UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PATSY WIDAKUSWARA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-1015-RCL

KARI LAKE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court are Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment asking whether

Defendant Kari Lake has served as and performed the duties of the acting CEO of the U.S. Agency

for Global Media (“USAGM”) in violation of the Appointments Clause and the Federal Vacancies

Reform Act (“Vacancies Act”) since joining the agency last year. The motions ripened on March

5, 2026, and for the reasons that follow, the Court holds that the Vacancies Act and the

Appointments Clause prohibit her de jure or de facto service as acting CEO; as such, the Court

will GRANT the plaintiffs’ motion and DENY the defendants’ cross-motion by separate order.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court has previously recounted many of the core facts underlying this dispute. See

Widakuswara v. Lake, 779 F. Supp. 3d 10, 19–22 (D.D.C. 2025); Order of September 29, 2025, at

2–7, ECF No. 164. The Court thus presumes familiarity with the historical circumstances of the

case and restates only the essentials.

a. Federal Appointments Law

Article II of the Constitution defines different categories of federal personnel and

prescribes procedures for their selection via the Appointments Clause. The relevant text provides

that the President:

1
 shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution thus classifies government personnel into several

categories. First, by its terms, the Appointments Clause applies only to “officers.” “An officer

exercises ‘significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,’” as apart from an

employee, who does not. Kennedy v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc., 606 U.S. 748, 759 (2025) (quoting

Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. 237, 245 (2018)). Second, the Appointments Clause further refines

“Officers” into subcategories, distinguishing “inferior Officers” from persons often called

principal officers. The text of the Constitution defines principal officers as “Ambassadors, other

public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United

States.” Inferior officers, by contrast “are those whose work is directed and supervised at some

level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the

Senate.” Kennedy, 606 U.S. at 1443 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Edmond v. United

States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)).

For the purposes of the pending cross-motions, these distinctions matter because principal

and inferior officers are subject to overlapping but distinct appointment procedures. Principal

officers must receive their appointment through Presidential nomination and Senatorial

confirmation. By contrast, the Appointments Clause provides that Congress may “vest the

Appointment of . . . inferior Officers . . . in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the

Heads of Departments.” Congress’s involvement in the appointments process has long been

understood as an important “guard against the appointment of unfit characters . . . from family

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connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.” NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 580

U.S. 288, 293 (2017) (discussing advice and consent). Indeed, as Alexander Hamilton explained,

the Senate’s advice-and-consent role serves as a check on the unilateral installment of “candidates

who ha[ve] no other merit than that . . . of being, in some way or other, personally allied to [the

President], or of possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious

instruments of his pleasure.” The Federalist No. 76, at 394–95 (George W. Carey & James

McClellan eds., 2001); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas to Off. of N.Y. State Att’y Gen., — F.

Supp. 3d —, 2026 WL 60793, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2026), appeal filed Jan. 23, 2026.

Recognizing that the advice-and-consent process is cumbersome by design, and the

inevitability of occasional vacancies, both Congress and the judiciary have long recognized that a

well-functioning executive requires service by qualified temporary officers when such vacancies

occur. Thus, when a vacancy arises in a principal office, a “subordinate officer” can undertake the

duties of a superior officer “for a limited time, and under special and temporary conditions,”

without “transform[ing] into the superior and permanent official.” United States v. Eaton, 169

U.S. 331, 343 (1898). Congress passed the Vacancies Act to specify procedures for temporarily

filling vacancies in Senate-confirmed positions. See 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a) (identifying the Vacancies

Act as “the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions

and duties” of a vacant Senate-confirmed office). In general, the Vacancies Act applies when “a[n]

officer of an Executive Agency . . . whose appointment to office is required to be made by the

President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns or is otherwise unable to

perform the functions and duties of the office.” Id. § 3345(a).

