reform the written languages used by the Han people;
To wipe out the “four pests,” improve sanitary conditions, promote
sports, eliminate the principal diseases, break down superstitions, reform
customs and change habits, and invigorate the national spirit. . . .
The party’s general line for socialist construction is the application
and development of its mass line in socialist construction, we must fully
combine centralized leadership with decentralized management, and
coordinate the resources of the central government with those of the local
authorities, the resources of the state with those of the local authorities,
the resources of the size with those of the masses, the giant undertak-
ings with small and medium-size plants, the striving to raise the quality
of work with popularization—all this applicable not only to industry but
also to other economic and cultural undertakings, and to the technical and
cultural revolutions as a whole.

10.10 PEOPLE’S DAILY “RED-FLAG COMMUNE

DINING HALLS” (NOVEMBER 6, 1958)
The Chinese government began to experiment with “People’s Communes” in
1958. The commune, by merging the village-level administrative structures,
sought to eliminate redundancies of labor, equipment, and bureaucracy. Politi-
cally, the communes also embodied the sense of fully eradicating private own-
ership and placing production, ownership, and control in the public sphere.
276 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

In the pursuit of rationalizing each individual’s time to maximize labor, Mao

and the party had over 2.65 million communal dining halls [gonggong shi-
tang] established in the fall of 1958. Viewed as signs of bourgeois individual-
ism, private kitchens were destroyed, personal food supplies swiftly consumed,
and individual cooking pots and utensils melted down to help meet local iron
and steel quotas. Initially, communal dining halls encouraged members to eat
as much as they wanted free of cost. In some cases, communes raced through
supplies that were intended to last months in only a few weeks. This over-con-
sumption, followed by crop shortages the next spring, led to extensive famine
in 1959.

Questions
1. Why were the communal mess halls seen as particularly benefi-
cial for villagers?
2. Why would China’s leadership want the public mess halls to
succeed?

More than three hundred public dining halls have been established by the
Red Flag People’s Commune in Hengshui Township of Mengjin County
in Henan Province receiving high praise from everyone. Since September,
ninety different dishes have been served, so that the variety of dishes can
last for a whole month without any dish being repeated.
Under the slogan “satisfy every commune member: eat your fill, eat
what you like, and eat until you’re satisfied,” the cooking staff became
highly motivated and creative. By perfecting their methods, even mun-
dane foods like wild vegetables and sweet-potatoes can be used to make a
wide variety of dishes making commune members feel like they are eating
delicacies from the high mountains and the deep seas.
Out of three hundred and seven dining halls two hundred and sev-
enty-nine have implemented the “one-dining-hall-with-three-menu” sys-
tem offering the elderly and sick five meals per day, and “three-sinks and
five-flavors [condiment] station.” The “one-dining-hall-with-three-menu”
system has three specialized stations, each serving a particular group:
one dedicated to the young and able, another for elderly and children,
and a third for the sick or pregnant. The elderly, ill or pregnant are given
five meals every day. The “three water stations and five-flavors [condi-
ment] station” offers three different water stations: one to wash one’s face,
another for brushing teeth, and the third for providing boiled water (to
drink). The “five-flavors” station provides an assortment of condiments
and sauces for the commune members to choose from: vinegar, soy sauce
chili peppers, salt, garlic, etc.
Every dining hall routinely conducts surveys to solicit suggestions
and receive feedback. Everyday particular attention is given to the atmo-
sphere, comments and feedback, so that meals can be adjusted and vari-
ety maintained. Already two hundred and fourteen of the dining halls in
the commune can serve ninety dishes and so can go for a month without
repeating any dish. . . .
Initially, the dining halls were not well-organized nor well-received
by the masses. At the outset, more than one hundred and fifty land-
lords, rich farmers, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and those
with serious capitalist ideology snuck into the dining halls and left them
in a complete shambles. The local Party Committee called the masses
into action and thoroughly purged those bad elements from the din-
ing hall and cooking staff. In their place, thirty-two Communist Party
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 277

members, sixty-three members of Communist Youth League and eighty-

five “Building-Communism Activists” were swiftly appointed to those
positions. Zhang Jinsheng, the deputy Party Secretary of the Commune,
followed up and thoroughly examined the No. 17 Dining Hall even per-
sonally overseeing the meals himself. He, together with dining hall staff,
created the “one-dining-hall-with-three-menu” system as well as many
new innovative dishes. He called spontaneous meetings that resulted in
each of the more than three hundred dining halls in the Commune to
gradually improve.

10.11 CLOSE PLANTING (1950S)

Prior to the Great Leap Forward, Mao had complained that “some of our comrades
are tottering along like a woman with bound feet, always complaining that oth-
ers are going too fast.” To accelerate China’s economic development, Mao sought
to jettison traditional economic assumptions while adopting revolutionary ones.
Mao’s revolutionary practices, while couched in quasi-scientific terms, were
not based on scientific reality. In the agricultural realm, Chinese farmers were
encouraged to embrace the ideas of “deep plowing” (to get closer to the ground
water), fertilizing in a thick layer over fields (based on the idea if a little was good,
a lot must be better), and “close planting,” the topic of the following article. Peas-
ants, even if they were skeptical, did not challenge the cadres’ production quotas.
The cadres, if dubious, could not diminish their pretense of revolutionary enthu-
siasm without fear of censure from the central government. To make the façade
complete, the communes were forced to deliver the mandated percentages to the
central governments. This often left the communes with desperately low levels of
supplies to last them through the winter, while their supposed surpluses rotted
in inadequately prepared state warehouses. The following account is typical of
articles printed in newspapers and other materials distributed to the communes
with a mix of factual information, typical village behavior, and new revolutionary
ideas all focused on a revolutionary-minded individual upon which all commune
members should model themselves.

Questions
1. Why would such a story be so difficult to contradict in the climate
of the Great Leap Forward?
2. Why would “close planting” be considered revolutionary?

In the old society, the practice was to leave enough space between cot-
ton plants for a baby to lie in. As things are today, a small dog might just
about manage to run between the rows, but not between two plants in the
same row. Qiliying commune, after years of testing and popularization,
has raised the density of its cotton plants from 2,000 to 7,000 and even
8,000 per mu.
One of the pioneers in achieving this was Du Fating, head of the
agro-technical group of the Kangzhuang brigade, another of the ten
commune-nominated peasant experts. Enjoying high regard not only in
his own village, he now leads a network comprising the agro-technical
groups of four brigades. . . .
His interest in close planting arose in the early 1950s, in the mutual-
aid period following the land reform. After visiting a state farm, he said
to his father one day:
“They get their high yields in cotton by planting 4,000 to the mu.
Why shouldn’t we?”
278 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

Not picturing how close the planting would have to be to get this
figure, his father said nothing. But out in the fields, when he saw how
densely his son was spacing the plants, he exploded:
“You don’t know what you’re doing! Who on earth ever planted like
that?”
“Let’s try it once,” said Du Fating, “if it won’t work, we’ll drop it.”
“You’ll have all the neighbors laughing at us. Don’t expect me to
look a fool along with you,” snapped the old man, stopping his work and
stalking off home.
Young Du sought support from the other old and experienced
peasants in the team. But they, too, didn’t believe in close planting.
Finally he alone tried the new method, his teammates stuck to the old
rule. Dense here, sparse there, the resulting average was barely 3,600
plants per mu.
In the field management afterwards, Du faithfully applied what he
had learned from the state-farm agronomist. When the plants came up,
many people gathered for a look.
“So close,” some remarked, shaking their heads. “There’ll be stalks
and leaves, but not bolls.”
“Beautiful!” one said, nodding. Du’s heart leaped at this seeming
approval. But then the man added, “Like flowers in the mirror, fine to look
at but of no use.”
Du was so put out, he almost picked a quarrel then and there. For-
tunately, the agronomist had warned him that at the start, close planting
was bound to meet with mockery, as people weren’t used to it. Only a rich
yield would convince them.
That year, Du’s experimental cotton plot produced a bumper crop of
110 jin per mu, and became the talk of the whole village.
“Young Du’s done it! The yield’s really high!” people said to each
other. . . . Local Party organizations had often seized on examples like Du
Fating’s to show the advantages of scientific farming to the peasants. But
its application over large areas became possible only after the formation
of the co-operatives.
With the founding of the commune, scientific farming rapidly devel-
oped in breadth and depth to become a revolutionary mass movement.
More and more members came to realize that this was a fight against the
force of habit left over from the small-peasant economy that had prevailed
in China for thousands of years. In making sweeping reforms in the old
methods of cultivation, they have exploded the myth of predestination
spread by Confucius and his adherents through the ages, and established
a firm belief in continued revolution and in the truth that man can conquer
nature.
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that they have learned to apply
Marxist dialectics to the solution of many problems arising in scientific
farming.

10.12 PENG DEHUAI’S LETTER TO CHAIRMAN

MAO (JULY 14, 1959)
In 1959, as the horrifying (and almost entirely preventable) results of the Great
Leap Forward became obvious, leaders began to discuss how to bring relief to those
areas hardest hit by famine. After a personal fact-finding trip through many of
the regions most affected by the campaign, Peng Dehuai learned of the severe suf-
fering and widespread starvation. Peng Dehuai, as a veteran of the Long March,
hero of the Korean War, and longtime friend of Mao, felt compelled to broach the
 Chapter 10 • New China: Finding a New Way 279

issue and to prevent any further deterioration of the situation. A firm believer BEIDAIHE—A coastal
and battle-hardened Communist himself, Peng only presented his findings after resort town northeast of
the Central Committee had confirmed the “success” of the movement during the Beijing used by the CCP’s
Lushan Meeting (July 1959). As the following letter indicates, he did not seek central committee and high
to grandstand (the letter was sent to Mao alone) and went to great lengths to level officials for work
make his comments constructive. He did, however, point out the failures of the and meetings during the
movement in a frank and forthright manner, while most of his colleagues chose summer.
to remain silent. As a result of Mao Zedong’s failure to address the agricultural
mistakes, the country experienced three years of famine, killing over 30 million
WALKING ON TWO
people.
LEGS—A phrase Mao
Questions used to describe the
simultaneous development
1. What does Peng Dehuai suggest are the root reasons for the fail- of both the agricultural and
ures of the Great Leap Forward? industrial sectors.
2. How does he suggest the party move forward?

A number of problems that have developed merit attention in regard to

our way of thinking and style of work. The main problems are:
1. A growing tendency towards boasting and exaggeration on a fairly
extensive scale. At the Beidaihe Meeting last year, the grain output was
overestimated. This created a false impression and everyone thought
that the food problem had been solved and that we could therefore
go all out in industry. In iron and steel, production was affected with
such extreme one-sided thinking that no serious study was conducted
on equipment for steel making and rolling and ore crushing as well
as for coal mining and other mineral ores and for making coke, on the
source of pit-props, on transportation capacity, on the expansion of
the labor force, on the increase in purchasing power, on the distribu-
tion of market commodities, etc. In sum, we did not have a balanced
overall plan.
It was also a lack of realistic thinking that gave rise to these errors.
This, I am afraid, was the cause of a series of our problems.
The exaggeration trend has become so common in various areas
and departments that reports of unbelievable miracles have appeared
in newspapers and magazines to bring a great loss of prestige to the
Party.
According to what was reported, it seemed that communism was
just around the corner, and this turned the heads of many comrades.
Extravagance and waste grew in the wake of reports of extra-large
grain and cotton harvests and a doubling of iron and steel output. As
a result, the autumn harvest was done in a slipshod manner, and costs
were not taken into consideration. Though we were poor, we lived as
if we were rich.
What is particularly serious in all this is that it was very hard for
us to get to know the real situation for a fairly long period. We did
not have a clear idea of the situation even at the time of the Wuchang
Meeting and the meeting of secretaries of provincial and municipal
Party committees held in January this year.
The tendency towards boasting and exaggeration has its social
cause, which is worth studying. It also has to do with our practice
of fixing production quotas without corresponding measures to meet
them.
Though Chairman Mao reminded the Party last year of the need
to combine soaring enthusiasm with a scientific approach and the
280 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

principle of “walking on two legs,” it seems that his instructions have

not been grasped by most leading comrades, and I am no exception.
2. Petty-bourgeois fanaticism which makes us vulnerable to “left” errors.
In the Great Leap Forward of 1958, I, like many other comrades, was
misled by the achievements of the Great Leap Forward and the zeal of
the mass movement. As a result, some “Left” tendencies developed in
our heads. We were thinking of entering a communist society in one
stride, and the idea of trying to be the first to do this gained an upper
hand in our minds for a time. So we banished from our minds the
mass line and the working style of seeking truth from facts, which had
been cultivated by the Party for a long time.
In our way of thinking, we have often muddled up the relationship
between strategic goals and concrete measures, between long-term prin-
ciples and immediate steps, between the whole situation and part of it,
and between big collectives and small collectives. The Chairman’s calls
such as “strive for a high yield on a smaller area and bring in a big crop”,
“catch up with Britain in 15 years”, etc., are long-term strategic goals. But
we have not studied them carefully and have not paid enough attention
to the specific current conditions so as to arrange our work on a positive,
safe and reliable basis.
[. . .]
By now we have got a basically clear picture of the domestic situa-
tion. Particularly because of the recent meetings, most comrades within
the Party basically hold the same view. The present task for the whole
Party is to unite and keep up the effort. In my opinion, it will be very ben-
eficial to review in a systematic way the achievements and lessons in our
work since the latter half of last year to further educate the comrades of
the whole Party. The aim is to make a clear distinction between right and
wrong and to raise our ideological level. Generally speaking, we should
not go about trying to affix blame; this would be harmful to our unity and
our cause. Basing ourselves on our experience and research since the latter
half of last year, we can clarify some problems arising from unfamiliarity
with the laws governing socialist construction. Other problems can also
be grasped after a longer period of study and experiment. As for our way
of thinking and work style, the profound lessons we are learning this time
help us to realize the problems in them more easily. But we’ll have to try
very hard before they can be thoroughly rectified. Just as the Chairman
has instructed us at the present meeting: “The achievements are great, the
problems are many, the experience is abundant, and the future is bright.”
It is up to us to grasp the initiative. So long as the whole Party is united
and works hard, the conditions for continuing the leap forward are pres-
ent. The plans for this year and next and for four more years will surely
be fulfilled successfully. The aim of catching up with Britain in 15 years
can be basically achieved in four years, and we can surely surpass Britain
in the output of some important products. Hence our great achievements
and bright future.
With greetings,
Peng Dehuai
 CHAPTER 11
China in the 1960s
Post-1949 China (1949–Present)China in the 1960s

2 5

1
6

7
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 283

1. GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION: The Cultural Revolution began in 1966,

largely engineered by Mao Zedong to catapult him back into power. The political campaigns were
largely an assault on lingering “bourgeois” elements in society, counterrevolutionaries, and anyone
disloyal to Mao. Extremely violent in the initial three-year period, the political consequences rever-
berated until Mao Zedong’s death in 1976.

2. TIANANMEN RALLIES: On August 18, 1966, Mao Zedong held the first of eight massive rallies
in Tiananmen Square, with more than 2 million people in attendance. Typically, the square would
begin to fill up in the dark early-morning hours. With deeply symbolic timing, Mao Zedong would
arrive just after sunrise, walking through the square before he ascended Tiananmen Gate to address
the adoring and, by this time, ecstatic crowd.

3. RED GUARDS: At this first rally, Mao publicly received the Red Guards, thus officially validating
their radical and violent tactics (11.7). “Chairman Mao’s Red Guards” first formed among Beijing
middle school students in the spring of 1966. Across the country, teenagers formed their own Red
Guard units to fight against the Four Olds: old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits.

4. LITTLE RED BOOK: Marshal Lin Biao, in 1964, selected, compiled, and published the quotations
of Mao Zedong. Designed with portability in mind, the “treasured red book,” was only about five
inches tall and was typically covered in a shiny, durable red plastic with Mao’s likeness on the
cover. By 1974, more than a billion copies had been published into eight indigenous languages and
37 foreign languages. During the Cultural Revolution, virtually all Chinese were expected to have a
copy and, as the picture depicts, wave it in the air to express their devotion and adherence to Mao
Zedong Thought.

5. EAST IS RED: The phrase “the East is Red” originally came from a revolutionary song of the late
1930s proclaiming the arrival of Mao and Communism. By 1966, the sun rising in the east had been
transformed into a potent symbol representing the arrival of Communism led by Chairman Mao.
In the poster (left), Chairman Mao is superimposed over the sun as a visual metaphor for the “East
is Red.” Along the bottom, it reads: “Proletariat Unite! Workers, Peasant, Soldiers Unite! We Must
Liberate Taiwan.”

6. PROPOGANDA POSTERS: The public posting of information on walls and public spaces dates
back well into imperial China. With the founding of the People’s Republic, propaganda posters took
on a new dimension. The posters, apart from their visually striking style, sought to reinforce mes-
sages being disseminated into other media forms, such as newspapers, speeches, radio, and film.
The poster pictured here is originally in black and red on a white background.

7. NEW SLOGANS, OLD THEMES: While Mao unequivocally attempted to create a cult of personal-
ity around himself, he played on popular nationalist sentiments to shore up support. In this poster,
although obviously the focus is on Mao himself, he aligns himself with the reunification of Taiwan.
With Soviet support waning, Mao also often attempted to make the Cultural Revolution appear as
part of a larger international movement in Africa, the United States, and Latin America (11.9).
284 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

FOUR OLDS—Referring In the summer of 1966, China launched the Great Proletarian Cultural
to broad categories Revolution. The Sixteen Point directive adopted on August 8 presented
denounced during the the revolutionary aims with considerable precision (11.6). This directive
Cultural Revolution: old instructed the people to “revolutionize people’s ideology” and, as a con-
customs, old culture, old sequence, to achieve greater, faster, and more economical results in all
habits, and old ideas. fields of work. The Chinese people were called upon to remove all traces
of traditional culture, to overthrow all remnants of the bourgeoisie, and
to make all elements of Chinese society conform to the socialist system.
FAMILY Most ominously, the document anticipated violence by stating explicitly
BACKGROUND— that the masses should expect to encounter resistance. The titles of the
Depending on the class campaigns unleashed by Mao and the central government offer a bone-
background of one’s chilling glimpse into the terrifying nature of this period: “Bombard the
parents (and sometimes Headquarters,” “Sweeping Away All Monsters and Demons,” “Destroy
one’s grandparents), each the Four Olds.”
individual was designated It bears remembering that the Cultural Revolution was unleashed
as “red” or “black.” If one’s against a population that had been remarkably compliant in the decade
parents were workers, and a half since the PRC had been founded. Indeed, with a few notable
poor peasants, lower- exceptions, public reaction to the series of political campaigns that had
middle-class peasants, radically reshaped Chinese society was overwhelmingly supportive of
revolutionary cadres, or the central government’s efforts. Mao’s new campaigns were not targeted
revolutionary soldiers, they against especially fractious segments of the population or in reaction to
were classified as one of specific challenge to his rule. Rather, the Cultural Revolution was a politi-
the five red types (coming cal campaign led by Mao, indisputably the most powerful and respected
from a “revolutionary” leader in China, against a population who had readily and repeatedly
background). If accepted considerable hardships all in the name of building a “New
one’s parents were China.”
landlords, rich peasants, To begin to understand the impact that the Chinese Cultural Revo-
counterrevolutionaries, lution era had on any individual, it is essential to understand the depth
evildoers, rightists, to which the state regulated virtually every aspect of their citizen’s lives.
capitalists, or reactionary A key node in this central government control was the personal dossier
intellectuals, they were [dang’an]. The importance of this dossier for the common Chinese citizen
classified as being in one of cannot be overstated, for it contained every significant document relating
seven black categories. to a citizen’s personal, academic, and professional life. To a Chinese citi-
zen in the 1960s, the most consequential elements would be family back-
DANWEI—A Chinese ground [jiating chushen], political appearance [mianmao], and the various
term meaning “work behavior evaluations of job, political, or personal conduct. Furthermore,
unit” or one’s place since a work unit’s [danwei] authorization was required to get married,
of employment. Until give birth, or transfer jobs—and the fact that those decisions were largely
the 1990s, each danwei based on the dossier—that dossier, to a large extent, dictated a future
controlled housing, career, an ability to find a partner, and even permission to attend college.
childcare, schools, clinics, The personal dossier was property of the state and, as such, the indi-
etc., and held considerable vidual was not permitted to see it. Only a person’s superiors or Communist
power over travel, Party members had the authority to review the file. Any information put
marriage, and having in the personal file could only be expunged in exceptional circumstances
children. with considerable effort. The constant fear that any errant behavior could
be entered in the dossier served as one of the PRC’s most powerful deter-
rents. Even more worrisome were the ways in which this system could be
RED GUARDS—Middle subverted: by irritated neighbors reporting politically inappropriate com-
and high-school-aged ments, by jealous co-workers embellishing any work-related shortcom-
students who answered ings, or by a resentful superior knowingly filing half-truths and out-right
Mao Zedong’s call in 1966 falsehoods in the dossier. These worries were compounded by radical
to spread his teachings, political campaigns like the Cultural Revolution.
fight against the “Four Unlike previous political campaigns that were mostly top-down
Olds,” and remove all affairs orchestrated by the central government, the Cultural Revolution
counterrevolutionary gave extensive power to China’s youth. With Mao Zedong’s explicit autho-
elements from society. rization, revolutionary youth groups called “Red Guards” [hongweibing]
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 285

were whipped into a revolutionary frenzy to purify the country. They MAO BUTTONS—Worn
were to attack all suspected counterrevolutionaries and cleanse society as a symbol of one’s loyalty
of the Four Olds: old culture, old ideas, old customs, and old habits. Offi- to Mao Zedong during
cially sanctioned by Mao, sporting Mao buttons, and quoting from their the Cultural Revolution,
“Little Red Book” (Quotations from Chairman Mao), they spread a public at least 2 billion badges
reign of terror such as the nation had never witnessed. Although the earli- were manufactured, with
est Red Guard units were from Beijing, revolutionary gangs quickly mate- well over 10,000 different
rialized throughout the country. Seeking to show their commitment, the designs.
units would work their way through neighborhood homes, searching for
evidence of revolutionary crimes. People wearing close-fitting clothes and COW SHEDS—a place of
high-heeled shoes or having long hair (all considered “improper bour- confinement chosen by the
geois attire” [zichanjieji qizhuang yifu]) were accosted in the streets, and Red Guards, usually in a
the offending articles of clothing were removed or hair was cut in a more vacant classroom, lecture
“appropriate” revolutionary style. Items as innocuous as pre-liberation hall, or even a bathroom
photos, books in a foreign language, or letters from abroad could be converted for their
enough to precipitate verbal abuse, physical beating, and incarceration in detainees.
cells, referred to as cow sheds [niupeng], for months on end. Those found
to be counterrevolutionary would be paraded through the streets and
forced to wear oversize dunce-caps and derogatory placards announcing STRUGGLE SESSIONS—
their crimes. These placards labeled them as counterrevolutionaries, trai- Cultural Revolution
tors, spies—or, worse, “son of a bitch,” “whore,” or “ox ghost and snake rallies where individuals
spirits.” It was routine for such public humiliations to culminate at mas- accused of “black” or
sive struggle sessions, where the accused would be publicly demeaned counterrevolutionary
and frequently beaten. By the end of 1966, thousands of cadres, teachers, activities would be publicly
and so-called counterrevolutionaries had been rounded up, accused in attacked in sessions lasting
public struggle sessions, and then killed. Even the highest leaders were many hours and held in
not immune from the violence and upheaval of the Cultural Revolu- large auditoriums.
tion. Liu Shaoqi, publicly acknowledged as Mao’s successor in 1961, was
labeled “the biggest capitalist roader in the Party” and removed as Party
Deputy Chairman in 1966, paraded through the streets of Beijing, and pil-
loried in massive public struggle sessions before finally being expelled
from the CCP in 1968. He would die alone, naked, and devoid of any
political standing in a Henan prison cell in 1969.
Life in China became more and more erratic as the revolutionary
excesses reached new extremes. These excesses altered even the normal
rhythms of the day. The day would begin with “morning instructions”
[zaoqingshi], conclude with “evening reports” [wanhuibao], and be inter-
rupted, day or night, with Mao Zedong’s “highest directives,” which
people were required to greet with appropriate celebratory behavior. To
accidentally sit on a newspaper with Chairman Mao’s name was a crime.
Children miswriting a slogan on a wall were said to be subversives work-
ing against the Communist Party, and their parents were arrested. The
fierce nature of the political attacks ripped apart the very fabric of Chinese
society. Family members would be urged to “make a clean break” [huaq-
ing jiexian] between themselves and a disgraced family member. Spouses
were told to divorce their partners, children told to renounce their par-
ents. People abandoned the habit of writing diaries or letters, terrified that
the thoughts and ideas politically acceptable during one campaign could
suddenly be used against them in another. Parents, fearful their children
might say the wrong thing at school or on the street and bring unwanted
attention to them, self-censored what they said in front of them; they
never dared to explain the complex political tides to their children and
thus facilitated, on some level, the excesses that teenagers unleashed on
China. Life was chaotic.
The first and most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution ended in
1969. Some estimate at least half a million people died as a direct result of
286 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

SINO-SOVIET SPLIT the initial revolutionary excesses, and it is likely 2 million were killed in
(c. 1959)—Relations the entire period. Virtually no one emerged unchanged from the Cultural
between the Soviet Union Revolution. Families were split apart as parents were consigned to sepa-
and China soured in the rate parts of the country (if they were lucky enough to avoid re-education,
late 1950s with a series of labor camps, or prison). Teenagers were raised without adult supervision
diplomatic disagreements and encouraged by the government to carry out appalling acts in the name
over Taiwan, India, and the of revolution. They found themselves working in remote parts of the
United States. As a result, countryside with no indication of when they would be allowed to return
the Soviet government to their home cities. Young children entering school at this period were
withdrew their experts, taught only a “revolutionary education” of Maoist propaganda, and the
scientific information, formal instruction at the universities, for all intents and purposes, stopped
and financial support for the duration.
from China. This led to If there was any bright spot to the Cultural Revolution, it was that,
an acrimonious 30-year by its end, most Chinese began to realize that the aging Chinese leader-
split between China and ship was not infallible. Those who came of age in the 1960s viewed the
the USSR that ended with central government and its leaders less as revolutionary heroes and more
Gorbachev’s visit in 1989. as political figures who sought to maintain control of the political rule
Mao had established.

LIN BIAO (1907–1971)—A

Chinese Communist PURSUING NEW LOYALTIES
military leader and hero Quite early in the history of the CCP, Mao Zedong sought to pursue
of the Chinese Civil War. a “China-first” policy with regard to China–Soviet Union relations.
In the 1960s, he compiled The relationship established between the two Communist powers in
Quotations from Chairman the early 1950s (discussed in the previous chapter) was a partnership
Mao Zedong and was of mutual convenience for both Stalin and Mao. Stalin’s death in 1953
named Mao’s successor and Mao’s growing disagreement with his successor, Nikita Khrush-
in 1969. He died in a 1971 chev (who sought to pursue a policy of “peaceful co-existence” with the
plane crash, after allegedly United States) brought about a rift between China and the USSR. This
attempting to wrest power Sino-Soviet split culminated in an open letter from the Soviet Central
from Mao Zedong. Committee publicly criticizing China. Mao’s fear of a Khrushchev-like
figure rolling back many of his revolutionary reforms after his own death
(as Khrushchev had done with Stalin’s) informed many of his actions
in the 1960s. In this climate, accusations of Khrushchev revisionism and
charges of Soviet breaks with orthodox Marxist–Leninist thought became
the norm (11.1). During this same period, China’s domestic propaganda
began to emphasize model workers like Lei Feng (11.2). And model com-
munes like Dazhai (11.3) would become mainstays of state campaigns
well into the 1970s. In the case of Lei Feng, this emphasis was occasion-
ally revived up to the present.

11.1 THE KHRUSHCHEV REVISIONISTS ARE BETRAYERS

OF THE PEOPLE’S WAR (SEPTEMBER 3, 1965)
A brilliant military strategist, PLA General, and hero of the Chinese Civil War
(1945–1949), Lin Biao succeeded Peng Dehuai in 1959 as Defense Minister.
(Mao secretly believed Peng Dehuai was colluding with the Soviets). In 1969,
Mao officially designated Lin Biao as his successor, but only two years later, in
1971, Lin would mysteriously die in a plane crash attempting to escape to the
Soviet Union. Although the Chinese had successfully detonated their first nuclear
explosion in 1964, Lin Biao, like Mao, believed China’s strength lay in a “people’s
war,” with China’s massive population as its greatest asset. The following speech
by Lin underscores China’s growing international strategy of bolstering Com-
munist insurgencies and governments throughout the world in the hopes of encir-
cling, and thus eventually defeating, American imperialism. It also underscores
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 287

the growing extremism that preceded the Cultural Revolution that would begin
the following year.

Questions
1. How does Lin Biao suggest Khrushchev’s efforts to bring about
a rapprochement between the United States and the USSR is a
threat to China and the world?
2. Why would China be particularly worried about the United States
in 1965 (and thus reluctant to follow the Soviet lead in enhancing
Sino-American relations)?

The Khrushchev revisionists have come to the rescue of U.S. imperialism

just when it is most panic-stricken and helpless in its efforts to cope with
people’s war. Working hand in glove with the U.S. imperialists, they are
doing their utmost to spread all kinds of arguments against people’s war
and, wherever they can, they are scheming to undermine it by overt or
covert means.
The fundamental reason why the Khrushchev revisionists are
opposed to people’s war is that they have no faith in the masses and are
afraid of U.S. imperialism, of war and of revolution. Like all other oppor-
tunists, they are blind to the power of the masses and do not believe that
the revolutionary people are capable of defeating imperialism. They sub-
mit to the nuclear blackmail of the U.S. imperialists and are afraid that, if
the oppressed peoples and nations rise up to fight people’s wars and if
the people of socialist countries repulse U.S. imperialist aggression, U.S.
imperialism will become incensed, they themselves will become involved
and their fond dream of Soviet-U.S. co-operation to dominate the world
will be spoiled.
Ever since Lenin led the great October Revolution to victory, the
experience of innumerable revolutionary wars has borne out the truth
that a revolutionary people who rise up with only their bare hands at the
outset finally succeed in defeating the ruling classes who are armed to the
teeth. The poorly armed have defeated the better armed. People’s armed
forces, beginning with only primitive swords, spears, rifles and hand-gre-
nades, have in the end defeated the imperialist forces armed with modern
airplanes, tanks, heavy artillery and atom bombs. Guerrilla forces have
ultimately defeated regular armies. “Amateurs” who were never trained
in any military schools have eventually defeated “professionals” gradu-
ated from military academies. And so on and so forth. Things stubbornly
develop in a way that runs counter to the assertions of the revisionists,
and facts are slapping them in the face.
The Khrushchev revisionists insist that a nation without nuclear
weapons is incapable of defeating an enemy with nuclear weapons, what-
ever methods of fighting it may adopt. This is tantamount to saying that
anyone without nuclear weapons is destined to come to grief, destined to
be bullied and annihilated, and must either capitulate to the enemy when
confronted with his nuclear weapons or come under the “protection” of
some other nuclear power and submit to its beck and call. Isn’t this the
jungle law of survival par excellence? Isn’t this helping the imperialists
in their nuclear blackmail? Isn’t this openly forbidding people to make
revolution?
[. . .]
We want to tell the U.S. imperialists once again that the vast ocean
of several hundred million Chinese people in arms will be more than
enough to submerge your few million aggressor troops. If you dare to
288 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

impose war on us, we shall gain freedom of action. It will then not be
up to you to decide how the war will be fought. We shall fight in the
ways most advantageous to us to destroy the enemy and wherever the
enemy can be most easily destroyed. Since the Chinese people were able
to destroy the Japanese aggressors twenty years ago, they are certainly
still more capable finishing off the U.S. aggressors today. The naval and
air superiority you boast about cannot intimidate the Chinese people,
and neither can the atom bomb you brandish at us. If you want to send
troops, go ahead, the more the better. They will annihilate as many as
you can send, and can even give you receipts. The Chinese people are
a great, valiant people. We have the courage to shoulder the heavy bur-
den of combating U.S. imperialism and to contribute our share in the
struggle for final victory over this most ferocious enemy of the people
of the world.
It must be pointed out in all seriousness that after the victory of the
War of Resistance Taiwan was returned to China. The occupation of Tai-
wan by U.S. imperialism is absolutely unjustified. Taiwan province is an
inalienable part of Chinese territory. The U.S. imperialists must get out of
Taiwan. The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan.
[. . .]
All people’s suffering from U.S. imperialist aggression, oppression
and plunder, unite! Hold aloft the just banner of people’s war and fight
for the cause of world peace, national liberation, people’s democracy and
socialism! Victory will certainly go to the people of the world!
Long live the victory of people’s war!

11.2 LEI FENG, CHAIRMAN MAO’S GOOD SOLIDER (1963)

As China’s Defense Minister, Lin Biao played a central role in educating and
building up the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Lin promoted Mao’s teach-
ings, eventually collecting and publishing Mao’s quotations into a compact red
handbook, first for the PLA soldiers and later for all Chinese. As part of this
broader campaign to promote Mao Zedong Thought, Lin Biao also promoted a
model soldier, Lei Feng, to reinforce the notion of individual sacrifice and com-
mitment to Mao. Mao officially bestowed his blessing on this endeavor in a 1963
speech in which he urged the Chinese masses to “Learn from Lei Feng.” Accord-
ing to his official biography, Lei Feng began work as a tractor driver before
becoming a steel worker. He finally joined the PLA and later died in a truck
accident in 1962. His undeviating adherence to Mao and China’s socialist path,
as revealed in his freakishly aseptic diary that was discovered and published,
as well as the amazing degree to which Lei Feng’s life was photo-documented,
has led many to suggest it is all a bit too convenient. Regardless of these sus-
picions, Lei Feng’s pristine class background and his unselfish and steadfast
commitment to Mao’s teaching made him an ideal model to be emulated by
all Chinese. In China today, his name lives on. To tell a friend or colleague to
“Learn from Lei Feng” is to suggest that they pursue an overly altruistic (even
foolish) course of action.

Questions
1. What practical lessons did Lei Feng learn from his studies of Mao
Zedong’s teachings?
2. What type of behavior do you think the average Chinese would
attempt to emulate after “learning from Lei Feng”?
To me Chairman Mao works are like food, weapons and the steering wheel
of a vehicle. To live you must have food, to fight you must have weapons, to
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 289

drive a vehicle you must have a steering wheel, and to work for the revolu-
tion you must read Chairman Mao’s works.
From Lei Feng’s diary

Lei Feng had begun to regularly study Chairman Mao’s writings from
1958. He had made a rule by which he studied one hour every morning
and up to ten or eleven o’clock in the evenings. He had made a point of
studying the Selected Works of Mao Zedong during every spare moment
when he worked in the coal yard of the Anshan Iron and Steel Com-
pany. After joining the army he had managed to complete volume three
of the Selected Works while boiling water for the amateur cultural troupe.
Then the army leadership called on the men to “study Chairman Mao’s
works, follow his teachings, act in accordance with his instructions and
be good soldiers of Chairman Mao”. Lei Feng took this call as a maxim
and wrote it down on the front covers of his copies of Chairman Mao’s
works. But where the leadership had asked the men to “study Chairman
Mao’s works”, he added “every day” so that he would study them more
diligently. Lei Feng’s job as a driver often took him to various places but
wherever he went he always carried a satchel containing different essays
by Chairman Mao, which he read at every opportunity. Soon his com-
rades had described his satchel as a “mobile library”.
About this time one of his comrades grumbles, “There’s so much
work to do we haven’t got enough time for our personal affairs, nor for
rest.” Lei Feng did not agree, and to encourage himself to work and study
even harder he wrote this passage in his diary which he remembered from
a book he once read:
How do you put a screw into a piece of wood which is perfectly
smooth and has no holes? You use force and screw it in. Then just as a
screw has to be forced and screwed in, so when you study you should
bore firmly into the subject.
It was with this spirit that Lei Feng was able to complete Chairman
Mao’s Selected Works, from volume one to four. And among many of the
essays he repeatedly read were: “In Memory of Norman Bethune”, “Serve
the People”, “Carry the Revolution Through to the End”, “On Practice”,
and “On Contradiction.” . . .
Lei Feng found an inexhaustible source of strength and wisdom in
Chairman Mao’s works, and he gradually came to understand the mean-
ing of life, of revolution and the laws of social development. He learnt
how to treat one’s enemy and one’s comrades, and what attitude one
should take to work. He felt he could see things more and more clearly,
that his vision of life was broadening and that a new big world was open-
ing up before him. . . .
It was about nine o’clock on the morning of August 15, 1962. Lei
Feng and his assistant, who had been driving in a drizzle, returned to
their barracks. Jumping down from the cabin Lei Feng told his comrade to
drive the truck away and get it washed down and cleaned.
Lei Feng’s comrade took the driver’s seat, got the truck in gear and
turned the steering wheel. The truck chugged, shook itself, and backed,
splashing mud all round. Meanwhile, Lei Feng waves and shouted, left,
left, back, back. . . .”
The ground was covered with water and the road was slippery.
While making a turn the truck bumped into a big wooden post standing
by the roadside. Lei Feng was so busy directing the truck that he did not
notice the post which crashed on his head knocking him unconscious. . . .
Within minutes the deputy company commander himself was driv-
ing at full speed to Shenyang to bring the city’s most competent surgeon to
290 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

DAZHAI—A village Lei Feng’s aid. Not a minute, not a second must be lost, the officer thought
located in the mountainous to himself as he raced against time for medical help.
Shanxi province and which Sweat was running down the deputy company commander’s face
Mao Zedong held up as a as he returned with the surgeon, but it was too late—Lei Feng had died
model village, encouraging from a cerebral hemorrhage in spite of emergency treatment by the army
all Chinese to “Learn from doctors. And so, Lei Feng parted from those close to him that morning,
Dazhai in agriculture.” unable to hear his commander’s call, his assistant’s cries, his comrades’
sobs. . . .
Lei Feng died on duty. He lived only twenty-two years, a short but
glorious life. He was born in misery and poverty and brought up in happi-
ness, and his life shed a brilliant light in the era of Mao Zedong. . . .
Every river has its source, every tree its root. Lei Feng’s character
also had its source—Mao Zedong’s thought and the Party’s instructions.
Lei Feng knew very well that “the more often and the more intensely
you study Chairman Mao’s works the clearer will be your mind, the
broader your views, the firmer your stand and the more far-reaching your
thoughts”. He compared Chairman Mao’s teachings to food, to a soldier’s
weapon and to a vehicle’s steering wheel. That was why he took to them
with such great zeal, not only creatively studying and applying them, but
applying them while studying them. This was essentially how Lei Feng,
a poor orphan in the old society, became a hero in the new society and a
communist fighter.
Lei Feng is immortal. In the words of a poet:
What death does to you;
From one Lei Feng come millions of Lei Fengs.
To remember Lei Feng, Chairman Mao, our beloved leader, called on us to
“Learn from Comrade Lei Feng”.
Yes, we must listen to what the Party and Chairman Mao say and
follow Lei Feng’s example. We are now confronted with the heavy task
of socialist construction and may face acute class struggle at any moment.
Like Lei Feng we must always remember the misery suffered by the pro-
letariat in the old society, take a firm stand in the class struggle, recognize
whom to love and whom to hate, and devote ourselves entirely to the rev-
olutionary cause of the proletariat. Like Lei Feng we must be “a screw that
never rusts” in our work. Like Lei Feng we must, in our daily work, add
brick after brick and stone after stone to the edifice of socialism. Above
all, like Lei Feng, we must ceaselessly study Chairman Mao’s works, con-
stantly raise our level of class consciousness and Marxism-Leninism, and
be good pupils of Chairman Mao.

11.3 WHAT IS DAZHAI SPIRIT? (1969)

In 1964, Mao Zedong introduced two new campaigns: “In industry learn from
Daqing” and “In agriculture learn from Dazhai.” At the base of both campaigns
was Mao’s desire to emphasize the self-reliance of communes as embodied by Daq-
ing and Dazhai. In an increasingly turbulent society, it appeared to many that
the safest way forward was to emulate the Dazhai model. Thus, many villages
and communes sought to reclaim land, and cadres would refuse central govern-
ment aid, even when it was desperately needed. Regardless of the actual efficacy
of this commune campaign, as a propaganda tool, it was a stunning success. In
the decade following Mao’s proclamation, Dazhai received about 10 million visi-
tors. The following document was published in the English-language magazine
China Reconstructs under a column “Questions and Answers” meant to help
explain various political movements that might not be self-evident to the foreign
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 291

readership. As was common in the Cultural Revolution, all quotations from

Chairman Mao are in bold.

Questions
1. What aspects of Dazhai made it a model other agricultural com-
munes should emulate?
2. Why do you think the central government relied so heavily on
such model campaigns (like “Learn from Dazhai” and “Learn
from Lei Feng”)?

Dazhai is the name of a production brigade of Dazhai People’s Commune

which lies at the foot of inhospitable Huto Mountain in Xiyang county,
Shanxi province.
In 1964 our great leader Chairman Mao issued the call to the nation:
“In agriculture, learn from Dazhai!” In the years since, and especially
since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution began, the millions upon
millions of China’s commune members, filled with militant daring, have
carried on a mass movement to learn from and catch up with Dazhai.
They vow: “We must resolutely take the Dazhai road and firmly learn the
Dazhai spirit!”
What is the Dazhai spirit? Premier Zhou Enlai, in his report on the
work of the government at the First Session of the Third National People’s
Congress in December 1964, said: “The spirit persisted in by the Dazhai
brigade is worth promoting—that is, the principle of putting politics in
command and proletarian ideology in first place, the spirit of self-reliance
and hard work and the communist style of love for the state and the col-
lective.” This is both a summary and high appraisal of the Dazhai spirit.
Putting politics in command and proletarian ideology in first place
means concretely that the Dazhai people have used Mao Zedong’s thought
to arm their minds and, through thoroughly eliminating self-interest and
establishing public interest, have revolutionized their thinking.
Over twenty years, under the leadership of the Communist Party
branch committee, the heroic Dazhai people have creatively studied and
applied Mao Zedong’s thought, followed closely Chairman Mao’s pro-
letarian revolutionary line and kept to the socialist road in advancing
through the mutual-aid team, semi-socialist and fully-socialist coopera-
tives to the people’s commune.
In carrying out the three great revolutionary movements of class
struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment, they have
constantly struggled against nature, against the handful of class enemies,
against the counter-revolutionary revisionist line which arch renegade,
traitor, and scab Liu Shaoqi pushed in the countryside, and against their
own selfishness. Through struggle, they transformed the poor Dazhai into
a prosperous, socialist new Dazhai. In the struggle, the Dazhai people
have matured into new men of high communist consciousness.
Our great leader Chairman Mao teaches us: “On what basis should
our policy rest? It should rest on our own strength, and that means
regeneration through one’s own efforts.” This self-reliance and arduous
struggle means to carry on socialist revolution and socialist construction
in the spirit of the Party’s General Line of going all out, aiming high and
getting more, faster, better and more economical results in building social-
ism, bringing into full play the initiative of the masses and relying on col-
lective strength and ingenuity.
Under the leadership of their Party secretary, Chen Yonggui, the
Dazhai people resolutely carried out these principles. Over the years they
292 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

BIG CHARACTER gradually tamed the mountain by thoroughly transforming seven ravines
POSTER—Posters often and eight mountain slopes, and built tier on tier of terraced fields with the
attacking a specific person heroic boldness of “daring to make sun and moon shine in new skies.”
or type of behavior written Dazhai’s average grain yield was just several dozen jin per mu at
in large characters and liberation. But now it has risen to over 800 jin. In the past decade and
posted publicly, typically more, Dazhai suffered severe setbacks on three occasions from heavy rain,
on interior and exterior drought and hail. The greater the difficulty, the greater their determina-
walls. tion. Three times the Dazhai people refused to accept state relief. They
resolved to restore their fields in five years and their houses in ten years,
all by their own efforts. But in only three years, the face of the village
underwent great changes. All the members have new cave houses, and
everyone has electric light. Chairman Mao’s classic teaching that people
are the decisive factor displayed its unparalleled power.
Through the creative study and application of Mao Zedong’s
thought, the Dazhai people have constantly remolded their outlook, cul-
tivated devotion to the public interest and developed a communist spirit.
It would take more than three years to eat the grain they produce in one
year. But they don’t farm just to get more grain for themselves. As their
contribution to building the socialist motherland, they sell all their sur-
plus grain to the state. Although the brigade has only some 80 house-
holds, the surplus grain they sell the state every year has always topped
240,000 jin. The Dazhai people proudly say, “Here on Hutou Mountain,
our eyes on Tiananmen and the whole world in our hearts, we farm the
revolution.”
Dazhai is only a small mountain village in Shanxi province. But
guided by Mao Zedong’s thought, it has become a brilliant example for
China’s 600 million peasants in building a new socialist countryside.

THE GREAT PROLETARIAT REVOLUTION

The scope, scale, and fervor of the Cultural Revolution overshadows vir-
tually every other Chinese political campaign that came before or after it.
Despite the horrendous atrocities that were carried out in its name, many
Chinese who survived it retain a fond nostalgia for the songs, propaganda,
and even for the seemingly black-and-white worldview it provided. The
Cultural Revolution had its beginnings in the spring of 1966, but it was
Mao’s “Big Character Poster” (11.5) and the Sixteen Point decision of
the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP that became
the political campaign’s guiding document (11.6). With the publicly vis-
ible resurgence of Mao’s attack against Liu Shaoqi and other top leaders,
events quickly escalated, and massive rallies were held for the Red Guards
in August and on into the autumn (11.7). By 1969, with violence disrupt-
ing the many basic elements of daily life, the distribution of goods, and the
general slowing of the economy, Mao ordered China’s youth to be “sent
down to the countryside” (11.8).

11.4 SONG BINBIN, “I PUT A RED GUARD ARMY BAND

ON CHAIRMAN MAO” (AUGUST 1966)
For many Chinese teenagers who had grown up under a Communist leadership,
Mao Zedong’s call to carry out the Cultural Revolution gave them an opportu-
nity to participate in a revolutionary experience their parents and grandparents
had experienced. Having grown up hearing about the Long March, the War of
Japanese Resistance, and the Chinese Civil War, many young Chinese felt they
had missed out on being “revolutionary.” Mao’s call to them gave them their
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 293

chance. The following account was likely ghost written for Song Yaowu (for- SONG BINBIN (1947–)—
merly Song Binbin). The daughter of a high level CCP official, Song Binbin was A famous Red Guard, who
from the Girl’s Middle School attached to Beijing Normal University—one of the was selected to meet Mao
most elite schools in the capital and where many children of China’s top officials Zedong in August 1966
attended. The incident described next is one of the most famous of the Red Guard at the start of the Cultural
movement and made Song an instant celebrity. What is not included in the article Revolution. When Song
is the fact that the Red Guards from Song’s school were, weeks earlier in early Binbin (“bin” meaning
August, responsible for the first recorded death of a teacher at the hands of young refined) was asked her
Red Guards. name, Mao told her she
should change it to Song
Questions Yaowu (“yaowu” meaning
1. What do you think the attraction to the Red Guards was for stu- “to be militant”).
dents (even privileged ones like Song)?
2. How is Mao’s suggestion to change Song’s name representative
of his goals for the Red Guard movement as a whole?

On August 18, when I saw our most beloved and respected leader, Chair-
man Mao atop Tiananmen Gate, I became delirious with excitement. At
that moment, I asked a comrade assisting in the organization of the rally
meeting for permission to present a red arm band to Chairman Mao, in
order to convey the infinite faith and love that all “Red Guards” have for
Chairman Mao. He escorted me to the Chairman. Ecstatic, I wrapped the
“Red Guards” armband around the arm of our great leader.
Tall and strong with a radiant glow, Chairman Mao was dressed
in an olive-green army uniform and cap. The bright red insignia on his
lapel touched deep into the soul of the people. Seeing the Chairman so
healthy and strong, an enormous happiness filled my heart. I could not
help but shout out: “Long live, long-long live, Chairman Mao! Chairman
Mao asked me my name and I answered: “My name is Song Binbin”. The
Chairmen then inquired: “Is the “bin” from the phrase of “be gentle and
refined” [“wenzhi binbin”]? When I answered, “yes,” the Chairman said
affectionately to me: You should be “militant!” [yaowu].
After returning home, my heart refused to calm down. Chairman
Mao’s words “You should be “militant!” kept echoing in my ears. The
words deeply moved me. They made me see how short I fell of the Chair-
man’s expectations and spurred me in the direction that I should go
towards. Even though I’d done nothing exceptional in the early days of
the Great Cultural Revolution, I had been allowed to meet Chairman Mao
and with my own hands put a red arm band on him. I was overjoyed and
yet I felt very ashamed. I became even more determined to carry forward
the revolution. I vowed to meet Chairman Mao’s expectations to “be mili-
tant,” to dash forward, and advance the Great Proletarian Cultural Revo-
lution to its end.
Before Liberation [1949], following Chairman Mao, our revolution-
ary predecessors held tight to their rifles, dashed over mountains and riv-
ers, fought many battles, and created a New China with revolutionary
violence. This is [why we say] “political power grows out of the barrel of
a gun.” The truth of “be militant” was necessary in the past, it remains
necessary in the present, and it will be necessary in the future. This truth
applies to China, and to all the nations and suppressed peoples around
the world.
Today, in the new stage of the socialist revolution, in the Great Pro-
letarian Cultural Revolution, we must learn from revolutionary prede-
cessors and “to be militant.” Chairman Mao exhibited his fighting spirit
by wearing a green army uniform when he met with over a million at
294 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

CAPITALISM—An the rally of the masses. Chairman Mao taught us: “A revolution is not a
economic system in dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroi-
which production, dery, . . . A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one
distribution, and markets class overthrows another.” Chairman Mao also taught us, “he who is not
are in the private sphere, afraid of death by a thousand cuts dares to unhorse the emperor.” This
where corporations and is the revolutionary spirit we need to carry forward with daring. In the
businesses succeed or fail past, the revisionist educational system tightly constrained us, seeking to
according to free-market wear away our sharp revolutionary edges, in order to turn us into gentle
forces. and refined book worms who would dare not “to be militant.” Today,
in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao has clearly
identified the direction for us. We have risen-up to rebel and “to be mili-
tant!” The shift from “refined” to “militant,” reflects a drastic change in
the people’s thinking and the coming of age of our young revolutionaries.
This is the result of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, marking a
significant historical event.
From the words “be militant,” we can see the limitless aspirations
Chairman Mao has for the revolution’s next generation. Most cherished
and revered Chairman Mao, please put all your worries aside! We are the
inheritors of the revolution and opponents of the old society. We will rebel
and carry on the revolution. We will throw off our shackles, sprint up the
road toward liberation, and smash to pieces all old ideology, old culture,
old customs, and old habits.
We realize that the road of revolution is not straightforward but has
many twists and turns, and that as we advance forward the road may con-
tain many hardships. But, in the name of Chairman Mao, and for the sake
of the revolution, I am prepared to confront mountains of daggers and
seas of flames. There is no hardship that cannot be overcome, as long as
we study Chairman Mao’s works, follow Chairman Mao’s teachings, and
embody the spirit of “being militant.” We must learn to swim by swim-
ming and to learn what it means to be an adult through struggle (dou-
zheng). We must shoulder the heavy burden of revolution and seize the
power of revolution. We pledge to Chairman Mao: Capitalism will never
be restored in China. We will never allow China to change its colors in
our generation, nor in the next. We will keep China red for thousands of
generations, in order to let the red rays of light shine down all around the
world.
The future of China belongs to us, the future of the world belongs
to us. We will confidently promote the spirit of “being militant,” and fol-
low Chairman Mao forward through the great storms and waves of class
struggle, in order to carry out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
to the end!

11.5 MAO’S BOMBARD THE HEADQUARTERS—

MY BIG CHARACTER POSTER (AUGUST 5, 1966)
Written on August 5, distributed at the Eleventh Meeting of the Central Com-
mittee on August 7, and published a year later on August 5, 1967, in the Peo-
ple’s Daily, Mao’s “Big Character Poster” was an unambiguous signal to his
supporters that his words alone mattered. Although his name is never explicitly
mentioned in the original poster, the poster suggests that China’s president, Liu
Shaoqi, was the center of the counterrevolutionary bourgeois base in the Cen-
tral Committee (or in the language of the poster, a “headquarters”). By divulg-
ing his target, Mao signals his determination to overthrow Liu Shaoqi and many
other long-term Communist revolutionaries whom Mao considered a threat to his
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 295

absolute authority. The Central Committee tacitly accepted his radical line, and DENG XIAOPING
several days later issued their Sixteen Point declaration, which signaled the attack (1904–1997)—Born in
on Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Sichuan, educated in
France, and a veteran of
Questions the Long March, he rose to
1. What does Mao mean by “bourgeoisie,” and how does he suggest be General Secretary of the
they are harming China? Central Committee before
2. What does Mao mean by suggesting the “wrong tendency of 1949. After 1949, Deng
1964” was “Left in form, but Right in essence”? Xiaoping held numerous
significant posts and
How brilliantly written is the country’s first Marxist-Leninist big-char- was purged twice before
acter poster and the People’s Daily editorial! Comrades, please read this rising, after Mao Zedong’s
big-character poster and the editorial again. In the past fifty days, some death, to become China’s
prominent leaders, from the local to central levels, have gone in the oppo- “paramount” leader and
site direction. Accepting the standpoint of the reactionary bourgeois and launched broad economic
imposing a bourgeois dictatorship, they are striking down the spectac- reforms. His decision to
ular Great Cultural Revolution. They have mistaken right for wrong, violently suppress the
and confused black for white, beseiged the revolutionaries, suppressed Tiananmen Movement
opposing views, and carried out a white terror. Pleased with themselves, and his inability to control
they have inflated bourgeois arrogance, and deflated the aspirations of government corruption
the proletariat. How very evil! It makes one think of the Rightest devia- tarnished an otherwise
tion of 1962 and the erroneous tendency of 1964 which was “Left” in popular era of governance.
form but Right in substance—it makes one rethink and keep one awake
at night?
LITTLE RED BOOK
11.6 THE SIXTEEN POINTS: DECISION OF THE CENTRAL (Quotations of Chairman
Mao)—A pocket-size
COMMITTEE OF THE CCP CONCERNING THE GREAT
collection of Mao Zedong’s
PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION (AUGUST 8, 1966)
quotations, first published
Perhaps no document so clearly lays out the entire scope and goals of the Cultural for the PLA in 1964. Nine
Revolution than the Sixteen Point decision of 1966. While Mao’s “Little Red hundred million copies
Book” may have provided the means by which the Red Guards and other lead- were ultimately printed.
ers could defend their own actions (and attack those of their rivals), the Sixteen
Points provided a road map for what classes to attack and what tools to use in
their assault and offered warnings against potential pitfalls. The document also
criticized the elements that Mao had undeniably grown to distrust—intellectuals,
science, and education—and instead audaciously adhered to a radical line. Mao’s
approach may have achieved his goals, but it created a highly unstable politi-
cal environment that destroyed societal stability. Many of his guidelines seemed
unambiguous in print, yet when they were applied, their meaning became far less
distinct. The result was considerable friction, in-fighting, and violence—all in the
name of Mao’s teachings.

