Disarmament and International

Security Committee (DISEC)

MUNUC 34
1 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
______________________________________________________

CHAIR LETTER…………………………….….………………………….….....…3

TOPIC A: ELECTORAL CONFLICT AND INTERFERENCE…………………….6

Statement of the Problem……………….……………..…………...…6

History of the Problem………………………………………………….12

Past Actions…………………………………………………………….. 17

Possible Solutions……………………………………………………….22

Bloc Positions……………………………………………………….……25

TOPIC B: STATE FRAGILITY…………...…………………..…………………...28

Statement of the Problem……………….………...………………....28

History of the Problem………………………………………………….34

Past Actions…………………………………………………………….. 40

Possible Solutions……………………………………………………….48

Bloc Positions……………………………………………………….……51

Bibliography………………………………………………………….....55

2 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

 CHAIR LETTER
____________________________________________________

Hello delegates,

Welcome to MUNUC 34 and to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). I
am incredibly excited to be your Chair and to lead fruitful, interesting, and substantive debate at
conference this year.

My name is Moritz Reichert, and I will be serving as your DISEC Chair. To tell a bit about myself, I was
born in Sydney, Australia before moving to New Jersey and attending school there, where I
unfortunately lost my Australian accent (although my love for Vegemite remains intact). I am
currently a third year at the University of Chicago, double majoring in Mathematics and Statistics.
Within the Model UN sphere of activities, I also serve as a Crisis Director for ChoMUN, which is our
collegiate Model UN conference, and I compete with UChicago’s traveling competitive Model UN
team. Outside of Model UN, I am a research assistant to professors in the UChicago math
department, lead some of the finance-oriented clubs on campus, mentor children in Hyde Park in
piano, and work as a teaching assistant for some courses. A large component of my free time is
dedicated toward going on runs, cultivating my list of best Chicago restaurants, and extensively
researching all of the backpacking travel that I will take on in the near future (next stop: Morocco).
While I did not compete in Model UN in high school, my college experiences with the activity have
made me incredibly excited to sit on the other side of the dais and facilitate a collaborative and
exciting environment for every delegate to expand their horizons, debate with one another, and
ultimately come to a robust resolution for one of the two topics laid out in the background guide.

I would like to share a few words of wisdom as to actions that will help put each of you in the best
spot possible to prime yourself for conference. First and foremost, a superficial review of the
problem areas for each topic will not suffice for true success in the committee room. The dais, which
is comprised of myself, the moderator, and assistant chairs, will be looking for a rich debate of the
nuances of these problems rather than surface-level solutions which are not feasible or practical.
Secondly, solutions which have been sourced directly from previous actions taken by countries or the
international community are of little significance within this committee. This does not mean that you

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should not analyze what has previously been undertaken; rather, I am looking for solutions which
build off of pre-existing actions and are creatively adapted to make them more attractive and
effective ideas. Finally, I will remain adamant about maintaining a robust and substantial debate in
the committee room – I will have little hesitation to pull delegates back into the room if I feel that
each speech are words strung together just to hear the sound of your own voice. Similarly, debate
where delegates are not engaging with one another but just attempting to promulgate and brute
force their own ideas without respect for the other thoughts circulating the room will reflect poorly
on yourself.

With that, I would like to finish by discussing some of my expectations for conference. I am holding
each of you to the highest of standards—DISEC is a large committee with many delegates, meaning
that each delegate must display both leadership and strong engagement with the nuances of the
content. I have a particular fondness for General Assemblies, as they provide you with incredible
flexibility regarding the position your delegation wishes to take, manners in which you can engage
with your fellow peers, and opportunities to create memorable blocs and resolutions. I would much
rather see ambitious attempts to create effective solutions and strong interpersonal dynamics than a
string of small successes which do not culminate in anything significant. That being said, I am
incredibly cognizant of how large of an undertaking it is to participate in such a large GA, and I
commend each of you for participating. If at any point we can act as a resource in any capacity,
either before or during conference, please do not hesitate to reach out to myself or any other
member of the dais. While I am expecting a rigorous and intense few days in Chicago, my primary
focus is to ensure that a positive environment is facilitated and that each of you feel that you can
perform at your best.

If you have any questions or concerns leading up to the conference, whether it is about the substance
of the topics, my expectations for committee, or any other area, please do not hesitate to send me a
note.

Wishing you all the best with your research. I am incredibly excited to meet each of you in February
and for an exciting couple of days debating topics which I think each of you will find fascinating.

4 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

All the best,

Moritz

mreichert@[Link]

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 TOPIC A: ELECTORAL CONFLICT AND INTERFERENCE
______________________________________________________

Statement of the Problem

Defining Electoral Conflict

Electoral processes are events within systems of government that attempt to achieve some form of
decentralized decision-making in governance. Over the course of history, elections have enabled
societies to move away from violence as a means of determining the system of government and who
sits atop that governmental hierarchy.1 Elections can be seen as fair or corrupt, or somewhere in a
continuum between those two absolute quantifiers. The public perception of elections can either
strengthen or weaken its ability to “function as an umpire for social decision-making.”2

Electoral conflict generally emerges in one of two ways within any type of election. The first type of
electoral conflict occurs during the course of an election. This type is a result of various players in an
election (e.g., candidates, external government officials, third parties, etc.) using conflict and
violence as a means to determine, delay, or otherwise influence the outcome of an election. Given
that the aim of this type is undermining the existing electoral process, it often (but not exclusively)
occurs within elections that are publicly perceived to be “fairer.”3 The chain of causality should be
noted: it is not that the elections cause this type of violence, but rather that this violence causes
elections to be undermined and broken down.

