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UNSC

Agenda: Discussing the instability in the region of South china Sea.

UNSC: Peace and Security

The Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance

of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each
Member has one vote. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all
Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions.
The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a
threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a
dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of
adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council
can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorise the use of force to
maintain or restore international peace and security.

The Mandate of the UNSC:

The mandate of the United Nations Security Council, elaborated in

chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, is the maintenance of
international peace and security. It is further based on the norms of

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international law including (but not confined to) the laws of war and
international humanitarian law. The Security Council’s mandate to act
also derives from the normative and operational precedent established
by actual Council practice on behalf of the international community
of states. Questions about whether this mandate – legal, normative
and functional – can or should be expanded to take account of
environmental issues have arisen against the backdrop of debates
about how security and threats to international peace is to be defined
in a post-Cold War world. A further impetus comes from demands for
UN reform in the face of accusations that it is undemocratic and
administratively and normatively ill-equipped to deal with
contemporary challenges.

The South China Sea Conflict

China’s sweeping claims of sovereignty over the sea—and the sea’s

estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet
of natural gas—have antagonised competing claimants Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. As early
as the 1970s, countries began to claim islands and various zones in the
South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands, which possess rich
natural resources and fishing areas.

China maintains that, under international law, foreign militaries are

not able to conduct intelligence-gathering activities, such as
reconnaissance flights, in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In July
2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague issued its
ruling on a claim brought against China by the Philippines under
UNCLOS, ruling in favour of the Philippines on almost every count.
While China is a signatory to the treaty, which established the
tribunal, it refuses to accept the court’s authority.

In recent years, satellite imagery has shown China’s increased efforts

to reclaim land in the South China Sea by physically increasing the

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size of islands or creating new islands altogether. In addition to piling

sand onto existing reefs, China has constructed ports, military
installations, and airstrips—particularly in the Paracel and Spratly
Islands, where it has twenty and seven outposts, respectively. China
has militarized Woody Island by deploying fighter jets, cruise
missiles, and a radar system.

Recent Developments:

Tensions between China and both the Philippines and Vietnam have
recently cooled, even as China increased its military activity in the
South China Sea by conducting a series of naval manoeuvres and
exercises in March and April 2018. Meanwhile, China continues to
construct military and industrial outposts on artificial islands it has
built in disputed waters.
The United States has also stepped up its military activity and naval
presence in the region in recent years, including freedom of
navigation operations (FONOPs) in January and March 2018. In a
speech during his November 2017 visit to Southeast Asia, President
Donald J. Trump emphasised the importance of such operations, and
of ensuring free and open access to the South China Sea. Since May
2017, the United States has conducted six FONOPs in the region.

Implications of The South China Sea Conflict:

A failure to peacefully resolve the dispute, especially if it leads to

renewed military actions by any one or more of the claimants, would
have much broader regional, if not global economic as well as
political/security consequences.
Regardless of how conflict starts or who the combatants are, the
consequences could be far-reaching. The region's economy, already
hard-hit by the on-going Asian financial crisis, would be sure to suffer
another, perhaps fatal, blow. Should the sea lanes be threatened,
the conflict would rapidly become internationalised.
The use of force by the PRC in the contested territories would have a
particularly far-reaching destabilising affect. The impact would be

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greatest on the prospects for cordial relations between China and its
Southeast Asian neighbours. The steadily-improving relationship
between the PRC and both the United States and Japan would also be
severely disrupted.

China’s Stance:

Beijing considers that the islands, banks, and

shoals as well as surrounding waters of the
Xisha, Nansha, Zongsha, and Dongsha
archipelagos all the way down to the Zengmu
Ansha reef as its southernmost tip, constitute
an indisputable and indivisible part of
China’s historical territory. Together these territories account for
hundreds of islands, islets, sandbanks, rocks, and shoals (also referred
to as “maritime features”) throughout the South China Sea region.
While Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam have
overlapping claims in the region, the Chinese government deems
alternative interpretations to its claims to be untenable and that China
considers it has sovereignty over.

USA’s Stance:

The USA believes that China is

planning to use the islands for military
intentions, this is made clear from the
large runway and the conversion of
reefs to military facilities sourced from
satellite images that the USA has on the
islands. The USA does not want China to own the islands because it is
concerned that China will gain more power and influence in that
Southern Asia region and also in controlling the Sea Lines of
Communications (SLOCs). USA believes that:
 The PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim – including
any Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims derived from
Scarborough Reef and the Spratly Islands – vis-a-vis the

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Philippines in areas that the Tribunal found to be in the