The Vacancies Act establishes three paths to fill vacant a government post. The first

method, and the default rule, provides that when a vacancy occurs, “the first assistant to the office

3
of such officer shall perform the functions and duties of the office temporarily in an acting

capacity.” 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also SW Gen., 580 U.S. at 305 (observing

that the first assistant takes over “automatically” upon the occurrence of vacancy). The second

and third options allow “the President (and only the President)” to select an alternative to the first

assistant. See id. § 3345(a)(2)–(3). The President may select either another person serving in a

Senate-confirmed office “to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office,” or “an officer

or employee” who has served in the affected agency for at least ninety days “during the 365-day

period preceding the date” of the vacancy” and was employed by the agency on the date the

vacancy occurred. Id.

The Vacancies Act yields if another “statutory provision expressly . . . authorizes the

President, a court, or the head of an Executive Department, to designate an officer or employee to

perform the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capacity.” Id.

§ 3347(a)(1)(A). But Congress qualified that exception: a “statutory provision providing general

authority to the head of an Executive agency . . . to delegate duties statutorily vested in that agency

head to, or to reassign duties among, officers or employees of such Executive agency” does not

supplant the Vacancies Act’s procedures. Id. § 3347(b) (emphases added). Only a statute that

specifically authorizes the appointment of an “acting” officer can qualify for the Vacancies Act

exception. Id. § 3347(a)(1)(A).

Finally, the Vacancies Act specifies the result when a person exercises principal officer

authority without complying with the statute. “An action taken by any person who is not acting”

according to the statute’s provisions “in the performance of any function or duty of a vacant office”

covered by the statute “shall have no force or effect.” Id. § 3348(d)(1). Nor may any such action

“be ratified” after the fact. Id. § 3348(d)(2).

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 b. The CEO of USAGM

The CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global Media is a principal officer and, as such, is

appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. See 22 U.S.C. § 6203(b)(1).

The CEO, in turn, may “appoint such personnel for the Chief Executive Officer” as the CEO “may

determine to be necessary.” Id. § 6204(a)(11).

In December 2024, then-President-elect Trump announced that Defendant Lake would

serve as the director of Voice of America in the incoming administration. See Statement of

Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 168-2 (“SUMF”). But upon taking office in January

2025, President Trump removed six of the seven members of the International Broadcasting

Advisory Board. Id. ¶ 2. Because the director of Voice of America “may only be . . . removed if

such action has been approved by a majority vote of the Advisory Board,” the President could not

remove and replace the incumbent Voice of America director with Lake until the Board regained

a quorum. 22 U.S.C. § 6205(e)(1).

All the while, on January 20, 2025, USAGM CEO Amanda Bennett resigned. See

Defendant’s SUMF ¶ 1, ECF No. 202-2 (“DSUMF”). Rather than being nominated for the

vacancy, however, Lake was appointed as Senior Advisor to acting CEO Victor Morales on

February 27, 2025.1 See Id. ¶ 2. On March 5, 2025, Morales issued a Delegation Order that

“designated” Lake “to perform the functions and responsibilities specified” in all but three of the

1
According to public reporting, it was Lake who announced that Morales would serve as acting CEO in an email to
USAGM staff. SUMF ¶ 5. Although the defendants dispute the admissibility of the news reporting and contend it
therefore should not be part of the summary judgment record, the Court has little doubt that the same facts could be
presented in admissible form at a later date if needed, either as part of the administrative record or through the
testimony of a party to the communication. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (allowing objections if proffered fact “cannot
be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence” (emphasis added)); Ecological Rights Found. v. U.S.
Envt’l Prot. Agency, 541 F. Supp. 3d 34, 51 (D.D.C. 2021) (holding summary judgment “evidence need not be in a
form that would be admissible at trial, so long as it is capable of being converted into admissible evidence” (citation
omitted)). In any event, this detail is not dispositive of the pending motions.

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twenty-two subsections of 22 U.S.C. § 6204(a) assigning the authorities of the CEO. Ex. 2 to

Cross-Reply, ECF No. 214-2 (“March Delegation”).