The second type of electoral conflict is one that emerges after an election occurs. In this case, any
number of stakeholders in the election could be unhappy and leverage conflict and violence as a
retaliatory act. Consider, for instance, a case wherein the general public deems an election to have
been pre-determined and the ballots not properly counted. The public might, as a result, use conflict
to rebel against the alleged result of the election. Conflict and violence can just as easily be used by
government officials or other elites to express their discontent with a certain outcome of an election

1
Jeff Fischer, “Electoral Conflict and Violence,” IFES: Making Democracy Work, February 5, 2002,
[Link]
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.

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process. This type of violence often (but not exclusively) occurs within elections that are publicly
perceived to be more “corrupt.”4 In this case, the chain of causality flows in the opposite direction to
the first type of electoral conflict: the violence directly stems from the election and the electoral
process itself.

Defining Electoral Interference

As with electoral conflict, defining electoral interference presents its own set of troublesome
considerations. The most concerning consideration is where the line can be drawn between run-of-
the-mill ‘dirty’ politics and true election interference.5 Elections are designed for candidates to be
able to persuade voters to vote for them, meaning that objectively outlining criteria against which to
check for election interference can become difficult. Delegates should keep in mind this issue within
the context of their resolutions and include clauses that target actions that can be thought of as true
electoral interference rather than a result of potentially imperfect institutions in various countries.

Due to the difficulty in delineating domestic electoral interference, this committee will follow the
generally accepted scholarly definition of electoral interference as “attempts by a foreign nation or
outside group to manipulate opinion and sway results in another polity’s election.”6 A categorical
definition of electoral interference (even foreign electoral interference, as this committee will adhere
to) is impossible, as seen by the subjectivity in defining what it means to be an “outside group.”

This definition provides delegates with the opportunity to consider what should fall into the
framework of electoral interference. For example, in 2017, a group of Macedonian youth executed
“fake news” operations in other nations with the intention of generating advertising revenue for
themselves.7 Inevitably, these operations swayed opinions and influenced, to some marginal extent,
the choice of candidate that some voters chose. However, this group of external actors were not
financed by any government entities. Delegates should consider whether such examples should be

4
Ibid.
5
Samuel Spies, “Election Interference, V1.0,” MediaWell, Social Science Research Council, October 22, 2019,
[Link]
6
Ibid.
7
Heather C. Hughes and Israel Waismel-Manor, “The Macedonian Fake News Industry and the 2016 US Election,” PS:
Political Science & Politics 54, no. 1 (January 2021): 19–23, [Link]

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categorized as electoral interference, forcing them to be met with the same actions as other state-
sponsored interference activities.

Electoral interference can come in multiple shapes and forms, but it is particularly important to
distinguish between analog and digital electoral interference. In an age of global technology
advancement and adoption, it has never been easier to leverage technology to attempt to influence
an election.8 Consider, for example, the alleged interference in the United States’ 2016 election. This
is not the only type of electoral interference: strategies that employ on-the-ground resources, such
as intelligence assets, diplomatic ties, or even the threat of sanctions, can all also be considered to be
electoral interference. During the drafting of working papers and resolutions, delegates should
consider whether a set of actions should broadly be applied to both analog and digital electoral
interference, or whether this committee should address the two types of interference in different
manners.

Shortcoming of Electoral Systems

Delegates need to keep in mind that countries can have radically different systems of governance
and electoral processes. For example, the United States uses the electoral college, a system which
decides the victor through state electoral votes, rather than a national popular vote. Germany’s
Chancellor is nominated by the President of Germany and is then voted on by the legislative body.9
Other nations have top officials ushered in through blood lineage, religious institutions, or other
factors. As such, there are multiple context-dependent shortcomings of different forms of electoral
systems that this background guide is unable to address. The most important consideration to come
from this discussion is that solutions cannot be universally implemented based on the fact that said
solution can be successfully implemented in one (or a few) nations.

8
Ibid.
9
“The Election of the Federal Chancellor,” accessed July 25, 2021, [Link]
en/chancellery/the-election-of-the-federal-chancellor.

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One of the most glaring shortcomings of electoral systems is the lack of absolute protection from
intimidation or pressure to vote for a certain candidate or party.10 The first type of electoral conflict,
defined above, is particularly relevant vis-à-vis the intimidation of voters. Some nations have
implemented their own safeguards against voter intimidation. One such protection is the restriction
of the presence of federal agents (e.g., the national police or equivalents) at polling locations.11 Voter
intimidation comes in multiple forms and does not necessarily need to be explicit: consider the
hypothetical example of many ardent supporters of one candidate gathering outside of polling
locations during an election.12 This type of pressure can make voters feel that they need to vote in a
certain way for their physical safety.

Another shortcoming of electoral systems is the fallibility of individuals who are involved in the
election. Consider electoral systems wherein legislators are responsible for submitting ballots for an
elected office. Every legislator has their own personal incentives, particularly in systems of
government where the legislators are not directly elected by constituents. Bribes, corruption,
lobbying, etc., can all come into play in influencing the vote of these highly influential legislators. As
such, elections can quickly be led astray from their original intent—choosing the best person for the
position—by personal conflicts of interest.

A third example of electoral shortcoming comes in the form of the digital age. Societies across the
world are adopting technological innovation at a pace that is unprecedented. As such, elections are
moving toward greater technological innovation as well: voting machines, electronic registration,
electronic ballots, and other technologies, are all becoming more prevalent in the electoral systems
of countries across the globe.13 Unfortunately, this provides another avenue for electoral systems to
be undermined, as by shifting elections online, there is a greater opportunity for cybersecurity
threats to jeopardize the integrity of the election outcomes. This is particularly prevalent in the

10
Frank Bitafir Ijon, “Election Security and Violence in Ghana: The Case of Ayawaso West Wougon and Talensi By-
Elections,” Asian Research Journal of Arts & Social Sciences, January 11, 2020, 32–46,
[Link]
11
Sean Morales-Doyle et al., “Voters Should Not Be Intimidated | Brennan Center for Justice,” accessed July 25, 2021,
[Link]
12
“Explainer: What ‘Poll Watching’ Really Means,” MIT Technology Review, accessed July 25, 2021,
[Link]
13
Danielle Root and Liz Kennedy, “9 Solutions to Secure America’s Elections,” Center for American Progress, accessed
July 25, 2021, [Link]
americas-elections/.