Questions
1. How does Mao Zedong define who the counterrevolutionaries are?
2. Who is the enemy? Who are “our friends”? Who might be some-
where in between?

1. A New Stage in The Socialist Revolution

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution now unfolding is a great revo-
lution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage
in the development of the socialist revolution in our country, a stage
which is both broader and deeper.
296 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the

Party; Comrade Mao Zedong said: To overthrow a political power, it is
always necessary first of all to create public opinion, to do work in the
ideological sphere. This is true for the revolutionary class as well as for
the counter-revolutionary class. This thesis of Comrade Mao Zedong’s has
been proved entirely correct in practice.
Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to
use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to
corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavor to stage a come-
back. The proletariat must do the exact opposite: it must meet head-on
every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new
ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental
outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle
against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capi-
talist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic
“authorities” and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting
classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts
of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic
base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist
system. . . .

4. Let The Masses Educate Themselves

in The Movement
In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the only method is for the
masses to liberate themselves, and any method of doing things in their
stead must not be used.
Trust the masses, rely on them and respect their initiative. Cast
out fear. Don’t be afraid of disturbances. Chairman Mao has often told
us that revolution cannot be so very refined, so gentle, so temperate,
kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. Let the masses educate
themselves in this great revolutionary movement and learn to distin-
guish between right and wrong and between correct and incorrect ways
of doing things.
Make the fullest use of big-character posters and great debates
to argue matters out, so that the masses can clarify the correct views,
criticize the wrong views and expose all the ghosts and monsters. In
this way the masses will be able to raise their political consciousness
in the course of the struggle, enhance their abilities and talents, distin-
guish right from wrong and draw a clear line between ourselves and
the enemy.

5. Firmly Apply The Class Line of The Party

Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first
importance for the revolution and it is likewise a question of the first
importance for the great Cultural Revolution.
Party leadership should be good at discovering the Left and devel-
oping and strengthening the ranks of the Left; it should firmly rely on
the revolutionary Left. During the movement this is the only way to iso-
late the most reactionary Rightists thoroughly, win over the middle and
unite with the great majority so that by the end of the movement we shall
achieve the unity of more than 95 per cent of the cadres and more than
95 per cent of the masses.
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 297

Concentrate all forces to strike at the handful of ultra-reactionary

bourgeois Rightists and counter-revolutionary revisionists, and expose
and criticize to the full their crimes against the Party, against social-
ism and against Mao Zedong’s thought so as to isolate them to the
maximum.
The main target of the present movement is those within the Party
who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road.
The strictest care should be taken to distinguish between the anti-
Party, anti-socialist Rightists and those who support the Party and social-
ism but have said or done something wrong or have written some bad
articles or other works.
The strictest care should be taken to distinguish between the reac-
tionary bourgeois scholar despots and “authorities” on the one hand and
people who have the ordinary bourgeois academic ideas on the other.

6. Correctly Handle Contradictions Among

The People
A strict distinction must be made between the two different types of con-
tradictions: those among the people and those between ourselves and
the enemy. Contradictions among the people must not be made into con-
tradictions between ourselves and the enemy; nor must contradictions
between ourselves and the enemy be regarded as contradictions among
the people. . . .

7. Be On Guard Against Those Who Brand The Revolutionary

Masses As “Counter-Revolutionaries”
In certain schools, units, and work teams of the Cultural Revolution,
some of the persons in charge have organized counter-attacks against the
masses who put up big-character posters criticizing them. These people
have even advanced such slogans as: opposition to the feeders of a unit
or a work team means opposition to the Central Committee of the Party,
means opposition to the Party and socialism, means counter-revolution.
In this way it is inevitable that their blows will fall on some really revolu-
tionary activists. This is an error on matters of orientation, an error of line,
and is absolutely impermissible.
A number of persons who suffer from serious ideological errors,
and particularly some of the anti-Party and anti-socialist Rightists, are
taking advantage of certain shortcomings and mistakes in the mass
movement to spread rumors and gossip, and engage in agitation, delib-
erately branding some of the masses as “counter-revolutionaries”. It is
necessary to beware of such “pick-pockets” and expose their tricks in
good time.
In the course of the movement, with the exception of cases of active
counter-revolutionaries where there is clear evidence of crimes such as
murder, arson, poisoning, sabotage or theft of state secrets, which should
be handled in accordance with the law, no measures should be taken
against students at universities, colleges, middle schools and primary
schools because of problems that arise in the movement. To prevent the
struggle from being diverted from its main target, it is not allowed, under
whatever pretext, to incite the masses or the students to struggle against
each other. Even proven Rightists should be dealt with on the merits of
each case at a later stage of the movement.
298 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

8. The Question of Cadres

The cadres fall roughly into the following four categories:
1) good;
2) comparatively good;
3) those who have made serious mistakes but have not become anti-
Party, anti-socialist Rightists;
4) the small number of anti-Party, anti-socialist Rightists.
In ordinary situations, the first two categories (good and compara-
tively good) are the great majority.
The anti-Party, anti-socialist Rightists must be fully exposed, refuted,
overthrown and completely discredited and their influence eliminated. At
the same time, they should be given a chance to turn over a new leaf.
[. . .]

10. Educational Reform

In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution most important task is to
transform the old educational system and the old principles and meth-
ods of [Link] this great Cultural Revolution, the phenomenon of our
schools being dominated by bourgeois intellectuals must be completely
changed.
In every kind of school we must apply thoroughly the policy
advanced by Comrade Mao Zedong of education serving proletarian
politics and education being combined with producing labor, so as to
enable those receiving an education to develop morally, intellectually and
physically and to become workers with both socialist consciousness and
culture.
The period of schooling should be shortened. Courses should be
fewer and better. The teaching material should be thoroughly trans-
formed, in some cases beginning with simplifying complicated material.
While their main task is to study, students should also learn other things.
That is to say, in addition to their studies, they should also learn industrial
work, farming and military affairs, and take part in the struggle of the
Cultural Revolution to criticize the bourgeoisie as these struggles occur.
[. . .]

14. Take Firm Hold of The Revolution

and Stimulate Production
The aim of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is to revolutionize
people’s ideology and, as a consequence, to achieve greater, faster, better
and more economical results in all fields of work. If the masses are fully
aroused and proper arrangements are made, it is possible to carry on both
the Cultural Revolution and production without one hampering the other,
while guaranteeing high quality in all our work.
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a powerful motive force
for the development of the social productive forces in our country. Any
idea of counterposing the Great Cultural Revolution to the development
of production is incorrect.

15. The Armed Forces

In the armed forces, the Cultural Revolution and the socialist education
movement should be carried out in accordance with the instructions of
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 299

the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Party and the
General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army.

16. Mao Zedong’s Thought is The Guide to Action

in The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it is imperative to hold aloft
the great red banner of Mao Zedong’s thought and put proletarian poli-
tics in command. The movement for the creative study and application
of Chairman Mao Zedong’s works should be carried forward among the
masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers, the cadres and the intellec-
tuals, and Mao Zedong’s thought should be taken as the guide to action in
the Cultural Revolution.
In this complex great Cultural Revolution, Party committees at all
levels must study and apply Chairman Mao’s works all the more con-
scientiously and in a creative way. In particular, they must study over
and over again Chairman Mao’s writings on the Cultural Revolution
and on the Party’s methods of leadership, such as On New Democracy,
Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art [9.9], On the Correct
Handling of Contradictions Among the People, Speech at the Chinese
Communist Party’s National Conference on Propaganda Work, Some
Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership and Methods of Work of
Party Committees.
Party committees at all levels must abide by the directions given by
Chairman Mao over the years, namely that they should thoroughly apply
the mass line of “from the masses, to the masses” and that they should
be pupils before they become teachers. They should try to avoid being
one-sided or narrow. They should foster materialist dialectics and oppose
metaphysics and scholasticism.
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is bound to achieve bril-
liant victory under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party
headed by Comrade Mao Zedong.

11.7 CHAIRMAN MAO JOINS A MILLION PEOPLE

TO CELEBRATE THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION
(AUGUST 18, 1966)
From August 18 to November 26, 1966, Mao Zedong greeted more than 12 mil-
lion Red Guards in eight massive rallies in Tiananmen Square. During those
months, millions of Chinese youth, Red Guards, middle school and university
students, and workers from across the country rushed to Beijing for the chance to
behold Chairman Mao. During this period, all Red Guards could ride the trains
for free simply by flashing their Red Guard armband. For young Chinese who
had never traveled outside the city of their birth, the chance to be in Beijing and
see the Chairman was a heady experience. Tens of thousands of revolutionary
youth chanted revolutionary slogans and waved their “Little Red Books.” The
rallies were highly orchestrated affairs, with participants housed in dormitories
or vacant schools, bused in early, and often escorted to the train station to ensure
their departure (and to make room for the next wave).

Questions
1. Why would so many young Chinese travel to Beijing to partici-
pate in such ceremonies?
2. How does the following article suggest Mao (and Mao Zedong
Thought) will guide the Cultural Revolution?
300 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

On August 18, at a mass rally to celebrate the Great Proletarian Cultural

Revolution, Chairman Mao Zedong, our great leader, great supreme com-
mander, and great helmsman, joined a million revolutionary people from
Beijing and other parts of China in the magnificent Tiananmen Square in
Beijing, the center of the proletarian revolution and the capital of our great
motherland.
At five o’clock in the morning when the sun had just risen above the
eastern horizon and had begun shedding its brilliant rays, Chairman Mao
arrived at Tiananmen Square which was covered by a vast sea of people
and a forest of red flags. There he met the revolutionary people, who even
earlier had converged on the square from all sides. He was dressed in
an olive cotton military uniform, and a red star sparkled on his cap. He
walked across Jinshui Bridge in front of Tiananmen Gate into the midst of
the masses, firmly shook hands with many of them and waved to all the
people in the square. The square was seething with excitement. Turning
towards Chairman Mao, people raised their hands overhead and jumped
up, cheered and clapped. Many clapped till their hands became sore,
many shed tears of joy. “Chairman Mao is here!” they exclaimed elatedly.
“Chairman Mao has come among us!” And the vast crowd in the square
shouted at the top of their voice: “Long live, long live Chairman Mao!”
The crescendo of cheers roared up to the sky.
Our great leader Chairman Mao spent more than six hours with
the masses that morning. He stood side by side with Comrade Lin Biao
on the rostrum on Tiananmen Gate and reviewed the parade of the one-
million-strong army of the proletarian Cultural Revolution. Watching the
magnificent march-past, he remarked with gratification to Comrade Lin
Biao: “This is a movement of a momentous scale. It has indeed aroused
the masses. It is of very great significance to the revolutionization of the
thinking of the people throughout the country.”
Tens of thousands of Red Guards, wearing red armbands and brim-
ming over with high spirit and vigor, caught the eye of all present. The
Red Guards are revolutionary mass organizations set up in the Great Pro-
letarian Cultural Revolution by the capital’s college and middle school
students. Members pledge that they will remain red vanguards defending
Chairman Mao, the Chinese Communist Party and their motherland all
their lives. Representatives of the Red Guards filled the rostrum on Tianan-
men Gate and the reviewing stands on both sides of the gate. Everywhere,
on the rostrum, in the square, and on the boulevard running through the
square, spirited Red Guards kept order at the rally.
During the rally, a Red Guard from the Girls’ Middle School attached
to Beijing Normal University mounted the rostrum and put a red arm
band of the Red Guards on Chairman Mao. The Chairman warmly shook
hands with her. Red Guards on and off the rostrum were beside them-
selves with joy. Some of them jumped high in the air and cried with great
excitement: “Chairman Mao is our supreme commander and we are his
little soldiers.” Some said: “Chairman Mao joins our Red Guards. This is
the greatest support and inspiration to us. With Chairman Mao’s backing,
we have nothing to fear.”
One thousand and five hundred student representatives mounted
the rostrum to attend the rally together with Party and government lead-
ers. Chairman Mao and Comrades Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing and
others received them in groups, talked with them and had pictures taken
together with them. When Chairman Mao received them, the students
excitedly crowded around him and kept shouting “Long live Chairman
Mao!”
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 301

The rally began at 7:30 in the morning. As the band played The
East Is Red [11.11], Chairman Mao appeared on the Tiananmen tower
together with Lin Biao and other comrades. The crowd leapt with joy.
A great many hands; holding red-covered Quotations from Chairman
Mao Zedong, stretched towards the rostrum. A million warm hearts
flew out to Chairman Mao and a million pairs of eyes sparkling with
revolutionary fervor were turned on him. The crowd became even more
excited when they noticed that their respected and beloved leader was
wearing a plain cotton uniform. “We feel Chairman Mao is still closer
to us in military uniform,” they said. “Chairman Mao always fights
together with us.” Some remarked: “We are wonderfully happy to
have such a supreme commander as Chairman Mao. We will always
be his good fighters, follow him and make revolution for the rest of our
lives.”

11.8 THE ROAD FOR CHINA’S SCHOOL GRADUATES (1976)

In the years immediately following Mao’s 1966 call for revolution, violence
spread throughout the country. Rival factions occupied whole areas of cities,
and fighting went on for months at a time. In 1969, Mao finally decided to
bring the excessive bloodshed to an end. He instructed the country’s youth,
some as young as 16 years old, that instead of doing the “teaching,” they
should go to the countryside and “learn” from the peasants. The so-called
“sent-down youth” are an often-forgotten chapter of the Cultural Revolu-
tion. While Mao succeeded in curtailing the violent excesses of the 1966–1968
period, the harsh living conditions and minimal local resources available to
support the newly arrived youths made the transition particularly harsh.
The following document is from the magazine China Reconstructs, which
interviewed Wu Zhangui, a deputy secretary of the municipal Communist
Party committee in Zhuzhou, Hunan province. Some youth moved only sev-
eral hours from their urban homes, while many of the early groups traveled
to China’s harshest borderlands in the northeast and southwest corners of the
country.
Questions
1. What does Wu Zhangui suggest the youth will acquire from their
time in the countryside?
2. What do the villages gain?

Q. Would You Discuss The Situation with The Middle-School

Graduates Who Have Gone To Work and Settle in The Rural
Areas and Its Significance?

A. It is one of the new socialist practices for young people from the
city to go and live in the countryside. When in December 1968 during
the Cultural Revolution Chairman Mao issued the call, “It is highly
necessary for young people with education to go to the countryside to
be re-educated by the poor and lower-middle peasants”, many young
people enthusiastically sent in applications declaring their determina-
tion to become peasants of a new type with socialist consciousness and
culture.
Since then, in Zhuzhou as in the rest of the country, going to the
countryside on graduation has become the thing, a powerful revolution-
ary tide. So far 10,000 middle school graduates from our area have left the
302 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

city and settled in the rural areas on the city’s outskirts and in surrounding
Zhuzhou county.
This is important for producing a new generation which will carry
on the revolutionary cause of the proletariat. It provides a force needed to
accelerate the building of a new socialist countryside. It has a profound
and far-reaching significance in relation to reducing the difference between
industry and agriculture, between town and country and between mental
and manual labor.
As you know, it took the Chinese people more than a hundred
years of struggle until finally, led by the Communist Party and Chairman
Mao, they overthrew the reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism and
bureaucrat capitalism. Thus, they achieved victory in the new-democratic
revolution and ushered in the new historical period of socialist revolution
and the dictatorship of the proletariat. An even more arduous task is to
consolidate this new political power and see that socialist China advances
according to a Marxist-Leninist line without deviating into revisionism
and backsliding into capitalism, in other words to achieve communism in
the end. It requires a protracted struggle over many generations.
Revolutionaries cannot grow up in a hothouse. They must take part
in revolutionary struggle. They must go to places where they face hard-
ships to be tempered and to gain experience. The countryside is such a
place. In the countryside, where the great majority of our population live,
young people will find plenty of opportunity to educate themselves in
the three great revolutionary movements: class struggle, the struggle for
production and scientific experimentation.
There their “teachers” are the poor and lower-middle peasants, the
most reliable allies of the working class. They have deep hatred for the
old society and strong feeling for the new, for socialism, for the collective
and for labor. They have a tradition of hard struggle and plain living, and
a lot of revolutionary experience. The young people need contact with all
of these.
Agriculture is the foundation of our national economy, but our agri-
cultural production is still not high. Young people with socialist conscious-
ness and cultural and scientific knowledge are needed in large numbers to
help change the situation. Seventy percent of the rural areas in Zhuzhou
county and the city’s outskirts are hilly. Water takes up another 10 percent
of the areas, leaving only 20 percent for farmland. If we are to follow the
example of Dazhai, the model agricultural brigade in Shanxi province, we
must make 130,000 hectares of our barren hills productive. Since 1964 the
Zhuzhou municipal Party committee has led the communes in transform-
ing the denuded hills through orchards, tea plantations and afforestation.
The young people have done well at this work.

Q. What Role Are The Young People Playing in the

Countryside? What Change Have They Undergone
Personally?

A. The young people have become a fresh, vigorous, militant army for
socialist construction in the countryside. Enthusiastic propagandists for
Mao Zedong Thought, they have become disseminators of new ideas, new
culture, new customs and new habits.
During the movement to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, many
of the young people have joined the poor and lower-middle peasants’
political theory study groups. From a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint they
criticize Lin Biao’s utilization of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 303

and condemn his criminal plot to restore capitalism in China. Some

of the young people have become instructors in the evening political
schools.
With the commune members they are reclaiming barren hills. Over
the past two years areas where the young people are located have planted
8,000 hectares of hills to fruit trees and Chinese firs and done the work of
tending more than 20,000 hectares of young forests. They have scientific
experimentation groups in which they study the best methods of caring for
young sassafras bushes, cultivating the firs and grafting orange and tan-
gerine trees, as well as of soil improvement and prevention of insect pests.
Some notable results have already been achieved. Jian Xinwu, a city school
graduate now at the Chunfeng commune’s forest farm, spent six months in
intensive study of the habits of termites and ways of eliminating them and
came up with material which will be of value to the entire area.
Through the centuries in China there has been a tendency to look
down on agriculture and the tillers of the soil. Always the thing was to
study, go to the city, become an official. It was thought there was no future
for people with education to go back to the farm. Today China’s school
graduates, being tempered in the countryside, are experiencing a profound
change in their thinking and feeling. With a firmer proletarian class stand,
they are developing a genuine love for physical labor and the working
people. They have high revolutionary ideals which now include the aim
of devoting their whole lives to building up the new socialist countryside.
Many of the young people have been elected to leading groups of their
communes or brigades. Some have become teachers, barefoot doctors or
tractor drivers in the communes. A younger generation of an entirely new
type is vigorously growing up in China’s vast countryside.

11.9 MAO’S STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF BLACK

AMERICANS’ STRUGGLE AGAINST VIOLENT
REPRESSION! (APRIL 16, 1968)
As the Cultural Revolution gained traction across China, Mao often attempted
to frame it within a global context. Mao’s 1968 “Statement in Support of Black
Americans” captures just such a gambit. In this manner, this statement is less
about the specifics of the American civil rights movement than an effort to por-
tray American racial tensions as part of a multi-pronged revolution, which were
all part of a larger global struggle against “American imperialism” and “Soviet
revisionism.”
The day after Mao made his statement, it appeared on the front page of the
People’s Daily, followed swiftly by a mass-produced pamphlet published in
Chinese as well as Tibetan, Uyghur, Kazak, Korean, and Mongolian. Two weeks
later, the People’s Daily announced on its front page that the statement would
be translated into more than two dozen languages (including Swahili, Hausa,
and Arabic) for distribution around the world. Official government translations
of Mao’s speech have often employed terms like “Afro-American,” “Black people,”
and “Negroes.” However, in the original Chinese, Africans and African Ameri-
cans were referred uniformly as “feizhou heiren” and “meiguo heiren” or,
literally, Black Africans and Black Americans. To keep the speech as true to the
Chinese as possible, we have chosen to offer a more literal translation.
Questions
1. Why would the average Chinese be interested in the events of
the civil rights movement occurring in the United States? Is this
different from the reason why Mao’s statement was immediately
translated into so many languages?
304 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

2. In what ways do you believe Mao’s characterization of the events

in the civil rights movement accurately (or inaccurately) captures
what was occurring in the United States?

Just recently, Martin Luther King Jr., the Black American reverend, was
shockingly assassinated by American imperialists. Martin Luther King
Jr. was an advocate of non-violence, not that the American imperialist
showed any lenience toward him as a result [of those beliefs]. Instead,
using counterrevolutionary violence, they killed him in cold blood. This
incident taught the broad Black American masses a profound lesson and
sparked a new storm in their fight against violence that spread across
more than a hundred cities in the United States—an act unprecedented in
American history. It revealed the unrealized massive revolutionary power
stored among the more than 20 million Black Americans.
That the storm of the Black struggle occurred inside the United States
itself conspicuously illustrates the political and economic crises now fac-
ing American imperialism. It is a heavy blow to the American imperialists
who are beset by domestic and international crises.
The struggle of Black Americans is not simply a fight for freedom
and liberty by the exploited and suppressed Black people. Rather, it is a
new “bugle call” to the entire exploited and suppressed American people
to fight against the cruel rule of the monopoly capitalists. It is an immense
help and inspiration to all peoples of the world in their fight against Amer-
ican imperialism and to Vietnamese people in their fight against American
imperialism. On behalf of the Chinese people, I express my firm support
to the righteous struggle of Black Americans.
The United States’ racial discrimination is a product of the colonial-
ist and imperialist system. The contradiction between the large number of
Black Americans and the American ruling clique is a class contradiction.
The large number of Black Americans can only obtain complete liberation
by overthrowing the reactionary rule of the American monopoly capitalists
and destroying the colonialist and imperialist system. The large number of
Black Americans and bulk of the working-class White Americans share the
same common interests and fight for the same common goals. Therefore,
the fight of Black Americans is gaining more and more sympathy and sup-
port from working-class White Americans and progressive-minded peo-
ple. To finally end the evil rule of American monopoly capitalists, the Black
American struggle must integrate with the American labor movement.
In my 1963 “Statement Supporting the Black Americans in their
Just Struggle Against Racial Discrimination by American Imperialism,”
I stated: “the exceptionally evil system of colonialism and imperialism
thrived through slavery and the smuggling of Black people and surely
can only end with the complete liberation of the Black race.” Today, I still
stand by this view.
Currently, the world revolution has entered a great new era. The
Black Americans’ fight for liberation constitutes a part of the broader
struggle of all the world’s fight against American imperialism and is a
part of the contemporary world revolution. I appeal to the workers, peas-
ants, revolutionary intellectuals of the world, and everyone all over the
world who wishes to fight against American imperialism to act and pro-
vide strong support to the Black Americans’ battle! People of the world
unite to launch a fierce and long-lasting attack against our common enemy
of American imperialists and their accomplices! It is certain that the date is
near for the complete collapse of colonialism, imperialism, and all exploit-
ative systems and the complete rise of all oppressed peoples and nations
in the world.
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 305

MUSIC, OPERA, AND PLAYS: CREATING A CULTURE JIANG QING

BEFITTING A REVOLUTION (1914–1991)—Wife of Mao
Zedong who advocated
From the beginning of the Communist movement in China, music played a radical line of political
a central role in the attempts to attract and retain support among the Chi- thought during the
nese. In 1942, Mao’s Forum on Literature and Art (9.9) dictated that there Cultural Revolution. After
were only two categories of literature and art: capitalist or proletarian. Mao’s death, she and her
As Jiang Qing provocatively (if not terribly imaginatively) demonstrated allies (Gang of Four) were
when she effectively asked a group of musicians in the following docu- arrested, tried, and, in 1981,
ment: “Which class do you support?”, class conflict remained a central found guilty. Her death
theme in art, literature, and film. From the 1950s onward, Mao sought sentence was commuted
to integrate “realism and romanticism” to portray accurately the life of to life in prison, where she
the peasants in their fields, the workers in their factories, and the sol- committed suicide in 1991.
diers protecting the nation. For Mao, the romanticism meant praise of
the proletarian socialism of China (visible in the song lyrics collected in
11.11). Many of China’s songs also sought to retell the glorious history of
China’s revolution and the difficulties that the Chinese people (and the
Chinese Communist Party) had overcome to create the People’s Republic
of China. During the Cultural Revolution, China’s theaters and stages,
as well as amateur productions, were dominated by the “Eight Model
Works” [yangbanxi] and other appropriately revolutionary plays, operas,
or movies.

11.10 JIANG QING DISCUSSING PEKING OPERA’S

REVOLUTION (JULY 1964)
Born with the name Li Yunhe in 1914, Jiang Qing had an undistinguished career
as an actress (under the name of Lan Ping) in Shanghai’s fledgling film industry.
More famous for her tempestuous relationships than her politics, she left Shang-
hai when the Japanese attacked the city and made the hazardous trip to Yan’an,
where she became romantically involved with Mao Zedong. Still married to He
Zizhen (his third wife), Mao sought a divorce despite stiff resistance from the
CCP elite. It is commonly said that the party leaders granted Mao his wish on
the grounds that Jiang Qing was to have no political powers or appointments.
For the most part, Jiang Qing remained in the background through the 1950s,
accepting only an honorary appointment to the Ministry of Culture. In 1964,
she was elected as a representative to the People’s Congress (a position with little
to no actual power). Behind the scenes, however, her power grew. From 1964
onward, Jiang Qing became progressively more powerful—personally supervis-
ing the creation and revision of model revolutionary operas and more generally
becoming the creative umpire of all things artistic or literary. Although generally
disliked by most powerful CCP leaders as the wife of Mao, she continued to wield
considerable power up until Mao’s death in 1976. The following document is a
speech she delivered in 1964, which was not published until May 10, 1967, when
it appeared on the front page of the People’s Daily, a gesture whose significance
was lost on very few Chinese.

Questions
1. Why does Jiang Qing suggest that Chinese should create more art
and literature for the proletariat?
2. What does Jiang Qing mean when she suggests “the stages are
filled with emperors and kings, generals and ministers, scholars
and beauties?”

I would like to congratulate you on this performance. Everybody worked

hard for this the first battle of the Peking Opera revolution, which has
306 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

already resulted in a great achievement and its impact will be both deep
and broad.
Modern revolutionary Peking Opera has begun to appear on stage,
but has everyone reached the same level of understanding? As I see it, I do
not think we can quite say that yet.
We should have full confidence in Peking Opera’s staging of con-
temporary revolutionary themes. It is simply unthinkable that on the
stage of our Communist-led socialist motherland the leading figures
would not be workers, peasants and soldiers, would not be the real cre-
ators of history, and would not be the true masters of our country. We
must create art and literature which protects our own socialist economic
foundations. When we lose our bearings, we must make every effort to
find the right direction. Here I have two sets of numbers I would like
to provide for your reference. These two sets of numbers are shocking
to me.
The first set of numbers: According to inaccurate statistics, there
are 3,000 performing troupes in the country (excluding amateur and
unauthorized troupes). Among these, ninety are professional the-
atrical companies, over eighty are song-and-dance companies, the
remaining 2,800 or so are [Chinese] opera companies. The opera stage
is dominated by emperors and kings, generals and ministers, scholars
and beauties, as well as ghosts and demons. Even the ninety some the-
atrical companies are not necessarily portraying the workers, peasants
and soldiers either, but rather are more “Grand [Spectacles], West-
ern [Theater], or Ancient [Dramas].” One can say that the theatrical
stage is monopolized by Chinese, foreigners and the ancients. The-
aters should be an arena where people are educated, but instead today
the stages are filled with emperors and kings, generals and minis-
ters, scholars and beauties—promoting either feudalist or bourgeoise
themes. With this sort of situation, not only can we not protect the
foundation of our economy, but it will play a damaging role to our
economic foundations.
The second set of numbers: In our country there are well over 600 mil-
lion workers, peasants and soldiers, as well as a handful of landlords, rich
peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, rightists and members of
the bourgeoise. Should we be serving these small handfuls of people or
the more than 600 million people? This is a question to be considered not
only by the Communist Party members, but also by every patriotic art and
literature worker. We are eating the grain grown by peasants, wearing the
clothes fabricated by workers, living in the houses built by workers, and
the People’s Liberation Army is defending our national fronts, yet we are
not representing them [on stage]. So, let me ask, what class stand are the
artists are taking? Where is the artist’s “conscience” that you so often talk
about?

11.11 REVOLUTIONARY SONG LYRICS

Xian Xinghai (1905–1945) was an early supporter of the CCP and wrote numer-
ous patriotic songs, including the “National Salvation Song” and “Children of
the Homeland” [Zuguo de haizimen]. His most famous work is the prodigious
“Yellow River Cantata” [Huanghe dahechang] that, like the following song,
sought to create a national narrative, a retelling of China’s past through music.
Like many of the early musicians from this era (including Nie Er, the composer
of the national anthem), Xian Xinghai died young and became a patriotic martyr
in the PRC.
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 307

Questions
1. How do the following songs capture the political spirit or the atti-
tudes towards China’s past and future?
2. How do you think these songs might be remembered today?

1. “National Salvation March” (1936)

Fire at the foe,
Onward march!
Do not harm nor fight,
Your own people!
Our ranks are solid as steel,
Our hearts are iron strong!
Protect the motherland.
Be free, evermore.
Fire at the foe,
Onward march!
Protect the motherland,
Be free, evermore!
Take up your guns,
Aim at the foe!
Each shot hits the mark.
Step by step we gain!
Our ranks are solid as steel.
Our hearts are iron strong!
Protect the motherland.
Be free, evermore.
Take up your guns,
Aim at the foe!
Protect the motherland,
Be free, evermore!
“The East is Red” is perhaps the best-known revolutionary song in China. Even
today, most Chinese can sing this song from memory (not surprising since a
good portion of them woke to the song blaring from loudspeakers every morning
for a decade or more). The song, originally written in 1943 by a peasant farmer
in Shaanxi, was reworked in 1964 into a revolutionary play known by the same
name, “The East is Red” [Dongfang Hong].

2. “East is Red” [Dongfang Hong]

The East is red, the sun has risen,
China has brought forth a Mao Zedong.
He works for the people’s happiness,
Hu er hai yo, he’s the people’s great liberator!
Chairman Mao loves the people,
He is our guiding leader,
To build a New China,
Hu er hai yo, he leads us; march on!
The Communist Party is like the sun,
It brightens whatever it shines upon.
Wherever the Communist Party goes
Hu er hai yo, there the people will be liberated
308 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

The Cultural Revolution marked a low point in twentieth-century China’s

music scene. Several ideologically correct model operas and revolutionary-
appropriate songs dominated the period. Political leaders demanded that songs
be subservient to the political campaigns and narrowly serve the same goals as
the ideological campaigns. A prime example of this is the following song, stiffly
comparing communes to ripening fruit.

3. “Commune Members are Sunflowers”

The commune is an ever-growing vine. All its members
are the fruit upon the vine. Ripening fruit and vine,
growing there together. Our commune and its members,
they all grow together. When the vine is strong,
all the fruit is large and sweet.
The green vine of people’s communes joins our homes. All our
families
work together growing commune crops. More hands mean good
yields;
unity is strength. When together, we do not fear
either drought or raging flood. When we are as one,
we can hold up the sky.
The commune is a red sun, a big red sun. All the members
of the commune are the sun flowers. Flowers face the sun,
big as any millstone. Rain or shine or wind or storm,
nothing makes us waver. Never will we leave,
never leave the good commune.
Sunshine of the people’s commune lights our homes. All the
families
join together setting higher aims. We all love our commune;
following the Party. Ours is daily happiness,
full as swelling grain. Ours is daily joy,
full as swelling harvest grain.

11.12 FILM: PINE RIDGE (1973)

Besides deeply upending daily life, the Cultural Revolution also altered less
mundane aspects of Chinese society, including the making of new movies.
Between 1967 and 1973, political exigencies resulted in filmmaking being
limited largely to the “eight model plays” [bage yangxi]. In 1972, Mao grew
concerned and stated that the “number of films and plays is too small,” lead-
ing several film studios to respond and resulting in the release of four films in
1973, including Pine Ridge. Like society as a whole, the film reflects a slow
return to a more stable life, a life, however, where ideological concerns remain of
paramount significance. Light on subtlety, the plot revolves around the heroes’
concern over the pernicious influence of capitalistic tendencies. One of these
negative influences can be seen in the following scene in the form of a horse-cart
driver, who seeks to tempt other villagers with the profits of the just-emerging
“free markets” (markets that were allowed but not entirely condoned by many
ideologically pure officials).

Questions
1. How does this scene depict recent economic changes in society?
Do these new pressures reinforce traditional communist political
beliefs?
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 309

2. How does the film’s portrayal of class, political classification, and

even an individual’s economic wealth reflect the government’s
attitudes (and desires) for the audience?

Scene 1:
(Wanshan is driving the cart along with two young villagers and a retired soldier
who has hitched a ride with them)
Wanshan: You want to know the inside story? Just wait, and in
a couple of days all you’ll have to do is watch and
listen, then you will understand. It’s not the young-
ster’s fault to want to learn how to drive the horse cart.
They’re just worried, the production team’s official
horse cart driver doesn’t have the right temperament
to drive the team’s collectivized cart. He doesn’t have
the same [revolutionary] mentality about things, like
we do around here.
Fang Jiyun: Uncle, I am sure with an experienced cart driver like
you, the production team doesn’t have anything to
worry about.
Wanshan: This business [about the production team’s driver],
I’ve got it all figured out.
Fang Jiyun: Nowadays, if we train the young generation, then
we’ll really achieve great things.
Wanshan: You and I really do think alike!
(When the cart arrives in the village Xiumei rushes into the village square telling
people about the startled horse cart)
Villagers: [general commotion asking Xiumei about what
happened]
(Zhou Cheng the production team leader, Xiumei’s brother, pushes through the
crowd)
Zhou Cheng: Xiumei, what trouble have you stirred up now?
Xiumei: What?! Caused what trouble?
Qian Guang: See, she wouldn’t even listen to her own brother. What
do you think I could do about it?
Xiumei: You!? Are you trying to rile me up again?
Zhou Cheng: Xiumei!
Qian Guang: Whoa, whoa, whoa, look everyone, I didn’t mean any
offense. But if the horse cart cannot be repaired, re-
member, it was those two who took the cart out, so
don’t forget and blame me for not taking good care
of the collective property. If this sort of thing happens
again, there’s no way I could drive the cart.
Xiumei: You’d like it like if that happened, wouldn’t you!
Zhou Cheng: Stop making a scene, from now on, no one else is al-
lowed to touch the whip.
(Zhou takes the horse whip from Xiumei)
Dahu: Nowadays, it’s all about us working together col-
lectively, the sky won’t fall down with just one of us
missing.
Qian Guang: So, you can all see, now the youth team leader is trying
to drive me away, just because I am not from around
here. But I am not a landlord, nor am I a rich peasant,
so I can become a commune member wherever I go. If
it doesn’t work out for me here, I can leave, and return
to my hometown Dongshan Heilongkou.
310 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

(Qian Guang abruptly turns and makes as if to leave)

Zhou Cheng: Stop right there! This is completely the wrong way to
go about it!
Wanshan: Qian Guang. Runaway cart or not, is none of this
your responsibility at all? You threaten to quit here
and move there, where are you going to go? In fact, in
the past we were afraid of not having any carts at all.
But because last year the government built the road
we now have carts in Pine Ridge. So, it’s not like we’re
worried about not having any drivers.
(Zhou Cheng strides forward to end the confrontation)
Zhou Cheng: Enough! In the future, let’s not make trouble when
there is none. (Returns the horse whip to Qian much to the
astonishment of the other villagers)
Zhou Cheng: Go and drive your cart. Everyone else, back to work.
Go, go!
(From the edge of the square the retired soldier who rode in the cart with Wanshan,
Dahu, and Xiumei calls out)
Fang Jiyun: Old squad leader!
Zhou Cheng: Oh my, Old Fang! You came.
Zhou Cheng: (Turning to Wanshan) This is comrade Fang Jiyun. The
Commune sent him over to be the acting Party secre-
tary.
Wanshan: (Realizing this is who he gave a ride into town) Ah, your
arrival is welcome!
(In a lengthy transition, the screen is filled with the village’s fields full of sorghum
with young men and women happily picking fruit together, as Zhou Cheng and
Xiumei carry fruit over for collection and begin discussing horse cart training)
Zhou Cheng: Now isn’t a good time, we already have a full plate
as it is. How could we have time to start a horse cart
driver training class?
Xiumei: Why do you get to have the final word?
Zhou Cheng: I don’t understand. Why do you have to learn to drive
a cart?
Xiumei: You should already be clear [why it’s important].
(In a slow tracking shot from Zhou Cheng and Xiumei more scenes of Qingsong’s
fruitful bounty are shown, ending with the dialogue returning to Wanshan with
Fang Jiyun)
Wanshan: Within the production team, the horse cart driver is an
important position. How [can everything work] if the
horse driver isn’t marching towards socialism [like the
rest of the team]?
Fang Jiyun: We should try to help and educate him more.
Old Man: Everyone made a big effort to help him, and the Party
branch also did their best to educate him. But he . . . he
just refused to change.
Wanshan: For example, he encourages people to go to free mar-
ket, taking goods to market for them.
(A jump cut to the alleyway where a husband pushing a wheelbarrow encounters
his wife leaving their house with a large basket of mushrooms)
Husband: Hey, where are you taking that?
Wife: I asked Old Qian to sell it for us [on the free market].
Husband: Why don’t we just sell it to the Cooperative Store.
Wife: Old Qian said the mushroom price went up again in
the free market.
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 311

Husband: Didn’t you hear what Uncle Wanshan said? This is not
the correct path, and not on the up-and-up.
Coworker: Hey, get a move on.
Wife: You always say everyone else is wrong. Always think
only you can see what is right.
(Now in the village square, the wife walks up to Old Qian whose cart is already
loaded with a large amount of goods)
Wife: Old Qian. Elder Brother Qian, sorry to bother you so
much by making you help me out.
Qian Guang: Don’t worry, I’ll take care of everything.
(Back in the orchards, the three men repairing baskets are still discussing the issue
of the wayward horse cart driver)
Wanshan: Since the old Party Secretary left and Qian Guang be-
came the head horse cart driver, he’s been acting like
this all the time making people unsure about the col-
lective production work. Isn’t the same as capitalism?
Fang Jiyun: This sort of thing cannot be allowed to continue like
this.
Wanshan: I think [his behavior] is the reason Xiumei and others
want to learn to drive. So, we should start up the train-
ing class right away.
Fang Jiyun: Let’s go and find Zhou Cheng to talk these things over
together.
Wanshan: Yes, let’s go.
(As Qian Guang crosses the mountain towards the market a man calls out for
him to stop)
Laosi: Elder Brother Qian! Elder Brother Qian! Can you take
this with you [to the free market].
Qian Guang: Laosi, hazelnut is unavailable in free market. Didn’t
you get some?
Laosi: The autumn harvest has been busy, so I didn’t have
any time to collect any.
Qian Guang: The amount you get paid for work per day is eight or
ten working points at most. But if you collected ha-
zelnuts, on a good day, you might get a couple bucks
[yuan]. Nowadays, you need to rely on the collective to
eat, but you need to rely on oneself if you want to get
rich.
Laosi: Missing work in order to pick hazelnuts seems dis-
honest.
Qian Guang: You’re too simple and stubborn. Nowadays, pay is
distributed by work points. If you didn’t show up
for work, at most, you’d have several working points
deducted. At the end of the season when points are
calculated, and pay is distributed, you would have
less points [and those who worked more] would have
more points.
Laosi: Heh, geez, you’re right!
(Having tied down Laosi’s basket of mushrooms on the top of his cart, Qian
Guang and Laosi climb down and Qian Guang prepares to resume his journey to
the free market)
Laosi: Brother Qian, if I to collect some [hazelnuts], could
you sell them for me?
Qian Guang: As long I control this whip, it’d be a piece of cake.
Laosi: Brother Qian, about my mushrooms . . .
312 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

Qian Guang: Don’t you worry, I make sure you get a good price.
(As Qian Guang drives off the horses are startled by a dead tree by the side of the
road)
Laosi: Old Qian! What’s got the horses so spooked?
Qian Guang: To drive this horse cart, one must be fearless.
Laosi: Heh, to drive a horse cart like this, no one other than
Old Qian could possibly handle it.
(Back in the village, Wanshan and Fang Jiyun are discussing up their proposal
with Zhou Cheng)
Zhou Cheng: Qian Guang is doing a great job of driving the village
horse cart. Why are you trying to stir things up?
Wanshan: Don’t you see him waving the whip all day long, entic-
ing everyone to join him on the Capitalist road.
Zhou Cheng: All Qian Guang is doing is helping others sell their
mountain products. I see nothing wrong [in what he’s
doing]. If it wasn’t for him, a lot more people would be
missing work.
Wanshan: Oh, are you saying that they have to miss work to have
their mountain goods sold at the free market? Isn’t
there a Supply and Marketing Cooperative Store right
here [in the village]?
Zhou Cheng: Hey, so some people just want a bit more money. Let’s
not get bent out of shape over such trivial matters. If
we did, it might have a negative effect on commune
morale. Besides, it’s the height of the autumn harvest,
we need to be thinking of ways to mobilize commune
members and not how to slow them down.
Wanshan: You think it’s trivial, Zhou Cheng? It’s like the saying:
“a big wind can blow through a small hole.”
Fang Jiyun: Old Zhou, uncle is right. Should the commune mem-
bers’ enthusiasm be motivated by socialist conscious-
ness, or by capitalism’s seductive ideology? This isn’t
something we should take lightly.
Zhou Cheng: Beginning cart driving training class isn’t a decision
I can make alone. Let’s wait until tonight’s managing
committee’s meeting to discuss this matter and we de-
cide it together.
(As the sun sets, all of the village workers return to the village after a long day’s
work, and Laosi passes by Qian Guang’s house to inquire about his mushrooms
and chili peppers)
Laosi: Elder Brother Qian. You’re home already!
Qian Guang: Oh, I just got back.
Wife of Qian: Hello Laosi!
Laosi: My mushrooms . . .
Qian Guang: I sold them all!
Laosi: What price did you get?
Qian Guang: This whole number, and this number. [showing him
with his fingers the price he got]
Laosi: One and a half bucks [per half-kilo]!!?
Qian Guang: A good price, right? (Pulling a wad of cash from his vest
he counts out Laosi’s share) This is what you made for
the chili peppers. And this is another seventeen and a
half bucks for the mushrooms.
Laosi: What? At one and a half bucks per kilo and there
was ten half-kilos [jin], shouldn’t it be fifteen bucks?
What’s the extra two and a half bucks for?
 Chapter 11 • China in the 1960s 313

Qian Guang: You lucked out. For your mushrooms, I stayed in

market a bit longer, and sold it for an extra 2.5 bucks.
Hah, much better than selling them to the Cooperative
store, right?
Laosi: Absolutely!
Qian Guang: Hey, go ahead and count it.
Laosi: It looks about right . . .
Qian Guang: Go ahead, count it.
 CHAPTER 12
China Reemerges: Political
Post-1949 China (1949–Present)China Reemerges

Trends in the 1970s

6 5
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 315

1. ANNOUNCING MAO’S DEATH: Mao died at just past midnight on September 9, 1976. The Cen-
tral People’s Broadcasting network did not make the public announcement until 4 p.m. that after-
noon. Even though his death was expected, many Chinese broke into tears (of grief, relief, or simply
because that was what was expected). Very quickly, people’s minds turned to what direction the
country was headed now that the “Great Helmsman,” the only paramount leader China had known,
was gone (12.5).

2. PRESERVING MAO ZEDONG: Mao’s death caused considerable consternation among the doc-
tors who had been assembled to preserve his body. Although Mao Zedong indicated he wanted
to be cremated, it was decided to preserve his body to place it permanently on display. With little
information on how to preserve a body, according to one account, the doctors assigned to the task
injected Mao’s body with so much formaldehyde that it oozed from his pores and made his neck as
wide as his head. Terrified, the team quickly squeezed out the excess liquid with towels and cotton
balls.

3. MAO’S FUNERAL: At 3 p.m. on September 18, 1976, after a ten-day period of mourning, the entire
nation was ordered to observe a three-minute period of silence. A million people gathered at Mao’s
funeral in Tiananmen Square. In 1977, his mausoleum was completed, where his embalmed body
was placed and can still be visited by the public.

4. GANG OF FOUR: The Gang of Four was a radical political clique led by Jiang Qing (wife of Mao
Zedong), which, in the wake of Mao’s death, attempted to wrest power away from the moderates,
like Deng Xiaoping, but failed. On October 6, 1976, Mao’s designated successor, Hua Guofeng, had
the Gang of Four arrested and launched a massive media barrage against them, labeling them the
“Gang of Four” and blaming the excesses of the Cultural Revolution on them. Five years later, in
1980, a massive (and televised) show trial found them all guilty of anti-party activities (12.9).

5. ANTI-POETRY MEETING OF THE “GANG OF FOUR” (Translation clockwise from the upper
left corner):

1) Jiang Qing: “By the river is a blue peak”

2) Chang Chunqiao: “A new ‘queen’ to replace the old.” (on his fan: “Revisionism”; on the scroll:
“Anti-experience-ism is the key”)
3) Wang Hongwen: “Who says there’s no fish to catch?” (on his fish: “Make a list of who should be
given cabinet posts”)
4) Yao Wenyuan: “Establish a long-lasting new dynasty.” (on his hand: “Follow the established
policy [of Mao Zedong]”)

6. SATIRIZING THE GANG OF FOUR: A Chinese viewing this cartoon would have found it humor-
ous on multiple levels. The first is that Jiang Qing’s words are the first line from a poem she wrote
in 1974 and thus the “anti-poetry” title pokes fun at the hypocrisy in the Gang of Four’s words (they
are anti-poetry but are composing a poem). The second level lies with the deliberate irony between
their “revolutionary” ideals and their constant pursuit of “feudalistic” power.
316 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

QINGMING FESTIVAL While the Cultural Revolution is often traditionally dated beginning in
(Tomb Sweeping Day): The 1966 and ending with Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, the latter years of the
15th day after the Spring period were characterized more by ideological uncertainty than by the
Equinox, Qingming is a radical violence associated with the early years of 1966–1969. Although
traditional Chinese holiday the Chinese may have taken some comfort in the reduction of violence
when families pray at the and radical politics in the early 1970s, several events caused many to
tombs or graves of their rethink the political assumptions they had built up over the three previ-
deceased relatives. It is ous decades.
believed that one should Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, Mao had appointed and dis-
offer food, and often liquor, missed several of the men who had been carefully selected to succeed him.
to the spirits on this day or In 1959, Liu Shaoqi replaced Mao’s first heir apparent, Minister of Defense
they will become “hungry Peng Dehuai. Liu Shaoqi was in turn purged and replaced by Lin Biao. Lin
ghosts” and disrupt the Biao, who had carefully promoted the Cult of Mao, was officially desig-
living. nated as Mao’s successor in 1969. It was with some bewilderment that the
Chinese people abruptly learned of his death on September 13, 1971, in a
plane accident over Mongolia. According to the state media, Lin Biao and
his associates were accused of plotting to assassinate Mao by blowing up
his house, then flying north in a plane piloted by his son (an Air Force offi-
cer) hoping for asylum in the Soviet Union. Before they could reach Soviet
airspace, Lin Biao’s daughter was said to have exposed their conspiracy to
Zhou Enlai, who successfully scrambled jet fighters to intercept and shoot
the plane down.
In the international arena, Mao Zedong’s state of mind seemed
equally volatile. China’s relationship with the Soviet Union had waxed
and waned over the years, but the role of the United States as China’s
archenemy had gone unchanged for decades. All that changed on July 16,
1971 (the time difference made this July 15 in the United States), when
the United States and China simultaneously announced that President
Nixon would visit China the following spring to seek the normalization
of relations between the two nations. The Chinese media made far less of
this announcement than their American counterparts. The following Feb-
ruary, President Nixon flew to Beijing, where he met with Mao Zedong
and Zhou Enlai. The two countries signed a joint communiqué in which
the United States agreed “there is but one China and that Taiwan is a
part of China.” With Nixon’s visit, both Americans and Chinese began
to view their relationship in a new light. If there was concern among the
average Chinese citizen, it was over the aging of China’s leadership, most
of whom had been in place since the 1930s. As China held its New Year
celebrations in 1972, Mao Zedong was 83, Zhou Enlai was 78, and Zhu De
was almost 90.
Of the three, Zhou Enlai, after a long battle with cancer, was the first
to, in Mao’s famous characterization, “go meet Marx.” The level of public
grief over Zhou Enlai’s death caught the government unprepared. Mao
and Zhou had never been close friends, and Mao allowed Jiang Qing and
others to stifle the people’s mourning for the former premier. This sup-
pression had the added benefit of hampering Deng Xiaoping (Zhou’s pro-
tégé) from becoming his replacement. Such repressive actions, however,
were at variance with the country’s mood.
Most Chinese believed that Zhou Enlai alone had acted to moderate
Mao’s excesses. Many Chinese erected a small memorial in their homes
with Zhou’s portrait draped in black. Few top officials realized the full
extent of the public’s desire and their need publicly to mourn Zhou’s
death. The tension this created burst to the surface on April 5 during the
traditional day of mourning the dead, known as “Tomb Sweeping Day.”
Seeking to honor Zhou Enlai’s memory, hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple gathered spontaneously at the Memorial to Revolutionary Heroes in
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 317

Tiananmen Square. There, they deposited funeral wreaths, flowers, and HUA GUOFENG
poems in a mass display of grief for one of the nation’s most beloved (1921–2007)—Chosen by
leaders. As the crowds grew, the government became uneasy. Police Mao Zedong to replace
and soldiers were called out to disperse the crowds. In a rare display of Zhou Enlai as Premier in
spontaneous resistance, the crowd resisted the attempts to deprive them 1976, he succeeded Mao
of what they believed was one of their last inviolable rights, the right to Zedong upon his death
grieve openly. Additional troops were summoned, and beatings and mass several months later. He
arrests followed. Ultimately, the square was cleared of all people and any moved quickly to arrest
items left in Zhou’s memory. Officially, the public demonstrations were the Gang of Four and end
blamed on Deng Xiaoping’s emotional eulogy at Zhou Enlai’s memorial the Cultural Revolution
service, and Deng was dismissed from his posts. but was soon eased
Several months later, just as the country seemed to be returning to its out of power by Deng
normal routine, the brilliant military strategist of the Chinese Civil War, Xiaoping. Hua Guofeng
Zhu De, died. Though viewed with respect, Zhu De had long been outside was not purged by Deng,
the corridors of power, hence his funeral did not produce much public setting a new precedent,
response. His death, however, in conjunction with growing concern about and retained his party
Mao Zedong’s ill health, did cause many Chinese to wonder more openly membership until his death
about the future of China. nearly two decades later.
Throughout the country, Chinese spoke in whispers to relatives,
close colleagues, and friends about the “Mandate of Heaven.” The Man-
date had, for millennia, been given and then taken back by “Heaven” if GANG OF FOUR—A
a dynasty lost its ethical moorings. Many felt this was precisely the case. term coined by Mao
Rumors circulated of Communist cadres using their positions to procure Zedong, it referred to top
scarce goods, to promote their friends and relatives, or even to demand Chinese leaders led by
sexual favors in exchange for promotions. All that was missing was a clear Mao’s wife Jiang Qing as
sign from Heaven of its displeasure. When, in the early morning hours well as Wang Hongwen,
of July 28,1976, a massive earthquake struck Tangshan several hundred Zhang Chunqiao, and
miles southeast of Beijing, it appeared that Heaven had spoken. Yao Wenyuan, who
The Tangshan earthquake was catastrophic. Official government fig- were accused of being
ures put the number of deaths at just under 250,000, while more recent responsible for the Cultural
scholarship suggests the toll was well over a half million people. Either Revolution’s worst excesses
figure makes it the deadliest earthquake of the twentieth century. The and were put on trial in
entire city of Tangshan was leveled. Roads and railroad tracks leading in 1980. All four were found
and out of the city were impassable. While the state media put a positive guilty.
spin on the heroic work of rescue and aid workers, most Chinese inter-
preted the earthquake as an unmistakable sign of Heaven’s rage with the
Communist regime. A change was needed. Thus, with little surprise but
considerable grief, the Chinese public greeted the announcement on Sep-
tember 9 of Mao Zedong’s death. As the entire country participated in the
state-orchestrated grieving for and burial of Mao Zedong, the underlying
question on the mind of most Chinese was who would be Mao’s successor.
The official announcement, declaring that Hua Guofeng had suc-
ceeded Mao, appeared to many as a compromise. The choice, undoubt-
edly preordained by Mao, sought to deny power to both Deng Xiaoping
(whom Mao considered a reformist) and the Gang of Four (who were
considered unstable radicals). Hua Guofeng realized that to remain
above these two factions meant that he would have no backing. He
accordingly moved quickly to arrest Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four.
This move dovetailed his decision to bring about a necessary and formal
closure of the Cultural Revolution, which was officially declared at an
end in August 1977. Without the Gang of Four, the field was left open
to the more reform-minded officials aligned behind Deng Xiaoping. It
was through Deng’s astute backroom maneuvering and the broad sup-
port for his program of modernization that resulted in ultimately Deng,
and not Hua Guofeng, to become the true inheritor of Mao’s legacy and
power.
318 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

SHANGHAI SHIFTING ALLIANCES: THE TWO CHINAS

COMMUNIQUÉ AND THE UNITED STATES
(1972)—An agreement
signed in 1972 between Since retreating to Taiwan in 1949, the Republic of China government
the United States and the had, for several decades, represented “China” internationally. In 1971,
PRC pledging further the PRC finally mustered the votes it needed to unseat the Republic
talks toward achieving a of China (Taiwan) in the United Nations. Chiang Kai-shek’s response
normalization of relations reveals much of the personal bitterness and his unremitting hope that the
and agreeing on the status Republic of China would remain a prominent international player (12.2).
of Taiwan as part of China. This marked the beginning of the diplomatic erosion of the Republic of
China’s international presence and foreshadowed President Nixon’s trip
to Beijing in 1972, which culminated in the Shanghai Communiqué (12.3).

12.1 RESOLUTION ON THE RESTORATION OF THE

LAWFUL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS (OCTOBER 25, 1971)
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek had relied on the inter-
national support of the United States. However, many countries, Great Britain
and France among them, had recognized the PRC many years before Taiwan lost
their UN seat. Many hoped to see Taiwan remain in the UN but not representing
China. Chiang stubbornly refused all efforts that would strip the ROC of their
position or to recognize “two Chinas.” He repudiated all attempts to make Taiwan
accept the same status of other divided countries, such as North and South Korea
or East and West Germany. But by 1971, it was clear to many observers that
the United States and Taiwan were fighting a losing battle against international
opinion. There had been almost annual votes to pass the China seat in the UN to
the PRC. Up until just hours before the actual vote, most thought the ROC would
again retain the votes to keep their seat in the United Nations. At the last moment,
several countries swung their votes to the PRC, and the final count was 59 to 54
in favor of the following resolution.