After Lake was elevated to the position of Deputy CEO in July, Morales issued a second

and materially identical delegation order. Ex. 3 to Cross-Reply, ECF No. 214-3 (“July

Delegation”). These documents corroborate testimony Lake provided during show-cause

proceedings in this case, in which she stated that during her tenure as Senior Advisor and Deputy

CEO, she exercised “95 percent” of the CEO’s duties and the acting CEO retained responsibility

for “[w]riting reports” and little else. SUMF ¶ 6. Although the Court sees no apparent defect in

the appointment of Morales as acting CEO, it is clear that Lake had de facto control of the agency

pursuant to these delegations. Lake was ultimately made acting CEO beginning on July 31, 2025,

and ending on November 19, 2025, two days after the filing of the plaintiffs’ motion. DSUMF

¶ 7. She has therefore exercised control over the agency during the period relevant to the motions.

The President issued Executive Order 14,238 on March 14, 2025. See 90 Fed. Reg. 13043

(Mar. 14, 2025). The Executive Order directed that “the non-statutory components and functions

of [USAGM] shall be eliminated to the maximum extent consistent with applicable law.” SUMF

¶ 7. Lake’s testimony indicates that she took the lead for the agency in its efforts to comply with

the Executive Order. Id. ¶ 8. For example, Lake cancelled USAGM’s lease on new office space.

Id. ¶ 9 (citing Lake Dep. at 124:12–19). Lake also personally oversaw the drawdown of USAGM’s

broadcasting operations, including the decision to cease television broadcasting. Id. ¶ 10. Lake

testified that she asked Morales and other senior career officers to recommend a plan for

compliance with the Executive Order, and Lake transmitted that plan to Congress in June. See id.

(citing Lake Dep. 153:14–18).

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 Lake also took charge of personnel decisions at USAGM. Most notably for purposes of

this litigation, Lake oversaw efforts to implement a reduction-in-force (“RIF”) that would have

removed 639 USAGM employees. Id. ¶ 12. In June, Lake personally signed the RIF notices after

Morales “refused to do [so].” Id. (quoting Lake Dep. at 311:4–6). These notices were later

rescinded due to errors, but Lake sent revised RIF notices to 532 employees on August 29, 2025.

Id ¶ 13; ECF No. 144-4 (sample RIF notice). Lake also made the decision to assign Leili Soltani

to perform the responsibilities of the head of programming for VOA while its director, Michael

Abramowitz, was on administrative leave. Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Soltani Dep. at 69:9–70:12). And

Lake hired new advisers, notably Frank Wuco. Id. (quoting Wuco Dep. at 60:5–13).

The defendants represent that Lake has returned to the role of Deputy CEO as of November

19, 2025 but do not identify who is serving as acting CEO at the present. See DSUMF ¶ 4.

c. Procedural History

The plaintiffs moved to supplement the Complaint in this case on November 17, 2025,

which the Court granted on December 12. See ECF Nos. 167-1, 179. The Supplemental Complaint

set forth new allegations related to Lake’s exercise of CEO authority and claims under the

Appointments Clause and Vacancies Act. See ECF No. 167-1 at 5–6 (alleging Count X under

Appointments Clause and Count XI under Vacancies Act). Also on November 17, the plaintiffs

filed the instant Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking judgment as a matter of law on

the claims raised in the Supplemental Complaint. ECF No. 168. The defendants opposed, moved

to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and cross-moved for summary judgment on

February 6, 2026. ECF Nos. 202, 203. The plaintiffs filed their joint reply/cross-opposition on

February 17. See ECF Nos. 208, 209.

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 On February 26, 2026, the plaintiffs advised the Court in writing that Defendant Lake had

reinstated a “Deferred Resignation Program” (“DRP”), allowing USAGM employees “to resign

from their position at USAGM now . . . and continue receiving pay until September 5[, 2026].”