Philippines’ EEZ or on its continental shelf. Beijing’s
harassment of Philippine fisheries and offshore energy
development within those areas is unlawful, as are any unilateral
PRC actions to exploit those resources. In line with the
Tribunal’s legally binding decision, the PRC has no lawful
territorial or maritime claim to Mischief Reef or Second Thomas
Shoal, both of which fall fully under the Philippines’ sovereign
rights and jurisdiction, nor does Beijing have any territorial or
maritime claims generated from these features.
 As PRC has failed to put forth a lawful, coherent maritime claim
in the South China Sea, the United States rejects any PRC claim
to waters beyond a 12-nautical mile territorial sea derived from
islands it claims in the Spratly Islands (without prejudice to
other states’ sovereignty claims over such islands). As such, the
United States rejects any PRC maritime claim in the waters
surrounding Vanguard Bank (off Vietnam), Luconia Shoals (off
Malaysia), waters in Brunei’s EEZ, and Natuna Besar (off
Indonesia). Any PRC action to harass other states’ fishing or
hydrocarbon development in these waters – or to carry out such
activities unilaterally – is unlawful.
 The PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to (or
derived from) James Shoal, an entirely submerged feature only
50 nautical miles from Malaysia and some 1,000 nautical miles
from China’s coast. James Shoal is often cited in PRC
propaganda as the “southernmost territory of China.”
International law is clear: An underwater feature like James
Shoal cannot be claimed by any state and is incapable of
generating maritime zones. James Shoal (roughly 20 meters
below the surface) is not and never was PRC territory, nor can
Beijing assert any lawful maritime rights from it.

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Brunei’s Stance:

Brunei has claims to Louisa Reef, Owen

Shoal and Rifleman Bank, all of which
Brunei declared in 1984 as features in its
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
However, Brunei is the only country
among the claimant states that does not assert sovereignty over these
islands, nor does it have any military presence there. Brunei’s
statement seems to present a unified front with the Philippines and
Vietnam, in preparation for its ASEAN chairmanship in 2021, where
ASEAN and China hope to finalise the formulation of the code of
conduct to reduce tensions in the South China Sea. However, Brunei's
insistence that specific issues in the maritime region should be
addressed bilaterally syncs with Beijing's position, indicating that the
country is still dependent on Chinese investment.
As the second-wealthiest member of ASEAN, it is paramount for
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah to maintain the economic status quo to
ensure the stability of the Sultanate.
Everything revolves around the Sultan in Brunei. The Bruneian
people subscribe to the Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), the Malay
Islamic Monarchy, as their political identity. As a result, Brunei’s
strategic culture is infused with the notion that everything, including
the determination of threats, is gauged by the Sultan.

Indonesia’s Stance:

Indonesia has long maintained that it is not a

legal claimant in the South China Sea. Over
the past five years, China has sent fishing
large fishing boats, often accompanied by
coast guard and maritime militia vessels, into
Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
near the Natuna islands, which Beijing claims as part of its expansive
“nine-dash line” maritime claim. In December 2019 and January
2020, for instance, nearly 60 vessels crossed into Indonesia’s EEZ.

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In the last few months of 2021, the two nations have engaged in a
low-level stand-off over an oil rig prospecting near the Natuna islands
inside Indonesia’s EEZ

Philippines’ Stance:

The relations between China and

Philippines have been experiencing a
decline since 2009 when China tried
to assert its claims over South China
Sea (SCS). Philippines objected
strongly to China’s claims during various bilateral consultations; it
also took the matter to United Nations Secretary General. China has
prevented the Philippines from carrying out oil and gas development
projects and from fishing in the disputed waters. Both countries used
their law enforcement agencies to stop each other from engaging in
activities claimed illegal by either of them. Philippines took the matter
to ASEAN but the Regional body failed to resolve the issue. So, in
2013 after years of vital engagements between both countries without
a proper resolution, Philippines filed arbitral proceedings against
China at Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague under United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). This paper is
a study of China-Philippines relations in the context of South China
Sea dispute and examines the award of the Tribunal and the post
arbitral relations between the Philippines and China.

Vietnam’s Stance:

Vietnam’s long-term goal is to recover

what it views as lost territories in the Sea.
As geopolitical realities dictate that it put
this maximalist aim on hold, Vietnam’s
immediate objective is to maintain the
territorial status quo and defend its waters
so that it can conduct normal economic activities such as fishing and
drilling for oil and gas without disruption.

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Vietnam pursues a long-term solution to the dispute through peaceful

means in accordance with international law, especially the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Vietnam’s main challenge is to
protect its national sovereignty and economic and strategic interests in
the South China Sea in the face of China’s frequent intrusions into
Vietnamese waters and its harassment of ships looking for oil and gas.
The two countries engaged in a standoff in 2014, which led to deadly
anti-China riots in Vietnamese cities, when China planted an oil rig in
Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. In 2017, Beijing reportedly
threatened to attack Hanoi’s outposts in the Spratly Islands if it did
not stop drilling in an area on Vietnam’s continental shelf that
overlaps with China’s expansive but ill-defined claims.

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