Questions
1. Why would the United States seek to keep China’s UN seat in the
hands of the ROC while pursuing the normalization of relations
with the PRC?
2. Why was the ROC’s loss of the UN seat so critical to the ROC?
The General Assembly,
Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s
Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of
the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve
under the Charter,
Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the
United Nations and that the People’s Republic of China is one of the five
permanent members of the Security Council,
Decides to restore all its right to the People’s Republic of China and
to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate
representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully
occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.
1976th plenary meeting,
25 October 1971.
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 319

12.2 CHIANG KAI-SHEK’S DECLARATION TO

COMPATRIOTS REGARDING THE REPUBLIC
OF CHINA’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UNITED
NATIONS (OCTOBER 26, 1971)
Immediately after the UN vote against Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek issued an acri-
monious declaration. Already 84 years old, Chiang Kai-shek had grown increas-
ingly isolated and inattentive to shifting global politics. His Cold War mindset
and outdated, repressive style of government seemed less and less attractive to
observers both inside and outside Taiwan. Following the UN vote, the countries
slowly began to switch their diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.
The question of just what status Taiwan (ROC) holds—sovereign or indepen-
dent, but no formal recognition of either—remains one of the biggest unresolved
diplomatic questions in Asia.

Questions
1. Why does Chiang Kai-shek compare the transfer of the UN seat
from the ROC to the PRC to the League of Nations? Do you find
it a compelling comparison?
2. How does Chiang Kai-shek suggest the UN vote will affect the
global situation?

Dear compatriots in and outside the country:

The 26th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations violated
its Charters and Regulations, and voted for a proposition brought by
Albania and other bandits affiliated countries who led Mao’s communist
bandits to steal the Republic of China’s position in United Nations and
it’s seat on the UN Security Council. To retain our policy to maintain the
separation between honorable and the thieves and to protect the dignity
of the Charter, we announced our withdrawal from the United Nations
that we helped to found, prior to the vote being put forward. At the
same time, we declared the Government of the Republic of China and all
Chinese people would not acknowledge the validity of the illegal deci-
sion passed by this General Assembly which violated its Charter and
Regulations.
Mao’s communist bandits are a rebellious regime within the Repub-
lic of China. Domestically, they have harmed and committed enormous
crimes against the people. They are the common enemy of all Chinese
people, especially the 700 million people on the mainland. Internation-
ally, they are actively involved in sabotage and engaged in invasions that
have been condemned by the United Nations as unlawful invaders. Now
despite that the mainland is occupied by the Mao-Communist-bandits,
the Government of Republic of China, based in Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen
and Mazu, is the true representative of the 700 million Chinese on the
mainland—representing their common will and painful cries and offering
them with the most courage and hope in their fight against violent force of
Mao’s communist bandits to obtain human rights and freedom. Therefore,
based on either the principles of United Nations’ Charter or on the natural
laws of humanism, especially on the common will of all Chinese people,
we absolutely will not tolerate Mao’s communist bandits’ unlawful occu-
pancy of the seat held by the Republic of China in the United Nations and
the Security Council.
[. . .]
For 20 years, the [Communist] bandits have continuously
fought for control of China. Recently the fight has become more fierce
320 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

demonstrating that both the ideology of the Mao bandits and the Com-
munist system are totally bankrupted. People on the mainland, including
the majority of the Communist cadres, have turned from disappointment
to resistance. As Mao’s communist bandits could not suppress the volca-
no [of popular discontent] that erupted underneath their feet they had no
choice but to turn their strategy outwards and hope that through decep-
tion they could survive a bit longer. In fact, Mao’s communist bandits are
unable to make any changes to their objectives of “anti-revisionism” “anti-
American Imperialism” and “anti all counter-revolutionists.” Therefore,
their international strategic change will cause them loosing stand either
moving forward or backward in ideological and policy front, which will
result more severe dispute and chaos in power struggle. Henceforth, the
anti-Communism and anti-violence forces on the mainland may take this
opportunity to speed up and become stronger. Facing such a change of
situation, we must further reinforce our faith, consolidate our strength
and intensify our military preparedness so that we shall lose no time in
grasping the moment of opportunity, to speed up the spreading of revo-
lutionary forces in struggle against anti-Mao and anti-Communism on
the mainland.
Compatriots! The process of the Anti-Communism movement is just
like moving ships forward in an unpredictable ocean with changing winds
and clouds. As long as we all share common understanding on the basic
situation towards anti-Communism, are not misguided by the temporary
changes, and stay towards the right direction. We must remain closely
united, collaborate with one mind, share fortune and misfortune, hard-
ship and good life alike. We cannot become arrogant and remain alert in
peaceful time. We cannot be not scared, disappointed, or delude ourselves
during stormy time. The worse the situation, the stronger and more driven
we become. Surely, we will reach the other side, save our compatriots and
revive the mainland.

12.3 JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUÉ) (FEBRUARY 28, 1972)
By the time Nixon arrived in Beijing in February 1972, Henry Kissinger and
Zhou Enlai had already agreed, in principle, to the normalization of Sino–United
States relations. But Nixon and Mao faced a difficult task; they needed a formula
that would satisfy conservative factions in both China and the United States. The
key phrase in the following document is: “there is but one China and that Taiwan
is a part of China.” It should be remembered that Nixon’s visit did not establish
diplomatic relations—an event that was further delayed by Nixon’s resignation
in 1974 and Mao’s death in 1976. China and the United States finally normalized
diplomatic relations in 1979.
Questions
1. The Joint Shanghai Communiqué acknowledges substantial dif-
ferences in how both countries viewed the world. Why do you
think both countries decided to seek out talks toward achieving
normalization?
2. In many ways, the diplomatic formula of there only being “one
China and Taiwan is part of China” papers over the remaining
problem that two governments both claiming to rule China con-
tinue to exist. Why was this solution amenable to both the United
States and the PRC?
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 321

1. President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the

People’s Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Zhou Enlai of
the People’s Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972.
Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State
William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and
other American officials.
[. . .]
6. The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resist-
ance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the
people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of his-
tory. All nations, big or small, should be equal: big nations should not
bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China
will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power
politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports
the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom
and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to
choose their social systems according their own wishes and the right
to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity
of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference,
control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to
their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to
the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the
attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point pro-
posal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic
of South Viet Nam and the elaboration of February this year on the
two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of
the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly sup-
ports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea
put forward by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the “U.N.
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea”. It firmly
opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism
and firmly supports the Japanese people’s desire to build an inde-
pendent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains
that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations
resolutions on the Indo-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all
their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the
ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan
Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independ-
ence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their
struggle for the right of self-determination.
8. There are essential differences between China and the United States
in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides
agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should
conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against
other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states,
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Interna-
tional disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting
to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People’s
Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their
mutual relations.
[. . .]
11. The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between
China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its posi-
tion: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the
322 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

normalization of relations between China and the United States; the

Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal gov-
ernment of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been
returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal
affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all US
forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The
Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the
creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”,
“two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status
of Taiwan remains to be determined”.
12. The US side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chi-
nese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China
and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government
does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With
this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the with-
drawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the
meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installa-
tions on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides
agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the
two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as
science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-
to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each
side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts
and exchanges.
13. Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual
benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on
equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the
two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of
trade between their two countries.
14. The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various
channels, including the sending of a senior US representative to Bei-
jing from time to time for concrete consultations to further the nor-
malization of relations between the two countries and continue to
exchange views on issues of common interest.
15. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this
visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two
countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between
the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and Ameri-
can peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia
and the world.
16. President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their
appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Govern-
ment and people of the People’s Republic of China.

12.4 TRANSCRIPTS OF THE FIRST MEETING BETWEEN

NIXON, MAO, KISSINGER, AND ZHOU (1972)
In October 1971 (during the UN’s vote on transferring China’s seat from Tai-
wan to the PRC), Henry Kissinger secretly flew to Beijing to negotiate President
Nixon’s visit the following year. It set up one of the most dramatic diplomatic
reversals of the twentieth century. Nixon, a fervent anti-Communist, visited
with Mao, an ardent adversary of the United States. Both realized the pragmatic
advantages of a Sino-American alliance, particularly as a strategy to diminish
the power of the Soviet Union. Ironically, it was, in part, Nixon’s known history
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 323

as an anti-Communist that made him the ideal person to seek the normalization
of Sino-American ties. The following transcripts offer an insider’s view of the
pleasantries, personalities, and quick-witted exchanges between two of the most
powerful leaders in the world at the time. Mao Zedong did not make the time
or location of this meeting known to Nixon in advance (Mao was notorious for
keeping a very erratic schedule), only notifying Nixon 15 minutes prior to their
meeting.

Questions
1. Does the following dialogue tell us anything about the goals,
attitudes, or even personalities that brought about the United
States’s and China’s efforts to re-normalize relations?
2. Do you get any sense of which side (or person) is controlling the
direction of the conversation and or negotiations?

Participants: Chairman Mao Zedong; Prime Minister Zhou

Enlai; Wang Hairong, Deputy Chief of Protocol
of the Foreign Ministry; Tang Wensheng, Inter-
preter; President Nixon; Henry A. Kissinger, As-
sistant to the President for National Security Af-
fairs; Winston Lord, National Security Council
Staff (Notetaker)
(There were opening greetings during which the Chairman welcomed President
Nixon, and the President expressed his great pleasure at meeting the Chairman.)
President Nixon: You read a great deal. The Prime Minister said
that you read more than he does.
Chairman Mao: Yesterday in the airplane you put forward a very
difficult problem for us. You said that what it is
required to talk about are philosophic problems.
President Nixon: I said that because I have read the Chairman’s
poems and speeches, and I knew he was a pro-
fessional philosopher. (Chinese laugh.)
Chairman Mao: (Looking at Dr. Kissinger) He is a doctor of phi-
losophy?
President Nixon: He is a doctor of brains.
Chairman Mao: What about asking him to be the main speaker
today?
President Nixon: He is an expert in philosophy.
Dr. Kissinger: I used to assign the Chairman’s collective writ-
ings to my classes at Harvard.
Chairman Mao: Those writings of mine aren’t anything. There
is nothing instructive in what I wrote. (Looking
toward photographers) Now they are trying to
interrupt our meetings, our order here.
President Nixon: The Chairman’s writings moved a national and
have changed the world.
Chairman Mao: I haven’t been able to change it. I’ve only been
able to change a few places in the vicinity of Bei-
jing.
  Our common old friend, Generalissimo Chi-
ang Kai-shek, doesn’t approve of this. He calls
us communist bandits. He recently issued a
speech. Have you seen it?
President Nixon: Chiang Kai-shek calls the Chairman a bandit.
What does the Chairman call Chiang Kai-shek?
324 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

Prime Minister Zhou: Generally speaking we call them Chiang Kai-

shek’s clique. In the newspapers sometimes we
call him bandit; we are also called bandits in
turn. Anyway, we abuse each other.
Chairman Mao: Actually, the history of our friendship with him
is much longer than the history of your friend-
ship with him.
President Nixon: Yes, I know.
Chairman Mao: We two must not monopolize the whole show.
It won’t do if we don’t let Dr. Kissinger have a
say. You have been famous about your trips to
China.
Dr. Kissinger: It was the President who set the direction and
worked out the plan.
President Nixon: He is a very wise assistant to say it that way.
(Mao and Zhou laugh.)
Chairman Mao: He is praising you, saying you are clever in do-
ing so.
President Nixon: He doesn’t look like a secret agent. He is the only
man in captivity who could go to Paris 12 times
and Beijing once and no one knew it, except pos-
sibly a couple of pretty girls. (Zhou laughs.)
Dr. Kissinger: They didn’t know it; I used it as a cover.
Chairman Mao: In Paris?
President Nixon: Anyone who uses pretty girls as a cover must be
the greatest diplomat of all time.
Chairman Mao: So your girls are very often made use of?
President Nixon: His girls, not mine. It would get me into great
trouble if I used girls as a cover.
Prime Minister Zhou: (Laughs.) Especially during elections. (Kissinger
laughs.) Dr. Kissinger doesn’t run for President
because he wasn’t born a citizen of the United
States.
[. . .]
President Nixon: Mr. Chairman, I am aware of the fact that over
a period of years my position with regard to
the People’s Republic was one that the Chair-
man and Prime Minister totally disagreed with.
What brings us together is a recognition of a
new situation in the world and a recognition on
our part that what is its policy toward the rest
of the world and toward us. That is why—this
point I think can said to be honest—we have dif-
ferences. The Prime Minister and Dr. Kissinger
discussed these differences.
  It also should be said—looking at the two great
powers, the United States and China—we know
China doesn’t threaten the territory of the Unit-
ed States; I think you know the United States has
no territorial designs on China. We know China
doesn’t want to dominate the United States. We
believe you too realize the United States doesn’t
want to dominate the world. Also—maybe you
don’t believe this, but I do—neither China nor
the United States, both great nations, want to
dominate the world. Because our attitudes are
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 325

the same on these two issues, we don’t threaten

each others’ territories.
  Therefore, we can find common ground, de-
spite our differences, to build a world structure
in which both can be safe to develop in our own
ways on our own roads. That cannot be said
about some other nations in the world.
Chairman Mao: Neither do we threaten Japan or South Korea.
President Nixon: Nor any country. Nor do we.
Chairman Mao: (Checking the time with Zhou) Do you think we
have covered enough today?
President Nixon: Yes. I would like to say as we finish, Mr. Chair-
man, we know you and the Prime Minister have
taken great risks in inviting us here. For us also
it was a difficult decision. But having read some
of the Chairman’s statements, I know he is one
who sees when an opportunity comes, that you
must seize the hour and seize the day.
  I would also like to say in a personal sense—
and this is to you Mr. Prime Minister—you do
not know me. Since you do not know me, you
shouldn’t trust me. You will find I never say
something I cannot do. And I will always will
do more than I can say. On this basis I want
to have frank talks with the Chairman and, of
course, with the Prime Minster.
Chairman Mao: (Pointing to Dr. Kissinger) “Seize the hour and
seize the day.” I think that, generally speak-
ing, people like me sound a lot of big cannons.
(Zhou laughs.) That is, things like “the whole
world should unite and defeat imperialism, re-
visionism, and all reactionaries, and establish
socialism.”
(There were then some closing pleasantries. The Chairman said he was not well.
President Nixon responded that he looked good. The Chairman said that appear-
ances were deceiving. After handshakes and more pictures, Prime Minister Zhou
then escorted the President out of the resident.)

WHO’S NEXT?: CHOOSING A SUCCESSOR

From Mao’s death in 1976 (12.5), Deng Xiaoping, Hua Guofeng, and other
top party officials jockeyed for the top positions of leadership in China. By
1978, Deng Xiaoping and his supporters had, almost entirely behind the
scenes, secured control of the government. Hua, though, would remain
active in the government until he quietly retired from the Central Com-
mittee in 2002. With his ascent, Deng Xiaoping ushered in a “Beijing
Spring,” effectively shifting the country from one where political ideology
was paramount to one that emphasized a reconstruction of the country’s
education system, industries, and economy. Deng’s policy sought to repu-
diate Hua Guofeng’s unpopular “Two Whatevers” policy that promoted
“whatever” Mao Zedong had advocated. Deng, for his part, did not totally
reject Mao Zedong Thought for fear that it would create an ideological free
for all (12.6). Instead, Deng Xiaoping sought to move the country away
from any specific ideology and concentrate instead on modernizing the
country. His aspirations sprung from the realization that without rebuild-
ing the country’s infrastructure and implementing deep-rooted reforms,
326 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

the PRC (and the CCP) could very well collapse. Through his advocacy of
the “Four Modernizations” (12.7), Deng sought to repair the decades of
neglect, particularly visible in the science and technology sector, through
renewed attention to education. He stopped short of achieving this
through the liberalization of the political sphere called for by many (12.8).

12.5 OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAO’S

DEATH (SEPTEMBER 1976)
At just minutes past midnight on September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong breathed
his last breath. The CCP would delay the public announcement of his death for
another 16 hours, until 4 p.m. later that day, when the following announce-
ment was broadcast across the nation. Although his health had been in visible
decline for some years, his death still came as a surprise to most Chinese. Because
Mao’s body needed to lay in state for many days, a team of several hundred were
involved in preserving the body. Due to strained relations with Vietnam and
the Soviet Union (nations who had experience preserving their fallen leaders),
the medical teams had no knowledge of how to properly embalm the Chairman’s
corpse. Mao’s former doctor, Li Zhisui, said the team, petrified with fear, pumped
the body so full of formaldehyde, to the point that the leader’s head swelled up
“like a football,” and used towels to soak up the oozing excess. Although the exact
process by which Mao’s body was preserved is a well-kept state secret, it remains
on view at his mausoleum at the edge of Tiananmen Square for the public to
pay their respects, as did Xi Jinping and other top leaders on the country’s 70th
anniversary.
Questions
1. How do you think the average Chinese citizen received the offi-
cial announcement of Mao’s death?
2. Why might many of the top Chinese officials have been anxious
over how this news was delivered to the Chinese public. Can you
identify specific facts that were included or omitted?

We now have a message to the whole party, the whole army, and the
people of all nationalities around the country by the Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party of China, the standing committee of the
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, the third
Council of the People’s Republic of China, and the Military Commis-
sion of the Central Party of the Communist Party of China. A message
to the whole party, the whole army and the people of all nationalities
throughout the country by the Central Committee of the Communist
[Party] of China. . . . The Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the
People’s Republic of China, . . . announce with the deepest grief to the
whole party, the whole army, and the people of all nationalities around
the country:
Comrade Mao Zedong, the esteemed and beloved great leader of our
party, our army and the people of all nationalities of our country, the great
teacher of the international proletariat and the oppressed nations and
oppressed people, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China, Chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of China, and Honorary Chairman of the
National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Con-
ference, passed away at 00:10 hours, Sept. 9, 1976, in Beijing, because of
the worsening of his illness and despite all treatment, although meticulous
medical care was given him in every way after he fell ill.
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 327

Chairman Mao Zedong was the founder and wise leader of the
Communist Party of China, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and
the People’s Republic of China. Chairman Mao led our party in waging a
protracted, acute and complex struggle against the right and left oppor-
tunist lines in the party, defeating the opportunist lines pursued by Chen
Duxiu. Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, Luo Zhanglong, Wang Ming, Zhang Guotao,
Gao Gang, Rao Shushi and Peng Dehuai and again, during the great pro-
letarian Cultural Revolution, triumphing over the counterrevolutionary
revisionist line of Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao and Deng Xiaoping, thus enabling
our party to develop and grow in strength steadily in class struggle and
the struggle between the two lines. . . .
The victory of the Chinese people’s revolution led by Chairman Mao
changed the situation in the East and the world and blazed a new trail for
the cause of liberation of the oppressed nations and oppressed people.
In the period of the Socialist revolution, Chairman Mao comprehen-
sively summed up the positive as well as the negative experience of the
international Communist movement, penetratingly analyzed the class
relations in Socialist society and, for the first time in the history of the
development of Marxism, unequivocally pointed out that there are still
classes and class struggle after the Socialist transformation of the owner-
ship of the means of production has in the main been completed, drew the
scientific conclusion that the bourgeoisie is right in the Communist Party,
put forth the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, and laid down the party’s basic line for the entire
historical period of socialism.
All the victories of the Chinese people were achieved under the
leadership of Chairman Mao; they are all great victories for Mao Zedong
thought. The radiance of Mao Zedong thought will forever illuminate
the road of advance of the Chinese people. . . . With the great boldness
and vision of a proletarian revolutionary, he initiated in the international
Communist movement the great struggle to criticize modern revisionism
with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique at the core, promoted the vig-
orous development’ of the cause of the world proletarian revolution and
the cause of all the people of all countries against imperialism and hege-
monies, and pushed the history of mankind forward.
Chairman Mao Zedong was the greatest Marxist of the contempo-
rary era. In the past half century and more, basing himself on the principle
of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete
practice of the revolution, he inherited, defended and developed Marxism‐
Leninism in the protracted struggle against the class enemies at home and
abroad, both inside and outside the party, and wrote a most brilliant chap-
ter in the history of the movement of proletarian revolution. . . .
The passing away of Chairman Mao Zedong is an inestimable loss to
our party, our army and the people of all the nationalities of our country,
to the international proletariat and the revolutionary people of all coun-
tries and to the international Communist movement. His passing away is
bound to evoke immense grief in the hearts of the people of our country
and the revolutionary people of all countries. . . .
We must carry on cause left behind by Chairman Mao and consoli-
date the great unity of the people of all nationalities under the leadership
of the working class and based on the worker‐peasant alliance, deepen
the criticism of Deng Xiaoping, continue the struggle to repulse the right
deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts, consolidate and develop
the victories of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution, enthusiastically
support the new socialist things, restrict bourgeois right and further con-
solidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country.
328 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

We should continue to unfold the three great revolutionary move-

ments of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experi-
ment, build our country independently and with the initiative in our own
hands, through self‐reliance, hard struggle, diligence and thrift, and go
all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical
results in building socialism.
We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and reso-
lutely implement his line on army building, strengthen the building of
the army, strengthen the building of the militia, strengthen prepared-
ness against war, heighten our vigilance, and be ready at all times to
wipe out any enemy that dares to intrude. We are determined to liberate
Taiwan. . . .
We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and assid-
uously study Marxism‐Leninism‐Mao Zedong thought, apply ourselves
to the study of works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and works by
Chairman Mao, fight for the complete overthrow of the bourgeoisie and
all other exploiting, classes, for the establishment of the dictatorship of the
proletariat in place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and for the tri-
umph of socialism over capitalism, and strive to build our country into a
powerful socialist state, make a still greater contribution to humanity and
realize the ultimate goal of communism.
Long live invincible Marxism‐Leninism‐Mao Zedong thought!
Long live the great, glorious and correct Communist Party of China!
Eternal glory to our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao Zedong!

12.6 EDITORIAL IN SUPPORT OF HUA GUOFENG’S

“TWO WHATEVERS” POLICY (FEBRUARY 7, 1977)
As Mao’s handpicked successor, Hua Guofeng tried to unconditionally carry out
Mao’s legacy. Desperately attempting to secure his own position as the party’s
leader, he orchestrated the publication of this editorial article simultaneously in
the two flagship publications of the state: People’s Daily and Liberation Army
Daily as well as one journal, the Red Flag. The “Two Whatevers” policy quickly
met strong resistance from powerful party elite. Many feared that Hua Guofeng’s
policy would leave the political landscape unchanged. The public mood did not
want more of the same; rather, most Chinese wanted a return to normalcy, not
a continuation of Mao’s policies. Deng Xiaoping quickly harnessed this senti-
ment and quickly orchestrated the removal of Hua Guofeng from key positions
of power.

Questions
1. What are the “two whatevers” that Hua Guofeng supports?
2. Why does Hua Guofeng intend to continue to promote Mao
Zedong Thought?

[. . .]
Chairman Mao, our great leader and tutor, led us to fight for over
half a century and experience ten significant struggles between the lines
[of interpretation] inside the Party. Whenever we adhered to Chairman
Mao’s revolutionary line and followed Chairman Mao’s instruction, rev-
olutionary victory was achieved; whenever we parted from Chairman
Mao’s revolutionary line, and disobeyed Chairman Mao’s instruction,
revolution would fail. Chairman Mao’s banner is the banner of victory.
When Chairman was alive, we united and fought under Chairman Mao’s
great banner. Today, Chairman Mao has passed away, even more we
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 329

ought to hold high and firmly safeguard Chairman Mao’s great banner. FOUR
This is the sacred duty of our 800 million people and over thirty million MODERNIZATIONS—
Party members; the political foundation for us to unite and fight continu- Part of Deng Xiaoping’s
ously; and the fundamental assurance to achieve further victory. Chair- modernization program
man Hua led us to implement Chairman Mao’s heritage, and to have emphasizing agriculture,
fought and still fighting to destroy the “Gang of Four.” This is another industry, national
significant struggle between two lines within our Party. Through this defense, and science and
struggle Chairman Mao’s great banner was safeguarded which secured technology.
our country to continue moving forward along Chairman Mao revolu-
tionary line. This is the significant historical achievement of Chairman
Hua. Under the leadership of wise leader Chairman Hua, we have started
on the new march to begin the important work of initiating new future
while continuing the past. The responsibility on our shoulder is heavy.
We are facing many difficulties. We have courage and confidence to bear
the heavy responsibility and conquer all difficulties. Chairman Mao used
to call upon us to: “Unite together, focus on the key situation, straighten
up spirit, and work hard.”
Let us hold high the great banner of Chairman Mao, even more vol-
untarily implement Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line. We will resolutely
uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made and unswervingly
follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave. We will mostly closely
united around the Central Committee of the Party headed by Chairman
Hua, closely follow the strategic plan of the Central Committee of the
Party headed by Chairman Hua. Every single action of ours should follow
the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party headed by Chairman
Hua, with one heart, one mind, and one coordinated step, to tightly grasp
to the core policy of thoroughly unveiling and criticizing the “Gang of
Four”, to obtain the significant new victory in governing country.

12.7 DENG XIAOPING ON THE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS

(MAY 7, 1978)
Consciously seeking to move the country toward practical results, Deng Xiaop-
ing’s first major campaign picked up and amplified a policy first voiced by Zhou
Enlai calling for the “Four Modernizations.” Deng Xiaoping clearly recognized
China’s industrial and economic shortcomings and sought to show that pursu-
ing a vibrant economy did not necessarily require the country to abandon the
socialist ideology upon which it was founded. The following speech is an excerpt
from a talk given to an economic and trade delegation of the government of the
Democratic Republic of Madagascar. It typifies many of the speeches given dur-
ing this period that tended to pillory the Gang of Four for the excesses of the past
and encourage the modernization of China.

Questions
1. How does Deng Xiaoping envision China pursue the “Four Mod-
ernizations”? How does he think it will change China?
2. What do you think Deng Xiaoping means by “less talk and more
action”?

The entire Chinese nation rejoiced over the downfall of the Gang of Four.
Things are better now and the mood of the people has improved. We are
soberly aware that it is an arduous task to achieve the four moderniza-
tions, but we can manage. First of all, the entire Party is united, as are the
people of the whole nation. Our people are hard-working and have a tra-
dition of hard struggle. Second, we have laid a solid material foundation.
330 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

DEMOCRACY WALL—A Third, we have clearly defined principles whereby we shall make use of all
wall located in central the advanced technologies and achievements from around the world. The
Beijing and covered in Gang of Four did not allow us to do so, calling this a slavish comprador
Big Character Posters philosophy. Science and technology have no class nature; capitalists make
advocating political reform them serve capitalism, and socialist countries make them serve socialism.
from 1978 until 1980 when Ancient China had four great inventions [paper, printing, gunpowder,
the wall was declared off and the compass], which later found their way to countries around the
limits to such postings and world. Why then should we be hesitant about making use of advanced
relocated to the outskirts of technologies and achievements from around the world? We should make
the city. advanced technologies and achievements the starting point for our devel-
opment. Finally, we have abundant natural resources. To sum up, the tre-
mendous enthusiasm of our people, a substantial material foundation and
our enormous resources, in addition to the introduction of state-of-the-art
technology from around the world will make it possible for us to achieve
the four modernizations. Naturally, the task will be far from easy. The
world’s advanced technologies continue to develop rapidly, with the rate
of development no longer calculated in terms of years, but in terms of
months, and even in terms of days, a trend which we call “changes coming
with each passing day.” Even when we have realized the four moderniza-
tions, our output of industrial and agricultural products and our national
income will remain relatively low when calculated on a per capita basis.
Our current principles and policies are clearly defined, and our motto is
“less talk, more action.”
At present, we are still a relatively poor nation. It is impossible for
us to undertake many international proletarian obligations, so our con-
tributions remain small. However, once we have accomplished the four
modernizations and the national economy has expanded, our contribu-
tions to mankind, and especially to the Third World, will be greater. As
a socialist country, China shall always belong to the Third World and
shall never seek hegemony. This idea is understandable because China
is still quite poor, and is therefore a Third World country in the real
sense of the term. The question is whether or not China will practice
hegemony when it becomes more developed in the future. My friends,
you are younger than I, so you will be able to see for yourselves what
happens at that time. If it remains a socialist country, China will not
practice hegemony and it will still belong to the Third World. Should
China become arrogant, however, act like an overlord and give orders
to the world, it would no longer be considered a Third World country.
Indeed, it would cease to be a socialist country. I first addressed these
points in a speech delivered at the Special Session of the United Nations
General Assembly in 1974. The current foreign policy, which was for-
mulated by Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, will be
passed on to our descendants.

12.8 WEI JINGSHENG’S FIFTH MODERNIZATION:

DEMOCRACY (DECEMBER 5, 1978)
Deng Xiaoping rose to power largely on his policy of reform and openness [gaige
kaifang]. After ten years of Cultural Revolution, tired of the unending sequence
of political campaigns, Deng Xiaoping’s policies were a welcome return to nor-
malcy. As government control over people’s lives loosened, many hoped that the
liberalization of the political sphere would also begin. In late 1978, posters began
to advocate more democratic reforms and were posted on a wall in the Xidan
district of central Beijing near the Forbidden City. Democracy Wall, as it came
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 331

to be known, attracted amazingly frank and philosophically sophisticated dis- FIFTH

cussions around China’s ability to democratize. Filled with the hopes of a new MODERNIZATION—
era, this “Beijing Spring” seemed full of promise to people like Wei Jingsheng. In the wake of Deng
Wei Jingsheng, a former Red Guard and electrician with no formal education, Xiaoping’s Four
actively publicized his ideas in articles posted on Democracy Wall. The title of Modernizations, Wei
the following document seeks to add a fifth modernization to the Four Modern- Jingsheng, first in a signed
izations already proposed by Deng Xiaoping. The exploration of China’s intel- wall poster, then in a
lectual freedoms flowered on into 1979 with the self-publication of numerous longer essay, famously
journals explicitly critical of the government. As the government became increas- called on Deng to add
ingly uneasy, one of the most prominent figures, Wei Jingshen, was arrested on democracy as a fifth
May 29, 1979. During his trial, the prosecutor admonished Wei that “[o]ur Con- modernization.
stitution clearly stipulates extensive democratic rights. However, our democracy
should be a democracy protected by law. It does not mean absolute freedom for
one to do as one likes.” On October 16, 1979, Wei was sentenced to 15 years in
prison for sedition and the leaking of state secrets. Released in 1994, he again
spoke critically of government policies and was rearrested. In 1997, the Chinese
government suddenly released Wei from prison and escorted him to the Beijing
airport, where he flew to the United States. Although still a Chinese citizen, Wei
Jingsheng remained in the United States, establishing a foundation to improve
human rights.

Questions
1. What does Wei Jingsheng mean by suggesting Deng Xiaoping’s
“Four Modernizations” are analogous to the Chinese proverbs
“feeding the people by painting cakes,” or “quenching thirst by
contemplating plums”?
2. Why does Wei Jingsheng believe that democracy is a prerequisite
to modernization?

The newspapers, magazines and radios have now finally stopped blasting
our ears with the loud and deafening propaganda about the proletariat
dictatorship and class struggle. On the one hand, its decline occurred
because such terms had been the bewitching incantations of the fallen
“Gang of Four.” But the more important reason is because people are sim-
ply weary of listening to such things, and so such methods have been
rendered ineffective as a tool to deceive the people.
It is a law of history that until the old disappears the new cannot
arrive. Now with the old gone, people naturally are waiting to see what
is next. The gods did not let people down, the great promise called “The
Four Modernizations” has finally arrived. The wise leader Chairman Hua
[Guofeng], and the wiser and, in people’s hearts and minds, even greater
Vice Chairman Deng [Xiaoping] at last defeated the “Gang of Four,” offer-
ing the people the possibility of realizing their dream of democracy and
prosperity—and suggesting the great people who bled on Tiananmen
Square [April 5 movement of 1976] had not died in vain.
With the arrest of the “Gang of Four,” every single day people placed
their hopes in the possibility that Vice Chairman Deng would “restore the
capitalism” and make it the great banner [of this new era]. When Vice
Chairman Deng at last returned to the post of central leadership, oh how
excited people were, oh how overjoyed, oh how . . . but alas: the old politi-
cal system that people resented remains unchanged. The democracy and
freedom that people have hoped is no longer mentioned. The living con-
ditions of people remain relatively unchanged, and the salary “increases”
lags behind the rapid inflation. . . .
332 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

There is an old Chinese fable called “painting cakes to satisfy your

hunger” and another saying that advocates “staring at plums to quench
one’s thirst.” The ancient wisdom summed up in such humorous and
satirical experiences stretch along the river of history and remain true
today. Of course, we believe no one would be so foolish to think such old
adages are true. Yet there are people who think they can make us think
those things are true, and that we should pretend that such acts will truly
succeed.
[. . .]
Nevertheless, there are those who warn us: Marxism-Leninism and
Mao Zedong Thought lie at the foundation of every single thing, and
at the bottom of all conversations. Or that Chairman Mao is the “great
savior” of people. Or “without the Communist Party, there would be no
new China” which is the same as saying “Without Chairman Mao, there
would be no new China.” Whoever denies this, as public proclamations
prove, will not come to a good end. And “some people” remind us that the
Chinese people need dictatorship, even if that despot’s actions surpasses
those of the ancient feudal emperor, that simply demonstrates his great-
ness. Chinese people do not need democracy, unless it is a “democracy
under centralized guidance,” otherwise it is worthless. Believing it or not
is up to you! The proof is in the prisons—with more cells always available.
And yet, you are still left a path forward: with the Four Moderniza-
tions as the guiding principle, move forward in lockstep, and pull like an
old yellow ox, only then will you reach your paradise: the wonderland of
Communism and the Four Modernizations. “Some kindhearted people”
gave us this reminder: if you can’t figure it out, then put more effort into
studying Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought! If you are still
unable to figure it out, the very fact you cannot get it, demonstrates the
true depth of this learning! Do not be disobedient, the leaders in your
work unit will not permit it! So on and so forth. . . .
I urge everyone to not let “political liars of this kind” dupe you any-
more! We know we are going to be deceived, so we might as well trust our
own instincts. The training of the Cultural Revolution has made us less
ignorant. Let us figure out ourselves what to do next!
[. . .]

Marching towards Modernization: Implementing

Democracy
To achieve modernization, the Chinese people must first implement
democracy to modernize China’s social system. Democracy is not exactly
the concoction described by Lenin as merely the result of social develop-
ment. It is not only an inevitable product of productivity and production
relations reaching a certain stage, but also the condition for productivity
and production relations to exist in this developed stage and in an even
more developed stage. Without this condition, society will stagnate, and
economic growth will also encounter insurmountable obstacles. Therefore,
as seen in history, a democratic social system is the prerequisite and pre-
condition for all development—or modernization. Without this precondi-
tion and prerequisite, it is not only impossible to further development,
but also hard to maintain the results of the current stage of development.
The best evidence for this is the thirty-year experience of our own great
motherland.
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 333

[. . .]
Will the enemy let us practice democracy? Of course not, they will
stop at nothing to halt the democratic process. Gaslighting and fooling
people about what they see and hear is the enemy’s most effective tactic.
All authoritarian fascists tell people: your current situation is the best in
the world.
[. . .]
Is the struggle for democracy the goal of the Chinese people? In the
Cultural Revolution, they demonstrated for the first time their power, in
front of which all reactionary forces trembled. But at that time the people
had not yet clearly identified a direction, and the power of democracy had
not become the core of the fight. Therefore, the struggles were distorted,
manipulated and preempted by tyrants who used seduction, bribery, dis-
cord, rumors, slander, and violent suppression. At that time the people
were still entranced by the various autocratic and careerist leaders, and so
once again they unintentionally became the tool and victim of tyrants and
other budding tyrants.
Today, twelve years later, the people have finally identified their
goal, confirmed the real direction of their fight, and recognized their
true leader—the banner of democracy. The Xidan Democracy Wall
has become the first battle ground in their fight against all reaction-
ary forces. The fight will, to use an old cliché, surely achieve victory,
while the people will be liberated, becomes the slogan with a new
consciousness. There will be bloodshed, sacrifices, and even more sin-
ister plots. But the banner of democracy will no longer be obscured by
the mists of reactionary forces. Let us unite under this great and true
banner, and march towards the modernization of the social system in
quest of the people’s peace and happiness, for the people’s rights and
freedom!

12.9 TRIAL OF LIN BIAO AND JIANG QING

CLIQUES (NOVEMBER 1980)
Arrested soon after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, the government waited four
years to put the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan,
and Wang Hongwen) on trial, formally beginning on November 20, 1980. The
trial was broadcast live across the country. It was little more than a show trial
that fulfilled Deng Xiaoping’s efforts to leave Mao Zedong unsullied while lay-
ing blame for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution primarily with the Gang of
Four and the associates of Lin Biao. At that time, many Chinese found the trial
cathartic and joined Deng Xiaoping in blaming the defendants for China’s suf-
fering. Others viewed the trial simply as a demonstration of “victor’s justice” by
Deng and his supporters toward those who opposed him. While most of the defen-
dants sat sullenly playing their proper role, Mao’s widow, Jiang Qing, famously
said, “I was merely the Chairman’s dog. Whatever he asked to me bite, I bit.” Her
theatrics, while entertaining, had little effect on the guilty verdict, which was
preordained from the outset.

Questions
1. Why do you think Deng Xiaoping decided to try the Gang of Four
publicly?
2. What crimes did the government prosecutors charge the Gang of
Four?
334 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

Principal Culprits of the Counter-Revolutionary Cliques

of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing to Be Tried
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate will soon start a public prosecution
against the counter-revolutionary cliques of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing. This
was announced by Huang Huoqing, Chief Procurator of the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate, at the 16th meeting of the Standing Committee of
the Fifth National People’s Congress on September 27. At the meeting he
gave a report concerning this case and proposed to the N.P.C. Standing
Committee that a special procuratorate of the Supreme People’s Procura-
torate and a special court of the Supreme People’s Court be set up to try
the principal culprits of the two counter-revolutionary cliques.
The ten principle defendants to be prosecuted are Jiang Qing, Zhang
Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen, Chen Boda, Huang Yongsh-
eng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo and Jiang Tengjiao.
According to the regulations of China’s Law of Criminal Procedure, no
prosecution will be instituted against those defendants who are dead.
Huang Huoqing said that the procuratorate had examined the case file
and evidence submitted by the Ministry of Public Security which had con-
cluded its investigation into the case, and had interrogated the accused.
He added that ample evidence proved that the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing
counter-revolutionary cliques were guilty of grave crimes.
The ten principal accused will be prosecuted and tried on the following
four counts:
• Sedition and conspiracy to overthrow the political power of prole-
tarian dictatorship;
• Frame-up and persecution of Party and state leaders and usurpa-
tion of Party leadership and state power;
• Persecution and suppression of cadres and the masses of the people
and practice of the fascist dictatorship; and
• Plotting to murder Chairman Mao and engineering a counter-revo-
lutionary armed rebellion.
In a word, their crimes were those of usurping Party leadership and state
power and bringing calamity to the country and the people.
The prosecution against Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and company involves
only their counter-revolutionary crimes which violated the Criminal Law,
and does not touch upon their errors in work, including those related to
political line. Huang Huoqing noted.
The case of Lin Biao and the gang of four is being handled seriously
and prudently. Huang Huoqing said. The leading group under the Cen-
tral Commission for Inspecting Discipline to examine the case of Lin Biao
and the gang of four has done a great deal of work. The Ministry of Public
Security began in late April this year the investigation and pre-trial of those
members of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques who are now in custody.
The results of the investigation showed that they had violated the Crimi-
nal Law and that they should be dealt with by the judicial department
according to law. Since the case was of an extraordinary and grave nature,
functionaries of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate were assigned to take
part in and supervise the whole process of the investigation and pre-trial
from the very beginning.
Huang Huoqing stated that the two counter-revolutionary cliques of
Lin Biao and Jiang Qing will be prosecuted as one case. This is because the
two cliques colluded with and made use of each other. During the first five
years of the “cultural revolution,” the two cliques acted in collusion and
committed crimes in usurping Party leadership and state power, plunging
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 335

the country and people into calamities. The criminal activities of the two
cliques were interrelated and inseparable from each other. After Lin Biao
died in an air crash in September 1971 while fleeing the country, the Jiang
Qing counter-revolutionary clique recruited his followers and carried on
conspiratorial activities.
Huang Huoqing said: The crimes Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their
followers committed during the ten years of the “cultural revolution”
brought untold calamities to our country and nation. But we will confine
our suit against them to their direct and principal crimes and their respon-
sibility for these crimes.
He added that a detailed study was made during the process of
investigation, pre-trial and procuratorial preparations. He stressed: “We
lay stress on evidence and do not readily believe confessions. We base our-
selves on facts and use the law as our criterion. In the criminal proceed-
ings against Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their followers, we base ourselves
on ascertained and verified original material evidence such as dossiers,
letters, diaries, notes, records and tape recordings.”
The other accomplices involved in the case will be tried separately
by the Supreme People’s Court, local people’s courts and military courts.

LIFE IN THE 1970S

Life in 1970s China fundamentally changed as a direct result of Deng
Xiaoping’s policies. Perhaps no event marked those changes and the new
opportunities available to the common citizen than the reestablishment
of university entrance exams to select students on the basis of test scores
rather than on class and revolutionary background (12.10). An often-over-
looked consequence of the government’s de-politicization of society was
the emotional relaxation that occurred as a result. In the Cultural Revolu-
tion, any reflection about one’s individual needs or desires outside the
needs of the party and state was labeled as “bourgeois behavior” and if
discovered, harshly punished. The need to articulate these sentiments
openly and publicly, questioning the value of the wasted years of the
Cultural Revolution, was as important to Chinese society as witnessing
the Gang of Four on trial (12.9). After years of being bottled up, the abil-
ity to express and even write about one’s own personal feelings brought
forth a wave of literature and articles dissecting what work, careers, and
even love should be about (12.12). The ambivalent feelings toward the
changes brought about by these policies are sharply underscored in one of
the most popular literary works of the 1980s, Zhang Jie’s “Love Must Not
Be Forgotten.” The author’s unvarnished depiction of women in Chinese
society created considerable controversy that was reminiscent of Ding
Ling’s work in the 1920s and 1940s (7.13 and 9.7).

12.10 UNIVERSITY ENTRANCE EXAMINATIONS (1977)

Beginning in 1957, access to universities, and often even to high school, was
denied to children of families with bad (“black”) class backgrounds. The Cultural
Revolution further perverted the traditional university system to political ends,
with many universities simply closing their doors during much of the period.
The return to standard and open entrance exams in 1977 had a deep cathartic
experience for Chinese society. Although there were cases of students being denied
admission to universities in 1977, the following year, the official policy demanded
that no student be denied the opportunity to enter a university based purely on
one’s family political background. Given the pent-up demand, Chinese under
336 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

age 30 (and, in special cases, even older) took the entrance exams, often with con-
siderable support from their work units. The following account appeared in China
Reconstructs and captures the widespread excitement surrounding the exams.

Questions
1. Why do you think Deng Xiaoping’s decision to open the entrance
exams was so popular among common Chinese?
2. What were the various motivations of the students profiled in
the article for taking the entrance exams? How did their reasons
conform to Deng Xiaoping’s new policies (or counter previous
campaigns)?

Ask anyone in China to name ten major events of 1977 and he is sure to
include the new reforms in the university enrollment regulations.
Since the announcement last October on extending eligibility, hold-
ing entrance examinations, and selecting the best according to an all-
round appraisal, this has been the topic of conversation everywhere. In
buses and restaurants even people who did not know each other would
get into warm discussions about it. Bookstores quickly ran out of books
helpful for reviewing middle school subjects. Factories, communes and
government organizations allowed applicants two weeks off to prepare.
Some units also engaged teachers to help.
Middle school teachers worked as hard as the applicants. Many who
had retired returned to open special classes. A classroom seating fifty
was often packed with twice the number, many of them applicants living
nearby and working in factories or stores. A math teacher came home after
a long day in her school and before she could sit down to supper, students
were already coming in for help. Telling them to be seated, she answered
their questions while she ate. Asked if she was tired, she said, “Yes, but
I’m glad to help. These are kids who hope to get into university so they’ll
be better equipped to help modernize our country.”
The general atmosphere of hard work in studies extended even to
junior middle and primary schools. Youngsters became more attentive in
class and there were fewer idlers after school. Many more stayed on in
school for extracurricular science activities or went straight home to do
homework.
A special kind of atmosphere prevailed in Beijing between Decem-
ber 10–12 when entrance examinations were held. At crowded bus stops
people smilingly let young people obviously headed for the exams get
on first. In restaurants they received extra quick service. First aid stations
and food stalls were set up next to the 200 examination sites. Outside the
gate of Beijing Middle School No. 150 a retired woman worker stood with
drawing compasses and triangles in her hands. “Waiting for somebody?”
she was asked. She held up the things in her hands and said, “Just in case
some kids forgot these.”

“Now We’re Moving!”

One couldn’t help thinking of the notorious incident during the univer-
sity entrance examinations of 1973. That summer a young man named
Zhang Tiesheng sat for the examinations in Liaoning province. When he
couldn’t answer most of the questions he filled a whole page of the exam
papers with complaints against examinations. The “gang of four,” look-
ing for troublemakers to mess up the country in their bid for power, lost
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 337

no time in setting him up as “a hero who dares to go against the tide.”

He was not only admitted into university but also given wide publicity
as an example for young people. This caused great confusion among the
students. Entrance examinations were all but scrapped and there was a
growing trend to try to get into university “through the back door”, that
is, through pull and connections or bribing people with influence, while
vast numbers of really promising young people were kept out. The qual-
ity of students in the next few years dropped markedly. In all fields of
work there is now a severe lack of young and competent trained person-
nel. If this situation had continued, modernizing the country by the end of
the century would have been hopeless. People were deeply worried about
the future of China.
With the “gang of four” out of the way, Chairman Mao’s hope of
seeing China a strong modern socialist country by the end of the century
is being made possible again. Plans to train scientists and technicians have
been drawn up. Now the reforms in the enrollment regulations are open-
ing the way to more talent and raising the quality of education. Thus,
when they were announced, people enthusiastically said, “Now we’re
moving ahead!”

The Applicants
Asked how they felt about the chance to enter university, many applicants
said, “Chairman Hua has made it possible.” These were sincere words.
First, Chairman Hua halted the “gang of four”. Second, the new regu-
lations initiated by the Party Central Committee give all young people
under 25 in good health and with a schooling of or equivalent to senior
middle school a chance to be selected. Naturally they must love social-
ism and work and are willing to study hard. The age limit for those with
some special skill and good job experience is extended to 30. This exten-
sion especially made entrance possible for young people who graduated
from senior middle school in 1966 and 1967, the two years at the begin-
ning of the cultural revolution when all universities and colleges were
closed. There have never been so many applicants from among workers,
peasants, [soldiers], barefoot doctors, rural school teachers, school gradu-
ates already working in the countryside and new senior middle school
graduates. By again selecting the best according to an all-round standard
consisting of political, intellectual and physical qualifications, including
appraisals given by the applicants’ places of work, the universities are
admitting a large number of very promising young people.
What are some of them like and what are their aims in getting a uni-
versity education? . . .
Chen Li, a 20-year-old girl working as a pig raiser in the Dongbei-
wang commune outside Beijing, said, “I hope to enter university so I can
learn more in the science field and serve the people better. But whether I’m
admitted or not, I’m going to keep up my studies and do my bit to help
modernize our country.” As soon as the exams were over she returned to
her commune to work while she waited for the results.
Chen Li went to the countryside in the spring of 1976 after gradu-
ating from senior middle school, carrying a small bedroll and a big bag
of books. She was assigned to the pig farm where everything was still
done with manual labor. With a hundred pigs to look after, she had to
carry a hundred double-loads of pig mash a day. But no matter how tired
she was after a long day’s work she would study before going to bed.
338 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

She concentrated on mathematics and English and always carried a small

English-Chinese dictionary in her pocket.
When Chen Li announce her intention to take the entrance exams,
her fellow commune members took over her work so she could give all
her time to reviewing her lessons. “Remember all the heavy loads you
carried,” they said to her. “If you get admitted, study to bring us mecha-
nization sooner.” . . .

A Welcomed Pressure
More than one college professor has spoken of their gratification at dis-
covering so many promising and talented young people. The feeling was
especially strong at the Central Music Conservatory.
The conservatory had planned to admit 130 students—then found
it had to choose from among 17,000 applicants! After stringent screening,
qualified applicants still exceeded the original quota by several times. The
teachers then submitted a joint request to the leaders to extend the quota.
The conservatory finally accepted nearly three hundred.
“In my twenty-eight years of teaching,” said Yu Yixuan, vice-director
of the conservatory and an accomplished soprano in her own right, “I have
never had to choose from such a great number of applicants, and from
so many who are already technically competent, or even proficient.” She
couldn’t help comparing what she saw this time with the admittance work
under the cultural dictatorship of Jiang Qing and her followers. At that
time the conservatory was allowed to enroll students only from certain
specified districts where children were “sure to come from families who
suffered bitterly in the old society and have a deep class hatred” (the “gang
of four’s” ultra-leftism). All other districts were ruled out. Even within
the specified districts, unreasonable requirements—one of which was to
investigate the applicants’ family background back three generations—
deprived many promising youngsters of the chance even to apply. With
this method invariably the school had been unable to meet its enrollment
quota. In 1975 the voice department under Professor Yu planned to enroll
14 students. After seven months of such investigations it selected only five
tenors and four sopranos. . . .
The admittance of so many talented your people eager to make
music serve socialism put pressure on the music teachers. It meant harder
work to cope with the new situation. “This is the kind of pressure we like,”
they said.

12.11 FILM: AT MIDDLE AGE (1982)

First published in a literary journal in 1980, the story At Middle Age poi-
gnantly depicted the sacrifices of those who came of age in the 1960s with little or
no recognition of their achievements. Then, in the 1970s, this group was expected
to redouble their efforts to help China modernize. Most Chinese professionals
saw no salary increase during the 1960s or early 1970s. Constantly in danger of
being labeled “rightist” or “counterrevolutionary” for their education in Western
sciences, even the most dedicated workers emerged emotionally and physically
depleted. Chen Rong’s story twists the common idealization of individual sacri-
fice (like Lei Feng [11.2]) by laying bare the negligible material rewards and the
lingering political suspicion intellectuals still encountered even after the end of
the Cultural Revolution—as well as the latent favoritism that high officials still
received.
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 339

Set in 1979, the novella recounts the life of ophthalmologist-surgeon Dr. Lu

through flashbacks after she has suffered a physical collapse in the hospital where
she works. Although the original work of fiction was attacked by some critiques,
thus slowing down filming, the film premiered in 1983 to near-universal popular
acclaim. Its success demonstrated Deng’s new line, admitting that Mao had made
“some mistakes” and thus oblique criticism that attacked policies but not the cen-
tral government was allowed.

Questions
1. Which character do you believe most viewers identified with in
the following scene?
2. Why do you think some doctors in the story chose to leave the
country or were planning to leave?
(Doctor Lu walks into Hospital Director Zhao’s office to find two other individu-
als waiting, one of whom is clearly a high-ranking cadre.)
Zhao: Doctor Lu, come in please. Come, allow me to introduce you [to
the visitors]. This is Vice Minister Jiao . . . Comrade Jiao Sicheng.
This is Comrade Sicheng’s wife, Comrade Qin Bo. This is Doctor
Lu.
Lu: Hello.
Jiao: Please have a seat.
Zhao: Doctor Lu, Vice Minister Jiao is planning to have his cataract
removal surgery done here.
Lu: Just the one eye?
Jiao: Yes.
Lu: Which one?
Jiao: My left eye.
Lu: Totally blind? Have you had it examined in the hospital? (Vice
Minister Jiao nods in agreement) Ah, okay. Vice Minister Jiao
(moves to stand up but is stopped by Comrade Qin Bo)
Qin: Doctor Lu, please sit back down. We probably should have it ex-
amined more formally in a clinic room, right? Doctor Lu, how
long have you worked in the hospital?
Lu: I came here in 1961.
Qin: Oh, so that would be 18 years then.
Zhao: Doctor Lu has considerable clinical experience and is a skilled sur-
geon.
Qin: You don’t look very healthy though?
Lu: My health is fine.
Zhao: She is considered among the fittest doctors here. Doctor Lu, I don’t
think you’ve ever missed a day for years?
Qin: Doctor Lu, are you confident doing cataract surgery?
Lu: Director Zhao. . .
(knock on door)
Zhao: Come in.
Nurse: Doctor Lu, that older gentleman, Mr. Zhang, he’s here for his ap-
pointment and he insists on you being the one that sees him.
Qin: Doctor Lu, you are busy. Please take care of whatever needs your
attention.
Zhao: Yes. Go ahead to tend to your patients.
Lu: Ah, excuse me then.
(Doctor Lu exits the office)
Zhao: Comrade Qin Bo, I think we should allow Doctor Lu to conduct
Vice Minister Jiao’s surgery.
340 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

Qin: Director Zhao, is Doctor Lu an associate head of her department?

Zhao: No.
Qin: Is she an attending doctor?
Zhao: No.
Qin: Is she a Party member?
Zhao: Not, that either.
Qin: Hmm, comrade, pardon my candidness. Isn’t it a bit imprudent to
let such a run-of-the-mill doctor operate on Vice Minister Jiao?
Jiao: Qin Bo! What are you talking about! Allow the hospital to make
the arrangements. Any surgeon can operate.
Qin: My dear Jiao, I do not agree with your careless attitude. One’s
health is the foundation of the revolution. You must be responsi-
ble to the Party. (Vice Minister Jiao, turns away from his wife with a
look of disgust) Director Zhao, would it be possible for Doctor Sun
to operate?
Zhao: Oh my (expressing surprise), Doctor Sun is almost seventy. His own
eyesight is quite bad.
Qin: Well, how about Doctor Guo, then?
Zhao: Doctor Guo?
Qin: Guo Ruqing.
Zhao: Hah, he’s gone abroad.
Qin: Then we will wait until he returns.
Zhao: His wife was an overseas Chinese who returned to China [after
1949]. Her father is seriously ill and so they returned overseas per-
manently to take over his business.
Qin: Ah, these people. I simply don’t understand what they were
thinking!
Jiao: In the early fifties, intellectuals like you returned from abroad
overcoming many obstacles in order to participate in the construc-
tion of New China. Now at the end of the 1970s, the intellectuals
we ourselves trained are all leaving. What a hard lesson to swal-
low!
Qin: We simply cannot allow things to continue in this manner. I think
it’s a sign we need to strengthen the political and ideological work.
My Comrade, this. . .
Jiao: Qin Bo! (Interrupting his wife) Director Zhao, I came to you, not
because I wanted an expert or a professor. I came because I have a
special attachment to your hospital. (Moves over closer on the couch
and removes glasses) You see, I had this eye operated on here [at this
hospital].
Zhao: Oh? Who did it?
Jiao: Ah, that’s my dilemma! All these years, and I still haven’t learned
who she was.