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evolution of electoral interference, wherein state-sponsored actors can now leverage their
cybersecurity expertise to threaten the digital electoral infrastructure of nations.14

The digital age introduces other, more subtle, weaknesses into the electoral system. One influencing
factor is the ability to influence voters on a broad scale. Social media has become a large part of
everyday life for billions of consumers spread across every country. These platforms serve not only as
a mechanism to connect with friends and families but also as a means to express opinions and gather
information, such as news. Many examples of disinformation and social media influence operations
in the context of electoral interference have been widely published and discussed.15 These types of
issues begin to blur the lines between the private and public sectors within the discussion of
elections. Delegates might want to consider whether public-private partnerships are effective, or if
not, what other mechanisms can be used to reduce the threat of electoral interference in the face of
digital elections.

Addressing Electoral Conflict

Solutions regarding electoral conflict need to consider the root of the conflict. In the definition
provided above, the first type of conflict can be caused by a number of contributing factors. Many of
these issues come in the form of imperfect institutions or governance mechanisms in a nation. In
certain situations, a tradition of the involvement of military and/or law enforcement officials might
enable opportunities for electoral conflict. Or, there might be some recent history of conflict and the
election is hotly disputed by the various warring parties. Other types of conflict could just be a result
of corrupt government officials that feel as though they can exert their power over legitimate voters.

In the second type of electoral conflict, wherein the conflict occurs after-the-fact, the cause is the
election itself. As such, there are likely issues with the electoral system or how the elections are
perceived by the public. There might be doubts about the legitimacy of an election outcome or acts

14
Ibid.
15
Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer and Heather Conley, “Successfully Countering Russian Electoral Interference: 15
Lessons Learned from the Macron Leaks,” n.d., 6.

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of retaliation in the face of defeat. Solutions to this type of conflict should focus on developing
confidence within electoral systems.

The other facet of electoral conflict to consider is the protection and safeguarding of citizens in the
face of violence. Once conflict is initiated, the goal of minimizing casualties and finding a peaceful
solution should be indisputable. This committee must consider in its resolutions how to protect
citizens from the violence associated with electoral conflict. In addition, delegates must consider
how to provide guardrails or a framework to ensure that a rapid adoption of a ceasefire and
reconciliation can occur after a conflict. While trying to preempt electoral conflict by addressing the
root causes is critical, the discussion of providing a robust set of reactionary solutions to electoral
conflict cannot be overlooked.

Addressing Electoral Interference

The primary consideration for Electoral Interference is how to essentially “wall-off” elections from all
types of foreign influence operations. This quickly becomes a difficult ideal to achieve, given how
globalized the modern world is. As such, solutions should aim to address broad areas of vulnerability
to electoral interference rather than becoming obsessed with how to perfectly achieve isolation from
foreign influence.

Discussion of this topic must seriously consider how to prevent cybersecurity vulnerabilities. With
the introduction of digital electoral infrastructure, there is an entirely new domain that state-
sponsored actors can attack to achieve some electoral interference. Each nation is developing its
own military and political cybersecurity capabilities to compete in the digital age. These resources
and skills can just as easily be applied to foreign elections in an attempt to sway the outcomes.16
Delegates must consider how to minimize fraud and provide each nation with the ability to secure
themselves in the digital playing field. Some potential solutions could include (but are most certainly
not limited to) identity checks of voters, post-election audits, and cybersecurity standards for
election infrastructure such as voting machines.17

16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.

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 History of the Problem

The first instances of voting in human history originated in early tribal societies, where the kings or
leaders of the tribe would be elected. Typically, these leaders were elected by a council of elders.
Given the small number of elders that were voting, all that could be done to influence the decisions
was for other members of the tribe to persuade the various elders.

One of the most classic examples of voting was in Ancient Greek society. Under the Spartan
Constitution in the 6th century BCE, the author Lycurgus enshrined a system of voting into Spartan
society.18 In Athens, the de facto “home of democracy,” democratic voting was introduced in 574
BCE by the Greek statesman Solon.19 By the beginning of the 5th century BCE, most male Athenians
were able to participate in the voting process, including on issues such as declarations of war and the
election of generals.20 Greek voting procedures became so commonplace that voting was allowed to
ostracize those deemed to be a threat to the state.21 One of the most prevalent examples thereof is
when the Athenians voted to exile Themistocles, who is a famous Greek soldier and philosopher.22
The voting process quickly became highly personal and featured many ad hominem attacks, leading
to violence and corruption. In fact, corruption in the electoral process became so prevalent that
many government positions were eventually filled through lottery rather than elections.23

The other notable ancient empire to mention with respect to elections is the Roman Empire. Rome
was initially created as a monarchy; however, after the expulsion of its last king, the Romans
established the Senate.24 The Senate formed a group of legislators who were indirectly elected. Over
time, Roman society became increasingly more excited by the idea of elections, to the point where

18
“How Was Sparta Organised?,” The Secret of Civilization (blog), accessed September 28, 2021,
[Link]
19
“Solon | Biography, Reforms, Importance, & Facts,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed September 28, 2021,
[Link]
20
National Geographic Society, “Democracy (Ancient Greece),” National Geographic Society, March 15, 2019,
[Link]
21
Ibid.
22
“The Greeks - Themistocles’ Ostracism,” accessed September 28, 2021,
[Link]
23
“A Short History of Voting in the Ancient World | Classical Wisdom Weekly,” accessed September 28, 2021,
[Link]
24
“Senate | Definition, History, & Facts,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed September 28, 2021,
[Link]