Notice at 1, ECF No. 212. Employees have until March 9, 2026, to accept the DRP. Id. An email

to USAGM staff advised that the “RIF noticed in August 2025 is currently suspended due to court

order, and the Agency still intends to carry out a significant RIF as soon as [it is] able.” Ex. B to

Decl. of Georgina Yeomans at 5, ECF No. 212-1.

The defendants cross-replied on March 4, see ECF No. 214, and the plaintiffs sur-replied

with the Court’s leave on March 5, see ECF Nos. 216-1, 217. In light of the proposed DRP, the

cross-motions are now not only ripe but pressing.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

a. Motion for Summary Judgment

A movant is entitled to summary judgment if he or she “shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if “it might affect the outcome of a suit under governing

law.” Mayorga v. Merdon, 928 F.3d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Holcomb v. Powell, 433

F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). A dispute is “genuine” only if “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (citation omitted). Rule 56(c)

“explicitly require[s] a party opposing summary judgment to support an assertion that a fact is

genuinely disputed with materials in the record.” Oveido v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 948

F.3d 386, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2020). “When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, each

motion is considered separately, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the court

must determine, for each motion, whether the Rule 56 standard has been met.” Am. Ctr. for Int’l

Lab. Solidarity v. Chavez-DeRemer, 789 F. Supp. 3d 66, 80 (D.D.C. 2025).

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III. ANALYSIS

a. The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction.

Before turning to the merits, the Court briefly notes that Lake purports to incorporate by

reference a challenge to standing presented in a motion to dismiss the defendants filed on July 18,

2025. See ECF No. 202 at 11 (citing ECF No. 128 at 7–11). That motion, however, predates the

Supplemental Complaint filed on December 12, in which the plaintiffs brought additional claims

under the Vacancies Act and Appointments Clause. See ECF Nos. 168, 179. Because the standing

arguments contained in the July motion target the plaintiffs’ standing to bring the APA and

constitutional claims presented in the original Complaint, those arguments have limited relevance

to the plaintiffs’ standing to bring the Appointments Clause and Vacancies Act claims at issue in

this opinion. See Scahill v. District of Columbia, 271 F. Supp. 3d 216, 224 (D.D.C. 2017) (“A

plaintiff . . . ‘must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief

that is sought.’” (quoting Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017))).

That notwithstanding, the Court has a duty to confirm its jurisdiction and readily finds that

the plaintiffs here have standing. Lake, exercising the authority of the USAGM CEO, has placed

many of these employees on administrative leave and initiated a reduction in force that would

permanently end the employee plaintiffs’ employment, which has only been paused by ongoing

litigation in this case; likewise, the same conduct would cause Article III injuries to plaintiff

American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), whose loss of

union dues supports standing. See Widakuswara, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 27–28. The Court is thus

satisfied that several classes of plaintiffs have standing to raise the present claims. See Newdow v.

Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining that courts may proceed to merits so

long as at least “one plaintiff has standing” (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S.

678, 682 (1977))).

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 Lake also alludes to an argument that these claims should be channeled under the Civil

Service Reform Act because the employee plaintiffs’ claims depend on the harms they would

suffer due to the proposed RIF. This argument fails for many reasons. First, case law makes clear

that challenges to the authority of an officer purporting to implement a RIF are not subject to

channeling. See Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1490–96 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Second, and as this

Court has previously held in a related case, claims that turn on Appointments Clause authority are

similarly exempt. See Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175, 180 (2023); Free Enter. Fund v.

Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010); Abramowitz v. Lake, 803 F. Supp. 1, 10–

13 (D.D.C. 2025), appeal filed Sept. 3, 2025. Third, several of the plaintiffs in this case, including

AFSCME and Radio Sans Frontières, raise claims not directly linked to an employment

relationship and cannot be channeled. As with the defendants’ prior attempts to circumvent

judicial review via the CSRA, these grounds for channeling are unpersuasive.

b. Lake’s purported appointment as acting CEO violates the Vacancies Act.