12.12 ZHANG JIE’S “LOVE MUST NOT BE FORGOTTEN”

(1979)
Born in 1937, Zhang Jie experienced the harshest of the country’s political cam-
paigns. Her stories, while not autobiographical, tapped into the experiences and
frustrations of her generation. Her 1985 novel won the Mao Dun literary prize for
Leaden Wings. Her writings aroused considerable controversy by challenging
the patriarchal, socially amoral, and often corrupt underside of Chinese society.
The story excerpted here, “Love Must Not Be Forgotten,” called into question
the basis of love and marriage in China. As one of the first to dare suggest mar-
riage could and did exist without love (or, conversely, that love could endure
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 341

outside marriage), the story was condemned in government circles as subverting

the country’s morality by defending love outside marriage. But the author was
viewed by the Chinese public as one of China’s first novelists to openly express
feminist ideas in the post–Cultural Revolution period. Her books were among the
country’s top sellers.

Questions
1. Why is the main character in a quandary over her suitor, Qiao
Lin?
2. Do you find the story more idealistic or realistic? Why?
3. Why might some Chinese officials be disturbed by the story?

I am thirty, the same age as our People’s Republic. For a republic thirty is
still young. But a girl of thirty is virtually on the shelf.
Actually, I have a bonafide suitor. Have you seen the Greek sculp-
tor Myrong’s Discobolus? Qiao Lin is the image of that discus thrower.
Even the padded clothes he wears in winter fail to hide his fine physique.
Bronzed, with clear-cut features, a broad forehead and large eyes, his
appearance alone attracts most girls to him.
But I can’t make up my mind to marry him. I’m not clear what
attracts me to him, or him to me. I know people are gossiping behind my
back, “Who does she think she is, to be so choosy?” To them, I’m a nobody
playing hard to get. They take offense at such preposterous behavior.
Of course, I shouldn’t be captious. In a society where commercial
production still exists, marriage like most other transactions is still a form
of barter.
I have known Qiao Lin for nearly two years, yet still cannot
fathom whether he keeps so quiet from aversion to talking or from hav-
ing nothing to say. When, by way of a small intelligence test, I demand
his opinion of this or that, he says “good” or “bad” like a child in
kindergarten.
Once I asked, “Qiao Lin, why do you love me?” He thought the
question over seriously for what seemed an age. I could see from his nor-
mally smooth but now wrinkled forehead that the little grey cells in his
handsome head were hard at work cogitating. I felt ashamed to have put
him on the spot.
Finally he raised his clear childlike eyes to tell me, “Because you’re
good!”
Loneliness flooded my heart. “Thank you, Qiao Lin!” I couldn’t help
wondering if we were to marry, whether we could discharge our duties to
each other as husband and wife. Maybe, because law and morality would
have bound us together. But how tragic simply to comply with law and
morality! Was there no stronger bond to link us?
When such thoughts cross my mind I have the strange sensation
that instead of being a girl contemplating marriage I am an elderly social
scientist.
Perhaps I worry too much. We can live like most married couples,
bringing up children together, strictly true to each other according to the
law. . . . Although living in the seventies of the twentieth century, people
still consider marriage the way they did millennia ago, as a means of con-
tinuing the race, a form of barter or a business transaction in which love
and marriage can be separated. Since this is the common practice, why
shouldn’t we follow suit?
But I still can’t make up my mind. As a child, I remember, I often
cried all night for no rhyme or reason, unable to sleep and disturbing the
342 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

whole household. My old nurse, a shrewd though uneducated woman,

said an ill wind had blown through my ear. I think this judgment showed
prescience, because I still have that old weakness. I upset myself over
things which really present no problem, upsetting other people at the
same time. One’s nature is hard to change.
I think of my mother too. If she were alive, what would she say about
my attitude to Qiao Lin and my uncertainty about marrying him? My
thoughts constantly turn to her, not because she was such a strict mother
that her ghost is still watching over me since her death. No, she was not
just my mother but my closest friend. I loved her so much that the thought
of her leaving me makes my heart ache.
She never lectured me, just told me quietly in her deep, unwom-
anly voice about her successes and failures, so that I could learn from her
experience. She had evidently not had many successes—her life was full
of failures.
During her last days she followed me with her fine, expressive eyes,
as if wondering how I would manage on my own and as if she had some
important advice for me but hesitated to give it. She suddenly blurted out,
“Shanshan, if you aren’t sure what you want, don’t rush into marriage—
better live on your own!”
Other people might think this strange advice from a mother to her
daughter, but to me it embodies her bitter experience. I don’t think she
underestimated me or my knowledge of life. She loved me and didn’t
want me to be unhappy.
“I don’t want to marry, mother!” I said, not out of bashfulness or a
show of coyness. I can’t think why a girl should pretend to be coy. She had
long since taught me about things not generally mentioned to girls.
“If you meet the right man, then marry him. Only if he’s right for
you!”
“I’m afraid no such man exists!”
“That’s not true. But it’s hard. The world is so vast, I’m afraid you
may never meet him.” Whether married or not was not what concerned
her, but the quality of the marriage.
“Haven’t you managed fine without a husband?”
“Who says so?”
“I think you’ve done fine.”
“I had no choice. . . .” She broke off, lost in thought, her face wistful.
Her wistful lined face reminded me of a withered flower I had pressed in
a book.
“Why did you have no choice?”
“You ask too many questions,” she parried, not ashamed to con-
fide in me but afraid that I might reach the wrong conclusion. Besides,
everyone treasures a secret to carry to the grave. Feeling a bit put out,
I demanded bluntly, “didn’t you love my dad?”
“No, I never loved him.”
“Did he love you?”
“No, he didn’t.”
“Then why get married?”
She paused, searching for the right words to explain this mystery,
then answered bitterly, “When you’re young you don’t always know
what you’re looking for, what you need, and people may talk you into
getting married. As you grow older and more experienced you find out
your true needs. By then, though, you’ve done many foolish things for
which you could kick yourself. You’d give anything to be able to make a
fresh start and live more wisely. Those content with their lot will always
 Chapter 12 • China Reemerges 343

be happy, they say, but I shall never enjoy that happiness.” She added
self-mockingly, “A wretched idealist, that’s all I am.”
Did I take after her? Did we both have genes which attracted ill
winds?
“Why don’t you marry again?”
“I’m afraid I’m still not sure what I really want.” She was obviously
unwilling to tell me the truth.
 CHAPTER 13
Life in China Under Deng
Post-1949 China (1949–Present)Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond

Xiaoping and Beyond

2 3

4
1

5
7

6
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 345

1. TIANANMEN SQUARE: Tiananmen Square has been the site of public demonstrations since the
early twentieth century. The first major demonstrations began in earnest in 1919 with the May
Fourth demonstrations (Chapter 6) and again as the site of a mass memorial for former premier
Zhou Enlai on April 5, 1976. As student discontent rose in the spring of 1989, Hu Yaobang’s death
in early April made the Monument of the Martyrs nestled in the heart of Tiananmen a natural focal
point.

2. GATE OF HEAVENLY PEACE: The Chinese term “Tiananmen” literally means the “Gate of Heav-
enly Peace.” The gate marks the entrance to the Imperial City. The square in front of the massive
Gate of Heavenly Peace was relatively small up until the 1950s. At the insistence of Mao Zedong and
other CCP leaders, the original square was enlarged so it could hold a million people for the massive
rallies.

3. 1989 STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS: The Tiananmen protests began on April 18, 1989, when
thousands of students gathered in the square to mourn and memorialize the passing Hu Yaobang.
The government’s April 26 front-page editorial threatening to oppose any “turmoil” only incited
larger numbers of demonstrators to flock to Tiananmen Square. On May 4, the 70th anniversary of
the first May Fourth demonstrations, the number of demonstrators topped 100,000 (13.9).

4. GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY [MINZHU NUSHEN]: As the demonstrations extended into late

May, initial enthusiasm, popular support, and intense media interest began to fade. To re-instill
the original zeal, students from the Central Academy of Fine Arts conceptualized, constructed, and
erected the Goddess of Democracy in only four days’ time. At over 30 feet in height, it towered over
the square and attracted massive crowds.

5. JUNE 4, 1989: On May 20, due to growing numbers of student demonstrations throughout Beijing,
the Chinese government declared martial law. On the evening of June 3, PLA troops moved into
the city and opened fire on those attempting to block their advance. By early the next morning, the
square had been forcibly cleared. Estimates of the deaths in the city of Beijing range from several
hundred to several thousand.

6. TANK MAN: On June 5, 1989, international media captured images of a young man stridently
walking out to the middle of Chang’an Avenue to prevent a line of tanks from continuing toward
Tiananmen. As the tanks slowed and then sought to go around him, the young man waved his bag
and stepped side to side, impeding their progress. As the tanks came to a stop, he climbed up on top
of the tank and spoke with the driver. Anxious bystanders then quickly whisked him away, as the
tanks continued forward. The true identity of the young man remains unclear to this day.

7. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNT: In the state media, government leaders attempted to paint the inci-
dent as instigated by a belligerent and misguided small group of agitators. Chinese leaders insist
that no lives were lost in Tiananmen Square itself. Mostly, however, the incident is simply forgot-
ten, with young Chinese unable to clearly describe the events that occurred during the “Tiananmen
Incident” (13.10).
346 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

CHINESE NATIONAL Since the 1920s, the CCP had used the control of information, theatrical
HOLIDAYS—Until 2008, performances, and media for setting the cultural and ideological param-
every Chinese had seven eters of the nation. The emergence of television in the 1980s allowed a new
days off per year. In 2008, and immensely powerful tool for propagating and controlling popular
this was raised to 11 days discourse among most Chinese citizens. Up until the late 1970s, China’s
per year: New Year’s Day primary television channel CCTV (China Central Television) broadcast
(one day), Spring Festival only one channel. Before that period, very few private individuals owned
(three days), Qingming a television, and the question of what was broadcast mattered little. This
Festival (one day); May quickly changed in the early 1980s, as television purchases increased dra-
Day (one day); Dragon matically in urban areas.
Boat Festival (Duanwu Jie, The Spring Festival, like many traditional Chinese holidays, con-
one day), Mid-Autumn forms to the lunar calendar. As a result, the festival can fall between early
Festival (one day) and January and mid- to late February. Officially, the holiday lasts for three
National Day (three day). days, but little work occurs days (and even weeks) before and after as
people prepare for the holiday or arrange their journeys home. In the
lead-up, train stations and airports become surreal masses of people, with
XIANGSHENG—A fast-
tickets often bought up months in advance. In the late imperial era, the
paced stand-up comedy
end of the lunar New Year was the day upon which all debts were due,
routine, typically with
and, according to the traditional reckoning, the day on which everyone
two people similar to the
(no matter what day you were born) was considered to be a year older. By
“Who’s on First” sketch
the 1980s, many of the customary traditions associated with the holiday
that relies heavily on puns
had been stripped away, leaving its primary importance as simply the lon-
and humorous wordplay.
gest national holiday of the year and when most all Chinese were granted
Often translated into
a three-day holiday. Particularly, during the first years of Deng Xiaop-
English as “Crosstalk.”
ing’ leadership, with less emphasis on political campaigns, an increas-
ingly large number of families were able to celebrate the Spring Festival
together.
Beginning in 1983, CCTV began broadcasting a Spring Festival Eve
television gala [chunjie lianhuan wanhui] comprised of singing, dancing,
comedy skits, and comedic cross-talk [xiangsheng]. The program became
an immediate hit. Usually lasting between four and five hours on the
Lunar New Year’s Eve, when families are typically gathered, the show
offered a variety of entertainment unprecedented for most Chinese. It
quickly became a set part of every family’s Spring Festival activities, along
with playing Mahjong (Majiang), cards, or other traditional family activi-
ties. The performers, skits, and singers would be the topic of subsequent
discussions between friends and colleagues for weeks (if not months!).
Over the course of the 1980s, the show evolved but never deviated
from the successful formula of an elaborate variety show. The holiday
special would perennially achieve a domestic audience share of well over
90 percent (and at the height of the show’s popularity in the mid- to late
1980s, it likely was close to 100 percent). The massive audience size (in
2020, some 1.2 billion viewers tuned in to the show—ten times the view-
ership of the Super Bowl) meant that both advertisers and stars cajoled,
jockeyed, and bribed their way onto the show. A single appearance could
launch singers and performers from virtual obscurity to instantaneous
stardom.
On the surface, the Spring Festival Gala reflected China’s increas-
ing openness to outside influences and its rising consumerism, but, on
a deeper level, the Gala was a throwback to many of the CCP’s earliest
efforts to merge entertainment with party propaganda. In addition to the
humorous skits and popular entertainers, there was a sizeable number
of unmistakably, and unadulterated, military, patriotic, and government
elements included in the gala. The combination of these two elements—
what some have called “indoctri-tainment”—appears to Western eyes as
somewhat bewildering. One skit hilariously portrayed a father on the run
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 347

from state officials with his seven daughters while still hoping his again- FOUR CARDINAL
pregnant wife will give birth to a boy is followed by revered (but clearly PRINCIPLES—On
past their prime) singers in military uniforms singing martial hymns and March 30, 1979, Deng
backed up by dancers all in fighter pilot outfits holding model jet fighters. Xiaoping outlined the
The Spring Festival Gala’s outward disjuncture, however, demonstrates the Four Cardinal Principles:
Chinese state’s flair for adapting the mode in which it delivers its politi- 1) keeping to the socialist
cal messages from outright propaganda campaigns to a more seductive road, 2) upholding the
delivery via a spectacular television program. people’s democratic
From its first broadcast in 1983 up to the present, the Spring Festival dictatorship (dictatorship
Gala has reflected the complex changes occurring in Chinese society. In of the proletariat), 3)
particular, a maturing sophistication and growing audience diversifica- upholding leadership by
tion demanded that the show aspire to please an increasingly disparate the Communist Party and
populace—often with less than satisfactory results. The Gala production 4) upholding Marxism–
has evolved by displaying impressive leaps in technology and staging; Leninism and Mao Zedong
however, many of the country’s middle-aged and senior viewers, includ- Thought.
ing many government officials, have wanted nostalgic and comforting
program content that reminds them of past Spring Festivals. The younger
population segments yearn for a television spectacular that will entertain JIANG ZEMIN (1926–)—
them and showcase new, and if not cutting edge, talent that were not sing- Born in Jiangsu, he grew
ers only their grandmothers would enjoy. up during the Japanese
The rapid social changes occurring in the late 1990s and early 2000s occupation and graduated
underscore the cavernous generation gap and widening urban–rural in 1947 with a degree in
dichotomy that characterizes contemporary China. Today’s Spring Festival electrical engineering. He
Gala is less a platform for new talent and excitement seen in the mid-1980s rose through the ranks to
than a show everyone loves to hate and, in many ways, reflects the myr- become mayor of Shanghai
iad internal differences within modern China. Yet, it seeks to strengthen in 1985 before being
the legitimacy of the state and its leadership. President Xi Jinping’s wife, chosen by Deng Xiaoping
soprano Peng Liyuan, appeared on the gala 20 times between 1986 and to replace Zhao Ziyang in
2007, singing the praises of the party. In 2019, the popular boyband, 1989 and ultimately replace
TFBoys, sang “We are the Dream-seekers” a quote from Xi Jinping’s New Deng Xiaoping after his
Year’s address. In the end, the Gala remains the ultimate means by which death in 1997. In 2003, he
the central government both reinforces its message and gives its official stepped down from the
stamp of approval to mainstream popular culture. Politburo to make way
for a new generation of
leaders.
POLITICAL CURRENTS
In 1980, Deng made a series of speeches regarding Mao Zedong, Mao
Zedong Thought, and the guiding principles of the party. Differences of
opinion on how the CCP should officially handle Mao’s legacy caused
Deng Xiaoping to repeatedly emphasize China’s Four Cardinal Princi-
ples. Deng Xiaoping sought to qualify his endorsement of Mao Zedong’s
legacy by disengaging the “original features” of Mao Zedong Thought.
Deng Xiaoping’s intent was to acknowledge Mao’s contributions as pri-
mary, while at the same time recognizing Mao’s mistakes (13.1). By the
early twenty-first century, China’s leadership continued to seek new
ways in which to balance adherence to their Communist roots while
pushing for modernization. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, as China’s
paramount leaders, created new ideological formulas that seek to bridge
external and internal inconsistencies. Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents”
sought to update past party doctrine to acknowledge the realities of an
economically vibrant China (13.2). Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook on
Development” reflects the efforts of a party run by technocrats rather
than ideologues to emphasize the maintenance of’ social harmony (13.3).
Despite new slogans and recent CCP ideologies (often impenetrable to
the common Chinese), many traditional goals of the central government
remain.
348 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

13.1 DENG XIAOPING’S BUILDING SOCIALISM WITH A

SPECIFICALLY CHINESE CHARACTER (JUNE 30, 1984)
Mao Zedong’s death, the arrest of the Gang of Four, and Deng Xiaoping’s liberal-
izing policies all generated considerable reflection among the Chinese people about
China’s past and future, as well as the role of Marxism as a guiding principle.
Deng Xiaoping had to walk a fine line to ensure his leadership did not totally dis-
credit Mao Zedong’s legacy and risk losing the support of core CCP powerbrokers,
while still turning the nation in a new direction. In the following speech, Deng
Xiaoping outlines the trials and tribulations China had successfully overcome in
the first decades after liberation in 1949 and also indicates the hurdles that China
faced on its road to modernization. Deng’s speech highlights his rather singular
notion of socialism while emphasizing economic reform.

Questions
1. What is “socialism with Chinese characteristics”?
2. What reasons does Deng Xiaoping give for China’s lack of devel-
opment and modernization?

Since the defeat of the Gang of Four and the convocation of the Third
Plenary Session of the Party’s Eleventh Central Committee, we have for-
mulated correct ideological, political and organizational lines and a series
of principles and policies. What is the ideological line? To adhere to Marx-
ism and to integrate it with Chinese realities—in other words, to seek
truth from facts, as advocated by Comrade Mao Zedong, and to uphold
his basic ideas. It is crucial for us to adhere to Marxism and socialism. For
more than a century after the Opium War, China was subjected to aggres-
sion and humiliation. It is because the Chinese people embraced Marxism
and kept to the road leading from new-democracy to socialism that their
revolution was victorious.
You may ask, what if the Chinese people had taken the capitalist
road instead? Could they have liberated themselves, and could they have
finally stood up? Let us review the history. The Kuomintang followed the
capitalist road for more than 20 years, but China was still a semi-colonial,
semi-feudal society, which proved that that road led nowhere. In contrast,
the Communists, adhering to Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought, which
integrates Marxism with actual conditions in China, took their own road
and succeeded in the revolution by encircling the cities from the country-
side. Conversely, if we had not had faith in Marxism, or if we had not inte-
grated Marxism with Chinese conditions and followed our own road, the
revolution would have been a failure, and China would have remained
fragmented and dependent. So, faith in Marxism was the motive force that
enabled us to achieve victory in the revolution.
At the founding of the People’s Republic, we inherited from old
China a ruined economy with virtually no industry. There was a short-
age of grain, inflation was acute and the economy was in chaos. But we
solved the problems of feeding and employing the population, stabi-
lized commodity prices and unified financial and economic work, and
the economy rapidly recovered. On this foundation we started large-
scale reconstruction. What did we rely on? We relied on Marxism and
socialism. Some people ask why we chose socialism. We answer that
we had to, because capitalism would get China nowhere. If we had
taken the capitalist road, we could not have put an end to the chaos
in the country or done away with poverty and backwardness. That is
why we have repeatedly declared that we shall adhere to Marxism and
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 349

keep to the socialist road. But by Marxism we mean Marxism that is THREE REPRESENTS—
integrated with Chinese conditions, and by socialism we mean a social- Jiang Zemin’s contribution
ism that is tailored to Chinese conditions and has a specifically Chinese to the development
character. . . . of Chinese Marxism
Proceeding from the realities in China, we must first of all solve officially introduced in
the problem of the countryside. Eighty percent of the population lives in 2000 and ratified by the
rural areas, and China’s stability depends on the stability of those areas. 16th Party Congress in
No matter how successful our work is in the cities, it won’t mean much 2002. Viewed by some
without a stable base in the countryside. We therefore began by invigo- critics as un-Marxist,
rating the economy and adopting an open policy there, so as to bring the Jiang introduced the view
initiative of 80 per cent of the population into full play. We adopted this that economic laws (e.g.,
policy at the end of 1978, and after a few years it has produced the desired capitalism) contributed
results. Now the recent Second Session of the Sixth National People’s Con- to socialism with Chinese
gress has decided to shift the focus of reform from the countryside to the characteristics.
cities. The urban reform will include not only industry and commerce but
science and technology, education and all other fields of endeavor as well.
In short, we shall continue the reform at home and open still wider to the
outside world.
We have opened 14 large and medium-sized coastal cities. We wel-
come foreign investment and advanced techniques. Management is also
a technique. Will they undermine our socialism? Not likely, because the
socialist sector is the mainstay of our economy. Our socialist economic
base is so huge that it can absorb tens and hundreds of billions of dol-
lars’ worth of foreign funds without being shaken. Foreign investment
will doubtless serve as a major supplement in the building of socialism in
our country. And as things stand now, that supplement is indispensable.
Naturally, some problems will arise in the wake of foreign investment.
But its negative impact will be far less significant than the positive use we
can make of it to accelerate our development. It may entail a slight risk,
but not much.
Well, those are our plans. We shall accumulate new experience and
try new solutions as new problems arise. In general, we believe that the
course we have chosen, which we call building socialism with Chinese
characteristics, is the right one. We have followed this road for five and a
half years and have achieved satisfactory results; indeed, the pace of devel-
opment has so far exceeded our projections. If we go on this way, we shall
be able to reach the goal of quadrupling China’s GNP by the end of the
century. And so, I can tell our friends that we are even more confident now.

13.2 JIANG ZEMIN’S THREE REPRESENTS (JULY 1, 2001)

Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” became a formal component of CCP’s official
ideology, with Marxist–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping The-
ory, during the 17th Party Congress (2001). Although “Three Represents” makes
as little grammatical and philosophical sense in Chinese as it does in English, it
suggests that the CCP represents three things: 1) the majority of the people—not
just the worker, peasant, soldier—the triumvirate of the traditional Communist
theory; 2) advanced culture—which Jiang equates with Marxism; and 3) advanced
technology—or, as Deng Xiaoping put it far more succinctly, modernization.
Jiang Zemin’s political philosophy, like his leadership, sought to update both the
“revolutionary language” and to legitimize the actions of the growing business
or “capitalist” class and to integrate both into a mainstream political culture.
On a functional level, Jiang’s doctrines attempted to refocus China’s ideology on
economic and technological advances while keeping the party machinery in place
as the dominant bureaucratic structure.
350 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

Questions
1. How does Jiang Zemin’s policy deviate from that of Deng Xiao­
ping? Does he emphasize or include any new or different policies?
2. What aspects of Chinese development do you think most con-
cerned Jiang Zemin?
The meaning of the important thought of Three Represents

Representing the Development Trend of China’s

Advanced Productive Forces
The Party’s basic nature determines that it must represent the develop-
ment trend of China’s advanced productive forces. Productive forces
are the most revolutionary and dynamic factors in a social mode of pro-
duction, and they are the forces that ultimately determine how human
society develops. The competition among all the forces in the world
today is, in the final analysis, a competition in overall national power,
including economic, scientific and technological strength and national
cohesiveness. . . .

Representing the Orientation of China’s

Advanced Culture
Socialist society means a society that develops and progresses compre-
hensively. A society is truly socialist only when its economic, political
and cultural development is balanced and a good job is done in both
material and spiritual civilization. Only by always representing the ori-
entation of China’s advanced culture and working hard to develop a
socialist culture with Chinese characteristics can the CCP achieve this
goal. . . .

Representing the Fundamental Interests of the

Overwhelming Majority of the Chinese People
Ever since our Party was founded, its primary aim has been to serve the
people wholeheartedly. Over the past 80 plus years, all our successes in
both revolution and development have been attributable mainly to the
fact that we represent the interests of the overwhelming majority of the
people and are able to unite with them in their struggles for their own
interests. . . .

The Three Represents are Mutually Related, Complement

Each Other and Constitute a Unified Whole
The unity of the Three Represents is a unity not only in theoretical logic
but also in practice. Developing advanced productive forces is a funda-
mental condition for developing advanced culture and materializing the
fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people. . . .
In short, the important thought of Three Represents is developing
and advancing. The whole Party must continuously emancipate their
minds, make theoretical progress and break new ground in practice. They
must infuse the important thought of Three Represents into all areas of
the socialist modernization drive and into all aspects of Party building so
that our Party always advances with the times and shares weal and woe
with the people.
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 351

13.3 HU JINTAO PROPOSES SCIENTIFIC OUTLOOK ON

DEVELOPMENT FOR TACKLING CHINA’S IMMEDIATE
WOES, CHALLENGES (OCTOBER 15, 2007)
The rise of Hu Jintao (1942–) to the position of paramount leader of China
marked the full transition from revolutionary leaders to more pragmatic tech-
nocrats who occupy the top tier of the CCP. Like Jiang Zemin before him, Hu
Jintao formulated his own ideology to give a more modern shape to the notion
of socialism with Chinese characteristics, a notion heralded by Deng Xiaoping
three decades earlier. Generally referred to as “Scientific Outlook on Develop-
ment” [kexue fazhanguan], Hu Jintao’s guiding vision emphasizes the cre-
ation of a “Harmonious Society,” sustainable development, social welfare, and a
more egalitarian society. Within Hu’s concept is the distinct effort to move the
country into a post-revolutionary era where China’s economic markets, its legal
framework, and its institutional/bureaucratic infrastructure define the param-
eters of political life.

Questions
1. How does Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook on Development seek to
guide China’s political evolution and economic growth?
2. A central element of Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook on Develop-
ment is his notion of developing a “harmonious society.” What
concrete elements does he put forth as contributing to such a
society?

Hu Jintao, on behalf of the 16th CCP Central Committee, expounded on

Monday on the political concept, which was put forward in 2003, in the
political report to the 17th CCP National Congress that opened Monday
morning.
“In light of the basic reality that China is in the primary stage of
socialism, the Scientific Outlook on Development has been formulated to
meet new requirements of development by analyzing China’s own prac-
tice and drawing on the experience of other countries in development,”
Hu told more than 2,000 delegates at the live telecast meeting.
Some of the major features of the preliminary stage include:
• The economic strength has increased markedly, but the overall pro-
ductivity remains low, the capacity for independent innovation is
weak, and the long-standing structural problems and the extensive
mode of growth are yet to be fundamentally addressed.
• The socialist market economy is basically in place, but there remain
structural and institutional obstacles slowing down development,
and further reform in difficult areas is confronted with deep-seated
problems.
• A relatively comfortable standard of living has been achieved for
the people as a whole, but the trend of a growing gap in income
distribution has not been thoroughly reversed, there are still a con-
siderable number of impoverished and low-income people in both
urban and rural areas, and it has become more difficult to accom-
modate the interests of all sides.
[. . .]
Hu said to thoroughly apply the Scientific Outlook on Development
“we must work energetically to build a harmonious socialist society,”
which features democracy and the rule of law, equity and justice, hon-
esty and fraternity, vigor and vitality, stability and order, and harmony
between man and nature.”
352 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

ONE-CHILD POLICY—A “We will spare no effort to solve the most specific problems of the
policy adopted in 1979 utmost and immediate concern to the people and strive to create a situa-
allowing each couple tion in which all people do their best, find their proper places in society
only one child. The policy and live together in harmony, so as to provide a favorable social environ-
was enforced with an ment for development,” Hu said.
array of incentives and
punishments, which varied
according to your ethnicity SHIFTING ROLES AND REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN
and residency. IN POLICY, CINEMA, AND LITERATURE
As the nation with the largest population in the world, the Chinese leaders
quickly realized the urgency of implementing clear policies to forestall the
country’s population from overwhelming their resources. In the Chinese
context, the question of family planning, delayed marriage, and the one-
child policy is inevitably, if inequitably, one largely about women. The
rationale for stringent birth control has evolved from one of revolution-
ary and socialist concerns (13.4) to the social repercussions of a one-child
policy and, finally, back in more recent years to worries about the coun-
try’s declining fertility rate (13.7). Ultimately, literary and cinematic depic-
tions of women in the 1980s and 1990s shifted from the one-dimensional
revolutionary heroes typical of the 1960s and 1970s to more realistic (and
sometimes humorous) portrayals. In one of her most striking, yet unglam-
orous, roles, China starlet Gong Li portrays a Shaanxi peasant in Zhang
Yimou’s The Story of Qiu Ju. The film challenges both government portray-
als of their new legal reforms as much as the complex position of women
in rural society (13.5).

13.4 ONE COUPLE, ONE CHILD (1980)

By the 1970s, the Chinese government had growing concerns regarding China’s
population growth and the effect it would have on its modernization and economic
goals. From the outset, the one-child policy was controversial. In response to
widespread concerns, the Central Party Committee took the extraordinary step
of issuing an “open letter” to clarify the program for restraining the country’s
population growth. The concerns faded but never entirely disappeared. Many
Chinese worried about the social effects of an entire generation of “only children”
raised without siblings and of having more males than females when they reached
maturity. The situation (like many dimensions of modern Chinese society) is com-
plicated by the widely varying conditions in the urban and rural sectors of society.
The one-child policy tended to be more strictly enforced in the city, including
numerous disincentives such as school fees and insurance for all children beyond
the first. On the other hand, rural families who exceeded local quotas or sought to
have children without the approval of the village leaders could and were severely
punished by local officials. The following is a synopsis that appeared in the Bei-
jing Review.

Question
1. In what ways does the 1979 family-planning policy differ from
that of 1972?
2. What concerns does the article raise if the population is not
brought under control?

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has issued an

open letter calling on all members of the Party and the Communist Youth
League to take the lead to respond to the call of “one couple, one child.”
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 353

The letter has also urged them to publicize among the people the impor-
tance of this call. The aim is to keep the population within [1.2 billion] by
the end of this century.
The letter said: “The State Council has already issued a call to the
people of the whole country, encouraging each couple to have only one
child. This is an important measure which concerns the speed and future
of the four modernizations and the health and happiness of the future
generations. It is a measure that conforms to immediate and longer-term
interests of the whole people.”
The letter recalled that in the 30 years since the founding of the Peo-
ple’s Republic in 1949, China’s net populations increase was 430 million.
This was the result of the improvement of health work and people’s living
standards, which greatly reduced the mortality rate. In those years, the
state did not take adequate measures to control the birth rate. The rapid
growth of population is causing increasing difficulties for the people
in food, clothing, housing, transportation, education, public health and
employment, and makes it difficult for the state to bring about a change to
the country’s poverty and backwardness within a short time.
What is even more aggravating is the fact that young people under
30 now account for 65 percent of the total population. This means that in
the coming years an average 20 million people will reach the marriage-
able and childbearing age every year. If efforts are not made to bring the
population growth under control, China’s population will swell to 1,300
[1.3 billion] after 20 years and will surpass 1,500 million [1.5 billion] in
40 years if the present rate of 2.2 children per couple continues. This will
definitely hinder the modernization program and give rise to difficulties
in improving the people’s standards of living.
Such being the case, the letter said, the most effective way to solve
this question is for one couple to have one child only.
Some people worry that if each couple has only one child, new prob-
lems will arise, such as the average age of the population will increase,
the male population will outnumber the female population and a large
number of old people will have to be supported. Some of these worries
result from their misunderstanding while others can be solved if neces-
sary measures are taken in good time. For example, the phenomenon of
the population getting older will not appear in this century because at
present half of the population are under 21 and those over 65 are less than
5 per cent. The problem of the population getting older will crop up only
after 40 years. But of course, measures can be taken in advance to prevent
such an occurrence.
The Party and the government have decided to take concrete steps to
control the population growth, the letter said. Special considerations will
be given to the only children and their families. These include enrolment
in nurseries and schools, special medical care, priority in getting employ-
ment and housing, equal pay for equal work.
In conclusion, the letter stressed that family planning is a matter that
concerns the interests of every household and that the method of persua-
sion and education should be adhered to. In the case of people having
actual difficulty in meeting policy requirements, they may be allowed
to have two children. The practice may be relaxed among the people of
minority nationalities.
Remin Ribao and other newspapers with a nationwide circulation
have all published the full text of this letter.
354 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

13.5 FILM: THE STORY OF QIU JU (1992)

Based on the novella The Wan Family’s Lawsuit [Wanjia Susong] by Chen
Yuanbin, the film was Zhang Yimou’s first to directly address issues relevant
to contemporary China. Set in the rural northwestern province of Shaanxi, the
film traces the pregnant Qiu Ju’s effort to work through the different, newly
established legal framework. Almost documentary in its style, the film cap-
tures the daily drudgery, complicated village politics, and the yawning gap
between urban and rural China. In many ways, Qiu Ju represents a type of
modern China anti-hero, unwilling to bow either to the village head’s arro-
gant behavior or be intimidated by China’s notoriously convoluted and opaque
bureaucracy.

Questions
1. What event causes Qiu Ju to seek out the police?
2. Why doesn’t Qiu Ju accept the village chief’s payment?

Policeman: Who are you looking for?

Qiu Ju: Policeman Li.
Policeman Li: Come over, come over, have a seat. Eh, you two, move
over there, I am busy here. What’s up?
Policeman Li: Wan Qinglai. What’s wrong with Qinglai?
Qiu Ju: He was kicked.
Policeman Li: You are Qinglai’s wife?
Qiu Ju: Yea.
Policeman Li: Oh shoot, I didn’t get to go to Qinglai’s wedding.
Everyone said his wife is quite beautiful. So it’s you,
hmmm? Wow, about to have a baby already. Sit, sit.
(reading the complaint outloud) Wound of soft tissue
on the right side. Minor swollen of testicle on left
side.
Policeman Li: (looking again back to Qiu Ju) Qinglai is not a trouble-
maker, how could he have been kicked so that it was
swollen? By whom?
Qiu Ju: The village head.
Policeman Li: Who? Wang Shantang?
Qiu Ju: Yea.
Policeman Li: What for?
Qiu Ju: My family grows chili peppers, um, you know that?
Policeman Li: Yeah.
Qiu Ju: We wanted to build a chili pepper shed and even had
the bricks ready, but the village head simply wouldn’t
approve it. There was no other way, so we thought we
could use the edge of the self-cultivated field my fam-
ily contracted, and we just build it there. But the vil-
lage head still said he would not approve it. He said
it was not permitted [to build]. I said, fine you have
the regulations, show me the regulations. He said he
didn’t need to show it to me. He said he is the regula-
tions, and he wouldn’t show me.
Policeman Li: Regardless, there is truly such a policy. The fields are
for growing crops, if everyone builds something on it,
what are we going to eat?
Qiu Ju: But the policy doesn’t say to hit people. He is the
village head, one or two hits are fine, but he simply
shouldn’t be allowed to kick him “where it counts.”
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 355

Policeman Li: One hand cannot clap. He wouldn’t hit anyone for no
reason? What was it really for? What for?
Sister: My brother was very angry and cussed him out.
Policeman Li: Who are you?
Sister: Qinglai is my older brother.
Policeman Li: What did your brother say to him?
Sister: Said he would have no heir to carry on the family . . .
that he only hatched a flock of hens.
Policeman Li: Ah, Qinglai was wrong to say that. Everyone knows
that [the village head] Wang Shantang has four daugh-
ters and no boys. Those words hit the old man hard.
Family planning just prevented him [from having
more kids], how could this be mentioned?
Qiu Ju: Whatever [the reason], he was wrong to hit people. He
is the village head, how could he just kick him “where
it counts?” So I went to ask for an explanation, he said
he didn’t care, he felt like kicking him, so he kicked.
I said you kicked him, if you are not responsible, who
is? You are the village head and you hit people, you
were wrong.
Policeman Li: This is it? Right?
Qiu Ju: Uh-huh.
Policeman Li: I tell you he was undoubtedly wrong to hit people.
Qiu Ju: He sure was wrong. How could he kick him “where it
counts.” He was damaged, he. . .
Policeman Li: I just told you, he was undoubtedly wrong. How about
you go home first. In a day or two, I will come to your
village to investigate. Okay?
Qiu Ju: Uh-huh.
Policeman Li: Both sides will need to self-criticize. Clear?
Qiu Ju: Uh-huh.
Policeman Li: You go home first. I am very busy today. I will keep
this here for now.
Qiu Ju: When will you come?
Policeman Li: In a couple of days.
Qiu Ju: Okay. Policeman Li, you come back in a couple of days.
[. . .]
(Qiu Ju and Policeman Li walk to the grinding house where the village head was.)
Villagers: Policeman Li, come in and warm up by the fire.
Policeman Li: (To the villagers) Ah, I need to talk to Old Wang, you
guys go outside first.
Village Head: You came.
Policeman Li: Grinding corn?
Village Head: Uh-huh.
Policeman Li: Ah, Old Wang, I have seen the proof from the hospi-
tal and Qinglai’s injury. He was wrong to insult you.
I have criticized him. No matter what, you are a [vil-
lage] elder and the village head, hitting people is sim-
ply wrong.
Village Head: I am handling [their case] according to the policy you
gave me.
Policeman Li: The policy does not say you can hit people.
Village Head: Think it over carefully, why do you think was he beaten?
Qiu Ju: You are the village head, to hit him just once or twice
would have been okay. But you cannot kick him
“where it counts.”
356 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

Village Head: So, I kicked him, I kicked him so he wouldn’t say any
more nonsense.
Policeman Li: Alright, alright. Qiu Ju, go outside, I need to talk to the
village head.
Qiu Ju: Hm, okay.
(Qiu Ju walks outside and waits. Policeman Li walks out, and we can hear his last
sentence.)
Policeman Li: Old Wang, so it’s solved. Qiu Ju.
Qiu Ju: Ah?
Policeman Li: You see, it’s like this. He was wrong to hit people, and
I have criticized him. But Qinglai’s words were quite
terrible. Both sides need to do more self-criticism. The
result of mediation is like this: Medical expenses and
the costs incurred from missing work are Wang Shan-
tang’s responsibilities, which totals 200 yuan. What do
you think?
Qiu Ju: I am not after money, but an apology.
Policeman Li: He is a stubborn man and the village head, so just give
him some face. Besides, Qinglai’s injury was not such
a big deal.
Qiu Ju: But without an apology?
Policeman Li: He is willing to pay, which proves you are right, and
he is wrong. Isn’t this an apology? So, this will suf-
fice. Tomorrow, bring the medical receipt and a proof
of payment to him. You two make the exchange face to
face, then it’s over.
(The next day Qiu Ju approaches the village head’s home.)
Qiu Ju: Village head.
Village Head: Did you bring the receipt and proof of payment?
Qiu Ju: Hm, yeah. Take a look.
Village Head: Here’s 200 yuan. It’s yours now.
(The village head then throws it into the air so that the money flies all over, caus-
ing Qiu Ju to run around bending over to pick the bills up off the ground.)
Qiu Ju: Village head, what’s that for?
Village Head: What for? It’s not so simple to take other’s money.
Qiu Ju: I am not after your money today. I just want what’s
right.
Village Head: Right? You think I am soft? I merely did it for sake of
Policeman Li who had to come all the way to see me.
I was just giving him face. There were a total of twenty
bills. Each time you picked one up, you bowed to me
once. After twenty bows, then this is over.
Qiu Ju: It’s not up to you if it is over or not.
(Qiu Ju returns to the town police station.)
Qiu Ju: I want to see Policeman Li.
Policeman: He’s gone to the district for a meeting.
Qiu Ju: Gone for a meeting. When is he coming back?
Policeman: Not sure.
(Qiu Ju and Qinglai talking at home)
Qiu Ju: Originally, it was all resolved. He threw the money on
the ground and said those mean words. I can’t believe
he couldn’t apologize.
Qinglai: Our family members are not good at talking. I cannot
move around well. The road to the county is not easy.
You are getting heavier and I worry.
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 357

Qiu Ju: Eh, nothing to worry about. If it’s meant to drop, it

will drop. If it’s not meant to drop, you cannot roll it
out with a rolling pin.
Qinglai: Don’t forget to take some money with you tomor-
row.
Qiu Ju: We have no cash. We will take a cart of chili peppers.
Qinglai: It’s not the right season and you probably won’t get a
good price for them.
Qiu Ju: I don’t care about the money. I just need an apology.

13.6 FUDAN UNIVERSITY RELAXES SEX RULES

FOR STUDENTS (JULY 19, 2005)
Up until the early 1990s, one rarely saw young couples holding hands in pub-
lic. As the following article suggests, by the early 2000s, attitudes began to
moderate somewhat. Although dating in high school remained frowned upon,
university officials had more difficulty controlling college students, despite
outdated rules that continued to prohibit dating. With rapidly shifting atti-
tudes toward premarital sex, more and more Chinese college couples showed
little concern over public displays of affection and, behind closed doors, became
intimate in ways their parents’ generation found inappropriate and scandal-
ous. By the late 1990s, several high-profile cases resulted in students being
expelled for having sex, becoming pregnant, or simply having a long-term rela-
tionship. Government and university officials also came under fire for the lack
of sex education and the rising number of cases of sexually transmitted dis-
eases. Despite the growing acknowledgment that such rules were outdated even
as late as 2005, when this article was published, many schools still attempted
to enforce such rules.
Questions
1. What is the rationale used by Chinese universities for their harsh
stance toward students’ intimate behavior?
2. Why do you think Fudan is no longer immediately expelling stu-
dents for having sex?

Unmarried students at Fudan University will no longer be immediately

expelled for having sex, according to a draft version of a revised campus
regulation posted on the school’s Website last week.
Students will still be punished if they are caught between the sheets
with a lover, however.
The school is looking for feedback on the draft, and the rule will go
into effect this September after necessary revisions.
Students caught having sex, whether on campus or off, will receive
a warning and a bad report on their personal record. Students can be
expelled after two warnings.
The new rule comes in response to the Ministry of Education’s deci-
sion to end a ban on students getting married.
“The revised draft is designed to be in line with the Ministry of
Education’s new university student management rule,” the Website
announcement said.
The ministry’s new rule, which was issued in March, didn’t say any-
thing about students engaging in sex.
Earlier this month, Chongqing Normal University set off a con-
troversy when it issued a rule saying students would be immediately
expelled for improper sexual behavior.
358 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

The rule specifically forbids female students from engaging in adul-

terous affairs with married men, but didn’t mention male students having
sex.
Fudan officials refused yesterday to say what constitutes improper
sexual activities, or what is allowed.
Many students question whether schools should have the authority
to ban sex, and suggested the rule can’t be enforced.
“The sex ban goes against the law and therefore violates students’
rights,” said Shan Min, a graduate student at Tongji University.
In China, men are allowed to marry at the age of 22 and women can
tie the knot at the age of 20, he said. Since many students are older than
that, their sex lives are no one else’s business, Shan added.
Shen Yaxin, a Fudan university student, said that the ban is simply
to show an attitude that the school opposes students having sex and won’t
be enforced.
“No one would let the secret out if they have sex,” Shen said. “How
could the school know if they have no evidence?”
Earlier this year, a male student at Shanghai University was expelled
after he allowed his girlfriend to spend the night in his dorm room to look
after him while he was sick. His expulsion raised a great deal of contro-
versy among many people in the city.

13.7 THE “TWO CHILDREN” DILEMMA (2018)

In 2016, China’s central government announced that it would allow all married
couples living in urban centers to have two children. This followed a relaxation
of the one-child policy that had allowed a second child but only when one of the
parents was an only child themselves. Thus, the new law was referred to as the
“universal two-child” policy. The following article, written by Xinhua journalist
Pan Ye, was originally published in a popular bimonthly magazine and shared
widely. It highlights the very different dynamics that current Chinese policies face
from those in earlier decades in shifting Chinese social and demographic patterns
in government-preferred directions.

Questions
1. What is the main factor shaping the “universal two-child” policy?
2. Why does the author believe it is unlikely that the birthrate will
rise in the near future?

To Have a Second Child or Not?

Is this a question you are you pondering? Don’t rush to give an answer.
Let’s first conduct a small survey. Ask your relatives who live in big urban
cities and those still living in your hometown to see how many children
they have. How many do they want to have? Compare their answers with
that of the previous generation to see how the number of children people
they desired differed. Likely, today many people want children, but prob-
ably not as many they did in the past.
Let’s look at the data: earlier this year, the National Bureau of Sta-
tistics released figures that underscore the situation behind the imple-
mentation of the “universal two-child” policy. In 2017, China recorded
17.23 million births, a decrease of 630,000 (3.5%) over the previous year.
Of those births, 51.2% were second children, an increase of 11% com-
pared to 2016. It showed that the “universal second-child” policy was not
enough to reverse the decline in the nation’s birthrate. Instead, it simply
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 359

reflects a reversal from previous efforts to limit the number of births [per
family], with the rate of second children surpassing fifty percent for the
first time.
[. . .]

With the New Policy, Why Wouldn’t You Have

a Second Child?
If you ask young mothers, they probably will reply with four words
“too tired for another” [leijue busheng] which simply means they “are so
exhausted that a second child is unlikely.”
Here “tired” begins with childbirth itself. With the cost of childbirth
rising and daily pressures increasing, some couples are afraid to have a
second child. According to Internet statistics, the cost of raising a child
from birth to entering college is estimated to be over two million yuan
[approx. $300,000 USD] if one lives in the first-tier cities like Beijing,
Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou. Although the number is hard to
confirm, our previous study on cost-profit comparison suggests raising a
child is becoming less and less cost effective. Raising a child is no longer
an “investment” but has become more like a “luxury.” . . .
In addition to the cost of raising a child, there is an “opportunity
cost.” As the social status of women has risen, women’s status and pur-
suits have also improved. They have become more aware of the cost and
price of childbirth. They consider the effect of children on career promo-
tion. They weigh the effect of potential [postpartum] depression and how
childbearing might affect their physical appearance. The opportunity cost
incurred as a mother raising children is becoming higher and higher.
A female designer friend said, in her company everyone’s workload
is such that leaving work early to take care of children is impossible. As
a result, this female designer only considered having children at 41. And
then she contemplated having two children at once through medical assis-
tance if necessary. . . .
The book, Chinese Could Have More Children co-authored by Ctrip
founder Liang Jianzhang, together with demographers, Li Jianxin and
Huang Wenzheng, offers a more pessimistic forecast suggesting that Chi-
na’s fertility rate will drop below 1.2, close to that of Japan and South
Korea by 2030. Their most pessimistic prediction is that China’s future
fertility rate could drop as low as 1.03. That would be a huge catastrophe.
Many people believe that [China’s one-child] family planning pol-
icy caused the decrease of fertility rate among Chinese family. This is not
fair. In fact, economists estimated, that China’s fertility rate would have
dropped to 1.5 even without the one-child policy. Regardless, China’s
population will peak at some point in the twenty-first century before
beginning to decline again.
The past experiences of mid-range developed countries confirms
that increased economic development leads to a gradual decline in the
fertility rate. The European fertility rate fell into this trap in 1970s and
1980s. Similarly, after experiencing rapid economic development, many
Asian countries fertility rate declined even more rapidly, with Japan and
Korea experiencing the lowest rates. China will be no exception.
Thus, more and more scholars are calling for an effort to boost the
birth rate, not simply authorize a second child, but implement policies
that provide subsidies and offers paid maternity leave. Childbirth is not
just a concern of the family but also a concern of the state. In order to ease
the problem of “too tired for childbirth,” I want to offer a bizarre thought
360 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

HU YAOBANG by posing the question of whether giving birth will need to become a sort
(1915–1989)—A key of “industry” in the future? If it does come true, will you choose or not
reformer under Deng choose to have a child?
Xiaoping who served as
Secretary General. His
support for students in TIANANMEN
1987 led to his removal The death of reformer Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989, sparked an out-
from office, and his pouring of grief that quickly grew into demonstrations, first of students,
death triggered student with growing support of workers and other segments of the popula-
demonstrations in 1989. tion. The government quickly labeled the students’ actions illegal, but
with the world’s attention already drawn to the public demands for
LI PENG (1928–2019)— democratic reforms and a reduction in government corruption, the cen-
Raised by Zhou Enlai, tral leadership had pause to use unnecessary force. In addition, there
educated in the Soviet existed an inner circle of officials, led by Zhao Ziyang, who supported
Union, and rising to the students and many of their goals. Seeking to take a new tack, one of
prominence under Deng the hardliners, Prime Minister Li Peng, agreed to a televised meeting
Xiaoping, he was a key with the student leaders (13.9). The students’ refusal to bow before state
advocate and orchestrator pressure only further antagonized the hardliners. In the days imme-
of the harsh suppression of diately following the meeting, martial law was declared, Zhao Ziyang
demonstrators in the June 4 was expelled from the CCP and dismissed from his post as the Secretary
Tiananmen Incident (1989). General (typically seen as the position held by Deng’s successor). At the
He was the key architect end of May and the first days of June, public support for reform soared.
of the Three Gorges Dam Demonstrations spread to virtually every major city in China, and rock-
project. stars visited the square, offering free concerts in support of the student
movement (13.11). Word also arrived that troops were being brought
into the capital, and despite efforts (and warnings) from many different
TIANANMEN SQUARE groups sympathetic to their cause, many students refused to clear the
MASSACRE (1989)— square. In the early morning hours of June 4, 1989, the military entered
The bloody military the city en force, with tanks and troop carriers shooting and crushing
suppression of the 1989 those who refused to disperse. In the aftermath, with the top student
student movement on leaders fleeing underground and often overseas, the government issued
June 4 that brought an end a variety of responses to the demonstrations in an attempt to counter
to two months of student the intense international condemnation and to justify their actions to the
demonstrations, hunger Chinese people themselves (13.10).
strikes, and unprecedented
international media
attention. Several hundred 13.8 SEVEN-POINT PETITION (APRIL 18, 1989)
unarmed students and
civilians died in the early- In the early hours of April 18, 1989, hundreds of students (largely from Beijing
morning military attack. University) gathered around the Monument to People’s Heroes, a ten-story-high
obelisk located at the southern end of Tiananmen Square. They spent the night
guarding the hundreds of wreaths, flowers, and personal poems left there. The
students discussed their thoughts and ideas and decided to draft a formal petition
to the government. The petition was first written as a “big character poster,” and
student leaders Wang Dan and Li Jinjin made separate attempts to present it to
the People’s Representatives meeting in the Great Hall of the People (at the west-
ern edge of Tiananmen). Four days later, on April 22, in one of the most dramatic
gestures of the movement, a small group of students, including Zhou Yongjun
and Guo Haifeng, kneeled in the hot spring sun on the steps of the Great Hall,
lifting a copy of the Seven-Point Petition over their heads in a highly symbolic
gesture dating back to the Qing dynasty whereby any commoner could bring their
appeal to the imperial city. Their effort was in vain. No party official came out to
receive their petition. The following translation is from the original version of the
petition, which was updated and modified over the next several days but retained
the original sentiments of this version.
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 361

Questions ZHAO ZIYANG

(1919–2005)—A leading
1. What seems to be the students’ primary focus in the demands reformer under Deng
included in their petition? Xiaoping and seen by many
2. Why would the government hesitate to even receive such a as his anointed heir, but
petition? his support for the student
demonstrations in 1989
Seven-Point Petition: caused him to be stripped
1. Reevaluate the merits and faults of Hu Yaobang. of all titles, and he spent
2. Negate the previous “anti-spiritual pollution” and “anti-bourgeois the last 15 years of his life
Liberation” movements. under house arrest until his
3. Allow private newspapers and freedom of speech. death in 2005.
4. Publicly publish the government leaders’ income and property
holdings.
5. Abolish Beijing’s “Ten-Point Restrictions” [restricting public assembly
and demonstrations].
6. Increase education funding and improve treatment of intellectuals.
7. Report this movement truthfully.

13.9 TRANSCRIPT OF MAY 18 MEETING BETWEEN

PREMIER LI PENG AND STUDENTS (MAY 18, 1989)
To appease the student hunger strikers, Prime Minister Li Peng agreed to meet
with the top student representatives. Among the student leaders were Wang Dan
of Beijing University and Wu’erkaixi (Örkesh Dölet), a Uyghur from the north-
western autonomous region of Xinjiang. They sensed that popular opinion was
on their side, as the students displayed little patience for the standard government
platitudes. Throughout the meeting, the student leaders did not soften their deliv-
ery, interrupting Li Peng, lecturing, and deliberately addressing him by titles
other than Prime Minister (Wu’erkaixi even attended the meeting wearing his
pajamas, a clear breach of etiquette). Li Peng and the hardliners were not amused
and felt their efforts at reconciliation received only insulting responses. Two days
later, the Central Committee voted to impose martial law, with Zhao Ziyang as
the only dissenting vote.

Questions
1. What is Premier Li Peng’s primary goal as stated in the following
transcript?
2. Why are Wang Dan and the student leaders so concerned with the
movement being labeled as a disturbance?

Li Peng (premier): I am so pleased to meet with you all. This meet-

ing came together a bit late. I apologize for
this. . . . To be frank, today I am hoping to dis-
cuss one topic only, and we can put aside the
other topics until sometime in the future. The
topic I would like to discuss is how to relieve
the hunger strikers of their predicament as
soon as possible. . . . It is not that we have other
motives, its simply that we mainly concerned
about students. Frankly, I see how young you
all are—I’d guess the oldest among you is about
22 or 23? My youngest child is older than you.
I have three children. None of my children
362 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

are engaged in profiteering by officials. None.