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nearly all local and federal officials were voted on.25 As elections became more widespread in
society, the Senators became worried about too much direct participation in those elected to
government positions. The Senators had become accustomed to the amount of power that they
could wield through their position and wanted to safeguard their interests.26 As such, the Senators
would oftentimes manipulate the results of the election to result in outcomes more favorable to their
personal standing. This was largely done through a vote-buying process, wherein local eligible
citizens would be paid to vote in a certain manner.27 Alongside interference, Roman society saw a
significant amount of electoral violence starting at around 200 BCE. Politicians would develop close
ties with local gang leaders. In turn, the gang leaders would intimidate voters through the threat
(and subsequent execution) of violence.28

During the European Renaissance, Europe was reimagining its political and societal institutions. The
period between 1300 and 1650 was a time of significant cultural development, largely based on
classical traditions and culture. However, this time also saw a heightening of intra-European conflict,
often related to the political workings of neighboring countries. One of the most prominent conflicts
related to political leadership was the Hundred Years’ War. At this point the monarchical tradition of
passing leadership through heirs led to a variety of relevant succession-based conflicts. The Hundred
Years War originated over disputed claims over the French throne when Charles IV, king of France,
died in 1328 without any heirs.29 The closest living relative of Charles IV at the time was his nephew,
Edward III of England. While the French throne was claimed in the name of Edward III, the French
nobility were dismissive of the claim due to the fact that Edward was not a native Frenchman.30
Accordingly, the throne passed to the cousin of Charles IV, Philip, the Count of Valois. This tension
led to a war that started on May 24, 1337 and spanned multiple generations before it ended on

25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Andrew Lintott, “Electoral Bribery in the Roman Republic,” The Journal of Roman Studies 80 (1990): 1–16,
[Link]
28
Ibid.
29
Anne Curry, The Hundred Years War (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2003).
30
“Hundred Years’ War,” World History Encyclopedia, accessed September 28, 2021,
[Link]

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October 19, 1453.31 Historians estimate that between 2.5-3.5 million people died over the course of
those 116 years.32

More recently, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (“IFES”) conducted a survey in
2001 of all 57 states that were experiencing major electoral events. Of those 57 elections, 24 (42.1%)
were classified as “Partly Free” or “Not Free” by the Freedom House rating process. Instances of
conflict or violence were identified in a total of 14 out of the 57 countries (24.5%).33 The survey was
run again in 2002 with all countries experiencing major electoral events in that year. IFES determined
that there were 32 countries that could be classified as having “Partly Free” or “Not Free” elections.34
The election types for countries that do not have fully free elections vary from everything from
legislative to parliamentary to presidential systems of government.

As a case study, IFES highlights the 2001 election that took place in Thailand. In the run-up to the
elections, there was widespread knowledge of electoral interference. Candidates had been
distributing packets of cash to voters in return for sworn allegiance, usually through those
canvassing neighborhoods.35 Money could also be sent to the local village fund rather than given
directly to voters, so as to avoid the appearance of directly influencing individuals.36 However, that
money would then be distributed by the village to its citizens in return for their votes. Other types of
interference included intentional misinformation, wherein voters were told that it was illegal for
party members to not vote for their parties, or that rival candidates were disqualified by the Thai
election commission.37 In addition, candidates would sometimes find government officers involved
in the election process to smuggle in ballot papers, allow for impersonation, or tamper with the
ballot boxes.

31
“Renaissance Conflict and Rivalries: Cultural Polemics in Europe, c. 1300–c. 1650,” accessed September 28, 2021,
[Link]
32
Frederic J. Baumgartner, France in the Sixteenth Century (Palgrave Macmillan US, 1995),
[Link]
33
Jeff Fischer, “Electoral Conflict and Violence,” IFES: Making Democracy Work, February 5, 2002,
[Link]
34
Ibid.
35
William F. Case, “THAI DEMOCRACY, 2001. Out of Equilibrium,” Asian Survey 41, no. 3 (June 18, 2001): 525–47,
[Link]
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.

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As the 2001 election progressed in Thailand, electoral violence became more commonplace. On the
day of the election, vote counting was disrupted in multiple of the Southern provinces due to violent
protests.38 The protests were caused by voters believing that local election officials were rigging the
counting procedures to favor certain candidates. In one protest, police vehicles were set on fire, and
in others there were dozens, if not hundreds, of casualties.39 The Asian Network for Free Elections
(“ANFREL”) noted that violent acts, particularly in the form of assault and murder, were often used
as an act of desperation against rival candidates and canvassers.40 Tensions were at an all-time high
on election day, where over 300 policemen were assigned to each constituency, 40 bomb squads and
37 border patrol police units were on standby, and 805 state hospitals had been told to prepare for
victims of electoral violence while also arranging for mobile medical units.41

One of the most recent examples of electoral interference was during the 2016 United States
presidential elections. The United States government states that there is definitive proof that Russia
interfered with the 2016 elections.42 The first manner in which the interference was conducted was
through the Russian Internet Research Agency (“IRA”), which is a troll farm linked to the Kremlin.43
Their purpose was to “wage a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J.
Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.”44 The IRA would use social media to
disseminate propaganda according to the aforementioned purpose to skew votes in favor of Donald
Trump. Another form of interference that occurred was through the GRU (the Russian intelligence
service). The GRU hacked into the email accounts of employees for the Clinton campaign, as well as
the email accounts of the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”). Through the infamous

38
James Ockey, “Change and Continuity in the Thai Political Party System,” Asian Survey 43, no. 4 (August 1, 2003): 663–
80, [Link]
39
Ibid.
40
“Thailand Final Report Parliamentary Elections,” accessed September 28, 2021, [Link]
en/regions/asia/TH/thailand-final-report-parliamentary-elections.
41
Ibid.
42
“Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measure Campaigns and
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election,” accessed September 28, 2021,
[Link]
43
“Assessing the Russian Internet Research Agency’s Impact on the Political Attitudes and Behaviors of American Twitter
Users in Late 2017 | PNAS,” accessed September 28, 2021, [Link]
44
Dmitry Volchek, “Inside The ‘Propaganda Kitchen’ -- A Former Russian ‘Troll Factory’ Employee Speaks Out,” Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 17:14:21Z, sec. Russia, [Link]

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WikiLeaks website, the GRU then disseminated those hacked documents (which totaled over 25,000
documents).45

To this day, electoral interference and violence can be found in multiple countries across the world.
Many nations will have voting procedures in place as part of their system of government, wherein
the elections are manipulated to grossly favor a certain candidate. Delegates must consider the
history of electoral interference and violence that spans back to the early tribes of human civilization
in order to glean appropriate insights for effective resolutions.