The limits on Presidential authority to appoint acting officers without the Senate’s advice

and consent provides “a critical ‘structural safeguard . . . of the constitutional scheme.’” SW Gen.,

Inc., 580 U.S. at 293 (quoting Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659). As discussed above, the Vacancies Act

permits three avenues by which a government official can hold a vacant office in an acting capacity

without separate advice and consent. To begin, by default, the “first assistant” of the vacant office

automatically becomes the acting principal. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1). Second, “the President (and

only the President) may direct a person who serves in an office for which appointment is required

to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform the

functions and duties of the vacant office.” Id. § 3345(a)(2). Third, “‘the President (and only the

President) may direct an officer or employee of’ the agency experiencing the vacancy ‘to perform

10
the functions and duties of the vacant office,’ but only if that individual served in a senior position

in that agency for at least 90 days ‘during the 365-day period preceding’ the occurrence of the

vacancy.” L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting 5 U.S.C.

§ 3345(a)(3)).

Lake is plainly ineligible to serve under subsection (a)(2) because she was not “serv[ing]

in an office for which appointment” is subject to advice and consent prior to her designation as

acting CEO. 22 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2). Nor can she serve under subsection (a)(3) because she was

not employed by USAGM in any capacity prior to the occurrence of the vacancy.

She insists, however, that her designation as acting CEO is proper under subsection (a)(1)

because she was serving as Deputy CEO, the first assistant to the CEO, at the time that Morales

was removed as acting CEO. Adopting Lake’s position would require the Court to find that the

President can fill a first assistantship at any time during a vacancy in a Senate-confirmed office

and then fall back on subsection (a)(1) to elevate the first assistant to serve as the acting officer.

Agreeing with other judicial decisions that have addressed this question, the Court concludes that

Lake’s argument is inconsistent with the text and structure of the Vacancies Act. See Giraud, 160

F.4th at 397–401; In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 2026 WL 60793, at *5. Instead, subsection (a)(1)

applies only to a first assistant who occupies that position at the time the vacancy occurs. Because

Lake was not first assistant at the time of the vacancy, she lacks authority to serve as the acting

CEO.

As an initial matter, the Court joins in the observation that “[t]he text of subsection (a)(1)

alone is . . . silent as to whether the first assistant must be in the role at the time of the vacancy.”

Giraud, 160 F.4th at 397. Neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Supreme Court has had “the occasion

to resolve” the question. L.M.-M., 442 F. Supp. 3d at 24 (citing SW Gen., Inc. v. NLRB, 796 F.3d

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67, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).2 Applying ordinary principles of statutory construction, however, the

Court finds that the best interpretation of the statute favors the plaintiffs.

First, it is undisputed that subsection (a)(1) is triggered “automatic[ally]” by the occurrence

of a vacancy in a Senate-confirmed position. SW Gen., 580 U.S. at 305. Several textual clues

support this conclusion. Upon the occurrence of an officer vacancy, “the first assistant to the office

of such officer shall perform the functions and duties of the office temporarily in an acting

capacity.” 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1) (emphasis added). “[T]he word ‘shall’ imposes a mandatory

command.” Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369, 379 (2025). And in the context of subsection (a)(1),

the word “shall” imposes a “directive that [the first assistant] perform acting duties.” SW Gen.,

580 U.S. at 303. Lake acknowledges as much in her briefing. See ECF No. 202 at 16 (“[A]bsent

any presidential designation, the first assistant to the office shall perform its functions and duties.”

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1))).

The use of “shall” distinguishes (a)(1) from the operative language in subsections (a)(2)

and (a)(3). Each of those subsections speaks of other officers or employees whom “the President

(and only the President) may direct . . . to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office.”

5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2)–(3) (emphasis added); see also SW Gen., 580 U.S. at 303 (“Compare the

mandatory language of subsection (a)(1) to (a)(2) and (a)(3).”). In other words, “[t]he President

may essentially override the automatic first assistant appointment by choosing a different person

who qualifies under subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3), but neither the President nor anyone else has a

role in the automatic elevation of the first assistant when the vacancy occurs.” Giraud, 160 F.4th

at 398.