They are all older than you. We look at you as if
you were our own children, our own flesh and
blood.
[Camera shows close-up shots of Li Peng speaking, with occasional pan shots of
the room.]
Wu’erkaixi (student): [Camera cuts to Wu’erkaixi as he interrupts] Pre-
mier Li, our time is limited. We can sit down
and have a drink here, but there are students
outside who are sitting on the cold ground and
starving on the Square. I’m sorry to butt in, but
our hope is to begin a substantial dialogue as
soon as possible. Sorry, to interrupt, because
you are like an elder.
Li Peng: It does not matter. You are not very, not very . . .
Wu’erkaixi: [interrupting] Not very polite.
Li Peng: It does not matter.
Wu’erkaixi: It’s not that it does not matter. You have just
said that this meeting is a little late. The fact is
that we asked for a meeting with you as early
as April 22nd at Tiananmen Square. Therefore,
this meeting is not only a little late, but too late.
However, it doesn’t matter, it’s good you are
here now. [words indistinct]. You said we were
going to discuss only one question. In fact, it
is not that you asked us to come for discus-
sion, but that the great number of people at the
Square asked you to come out for a talk. The
topics of discussion should be decided by us.
Fortunately, we agree that there is only one,
and just one, question that needs to be dis-
cussed. Therefore, let us discuss just this single
question.
  Many students have already fainted. But this
is not my point. What is important is to solve
the problem. How can the problem be solved?
I think that it is good that you have finally
come out and shown your sincerity to resolve
the problem. We read and listened to Comrade
Zhao Ziyang’s written statement yesterday and
the day before [in which Zhao indicated that the
students demands for democracy were reasona-
ble and patriotic, and promised there would be
no retaliation]. Why haven’t the students left?
Why did we stay after Comrade Zhao Ziyang’s
speech? I believe you know are clear on this as
well. We regard the written statement as insuf-
ficient. It’s truly insufficient. I believe that you
are aware of the prevailing conditions at the
Square. If such conditions continue, then it is
likely we will not be here to continue to discuss
matters with you. Premier Li, it may seem like
I am over-exaggerating a bit. Please think about
this: Should the slightest misstep unfold at the
Square, or should a student . . . I do not want to
elaborate further.
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 363

[Wu’erkaixi motions to Wang Dan, seated next to Wu’erkaixi, to speak.]

[Video shows shots of Wang Dan speaking, but he does not face the speaker
directly, thus making his comments difficult to hear.]
Wang Dan (student): Let me report on the current situation. So far,
some 2,000 [students] have fainted and lost
consciousness. [words indistinct] On the con-
trary, the students’ emotions are reaching new
highs. As to how we can bring the hunger
strike to an end so that the students will leave
the Square? Our requests must be addressed
thoroughly. Moreover, you might have all seen,
yesterday’s demonstration, the street was filled
with demonstrators. Several million people
came out in support. What we proposed were
very clear. [words indistinct] A government
must pay attention to people’s wishes to solve
the problem as soon as possible. Therefore, our
stand is clear that the two conditions proposed
by students must be implemented before the
hunger strike students would end their strike
[words indistinct].
Wu’erkaixi: Because your age, please allow me to address
you as “Teacher Li,” if I may. Teacher Li, the
problem now lies not in persuading us [the stu-
dent representatives]. First, as we have already
stated clearly, we too wish very much for the
students to leave the Square. Second, even if
you succeed in utterly convincing us here, it
would be pointless. The situation at the Square
is dictated not by the standard rule of a minor-
ity following majority. Instead it’s more like
99.9 percent of the students obeying the 0.1 per-
cent. If a single student refuses to leave, I be-
lieve then thousands will also choose to stay.
Wang Dan: After Comrade Yan Mingfu’s talk, we conduct-
ed a survey among over a hundred students
yesterday, on the question of evacuating the
Square. 99.9% students voted against with-
drawing from the Square. . .
Wang Zhixin (student): [interrupting] If [government decision] is put off
any longer, it is not only the students will be
unable to control themselves, but also citizens
more generally. . . . [Video shows Li Peng nod-
ding his head.] I have another question to ask the
government. On April 22nd, we went down on
our knees for a long time to present our peti-
tion. However, you did not show up despite
our repeated request for you to do so. . . . One
more question. I wonder how the government
is going to respond to this. At present, differ-
ent types of people, including aunties, grand-
pas and grandmas, and whole families, have
joined our ranks. I wonder what the govern-
ment thinks of this. There are people as old as
80 and as young as just a few years old. Small
children formed a line marching in an orderly
364 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

way, shouting slogans, and crying: Big brothers,

sisters, drink some water; eat something.
[. . .]
Li Peng: I would like to express my views on several
points. Everyone is interested in discussing
substantive issues. First, I want to discuss one
substantive issue. I propose that the China Red
Cross Society and its chapter in Beijing respon-
sibly and safely send the hunger strikers to
various hospitals. I hope that all other students
at the square will help and support this oper-
ation. This is my concrete proposal. . . . This
morning, Comrades Ziyang myself and other
comrades visited some of the students [in hos-
pitals].
  Second point is that neither the government
nor the party Central Committee have ever said
that the broad masses of students were creating
turmoil. We have never said such a thing. We
have unanimously affirmed the patriotic aspi-
rations of everyone. . . . Nevertheless, the situa-
tion may develop independently of your good
ideas, fine intentions, and patriotic fervor. This
an objective principle no one can control it. In
fact, there is complete chaos in Beijing. More-
over, chaos has spread throughout the coun-
try. . . . I can state that during the past few days,
Beijing has been in a state of anarchy. I hope
comrades will think what consequences might
be brought about by this situation.
  The government of the People’s Republic of
China is a government responsible to the peo-
ple. It is impossible for us to be indifferent to
this phenomenon. It is impossible for us not
to protect the safety and lives of students, not to
protect factories, not to protect our socialist sys-
tem. Whether or not you are willing to listen to
what I have said, I am really pleased to have the
opportunity to say it. I want to tell you that it is
absolutely not my intention to impose anything
on you, because some things are independent of
man’s will. Much unrest has occurred in China.
Many people did not want unrest to occur, but
it occurred anyway. . . . I have finished what
I wanted to say.
[. . .]
Xiong Yan (student): I’d like to add one more point. Dear Comrade
Li Peng, just now you brought up the point
that there are signs of a disturbance in society.
I will speak briefly for 3 minutes, offering the
simplest explanation of the difference between
a student movement and a disturbance. If a dis-
turbance occurs in a country or a society, does
it have a direct cause-and-effect relationship
with a student demonstration? I say no. A dis-
turbance in a country or society is not caused
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 365

by student demonstrations, but by the social

system in existence, the ills of society. It does
not have a direct cause-and-effect relationship
with student demonstrations. The very purpose
of student demonstrations is to expose the ills
of society at an early date so that the govern-
ment can deal with them and overcome the ills
without delay. Thus, the student movement or
the movement to promote democracy will in-
deed serve to prevent society from falling apart
and avoid a real disturbance. The argument is
utmost simple explanation. This is what I want
to say.
[. . .]
Wang Zhixin: [interrupting] I want to make one point. At the
beginning it was said that this is a meeting not
a dialogue.
Li Peng: [interrupting] Yes, it is a meeting. See you again.
Yan Mingfu (student): Premier Li Peng is having talks with a foreign
delegation in the next hour. . .[Video shows Li
Peng standing up, shaking the hands of the students
before departing for his next meeting.]

13.10 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE BEIJING TURMOIL (1989)

If you ask many young Chinese today about “June fourth,” or show the famous
“tank man” photo of a man standing unarmed and attempting to single-handedly
stop a line of tanks (see chapter visual source), most will offer a blank look in
return or only be able to give the vaguest of details. The Tiananmen massacre
remains not simply heavily censored today in China but almost entirely erased,
in what one journalist referred to as “a complicit act of mass amnesia.” The fol-
lowing government account (published bilingually in Chinese and English) offers
valuable insight into how the Chinese state immediately, deliberately, and with an
amazing degree of thoroughness rewrote the events surrounding the Tiananmen
Square demonstrations. While much of the following article might ring false to
Western ears, the over-riding concern with maintaining stability and suppress-
ing violent elements is viewed as a quite legitimate issue for the central govern-
ment to police by most Chinese.

Questions
1. In what ways does the article attempt to vilify the students and
demonstrators involved in the 1989 Tiananmen events?
2. Why would the government want to publish and distribute such
an account of these events?

When Hu Yaobang suddenly died on April 15, a handful of people, think-

ing that their time had come, stirred up a student upheaval on the pre-
text of “mourning” for Hu Yaobang. The student unrest had been taken
advantage of by the organizers of the turmoil from the very beginning.
In violation of the Constitution, laws and regulations, some people put
up big-character posters everywhere on the college campuses, preach-
ing bourgeois liberalization and calling for the overthrow of the Com-
munist Party and the legal government. They held many rallies, made
speeches, boycotted classes and organized demonstrations, all without
permission; they stormed the seat of the Party Central Committee and
366 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

the State Council; they forcibly occupied the Tiananmen Square on many
occasions and organized various illegal organizations without registration
for approval. In Changsha, Xi’an and other cities, some people engaged in
grave criminal activities such as beating, smashing, looting and burning
stores, and even broke into the compounds of provincial government seats
and set fire to the motor vehicles there.
In view of this turmoil, the People’s Daily issued, on April 26, an
editorial exposing the nature of the turmoil. Even under this circumstance,
the Party and the government exercised great restraint towards the stu-
dents’ extremist slogans and actions and had all along given due recog-
nition to the students’ patriotic enthusiasm and reasonable demands. At
the same time, the Party and the government warned the students not to
be made use of by a handful of people and expressed the hope for solv-
ing the problems through dialogues and by normal, democratic and legal
procedures. However, on May 13, the illegal student organization started
a general hunger strike involving over 3,000 people and lasting for seven
days. Party and government leaders, on the one hand, went to see the fast-
ing students at Tiananmen Square and met with students’ representatives
on many occasions, asking them to value their lives and stop the hunger
strike, and on the other hand, they lost no time in organizing on-the-spot
rescue teams and providing all kinds of materials so as to relieve the suf-
fering of the fasting students. Thanks to efforts of the government and
other quarters not a single student died in the hunger strike. But all this
failed to win active response. . . .
On May 19, the Party Central Committee held a meeting attended
by cadres from the Party, government and military institutions in Beijing,
At the meeting, Premier Li Peng and President of the People’s Republic of
China Yang Shangkun announced the decision to adopt resolute measures
to stop the turmoil. But Zhao Ziyang, then general secretary of the Party
Central Committee, refused to attend this important meeting.
On May 20, Li Peng signed a martial law order as empowered by
Clause 16 of Article 89 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of
China. The martial law was to be enforced at 10 a.m. on the same day
in parts of Beijing. The small handful of people took fright and coerced
those residents who were in the dark about the truth to set up roadblocks
at major crossroads to stop the advance of army vehicles and prevent the
martial law enforcement troops from getting to designated places accord-
ing to plan. Besides, they threatened to mobilize 200,000 people to occupy
Tiananmen Square and organize a nation-wide general strike. Using the
funds provided by reactionary forces at home and abroad, they installed
sophisticated communication facilities and illegally purchased weapons.
They gathered together hooligans and ruffians to set up terrorist organiza-
tions such as the “Dare-to-Die Corps” and the “Flying Tiger Team,” and
threatened to kidnap or put Party and government leaders under house
arrest. They offered high prices in recruiting thugs and fabricated rumors
to deceive people.
All the facts proved that, no matter how tolerant and restrained the
government was, such people would not give up their wild scheme; on
the contrary they threatened to “fight to the end” against the government.
On the evening of June 2, a handful of people bent upon inciting a
riot used a traffic accident to spread rumors and mislead people, lighting
the fuse of a rebellion. In the small hours of June 3, rioters set up road-
blocks at every crossroad, beat up soldiers and armed police, seized weap-
ons, ammunition and other military materials. Mobs also assaulted the
Great Hall of the People, the Central Propaganda Department, the Min-
istry of Public Security, the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television and
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 367

the west and south gates of Zhongnanhai. The seat of the Party Central
Committee and the State Council. At about 5 p.m., the illegal organiza-
tions distributed kitchen knives, daggers and iron bars, to the crowd on
Tiananmen Square and incited them to “take up weapons and overthrow
the government.” A group of ruffians banded together about 1,000 people
to push down the wall of a construction site near Xidan and seized large
quantities of tools, reinforcing bars and bricks, ready for street fighting.
They planned to incite people to take to the streets the next day, a Sunday,
to stage a violent rebellion in an attempt to overthrow the government
and seize power at one stroke.
At this critical juncture, the martial law troops were ordered to move
in by force to quell the anti-government rebellion. At 6:30 p.m., on June 3,
the Beijing municipal government and the headquarters of the martial
law enforcement troops issued an emergency announcement, asking all
citizens to keep off the streets and stay at home. The announcement was
broadcast over and over again. At about 10 p.m., the martial law troops
headed for Beijing proper from various directions. The rioters, taking
advantage of the soldiers’ restraint, blocked military and other kinds of
vehicles before they smashed and burned them. They also seized guns,
ammunitions and transceivers. Several rioters seized an armored car and
fired guns as they drove it along the street. Rioters also assaulted civil-
ian installations and public buildings. Several rioters even drove a public
bus loaded with gasoline drums towards the Tiananmen gatetower in an
attempt to set fire to it. At the same time, rioters savagely beat up, kid-
napped and killed soldiers and officers. On the Chang’an Avenue, when
a military vehicle suddenly broke down, rioters surrounded it and fero-
ciously crushed the driver with bricks. At Fuchengmen, a soldier’s body
was hung heel over head on the overpass balustrade after he had been
savagely killed. At Chongwenmen, another soldier was thrown down
from the flyover and burned alive. Near a cinema, an officer was beaten to
death, disemboweled and his eyes gouged out. His body was then strung
up on a burning bus.
Over 1,280 vehicles were burned or damaged in the rebellion, includ-
ing over 1,000 military trucks, more than 60 armored cars, over 30 police
cars, over 120 public buses and trolley buses and over 70 motor vehicles
of other kinds. More than 6,000 martial law officers and soldiers were
injured and scores of them killed.
Such heavy losses are eloquent testimony to the restraint and toler-
ance shown by the martial law enforcement troops. For fear of injuring
civilians by accident, they would rather endure humiliation and meet their
death unflinchingly, although they had weapons in their hands. It can be
said that there is no other army in the world that can exercise restraint to
such an extent.
The martial law troops, having suffered heavy casualties and been
driven beyond forbearance, were forced to fire into the air to clear the
way forward. During the counter-attack, some rioters were killed, some
onlookers were hit by stray bullets and some wounded or killed by armed
ruffians. According to reliable statistics, more than 3,000 civilians were
wounded and over 200, including 36 college students, were killed.
At 1:30 a.m. on June 4, the Beijing municipal government and the
martial law headquarters issued an emergency notice asking all students
and other citizens to leave Tiananmen Square. The notice was broadcast
repeatedly for well over three hours over loudspeakers. The students on
Tiananmen Square, after discussion among themselves, sent represen-
tatives to the troops to express their willingness to withdraw from the
square and this was approved by the troops. Then at about 5 a.m., several
368 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

thousand students left the square in an orderly manner through a wide

corridor in the southeastern part of the square vacated by the troops, car-
rying their own banners and streamers. Those who refused to leave were
forced to leave by the soldiers. By 5:30 a.m., the clearing operation of the
square had been completed.
During the whole operation not a single person was killed. The
allegations that “Tiananmen Square was plunged into a bloodbath” and
“thousands of people were killed in the square” are sheer rumors, and the
true state of affairs will eventually be clear to the public.
After the decisive victory in quelling the riot, order in the capital
was basically restored to normal and the situation throughout China soon
became stable. The measures adopted by the Chinese government to stop
the turmoil and put down the rebellion have not only won the acclaim
and support of the Chinese people, but they have also won the under-
standing and support of the governments and people of many other
countries. The Chinese government has announced that it will unswerv-
ingly carry on the policy of reform and opening to the outside world,
the policy of developing friendly cooperation with different countries of
the world on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and
the policy towards Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. We will continue to
strive for the realization of the socialist modernization. We are fully con-
fident of our future.

13.11 SONGS AND TIANANMEN (1989)

A significant dimension of the 1989 student demonstrations was the astounding
level of popular support it attracted among Beijing’s ordinary citizens. Many
street vendors distributed free food and drink to students. Local residents lined
the streets and applauded the students’ frequent processions from the university
district in northwest Beijing into Tiananmen (in the center of the city). Even
soldiers posted at intersections or blocked by demonstrators in trucks carried on
friendly banter (part of the reason that non-Beijing-based troops were brought in
to carry out the final strike on June 4). Two songs, along with the rockstars who
sang them, Hou Dejian and Cui Jian, became closely associated with the demon-
strations. Both songs are famous in their own right, but their message and tone
captured the emotions and spirit of Tiananmen and became virtual anthems of the
demonstrations.

Questions
1. Which song do you find more appropriate as an anthem for the
Tiananmen demonstrations?
2. Why do you think Cui Jian’s “Nothing to My Name” became so
popular among the students of 1989?

Song 1: Hou Dejian, “Descendants of the Dragon”

[“Long de chuanren”]
In the Far East there is a river,
Its name is the Yangtze River;
In the Far East there is a river,
Its name is the Yellow River.
Although I have never seen the beauty of the Yangtze River,
In dreams I often swim in the Yangtze River;
Although I have never heard the roars of the Yellow River,
In dreams there are the fierce waves of the River.
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 369

In the ancient Far East there is a dragon, ENEMIES ON ALL

Her name is China; SIDE—The Chinese term
The ancient Far East there lives a group of people, “simian Chu-ge” comes
They are all descendants of the dragon from a tale known to most
I grew up beneath the feet of the giant dragon, all Chinese from the third
I grew up to become a descendant of the dragon; century BCE regarding
Black eyes, black hair, and yellow skin; Xiang Yu a famous general.
Forever and ever, a descendant of the dragon. When surrounded on all
A hundred years ago one serene night, sides, he heard the enemy
In the deep night on the eve of a vast change; troops singing songs from
The sound of gunfire and cannon shattered the serene night, his native region of Chu.
Enemies on all side and menacing swords. This caused them to believe
that their homeland had
A great many years, the explosions still rumble,
already fallen. In Chinese
A great many years and yet many more years;
today, the saying means
Giant dragon, giant dragon, open your eyes bright,
that defeat is near and all
Forever, forever, open your bright eyes.
hope is lost.
Giant dragon, giant dragon, open your eyes bright,
Forever, forever, open your bright eyes.

Song 2: Cui Jian, “Nothing to My Name”

[“yiwu suoyou”] (1986)
I used to ask non-stop,
When are you coming with me?
But you always laugh at me,
For I have nothing.
I want to give you my pursuit
And my freedom,
But you always laugh at me,
For I have nothing.
Oh, when are you coming with me?
Oh, when are you coming with me?
The earth under the feet is moving,
The water next to me is flowing,
But you keep laughing,
For I have nothing.
Why do you keep laughing,
Why am I always after something,
How come in front of you,
I always have nothing.
I am telling you I waited for so long,
I am telling you my last request.
I want to hold your hands,
And take you with me now.
Now your hands are shaking,
Your tears are running,
Aren’t you telling me you love me
For I have nothing.
Oh . . . you will come with me. [repeat]

HONG KONG HANDOVER

The Qing empire ceded Hong Kong Island to Great Britain at the end
of the First Opium War under the terms of the Treaty of Nanjing (1842).
370 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

Eighteen years later, at the end of the Second Opium War, in 1860, the
British acquired the Kowloon Peninsula. Finally, in 1898, the British
obtained a 99-year lease on the New Territories that more than qua-
drupled the territory of the colony. It was the pending expiration of this
lease that set in motion Britain’s decision to sign the Sino-British Joint
Declaration (13.12) to set out how the colony would be returned to the
People’s Republic of China on July 1, 1997. The primary points of con-
tention centered on maintaining the legal, political, and cultural rights
of Hong Kong’s citizens. Both countries ended up agreeing on the “One
country, two systems” principle, a principle intended to remain in place
for a period of 50 years (until 2047). The legacy of this decision has taken
on many different shapes depending on one’s perspective. For most Chi-
nese, the return of the city marked the end of a century of humiliation at
the hands of the West. Some Hong Kong residents disagreed, suggesting
instead that the handover represented a period of “recolonization” rather
than a “homecoming.”

13.12 SINO-BRITISH JOINT DECLARATION

(DECEMBER 19, 1984)
Although the Qing empire, the Republic of China, and People’s Republic of China
had all given up claims for Hong Kong and Kowloon, with the New Territories
lease set to expire in 1997, Britain realized that maintaining Hong Kong without
the New Territories was both unfeasible and, in the post-colonial era, undesir-
able. Yet, unlike most of Britain’s former colonies, Hong Kong’s future would
not result in independence. When Margaret Thatcher became the first British
Prime Minister to visit the PRC in 1982, she formally broached the question of
Hong Kong’s future and agreed to begin negotiations over the terms by which
the handover would take place. The following agreement was signed two years
later by British Prime Minister Thatcher and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang. The
agreement put a timeline in place that would bring an end to more than 150 years
of British rule in Hong Kong.

Questions
1. What key guarantees did the agreement put in place for Britain to
hand over Hong Kong back to China in 1997?
2. Why would China agree to such guarantees?
1. The Government of the People’s Republic of China declares that to
recover the Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island, Kowloon
and the New Territories, hereinafter referred to as Hong Kong) is
the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people, and that it has
decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with
effect from 1 July 1997.
2. The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will restore
Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China with effect from 1
July 1997.
3. The Government of the People’s Republic of China declares that the
basic policies of the People’s Republic of China regarding Hong Kong
are as follows:
1) Upholding national unity and territorial integrity and taking
account of the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the People’s
Republic of China has decided to establish, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People’s Repub-
lic of China, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region upon
resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 371

2) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly

under the authority of the Central People’s Government of the
People’s Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in
foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the
Central People’s Government.
3) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested
with executive, legislative and independent judicial power,
including that of final adjudication. The laws currently in force in
Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.
4) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The chief execu-
tive will be appointed by the Central People’s Government
on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be
held locally. Principal officials will be nominated by the chief
executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for
appointment by the Central People’s Government. Chinese and
foreign nationals previously working in the public and police
services in the government departments of Hong Kong may
remain in employment. British and other foreign nationals may
also be employed to serve as advisers or hold certain public
posts in government departments of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will
remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and free-
doms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of
assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspond-
ence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and
of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of enter-
prises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will
be protected by law.
6) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the sta-
tus of a free port and a separate customs territory.
7) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the sta-
tus of an international financial centre, and its markets for foreign
exchange, gold, securities and futures will continue. There will be
free flow of capital. The Hong Kong dollar will continue to circu-
late and remain freely convertible.
8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will have inde-
pendent finances. The Central People’s Government will not levy
taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
[. . .]
4. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the
People’s Republic of China declare that, during the transitional period
between the date of the entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30
June 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible
for the administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining
and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability; and that
the Government of the People’s Republic of China will give its coop-
eration in this connection.
[. . .]
8. This Joint Declaration is subject to ratification and shall enter into
force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which
shall take place in Beijing before 30 June 1985. This Joint Declaration
and its Annexes shall be equally binding.
372 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

Done in duplicate at Beijing on 19 December 1984 in the English and Chi-

nese languages, both texts being equally authentic.
[Signed] [Signed]
Government of the Government of the People’s Republic of China
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland

13.13 CHRISTOPHER PATTEN’S HANDOVER

SPEECH (JUNE 30, 1997)
Hong Kong had never been like Britain’s other colonies. As the colony’s last
governor from 1992 to 1997, Christopher Patten faced numerous logistical, ide-
ological, and administrative hurdles in the lead up to 1997. On a certain level,
many of the colonial Hong Kong government’s efforts to hardwire in as many
democratic measures after a century and a half of implementing very few demo-
cratic reforms came off as too little too late. In other areas, such as the decision to
build a massive new airport in just six years (with a final price tag of $20 billion
and delays that resulted in its opening a year late in 1998), gave the impression
of Britain’s firm commitment to Hong Kong’s long-term success. Behind closed
doors, some British officials remained less than pleased. Prince Charles, also in
attendance, in a characteristically appalling lack of grace, reportedly referred
to Hong Kong’s handover as the “Great Chinese Takeaway.” Patten’s speech,
“Today is a day of Celebration not sorrow,” at 6 p.m. on June 30, 1997, more
fittingly captured the common mixture of nostalgia, concern, and hope felt by
most British officials.
Questions
1. How does Patten attempt to characterize Hong Kong’s history
under British rule?
2. To what type of sadness does Patten refer? What type of sadness
might he be leaving unsaid?
Your Royal Highness,
Prime Minister,
Distinguished Guests,
People of Hong Kong,
For Hong Kong as a whole, today is cause for celebration not sorrow. But
here and there, perhaps there will be a touch of personal sadness as is true
of any departure, a point to which I shall return.
History is not just a matter of dates. What makes history is what
comes before and what comes after the dates that we all remember. The
story of this great city is about the years before this night, and the years of
success that will surely follow it.
Of course, Hong Kong’s story is not solely that of the century and a
half of British responsibility, though it is the conclusion of that chapter that
we mark tonight.
This chapter began with events that, from today’s vantage point, at
the end of the following century, none of us here would wish or seek to
condone. But we might note that most of those who live in Hong Kong
now do so because of events in our own century which would today have
few defenders. All that is a reminder that sometimes we should remember
the past the better to forget it.
What we celebrate this evening is the restless energy, the hard work,
the audacity of the men and women who have written Hong Kong’s
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 373

success story. Mostly Chinese men and Chinese women. They were only
ordinary in the sense that most of them came here with nothing. They are
extraordinary in what they have achieved against the odds.
As British administration ends, we are, I believe, entitled to say that
our own nation’s contribution here was to provide the scaffolding that
enabled the people of Hong Kong to ascend. The rule of law. Clean and
light-handed government. The values of a free society. The beginnings of
representative government and democratic accountability. This is a Chi-
nese city, a very Chinese city with British characteristics. No dependent
territory has been left more prosperous, none with such a rich texture and
fabric of civil society, professions, churches, newspapers, charities, civil
servants of the highest probity and the most steadfast commitment to the
public good.
I have no doubt that, with people here holding on to these values
which they cherish, Hong Kong’s star will continue to climb. Hong Kong’s
values are decent values. They are universal values. They are the values
of the future in Asia as elsewhere, a future in which the happiest and the
richest communities, and the most confident and the most stable too, will
be those that best combine political liberty and economic freedom as we
do here today.
All of us here tonight, and I am sure all my fellow countrymen and
women watching these events from afar, wish the Chief Executive of the
Special Administrative Region and his excellent team the very best of luck
as they embark on their journey. C. H. Tung and his wife, Betty, will serve
Hong Kong with dedication, strength and enthusiasm. Everyone here,
and people outside Hong Kong as well, will be willing them to succeed in
the challenging years that lie ahead.
I said that tonight’s celebration will be tinged for some with
sadness.
So it will be for my family and myself and for others who like
us will soon depart from this shore. I am the 28th governor. The last
governor. Like all the other governors and their families, my wife, my
children and myself will take Hong Kong home in our hearts. You have
been kind to us. You have made us as welcome. It has been the greatest
honor and privilege of my life to share your home for five years, and
to have some responsibility for your future. Now, Hong Kong people
are to run Hong Kong. That is the promise. And that is the unshakeable
destiny.

13.14 JIANG ZEMIN’S SPEECH AT THE HANDOVER

CEREMONY (1997)
At just past midnight, six hours after Christopher Patten’s speech, and moments
after the flag of the United Kingdom had been lowered, the PRC flag was raised
and President Jiang Zemin gave the following speech, “One Country, Two Sys-
tems,” in the first minutes of July 1, 1997. It is difficult to exaggerate the deep
emotion that China’s leaders, and the Chinese people, felt at the return of Hong
Kong. Many Chinese believed it fulfilled Mao’s initial speech at the founding of
China on October 1, 1949, that the Chinese nation had finally “stood up.” Ini-
tially, for most Hong Kong residents, little had changed with the handover. Day-
to-day life remained outwardly much as it had. Yet things would slowly begin
to transform. Several decades later, when asked about the decline in the city’s
political freedoms, Christopher Patten offered the chilling metaphor that “When
the snow starts melting, it melts quickly.”
374 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949–Present)

Questions
1. How does Jiang Zemin suggest Hong Kong will benefit from
returning “to the embrace of the motherland”?
2. To whom are most of Jiang Zemin’s comments directed?
3. Looking at both Christopher Patten’s and Jiang Zemin’s speeches,
what different goals were they trying to achieve?

The national flag of the People’s Republic of China and the regional flag
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Repub-
lic of China have now solemnly risen over this land. At this moment,
people of all countries in the world are casting their eyes on Hong Kong.
In accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the question of
Hong Kong, the two governments have held on schedule the handover
ceremony to mark China’s resumption of the exercise of sovereignty
over Hong Kong and the official establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. This is both a
festival for the Chinese nation and a victory for the universal cause of
peace and justice.
Thus, July 1, 1997 will go down in the annals of history as a day that
merits eternal memory. The return of Hong Kong to the motherland after
going through more than one century of vicissitudes indicates that from
now on, Hong Kong compatriots have become true masters of this Chi-
nese land and that Hong Kong has now entered a new era of development.
History will remember Mr. Deng Xiaoping for his creative concept
of “one country, two systems.” It is precisely along the course envisaged
by this great concept that we have successfully resolved the Hong Kong
question through diplomatic negotiations and finally achieved Hong
Kong’s return to the motherland.
On this solemn occasion, I wish to express thanks to all the person-
ages in both China and Britain who have contributed to the settlement of
the Hong Kong question and to all those in the world who have cared for
and supported Hong Kong’s return to the motherland.
On this solemn occasion, I wish to extend cordial greetings and best
wishes to more than six million Hong Kong compatriots who have now
returned to the embrace of the motherland.
After the return of Hong Kong, the Chinese Government will
unswervingly implement the basic policies of “one country, two systems,”
“Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong” and “a high degree of
autonomy” and keep Hong Kong’s previous socio-economic system and
way of life of Hong Kong unchanged and its previous laws basically
unchanged.
After the return of Hong Kong, the Central People’s Government
shall be responsible for foreign affairs relating to Hong Kong and the
defense of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall be vested, in accordance with the Basic Law, with executive power,
legislative power and independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication. Hong Kong people shall enjoy various rights and freedoms
according to law. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall
gradually develop a democratic system that suits Hong Kong’s reality.
After the return, Hong Kong will retain its status of a free port, con-
tinue to function as an international financial, trade and shipping center
and maintain and develop its economic and cultural ties with other coun-
tries, regions, and relevant international organizations. The legitimate
economic interests of all countries and regions in Hong Kong will be pro-
tected by law.
 Chapter 13 • Life in China Under Deng Xiaoping and Beyond 375

I hope that all the countries and regions that have investment and
trade interests here will continue to work for the prosperity and stability
of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong compatriots have a glorious patriotic tradition. Hong
Kong’s prosperity today, in the final analysis, has been built by Hong
Kong compatriots. It is also inseparable from the development and sup-
port of the mainland. I am confident that, with the strong backing of the
entire Chinese people, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region and Hong Kong compatriots will be able to manage Hong
Kong well, build it up and maintain its long-term prosperity and stability,
thereby ensuring Hong Kong a splendid future.
Thank you.
 CHAPTER 14
China in the Twenty-First Century
Post-1949 China (1949- Present)China in the Twenty-First Century

3 1
2

4 5 7
6
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 377

1. A CENTURY IN THE MAKING: Serious consideration of a Yangtze dam began with Sun Yat-sen’s
proposition in 1919—though it, like most of Sun’s ideas, remained unachievable during China’s
divisive warlord era. Although Mao Zedong gave the dam project his blessing (and many smaller
hydroelectric projects were completed), it was only in the 1980s that serious plans were revived. In
the 1980s, the Chinese government began feasibility studies for a massive single dam that would
achieve the disparate goals of flood control, power generation, and improved shipping.

2. THREE GORGES YANGTZE RIVER DAM: It was not until Premier Li Peng (a hydroelectric engi-
neer) made the plan a key platform of his reforms did planning accelerate. In 1992, Li Peng finally
pushed it through the National People’s Congress, and the Three Gorges Dam project was formally
launched in 1993. Construction of the dam began in 1997 and was completed in 2008. The dam wall
is 7,575 feet long and over 600 feet high. It created a narrow reservoir 412 miles long with an average
width of three-quarters of a mile.

3. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: Particularly in the ecologically pristine regions in southwest China,

like Tiger Leaping Gorge (upper left), the projects encountered considerable international attention.
Despite optimistic environmental evaluations by the central government, the hydroelectric revolu-
tion in China has resulted in landslides, erratic water flow, and a pooling of pollutants that accumu-
late behind the dams. The government’s responses to such claims tend to tout the benefits of “clean
energy” over coal-burning electricity plants (14.5).

4. RELOCATION: A controversial aspect of the dams are the relocation of affected residents. The
Three Gorges Dam displaced 1.4 million residents from 13 cities, 140 towns, and 1,352 villages (and
about 650 factories). In southwest China, the number is numerically smaller, but relative to the local
population it is significantly larger. In both cases, residents who were moved were given compen-
sation packages that often included new homes. Yet, the moves caused drastic changes in lifestyle,
and often accusations of corruption by local officials who siphoned off millions of dollars intended
for residents are reported.

5. SOUTHWEST CHINA: Aside from the Three Gorges Dam, most of China’s hydro-energy comes
from projects in southwest China. With the completion of two mega-hydropower plants in 2022,
China will have completed five of the world’s ten biggest hydropower plants in just ten years. When
at full capacity, China’s dams generate more electricity than every other country’s total supply in
the world, except the United States and India. China is not finished yet, with feasibility studies
being carried out for a 38-gigawatt plant for the Mutuo Dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet.

6. HYDROPOWER BOOM: With China’s economy growing at around 10 percent per year between
1990 and 2010, the demand for energy soared. At the same time, China became increasingly con-
cerned with the levels of pollution and desired “green” sources of energy. By 2010, China became
the world’s largest hydroelectricity producer, with 721 terawatt-hours of production.

7. EXPORTING HYDROPOWER TECHNOLOGY: As China’s dam builders complete their domes-

tic projects, China’s banks are financing billions of dollars’ worth of hydropower projects in South-
east Asia and elsewhere around the world.
378 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

XI JINPING (1953–)— On the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China
Son of a prominent (October 1, 1959), Mao Zedong drove down Chang’an Avenue in the back
first-generation Chinese seat of China’s first domestically produced car, a black Red Flag [Hongqi]
Communist leader, Hu sedan. According to revolutionary lore, the sleek Red Flag in which he
Jintao designated Xi rode had been rush-ordered for the occasion and built in 33 days. In an
Jinping as his designated era when owning a bicycle was considered a luxury, the extravagance of
successor in 2008. Since a private car would have been considered feudalistic and counterrevolu-
assuming power, Xi tionary for all but the party elite. As a result of this attitude, domestic car
Jinping has led a series of production in China was negligible, with only 2,000 cars produced (for
actions to enforce party exclusive use by the party leaders) in two decades. Their massive frames,
discipline and impose abysmal handling, and poor mileage finally brought production of the
internal unity, including original produced Red Flags to an end in the 1980s.
removing term limits and Twenty-five years after the last model rolled off the assembly line,
instituting what some have First Auto Works (FAW) introduced a distinctly retro-chic Red Flag sedan.
called a cult of personality. Unveiled in a Beijing car show, the version on display adopted East-is-
Red-Sun-shaped hubcaps, a grill evocative of the Gate of Heavenly Peace,
and the marquee Red Flag hood ornament. Just as unattainable for Chi-
na’s masses as the first Red Flag sedan, this newly released special model
had a sticker price of well over a quarter of a million dollars. But unlike
1959, when there were few or no options for the ordinary Chinese, China’s
burgeoning middle class can today choose from several dozen domestic
manufacturers and virtually every major global car producer. Recently,
as part of Xi Jinping’s call to raise the number of domestically manufac-
tured cars, China’s leading automaker, FAW Group, has introduced 21
new models with annual sales to exceed 600,000 units in 2025. In what
some have called “limousine diplomacy,” Xi has also made the Hongqi
luxury limousine his preferred car of choice for his overseas visits and for
traveling down Chang’an Boulevard for his annual review of the troops
for the National Day parade.
China’s love affair with cars is not unlike what exists in the West.
Chinese have embraced personal automobiles as a sign of upward mobil-
ity, and they increasingly view them as a necessity of life and an extension
of their personality, much as any American or European does. Automo-
biles provide convenience, privacy, and status in a way few other com-
modities do.
For decades, China remained a land where the bicycle was the
king. In urban China, separate bike lanes as wide as those allocated for
cars ran along all major roads. By the late 1990s, however, the era of the
bicycle came to a sudden and rapid end. Although, in recent years, bike-
share programs have re-invigorated bike use, bicyclists must share their
(increasingly smaller) lanes with mopeds, electric scooters, and even auto-
mobiles trying to squeeze through. With the rising number of cars on the
road, bicycles are but a fraction of what they were in the 1980s.
In June 2007, China had nearly 53 million cars on the road. By 2011,
that number had risen to 172 million, and by 2019, 258 million. (By com-
parison, the United States, with less than a quarter of the population of
China, had 280 million cars on the road in 2018). The rise of automobiles
in China has resulted in a host of other changes within China. Car clubs
have sprung up, sponsoring long-distance trips, with members traveling
in convoys along China’s rapidly expanding highway network. China’s
swift adoption of the automobile initially caused an equally abrupt rise in
the number of automobile accidents. Although today China is ranked first
in the world for traffic fatalities, the number of serious traffic accidents
relative to the number of cars on the road has dropped consistently over
the past several years.
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 379

The possibility of an individual being able to buy a car underscores IRON RICE BOWL—A
the massive social changes generated by Deng Xiaoping’s economic term describing guaranteed
reforms begun in the 1980s. These reforms were expanded by Jiang Zemin or “unbreakable” jobs,
in the 1990s, sustained by Hu Jintao, and extended under Xi Jinping in housing, and social security
the first decades of the twenty-first century. The policies deeply altered in the decades immediately
Chinese society. In the early years of the People’s Republic of China, virtu- after the founding of the
ally every Chinese living in a town or city belonged to a work unit. One’s PRC.
housing, workplace, cafeteria, and infirmary were often all located within
a 15-minute walk of each other. But as the centralized system of controls HU JINTAO (1942–)—Born
were rolled back, the work units no longer provided such amenities, and in Jiangsu, he received
Chinese began to find their own careers, buy their own (often much larger) a degree in hydraulic
apartments and purchase their own cars. The trade-offs for the individual engineering from Tsinghua
citizen were complex and remain difficult to discern (particularly while University and rose
the economy remains profitable for most Chinese). through the ranks with
If the first decades of the PRC established the “iron rice bowl” [tie posts in Guizhou and Tibet.
fanwan], the last several decades have seen such government programs He became President of
almost entirely dismantled. The iron rice bowl is a Chinese idiom referring the PRC in 2003 and has
to the Chinese government’s original promise (in the 1950s) of cradle-to- pursued conservative
grave social security, housing, and employment (regardless of job per- economic and political
formance). Under Deng Xiaoping, the country sought to modernize and reforms.
abandon much of the inefficient, over-staffed, and unprofitable state-run
industry (much of it the soviet-modeled heavy-industry sectors) through
privatization. By the time Jiang Zemin took office in the early 1990s, the
central government had begun to force the closures of inefficient and
outdated state industries across the country. This resulted in millions of
workers either being laid off [maiduan], whereby workers would receive
a lump-sum severance payment but no pension or medical insurance, or
receiving internal retirement [neitui], whereby the workers would cease
working but receive a minimal salary with minimal contributions toward
their pension and medical benefits (the size of which would depend upon
the financial situation of the individual work unit). It was left to Hu Jin-
tao, who took office in 2003, to remedy the resulting unemployment and
growing disparity between China’s urban rich and the rural poor. To this
end, Xi Jinping, during his time as China’s supreme leader, has sponsored
legislation that promotes projects such as the high-speed trains and Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) often justified as a means to bolster China’s eco-
nomic health (14.2, 14.3).
The central government’s role in the privatization process jux-
taposed with their focus on urban commercialization stands in sharp
contrast to the CCP’s original focus on China’s industrial laborers and
rural peasants. Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping were apprehen-
sive about this seeming move against the traditional core constituents of
China’s Communist roots. This apprehension has led them to consistently
reiterate the Deng Xiaoping slogan emphasizing “socialism with Chinese
characteristics.”
For most Chinese (both in urban and rural areas), the recent eco-
nomic benefits are perceived to offset any negative elements of the current
administration. The CCP leadership and the Chinese people are clearly of
one mind on most things. Neither wants to replicate the harsh economic
privations that struck Russia in the wake of the Soviet Union’s dissolution,
privations that resulted in only limited political freedom and widespread
economic stagnation. In the short term, it appears that the Chinese people
are content to allow for the centralized economy and party-controlled
political state to remain as long as it provides the economic and social
incentives desired—like the chance to purchase their own automobile
380 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

SUPREME LEADER along the nation’s growing network of highways or travel on some of the
[weida lingxiu]—An world’s fastest high-speed trains.
informal term used to refer
China’s top leader. Used
because many of China’s RISE OF XI JINPING
leaders continue to wield No leader in the post–Deng Xiaoping era has served as China’s supreme
political power without leader longer than Xi Jinping. As a son of a prominent Chinese leader,
holding any formal Xi Zhongxun, Xi reflects the prominent role that “princelings” (children
position of leadership at of the prominent and influential senior first-generation Communist offi-
any given time. cials) have achieved in this “second generation” of Chinese leadership.
Significantly centralizing institutional power, Xi has brought about a
much more assertive foreign and domestic policy, particularly through
the high profile Belt and Road Initiative (14.2) and other domestic infra-
structure projects (14.3). Taken together, the removal of term limits, the
centralization of power, and the intolerance of dissent (14.9) have led
some critics to suggest Xi is deliberately erecting a cult of personality
around himself.

14.1 XI JINPING’S SOCIALIST CORE VALUES (2012)

Xi Jinping’s Socialist Core Values were officially adopted and promoted as the
new official interpretations of Chinese socialism in 2012 at the 18th National
Congress of the Communist Party of China. Like the political formulas of his
predecessors, it is difficult to make much sense of the ideological roots or direction
from the terms themselves. Under Xi’s rule, the 12-word slogan became pervasive
across China: on the sides of city buses, in neon letters across high rises, and even
on bulletin boards in university campuses. Indeed, it would not be an exaggera-
tion to call the slogan inescapable. Stand on any street corner and you could likely
see the slogan present in half a dozen places. Minimally, it is clear the government
believed the slogan could be effective in maintaining social functioning and order.
So, one should not be lulled into thinking such slogans are empty of meaning or
power. Many campaigns, including aligning curriculums in schools, or books in
libraries, are told they must eliminate all ideas “not in line with the socialist core
values”—what exactly that means is, as always, left up to the central government,
just as they would prefer it be.

Questions
1. Do the following words appear to be particularly “socialist?”
What values do you associate with the following words?
2. Why might the following values be particularly useful to Xi Jin-
ping’s mode of rule?

National values
• Prosperity (富强)
• Democracy (民主)
• Civility (文明)
• Harmony (和谐)

Social values
• Freedom (自由)
• Equality (平等)
• Justice (公正)
• Rule of law (法治)
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 381

Individual values
• Patriotism (爱国)
• Dedication (敬业)
• Integrity (诚信)
• Friendship (友善)

14.2 XI JINPING’S SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE

BELT AND ROAD FORUM (MAY 14, 2017)
Known officially as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), the global develop-
ment strategy formally launched by Xi Jinping in 2013 is also sometimes call
the “Silk Road Economic Belt” or by its more literal translation, “One Belt,
One Road.” At its base, the initiative is an economic one based on China’s
desire to create a network of railways, pipelines, ports, and highways overland
and via maritime routes across Asia and into Africa. Such efforts are presented
by Xi Jinping as helping to promote peace trade, environmental sustainability,
and cultural understanding. But, certainly, it is that and more. The BRI is a
cornerstone of Xi’s efforts to not just make China a global player but also to
begin to shape the manner those global interactions take. Despite the rhetoric
deployed following speech, China, more than other global players, is particu-
larly focused on strengthening its own economic presence globally. It rarely
includes ideological demands for market reform, freedom of speech, or specific
modes of governance among the national partners. There is little doubt that the
BRI has reshaped regional politics across Asia; it is less clear if, as many of its
detractors suggest, that it has created a network of client states willing to do
China’s bidding.

Questions
1. Why would Xi Jinping see the BRI as a particularly effective tool
to promote China’s international goals?
2. Why would China’s Asian neighbors be interested in becoming
part of the BRI network?

As we often say in China, “The beginning is the most difficult part.”

A solid first step has been taken in pursuing the Belt and Road Initia-
tive. We should build on the sound momentum generated to steer the Belt
and Road Initiative toward greater success. In pursuing this endeavor, we
should be guided by the following principles:
First, we should build the Belt and Road into a road for peace. The
ancient silk routes thrived in times of peace, but lost vigor in times of
war. The pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative requires a peaceful and
stable environment. We should foster a new type of international rela-
tions featuring win-win cooperation; and we should forge partnerships of
dialogue with no confrontation and of friendship rather than alliance. All
countries should respect each other’s sovereignty, dignity and territorial
integrity, each other’s development paths and social systems, and each
other’s core interests and major concerns.
Some regions along the ancient Silk Road used to be a land of
milk and honey. Yet today, these places are often associated with con-
flict, turbulence, crisis and challenge. Such state of affairs should not
be allowed to continue. We should foster the vision of common, com-
prehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and create a security
environment built and shared by all. We should work to resolve hotspot
issues through political means, and promote mediation in the spirit of
justice. We should intensify counter-terrorism efforts, address both its
382 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

symptoms and root causes, and strive to eradicate poverty, backward-

ness and social injustice.
Second, we should build the Belt and Road into a road of prosper-
ity. Development holds the master key to solving all problems. In pur-
suing the Belt and Road Initiative, we should focus on the fundamental
issue of development, release the growth potential of various countries
and achieve economic integration and interconnected development and
deliver benefits to all.
Industries are the foundation of economy. We should deepen indus-
trial cooperation so that industrial development plans of different coun-
tries will complement and reinforce each other. Focus should be put on
launching major projects. We should strengthen international cooperation
on production capacity and equipment manufacturing, and seize new
development opportunities presented by the new industrial revolution to
foster new businesses and maintain dynamic growth.
Finance is the lifeblood of modern economy. Only when the blood
circulates smoothly can one grow. We should establish a stable and sus-
tainable financial safeguard system that keeps risks under control, create
new models of investment and financing, encourage greater cooperation
between government and private capital and build a diversified financing
system and a multi-tiered capital market. We should also develop inclu-
sive finance and improve financial services networks.
Infrastructure connectivity is the foundation of development
through cooperation. We should promote land, maritime, air and cyber-
space connectivity, concentrate our efforts on key passageways, cities and
projects and connect networks of highways, railways and seaports. The
goal of building six major economic corridors under the Belt and Road
Initiative has been set, and we should endeavor to meet it. We need to
seize opportunities presented by the new round of change in energy mix
and the revolution in energy technologies to develop global energy inter-
connection and achieve green and low-carbon development. We should
improve trans-regional logistics network and promote connectivity of
policies, rules and standards so as to provide institutional safeguards for
enhancing connectivity.
Third, we should build the Belt and Road into a road of opening-up.
Opening-up brings progress while isolation results in backwardness. For
a country, opening-up is like the struggle of a chrysalis breaking free from
its cocoon. There will be short-term pains, but such pains will create a new
life. The Belt and Road Initiative should be an open one that will achieve
both economic growth and balanced development. . . .
Trade is an important engine driving growth. We should embrace
the outside world with an open mind, uphold the multilateral trading
regime, advance the building of free trade areas and promote liberaliza-
tion and facilitation of trade and investment. Of course, we should also
focus on resolving issues such as imbalances in development, difficulties
in governance, digital divide and income disparity and make economic
globalization open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial to all.
Fourth, we should build the Belt and Road into a road of innova-
tion. Innovation is an important force powering development. The Belt
and Road Initiative is new by nature and we need to encourage innovation
in pursuing this initiative. . . .
We should pursue the new vision of green development and a way
of life and work that is green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable. Efforts
should be made to strengthen cooperation in ecological and environmen-
tal protection and build a sound ecosystem so as to realize the goals set by
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 383

Fifth, we should build the Belt and Road into a road connecting
different civilizations. In pursuing the Belt and Road Initiative, we
should ensure that when it comes to different civilizations, exchange
will replace estrangement, mutual learning will replace clashes, and
coexistence will replace a sense of superiority. This will boost mutual
understanding, mutual respect and mutual trust among different
countries.
We should establish a multi-tiered mechanism for cultural and
people-to-people exchanges, build more cooperation platforms and open
more cooperation channels. Educational cooperation should be boosted,
more exchange students should be encouraged and the performance of
cooperatively run schools should be enhanced. . . . Historical and cultural
heritage should be fully tapped to jointly develop tourist products and
protect heritage in ways that preserve the distinctive features of the Silk
Road. . . .
An ancient Chinese saying goes, “A long journey can be covered
only by taking one step at a time”. Similarly, there is an Arab proverb
which says that the Pyramid was built by piling one stone on another. In
Europe, there is also the saying that “Rome wasn’t built in a day.” The
Belt and Road Initiative is a great undertaking which requires dedicated
efforts. Let us pursue this initiative step by step and deliver outcome one
by one. By doing so, we will bring true benefit to both the world and all
our people!

14.3 XI JINPING’S CELEBRATION OF THE 70TH

ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE PRC (2019)
Anniversaries often provide a moment for reflection, a brief moment to take stock
of achievements made, hardships overcome, and battles won. On October 1, 2019,
standing in the exact spot atop Tiananmen Gate where Mao declared the found-
ing of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, President Xi also sought to make
explicit the similarities between himself and China’s most powerful leader. His
words suggest not simply a tale of progress but also a decision on his part to revert
to much of the same language, ideology, and posturing used by Mao. If such
nuances were lost on anyone, Xi Jinping’s decision to deliver his speech wearing
a retro 1950s Mao jacket would have likely ensured that all but a few observers
would have understood his message.
Questions
1. What continuities can you find between Xi’s 2019 speech and that
delivered by Mao in 1949 (10.1)?
2. At the end of his speech, Xi speaks of “the Chinese dream of great
national renewal.” What do you believe Xi has in mind for such a
renewal?

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Comrades and Friends,
In this golden season of autumn, we are gathered here to mark the 70th
anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. For the
Chinese people of all ethnic groups and Chinese sons and daughters at
home and abroad, this is a joyful moment—a moment to celebrate the 70th
birthday of our great People’s Republic and to salute the epic progress of
our motherland during the past seven decades.
Over the past 70 years, under the strong leadership of the Commu-
nist Party of China (CPC), the Chinese people, with great courage and
384 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

relentless exploration, have successfully opened the path of socialism with

Chinese characteristics. Along this path, we have ushered in a new era.
Having caught up with the world in great strides, we are now marching
forward at the forefront of the times with boundless energy!
Over the past 70 years, the Chinese people, with perseverance and
strenuous efforts, have made development achievements that are the mar-
vel of the world. Absolute poverty, which has haunted the Chinese nation
for thousands of years, will soon become a thing of the past. This will be a
great miracle in human history!
Over the past 70 years, the Chinese people, upholding an independ-
ent foreign policy of peace, have forged ahead along the path of peaceful
development. Guided by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, we
have deepened friendship and cooperation with other countries and made
an important contribution to building a community with a shared future
for mankind and advancing the noble cause of peace and development for
humanity!
Seventy years are but a fleeting moment in human history. But for the
Chinese people, for our nation, these have been 70 years of epoch-making
changes. The Chinese nation has realized a tremendous transformation: it
has stood up, grown rich and is becoming stronger; it has come to embrace
the brilliant prospects of national renewal. This phenomenal transforma-
tion brings infinite pride to every son and daughter of the Chinese nation!
Here on behalf of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council,
I pay high tribute to the Chinese people of all ethnic groups and all CPC
members, to officers and men of the People’s Liberation Army and mem-
bers of the armed police, and to all the other political parties and person-
ages with no party affiliations in China! I wish to convey sincere greetings
to fellow Chinese in the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative
Regions, in Taiwan and residing abroad! I also wish to express heartfelt
thanks to all the countries and international friends who have given sup-
port and help to the development of New China!
Comrades and Friends!
Unity is iron and steel; unity is a source of strength. It is what has en-
abled the Chinese people and the Chinese nation to move forward against
all risks and challenges, from one victory to another.
In our new journey, we must hold high the banner of unity and rally
closely around the CPC Central Committee. We must cement the great
unity of all our ethnic groups, and strengthen the great unity of all Chinese
sons and daughters at home and abroad and of all political parties, organi-
zations, ethnic groups, social strata and fronts. We must maintain the close
bond between the CPC and the people and promote patriotism. Thus we
will create an unparalleled force that will power the ship of our national
renewal to clip waves and reach its destination.
Comrades and Friends!
We will continue to fully and faithfully implement the principles of
“One Country, Two Systems”, “Hong Kong people administering Hong
Kong”, “Macao people administering Macao” and a high degree of auton-
omy. We will act in strict accordance with the Constitution and the Basic
Laws. We are confident that with the full backing of the motherland and
the concerted efforts of our fellow Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao who
love the motherland as well as their communities, Hong Kong and Macao
will prosper and progress alongside the mainland and embrace an even
brighter future!
We will uphold the one-China principle and the “1992 Consensus”,
promote the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait,
and deepen cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 385

to the benefit of people on both sides. The complete reunification of the

motherland is an inevitable trend; it is what the greater national interests
entail and what all Chinese people aspire for. No one and no force can
ever stop it!
We will hold high the banner of peace, development, cooperation
and mutual benefit, and keep firmly to the path of peaceful development.
We will stay committed to opening-up and work with people in all coun-
tries to build a community with a shared future for mankind, and to create
a world bathed in peace and development.
Comrades and Friends,
The Chinese people are great people, the Chinese nation is a great
nation, and Chinese civilization is a great civilization. History will shed
light on the future, and our journey ahead will be a long one. We are con-
vinced that the Chinese people and the Chinese nation, with a proud civi-
lization spanning over five millennia and great accomplishments during
the past 70-year history of New China, will write a more brilliant chapter
in our new journey toward the realization of the Two Centenary Goals and
the Chinese Dream of great national renewal.
Now please join me in a toast:
To the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of
China;
To the prosperity and strength of China and the happiness and well-
being of the Chinese people of all ethnic groups;
To the friendship and cooperation between the people of China and
all other countries; and
To the health of all the guests, comrades and friends present.
Cheers!

DEVELOPMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL

ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
When China appears in the international news today, the items tend to
group around a core set of topics. In the past decade, the ability to discuss
and deviate from the official government line has eroded precipitously.
The following articles offer a Chinese perspective of these topics, not as
unadulterated propaganda but, rather, the slow shift away from open,
if contentious, discussion to one of considerable restrictions today. The
chilling shift in the government’s tolerance of outspoken dissent is visible
in the manner in which the 2006 Freezing Point Weekly editorial (14.9) was
generally tolerated, while more recent voices of dissent (such as Xu Zhan-
grun) have led to detainment or house arrest. The editor’s ability to pub-
licize his side of the story over the Internet reveals the growing difficulty
the government has in controlling information released to the public.
Similarly, the government’s position regarding the massive Three
Gorges Dam project (completed in 2012) and the numerous new dams
being built across southwest China (14.4 and 14.5) reveal a more nuanced
approach that is selective in its manner of censorship. Allowing Jia
Zhangke, one of China’s new generation of directors, to shoot a feature-
length film (14.6) and documentary at the dam site (and to show it at top
film festivals) is a far cry from the rigid oversight imposed on earlier direc-
tors, like Jiang Wen, encountered a decade earlier (9.3). Yet, neither of
these films had a fraction of the audience and attention that Wu Jing’s
patriotic sci-fi thriller Wandering Earth received. None of these issues
marks as abrupt a shift as the government’s oversight of Chinese soci-
ety, compared to the decision in 2015 to alter its one-child policy (13.7).
Seen together, these issues suggest that while the central government still
386 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

THREE GORGES exerts a firm grip on the circulation of information, the variety of topics
DAM—A massive and freedom to express opinions on those topics is improving.
hydroelectric dam on the
Yangtze River at the head
of the Qutang, Wuxia, and 14.4 A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION: WHY IS THERE
Siling gorges. The dam STILL FLOODING IN THE YANGTZE RIVER BASIN
was completed in 2008, a WITH THE THREE GORGES DAM? (JULY 20, 2020)
year of head of schedule,
The Yangtze River flows from the Tibetan Plateau for nearly 4,000 miles through
supplying much-needed
the heart of China before depositing nearly 960 billion cubic meters of water annu-
electricity but with
ally into the East China Sea. Since Sun Yat-sen first proposed the idea of a dam in
severe environmental
1918, every Chinese leader from Chiang Kai-shek to Mao Zedong has dreamed of
consequences.
tapping the river’s hydroelectric potential as well as curbing the devastating flood
waters that perennially threaten China’s fertile heartland. Actual construction on
the Three Gorges Dam only began in 1994, with the massive undertaking being
completed in 2008. Its construction aroused international condemnation and
concern over the ecological consequences. Chinese officials were steadfast, saying
that, unlike the Americans who try and “preserve” the environment, the Chinese
approach is to “correct” existing ecological shortcomings. In September 2007,
a conference of experts acknowledged that the dam’s performance had been less
than anticipated and that structurally there had been “displacement, seepage
and deformation.” In recent years, international reports began circulating of the
dam’s shortcomings and potential threats to the Yangtze basin. In response, the
government held a conference in July 2020 to forcefully refute any and all criti-
cisms of the Three Gorges Project.

Questions
1. What questions were being asked about the Three Gorges Dam
by the international community?
2. Does the article offer any insight into how Chinese officials
respond to the external criticisms of the potential risks or threats
to the Three Gorges Dams?

During the summer rainy season, serious flooding occurred across the
upper, middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River. Our country’s
largest water conservancy project, the Three Gorges Project on the Yang-
tze River, has once again become the focus of attention at home and
abroad.
In response to the deep concerns from all sectors of society regard-
ing the Three Gorges Project, China Economic Weekly organized a round-
table discussion on July 7, 2020. Wang Hao, academician of the Chinese
Academy of Engineering, Zhang Shuguang, chief engineer of China Three
Gorges Corporation, and Wang Zhangli, deputy director of the Department
of Flood and Drought Prevention of the Ministry of Water Conservancy,
Zhang Boting, deputy secretary-general of the Chinese Society of Hydro-
power Engineering, Wang Yinan, researcher of the Resource and Environ-
mental Policy Research Institute of the Development Research Center of
the State Council, and other experts were invited to a roundtable to discuss
the public’s three most pressing issues regarding the Three Gorges Dam.

First Question: Can We Definitively State That

the Three Gorges Dam is Safe?
Every year as the summer rainy season arrives, various rumors about the
safety of the Three Gorges Dam circulate. For example, in June last year, a
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 387

Google satellite photo purportedly showing that “the Three Gorges Dam
has been deformed” went viral. Even though experts in satellite remote
sensing have come forward to clarify that the “dam deformation” is a
technical issue with Google’s satellite imagery itself, the China Aerospace
Science and Technology Corporation took the exceptional step to produce
a complete set of photos from directly above the Three Gorges Dam using
“High Resolution-6” satellite imagery to prove that “the dam is straight
and safe.”
However, during this year’s flood season, new statements about the
“deformation” and “dam collapse” of the Three Gorges Dam have spread
on the Internet. . . .
So, how safe is the Three Gorges Dam? Can it withstand the impact
of a mega flood? Since there are instances of dam failures at home and
abroad, can be we assured the Three Gorges Dam will not collapse?
Wang Hao, an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineer-
ing and a hydrologist and water resource scientist, told China Economic
Weekly “There are no safety concerns with the Three Gorges Dam itself.”
His thesis is based on the following: First, the dam itself is designed
to withstand the “once in 10,000 years” super flood. . . . Second, the
Three Gorges Dam is a concrete gravity dam. It is the strongest type of
dam. Not only is it impervious to long-term inundation, but its com-
pressive capacity will only become stronger and stronger over the next
100 years.
In recent years, alarmist talks such as “The Three Gorges Dam has
been deformed” or “The Three Gorges Dam has shifted 4 meters” have
constantly appeared on the Internet, with new and different versions pop-
ping up every year during the flood season.
In response to this phenomenon, Chief Engineer Zhang Shuguang
told China Economic Weekly: We did explain that “the elastic deforma-
tion of the dam is within the designed allowable range”, but this state-
ment was taken out of context by some people on the Internet who said
“an official has finally admitted there is deformation in the dam.” In
fact, “elastic deformation” is a phenomenon that all structures expe-
rience after being stressed, including roads, bridges, high-rise build-
ings, and even the concrete floor under our feet. Elastic deformation is
not inherently bad, it all depends if it is within the design’s allowable
range. . . .
Some people have even worried about whether the Three Gorges
Dam can withstand an atomic bomb. Zhang Boting replied: This was actu-
ally a national defense concern as early as 1958. As a result of the special
international circumstances of that historical moment the consequences of
the Three Gorges Dam becoming a target of war had to be considered. . . .
Stated hypothetically, if an atomic bomb hit the dam directly, the only
consequence would be to blow a large hole in the dam, which is equiva-
lent to a few large flood gates that cannot be closed. It is impossible to
cause a complete failure of the dam resulting in the release of the entire
reservoir in a single instant. . . .

Experts’ Conclusion
The Three Gorges Dam does not exhibit any safety issues: the choice of
dam type, design standards, and quality assurances determine that it is
not possible for Three Gorges Dam to be breached. The Three Gorges Proj-
ect is the “Yangtze River’s Great Wall of Steel.”
388 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

Second Question: Will the Storage and Discharge of the

Three Gorges Intensify Flooding Disasters Both Up
and Downstream Along Yangtze?
...

Experts’ Conclusion
In the past decade or so, the joint operation of the [up-river] reservoirs in
conjunction with the Three Gorges as the mainstay has repeatedly saved
the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River basin from the cata-
strophic disaster. Without the Three Gorges Dam and its 41 reservoirs
upstream, the floods in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River
would be more severe today. To solve the floods in the Yangtze River
basin, we need more water conservancy infrastructure like the Three
Gorges.

Third Question: What Are the Irreplaceable

Functions of the Three Gorges Project?
One of the most widespread and influential objections when the Three
Gorges Project was built was that “if the Three Gorges Dam is built, it
will eventually be blown up.” This prophecy was made by Mr. Huang
Wanli, a famous water conservancy expert in our country. Later, many
remarks against the Three Gorges, questioning the Three Gorges, and
even rumors surrounding the Three Gorges were often based on Mr.
Huang Wanli’s prophecy. To this day, the perception and argument that
the Three Gorges Project is “reckless decision-making and endless disas-
ters” still exists. . . .

Experts Conclusion
The main function of the Three Gorges Project is to enhance the ability
to regulate and control water resources. There may be other alternative
power sources aside from the Three Gorges, but there is no alternative to
the Three Gorges Reservoir’s regulation and control of the Yangtze River’s
water resources. Floods are not an inevitable outcome of the natural disas-
ters. It is necessary to improve the ability to regulate and control water
resources as expeditiously as possible in order to overcome inherently
unfavorable climate and geographical conditions, to achieve sustainable
economic and social development, and to ensure the safety of people’s
lives and properties.

14.5 CHINA’S HYDROPOWER MOVING WEST (2020)

At the eastern edge of the Tibetan plateau, four of Asia’s major rivers—
Irrawaddy, Salween, Mekong, and Yangtze—flow southward into four parallel
gorges only 56 miles apart but separated by towering mountain ranges. The
steep descent, narrow canyons, and heavy runoff all combine to make the region
attractive to a nation desperate to tap the river’s latent hydropower. In their
drive to decarbonize their economy between 2000 and 2016, China’s hydropower
capacity in the southwestern province of Yunnan grew tenfold to 62 gigawatts
of hydropower. Yet, as the following article demonstrates, the original set of
dams were just a start to China’s massive hydroelectric push with entire suites
of dams, 12 or more per river, being planned or already in construction. If one
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 389

adds the Chinese-constructed dams just across the border in Southeast Asia
over the same period, one can begin to appreciate the massive geopolitical and
biophysical scope of such projects and their consequences. The following article
also captures the often opaque, jargon-laden, and self-promoting language found
in the government’s public outreach arguing that modernization benefits all and
harms few.

Questions
1. What factors do the following proponents of hydropower cite as
benefits? Do they broach any downsides (e.g., the displacement
of people, disrupted ecosystems, and radically altered cycles of
flooding downstream)?
2. How does the push for hydropower development dovetail with
the geopolitical push for the Belt and Road Initiative (14.2)?

At the “China Hydropower Development Forum and Hydropower Sci-

ence and Technology Award Ceremony” the Vice Minister of Water
Resources, Jiang Xuguang, heartily affirmed China’s water conservancy
and hydropower development achievements in the past year: “In the
past year, China’s water conservancy and hydropower projects have
developed rapidly, with the transformation of rural hydropower being
particularly satisfactory—in total more than 1067 rivers affected, over
1,900 ecological renovation projects completed, some 2,500 kilometers
of water-scarce rivers restored, and 173 small “green model” hydro-
power stations constructed. With a year of ceaseless efforts, the water
conservancy project has made up for shortcomings and improved the
quality, and speed. The supervision and managing of water conser-
vancy industry is strong and effective.” . . . Representing seventy per-
cent of the global hydropower construction market, China has become
the largest hydropower provider in the world. In turn, China’s hydro-
power development and construction is gradually turning towards
China’s west, where overall condition is more complicated with the
hydropower industry entering new phase of this new era of high-qual-
ity development. . . .
From a global perspective, the current state of hydropower devel-
opment in Europe and North American is relatively high, with the
degree of hydropower development in African and Asia, outside of
China, remaining relatively low. According to 2018 data on maximum
hydropower capacity, China, Brazil, Canada, the United State, and
Russia, rank as the top five countries with a total maximum capacity
of 636 million kilowatts, or fifty-six percent of the world’s total con-
ventional hydropower capacity . . . “at present, China’s hydropower
development accounts for about 75.6% of Asia’s and 31% of the world’s
total.” . . .
Deng Jianling, General-Manager of China Huaneng Group Co. Ltd.
noted that the “China Huaneng Group sees the globalization of hydro-
power as a concrete step for the implementation of the “Belt and Road Ini-
tiative.” [The company] has put into operation Shweli River Hydropower
Station (600,000 kilowatts) and Tonlé Se San Hydropower Station (400,000
kilowatts) the largest dams in Myanmar and Cambodia and become a
successful model of hydropower cooperation in the Greater Mekong Sub-
region and functions as a model in the central government’s efforts to
establish the ‘Belt and Road Initiative.” . . .
Comprehensive research based on factors such as environmen-
tal protection, market consumption, and economic development, has
390 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

estimated that by 2035, with a total of 52 large-scale hydropower proj-

ects already underway in the major river basins mentioned above and
will be developed, with an installed capacity of approximately 110 mil-
lion kilowatts. These 52 power stations are mainly concentrated in the
Tibet area, with a total of 31 stations (3 of which are the boundary rivers
of Sichuan and Tibet), contributing about 80 million kilowatts, while
about 30 million kilowatts are in other areas. “During the 14th Five-
Year Plan, we will focus on key development areas such as Sichuan,
Yunnan, and Tibet, deepen the construction of large hydropower bases,
steadily promote the development of hydropower in southeast Tibet,
and accelerate the construction of control reservoirs with good regula-
tion performance.” . . .
Zheng Sheng’an pointed out that “The conditions of the remaining
hydropower development, such as the Jinsha River [Upper Yangtze], the
Yalong River [Yangtze tributary], and the Dadu River [Tib. Gyelmo Ngul
Chu, Yangtze tributary] are relatively lacking, and sensitive issues gener-
ally more numerous. Working to ensure environmental protection is dif-
ficult, which further increases the burden of hydropower development.
Interest in investment is affected by factors such as construction condi-
tions, as well as policies on immigration and environmental protection.
Also due to inflation, the difficulties of development, and construction
costs have continued to increase.” . . .
In addition to steadily promoting technological innovation, Zheng
Sheng’an believes, the next step needed in the development of China’s
hydropower industry is: to actively respond to global climate change;
to fully realize the adjustment capabilities of hydropower plants; look
towards complementary multi-energy joint operations that accelerate
regional wind, solar and other new energy consumption to realize the
optimal allocation of resources, in order to promote and fulfill the goal of
a high proportion of renewable energy. . . . This is the way for the future
development of our country’s hydropower industry.”

14.6 FILM: STILL LIFE (2006)

It was only when Chinese director Jia Zhangke began a documentary on the
Three Gorges Dam project that he realized the unfolding human drama sur-
rounding the massive undertaking was a perfect topic for a feature-length
film that he later titled Still Life. (Jia Zhangke ultimately also released a doc-
umentary about life in the Three Gorges under the title “East” [Dong].) The
film follows two individuals who separately return to the region looking for
their respective spouses. With a discerning eye for the lives of ordinary people
developed in many of his early films, Jia Zhangke highlights the choices of
ordinary Chinese (as well as the larger forces shaping those choices) that
often lead to dislocation rather than accommodation. The film effortlessly
displays the scenery and life along the Yangtze without entering a political
commentary about the dam. Upon its release, the film won numerous prizes
at top film festivals, including the Golden Lion—the top prize of the Ven-
ice Film Festival (2006). Jia Zhangke has been compared to Fifth-generation
director Zhang Yimou (whose films The Story of Qiu Ju (13.5) and Not
One Less also won the Golden Lion), with many conferring upon him the
moniker “torchbearer of China’s new Sixth Generation” of filmmakers. In the
following scene, a middle-aged coal miner from the province of Shanxi (who
shares the same name of the actor, Han Sanming), arrives in the riverside
city of Fengjie to search for his ex-wife and daughter, both displaced because
of the dam construction.
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 391

Questions
1. Unlike the glamorous portrayal of China in many films, how does
the flowing dialogue evoke a much more realistic style of life?
2. Why is Han Sanming confused about where he should go to look
for his wife, Ma Yaomei?
Scene 1: Han Sanming, one of the central characters in the film, disembarks from
the Yangtze ferry and walks several steps to the landing, where motorcycle driv-
ers are trying to get customers to taxi them to nearby destinations.
Motorcyclist: Hey, brother, where are you going? Can I take you?
Where are you going to?
Han Sanming: Here.
(Showing the young motorcyclist his address on a piece of paper)
Motorcyclist: (Reading address) Sichuan Province, Fengjie County,
Qingshi Street No. 5. . . . Okay, let’s go. Five yuan.
Han Sanming: How about three yuan?
1st Motorcyclist: Come on, everyone charges five yuan.
2nd Motorcyclist: Alright, let’s go.
Scene 2: The motorcycle slows to a stop up the river but, curiously, there is no
town.
1st Motorcyclist: Brother, here we are.
Han Sanming: Here?
Motorcyclist: See? To the left of the clump of grass grows over there.
That’s Qingshi Street, No.5. Get off.
Han Sanming: How come it’s all under water?
Motorcyclist: Fengjie town has already been flooded. Do you watch
news? Do you know about Three Gorges Dam project?
Han Sanming: Where are the people?
Motorcyclist: Dispersed. Relocated and moved away.
Han Sanming: You knew it was flooded, but you still brought me
here? You cheated me out of 5 yuan.
Motorcyclist: I didn’t order it flooded.
Han Sanming: Do you know Ma Yaomei?
Motorcyclist: All the girls are called Yaomei here. Which one are you
looking for? Are you looking for a person or looking
for work?
Han Sanming: A person.
Motorcyclist: Brother, I tell you what. For three more yuan, I will
take you to the Relocation Office. Give them her house
number and their computer can check and find every-
thing. How about it?
Han Sanming: OK.
Motorcyclist: See that ferry marooned over there? My home was
originally underneath that. It’s long gone now.
SCENE 3: People are arguing inside the hallway of the relocation office. An official
is surrounded by many residents, who are all complaining to him simultaneously.
Official: We are implementing that policy. It is Policy No. 195
which is posted on the wall over there.
Man: I say, we are all under the leadership of the same Com-
munist Party. And there is only one policy for reloca-
tion subsidies.
Official: Right, the same one.
Man: How come it is implemented differently?
Official: Where is it different?
392 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

(Once again, the small crowd all talks at once)

Official: Watch what you say. Watch what you say.
Woman: You officials have pocketed the relocation fund. There
are problems here.
Official: Of course, there are problems. How can there be no
problems? A 2000-year old city was razed in two years.
There are problems. They can only be solved slowly.
(Han speaking with a female staff member inside the office)
Han Sanming: Qingshi Street No.5.
Staff: Sichuan Province, Fengjie County. How long have you
been out of touch?
Han Sanming: Sixteen years.
Staff: No wonder. Fengjie hasn’t been part of Sichuan Prov-
ince for quite some time. It belongs to Chongqing since
Chongqing became an independently administered
Municipality in 1997.
Han Sanming: I heard that.
Staff: Is she still in Fengjie now?
Han Sanming: She should be. Where else can she go?
Staff: It’s not certain. Since they are building the Three Gorg-
es Dam we belong to the area which will become the
reservoir. So many people have migrated to Guang-
dong, Liaoning and everywhere.
Han Sanming: Hmm.
Staff: Damn computer! Come back to pick up the informa-
tion tomorrow.
Han Sanming: Why?
Staff: The computer is dying.
Han Sanming: Dying?
Staff: Dying. . . . not working.
(The official shown earlier walks into the office still pursued by the woman
demanding an answer to her requests.)
Official: You should go home first. Go home. It’s no use talking
to me.
Old woman: You must resolve this for us.
Official: I am telling you. I have lots of work to do.
SCENE 4: The same motorcyclist is driving Han Sanming through town. Along
the street, some workers are writing big red characters on the wall of a building:
Water Level for Phase Three: 156.5 meters. At a cheap hotel, the manager of the
hotel greets Han Sanming and the motorcyclist.
Old Man: You came from Shanxi [province]? Three yuan per day.
Three yuan per day. Alright?
Motorcyclist: What? Three yuan a day? The Three Gorges tourism
market is messed up by people like you.
Old man: Alright, alright, for this young man’s sake, one and
half yuan, one and half yuan.
Motorcyclist: One yuan and twenty cents, let’s go.
Old man: Alright. One yuan and twenty cents, so one yuan and
twenty cents.
(Han walks away toward his room, and the young motorcyclist returns to the old
man at the door.)
Motorcyclist: Give me my money.
Old man: You are best at helping the others. Here is one yuan.
Here you are.
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 393

14.7 FILM: THE WANDERING EARTH (2019)

The film The Wandering Earth is based on a novella written by science-
fiction writer Liu Cixin (most famous for his book The Three-Body Prob-
lem). It would be hard to overstate Liu’s influence in China today and the
popularity of what one commentator called “intergalactic Darwinism.” The
Wandering Earth, capturing many of the same critiques of climate change,
capitalism, and Western hegemony became a sci-fi blockbuster among the
top-grossing movies of all time in China. The film is set in a post-apocalyp-
tic future, where the world’s population has, by a lottery system, retreated
below ground and is now governed by a multi-lingual United Earth Govern-
ment. The disastrous choices that led to the earth’s dilemma are unambiguous
analogies for current environmental tragedies and the lack of international
agreement. Yet, the film’s reception, particularly in the United States, was
cool, with many regarding the film as nothing more than a well-spun piece
of nationalistic confection. The following scene begins with the earth’s crash
into Jupiter imminent and the fate of the planet seemingly sealed. The father,
Liu Peiqiang (in the space station), and his son, Liu Qi (on earth), must
decide whether to put aside their own troubled relationship or work together
to save the earth by steering the space station and its massive fuel reserves
into Jupiter.

Questions
1. What role does the theme of self-sacrifice—on a personal level,
within society, and in the universe—play in the scene?
2. What larger symbolism does Liu Peiqiang’s irreverence
toward both the computer and the United Earth Government
represent?

LIU PEIQIANG: There is another possibility. Liu Qi, Wang Lei.

There is still a chance! Hold on! (communicat-
ing with central command) United Earth Govern-
ment. The space station still has 300,000 tons of
fuel. Requesting to move station into plasma
beam.
MALE OFFICIAL OF THE UNITED GOVERNMENT IN FRENCH:
Lieutenant Colonel Liu Peiqiang. The purpose
of the Wondering Earth Project is to ensure the
survival of the maximum number of human
lives while the Helios Project seeks to ensure
the continuation of human civilization. We
need more time to discuss . . .
LIU PEIQIANG: There isn’t any time left! A civilization without
human beings is without meaning.
COMPUTER SCREEN: Communication Fail. Program Terminated.
(Central command overrides the system preventing Liu from carrying out his
suggested course of action.)
COMPUTER VOICE: As the OS for the Helios Project, MOSS forbids
any action that sacrifices Pilot Space Station.
(Liu manually overrides the fire extinguishing system then grabs a bottle of alco-
hol from a space suit and says to the computer)
LIU PEIQIANG: You know why no alcohol was allowed in space
during Gagarin’s time? Happy New Year!
(He hurls the bottle at the computer’s main frame, setting it on fire.)
COMPUTER VOICE: Data error, core node unavailable.
394 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

(Liu walks over to the control panel and manually returns power to himself as
flames engulf the computer mainframe.)
COMPUTER VOICE: It is too much to demand that human-beings
think rationally? (the computer voice slowly be-
comes more and more distorted and then fizzles out
completely)
(Liu turns off the auto-gravity functions and floats back up to the pilot seats, belt-
ing himself in, restarting the station’s function, and placing a picture of his family
on the monitor.)
LIU PEIQIANG: Time to go home!
COMPUTER VOICE: Reconnecting communication of United Earth
Government.
MALE OFFICIAL OF THE UNITED GOVERNMENT (IN FRENCH):
Lieutenant Colonel Liu Peiqiang, this is the
United Earth Government. We have decided to
chose “hope.” No matter the outcome this leads
humankind. In the end, we shall respect and ac-
cept it.
LIU PEIQIANG: The Earth for sure will survive. Separate the
dormant cabin. Prepare for impact.
COMPUTER VOICE: Escaping system for dormant cabin was
turned on.
LIU PEIQIANG: United Government, notify all staff on earth
surface to enter emergency hiding.
COMPUTER VOICE: Forward three.
(Liu then speaks to the people on earth through this radio, telling them his plan
to save Earth.)
LIU PEIQIANG: China Rescue Team CN171–11, this is space sta-
tion. I am Liu Peiqiang. There are 300,000 tons
of fuel in space station. The explosion diameter
may reach 5000 kilometers. Igniting the space
station should ignite the hydrogen in Jupiter’s
atmosphere.
LIU QI: Liu Peiqiang, what are you doing? Wang Lei,
don’t let it happen!
LIU PEIQIANG: Lieutenant Wang Lei, do as your told!
LIU QI: Liu Peiqiang, shut up!
LIU PEIQIANG: This is an order!
WANG LEI: Yes.
LIU QI: Wang Lei, damn you!
LIU PEIQIANG: Liu Qi.
LIU QI: Li Yiyi, turn off the engine!
LIU PEIQIANG: Liu Qi!
LIU QI: Shut up! Shut up! Shut up!
LIU PEIQIANG: Son.
LIU QI: Shut up!
LIU PEIQIANG: Son, I am sorry. Your dad must leave to carry
out another task. This is the most significant
task of my life.
LIU QI: You told me you would be back when I can see
Jupiter. You lied.
LIU PEIQIANG: You were four when I left and now you have
grown up. I told you, I am up in the sky. Look
up and you will see me. This time, for sure you
will see me. Come on, son. Three, two, one.
LIU QI: Dad . . .
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 395

14.8 WHY ARE CHINESE HIGH-SPEED TRAINS

LEADING THE WORLD? (2019)
It is often forgotten that, in China today, there are over 100 cities with a popula-
tion greater than 1 million, a number that will double to more than 200 cities
within the next decade. The question of how to provide such a populous nation
with adequate transportation infrastructure has long been in the forefront of Chi-
nese government initiatives. In 1949, the newly founded government set out to
expand the reach of the national railway system, constructing nearly 10,000 miles
of new rail lines in 15 years. Another 25,000 miles was added in the next 40 years.
In 2006, instead of simply “upgrading” the old network, China decided to create
a parallel network of high-speed trains, a network that, by 2020, is more than
10,000 miles in total and has witnessed double-digit passenger growth and today
transports billions of passengers annually, traveling at speeds that reach in excess
of 200 miles per hour.

Questions
1. What would be the incentives for the Chinese government to
build and continue to expand a high-speed train network?
2. Who benefits from a high-speed train network? Who suffers?

Open a path to go through the mountains. Build a bridge to cross a river.

From not having even an inch of high-speed rail to building the longest
high-speed rail in the world. . . . The past 70 years, have been 70 years
of transforming the backward state of transportation, and promoting
the construction of the national economic network; 70 years of indepen-
dent rail research and development, and making great strides in the con-
struction of infrastructure to become a world leader; 70 years of constant
improvements in the support of transportation services, and enhancing
the joy of travel for Chinese people; 70 years of building internal linkages
and external connectors, from drawing imports in to pushing exports out
creating new patterns of international cooperation.
Through the efforts of several generations of railway workers, Chi-
nese high-speed rail has surpassed itself achieving “Chinese speed,” and
created a Chinese miracle. Across the vast expanse of the motherland,
Chinese high-speed rail is weaving a giant fluid network that alters the
time and space within Chinese society while providing Chinese wisdom
towards world development. . . .
China’s railways took decades to accomplish what the developed
countries only achieved after several hundred years. China’s highspeed
rail has written a new chapter on speed that surpasses the miracle of a
butterfly’s metamorphosis.
When the PRC was first established, its transportation systems
were very backward. The length of the national railway network
totaled only 21,800 kilometers [13,500 miles], with half of that inoper-
able. Faced with a situation of poverty and minimal technology, the
Chinese government clearly made the restoration of the transportation
networks among the most urgent of the basic conditions requiring state
attention.
Since then, the concept of “transportation first” has been central to all
policies. Beginning in 1953, the state carried out transportation construc-
tion in a planned manner. In 1978, the “reform and open-door policy”
prioritized transportation development bolstered by the support of state
policy. With the establishment of the socialist market economic system in
1992, transportation development continued to flourish as a result of the
396 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

“reform and open-door policy,” with breakthroughs occurring in a variety

of different transportation methods. . . .
“In the past, it was difficult for my son to get home for the Chinese
New Year. He would have to awake before dawn, wait in line to buy a
ticket, and even then still often failed to get a ticket. Recently, Ms. Wei of
Shanghai discovered that train tickets for the New Year had become much
easier to purchase. Her son who works far away in Beijing can now get
home much faster. “High speed trains are both fast and numerous. Tickets
can be purchased via smart phone, making it so convenient!”
According to Ministry of Transportation statistics, during the 40-day
Spring Festival travel period in 2019, more than 2.98 billion passengers
nationwide travelled by train. Today, if one put the number of tickets
sold in one year end-to-end, they would circle the earth seven or eight
times. . . . A nation’s strength lies in its transportation, and railways are
key. The change in the people’s lifestyle calls for the development of Chi-
na’s high-speed rail, and China’s economy, particularly regional economic
development, urgently needs the boost from high-speed rail. . . .
When Deng Xiaoping visited Japan and rode the Shinkasen Bul-
let Train in 1978, he was asked how he found it, and replied, “It just felt
like you were going really fast, like being pushed to run.” 40 years later,
President Xi and Russian President Putin rode the high-speed train to
Tianjin, they felt “speed of China.” Time and space changed. Stars move
and rotated. 70 years of hardship, 70 years of struggle, 70 years of change,
70 years of development. A follower has become a leader. What future lies
ahead for China’s railway and high-speed rail? We believe the answer is
already in rail worker’s heart.

MOVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES TO THE STATE

Protests have always been part of China’s past and present. From the
May Fourth Movement to the Tiananmen protests, demonstrations have,
in many ways, defined China’s path forward. Despite such periodic dis-
plays of discontent, however, most Chinese embrace the new direction of
the country. In large part, there exists a consensus that the central policies
implemented under Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping have ush-
ered in an era of economic prosperity not seen in China since the mid-
eighteenth century, the golden age of the Qianlong emperor. However,
like the Qianlong reign, such prosperity also created new problems like
corruption, malfeasance, and ethnic chauvinism. As a result, the PRC’s
economic success has not benefited all Chinese evenly. According to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the level of income inequality in
China has gone from being “moderately unequal” in 1990 to being one
of the “world’s most unequal” countries in 2020. In the past two decades,
Tibetans, Ughyurs, and numerous religious minorities continue to be
targeted, detained, and repressed. Knowledge of such events remain
actively censored and rarely publicized, resulting in little public engage-
ment or discussion.
In recent decades, Chinese have increasingly carried out strikes and
protests as state subsidies were slowly rolled back and as the judicial sys-
tem was no longer an avenue to promote change. To see this from the
point of view of Taiwan’s government is also insightful as they seek to
find a path that breaks them out of the so-called One China policy (14.10).
What is clear, however, is an increasingly harsh attitude toward open
disagreement. The government’s reaction to dissent in print, such as Li
Datong’s letter in Freezing Point Weekly (14.9), or as mass gatherings such
as those held in Hong Kong in 2019 (14.11), or even just efforts, such as Li
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 397

Wenliang’s, to share information about COVID-19 (14.12), all hint at the

difficulty to discern a clear-cut definition of what is and is not tolerated.

14.9 OPEN LETTER PROTESTING THE DECISION ON

FREEZING POINT WEEKLY (JANUARY 25, 2006)
Freezing Point was a weekly supplement published by the China Youth
Daily newspaper. Well known for its spirited intellectual analysis of contem-
porary issues, the weekly had a wide readership, which was largely a result of
the unflinching editorial board that challenged unstated (but apparent) restric-
tions on sensitive topics typically censored by the Propaganda Department. The
aggressive editorial stance taken by the weekly, however, eventually resulted in
the editor, Li Datong’s dismissal and the magazine being “stopped for reorgani-
zation.” The professed reason for closing the supplement was an essay by Yuan
Weishi (a professor at Zhongshan University) that accused government-approved
history textbooks of whitewashing specific historical movements (such as the Sec-
ond Opium War and the Boxer Rebellion) for patriotic and political purposes. The
dismissal was met with a wave of negative publicity and international condem-
nation. As result of this negative reaction, the Propaganda Department allowed
the supplement to resume publication but without the two top editors and with
a requirement to publish a criticism of Yuan Weishi’s article. The following is a
complete translation of the letter posted by Li Datong on his website after he was
removed as editor.

Questions
1. What is the primary focus of Li Datong’s indignation? Is it the
issue of censorship, party oversight, or his dismissal?
2. Why would Yuan Weishi’s article be a sensitive topic for the Chi-
nese government and the Chinese Communist Party?

Media colleagues, friends from academic and legal circles, and Freezing
Point readers around the world:
As the deadline for the January 25 issue of Freezing Point Weekly ap-
proached, on Tuesday, January 24, 2006, following the typical routine, the
Beijing editors and reporters gathered in the editorial department intently
proofreading the next issue. A little after 4 p.m., the galley proofs were
completed and delivered to the editor-in-chief for review and printing.
But abnormally, there was no response. We heard that the entire leader-
ship of the newspaper had been called to the [Youth] League Central Of-
fice for an emergency meeting, so there was no one to look over anything.
This was our clue that something out of the ordinary was about to happen.
Even when the sky comes crashing down, a newspaper’s publica-
tion has to go on as usual. This is the responsibility owed towards all
subscribers and readers. We corrected all the identified errors in the proof
and waited quietly for what was to happen. There had been endless
criticisms and attacks toward the Freezing Point Weekly from the Central
Propaganda Department. Just on Monday as we read their ruthless attack
from the news critics group of the Central Propaganda Department which
employed a Cultural Revolution-style tactic of magnifying insignificant
problems appearing in Professor Yuan Weishi’s Freezing Point article “Mo-
dernity and History Textbook,” I, as the chief editor, expected my dis-
missal was near.
However, the degree of their despicableness is still beyond the im-
agination of normal people. Around 5 p.m., telephone calls from friends
of various media centers around the country began to arrive, informing
398 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

PINGXINGGUAN me they had received notices from the Central Propaganda Department,
CAMPAIGN (LIAN News Office of State Council, and Beijing Municipal News Bureau “for-
XIANGBAN)—One of the bidding them to publish any news or commentary on the suspension and
largest battles carried out reorganization of Freezing Point,” “Forbidding them to participate in the
by Communist military news conference of Freezing Point’s editors and reporters,” “Forbidding
forces during the War of them from making it into a media frenzy,” and “To maintain distance” etc.
Resistance Against Japan. A steady stream of phone calls from overseas media reporters followed,
asking me to verify the situation. Yet up until 7 p.m. I received no official
notice of any kind. The top leaders of the newspaper had returned from
[their meeting with] the Youth League Central Committee but remained
sequestered in a meeting. I, on the other hand, became the last person to
learn of this decision. All information suggests that their action had been
carefully planned by several senior Party officials for a long time, which
goes against the will of the people. This action not only lacks any consti-
tutional or legal basis, but also grievously violates and tramples on the
Party’s constitution and the principles of political life within the Party.
As a professional journalist, the suspension of the Freezing Point
Weekly is beyond my comprehension, something I simply cannot accept.
Because a newspaper is a civic tool, there is a contract between the news-
paper and the subscribers and readers public—that is to say the buyer
expects an information product, and the newspaper must honor this
agreement—no matter the fate of any one individual, the Freezing Point
Weekly should reach the subscribers on time. But for those who made this
decision, what does social influence matter? What does broad readership
matter? What does the reputation of a large mainstream newspaper mat-
ter? What does the Party Constitution and the country’s law matter? What
does the image of China’s ‘reform and opening to the outside world’ mat-
ter? What does the image of the governing Party matter? They regard the
civic tool as their private property, to be disposed of at their own will.
At 7:30 p.m., I received a call from the publisher and the editor-in-
chief asking me to come up for a conversation. They notified me the de-
cision made by that the Communist Youth League Central Propaganda
Bureau. The “decision” consisted of groundless charges against the article
by Mr. Yuan Weishi, and announced that the publication of Freezing Point
Weekly would be “stopped for reorganization.” In addition to published
criticism of the editor-in-chief and myself, a “monetary penalty” would
also be assessed. Who gave them this kind of power! Such a despicable
mindset leaves one not knowing whether to laugh or cry.
Under the conditions described above, the conversation became a
farce. Obviously, the Youth League Central Committee was assigned to
play the role of the clown on the stage, while a small number of “superi-
ors” manipulated them from behind the scenes. I condemned this “deci-
sion” in front of the publisher and editor-in-chief, as well as the absurdity
of the Central Propaganda Department’s “News Commentary and Criti-
cism.” I also announced that I would formally complain to the Party’s
Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee about this illegal act.
Today just as the Freezing Point Weekly is being shut down, the news-
paper is receiving a large number of calls from readers for clarification,
with some of them, upon learning of the Freezing Point Weekly’s suspen-
sion, angrily going to the Post Office to cancel their subscriptions.
The elimination of Freezing Point Weekly by a few “superiors” had
been plotted far in advance. On June 1 of 2005, prior to the sixtieth an-
niversary celebrating the victory of the Second World War, the Freezing
Point Weekly published an article entitled “The Campaign of Pingxingguan
and Victory of Pingxingguan.” The article factually documented the close
cooperation between Communist and Kuomintang military forces that
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 399

bravely fought together in a period of great danger for the nation. Differ-
ing from previous propaganda, Freezing Point, for the first time in a main-
stream publication, objectively and truthfully reported the Kuomintang’s
sacrifice of several tens of thousands of officers and soldiers in the battle.
This fact-based historic narration received churlish criticism from
the journalist-criticism group of the Central Propaganda Department.
What was their evidence for criticism? They had not one iota of historical
fact; instead, they based their critique on the “Narratives on the Victory of
Pingxingguan in the History of Communist Party of China, published by
XX Press in XX year, on XX page.” The Freezing Point Weekly, they went on
to proclaim, “glamorized the Kuomintang and debased the Communist
Party.” In the end, however, at the sixtieth anniversary celebration of the
victory of the Second World War, Comrade Hu Jintao, General-Secretary
of the Central Committee of the Party, fully confirmed the contributions of
the Kuomintang officers and soldiers in the main battlefields of the Resist-
ance War Against Japan. It is obvious who was right and who was wrong.
When [KMT Chairman] Lian [Zhan] and [PFP Chairman] Song
[Chuyu] were visiting the mainland [separately,] Ms. Long Yingtai, the
well-known Taiwanese writer published a long article in Freezing Point,
“The Taiwan You May Not Know.” Supported by abundant references
and factual sources, the article for the first time, objectively and truthfully
revealed to mainland Chinese the changes in and the development of Tai-
wan over the past few decades. The article generated strong response and
received positive comments among readers, as well creating an essential
conduit connecting the peoples from both sides of the strait. However,
some people from the Central Propaganda Department, whose view-
points and mindset were astonishingly narrow, condemned the article as
“targeting the Communist Party on every level.”
On November 18 of last year, the Central Committee of the Party
held a solemn meeting to commemorate the 90th birthday of Comrade Hu
Yaobang, the great proletariat revolutionist. On behalf of Central Com-
mittee of the Party, Comrade Zeng Qinghong introduced Comrade Hu
Yaobang’s glorious achievements and great character at length, a pres-
entation that was warmly received by the people. However, some indi-
viduals from the Central Propaganda Committee prohibited media from
publishing articles commemorating Comrade Hu Yaobang and limited
publications to articles exclusively from Xinhua News Agency with no
alterations permitted.
On December 7 of 2005, Freezing Point published Comrade Hu
Qili’s unabridged reminiscence, “[Hu] Yaobang in My Heart.” The arti-
cle generated a deep-felt response in many domestic and international
Chinese-language media outlets, which republished the article. Many
Internet readers posted comments in which they said the article was so
touching it brought them to tears. Despite receiving singularly positive
popular reactions, the Central Propaganda Department made phone call
to the newspaper agency, condemned and claiming it violated the rule of
“publishing without approval!” Among these people there is not a single
ounce of recognition of the true feelings and reminiscences expressed to-
wards Comrade Hu Yaobang! . . .
Under pressure, the next installment of the report was withdrawn
from the Freezing Point Weekly. As a result, on December 28 of 2005, Freez-
ing Point Weekly for the first time was a reduced to a three-page issue. Let’s
ask, what kind of behavior are the people from the Central Propaganda
Department safeguarding? . . .
This incident again reveals the fundamental flaws in the news man-
agement system of our country. A small number of people in the Central
400 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

Propaganda Department employ a narrow-minded view, using an intoler-

ant, autocratic and peremptory style, to impose controls that deaden what
should be a lively political phenomenon in which “a hundred flowers
bloom, and a hundred schools of thought contend.” These people want
obedience, not equality. Which article in the Chinese Communist Party’s
constitution grants them this monopoly of power? . . .
With heartfelt thanks!
Li Datong
Chief Editor of Freezing Point Weekly, China Youth Daily
January 25, 2006

14.10 MA YING-JEOU’S SPEECH AT THE SOCIETY

OF PUBLISHERS IN ASIA (SOPA) (JUNE 15, 2016)
After a popular eight years as the mayor of Taipei, Ma Ying-jeou served two
four-year terms as president of Taiwan (Republic of China). A key plank of his
platform was to forge closer relations with the PRC, and as part of his efforts to
warm ties between the “two Chinas,” he became the first Republic of China offi-
cial to meet with a CCP official when he met Xi Jinping (in Singapore) in 2015.
Ma’s rapprochement with the PRC triggered a crisis of confidence and general
discontent with Taiwanese. As Ma describes next, the evolution of this relation-
ship is one fraught with concern and caution on both sides of the Taiwan straits.
Yet, with few promises and even fewer guarantees from the PRC about possible
closer ties, the question of Taiwan remains a difficult one to Chinese in the PRC
and in Taiwan.

Questions
1. What different formulas have Taiwanese officials proposed for
“cross-strait” relations?
2. Why does Ma Ying-jeou suggest the “One China” policy is founded
on a false premise?

The topic I want to talk about today is cross-strait relations in the after-
math of the Ma-Xi meeting in Singapore in November last year. Cross-
strait relations have improved more in the past eight years than during
any period since 1949. And the foundation of that change is the 1992 Con-
sensus, which is “one China, respective interpretations.” But where did
that foundation come from?
Taiwan lifted Martial Law and restrictions on family visits across
the Taiwan Strait in 1987, and cross-strait relations began to thaw. In 1991,
the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) was established in Taiwan, and the
mainland set up its counterpart, the Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Strait (ARATS). That marked the beginning of institutionalized
exchanges. In October of 1992, right here in Hong Kong, those two agen-
cies held working-level talks. The mainland side wanted to negotiate the
“one China” principle, but talks between the two sides were inconclusive.
So, they all went home. However, after the meeting Taiwan’s SEF perse-
vered, and sent a new suggestion. Its proposal stated that, “Both sides of
the Taiwan Strait insist on ‘one China’ principle.” However, the two sides
have different opinions as to the meaning of “one China,” and each side
may state its interpretation verbally. On November 16, ARATS sent a for-
mal letter informing the SEF that they “fully respect and accept the SEF’s
suggestion.” The two sides had finally reached a consensus, and that is the
origin of the [19]92 Consensus. At that time, Taiwan media came up with
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 401

the headline “One China, respective interpretations,” which is still in use LEE TENG-HUI (Li
today. So when the two sides reached the’92 Consensus, Hong Kong also Denghui) (1929–2020)—
played a role. Born in Taiwan and
Based on that foundation, SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu and ARATS educated in Japan and the
Chairman Wang Daohan signed four agreements in Singapore in April United States, he joined
of 1993. So, four decades after the two sides of the Taiwan Strait came the KMT in 1971, was
under separate rule in 1949, government- authorized bodies from both appointed mayor of Taibei
sides signed formal, binding agreements for the first time. Unfortu- in 1981, and succeeded
nately, for the next 15 years cross-strait relations were marked by tur- Jiang Jingguo after his
moil, including the Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis in 1996; the shockwaves death in 1988. He became
from President Lee Teng-Hui’s “Two States [liangguo lun]” remarks the first popularly elected
in 1999; President Chen Shui-bian’s “one country on each side [yibian ROC president in 1996.
yiguo]” remarks in 2001; and four referendums tied to general elections
in 2004 and 2008. So for a decade and a half, cross-strait relations were
THREE NOES—A
fraught with peril.
policy dating from the
In 2008 I became president and began to promote cross-strait rap-
late 1970s by Taiwan in
prochement. Under the framework of the ROC Constitution, I sought to
response to the PRC’s
maintain the status quo, defined as: “no unification, no independence, and
efforts to have direct talks.
no use of force [butong, budu, buwu].” I also promoted peaceful develop-
President Chiang Ching-
ment across the Taiwan Strait based on the’92 Consensus, which is “one
kuo asserted “no contact,
China, respective interpretations [yige zhongguo gezi biaoshu].” The “three
no negotiation, and no
noes” [san bu zhengce] above is supported by over 80% of the people in
compromise.” In 2008, Ma
Taiwan; it can be called a “Taiwan Consensus,” whereas the’92 Consensus
Ying-jeou later established
is a cross-strait consensus which is part of the status quo. And as a result
a new “three noes” policy
of those policies, cross-strait relations began to stabilize.
of “no unification, no
Over the past eight years: Taiwan and mainland China signed 23
independence, and no use
agreements; the ministers in charge of cross-strait affairs from both sides
of force.”
met seven times, addressing each other using their official titles; the num-
ber of scheduled cross-strait flights each week rose from zero to 890; over
4 million mainland tourists traveled to Taiwan last year, a 14-fold increase;
and the number of mainland students in Taiwan surpassed the 42,000
mark, almost a 50-fold increase. Tension in the Taiwan Strait decreased
significantly.
Those developments have transformed a flashpoint of conflict into
an avenue of peace. It was the’92 Consensus that allowed our minister of
health and welfare to formally attend the annual World Health Assembly
(WHA) eight times in a row after an absence of 38 years. This was all
possible because while we were improving cross-strait relations, we also
adopted a new approach to foreign relations called “viable diplomacy,”
and stopped contending with mainland China for diplomatic allies in the
international arena. That meant Taiwan’s cross-strait and international
relations were no longer a zero-sum game, and no longer mired in a
vicious cycle.
Instead, we created a win-win situation, a virtuous cycle, and peace
dividends started to roll in. These developments were well received by
the United States, Japan, the European Union, and countries throughout
the Asia Pacific region. In fact, our relations with these countries have
been the best ever as a result.
Some of you might recall that back on August 23, 1958, communist
forces in Xiamen, Fujian Province, began a massive bombardment of the
island of Kinmen. In just 44 days, 470,000 artillery shells rained down on
Kinmen, an area of only 150 square kilometers. That’s an average of over
10,000 shells per day. But since 1979, Xiamen hasn’t been firing artillery
shells. Instead, they have been sending an average of over 175,000 tourists
each year since I took office in 2008. What’s interesting is that when main-
land tourists go shopping in Kinmen, their favorite souvenir is a kitchen
402 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

knife—a kitchen knife made from artillery shell casings fired by commu-
nist troops many, many years ago!
Because mainland China and Taiwan had built up sufficient mutual
trust, and predicated on the principles of equality and dignity, I was able
to meet with mainland Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Singapore on Novem-
ber 7 of last year. That was the first meeting between cross-strait leaders in
the 66 years since the two sides came under separate rule in 1949.
During that meeting, both sides affirmed that the shared foundation
of “consolidating cross-strait peace and maintaining the status quo in the
Taiwan Strait” is the’92 Consensus. I also reminded Mr. Xi that the sub-
stance of the’92 Consensus is that “Both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on
the ‘one China’ principle. However, the two sides have different opinions
as to the meaning of ‘one China’, and each side may state its interpre-
tation verbally.” That is the’92 Consensus: “one China, respective inter-
pretations.” Our side would not interpret that as “two Chinas,” or “one
China, one Taiwan,” or “Taiwan independence,” all of which are prohib-
ited under the Constitution of the Republic of China. For us, of course,
“one China” means the Republic of China. After the Ma-Xi meeting, Tai-
wan opinion polls showed that over 60% of Taiwan people support the’92
Consensus as I just explained it, a higher level of support than in the past.
The’92 Consensus also reflects the concept of “mutual non-recognition of
sovereignty and mutual recognition of governing authority,” as applied
by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. . . .
Taiwan is a society of immigrants, creating a rich and diverse Chi-
nese culture with Taiwanese characteristics. Taiwan’s free and democratic
way of life, and our successful political and economic transformations,
have become deeply embedded in the public’s collective memory and core
values for three generations. Those characteristics and values have thus
become a wellspring of Taiwan society, nurturing our creativity and genu-
ine human warmth. This is what the mainland needs to understand most.
On the other hand, with its vast territory and hard-working people,
the mainland has implemented massive economic reforms over the past
35 years to achieve rapid growth of its overall wealth and strength. Main-
land China is very, very different now. So both Taiwan and the mainland
need to seek in-depth mutual understanding—and cultural empathy. Over
the past eight years, we have welcomed mainland people to visit Taiwan,
and encouraged mainland students to study in Taiwan. Mainland students
live, study, debate, exercise, and play in a free and democratic environment
together with their Taiwan schoolmates. So early in life, they start to develop
friendships, creating a solid foundation for a sustainable peace and prosper-
ity across the Taiwan Strait. By doing that, I believe together we will create a
very different future for the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
I remember four years ago this past January, on the day of my suc-
cessful re-election as ROC President, Taiwan and mainland students were
together watching the ballot count on television. As reported in the inter-
national press, a Taiwan student said to his mainland schoolmate, “Look
how efficiently we count the ballots. We vote in the morning, and know
the result in the evening!” A mainland student replied, “Oh that’s noth-
ing. On the mainland, we also vote in the morning. But we already know
the result the day before!” So when it comes to having a sense of humor,
mainland students can clearly hold their own with Taiwan students. . . .
Let me close by wishing all of you much happiness, and the best of
health. I also welcome you, should you have a chance, to visit Taiwan as
my guest.
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 403

14.11 HONG KONG FUGITIVE OFFENDERS AND MUTUAL

LEGAL ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION (2020)
Hong Kong ceded to Britain in 1842 (2.13), returned to China under the concept
of “one country, two systems” in 1997 (13.5 and 13.9), and erupted into open
demonstrations over a controversial extradition bill. Millions of Hong Kong–ers
marched in defiance of an increased police presence and harsher political repercus-
sions. Fearing that political dissent could lead to an individual being extradited
from Hong Kong (and its judicial process) to be charged and convicted under the
PRC’s system was a right many Hong Kong–ers believed was a right granted
them in 1997. With pressure from PRC leaders and increased police presence,
marches were banned, and hundreds of demonstrators were swept up in mass
arrests. In response to continued resistance, demonstrations, and dissent, China’s
central government imposed a sweeping national security law in mid-2020 that
stripped Hong Kong of its autonomy and, with it, many of their civil and social
freedoms. The following document is the amendment that triggered the demon-
strations and subsequent crack-down. The bill begins with a general justification
for the changes and is then followed by the specific manner the original law was
to be amended.
Questions
1. Why would Hong Kong–ers believe the amendment challenged
many of their basic rights? Why might citizens of the PRC see
the law as a legitimate right of the central government to oversee
Hong Kong affairs?
2. Why would such a law be deemed essential by Beijing’s high
officials?
A bill to Amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance so that the Ordinance
applies to special surrender arrangements once they are made between
Hong Kong and any other place in relation to particular circumstances not
covered by surrender arrangements of a general nature; to provide that
in relation to special surrender arrangements, the scope of the offences
covered for a surrender from Hong Kong is limited to 37 items of offences,
on the basis of their existing descriptions in the Ordinance only, that cur-
rently apply in relation to surrender arrangements of a general nature;
and to provide that documents authenticated in accordance with surren-
der arrangements that are prescribed arrangements are deemed as duly
authenticated; to amend the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters Ordinance so that the Ordinance applies to requests for assistance
between Hong Kong and any other place; and to provide that a request
for assistance in a criminal matter covered by bilateral arrangements for
mutual legal assistance made between Hong Kong and any other place
that are prescribed arrangements may only be made pursuant to the
arrangements.

Part 1

Preliminary
1. Short title: This Ordinance may be cited as the Fugitive Offenders and
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amend-
ment) Ordinance 2019.
2. Enactments amended: The enactments specified in Parts 2 and 3 are
amended as set out in those Parts.
404 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

Part 2

Amendments to Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 503)

3. Section 2 amended (interpretation)
(1) Section 2(1), definition of arrangements for the surrender of fugi-
tive offenders—
Repeal
“arrangements—
(a) Which are applicable
Substitute:
“arrangements of a general nature that are—
(a) applicable.”

(3) Section 2(1), definition of prescribed arrangements—

Add in alphabetical order
“special surrender arrangements” (特別移交安排) means arrange-
ments that are—
(a) Which are applicable to—
(i) the Government and the government of a place out-
side of Hong Kong; or
(ii) Hong Kong and a place outside Hong Kong; and
(b) for the purposes of the surrender in particular circum-
stances of a particular person or particular persons
wanted for prosecution, or for the imposition or enforce-
ment of a sentence, in respect of an offence
(i) that is an offence against the law of Hong Kong or
that place; and
(ii) that is not an offence in respect of which procedures
in this Ordinance apply between Hong Kong and
that place by virtue of an order in force made under
section 3(1)
Substitute
“means—
(3)
[. . .]
(3) Section 2(1)—
Add in alphabetical order “special surrender arrangements
(a) applicable to—
(i) the Government and the government of aplace outside Hong
Kong; or
(ii) Hong Kong and a place outside Hong Kong; and
(b) for the purposes of the surrender in particular circumstances of a
particular person or particular persons wanted for prosecution, or
for the imposition or enforcement of a sentence, in respect of an
offence—
(i) that is an offence against the law of Hong Kong or that place;
and
(ii) that is not an offence in respect of which procedures in this
Ordinance apply as between Hong Kong and that place by
virtue of an order in force made under section 3(1);”.
[. . .]
10. Section 8 amended (requests for assistance to Hong Kong)
After Section 8(2)—
Add
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 405

“(3) If—
(a) a request by a place outside Hong Kong made under subsection
(1) relates to a criminal matter in respect of which this Ordi-
nance applies as between Hong Kong and that place by virtue
of an order in force made under section 4(1); and
(b) the prescribed arrangements concerned are arrangements for
mutual legal assistance that were made bilaterally between
Hong Kong and that place,
  The request may only be made pursuant to the prescribed ar-
rangements concerned.”

Explanatory Memorandum
The main purposes of this Bill are—
(a) to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 503) (FOO) in rela-
tion to special surrender arrangements (see paragraph 3(b)) made
between Hong Kong and any other place so that the arrangements,
once made, may be given effect according to the procedures in the
FOO and any further protection for the surrender of a person as may
be provided for by the arrangements; and
(b) to amend the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance
(Cap. 525) (MLAO) so that arrangements for mutual legal assistance
made between Hong Kong and any other part of the People’s Repub-
lic of China (PRC) may be given effect.

Amendments to FOO
2. Currently—
(a) arrangements for the surrender of fugitive offenders (surren-
der arrangements), not being such arrangements made between
Hong Kong and other parts of the PRC, may be given effect under
the FOO; and
(b) in order to give effect to such arrangements, it is necessary for the
Chief Executive in Council to make an order under section 3 of
the FOO (section 3 order) so that the FOO applies in relation to
the arrangements.

14.12 COVID-19: LI WENLIANG’S LETTER

OF ADMONITION (2020)
Li Wenliang was a Chinese ophthalmologist who worked at Wuhan Central
Hospital. At the end of December 2019, he noticed seven cases of a virus
that displayed symptoms similar to the 2003 SARS outbreak. With no public
information being released, he sent a message to doctors in Wuhan, warning
them of the outbreak and advising them to wear protective clothing and masks
or risk infecting themselves. Four days later, he was ordered to visit the local
police station, where he was warned to cease and desist the spreading of false
rumors and was required to sign the following letter of admonition. Contrary
to his advice, officials in Wuhan continued to insist that only those in direct
contact with infected animals risked infection. No warnings to the public
were issued nor were any guidelines distributed to protect doctors. Like many
doctors, Dr. Li was ordered back to work, and sometime later, he contracted
the virus; he died on February 1, 2020. The slow government response and
the deliberate effort to suppress preventative measures struck a chord with
406 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

the Chinese public, creating a groundswell of support for Dr. Li as well as

grief and anger over his death.