45
Ibid.

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 Past Actions

Previous discussions illustrated the radical ramifications that electoral conflict and interference can
have on political systems and society at large. When analyzing the various pieces of electoral conflict
and interference, not only are the historical influences important to recognize, but also the manner
in which various methods for stabilization have (or have not) been implemented. The approach to
understanding effective and ineffective solutions to electoral conflict and interference revolve
around two core considerations. First, delegates must validate hypotheses across geographies to
eliminate the influence of cultural differences. Any actions that are meant to be utilized on a global
scale to address this topic must be generalizable enough such that they are not reliant on the cultural
niches of a certain country or geography. The other consideration needs to be a thoughtful
exploration of the short-term and long-term consequences of each action. Considering areas
throughout the world that have experienced some form of electoral conflict or interference, and
cross-checking the validity of potential solutions, helps inform a more robust set of potential actions.
For example, suggesting each nation to spend a certain percent of GDP on cybersecurity for
elections might have helped countries such as the U.S. in 2016; however, in more rural societies that
still rely on paper ballots, such a requirement would amount to nothing more than frivolous
spending. Understanding the past actions of players in the space can also enable greater insights
into what has historically been successful, and how new ideas can be engineered to improve or
reimagine old concepts.

One particularly prevalent strategy that has been implemented against electoral conflict is
peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies. These types of strategies often encompass youth
programs, election observations, police training, and civic education, among others. To take youth
programming as an example, the youth are often excluded from the political process. Given their
malleability and naïveté, the youth are often vulnerable to recruitment by political actors that are
looking to instigate electoral conflict.46 The success rate of such exploitation is increased due to the
fact that the youth typically experience high levels of unemployment. By setting out programming

46
“Youth Engagement,” accessed September 28, 2021, [Link]

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that engages the youth and teaches them about the election process, they can theoretically be
convinced to stay away from electoral conflict.47

Youth programming has been implemented in Liberia, a country with a significant youth
population.48 Children were recruited during the Liberian civil wars as fighters and can be easily
mobilized by political parties for violent purposes. NAYMOTE, a Liberian organization, has used
youth programming to train young populations to avoid being exploited for electoral conflict.49 It
should be noted that youth programming, among other peacebuilding and conflict prevention
strategies, has yet to have its value empirically proven. As such, the success of implementing this
type of programming cannot be fully relied upon.50

Another solution that was implemented during the Liberian elections was the revamping of the
relevant security forces. This was a solution that was driven by the Liberian government and
domestic institutions and was focused on ensuring the performance of security forces throughout
the electoral cycle.51 The idea is that security forces, such as the police and military, can provide a
guarantee for election security if they are well-equipped, well-trained, and well-intentioned.52 The
police in particular can help mitigate violence by acting in a nonpartisan and visible manner;
however, when not aligned or ill-equipped, the police might instead serve as passive bystanders or
even active perpetrators of crime. In Liberia, the Liberia National Police (“LNP”) were responsible for
securing the elections, with some levels of international assistance. However, the LNP found that
they had significant shortages of properly trained officers and not enough financial and logistical
resources to rise to the challenge.53 Although underfunded and understaffed, with over 1/3 of
Liberian voters saying that they did not see any LNP officers present at the polling station, the police
were nonetheless well-trained and deployed. The Economic Community of West African States

47
“Youth and Politics in Conflict Contexts | Wilson Center,” accessed September 28, 2021,
[Link]
48
“What Works in Preventing Election Violence: Evidence from Liberia and Kenya,” accessed September 28, 2021,
[Link]
[Link].
49
“NAYMOTE,” Peace Insight, accessed September 28, 2021, [Link]
50
“The Sad Irony of Youth Participation in Election Violence,” Young African Leaders Initiative, June 24, 2016,
[Link]
51
Ibid.
52
Ursula E Daxecker, “The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-Election
Violence in Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 4 (July 1, 2012): 503–16, [Link]
53
Ibid.

18 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

(“ECOWAS”) and United Nations Mission in Liberia (“UNMIL”) helped train LNP officers and improve
their professionalism and crowd control. In addition, the UNMIL deployed 300-400 additional officers
to assist with the security of the elections.54

Another strategy that has been widely implemented is election monitoring. This process involves
having independent parties observe and evaluate the electoral process in a country. These observers
can also hold the electoral process to the domestic and international standards set out for
democratic elections.55 By bringing the reports of the observers together, election monitors can help
substantiate legitimacy and confirm victory or defeat, as well as comment upon the veracity of any
fraud allegations.56 Election monitoring is largely dependent on cooperation from the host
government. One major risk to note with election monitoring is that, although they do help evaluate
the nature of the electoral process, their role is largely passive. As such, it can be easy to rely on the
monitors too heavily and buy into a false sense of security and integrity.