2
Although the D.C. Circuit has not decided the question presented here, the panel in Southwest General drew the
same assumption as part of its reasoning. 796 F.3d at 76 (“Although we do not decide its meaning today, subsection
(a)(1) may refer to the person who is serving as first assistant when the vacancy occurs.”).

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 Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) also reflect a careful balance between “honor[ing] the

Senate’s advice-and-consent role” and “reconiz[ing] a need for some flexibility in choosing an

acting officer.” Id. They do so by “cabin[ing] the pool of eligible people” for acting service to

two narrowly defined groups: “those the Senate has already confirmed” to another office (which

may be indicia of fitness for federal leadership) “or those with [recent] expertise within the agency”

(which may confer relevant substantive experience). Id. Lake’s view of subsection (a)(1) is

therefore difficult to square with the decisions Congress made in enacting (a)(2) and (a)(3). That

is because “while subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) narrowly constrain who ‘the President (and only

the President)’ may direct to take an acting role,” Lake’s reading of subsection (a)(1) would allow

the President “to, in effect, appoint almost anyone, whether or not the person is previously Senate-

confirmed to another role, and whether or not the person has any recent experience in the agency,”

merely by installing them as a non-Senate-confirmed first assistant. Id. at 399 (citations omitted).

Allowing the President to circumvent Congress’s carefully crafted limitations in this way would

relegate subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) — to say nothing of the advice-and-consent requirement —

to vestigial surplusage. The Court declines Lake’s invitation to do such violence to the statutory

and constitutional scheme.

Lake warns that the reading the Court adopts today would “upend the functioning of the

Executive Branch, which routinely relies on acting officers who serve in that capacity upon being

installed as first assistants after . . . the officer position became vacant.” ECF No. 202 at 17. She

observes that “[t]his practice is most common at the beginning of a new Administration, which

typically fills vacancies in Senate-confirmed positions by appointing first assistants, who then

serve in an acting capacity until the Senate confirms the new Administration’s nominees.” Id. at

17–18. But “just because a practice previously went unchallenged does not mean it complies with

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the [Vacancies Act].” Giraud, 160 F.4th at 400. And the government has never “identif[ied] a

single example of a post-vacancy first assistant serving in an acting capacity prior to enactment of

the [Vacancies Act].” Id. (quoting L.M.-M., 442 F. Supp. 3d at 27–28). Thus, any “practice of

elevating later-named first assistants is a recent development . . . not a practice to which Congress

has acquiesced,” let alone “a process essential to the Government’s ability to function.” Id. In

sum, § 3345 does not authorize Lake to serve as acting CEO.

c. Lake cannot exercise the duties of the USAGM CEO through delegation.

As a fallback position, Lake contends that even if she is not the acting CEO of USAGM

under the Vacancies Act, she may nevertheless continue to exercise the authorities delegated to

her by Victor Morales. This argument falters out of the gate.

Lake contends that then-acting CEO Morales assigned the duties and responsibilities of

CEO to her in a series of formal delegations issued pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §§6204(a)(17)–18 and

§ 1435. By statute, the CEO may “utilize the provisions of titles III, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, and X

of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act [the “Smith-Mundt Act”] . . . to

the extent the [CEO] considers necessary in carrying out the provisions and purposes of this

chapter.” Id. § 6204(a)(17). Title X of the Smith-Mundt Act, in turn, includes the provision now

codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1435, and Lake contends this provision empowers “the highest official —

such as the UASGM CEO or Acting CEO — to delegate powers conferred by the Act to

appropriate government officers.” Cross-Reply at 7. The problem for Lake is that the provision

she cites says not one word about delegation by the CEO. Instead, the Act provides that “[t]he

Secretary,” meaning the Secretary of State,3 “may delegate, to such officers of the Government as

the Secretary determines to be appropriate, any of the powers conferred upon him by this chapter.”