Questions
1. What outcome do you suppose the local police hoped to achieve
by issuing this letter to Dr. Li?
2. What aspects of Dr. Li’s case caused his sudden popularity across
China? Why do you think his situation resonated with so many
Chinese?

Wuhan Municipal Public Security Bureau,

Wuchang Branch, Zhongnanlu Police Station
Letter of Admonition
Wuhan Police (Zhong) character (20200103)
The admonished Li Wenliang Gender Male DOB 19861012
ID Number or Other ID Number (Blurred)
Current Address (Household Residency) Wuhan (Blurred)
Employment Wuhan Municipal Central Hospital
Illegal Behavior (time, location, participants, number of participants,
problems reported, results, etc.)
On December 30, 2019 on WeChat Group “Wuhan University Clinical
Medicine Class 04 [entering]”, posted false information that seven
SARS cases confirmed from Hua’nan Produce and Seafood Market.
Now by law you are given a warning and admonishment for your illegal
conduct in distributing false information via Internet. Your behavior
seriously disturbed social order. Your action went beyond what the
law permitted, violated relevant regulations in “Public Security Ad-
ministration Punishment Act of the People’s Republic of China,” and
was an illegal conduct!
Public Safety Agency hopes you will cooperate actively, obey police ad-
vise, and stop illegal action from now on. Can you follow it?
Answer: Yes. [handwriting and fingerprint]
We hope you will calm down and reflect well. We are admonishing you
seriously: If you remain stubborn, do not repent, and continue illegal
conducts, you will be published by law! Do you understand?
Answer: Understood. [handwriting and fingerprint]
The Admonished: Li Wenliang [handwriting and fingerprint January 3rd,
2020
Admonisher: Hu Guifang, Xu Jinhang [handwriting] Working Unit:
[Official SEAL of Zhongnanlu Police Station, Wuchang District Branch,
Wuhan Public Security Bureau]
January 3, 2020.

USEFUL WEBSITES AND SUGGESTED READING

FOR PART THREE
Useful Websites
1. MORNING SUN
[Link]/—A companion website to the film by the
same name, the site is an unparalleled and visually stunning exami-
nation of the Cultural Revolution. Seeks to move beyond the purely
political dimensions of the event by examining how political cam-
paigns shaped culture, family, and art.
2. WOMEN’S ROLES IN CHINA: CHANGES OVER TIME
[Link] resource
that examines how Chinese women’s roles, responsibilities, and
 Chapter 14 • China in the Twenty-First Century 407

expectations have been transformed within Chinese society

throughout different political eras. Website includes essays, post-
ers, and interviews.
3. RED COLOR NEWS SOLDIER: LI ZHENSHENG
[Link]/[Link]—A deeply powerful
look at the Cultural Revolution through the pictures of Li Zhensh-
eng, a photographer for the Heilongjiang Daily in northeast China.
With dozens of photos, the website tracks the evolution of the polit-
ical campaigns in stark black-and-white photos.
4. SONGS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
[Link]
[Link]—A lovingly curated site that has translated lyrics
from some of the Cultural Revolution’s most popular songs.
5. CHINESE PROPAGANDA POSTERS
[Link] ever-growing online collection
of Chinese propaganda posters, organized into helpful categories
with basic introductions and explanations of the posters and the
political campaigns for which they were produced.

Suggested Readings
1. Karoline Kan, Under Red Skies: Three Generations of Life, Loss,
and Hope in China (New York: Hachette, 2019). Largely a biogra-
phy of a Chinese millennial (that also tells the story of her mother
and grandmother), Kan’s life offers a coming-of-age story that
highlights the contrasting nature of China’s growing economic
opportunities and the heightened governmental oversights.
2. Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, Chen Vil-
lage: Revolution to Globalization (Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 2009). An updated edition of the classic work on
Maoist China, Chen Village offers an insightful and penetrating vil-
lage-level view of the first three decades of political reforms in the
1950s–1980s from the original version but with updated chapters
tracing the south China village into the twenty-first century.
3. Mo Yan, The Garlic Ballads: A Novel (New York: Arcade, 1988).
A perfect gateway to the work of China’s first resident Nobel Prize
winner in Literature, Mo Yan. A rural tale of 1980s China, using a
complex mixture of imagery, flashbacks, and inner monologues,
the author brings to life the lingering memories of the Cultural
Revolution and the engrained corruption at village level China.
4. Philip Short, Mao: A Life (New York: Henry Holt & Company,
2000). The most thorough and detailed biography of Mao Zedong
written to date. The book is more than a tally of Mao’s good or bad
acts; Short offers a deeper assessment of Mao’s role in history.
5. Barbara Demick, Eat the Buddha: Life and Death in a Tibetan
Town (New York: Random House, 2020). Former Los Angeles
Times reporter Demick writes about the eastern Tibetan town of
Ngaba that lies at the eastern edge of ethnic Tibet in Sichuan prov-
ince. Weaving together the multiple layers of an ethnically Tibetan
county inside a Han-majority Chinese province, the author offers
intimate personal interviews, the unrelenting nature of a society
slowly being dismantled, and a people being stripped of their reli-
gion, culture, and language.
6. Louisa Lim, People’s Republic of Amnesia: Tiananmen Revisited
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). An astonishingly hon-
est examination of the events of 1989. Examines the nature of the
408 Part 3 • Post-1949 China (1949- Present)

1989 demonstrations, not just in Beijing but across China, and dem-
onstrates the effective manner by which the Chinese government
has effaced it from public memory and consciousness.
7. Liu Cixin, The Three-Body Problem (New York: Tor, 2014). Origi-
nally written in 2006, the Three-Body Problem is perhaps the most
widely read piece of popular fiction in China. Setting the story in
the confusion and political conflicts of the Cultural Revolution, it
asks what it means for the human race to come into contact with
aliens from outer space and the choices such contact requires. Liu
is indisputably China’s preeminent sci-fi writer, and it was trans-
lated brilliantly into English by award-winning translator Ken Liu
in 2014.
 GLOSSARY GLOSSARYGLOSSARY

AMBAN: A Manchu term meaning high official, but in the Tibetan context refers to the Qing imperial
residents first assigned to Lhasa in 1727. Typically, two Ambans were assigned to Tibet to guide and
supervise the political situation of the region.
ANTI-RIGHTEST CAMPAIGN: A political campaign launched in July 1959 immediately following
the Hundred Flowers Movement to purge those labeled as rightist and not adequately supportive
of the CCP.
BA JIN (1904–2005): Pen name of influential May Fourth author Li Feigan, who was best known for his
novel Family, the first in the Torrents Trilogy, which also included Spring and Autumn.
BANNERMEN [QIREN]: “Banners” were large civil-military units organized along ethnic (Manchu,
Mongol, or Han) and hereditary lines, though during the Qing, the term “bannermen” became syn-
onymous with being Manchu.
BEHIND THE CURTAIN [CHUILIAN TINGZHENG]: During both of Cixi’s regencies, the Tongzhi
and Guangxu emperors, when the young emperor sat on the throne for any audience with his offi-
cials, the empress would sit behind a silk curtain (or, by some accounts, a decorative screen), where
she could hear everything said to and by the emperor as well as issue instructions.
BEIDAIHE: A coastal resort town northeast of Beijing used by the CCP’s central committee and high-
level officials for work and meetings during the summer.
BEIJING CONVENTION (1860): A set of three separate treaties signed by China with Great Britain,
France, and Russia after the Second Opium War.
BEIYANG ARMY: A Western-style army forged from Li Hongzhang’s Anhui Army in the 1880s and
led by Yuan Shikai after Li Hongzhang’s death in 1901. It was funded by North China customs’ rev-
enues, first used to build the Beiyang (“Northern Ocean”) fleet, hence the name. The Beiyang Army
remained intact until the Republican era, first led by Yuan Shikai, then the conservative warlord
general Zhang Xun.
BIG CHARACTER POSTER: Posters often attacking a specific person or type of behavior, written in
large characters, and posted publicly, typically on interior and exterior walls.
BOARD OF REVENUE [HUBU or HOPPO]: Nineteenth-century Western accounts of trade in Guang-
zhou refer to any customs officer (and sometimes to the Superintendent of Maritime Customs) as
the “hoppo.” The term is a corruption of the Chinese designation for the Board of Revenue (hubu) to
which all revenue from maritime customs was remitted.
BOXER PROTOCOL (1901): An extremely harsh peace treaty imposed by the Eight Nation Alliance
upon the Qing government, including a 450 million taels ($333 million) indemnity, almost twice the
annual Qing budget of 250 taels, and with interest totaling nearly 1 billion taels over 33 years.
BOXER UPRISING (1900): Originating in Shandong province, the Boxer movement was anti-foreign,
anti-Christian, and dedicated to expelling all foreigners from China. Boxers combined martial art
techniques (“boxing”) with beliefs in traditional spirit possession.
BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY: Founded in 1600, the East India Company was granted a monop-
oly on all British trade from western India to eastern China. The company lost its exclusive monop-
oly on Asian trade in 1813 and was dissolved in 1874.
CADRE: In the Chinese Communist context, a term meaning functionaries or administrators, often
used as shorthand for essential or particularly revolutionary “backbone” members of the CCP.
CAI YUANPEI (1868–1940): Born in Zhejiang, Cai Yuanpei was appointed to Hanlin Academy in
1894, joined the Tongmenghui in 1905, and served as Chancellor of Beijing University (1916–1926).
A major proponent of the May Fourth Movement, advocating the progressive ideals of anarchism
and women’s rights.
CAPITALISM: An economic system in which production, distribution, and markets are in the private
sphere, where corporations and businesses succeed or fail, according to free market forces.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE: A committee limited to the highest-ranking CCP members, ranging in
size from 100 to 300 members and from which the powerful Politburo and Standing Committee are
selected.
410 Glossary

CHEN DUXIU (1880–1942): A gifted May Fourth intellectual who helped launch and edit the New
Youth in 1915, was appointed as Dean to the School of Arts at Beijing University in 1917, and was a
founding member and first party secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921.
CHIANG KAI-SHEK (1887–1975): Born in Zhejiang, he attended numerous military schools before
joining the KMT, serving as commandant of Huangpu Military Academy in 1924. After Sun Yat-
sen’s death in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek became the military commander who organized and led the
Northern Expedition in 1927. From 1928 until 1949, he served as president of China. After the KMT’s
retreat to Taiwan, he served as president from 1952 until his death in 1975.
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP): Founded in 1921 by a small group of intellectuals. Following
orders from the Soviet Union, the CCP allied themselves with the KMT during the War of Resistance
Against Japan, before splitting irrevocably in 1945 and founding the PRC in 1949.
CHINESE NATIONAL HOLIDAYS: Until 2008, every Chinese had seven days off per year. In 2008,
this was raised to 11 days per year: New Year’s Day (one day), Spring Festival (three days), Qing-
ming Festival (one day); May Day (one day); Dragon Boat Festival (Duanwu Jie, one day), Mid-
Autumn Festival (one day), and National Day (three days).
CIXI (1834–1908): An imperial courtesan of the Xianfeng emperor, she gave birth to his only son, the
Tongzhi emperor. After the Xianfeng emperor’s death, she served as regent to the Tongzhi emperor
and, after his death, to the Guangxu emperor. She remained a driving, if controversial, force within
the Qing government until her death in 1908.
COMINTERN: Founded in Moscow in 1919, the Comintern (short for Communist International)
played a guiding role in the global Communist movement, including China.
COMMUNE: Seeking to reduce the state economy through consolidation, China merged, as part of the
Great Leap Forward, 750,000 cooperatives into 24,000 communes, which became the highest of three
administrative levels in rural areas from 1958 until 1983.
COMPRADORE: The top Chinese agent serving in the factories in Guangzhou. The term was also
applied to Chinese representatives on foreign sailing vessels.
COW SHEDS: A place of confinement chosen by the Red Guards, usually in a vacant classroom, lec-
ture hall, or even a bathroom converted for their detainees.
CULTURAL REVOLUTION (GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION): A political
movement launched by Mao Zedong in 1966 to rid China of “liberal bourgeoisie” and to abolish the
Four Olds. Though Mao Zedong officially ended its most radical phase in 1969, it continued to affect
China until his death in 1976.
COMMUNISM: A system of government in which the economy, production, and governance is con-
trolled by a single party that rules in the name of the people, property is to be held in common, class
divisions disappear, and society works for the common good of the people.
DALAI LAMA: Conventionally viewed as one of the two highest reincarnated lamas of Tibet’s main
Buddhist order (Gelugpa). Since the seventeenth century, the Dalai Lama has been the head of the
Tibetan government based in Lhasa. In 1959, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama fled China and established
a government in exile in neighboring India.
DANWEI: A Chinese term meaning “work unit” or one’s place of employment. Until the 1990s, each
danwei controlled housing, childcare, schools, clinics, etc., and held considerable power over travel,
marriage, and having children.
DAZHAI: A village located in the mountainous Shanxi province, which Mao Zedong held up as a
model village, encouraging all Chinese to “Learn from Dazhai in agriculture.”
DAOGUANG (1782–1850): Seventh emperor of the Qing dynasty, ruling from 1821 to 1850 during a
period of tremendous internal turmoil and external threats to the empire.
DAOTAI: A sub-provincial-level civil official, often translated as “intendant,” he oversaw various sec-
tions (or “circuits”) of a province or particular waterways, monopolies, and transportation networks.
DEMOCRACY WALL: A wall located in central Beijing and covered in Big Character Posters advo-
cating political reform from 1978 until 1980, when the wall was declared off limits to such postings.
DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE: A political party first formed in 1941 and officially reorganized into the
Democratic League in 1944. Intellectuals dominated the league leadership and espoused national
unity, open democracy, and peace. It remains an active party within the PRC today.
DENG XIAOPING (1904–1997): Born in Sichuan, educated in France, and a veteran of the Long March,
he rose to be General Secretary of the Central Committee before 1949. After 1949, Deng Xiaoping
held numerous significant posts and was purged twice, before rising, after Mao Zedong’s death, to
 Glossary 411

become China’s “paramount” leader and launch broad economic reforms. His decision to violently
suppress the Tiananmen Movement and his inability to control government corruption tarnished an
otherwise popular era of governance.
DOWAGER EMPRESS: Dowager indicates the empress is widowed. In Cixi’s case, the term is an over-
simplification since she was the widowed mother of the Tongzhi emperor, the aunt of the Guangxu
emperor, and the great-aunt of the Xuantong emperor (better known as Puyi, the last emperor).
DU WENXIU (1823–1872): Hui leader of the Yunnan Panthay Rebellion from 1856 to 1872. Born in
western Yunnan, he passed the civil exam at age 16. In 1856, after helping capture the western Yun-
nan city of Dali, he was selected to rule the new rebel regime. He died in 1872 after surrendering to
Qing troops.
DUAN QIRUI (1864–1936): A prominent warlord, whose power base was centered in Beijing. He
served as China’s premier during Yuan Shikai’s presidency. His later political activities were tainted
by his close relationship with Japan, though he continued to be active politically in the Beijing gov-
ernment as well as in the Anhui warlord clique.
EIGHT NATION ALLIANCE: An alliance of eight nations (Austria-Hungry, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) who came together to quell the Boxer
Rebellion.
ELGIN, LORD JAMES (1811–1863): British diplomat who, in 1857, led British expeditionary forces
during the Second Opium War and ordered the destruction of the Yuanming Yuan.
ELLIOT, CHARLES (1801–1875): A British diplomat serving as Chief Superintendent of Trade and
British Minister to China from 1835 until 1841, when he was recalled from his position for not extract-
ing harsh enough concessions in the Convention of Chuanbi (1841).
ENEMIES ON ALL SIDES: The Chinese term “simian Chu-ge” comes from a tale known to most all
Chinese from the third century BCE regarding Xiang Yu, a famous general. When surrounded on
all sides, he heard the enemy troops singing songs from his native region of Chu. This caused them
to believe that their homeland had already fallen. In Chinese today, the saying means that defeat is
near, and all hope is lost.
EXAMINATION QUOTAS: Unlike modern university entrance or SAT exams on which the test taker
is given an objective score, each sitting of the imperial exams had a specific quota of degrees to be
offered that year with each province designated a pre-determined number of degrees to be issued to
those candidates who scored highest on the examination.
EXAMINATION DEGREES: The three imperial exam degrees relate to the modern system as follows:
the shengyuan (or “Budding Genius”) is a bachelor’s degree (BA), the juren (or “Promoted Gentle-
man”) is a master’s degree (MA), and the jinshi (“Achieved Scholar”) is a doctorate (PhD). The aver-
age age for passing was 24 years old for the shengyuan degree, 31 for the juren, and 35 for the jinshi.
EXTRATERRITORIALITY: A legal practice that gives individuals from foreign countries immunity
from local laws. In theory, an individual’s home country would try the person for a crime under their
country’s laws, but, in practice, this rarely occurred.
FAMILY BACKGROUND: Depending on the class background of one’s parents (and sometimes one’s
grandparents), each individual was designated as “red” or “black.” If one’s parents were workers,
poor peasants, lower-middle-class peasants, revolutionary cadres, or revolutionary soldiers, they
were classified as one of the five red types (coming from a “revolutionary” background). If one’s par-
ents were landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, evildoers, rightists, capitalists, or reac-
tionary intellectuals, they were classified as being in one of seven black categories.
FANG FENG (c. 2150 BCE): A local ruler summoned by Emperor Yu of the Xia dynasty. Vexed at his
late arrival (perhaps seeing it as an indication of his tepid support), the emperor had Fang Feng
executed.
FATHER MARIA AMIOT (1718–1793): A Jesuit missionary born in France and sent to China in 1740,
he quickly won the trust of the young Qianlong emperor and learned to speak Manchu and Chinese
fluently.
FENG GUIFEN (1809–1874): A precociously bright scholar, he achieved his jinshi degree at the age of
32 and was immediately appointed to the prestigious Hanlin Academy. A reformer who advocated
using Western methods within a Chinese context, he is best known for championing a school to teach
Western languages and sciences.
FENG QIYE—literally means “Crazy Seventh Grandpa”—Yuer’s father-in-law, who is lying in bed
ranting against Ma Dasan, who he reviles for sleeping with his daughter-in-law.
412 Glossary

FIFTH GENERATION: A group of Chinese filmmakers that emerged after the end of the Cultural
Revolution and included Zhang Yimou, Tian Zhuangzhuang, and Chen Kaige. They ushered in an
era of considerable international acclaim for Chinese cinema.
FIFTH MODERNIZATION: In the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations, Wei Jingsheng,
first in a signed wall poster, then in a longer essay, famously called on Deng to add democracy as a
fifth modernization.
FOOTBINDING: By the nineteenth century, footbinding for women had been practiced within China
among the rich and the poor for many centuries. The foot was bound by breaking the bones in the
foot’s arch, then curling the outer toes underneath by wrapping long cloth bindings tightly around
the foot. If done correctly, this produced feet 3 to 5 inches in length.
FOUR CARDINAL PRINCIPLES: On March 30, 1979, Deng Xiaoping outlined the Four Cardinal
Principles: 1) keeping to the socialist road, 2) upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship (dicta-
torship of the proletariat), 3) upholding leadership by the Communist Party, and 4) upholding Marx-
ism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.
FOUR MODERNIZATIONS: Part of Deng Xiaoping’s modernization program emphasizing: agricul-
ture, industry, national defense, and science and technology.
FOUR OLDS: Referring to broad categories denounced during the Cultural Revolution: Old Customs,
Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas.
GANG OF FOUR: A term coined by Mao Zedong, it referred to top Chinese leaders led by Mao’s wife
Jiang Qing as well as Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan, who were accused of
being responsible for the Cultural Revolution’s worst excesses and were put on trial in 1980. All four
were found guilty.
GATE OF HEAVENLY PEACE (TIANANMEN): The main gate and entrance to the Forbidden Palace,
erected during the Ming dynasty and rebuilt in 1651. Over 100 feet tall, the gate has five arched por-
tals through the base, the middle and largest being exclusively for the emperor.
GONGHANG (COHONG): A merchant guild authorized in 1720 by the central government as the
only organization through which Western merchants could trade with China and designated to
collect duties on Western trade. It was abolished by the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842. This merchant
guild was the sole venue through which foreign merchants could legally carry out trade with China.
The gonghang merchants were overseen by the superintendent of maritime customs and duties
(appointed by the Board of Revenue).
GORDON, CHARLES “CHINESE” (1835–1885): A British officer serving in China during the Taiping
Rebellion. He initially fought with British forces, then was appointed to head a joint force of Europe-
ans and Asians known as the “Ever Victorious Army.”
GUANGXU (1871–1908): The ninth emperor of China, selected at the age of four by his aunt Cixi. He
initiated the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898, which was abruptly halted by Cixi, who stripped him
of all power, privileges, and honors. He died on November 14, 1908, a day before Cixi.
HAKKA (KEJIA): An ethnic minority prominent in southern China. Many of China’s most prominent
leaders were Hakka, including Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan, the Song family, and Deng Xiaoping.
HAN CHINESE: The term Han Chinese today refers to the ethnic majority of China’s population. In
imperial times, “Han Chinese” often referred to individuals viewed as culturally Chinese, regardless
of their ethnicity.
HANLIN ACADEMY: Located within the Imperial Palace, the Hanlin Academy served the emperor,
central government, and associated ministries. The academy functioned more as a think-tank with
official duties than an institution of higher learning. Often, newly minted jinshi would be appointed
to the academy to both familiarize themselves better with the inner workings of the government and
to prepare them for future postings.
HONG KONG: An island south of Guangzhou, ceded to Great Britain in 1842 after the Opium War as
part of the Treaty of Nanjing and returned to China in 1997.
HONG XIUQUAN (1814–1864): Leader of the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864). Born in the southern
Chinese province of Guangdong and of Hakka ethnicity. Failed to pass the civil service exam in four
attempts, before he formed the Society of God Worshippers in Guangxi. He proclaimed himself the
Heavenly King of the “Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace,” leading his followers in a failed rebellion
against the Qing. Died, likely from suicide, on June 1, 1864.
HONORIFICS: In China, villagers, neighbors, and friends are often addressed by adding “uncle”,
“elder brother,” or “old” to one’s surname.
 Glossary 413

HU JINTAO (1942–): Born in Jiangsu, he received a degree in hydraulic engineering from Tsinghua
University and rose through the ranks with posts in Guizhou and Tibet. He became President of the
PRC in 2003 and has pursued conservative economic and political reforms.
HU SHI (1891–1962): Born in Shanghai and educated at Cornell University with funds from the Boxer
Indemnity Scholarship Program, he returned to China to become a leading intellectual luminary,
in particular advocating vernacular Chinese. Hu Shi supported the KMT and, in 1949, retreated to
Taiwan, where he became the president of the Academia Sinica.
HU YAOBANG (1915–1989): A key reformer under Deng Xiaoping who served as Secretary General.
His support for students in 1987 led to his removal from office, and his death triggered student dem-
onstrations in 1989.
HUA GUOFENG (1921–2007): Chosen by Mao Zedong to replace Zhou Enlai as Premier in 1976, he
succeeded Mao Zedong upon his death several months later. He moved quickly to arrest the Gang
of Four and end the Cultural Revolution but was soon eased out of power by Deng Xiaoping. Hua
Guofeng was not purged by Deng, setting a new precedent, and retained his party membership until
his death nearly two decades later.
HUANG JUEZI (1793–1853): A powerful Qing official and leader of a prohibition faction that pro-
moted the outlawing of opium enforced by harsh penalties instead of the legalization sought by
other officials.
HUANGPU: A deep-water anchorage 12 miles downstream from Guangzhou, serving as the primary
port for sailing vessels involved in China trade during the nineteenth century.
HUANGPU (WHAMPOA) ACADEMY: A military academy founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1924 (often
romanized, according to Cantonese pronunciation, as Whampoa) outside of Guangzhou. Many of
China’s top military leaders of the 1920s and 1930s, regardless of party affiliation, were educated or
served at the academy.
HUI: A Chinese ethnic group largely defined by their practice of Islam and often referred to as “Chi-
nese Muslims,” though the label does not include other Muslim groups within China, such as the
Uyghur, Kazakhs, or Kyrgyz peoples.
HUMEN: The mouth of the Pearl River, known in Chinese as “Humen” or, literally, “Tiger’s Gate.”
Early European sailors labeled it “Bocca Tigris” or “Mouth of the Tiger,” which was later called the
“Bogue” by British sailors.
HUNDRED DAYS REFORM (1898): A period that lasted from June 11 to September 21, 1898, when the
Guangxu emperor, on advice from Kang Youwei and other top reformers, issued a series of decrees
instituting far-reaching reforms. The reform movement ended when Cixi, Dowager Empress, staged
a coup, executed several reformers, and effectively removed the emperor from power.
HUNDRED FLOWERS MOVEMENT (1956–1957): A short-lived, government-sponsored campaign
to encourage suggestions and critiques of the government’s performance during its first Five Year
Plan. The overwhelmingly negative criticism led to its swift conclusion in the summer of 1957.
IRON RICE BOWL: A term describing guaranteed or “unbreakable” jobs, housing, and social security
in the decades immediately after the founding of the PRC.
JESUITS (SOCIETY OF JESUS): A Christian religious order of the Roman Catholic Church that first
established Chinese missions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Successfully operating in
the Ming and early Qing era, the Jesuits actively transmitted European knowledge to China and
Chinese learning to Europe. Their influence ended when Pope Clement XI decided that Chinese
Confucian practices and offerings to the emperor constituted idolatry.
JIANG QING (1914–1991): Wife of Mao Zedong who advocated a radical line of political thought dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. After Mao’s death, she and her allies (Gang of Four) were arrested, tried,
and, in 1981, found guilty. Her death sentence was commuted to life in prison, where she committed
suicide in 1991.
JIANG ZEMIN (1926–): Born in Jiangsu, he grew up during the Japanese occupation and graduated in
1947 with a degree in electrical engineering. He rose through the ranks to become mayor of Shanghai
in 1985 before being chosen by Deng Xiaoping to replace Zhao Ziyang in 1989 and ultimately replace
Deng Xiaoping after his death in 1997. In 2003, he stepped down from the Politburo to make way for
a new generation of leaders.
JIANGXI SOVIET: A CCP-controlled area (or “soviet”) founded in 1931 and governed by a council
headed by Mao Zedong. The KMT carried out a series of “extermination campaigns” that eventually
caused the CCP to flee the soviet on a yearlong “Long March.”
414 Glossary

JUELO (GIORO): Imperial kinsmen who, because of their relationship to the imperial line, received
special treatment and titles
KANG YOUWEI (1858–1927): A prominent late-Qing classically trained scholar who advocated mod-
ernization and reform within a Confucian framework. His influence peaked during the 100 Days
Reform, when the Guangxu emperor selected his proposals as the framework for reforms. He was
forced to flee China when Empress Dowager Cixi abruptly seized power and executed Kang You-
wei’s younger brother and five other top reformers.
KANGXI (1654–1722): The second emperor of the Qing dynasty. His 61-year reign oversaw the con-
solidation of Qing rule over China, including the defeat of the renegade General Wu Sangui and
other rebel generals of the Three Feudatories.
KARAKHAN MANIFESTO (1919): A manifesto issued on July 25, 1919, by Russian Foreign Minister
Lev Karakhan, relinquishing all Tsarist Russian claims to special rights and privileges in China. The
Soviet Union did, however, continue to pursue special rights and privileges.
KOWTOW: From the Chinese term ketou or koutou, meaning to ritually prostrate and knock one’s
forehead to the ground. A gesture of respect and deference used in China before the Emperor, one’s
elders, or when worshiping.
KUOMINTANG (NATIONALIST PARTY): The party founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1912 after the found-
ing of the Republic of China. It ruled China from 1928 until 1949. Defeated by the CCP, it retreated to
Taiwan, where it remains an important political force.
LATE IMPERIAL CHINA: A period of Chinese history traditionally defined as beginning with the end
of Mongol rule in 1368 and concluding with the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911.
LEE TENG-HUI (Li Denghui) (1929–2020): Born in Taiwan and educated in Japan and the United
States, he joined the KMT in 1971, was appointed mayor of Taipei in 1981, and succeeded Chiang
Ching-kuo after his death in 1988. He became the first popularly elected ROC president in 1996.
LI PENG (1928–2019): Raised by Zhou Enlai, educated in the Soviet Union, and rising to prominence
under Deng Xiaoping, he was a key advocate and orchestrator of the harsh suppression of demon-
strators in the June 4th Tiananmen Incident (1989). He was the key architect of the Three Gorges Dam
project.
LI HONGZHANG (1823–1901): A major figure in the Self Strengthening Movement, Li Hongzhang
rose to prominence under the tutelage of Zeng Guofan and commanded the Anhui (Huai) Army. In
the 1870s, he promoted the adoption of Western technology, such as railways and arsenals, as well
as Western-style education. In the last decades of his life, Li Hongzhang became the Qing empire’s
preeminent (if unappreciated) diplomat.
LIN BIAO (1907–1971): A Chinese Communist military leader and hero of the Chinese Civil War. In
the 1960s, he compiled Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong and was named Mao Zedong’s succes-
sor in 1969. He died in a 1971 plane crash, after allegedly attempting to wrest power from Mao.
LIN ZEXU (1785–1850): A scholar-official who passed the highest (jinshi) civil exam at age 26, he was a
favorite of the young Daoguang emperor (r. 1821–1850) and a member of Huang Juezi’s “prohibition
faction.” In 1838, he headed the empire’s anti-opium efforts, until he was banished to Xinjiang after
failing to resolve China’s confrontation with Britain.
LITTLE RED BOOK (Quotations of Chairman Mao): A pocket-size collection of Mao Zedong’s quo-
tations, first published for the PLA in 1964. Nine hundred million copies were ultimately printed.
LIU SHAOQI (1898–1969): Born in Hunan, he joined the CCP in 1921, gaining notoriety as a key party
theoretician. In the 1960s, he fell out of favor with Mao Zedong, who denounced and stripped him
of all his positions then expelled him from the party in 1968.
LONG MARCH (1934–1935): A series of CCP marches from their bases in the southeast to northwest-
ern China. The main route ran 6,000 miles from Jiangxi to Shaanxi and took one year to complete.
Casualties and desertions reduced the original 100,000 marchers by more than 90 percent, to fewer
than 10,000.
LUGOUQIAO (MARCO POLO BRIDGE) INCIDENT: An event outside Beijing near the Lugouqiao
Bridge on July 7, 1937, which sparked the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan.
LYTTON REPORT (1932): A League of Nations report indicting Japan for its role in seizing, subjugat-
ing, and continuing to manage the northeastern area of China under the puppet Manchukuo gov-
ernment. Japan withdrew from the League a month after the international body voted to accept its
conclusions.
 Glossary 415

MACARTNEY, GEORGE (1737–1806): Served as the British envoy to China in 1793, where he met
with Emperor Qianlong and controversially refused to kowtow before him. The mission failed to
achieve a permanent embassy in Beijing or a reduction of restrictions on British trade with China.
MACARTNEY’S ESCORTS: Of these three officials, only Zhengrui was a high official (and a Manchu).
The other two, Wang Wenxiong and Qiao Renjie, were local officials (military and civil, respectively)
assigned to accompany Macartney while traveling overland to their audience with the Emperor.
MANCHUKUO: The puppet government formed by the Japanese in 1932 in northeastern China. The
last Qing emperor, Puyi, was named its chief executive and remained its titular head until the end of
World War II in 1945.
MANCHURIA: An area roughly coterminous with northeastern China and the ancestral lands of the
Manchu peoples that established the Qing dynasty. Japan occupied the territory in the 1930s and
established the puppet state of Manchukuo.
MAO BUTTONS: Worn as a symbol of one’s loyalty to Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution,
at least two billion badges were manufactured with well over 10,000 different designs.
MAO ZEDONG (1893–1976): Born in Hunan, he became involved in the nascent CCP in Beijing dur-
ing the May Fourth era. Played an increasingly prominent role in the Jiangxi Soviet in the early 1930s
before rising to prominence during the Long March (1934). He successfully guided the CCP through
the War of Resistance Against Japan and the Chinese Civil War before founding the PRC in 1949. His
legacy is a mixed one of significant social and economic development as well as of policies that led
to the deaths of tens of millions Chinese citizens.
MARRIAGE LAW OF 1950: One of the first laws promulgated after the founding of the PRC in 1949,
it set a minimum age for marriage, legalized divorce, made men and women equal in courts of law,
and prohibited concubinage.
MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT: A movement narrowly defined as events sparked by the student-led
demonstrations of May 4, 1919, against the Treaty of Versailles. More often, it is used to identify the
broad intellectual and cultural transformations that took place after Japan’s Twenty-One Demands
(1915), lasting well into the 1920s.
MUKDEN INCIDENT (September 18, 1931): Japan’s Kwantung Army blew up a portion of the South-
ern Manchuria Railway and used the incident to justify an attack on the city of Shenyang and then
all across Manchuria.
NANJING MASSACRE (December 1937–January 1938): A six-week assault carried out in and around
the capital of Nanjing after it fell to the Japanese army in 1937. Upwards of 300,000 non-combatants
were killed, including tens of thousands of women and children. The army committed numerous
atrocities, including looting, rape, and arson, with the seeming consent of their officers. Also referred
to as the “Rape of Nanking.”
NATIONAL DAY: The Wuchang Uprising on October 10 (or “Double-10”), 1911, marked the begin-
ning of the Chinese Revolution and is still celebrated as National Day in the Republic of China [Tai-
wan]. The anniversary of the founding of the PRC on October 1, 1949, is National Day in the People’s
Republic of China.
NEW CHINA: A term widely employed in China today, suggesting a significant demarcation between
the traditional practices of “old China” and those of the People’s Republic of China. Many Chinese
refer to the PRC-era as “New China.”
NEW CULTURE MOVEMENT (c. 1917–1923): A movement roughly equivalent to the “May Fourth
Movement,” though some suggest the New Culture Movement indicates a more “thought”-oriented
movement compared to the “action” agenda of the May Fourth Movement. The conflation of the
terms has made them interchangeable in popular discourse.
NEW LIFE MOVEMENT (1934—c. 1937): A program of moral renewal with distinct fascist overtones
launched in 1934 by Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Song Meiling to counter Communism by promot-
ing Confucianism, Nationalism, and Christianity.
NEW POLICIES (1901–1910): A series of political reforms set in motion after the failure of the Boxer
Uprising by Cixi to erect a modern administrative bureaucracy.
NORTHERN EXPEDITION (1926–1927): A military campaign led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuo-
mintang in 1926 that began in southern China and advanced northward, reuniting much of eastern
China. It brought an end to the worst of the warlord excesses—often by simply co-opting the war-
lords into Chiang’s government.
416 Glossary

ONE-CHILD POLICY: A policy adopted in 1979 allowing each couple only one child. The policy was
enforced with an array of incentives and punishments, which varied according to your ethnicity and
residency.
OPIUM WAR (1839–1842): A war between China and Great Britain fought over the importation of
opium into China by British merchants. Following imperial orders, Lin Zexu seized and destroyed
some 1,300 tons of opium stored in Guangzhou, resulting in military hostilities. The conflict came to
an end in 1842 with the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing. The war was a military disaster for China
and marked the beginning of a century of Western imperialism in China.
PANCHEN LAMA: A reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist religious leader in Tibet’s Gelugpa Buddhist
order, second only to the Dalai Lama. The Panchen Lama is traditionally based at the Tashilhunpo
Monastery near Shigatse.
PENG DEHUAI (1898–1974): A PLA general who gained notoriety and prestige for his command of
Chinese troops during the Korean War. When he offered Mao Zedong a negative assessment of the
Great Leap Forward in 1959, he was denounced and never regained his prominent position within
the Party or the government.
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA): Established in 1927 as the “Red Army,” the PLA became the
official name of China’s military forces during the Chinese Civil War. In popular culture and propa-
ganda, the army was portrayed as a true “people’s army”—from the people, of the people, and for
the people.
PEOPLE’S VOLUNTEER ARMY OF CHINA: In an effort to distinguish their actions from what they
considered the imperialist actions of the United States, China’s military forces in Korea adopted the
name “People’s Volunteer Army.” It suggested China was voluntarily aiding their Korean neighbors
and not imposing external pressure on Korea’s domestic affairs.
PINGXINGGUAN CAMPAIGN: One of the largest battles carried out by Communist military forces
during the War of Resistance Against Japan.
POLITBURO: A shorthand term for “political bureau,” it was the principal executive policymaking
committee within a Communist Party. The politburo is centralized within the Standing Committee
of the Communist Party of China.
PREMIER’S WILL: The “Premier’s Will” became a staple of Chinese life in the decade after Sun’s
death. Employed in a manner similar to the “Pledge of Allegiance” in the United States, all school-
children recited the will every Monday morning throughout the 1930s and 1940s.
PUNITIVE FACTION: A group within the KMT led by He Yinqin and Dai Jitao, who some claimed
sought to kill Chiang Kai-shek in the Xian Incident (1936) to destabilize the political situation by
promoting a civil war and delaying engagement with the Japanese.
PUYI (1905–1967): More formally known as the Xuantong emperor, he was the tenth and last emperor
of the Qing dynasty. He became emperor at the age of three, abdicated at the age of seven in 1912,
and was the titular head of Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet state in northeastern China at the age
of 27 in 1932.
QIANLONG (1711–1799): The fourth emperor of the Qing dynasty. He officially abdicated in the 60th
year of his reign to not surpass the 61-year reign of his grandfather, the Kangxi emperor, though he
retained de facto power until his death in 1799. Under his reign, Qing armies enlarged the empire
to its greatest territorial scope, Qing scholars compiled the 36,000 volume Four Treasuries, and the
emperor’s artisans greatly expanded the Yuanming Yuan.
QING DYNASTY (1644–1911): The last Chinese imperial dynasty, founded in 1644 by Manchus from
northeastern China. It fell in 1911 after the Wuchang Uprising.
QINGMING FESTIVAL (Tomb Sweeping Day): The 15th day after the Spring Equinox, Qingming is
a traditional Chinese holiday when families pray at the tombs or graves of their deceased relatives. It
is believed that one should offer food and often liquor to the spirits on this day, or they will become
“hungry ghosts” and disrupt the living.
RED GUARDS: Middle- and high-school-aged students who answered Mao Zedong’s call in 1966 to
spread his teachings, fight against the “Four Olds,” and remove all counterrevolutionary elements
from society.
RONG HONG (1828–1912): More familiar to Western readers as Yung Wing, Rong Hong traveled to
the United States in 1847, became a US citizen in 1852, graduated from Yale in 1854, and served as an
early emissary between China and the United States.
 Glossary 417

RUYI: A Chinese scepter made of jade, or other precious material, given as a sign of respect. Tradition-
ally, it has a stylized head of a cloud and a long, curved handle.
SACRED EDICT: A list of Confucian rules of moral conduct and social relations compiled by the
Kangxi emperor in 1670.
SAILING UNDER A FOREIGN FLAG: In a tactic common in the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese
smugglers would hire Europeans to serve as the ostensible captains of their vessels. Often unable to
speak Chinese and unfamiliar with the waters in which the ship sailed, these “captains” were little
more than a maneuver to secure the protection of the British flag.
SECOND OPIUM WAR (1856–1860): Known by a variety of names, including the Arrow War, the
Second Anglo-Chinese War, as well as the Second Opium War, the war is traditionally understood as
taking place in two parts: the first began with the Arrow Incident in 1856 and ended with the sign-
ing of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858. The second part began with the attack on Tianjin and Beijing and
ended when the Qing acquiesced and signed the Conventions of Beijing in 1860.
SELF-STRENGTHENING MOVEMENT (c. 1861–1894): A movement beginning in 1861, largely
stemming from the urgent need to counter the mid-nineteenth-century Chinese rebellions. Initially,
the campaign consisted of military reforms adopted by Zeng Guofan and later broadened to adopt
Western methods in education, industry, and diplomacy.
SEVENTEEN-POINT AGREEMENT (1951): An agreement signed in 1951 between representatives
of the Tibetan government, with CCP leaders laying out the points by which Tibet would accept
Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Both sides renounced the agreement in 1959, and the Dalai Lama
established a government in exile in neighboring India.
SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUÉ (1972): An agreement signed in 1972 between the United States and the
PRC pledging further talks toward achieving a normalization of relations and agreeing on the status
of Taiwan as part of China.
SHENGYUAN: The lowest of the three degrees of the imperial civil service exam, which granted hold-
ers’ the status of “lower gentry.” Examinations were held every three years in one’s native district
or prefecture.
SOCIALISM: A socioeconomic system in which wealth, services, and production are controlled by the
community or government. For Karl Marx, socialism would be the socioeconomic system that later
progressed into Communism.
SONG BINBIN (1947–): A famous Red Guard who was selected to meet Mao Zedong in August 1966
at the start of the Cultural Revolution. When Song Binbin (“bin” meaning refined) was asked her
name, Mao told her she should change it to Song Yaowu (“yaowu” meaning “to be militant”).
SONG FAMILY: The Song (often spelled as “Soong”) family had an aura akin to the Kennedy family
in the United States. Each of the Song sisters married prominent politicians or business leaders. Due
to their American education, their faces became the face of China for many Westerners.
SONG MEILING (1897–2003): The youngest of the three Song sisters graduated from Wellesley Col-
lege in 1917 and married Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. Her familiarity with the United States and Ameri-
can customs helped her play a prominent role as a spokesperson for China during the 1930s and
1940s.
SONG ZIWEN (1894–1971): The third of six Song siblings born to Song “Charlie” Jiashu. Often known
in Western sources as T. V. Soong, he was Harvard educated and served as the Finance Minister,
Foreign Minister, and President of the Executive Yuan in the Nationalist government between 1928
and 1947.
SINO-SOVIET SPLIT (c. 1959): Relations between the Soviet Union and China soured in the late 1950s
with a series of diplomatic disagreements over Taiwan, India, and the United States. As a result, the
Soviet government withdrew their experts, scientific information, and financial support from China.
This led to an acrimonious 30-year split between China and the USSR that ended with Gorbachev’s
visit in 1989.
SOVIET: The term “soviet” [suweiai] in the Chinese context designated CCP bases in Anhui, Hunan,
Fujian, and later in Shaanxi and Gansu during the late 1920s and early 1930s. The term refers to
areas under the direct control of Communists. Western papers at the time referred to them as “red
bases.”
SPHERES OF INTEREST (SPHERES OF INFLUENCE): Areas of China in which a specific Western
power was said to hold particular interest, but no specific powers, during the late nineteenth century.
418 Glossary

STRUGGLE SESSIONS: Cultural Revolution rallies where individuals accused of “black” or coun-
terrevolutionary activities would be publicly attacked in sessions lasting many hours held in large
auditoriums.
SUMMER PALACE (YIHE YUAN): An imperial garden constructed in 1888 for the Dowager Empress
Cixi. In some English language sources, the Yuanming Yuan is also referred to as the “Old Summer
Palace” to distinguish it from the newer summer palace known as the Yihe Yuan.
SUN YAT-SEN (1866–1925) (SUN ZHONGSHAN): Often called the “Father of Modern China,” Sun
was a principal revolutionary leader during the last decades of the Qing Dynasty. He served as the
provisional president of the Republic of China but resigned in favor of Yuan Shikai. Over the next
two decades, he headed the Kuomintang party until his death in 1925 from cancer.
SUPREME LEADER [WEIDA LINGXIU]: An informal term used to refer to China’s top leader. Used
because many of China’s leaders continue to wield political power without holding any formal posi-
tion of leadership at any given time.
TAELS: Technically, a Chinese ounce of silver, but, in reality, there were numerous different forms of
taels, of unequal values. In international treaties, the most commonly used tael was the “customs tael”
[haiguan tael] equivalent to 37.68 grams of silver. The other commonly used tael was the “kuping tael”
or “treasury tael,” equivalent to 37 grams.
TAIPING REBELLION (1851–1864): The largest of China’s mid-nineteenth-century rebellions, it was
led by Hong Xiuquan, which, at its height, ruled over 30 million people and lasted 13 years before
finally being suppressed by Qing military force.
TANGGU TRUCE (1933): An agreement signed on May 31, 1933, between China and Japan, establish-
ing a demilitarized zone south from the Great Wall to Beijing.
TASHILHUNPO: One of Tibetan Buddhism’s four great monasteries of the Gelugpa schools located in
the central Tibetan city of Shigatse. It was founded in 1447 by the First Dalai Lama and is tradition-
ally the seat of the Panchen Lama.
THREE FEUDATORIES: Areas granted by the early Manchu emperors in southern China to three Chi-
nese generals—Wu Sangui, Geng Jingzhong, and Shang Zhixin—who aided in the Manchu’s early
conquest of China. All three later rebelled against the Qing rulers, with the last rebel forces defeated
in 1683.
THREE GORGES DAM: A massive hydroelectric dam on the Yangtze River at the head of the Qutang,
Wuxia, and Siling gorges. The dam was completed in 2008, a year of head of schedule, supplying
much-needed electricity but with severe environmental consequences.
THREE NOES: A policy dating from the late 1970s by Taiwan in response to the PRC’s efforts to have
direct talks. President Chiang Ching-kuo asserted “no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise.”
In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou later established a new “three noes” policy of “no unification, no independ-
ence, and no use of force.”
THREE REPRESENTS: Jiang Zemin’s contribution to the development of Chinese Marxism officially
introduced in 2000 and ratified by the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002. Viewed by some critics as
un-Marxist, Jiang introduced the view that economic laws (e.g., capitalism) contributed to socialism
with Chinese characteristics.
THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE: A political philosophy developed by Sun Yat-sen grouped
into the three guiding principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and Livelihood.
TIANANMEN SQUARE MASSACRE (1989): The bloody military suppression of the 1989 student
movement on June 4 that brought an end to two months of student demonstrations, hunger strikes,
and unprecedented international media attention. Several hundred unarmed students and civilians
died in the early-morning military attack.
TONGMENG HUI (REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE SOCIETY): A political group forged out of sev-
eral competing parties in 1910. By joining forces, they became the largest Chinese revolutionary
party and the forerunner of the Nationalist party, the Kuomintang.
TONGWEN GUAN (FOREIGN LANGUAGE COLLEGE): Founded in 1862 to systematically begin
foreign language instruction under government oversight, the college taught English, French, Ger-
man, Russian, and Japanese as well as courses in science, philosophy, and international law. In 1902,
it was consolidated into the Imperial University (which later became Beijing University).
TREATY OF NANJING (1842): Treaty ending the Opium War between China and Great Britain.
It opened five treaty ports, ceded the island of Hong Kong, and imposed a 21 million taels
indemnity.
 Glossary 419

TREATY OF TIANJIN (1858): Treaty ending the first phase of the Second Opium (Arrow) War. Its
terms forced the Qing court to accept a British ambassador in Beijing, as well as the addition of ten
cities as treaty ports, and the opening all interior China to travel, trade and Christian proselytizing.
The treaty was ratified in the Beijing Convention by the emperor in 1860, only after British and
French forces looted and burned the Yuanming Yuan.
TREATY PORTS: Any city in which foreigners were to be allowed to trade and conduct business
within China. In addition to treaty ports, foreign settlements and foreign concessions were carved
out of existing Chinese cities. These were under the direct control and rule of resident foreign consuls.
TRIPLE INTERVENTION: Germany, France, and Russia, ostensibly seeking to help the Qing empire
but acting more in self-interest, forced Japan to return territory in northeastern China in exchange for
an additional payment to Japan of 30 million taels. Quickly thereafter, Russia, Germany, and France
each demanded a territorial concession in exchange for their role in the intervention.
TUNGAN (DONGGAN): An ethnic label for Muslim Chinese employed only in northwestern China.
Also referred to in late imperial documents as Han-Hui.
WALKING ON TWO LEGS: A phrase Mao used to describe the simultaneous development of both
the agricultural and industrial sectors.
WANG JINGWEI (1883–1944): Born in Guangdong, he joined the Tongmenghui in 1905 and attempted
to assassinate the last emperor’s father, Prince Chun. After his release, he worked closely with Sun
Yat-sen and challenged Chiang Kai-shek for leadership of the KMT. In 1940, he became the head of
state for Japanese-occupied China.
WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN (1937–1945): Sometimes referred to as the “Anti-Japa-
nese War,” fought between China and Japan before and during World War II. Beginning in 1937,
Japan occupied all major urban and communication centers in eastern China by 1938 and forced the
Nationalist government to move its capital inland to Chongqing until Japan’s defeat in 1945.
WARLORDS [DUBAN]: A term applied to the military governors and commanders who battled for
political control, usually through the use of regionally based armies, from 1911 to the late 1920s.
WHITE LOTUS SOCIETY: A secret society based on a mixture of Buddhist, Daoist, and local spiritual
beliefs prevalent since the seventeenth century, it was declared heretical and was prohibited by the
Qing government.
WOREN (1804–1871): A powerful Qing official who served as head of the influential Hanlin Academy.
Woren espoused strong Neo-Confucian views and vigorously opposed the Westernized curriculum
advocated by the Self-Strengthening Movement.
WUCHANG UPRISING (1911): The uprising that began on October 10, 1911, as a result of the acciden-
tal detonation of explosives by Tongmenghui members. It started the Chinese revolution, which led
to the fall of the Qing dynasty and the founding of the Republic of China.
WUHAN: The tri-city area of Wuchang, Hankou, and Hanyang, situated at the confluence of the Yang-
tze and Hanshui Rivers. Site of the October 10, 1911, Wuchang uprising, which sparked the Chinese
Revolution.
WU PEIFU (c. 1874–1939): A major figure and leader of the Zhili clique during the Warlord era, often
referred to as the “Scholar General.” In 1924, Wu was nearly able to broker a peace agreement among
the various factions but ultimately failed. He resisted overtures from both the Guomindang and
Japanese during the 1930s and died in suspicious circumstances in 1939.
WU SANGUI (1612–1678): A Ming general who allowed the Manchu army to pass through the Great
Wall and capture Beijing. He later revolted against the Qing and declared himself emperor of the
new Zhou dynasty. He died of dysentery in 1678.
XIANGSHENG: A fast-paced stand-up comedy routine typically with two people, similar to the
“Who’s On First” sketch that relies heavily on puns and humorous wordplay. Often translated into
English as “Crosstalk.”
XI JINPING (1953–): Son of a prominent first-generation Chinese Communist leader, Hu Jintao des-
ignated Xi Jinping as his designated successor in 2008. Since assuming power, Xi Jinping has led
a series of actions to enforce party discipline and impose internal unity, including removing term
limits and instituting what some have called a cult of personality.
XIUCAI: Literally meaning “cultivated talent,” it was the lowest of the three imperial degree levels
that made up the imperial civil service examination system.
XIUNÜ: A selection process used by the imperial household to select Manchu women as partners for
the Qing emperors and princes.
420 Glossary

YALTA AGREEMENT: An agreement signed near the end of World War II between the Allies, in which
the USSR gained the Kurile Islands, Southern Sakhalin, Lüshun, and Dalian as well as control of the
Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway.
YAMEN: Refers to the compound that houses the local administrative office of the magistrate, his judi-
cial court, and his official residence. It also less frequently refers to the magistrate himself.
YANG RUI (1857–1898): One of the key reformers in the Guangxu emperor’s inner circle during the
Hundred Days Reform. He was one of six reformers arrested and executed by Dowager Empress
Cixi upon her return to power.
YIXIN (1833–1898): The sixth son of the Daoguang emperor, often referred to as Prince Gong. He served
as regent for the young Tongzhi emperor and became a strong proponent of the Self Strengthening
Movement and the establishment of the Zongli Yamen.
YUAN SHIKAI (1859–1916): Staunch Qing loyalist and commander of the powerful Beiyang Army,
which allowed him, in 1912, to broker the abdication of the Qing in exchange for the presidency
of the new republic. His term as president was plagued by corruption, extortion, and a misguided
attempt to proclaim himself emperor before his death in 1916.
YUANMING YUAN: An immense garden with massive lakes, islands, and sprawling palaces begun
in 1709 and expanded over several decades. The Jesuit priests serving in the Qing court helped
design one section that had elaborate fountains and Baroque palaces. Sometimes referred to as the
“Old Summer Palace.”
ZENG GUOFAN (1811–1872): A strict Confucian who nonetheless championed progressive fiscal and
military reforms in the early 1860s helping the Qing to suppress the Taiping Rebellion.
ZHANG XUELIANG (1900–2001): Son of Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin and mastermind behind
the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek in 1936, convincing him to fight Japan rather than the CCP.
ZHANG XUN (1854–1923): A prominent warlord during China’s Republican era and a noted Qin -loy-
alist known as the “Pigtail General” who attempted to restore the last Qing emperor to the throne
in 1917.
ZHANG ZUOLIN (1875–1928): Warlord nicknamed the “Old Marshal” who controlled most of north-
east China (Manchuria) from 1916 until 1928, when he was assassinated by a Japanese military officer.
ZHAO ZIYANG (1919–2005): A leading reformer under Deng Xiaoping and seen by many as his
anointed heir, but his support for the student demonstrations in 1989 caused him to be stripped of all
titles and spend the last 15 years of his life under house arrest, until his death in 2005.
ZHONGNAN HAI: An official compound just west of the Forbidden City in the center of Beijing,
which, in the first decades of the PRC, housed its top leaders and today serves as the headquarters
of the party and top government officials.
ZONGLI YAMEN: Established in 1861, following the Convention of Beijing, its primary goal was
to handle China’s foreign relations in a more systematic manner. Often simply called the “Foreign
Office,” the office’s full title, Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen, translates as “Office for the Management
of the Affairs of All Foreign Countries.”
 SOURCES SOURCESSOURCES

CHINA MAP: Map of the People’s Republic of China: Pease Press Maps

Chapter 1
GRAPHIC: Examination Hall: Etienne Zi, Pratique des Examens Littèraires en Chine (Shanghai: Imprim-
erie de la Mission Catholique, 1894)
1.1 Translated. Qing Shizu Shilu (Taibei: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985), juan 17, p. 151.
1.2 Translated. Zhou Zhenhe, Shengyu Guangxun: Jjijie yu Yanjiu (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chu-
banshe, 2006) [Frontpiece].
1.3 Translated. Yubi Zhaoling Shuo Qingshi (Jinan: Shandong Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2003), p. 63.
1.4 Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1998), pp. 36–44. Copyright © 1998. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia. Reprinted by permission of University of California Press.
1.5 Translated. Dalai Lama Zhuan (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), pp. 72–83.
1.6 Séraphin Couvreur, Choix de Documents: Lettres Officielles, Proclamations, Édits, Mémoriaux, Inscrip-
tions (Ho Kien Fou: Imprimerie de la Mission Catholique, 1906), p. 105.
1.7 Translated. Accessed: [Link]
1.8 Hosea Ballou Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834 (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), vol. 2, pp. 244–47.
1.9 Helen Macartney Robbins, Our First Ambassador to China: An Account of the Life of George, Earl of
Macartney, with Extracts from His Letters, and the Narrative of His Experiences in China, as Told by Him-
self, 1737–1806, from Hitherto Unpublished Correspondence and Documents (London: J. Murray, 1908),
pp. 299–300, 303–04, 308–10, 332–34.
1.10 An Embassy to China: Being the Journal Kept by Lord Macartney During His Embassy to the Emperor
Ch’ien-lung, 1793–1794 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1963), pp. 337–41.
1.11 Pu Songling, Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio (London: Thomas De la Rue & Co., 1880), vol. 1,
pp. 214–16.
1.12 Wells Williams, The Middle Kingdom: A Survey of the Geography, Government, Education, Social Life,
Arts, Religion, etc. (New York: John Wiley, 1849), pp. 441–43.
1.13 Wells Williams, The Middle Kingdom: A Survey of the Geography, Government, Education, Social Life,
Arts, Religion, etc. (New York: John Wiley, 1849), pp. 438–39, 443.
1.14 Chinese Repository 9 (December 1840): 543–44.