Election monitoring was implemented in Kenya during the 2017 elections, albeit with significant
difficulties and headwinds. Election monitors were present on election day, originating from nine
international missions including the Carter Center, the African Union, the European Union, and the
Commonwealth.57 The consensus of these nine missions was that the election that was held had
been peaceful, free, fair, transparent, and credible. However, slightly after the August 8 election, the
Kenyan Supreme Court declared that the election was illegitimate and void due to ballot
irregularities. As a result of these opposed stances, the international election monitors faced
significant backlash from the Kenyan political institutions and Kenyan society broadly.58 During the
make-up election, international and domestic observers were unable to adequately execute their job
due to security concerns.59 In fact, in several areas of the country, observers were denied access to

54
Ibid.
55
Andrew T. Little, “Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution,” Quarterly Journal of Political
Science 7, no. 3 (June 13, 2012): 249–83, [Link]
56
Jørgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, “The Rise of Election Monitoring: What Makes Elections Free and Fair?,” Journal of
Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): 32–46, [Link]
57
“International Observers and the Kenya Election,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed September 28, 2021,
[Link]
58
Ibid.
59
“Chief Observer Presents EU EOM Final Report on 2017 Kenya Elections, 10 January 2018,” Text, EEAS - European
External Action Service - European Commission, accessed September 28, 2021, [Link]
observation-missions/eom-kenya-2017/38107/chief-observer-presents-eu-eom-final-report-2017-kenya-elections-10-
january-2018_en.

19 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

the polling stations and sometimes even outright attacked. This should serve not as a deterrent from
any sort of election monitoring system, but as a reminder that the realities of each potential solution
should be thoroughly considered.

Another action that has been previously implemented to mitigate electoral conflict and interference
has been to leverage the expertise of international institutions on a case-by-case basis. Through
organizations such as the United Nations and other international working groups, some of the
foremost academics, researchers, and thought leaders have been brought together to convey
economic and political ideas for reform. During previous periods of electoral violence, bodies such as
the United Nations Development Program (“UNDP”), the International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance (“International IDEA”), the United States Agency for International Development
(“USAID”), the IFES, and the United States Institute for Peace (“USIP”) have been leveraged to
specify the risk factors for electoral violence.60

To mitigate the effects of electoral interference, many developed nations have strengthened their
election cybersecurity strategy. This has been particularly reinforced after the 2016 US presidential
election interference occurred. In the United States, government bodies such as the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission help each
state adequately prepare cybersecurity platforms for elections.61 In the European Union, the
domestic cybersecurity and election bodies of each member state work with the larger European
Union Agency for Cybersecurity (“ENISA”) to properly secure elections.62 In addition to these
cybersecurity protocols, many governments that have formerly embraced digital voting technology
are advocating for a return to analog systems.63 These paper-based processes are not prone to the
same level of cyber threat that correspond to digital voting processes.64

Electoral interference can also be mitigated through interagency and international cooperation.
Being able to shift resources between various agencies and departments within a nation provides

60
Ibid.
61
QUENTIN E. HODGSON, MARYGAIL K. BRAUNER, and EDWARD W. CHAN, “Securing U.S. Elections Against Cyber
Threats: Considerations for Supply Chain Risk Management” (RAND Corporation, 2020),
[Link]
62
Konstantinos Voudouris, “The European Networks and Information Security Agency - ENISA,” n.d., 4.
63
Lawrence Norden and Ian Vandewalker, “Securing Elections from Foreign Interference,” n.d., 42.
64
Michael Ian Shamos, “Paper v. Electronic Voting Records – An Assessment,” n.d., 23.

20 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

greater flexibility to secure an election from any interference. For example, in 2014, Moldova
introduced a digital voter register that recorded voters’ presence at polling stations as a verification
mechanism. However, the Moldovan Election Commission did not secure an appropriate number of
servers, causing the entire system to crash and leading to public perception that interference was
underway.65 The Moldovan Election Commission had previously developed a robust connection with
the Moldovan Security Services. As such, they could leverage that interagency relationship to secure
additional servers and promptly return the election to the commission’s control.66 International
cooperation is slightly more difficult to achieve, given matters of proprietary and confidential
information, as well as sovereignty. However, partnerships such as the Five Eyes intelligence alliance
between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States has pushed
the boundaries of transparency across allies.67

65
Sam von der Staak Wolf, Peter, Cybersecurity in Elections: Models of Interagency Collaboration, 2019,
[Link]
66
Ibid.
67
Corey Pfluke, “A History of the Five Eyes Alliance: Possibility for Reform and Additions,” Comparative Strategy 38, no. 4
(July 4, 2019): 302–15, [Link]

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 Possible Solutions

One broad approach to take when tackling electoral interference and security is the centralization of
power and legitimacy in Electoral Management Bodies (“EMBs”). An EMB serves as the national
center for managing and securing the electoral process. There is empirical evidence that by
possessing credibility, EMBs significantly increase election security.68 EMBs can be empowered to
take control of the electoral process through: (i) obtaining the necessary technical skills and (ii)
obtaining the necessary capacity to appropriately manage all voting streams. When properly staffed,
trained, and resourced, EMBs can function within any system of government and centralize all
decision making.69 Assuming that the EMB possesses the necessary credibility in the eyes of the
populace, an election can de facto be run through the EMB and all legitimacy will be conferred to the
winner. This greatly reduces the chance of any electoral conflict from other political candidates that
did not succeed. The added benefit of EMBs is that a centralized, stable electoral process is one that
naturally attracts less electoral interference from foreign and domestic actors.70

The role of security services, such as police and military, are also to be considered. In every society,
but particularly within developing nations, it is critical that security services find the right balance
between deterrence and confidence-building during times of elections.71 However, it should not be
assumed that a well-trained and well-equipped security service will single-handedly suffice with
respect to confidence building. Especially in countries where there is significant mistrust in the
electoral process, security services should work with local leaders and the judiciary to effectively
combat impunity while serving as an additional source of legitimacy for the elections.72 Delegates
may consider new pathways for security services to engage with local actors to uncover networks of
those instigating electoral conflict. Other potential solutions in this space include encouraging
interagency collaboration between national and local security forces, as well as peace workers. It

68
Ibid.
69
“Strategic Planning of Electoral Management Bodies,” accessed September 28, 2021, [Link]
en/topics/em/eme/eme05.
70
Ibid.
71
Kristine Höglund and Anna K Jarstad, “Strategies to Prevent and Manage Electoral Violence : Considerations for
Policy,” n.d., 5.
72
Ibid.