3
See 22 U.S.C. § 1433(1) (“When used in this chapter, the term ‘Secretary’ means the ‘Secretary of State.’”)

14
22 U.S.C. § 1435 (emphasis added). Although the Court assumes that this citation was not

purposely misleading, Lake does not acknowledge the gap between her characterization of § 1435

and its plain next, let alone suggest why the Court should infer that when Congress explicitly

referred to the Secretary of State, it in fact meant to include the CEO of USAGM. See Simmons

v. Himmelreich, 578 U.S. 621, 627 (2016) (“Absent persuasive indications to the contrary, [courts]

presume Congress says what it means and means what it says.”).

Nor does Lake contend with a further hurdle: the separate and specific anti-delegation

provisions of the Vacancies Act. The Vacancies Act provides “the exclusive means for

temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions and duties of any office.” 5

U.S.C. § 3347(a). “But the [Vacancies Act] also prohibits the use of general vesting and delegation

statutes to ‘temporarily authoriz[e] an acting official to perform the functions and duties’” of a

vacant office. Giraud, 160 F.4th at 403 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 3347(b)). In other words, delegation

statutes cannot function as an end-run around the provisions of § 3345(a). So even if the Smith-

Mundt Act authorized delegations by the CEO of USAGM — a proposition Lake has not

established — that statute still could not transform Lake into the de facto acting CEO, as she

supposes, because the Vacancies Act forbids it. Like her reading of subsection (a)(1), her approach

would “bypass[] the constitutional [advice-and-consent] process entirely” and functionally

“eliminate[] the requirements of the [Vacancies Act].” Id.

But that has not stopped Lake from trying. The exhibits Lake has submitted in support of

her cross-reply corroborate her testimony that Morales delegated to her nearly all statutory

authorities of the Chief Executive Officer apart from the making of reports. See SUMF ¶ 6 (citing

deposition testimony that Lake exercised “95 percent” of the CEO’s duties and acting CEOs

retained responsibility only for “[w]riting reports”). Lake has provided nearly identical delegation

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orders dated March 5 and July 11, 2025, in which Morales delegated nearly all of his statutory

authority as acting CEO under 22 U.S.C. § 6204(a). See March Delegation; July Delegation. The

only powers reserved to Morales were those contained in § 6204(a)(9) (making annual reports to

Congress), § 6204(a)(19) (authorizing expenses for personnel stationed in the Northern Mariana

Islands), and § 6204(a)(22)(B)–(C) (reporting of “biased, unprofessional, or otherwise problematic

content” to Congress). Pursuant to these delegations, and in violation of the Vacancies Act’s anti-

delegation provisions, Lake assumed authority “[t]o supervise all broadcasting activities” of

USAGM, id. § 6204(a)(1), to “determine . . . the addition or deletion of language services,” id.

§ 6204(a)(4), “[t]o make and supervise grants and cooperative agreements for broadcasting,” id.

§ 6204(a)(5), and “[t]o allocate” congressionally appropriated money “for international

broadcasting activities among the various elements of” USAGM, id. § 6204(a)(6), among many

other important responsibilities in furtherance of the “broad foreign policy objectives of the United

States,” id. § 6204(a)(2). The Court finds that these expansive delegations were an unlawful effort

to transform Lake into the CEO of U.S. Agency for Global Media in all but name, and therefore

violated § 3347(b) of the Vacancies Act.

d. Remedy

Only the Appointments Clause or the Vacancies Act’s exclusive structure may authorize

service as a principal officer, and Lake satisfies the requirements of neither the statute nor the

Constitution. “[A]ction taken by any person who is not acting” in compliance with the Vacancies

Act’s provisions “in the performance of any function or duty of a vacant office . . . shall have no

force or effect.” 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d)(1). Nor may any such action “be ratified.” Id. § 3348(d)(2).

As a consequence, any actions taken by Lake during her asserted tenure as acting CEO between

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