Chapter 2
GRAPHIC 1: Zhang Bao, Images of Broad Investigation (1826)
GRAPHIC 2: Map of Pearl River Delta (Pease Press Maps)
2.1 William C. Hunter, The ‘Fan-kwae’ at Canton Before the Treaty, 1825–1844 (London: K. Paul, Trench &
Co., 1882), pp. 20–22.
2.2 Translated. Qingdai Waijiao Shiliao (Beiping: Gugong Bowuyuan, 1932), juan 4:4–5.
2.3 British Relations with the Chinese Empire (London: Parbury, Allen & Co., 1832), pp. 143–47; Chinese
Repository 3 (August 1834): 191–92.
2.4 Hosea B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London: Longmans & Green,
1910), pp. 90–91, 209–10; Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800–1842
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), p. 81.
2.5 Translated. Chouban Yiwu Shimo, Daoguang Chao (Taibei: Guofeng Chubanshe, 1963), 2:4a–9b.
2.6 The Chinese Repository, 5 (May 1836–April 1937): 304–05, 368–70, 407–12.
2.7 Translated. Yapian Zhanzheng Lishi Dang’an Shiliao (Tianjin: Tianjin Guji, 1992), vol. 1, pp. 513–15.
2.8 London Times (August 9, 1839): 6.
2.9 Translated. Lin Zexu Jiashu (Shanghai: Zhongyang Shudian, 1935), pp. 4–5.
2.10 Portfolio Chinensis: or a Collection of Authentic Chinese State Papers (Macau: New Washington Press
of F F de Cruz, 1840), pp. 128–49.
422 Sources

2.11 Translated. Qi Sihe, Yapian Zhanzheng (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2000), vol. 4,
pp. 12–13.
2.12 House of Commons, Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates (3rd Series) (London: Thomas Curson Han-
sard, 1843), vol. 63, pp. 362–470.
2.13 Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between China and Foreign States (Shanghai: Statistic Dept. of the Inspec-
torate General of Customs, 1917), vol. 1, pp. 351–56.

Chapter 3
GRAPHIC: Taiping Seal (National Museum of China, 1864)
3.1 Translated. Luo Ergang, ed., Taiping Tianguo Wenxuan (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe,
1956), pp. 77–80.
3.2 Translated. Zuo Shunsheng, ed., Zhongguo Jinbainian Shi Ziliao Xubian (Taibei: Zhonghua Shuju,
1958), pp. 81–84.
3.3 Translated. Wang Zhongmin, ed., Taiping Tianguo (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2000),
vol. 1, pp. 78–80.
3.4 Translated. Taiping Tianguo de Lixiangguo: Tianchao Tianmu Zhidu Kao (Shanghai: Shangwu Yins-
huguan, 1950), pp. 3–7.
3.5 Translated. Taiping Tianguo de Lixiangguo: Tianchao Tianmu Zhidu Kao (Shanghai: Shangwu Yins-
huguan, 1950), pp. 1–2.
3.6 Translated. Bai Shouyi, ed., Huimin Qiyi (Shanghai: Shenzhou Guoguang Chubanshe, 1952),
vol. 2, p. 131.
3.7 Hodong Kim, Holy War in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 4–7. Reprinted
with permission of publisher.
3.8 London Times (March 3, 1870): 4.
3.9 Translated. Xuxiu Siku Quanshu (Shanghai Guji), vol. 952, pp. 540–41.
3.10 Ssu-yü Têng and John K. Fairbank, China’s Response to the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1965), pp. 64–65. Reprinted by permission of the publisher, copyright © 1954,1979
by the President and Fellows of Harvard College copyright © renewed 1982 by Ssu-yü Têng and
John K. Fairbank.
3.11 Translated. Li Hongzhang Quanji (Anhui Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2008) vol. 1, pp. 208–09. Chouban Yiwu
shimo, Tongzhi Chao, pp. 11a–13a.
3.12 Translated. Chouban Yiwu Shimo, Tongzhi Chao, juan 47, pp. 24–25.

Chapter 4
GRAPHIC 1: Gulangyu Island, Xiamen (Alamy Images)
GRAPHIC 2: Map of Treaty Ports (Pease Press Maps)
4.1 T.L. Behan, Bulletins and Other State Intelligence for the Year 1857 (London: London Gazette Office,
1859), pp. 46–48.
4.2 Lord Elgin, Letters and Journals of James, Eighth Earl of Elgin, Governor of Jamaica, Governor-General of
Canada, Envoy to China, Viceroy of India (London: John Murray, 1872), pp. 253–54.
4.3 G.J. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China in 1860 (London: Longman, Green, Longman and
Roberts, 1862), pp. 397–411.
4.4 G.J. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China in 1860 (London: Longman, Green, Longman and
Roberts, 1862), pp. 224–41.
4.5 United State, Dept. of States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washing-
ton: G.P.O., 1894), p. 54.
4.6 Harley MacNair, Modern Chinese History Selected Readings (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1923),
pp. 530–31.
4.7 The American Journal of International Law 1: 4 (October 1907) Supplement, Official Documents:
378–84.
4.8 William Mannix, ed., Memoirs of Li Hung Chang (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany, 1913), pp. 97–122.
 Sources 423

4.9 United State, Dept. of States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washing-
ton: G.P.O., 1899), pp. 129–30.
4.10 The China Review 11:6 (May 1883): 364–65.
4.11 The China Review 18:1 (July 1889): 35–36.
4.12 The China Review 10:6 (May 1882): 357–65.

Chapter 5
GRAPHIC 1: Boxer Photo (Library of Congress)
GRAPHIC 2: Boxer Engraving (Library of Congress)
5.1 Translated. Guangxu Chao Donghualu, pp. 4017–21; Zhongguo Sixiangshi Cankao Ziliaoji: Wanq-
ing zhi Minguo Juan (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 2005), pp. 84–87.
5.2 Adapted. China Mail, August 23, 1898.
5.3 Translated. Zuo Shunsheng, Zhonguo Jinbainianshi ziliao (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1966), vol. 2,
pp. 421–22.
5.4 Translated. “Guoshi Haiwen 13 Zhi,” Xinwen Bao (Shanghai, October 6, 1898)
5.5 Translated. Chen Zhenjiang, Yihetuan Wenxian Jizhu yu Yanjiu (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chuban-
she, 1985), pp. 26–27.
5.6 Translated. Yihetuan Shiliao (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe, 1982), vol. 1, p. 18.
5.7 Translated. Yihetuan Dang’an Shiliao (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 162–63.
5.8 The American Journal of International Law 1:4 (October 1907): 388–96.
5.9 Ssu-yü Têng and John K. Fairbank, China’s Response to the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1965), pp. 199–200. Reprinted by permission of the publisher, copyright © 1954, 1979
by the President and Fellows of Harvard College copyright © renewed 1982 by Ssu-yü Têng and
John K. Fairbank.
5.10 Translated. Qiu Jin Ji (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji, 1979), pp. 4–6.
5.11 John C. Ferguson, “The Abolition of the Competitive Examinations in China,” Journal of the Ameri-
can Oriental Society 27 (1906): 79–87.

Chapter 6
GRAPHIC: May Fourth Photographs (Sidney D. Gamble photographs, David M. Rubenstein Rare
Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University)
6.1 Julie Lee Wei, Prescriptions for Saving China, Selected Writings of Sun Yat-sen (Stanford: Hoover
Press, 1995), pp. 41–50.
6.2 Rev. G.H. Bondfield, The China Mission Year Book (Shanghai: Christian Literature Society for China,
1912), Appendix C, pp. 10–11
6.3 Translated. Sun Zhongshan Wenji (Beijing: Tuanjie Chubanshe, 1997), pp. 484–86.
6.4 Translated. Yubi Zhaoling Shuo Qingshi (Jinan: Shandong Jiaoyu Chubashe, 2001), p. 236.
6.5 Rev. G.H. Bondfield, The China Mission Year Book (Shanghai: Christian Literature Society for China,
1912), Appendix C, pp. 23–24.
6.6 Wunsz King, V.K. Wellington Koo’s Foreign Policy, Some Selected Documents (Shanghai: Kelly and
Walsh, 1931), pp. 87–90.
6.7 Translated. Meizhou Pinglun (May 11, 1919).
6.8 Tse-tsung Chow, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 174–75. Copyright © 1960 by the President and Fellows
of Harvard College, Copyright © renewed 1989 by Tse-tung Chow.
6.9 Hu Shih, “The Renaissance in China,” Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 5:6
(November 1926): 269–73.
6.10 Reginald F. Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1934),
pp. 137–38.
6.11 “The Game of Playing One Against the Other,” The North -China Daily News (April 2, 1925): 7.
6.12 Translated. Gong Yao, “Huoguo Yangmin Tanwu Canbao zhi Zhang Zongchang,” Yijing Wenshi
Banyuekan 6 (May 20, 1936): 316–20.
424 Sources

Chapter 7
GRAPHIC: 1920s Advertisement (University of Minnesota, College of Liberal Arts, Digital Content
Library, Art History Collection)
7.1 Translated. Sun Zhongshan Quanji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), vol. 5, pp. 472–81.
7.2 Leonard Hsu, Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals (Los Angeles: University of Southern Cali-
fornia Press, 1933), pp. 142–45.
7.3 Translated. Sun Zhongshan Quanji (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986), vol. 11, pp. 639–41.
7.4 Secretariat, the Kuomintang of China, Nationalist China (Canton: Central Political Council of
Kuomintang, Canton Branch, April 1927), pp. 14–15.
7.5 Secretariat, the Kuomintang of China, Nationalist China (Canton: Central Political Council of
Kuomintang, Canton Branch, April 1927), pp. 25–26.
7.6 Secretariat, the Kuomintang of China, Nationalist China (Canton: Central Political Council of
Kuomintang, Canton Branch, 1927), pp. 15–17.
7.7 The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (October 1, 1927): 3.
7.8 Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, Documentary History of Chinese Commu-
nism (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 54–63. A Documentary History of Chinese Communism
by Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, Cambridge, MA: Russian Research
Center Studies, 6, Harvard University Press, 1952.
7.9 Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), vol. 1,
pp. 23–30. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
7.10 Translated. Chen Cheng, Ed., Chifei Fandong Wenjian Huibian (1935), vol. 3, pp. 922-27.
7.11 Translated and adapted from: Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Lan-
guages Press, 1967), vol. 4, p. 155.
7.12 Hua R. Lan and Vanessa L. Fong, eds., Women in Republican China, a Sourcebook (Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe, 1999), pp. 44–46. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
7.13 Ding Ling, Miss Sophie’s Diary and Other Stories, trans. W.J.F. Jenner (Beijing: Panda Books, 1985),
pp. 29–32. Panda Books, reprinted with the permission of Foreign Languages Press.
7.14 Ba Jin, The Family, trans. Sidney Shapiro (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), pp. 24–26.
Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

Chapter 8
GRAPHIC 1: Mao on horseback (Alamy Images)
GRAPHIC 2: Map of Long March (Pease Press Maps)
8.1 British Foreign Office File, 371–13171, June 13, 1928.
8.2 Memoranda Presented to the Lytton Commission (New York: Chinese Cultural Society, 1932),
pp. 47–50.
8.3 Report of the Lytton Commission of Inquiry (Genova: League of Nations, 1932).
8.4 “Notification by the Japanese Government of Its Intention to Withdraw From the League of
Nations,” Official Journal of League of Nations (May 1933): 657.
8.5 T’ang Leang-Li, ed., Suppressing Communist Banditry in China (Shanghai: China United Press,
1934), pp. 111–13.
8.6 General Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Crisis; Madame Chiang Kai-shek on the New Life Movement
(Shanghai: China Weekly Review Press, 1937), pp. 55–60.
8.7 Transcribed and translated, Ying Yunwei (director), The Plunder of Peach and Plum, 1934.
8.8 “Lolo Tribesmen Take Novel Revenge on Communists,” The Shanghai Time, 1935. Translated.
A’ermuxia, “Hongjun, Hongjun,” Huigu Changzheng (Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1976),
pp. 176–83.
8.9 Translated. Zhang Xueliang Wenji (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1992), vol. 2, pp. 1064–68.
8.10 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), vol. 1, pp. 255–58.
Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
8.11 Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981), vol. 1, pp. 93–95. Reprinted
with permission of the publisher.
 Sources 425

Chapter 9
GRAPHIC: Political Cartoons
#1: Gao Longshang, “’De’ bugu, bi you lin.” (Analects, IV 25), Quanguo Manhua Zuojia Kangzhan Jiezuo
xuanji, Huang Miaozi, n.p.: Zhanwang Shuwu, 1938, p. 61.
#2: Feng Zikai, “A Baby’s Head Thrown into the Air,” China Weekly Review 88:7 (April 15, 1939): 207,
Shanghai.
#3: Feng Zikai, Zhoubao 10 (November 15, 1945): front cover, second impression, Shanghai.
#4: Kong Ping, “Watch Yourself,” Xiaoxi [News], No. 12 (May 16, 1946), p. 178.
9.1 John H.D. Rabe, “Letter to the Japanese Embassy,” in Timothy Brook, ed., Documents on the Rape
of Nanking (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), pp. 18–23.
9.2 The China Press (July 17, 1938): p. 1.
9.3 Transcribed and translated, Jiang Wen (director), Devils on the Doorstep (Guizi Laile), 2000.
9.4 Translated. Wang Jingwei Jituan Maiguo Toudi Pipan Ziliao Xuanji (Nanjing Daxue, 1981),
pp. 298–99.
9.5 American Journal of International Law 35:3, Supplement, Official Documents (July 1941): 127–28.
9.6 The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1937–1945 (The John Day Com-
pany, 1946), vol. 2, pp. 697–700.
9.7 Gregor Benton, ed., Wild Lily, Prairie Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 78–82.
Copyright © 1995 Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University
Press.
9.8 Benton, Gregor, ed., Wild Lily, Prairie Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 69–71,
73–75. Copyright © 1995 Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
9.9 Translated. Mao Zedong, Zai Yan’an Wenyi Zuotan Huishang de Jianghua (Jiefang She, 1950), pp. 1–3,
11–16, 42–44.
9.10 Translated. Wen Yiduo, “Last Speech,” Wencui (1946, 41): 19.9.11 Translated. Xinsheng Bao (May 19,
1949).
9.12 Transcribed and translated. Zheng Junli (director), Crows and Sparrows, 1949.

Chapter 10
GRAPHIC 1: Backyard Furnaces (Getty Images)
GRAPHIC 2: Communal Dining Hall (Alamy Images).
10.1 Translated. Renmin Ribao (October 2, 1949): 1.
10.2 Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of
Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” International Security 17:1 (1992): 151–53. Reprinted with per-
mission of MIT Press.
10.3 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), vol. 5, pp. 308–11.
Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
10.4 International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet, Legal Materials on Tibet (Berkeley, CA: Interna-
tional Committee of Lawyers for Tibet, 1997), pp. 182–85. Reprinted with permission of the
publisher.
10.5 Translated. National People’s Congress. Accessed: [Link]/wxzl/wxzl/2001-05/30/
content_136774.htm.
10.6 Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank, Communist China 1955–1959: Policy Documents with Anal-
ysis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 297–98. Copyright © 1962 by the
President and Fellows of Harvard College. English text is taken from CB 445, translated by the
U. S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, from the People’s Daily of March 8, 1957.
10.7 Translated. Renmin Ribao (June 13, 1956): 2–3.
10.8 Transcribed and Translated. Tian Zhuangzhuang (director), Blue Kite (Lan Fengzheng), 1993.
10.9 Mark Selden, The People’s Republic of China, a Documentary History of Revolutionary Change (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), p. 389–95. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
10.10 Translated. Renmin Ribao (November 6, 1958): 3.
426 Sources

10.11 Chu Li, and Tien Chieh-yun, Inside a People’s Commune: A Report from Chiliying (Beijing: Foreign
Languages Press, 1974), pp. 40–42. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
10.12 Peng Dehuai, Memoir of a Chinese Marshal (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), pp. 510–23.
Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

Chapter 11
GRAPHIC 1: Mao in Tiananmen (Getty Images)
GRAPHIC 2: Cultural Revolution Poster (Alamy Images)
11.1 Long Live the Victory of People’s War! (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 58–68.
Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
11.2 Chen Kuang-sheng, Lei Feng, Chairman Mao’s Good Fighter (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,
1968), pp. 60–62, 99–102. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
11.3 China Reconstructs 18 (April 1969): 19. Reprinted with permission of China Today.
11.4 Translated. Guangming Ribao (August 20, 1966): 3.
11.5 Translated. Renmin Ribao (August 5, 1967): 1.
11.6 Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Through to the End (Beijing: Foreign Languages
Press, 1966), pp. 1–14. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
11.7 Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Through to the End (Beijing: Foreign Languages
Press, 1966), pp. 15–20. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
11.8 China Reconstructs 25 (January 1976), Supplement: 64–70. Reprinted with permission of China
Today.
11.9 Translated. Renmin Ribao (April 17, 1968): 1.
11.10 Translated. Renmin Ribao (May 10, 1967): 1.
11.11 China Reconstructs 12 (May 1963): 28–29; 14 (June 1965): 34–35. Reprinted with permission of
China Today.
11.12 Transcribed and translated. Liu Guoquan and Jiang Shusen (directors), Pine Ridge, 1973.

Chapter 12
GRAPHIC 1: Mao Zedong’s Funeral (Getty Images)
GRAPHIC 2: Gang of Four—Lishi de shenpan (Shanghai Renmin Meishu, 1979), p. 8.
12.1 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly during Its 26th
session, GAOR, 26th sess., Suppl. no. 29, (New York: Oceana), p. 2.
12.2 “Message of President Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese People” (October 26, 1971). Accessed:
[Link]
12.3 Accessed: [Link]
12.4 Accessed: [Link]
12.5 Transcribed and translated. From People’s Central Broadcasting Station (September 9, 1976) and
Renmin Ribao (September 10, 1976): 1.
12.6 Translated. Renmin Ribao (February 7, 1977): 1.
12.7 Deng Xiaoping, “Realize the Four Modernizations and Never Seek Hegemony” (May 7, 1978).
Accessed: [Link] Reprinted with
permission of Foreign Language Press.
12.8 Translated. Accessed: [Link]/b5/9/6/24/[Link].
12.9 Beijing Review 46 (October 6, 1980): 3–4. Reprinted with permission of Beijing Review.
12.10 China Reconstructs 27 (April 1978): 9–12. Reprinted with permission of China Today.
12.11 Transcribed and translated. Chen Rong (author) and Wang Qimin (director), At Middle Age
(Rendao Zhongnian), 1982.
12.12 Zhang Jie, Love Must Not Be Forgotten (Beijing: Panda Books, 1987), pp. 1–4. Panda Books,
reprinted with the permission of Foreign Languages Press.

Chapter 13
GRAPHIC 1: Tiananmen Square (Getty Images)
GRAPHIC 2: Tank Man (AP Images)
 Sources 427

13.1 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), vol. 3, pp. 72–75.
Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
13.2 News of the Communist Party of China. Accessed: [Link]
[Link].
13.3 17th CPC National Congress. Accessed: [Link]
tent_6883135.htm.
13.4 Beijing Review 46 (October 6, 1980): 4–5. Reprinted with permission of Beijing Review.
13.5 Transcribed and translated. Zhang Yimou (director), Story of Qiu Ju (Qiuju Daguansi), 1992.
13.6 Accessed: [Link]/english/doc/2005-07/19/content_461372.htm.
13.7 Translated. Accessed: [Link]/2018-09/07/c_129949536.htm.
13.8 Translated and adapted. Accessed: [Link]/2011/04/blog-post_17.html.
13.9 Translated and adapted. Renmin Ribao (May 19, 1989): 1, 4.
13.10 The Truth about the Beijing Turmoil (Beijing: Beijing Publishing House, 1990), pp. 3–5.
13.11 Translated. Hou Dejian, “Long de Chuanren”; Cui Jian, “Yiwu Suoyou”.
13.12 United Nations, Treaty Series (New York: United Nations, 1994), vol. 1399, 1985: No. 23389–
23396, pp. 61–63.
13.13 Accessed: [Link]
of_Hong_Kong_Handover_1997.
13.14 Accessed: [Link]/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/[Link].

Chapter 14
GRAPHIC 1: Tiger Leaping Gorge (Alamy Images)
GRAPHIC 2: Three Gorges Dams (Alamy Images)
GRAPHIC 3: Dam Map (Pease Press Maps)
14.1 Translated. Renmin Ribao (Overseas Edition) (November 13, 2012): 1.
14.2 Adapted and accessed: [Link]/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm.
14.3 Accessed: [Link]/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/[Link].
14.4 Translated. Accessed: [Link]
14.5 Translated. Accessed: [Link]/zdyw/202001/t20200115_1184043.html.
14.6 Transcribed and translated. Jia Zhangke (director), Still Life (Sanxia Haoren), 2006.
14.7 Transcribed and translated. Guo Fan (director), The Wandering Earth (Liulang Diqiu), 2019.
14.8 Translated. Accessed: [Link]
14.9 Translated and adapted. Accessed: [Link]/20060126_3.htm.
Translated. Accessed: [Link]
14.10 Accessed: [Link]
Mr-Ma-keynote-speech_eng.pdf.
14.11 Accessed: [Link]/yr18-19/english/bills/[Link].
14.12 Translated. Accessed: [Link]
 INDEX

26th army headquarters, proclamation from 172 – 3 China in 21st century, contemporary issues 397 – 400
29 regulations for reorganizing 9 – 11 China in the 20s, struggle for unity: CCP, origins of 177 – 82;
1911 revolution 137 – 46; abdication edict, last emperor’s description of 162 – 3; ideologies and realities of fractured
144 – 5; National Assembly demands 141 – 2; president’s republic 163 – 9; Kuomintang, rise of 169 – 75; literary
proclamation, first provisional 142 – 4; Sun Yat-sen’s currents in 1920s China 182 – 8; visual source 160 – 1
resignation and reply to Yuan Shikai 145 – 6 China in the 21st century: description of 378 – 80;
developmental, social, and environmental issues in 385 – 96;
abdication edict, last emperor’s 144 – 5 movements and challenges in 396 – 406; visual source 376 – 7;
Agesuo 9 Xi Jinping, rise of 380 – 5
alliances in the 70s, shifting: Joint Communique/ of U.S. and China in the 60s: description of 284 – 6; Great Proletariat
China 320 – 2; UN, Chiang Kai-shek declaration to withdraw Revolution 292 – 304; music, opera and plays in 305 – 13; new
from 319 – 20 loyalties, pursuing 286 – 92; visual source 282 – 3
Amban 10 – 11 China in the 70s: alliances, shifting, UN, Chiang Kai-shek
Amiot, Joseph Marie 17 declaration to withdraw from 319 – 20; description of
Andijanis 74 316 – 17; life in 335 – 43; Pine Ridge (1973 film) 308 – 13;
At Middle Age (Chen Rong) 338 – 40 successor, choosing 325 – 35; Transcripts of the First Meeting
between Nixon, Mao, Kissinger, and Zhou 322 – 5; visual
Ba Jin 186 – 8 source 314 – 15; Zhang Jie’s “Love Must Not Be Forgotten”
Bannermen 9 340 – 3
behind the curtain (chuilian tingzheng) governing 110 China in the 80s and 90s under Deng Xiaoping: building
Beidaihe 279 socialism with Chinese characteristics 348 – 9; description
Beijing Convention 84 of 346 – 7; Fudan University relaxes sex rules for students
Beijing turmoil 365 – 8 357 – 8; Hong Kong handover 369 – 75; Tiananmen 360 – 9;
big-character poster 294 – 5 two children dilemma 358 – 60; visual source 344 – 5; women,
Bingwu Cycle 131 shifting role and representation of 352 – 60; Zhang Yimou’s
birth control 267 – 9 The Story of Qiu Ju 354 – 7
Blue Kite (Tian Zhuangzhuang) 271 – 3 China-Japan treaty 230 – 1
Board of Revenue 32 Chinese Communist Party (CCP): communist co-operation
Board of Rites 6 by Central Committee 215 – 17; discipline, three main
Boxers United in Righteousness 108 – 9; Boxer Protocol 118, rules of 181 – 2; first manifesto 175 – 7; land law of Jiangxi
121 – 4; competitive examinations, abolition of 128 – 31; Soviet 180 – 1; peasant movement in Hunan, Mao Zedong’s
eight-nation alliance 111; imperial edict to “declare war” report on 177 – 80; “Six Points for Attention” 181 – 2; see also
120 – 1; Malan proclamations 118 – 19; post-Boxer reform, Long March
Qing officials’ join proposals 125 – 6; post-Boxer reform and Chinese-Eastern Railroad 254 – 5
push for revolution 124 – 5; Spirit Boxer possession 119 – 20; Chinese national holidays 346
uprising 118 – 24; visual source 108 – 9 Chinese Repository, The 40 – 3, 52
British East India Company 31 Cixi 110 – 11, 115, 116 – 17, 120, 121, 124
British empire: Elliot’s public notice to subjects of 45 – 6; close planting 277 – 8
Guangdong’s denunciation of 50 – 2; parliamentary Comintern (Communist International) 163
discussion of resolution on “Suppression of the Opium Commune Members are Sunflowers 308
Trade” 52 – 3 communes 275 – 7
Buddhist Temple on Henan Island 35 communist co-operation by Central Committee 215 – 17
burning of the Yuanming Yuan, narrative on 84 – 5, 85 Communist International (Comintern) 163
competitive examinations, abolition of 128 – 31
cadre 234 Compradore 31, 32, 35
Celestial Empire 18 – 19 conquest, consolidation, and preservation of Qing dynasty: 29
Central Committee: communist co-operative by 215 – 17; regulations for reorganizing Tibet 9 – 11; Manchu identity,
defined 216; Sixteen Point Decision 295 – 9 promoting and preserving 8 – 9; Sacred Edict of Kangxi
Central People’s Government, proclamation of 256 – 7 emperor 6; Sacred Edict of Kangxi emperor regarding Wu
Chen Duxiu 146; “New Youth” manifesto 150 – 1 Sangui 7 – 8; Shunzhi’s head shaving 5 – 6
Chen dynasty 127 contemporary issues, Freezing Point Weekly, open letter
Chen Rong, At Middle Age 338 – 40 protesting 397 – 400
Chiang Kai-shek: biography 169; “China’s War, a World War” COVID-19 pandemic 405 – 6
231 – 3; declaration/withdrawal from League of Nations cow sheds (niupeng) 285
Assembly 319 – 20; emergency law 201 – 2; encirclement of crimes, emergency law for suppression of 202 – 4
Chinese Communist forces 192 – 3; marriage proposal to Crows and Sparrows (1949 film) (Zheng Junli) 246 – 7
Song Meiling 173 – 5; New Life movement 204; Sino-Soviet Cui Jian, “Nothing to My Name” (yiwu suoyou) 369
Treaty of Friendship with 254 – 5; in Taiwan 245; Wang Cultural Revolution see China in the 60s, Great Proletariat
Jingwei’s telegraph to 228 – 30; Xi’an Incident 211 – 13 Revolution
China at war: description of 220; KMT’s road to defeat and
Taiwan 242 – 7; occupied China 221 – 33; political cartoons Dalai Batulu Taiji 7
218 – 19; visual source 218 – 19; Yan’an, life in 233 – 42 Dalai Lama 9
430 Index

Daoguang 38 Gelugpa 10
daotai 77 George III, King of England 13; letter to emperor of China
Dazhai 290 12 – 14; Qianlong’s edict to 18 – 20
Dazhai spirit, explained 290 – 2 Gordon, Charles “Chinese” 78
Dealtry, Thomas 40 – 3 Great Leap Forward 274 – 5
democracy, implementing 332 – 3 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 292 – 304; Jiang Qing’s
Democracy Wall 330 – 1, 333 speech on, in Beijing Opera 305 – 6; Mao’s statement in
Democratic League 243 support of Black Americans’ struggle against violent
Deng Xiaoping: building socialism with Chinese repression 303 – 4; Mao Zedong joins 299 – 301; Mao
characteristics 348 – 9; on Four Modernizations 329 – 30; life Zedong’s “Big-Character Poster” 294 – 5; music, opera
in China under 344 – 75 and plays 305 – 13; school graduates 301 – 3; Sixteen Point
Deqing, memorial on the responsibilities of Gonghang 33 – 4 Decision 295 – 9; Song Binbin’s “I Put a Red Guard Army
Devils on the Doorstop (2000 film) (Jiang Wen) 224 – 8 Band on Chairman Mao” 292 – 4
Ding Ling: Miss Sophie’s Diary 184 – 6; on Women’s Day 233 – 6 Guangdong residents’ denunciation of the British 50 – 2
discipline, three main rules of 181 – 2 Guangxu 111; Three Secret Decrees 115 – 16
Donggan (Tungan) 72 Guangzhou: Dealtry, Thomas 40 – 3; Huang Juezi on evil of
Double Tenth Agreement of 1945 with Mao Zedong 254 opium 38 – 40; opium in early nineteenth century 36 – 43;
Dowager Empress 110 – 11, 115, 116 – 17, 120, 121, 124 opium questions among westerners in China 40 – 3;
Duan Qirui 153 “Remarks on the Opium Trade with China” pamphlet 41;
Du Chaylard, George 121 tea trade with China 36 – 8
Dutch East India Company 31 Guangzhou trade in early nineteenth century: Deqing’s
Du Wenxiu 70 – 1 memorial on the responsibilities of Gonghang 33 – 4;
factories, description of 31 – 2; foreign trading, rules
East India Company 32 regulating 34 – 5
East is Red (Dongfang Hong) 307 or 309 Gurun 8
education: eight-legged essay-civil service examination 21 – 3;
female education 26 – 7; provincial examination, description Hakka 58
of 23 – 5; Pu Songling’s “Three Genii” 20 – 1 Hay, John 101 – 2
eight-legged essay-civil service examination 21 – 3 head shaving 5 – 6
eight-nation alliance 111 Hong Kong 29, 30; fugitive offenders and mutual legal
Elgin, James Bruce, Earl of 85; reflections on Treaty of Tianjin assistance legislation 403 – 5
87 – 8 Hong Kong handover 369 – 75
Elliot, Charles, public notice to British subjects 45 – 6 Hongtaiji: on adoption of term Manchu 8; on maintaining
emergency law for suppression of crimes 202 – 4 Manchu traditions 8 – 9
enemies on all sides (simian Chu-ge) 369 Hong Xiuquan 58
examinations: competitive, abolition of 128 – 31; eight-legged Hou Dejian, Descendants of the Dragon (Long de chuan ren)
essay-civil service 21 – 3; as obstruction to reform 114 – 15; 368 – 9
provincial, description of 23 – 5; quotas 20; university Hua Guofeng, “Two Whatevers” policy 328 – 9
entrance 335 – 8 Huang Juezi 38; evil of opium 38 – 40
external challenges of People’s Republic of China: Korean Huangpu 32
War, telegrams relating to 257 – 60; proclamation of Central Huangpu Military Academy 163, 166, 169, 172
People’s Government 256 – 7; Tibet, Seventeen-Point Hui 70 – 1, 71
Agreement 262 – 4; U.S. imperialism 260 – 1 Hui Rebellion 58
extraterritoriality 88 Hu Jintao 351 – 2, 379
Humen 35
factories in Guangzhou, description of 31 – 2 Hunan, peasant movement in 177 – 80
Family (Ba Jin) 186 – 8 Hundred Days Reform Movement: Guangxu’s Three Secret
family background 284 Decrees 115 – 16; Kang Youwei’s memorial on institutional
Fang Feng 61 reform 114 – 15
female education, Lan Dingyuan on 26 – 7 Hu Shi 151; literary revolution and renaissance
Feng Guifen, adoption of Western learning 75 – 6 151 – 2
Fifth Generation 271 Hu Yaobang 360, 365
Fifth Modernization 330 – 3 hydropower development 388 – 90
first manifesto 175 – 7
Flower Gardens 35 imperial edict, to “declare war” 120 – 1
Forbidden City 4, 110 imperialism in China, crisis of: description of 84 – 5; Parkes’
foreign language training, Li Hongzhang’s memorial letter to Commissioner Ye Mingchen 85 – 7; Second Opium
advocating 77 – 9 War 84, 85 – 7; Sino-Japanese War 94 – 102; Treaty of Tianjin
foreign trading in Guangzhou, rules regulating 34 – 5 88 – 92; visual source 82 – 3; Yuanming Yuan 85, 92 – 4
Four Cardinal Principles 347 Imperial Summer Palace 84
Four Guardians of Dharma 10 institutional reform, Kang Youwei’s memorial on 114 – 15
Four Modernizations 329 – 30 “I Put a Red Guard Army Band on Chairman Mao” (Song
Fourteen Points 149 Binbin) 292 – 4
Freezing Point Weekly, open letter protesting 397 – 400 iron rice bowl 379
Fudan University relaxes sex rules for students 357 – 8
Japan: assertion that China is not organized state 200 – 1;
Gang of Four, trial 333 – 5 declaration/withdrawal from League of Nations Assembly
Gate of Heavenly Peace 4, 135, 345 200 – 1; letter to the embassy from Nanjing safety zone
 Index 431

221 – 2; twenty-one demands 146 – 9; War of Resistance Liu Shaoqi, blueprint for Great Leap Forward 274 – 5
against 201; see also Manchukuo; Manchuria, Japan in Li Wenliang 405 – 6
Jesuits 4, 11 – 13 Lolo (Yi) tribesmen 210
Jiang Bingzhi see Ding Ling Long March: communist co-operation 215 – 17; description
Jiang Qing 305 – 6, 333 – 5 of 191, 193; ethnic borderlands, two perspectives 209 – 11;
Jiang Wen 224 – 8 Mao Zedong’s statement on Chiang Kai-shek’s statement
Jiangxi Soviet 180 – 1; land law of 180 – 1 213 – 15; visual map of 190 – 1
Jiang Zemin 347, 349 – 50, 373 – 5 looting and prize money at Yuanming Yuan, narrative on 92 –4
Jia Zhangke 390 – 2 “Love Must Not Be Forgotten” (Zhang Jie) 340 – 3
Joint Communique/ of U.S. and China 320 – 2 Lu Dingyi, “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, a Hundred
Joint Memorial by Manchu General of Shenyang 129 Schools of Thought Content” 269 – 71
juelo (gioro) 9 Lugouqiao Bridge incident 215, 220
Lytton, Lord 198
Kan Army 118 – 19 Lytton Report 198 – 9
Kangxi’s Sacred Edict see Sacred Edict of Kangxi emperor
Kang Youwei 111; memorial on institutional reform 114 – 15 Macartney, Lord George 13 – 14; journal entries 15 – 17
Karakahan Manifesto 175 Macartney Embassy 11
Kashgar 73 – 4 Malan Boxer proclamations 118 – 19
Khrushchev revisionists 286 – 8 Manchu: Hongtaiji on adoption of term Manchu 8; Hongtaiji
Kissinger, Henry 322 – 5 on maintaining traditions 8 – 9; Joint Memorial by
KMT government, Soviet Union and 254 General of Shenyang 129; Taiping rebellion anti-Manchu
Kokand 74 proclamation 59 – 61; women adopting Chinese-style
Korean War, telegrams relating to 257 – 60 clothing, Qianlong on 9
kowtow 15 Manchu City 62 – 3
Kublai Khan 70 Manchu identity, promoting and preserving 8 – 9
Kuomintang (KMT) government, road to defeat and Taiwan: Manchukuo 193
Crows and Sparrows (1949 film) 246 – 7; Li Gongpu, eulogy of Manchuria 60 – 1
243 – 4; Taiwan, Republic of China’s declaration of martial Manchuria, Japan in 193 – 201; British consulate report on
law in 245 – 6; Wen Yiduo’s “Last Speech” 243 – 4 death of Zhang Zuolin 194 – 6; Japanese declaration and
Kuomintang (KMT) (Nationalists) 157 withdrawal from League of Nations 200 – 1; Lytton Report
Kuomintang Party 151; purification of 169 – 71 198 – 9; as Manchukuo 193; principles for organization of
Kuomintang, rise of: Northern Expedition, manifesto on Manchukuo government 196 – 8
166 – 8; party slogans 171 – 2; proclamation from 26th army Mao Zedong 322 – 5; Big-Character Poster 294 – 5; biography
headquarters 172 – 3; purification of the Kuomintang Party 177; buttons worn as symbol of loyalty to 285; on Chiang
169 – 71; Sun Zhongshan’s last wills and testament 168 – 9; Kai-shek’s statement 213 – 15; Double Tenth Agreement
Three Principles of the people 138 – 41 of 1945 with 254; joins Cultural Revolution 299 – 301; Little
Red Book 295; Official Announcement of Death of 326 – 8;
Lama Kyiron Hutuktu 9 on peasant movement in Hunan 177 – 80; Peng Dehuai’s
Lan Dingyuan 26 – 7 letter to 278 – 80; Red Guards 284 – 5; statement in support of
land law of Jiangxi Soviet 180 – 1 Black Americans’ struggle against violent repression 303 – 4;
late imperial China: China’s ills, seeking to solve 108 – 32 successor, choosing 328 – 9; “Talk at the Yan’an Forum on
(see also Boxers United in Righteousness); deepening Literature and Art” 239 – 42; visit to Moscow 254 – 5; walking
crisis of Imperialism in China 82 – 107; description of 4; on two legs phrase 279
mid-nineteenth century rebellions and Qing responses Marco Polo Bridge Incident 215, 220
56 – 80; Opium War 29 – 55; rise of the Qing 2 – 27; timeline 1 marriage, legal case studies 106 – 7; brother-in-law seeking
law for suppression of crimes, emergency 202 – 4 remarriage of sister-in-law to procure property 107;
League of Nations Assembly 200 – 1 marriage of woman betrothed by one’s brother 107;
Lee Teng-Hui 401 remarriage of widow while mourning 106 – 7
Lei Feng 288 – 90 marriage law 264 – 7
“Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, a Hundred Schools of May Fourth manifesto 149
Thought Content,” Lu Dingyi 269 – 71 May Fourth Movement: Chen Duxiu’s “New Youth”
life in the 70s: Chen Rong’s At Middle Age 338 – 40; university manifesto 150 – 1; Hu Shi’s literary revolution and
entrance examinations 335 – 8; Zhang Jie’s “Love Must Not renaissance 151 – 2; Japan’s twenty-one demands 146 – 9;
Be Forgotten” 340 – 3 May Fourth manifesto 149
Li Gongpu, eulogy of 243 – 4 Ma Ying-Jeou 400 – 2
Li Hongzhang 76; memorial advocating foreign language Miao Rebellion 58
training 77 – 9; Treaty of Shimonoseki 96 – 9 Ming Dynasty 51
lijin (transit tax) 126 Miss Sophie’s Diary (Ding Ling) 184 – 6
Lin Biao 286, 333 – 5 Molotov, Vyacheslav 255
Lin Zexu on Opium War: edict to foreigners 43 – 5; Elliot’s monarchy, restoration of 153 – 4
public notice to British subjects 45 – 6; letter to his wife 46 – 7; Mukden incident 201
letter to Queen Victoria 47 – 50 music, opera and plays in China in the 60s 305 – 13; Jiang
Li Peng 360; meeting with students, transcript of 361 – 5 Qing’s speech on revolution in Beijing Opera 305 – 6; Pine
literary currents in 1920s China: Ba Jin’s Family 186 – 8; Ding Ridge (1973 film) 308 – 13; revolutionary song lyrics 306 – 8;
Ling’s Miss Sophie’s Diary 184 – 6; Yang Zhihua’s love and see also songs
socializing between men and women 182 – 4 Muslim rebellions: Panthay Rebellion summons to arms
literary revolution 151 – 2 70 – 1; Shaw’s visit to Yarkand and Kashgar 73 – 4; Tungan
Little Red Book 295 massacre, rumors of a 71 – 2
432 Index

Nanjing Decade (1927–1937): description of 201 – 9; People’s Volunteer Army of China 258
emergency law for suppression of crimes 202 – 4; New People’s War of Liberation 257
Life Movement 204 – 6; Plunder of Peach and Plum (1934 Pine Ridge (1973 film) 308 – 13
film) 206 – 9; Zhang Xueliang’s Xi’an incident speech Pingxingguan Campaign 398
211 – 13 planned families 267 – 9
Nanjing Massacre 221 Plunder of Peach and Plum (1934 film) 206 – 9
National Assembly demands 141 – 2 policies under Deng Xiaoping: Beijing turmoil 365 – 8; Hu
National Day 136 Jintao’s scientific outlook on development 351 – 2; Jiang
national holidays, Chinese 346 Zemin’s Three Represents 349 – 50; Li Peng’s meeting
Nationalist Party see Kuomintang Party with students, transcript of 361 – 5; one-child policy 352 – 3;
National Salvation March 307 political currents 347; seven-point petition 360 – 1; sex rules,
National style songs 306 – 8 relaxing of 357 – 8; socialism, building of 348 – 9; songs and
New China (People’s Republic of China) 275 – 7; birth Tiananmen 368 – 9; two children dilemma 358 – 60
control and planned families 267 – 9; close planting 277 – 8; policies under Xi Jinping: Belt and Road Initiative 381 – 3;
description of 254 – 6; external challenges of 256 – 64; Korean celebration of 70th anniversary of PRC’s founding 383 – 5;
War, telegrams relating to 257 – 60; Liu Shaoqi’s blueprint hydropower development 388 – 90; Jia Zhangke’s Still
for Great Leap Forward 274 – 5; Lu Dingyi’s “Let a Hundred Life (2006 film) 390 – 2; socialist core values 380 – 1; trains,
Flowers Bloom, a Hundred Schools of Thought Content” Chinese high-speed 395 – 6; The Wandering Earth (2019 film)
269 – 71; Mao Zedong’s visit to Moscow 254 – 5; Marriage 390 – 2; Yangtze River basin flooding 386 – 8
Law, first 264 – 7; Peng Dehuai’s letter to Chairman Mao Politburo 254
278 – 80; proclamation of Central People’s Government political cartoons 218 – 19
4, 256 – 7; Seventeen-Point Plan for peaceful liberation of ports 55
Tibet 262 – 4; Tian Zhuangzhuang’s Blue Kite 271 – 3; U.S. post-Boxer reform: push for revolution 124 – 5; Qing officials’
imperialism 260 – 1; visual source 252 – 3 joint proposals 125 – 6
New Culture Movement 146 Premier’s Will 168 – 9
New Life Movement 201, 204 – 6 provisional government 142 – 4
new loyalties, pursuing in the 60s: Dazhai spirit, explained punitive faction 214
290 – 2; Khrushchev revisionists 286 – 8; Lei Feng 288 – 90 purification of Kuomintang Party 169 – 71
new policies 111 Pu Songling, “Three Genii” 20 – 1
new society in New China: birth control and planned families Puyi 111
267 – 9; close planting 277 – 8; Liu Shaoqi’s blueprint for
Great Leap Forward 274 – 5; Lu Dingyi’s “Let a Hundred Qianlong: Manchus adopting Chinese names 9; Manchu
Flowers Bloom, a Hundred Schools of Thought Content” women adopting Chinese-style clothing 9
269 – 71; marriage law, first 264 – 7; Peng Dehuai’s letter to Qing China-Europe relations: George III’s letter to emperor
Chairman Mao 278 – 80; People’s Daily “Red-flag Commune of China 12 – 13; Kangxi’s edict of toleration 12; Macartney’s
Dining Halls” 275 – 7; Tian Zhuangzhuang’s Blue Kite 271 – 3 journal entries 15 – 17; Qianlong’s edict to George III 18 – 20
New Youth (Xin Qingnian) 150 – 1 Qing Dynasty, rise of: conquest, consolidation, and
Nian Rebellion 58 preservation of 5 – 11; description of 4 – 5; Qing
Nixon, Richard M. 322 – 5 China-Europe relations 11 – 20; visual source 2 – 3
Northern Expedition 157; manifesto on 166 – 8 Qing education, examinations, and literature 20 – 7; education
23 – 5; eight-legged essay-civil service examination 21 – 3;
occupied China: Chiang Kai-shek, “China’s War, a World Lan Dingyuan on female education 134 – 41; provincial
War” 231 – 3; China-Japan treaty 230 – 1; Jiang Wen’s Devils examination, description of 23 – 5; Pu Songling’s “Three
on the Doorstop (2000 film) 224 – 8; letter to the Japanese Genii” 20 – 1
embassy from Nanjing safety zone 221 – 2; Song Meiling’s Qing responses and rebellions: description of 58 – 9; Muslim
“Only the Sword is Left” 223 – 4; Wang Jingwei’s telegraph rebellions 70 – 4; self-strengthening movement 74 – 80;
to Chiang Kai-shek 228 – 30 Taiping rebellion 59 – 61; visual source 56 – 7
Official Announcement of Mao’s Death 326 – 8 Qiu Jin 126 – 8
one-child policy 352 – 3 Qiu Ju, story of 354 – 7
Opium War: Deqing’s memorial on the responsibilities of
Gonghang 33 – 4; description of 30 – 1; Guangzhou trade in Red Army 210 – 11
early nineteenth century 25 – 35; Lin Zexu and 43 – 5; opium Red Guards 284 – 5
in early nineteenth century Guangzhou 36 – 43; popular “Remarks on the Opium Trade with China” pamphlet 41
responses and diplomatic resolutions to 50 – 5; Second remarriage of widow while mourning 106 – 7
Opium War 84, 85 – 7; visual source 28 – 9 Renaissance 151 – 2
Republican China: 1911 revolution 137 – 46; description of
palanquins 16 136 – 7; May Fourth Movement 146 – 52; timeline 133; visual
Panchen Lama 9 – 11 source 134 – 5; warlord era 153 – 8
Panthay Rebellion summons to arms 70 – 1 Revolutionary Alliance Society (Tongmeng Hui) 136
Parkes, Harry 85 – 7 revolutionary lyrics: Commune Members are Sunflowers
Party slogans 171 – 2 308; East is Red (Dongfang Hong) 309; National Salvation
Patten, Christopher 372 – 3 March 307
peasant movement in Hunan, Mao Zedong’s report on 177 – 80 Rong Hong 76, 77
Peng Dehuai 279; letter to Chairman Mao 278 – 80
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 257, 262 – 3, 288 Sacred Edict of Kangxi emperor 6, 12; regarding Wu Sangui
People’s Republic of China see New China (People’s Republic 7–8
of China) sailing under a foreign flag 85
 Index 433

school graduates 301 – 3 tea trade with China, Guangzhou 36 – 8

Scientific Outlook, Hu Jintao’s 351 – 2 Ten Commandments, Taiping 63 – 7
Second Opium War 84, 85 – 7 Three Feudatories 7
self-strengthening movement: Li Hongzhang’s memorial “Three Genii” (Pu Songling) 20 – 1
advocating foreign language training 77 – 9; Shanghai Three Gorges Dam 386 – 8
arsenal, Zeng Guofan on founding 76 – 7; Western learning, three noes 401
Feng Guifen on adoption of 75 – 6; Western learning, Three People’s Principles 138 – 41, 164 – 6
Woren’s memorial objecting to 79 – 80 Three Represents, Jiang Zemin’s 349 – 50
seven-point petition 360 – 1 Three Secret Decrees 115 – 16
Seventeen-Point Agreement 262 – 4 Tiananmen 360; songs 368 – 9
sex rules, relaxing of 357 – 8 Tian Zhuangzhuang, Blue Kite 271 – 3
Shandong 118, 135, 147, 149 Tibet: 29 regulations for reorganizing 9 – 11; Seventeen-Point
Shanghai 75 – 6, 83, 136, 151; arsenal at, Zeng Guofan on Agreement 262 – 4
founding of 76 – 7 Tongmeng Hui 136, 138, 149
Shanghai Communiqué, 318 trains, Chinese high-speed 395 – 6
Shenyang 194 Transcripts of the First Meeting between Nixon, Mao,
Shiyang Mine massacre 71 Kissinger, and Zhou 322 – 5
Shunzhi, head shaving 5 – 6 Trans-Siberian Railroad 255
Sino-British Joint Declaration 370 – 2 Treaty of Nanjing 53 – 5
Sino-Japanese War 94 – 102; China’s declaration of 94 – 5; Hay’s Treaty of Shimonoseki (Triple Intervention) 96 – 9
open-door note 101 – 2; Japan’s declaration of 95 – 6; Treaty Treaty of Tianjin 88 – 92; Elgin on 87 – 8
of Shimonoseki (Triple Intervention) 96 – 9 Treaty of Versailles 149
Sino-Soviet split 286 treaty ports 55, 83
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship with Chiang Kai-shek 254 – 5 Triple Intervention 96 – 9
“Six Points for Attention” 181 – 2 Tungan massacre, rumors of 71 – 2
Sixteen Point Decision 295 – 9 Twenty-one demands, Japan’s 146 – 9
Smith, Adam 43 two children dilemma 358 – 60
socialism: building 348 – 9; defined 165; Socialist songs 306 – 8 “Two Whatevers” policy 328 – 9
Song Binbin 292 – 4
Song Meiling 204 – 6, 223 – 4 unequal treaties 74 – 5, 167 – 8
songs: militant 307; national style 306 – 8; of resistance United Nations, Chiang Kai-shek declaration to withdraw
307 – 8; revolutionary lyrics 306 – 8; Socialist songs 306 – 8; from 319 – 20
Tiananmen 368 – 9; War of Liberation 306 – 8 United States imperialism 260 – 1
songs and Tiananmen 368 – 9 university entrance examinations 335 – 8
Soviet Union: meaning of Soviet 180 – 1; Sino-Soviet split 286
spheres of interest 101 walking on two legs (Mao phrase) 279
Spirit Boxer possession 119 – 20 Wandering Earth, The (2019 film) 393 – 4
Spirit Boxers United in Righteousness 120; see also Boxers Wang Jingwei 125; on republic vs. constitutional monarchy
United in Righteousness 124 – 5; telegraph to Chiang Kai-shek 228 – 30
Spring Festival Gala 346 – 7 Wang Shiwei, Wild Lily 236 – 9
Stalin, Joseph 254 – 5 Warlord era: Wu Peifu and other warlords 166 – 8; Zhang
Stanton, George 52 – 3 Xun’s restoration of monarchy 153 – 4; Zhang Zongchang
Still Life (2006 film) (Jia Zhangke) 390 – 2 156 – 8
Story of Qiu Ju, The (Zhang Yimou) 354 – 7 War of Liberation songs 306 – 8
struggle sessions 285 War of Resistance against Japan 201
Summer Palace 84 Wei Jingsheng, Fifth Modernization 330 – 3
Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan) 125, 157, 163, 175, 179; Wen Yiduo 243 – 4
Kuomintang (KMT) 175; last wills and testament 168 – 9; Western learning: Feng Guifen on adoption of 75 – 6; Woren’s
president’s proclamation, first provisional 142 – 4; memorial objecting to 79 – 80
resignation and reply to Yuan Shikai 145 – 6; Three People’s Whampoa see Huangpu Military Academy
Principles 138 – 41 White Lotus Society 120
suppression of crimes, emergency law for 202 – 4 White Terror purge 170 – 1
“Suppression of the Opium Trade” 52 – 3 widows, remarriage while mourning 106 – 7
Wild Lily 236 – 9
Taels 33 women: adopting Chinese-style clothing 9; female education,
Taiping Land System 68 – 70 Lan Dingyuan on 26 – 7; marriage, legal case study 106 – 7;
Taiping plan for reorganization 67 – 8 one-child policy 352 – 3; Qui Jin’s address to two hundred
Taiping Rebellion 59 – 70; anti-Manchu proclamation 59 – 61; million fellow countrywomen 126 – 8; Qiu Ju, story of 354 – 7;
Nanjing, Taipings arrival at 61 – 3; Taiping Land System shifting roles and representations of 352 – 60
68 – 70; Taiping plan for reorganization 67 – 8; Taiping Ten Woren, memorial objecting to Western learning 79 – 80
Commandments 63 – 7 Wuchang Uprising 136
Taiwan: KMT’s road to defeat 242 – 7; Ma Ying-Jeou’s speech Wuhan 136
at SOPA 400 – 2 Wu Peifu 166 – 8
“Talk at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” 239 – 42 Wu Sangui, sacred edit of regarding 7 – 8
Tanggu Truce 228
Tartary 73 Xiangsheng 346
Tashilhunpo 11 Xi’an incident speech, Zhang Xueliang’s 211 – 13
434 Index

Xi Jinping 378, 380 – 5 Yuanming Yuan 17; burning of, narrative on 84–5, 85; expansion
xiunü (marriage draft) 9 on 13; looting and prize money at, narrative on 92–4; site of 84
Yuan Shikai 136 – 7; Memorial from 130; Sun Yat-sen’s
Yakub Beg Rebellion 58 resignation and reply to 145 – 6
Yalta Agreement 255
Yamen 19 Zhang Jie, “Love Must Not Be Forgotten” 340 – 3
Yan’an: “Talk at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” Zhang Runan 61
239 – 42; Wild Lily (Wang Shiwei) 236 – 9; Women’s Day, Zhang Xueliang: biography 192; Xi’an incident speech 211 – 13
Ding Ling’s thoughts on 233 – 6 Zhang Xun’s restoration of monarchy 153 – 4
Yan Dian 230 – 1 Zhang Yimou 354 – 7
Yang Hucheng 214 – 15 Zhang Zuolin 155 – 6, 194 – 6
Yang Rui 115 Zhao Ziyang 347, 360, 361, 362, 370
Yangtze River basin flooding 386 – 8 Zheng Guofan, Shanghai arsenal 76 – 7
Yang Zhihua 182 Zheng Junli, Crows and Sparrows (1949 film) 246 – 7
Yarkand 73 – 4 Zhongnan Hai 4
Ye Mingchen, Parkes’ letter to 85 – 7 Zhou Enlai 254, 255, 322 – 5
Yihuan, royal family archery skills 9 Zongli Yamen 94
Yixin, Prince 110 Zunyi Conference 191