22 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

could also be suggested that security forces should be trained in electoral laws and the codes of
conduct.73

Another potential way to address electoral conflict is through pacts and pledges between the various
political parties and candidates. The thought process behind these approaches is that political
parties will feel less compelled to contest elections through violence if they can be assured that other
parties will also not contest the elections through violence. The empirical evidence on the categorical
use of such codes of conduct is still controversial among scholars.74 However, some approaches
following this method have proven to be extremely useful in reducing electoral conflict. For example,
the Ghanaian code of conduct, spearheaded by the Ghana Political Parties Program (“GPPP”), is
considered a model framework for codes of conduct. The code requires party leaders to meet once a
month at the EMB to review compliance with the code, with a national body overseeing the
compliance.75 The code contains no legal retributions for those that violate the code, but there may
be backlash by being publicly called out by the GPPP, their peers, or the EMB.76 As such, delegates
may consider what type of framework, if any at all, would allow such codes of conduct to become
broadly effective.

In order to combat cyber electoral interference, one approach to take is to consider the equipment
that is being used to enable such systems. Oftentimes, countries with digital voting procedures will
have antiquated voting machines and technology stacks. For example, the Brennan Center estimates
that 42 states are using voter registration databases that were initially created over ten years ago.77
These systems will run discontinued software such as Windows XP or Windows 2000, which is greatly
more exposed to cyberattacks relative to more modern software that is vendor-supported.78 Post-
election audits may also be useful in preventing cyberattacks on digital voting equipment. Many
digital voting systems will track votes with a paper record of the votes. As such, employees of an

73
Nahomi Ichino and Matthias Schündeln, “Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of
Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana,” The Journal of Politics 74, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 292–307,
[Link]
74
Ibid.
75
Ransford Gyampo, “The Voluntary Code of Conduct for Elections in Ghana,” 2019, 99–102.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
D. Ashok Kumar and T. Ummal Sariba Begum, “Electronic Voting Machine — A Review,” in International Conference on
Pattern Recognition, Informatics and Medical Engineering (PRIME-2012), 2012, 41–48,
[Link]

23 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

EMB or other governmental body could sample a sufficiently large enough number of ballots to
catch and prevent a hack or software error from changing the results of elections. These post-
election audits can also assure voters that regardless of what type of attack may be launched, the
ultimate vote tallies can be confidently relied upon.79

79
Lawrence Norden et al., “POST-ELECTION AUDITS: RESTORING TRUST IN ELECTIONS,” n.d., 90.

24 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

 Bloc Positions

Electoral conflict and interference have broad impacts across the globe. To be sure, the nuances of
such violence and interference are generally more dependent on a case-by-case and country-by-
country basis. That being said, certain regions might experience more digital interference, and are
subsequently more focused on the cybersecurity and deterrence aspects of the topic, whereas other
regions and countries are more focused on combating electoral conflict. As seen in the graphic
below, there is no one region in which electoral conflict and interference are localized. Even with
regard to technological disruptions to elections, countries in almost every continent have
experienced their own troubles.

Figure 1: From Freedom House [Link]

across-democratic-spectrum

New Democracies

“New Democracies” would include countries that established their democratic systems within the
past 50 years or so, and are still developing their electoral infrastructures. One issue is the influence
25 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34
of fake social media. For example, the 2018 Brazilian election saw large-scale misleading
propaganda distributed through WhatsApp to Brazilian voters in favor of a candidate. Similarly, the
2017 Presidential election in Honduras was subject to hundreds, if not thousands, of fake accounts
supporting some candidates. Another issue is when the citizens of a New Democracy do not have
trust in the election system. The 2017 Kenyan election and the 2018 Zimbabwe election both had
large-scale protests in response to the results. In these cases, participants of these protests were
often met with police violence. Finally, New Democracies can also be fraught with corruption. The
1988 Mexican election was blatantly fraudulent; even the former president Miguel de la Madrid
admitted that the PRI party tampered with results, when it became obvious that the PRI candidate
would lose. So, New Democracies have to consider foreign influence, trust in the system, peaceful
election results, and anti-corruption, in order to prevent electoral conflict.

Full Democracies

Even in countries with longstanding democratic traditions, there are still threats of electoral conflict.
After the Russian government interfered in the 2016 American election, democratic nations around
the world placed a significant emphasis on the cybersecurity and digital privacy of their elections.80
The European Union in particular has focused heavily on providing their member states with the
necessary toolkit to secure their elections from any interference. For example, the European Union
will often deploy its own personnel to help with election observation in member states and across
the world to ensure that elections are free and fair. However, with the growing split and polarization
of politics, especially with populist movements taking root in many European countries, tension with
regard to elections is increasing. As these nations have led the democratic world order since post-
WWII, they can help forge solutions in substantive mechanisms to prevent different forms of
electoral conflict around the world.

80
Mueller, Robert S., Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election § (2019).

26 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

Hybrid Regimes

Hybrid regimes have elements of democratic and authoritarian regimes, and typically emerge from
an incomplete transition to a democracy.81Hybrid regimes may have a variety of democratic
institutions, but these systems are usually under the control of one political entity, and therefore do
not lead to significant change. After the end of the USSR, Russia could be considered a hybrid
regime, as multiple parties competed in elections, but the political system was still heavily influenced
by powerful oligarchs. This structure allowed for the United Russia party to essentially transform
Russia into a one-party system. An example of electoral conflict in hybrid regimes is noted in the
earlier graphic; some Southeast Asian countries impose restrictions on digital campaigning for
opposition parties. Delegates representing these nations should be concerned about how parties
might try to consolidate political power, as this can lead to conflict. It is critical for hybrid regimes to
protect their democratic systems, if they wish to maintain trust in election results.

Authoritarian Regimes

Many nations around the world simply do not have traditions of elections. Authoritarian regimes are
still affected by electoral conflict. To begin, all governments must have a plan for who will succeed
the current leader. Democracies host elections, while a monarchy usually passes leadership to a royal
family member. With this in mind, regimes without democratic systems should be concerned about
ways to protect the legitimacy of succession; this can include solutions on how to integrate
democratic systems into authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, cyber attacks on elections have often
been based in authoritarian countries. It’s the responsibility of these countries to cooperate on this
new security threat, and work to prevent electoral conflict caused by cyber attacks. Finally, it should
be noted that no delegate should take an aggressively anti-democracy stance in this committee.
Debate in committee will revolve around ways to reduce conflicts that stem from elections, and
every nation can provide help in this matter.

81
Ekman, Joakim. “Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes.”
International Political Science Review 30, no. 1 (2009): 7–31. [Link]

27 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

 TOPIC B: STATE FRAGILITY
______________________________________________________

Statement of the Problem

Significance of State Fragility

The recent development and prevalence of globalization has connected every country in ways
previously unimaginable. Nations and people are connected through trade, politics, transportation,
technology, and a whole host of other mechanisms. The subsequent ramifications of such an
interconnected society include that the pressures on one fragile state can radically impact not only
its own citizens and institutions, but its regional neighbors and countries thousands of miles away.
For example, recent Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) into very fragile states means that the
economic activity and well-being of many countries, even those that are considered to be developed,
partially hinges on the stability and flourishment of the fragile states.82 It is also important to note
the regional implications of having a fragile state that falls into disarray. Countries depend on the
stability of their neighbors and the broader region in which they sit to ensure that there can be
effective governance and security for their citizens.83 However, when a nation falls into disarray,
issues such as refugee influx and cross-border violence can cause a disruption to the regional status
quo.84

A nation’s borders are oftentimes arbitrarily drawn and do not necessarily reflect a total isolation and
demarcation between people and cultures. For example, the 1885 Berlin Conference is infamously
known as a quintessential example of when the European leaders met and decided to arbitrarily
draw up borders for African nations, many of which exist to this day.85 In such situations, where
borders were the result of colonialism, these state boundaries are often challenged. While violence is

82
Alexandros Ragoussis and Heba Shams, “FDI in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations,” in Global Investment
Competitiveness Report 2017/2018: Foreign Investor Perspectives and Policy Implications (The World Bank, 2017), 135–59,
[Link]
83
“Bad Neighbors: Failed States and Their Consequences,” GSDRC, accessed October 23, 2021,
[Link]
84
Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, “No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and Child Soldier Recruits,” Child
Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States, 2010, 55–76.
85
“Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 - Oxford Reference,” accessed October 23, 2021,
[Link]

28 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

one outcome of border disputes, there are other cross-border implications of instability. The
financial and economic volatility that can result from a fragile state to the neighboring countries and
the larger region could be just as impactful. This is additionally by no means limited to the African
nations: every country is influenced by neighboring and regional matters. Consider the European
Union (“EU”), which is considered to be a regional partnership of developed nations. When one EU
member state has issues, the ramifications are widespread across the entire system. One can simply
consider the 2009 debt crisis in Greece to understand how even financial fragility can radically upend
a region.86

While considering fragile states, so-called developed nations should not consider themselves as free
from the issue and threats of state fragility. Consider first the fact that, as previously emphasized,
the negative implications of a fragile or failed state are not limited to that state itself, or even the
region in which it sits. Due to rampant globalization and cultural connections throughout the world,
the ramifications of state fragility can impact the security, safety, and status quo for citizens across
the globe. In addition to the threat of very fragile states impacting the nation, there is no country
that is truly free from state fragility. State fragility will be defined later in this section; however, state
fragility does not necessarily mean a state that is near failure or cannot in any way protect its
citizens. State fragility refers to aspects of a nation that are insufficient to adequately and effectively
ensure proper governance and safety for its citizens. When considered from this angle, every nation
can be considered a fragile state, and state fragility quickly transforms from a binary demarcation to
a spectrum.

On the topic of state fragility being an index, it would be worthwhile for delegates to consider the
Fragile States Index (“FSI”), published by the Fund for Peace.87 In this index, each nation is ranked in
terms of how fragile the state is relative to other nations across the world. Factors that are
considered include (but are not limited to) the security apparatus, economic decline, state
legitimacy, and refugees. This source is not meant to be a comprehensive guide for how to approach

86
“Greece’s Debt Crisis Timeline,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed October 23, 2021,
[Link]
87
“Methodology | Fragile States Index,” accessed October 23, 2021, [Link]

29 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

the issue of state fragility. Rather, the FSI serves to prove that no state is truly free from fragility and
imperfect institutions.

Defining State Fragility

The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”), an international Non-
Governmental Organization (“NGO”) that works with countries across the globe to foster economic
development, published a definition for state fragility in their article Principles for Good International
Engagement in Fragile States & Situations (“Principles”).88 89 The OECD defined state fragility in
Principles as “when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions
needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their
populations.”90 This is a commonly used definition that encompasses the consequences of a fragile
versus non-fragile state. Note that the definition relies heavily on the end results of a “stable” state,
i.e., the goals of safeguarding security and human rights, poverty reduction, and development. The
means through which this can be accomplished is left vague beyond the need for the ends to be
secured through some sort of political process and/or institution. This highlights a key point of the
discussion of state fragility: each nation has their own systems, institutions, and political processes.
The international community, in its effort to find a framework for mitigating state fragility, cannot
infringe on the sovereignty and political systems that are in place.

While this is a very commonly used and well-cited definition of state fragility across the academic
and political literature, there are natural criticisms that have been highlighted as well. One such
critique is that the definition can in no way distinguish between fragile states and underdeveloped
states.91 It is critically important that delegates do not synonymize fragility and underdevelopment.
As mentioned before, each state has its own form(s) of fragility and underdevelopment does not
imply fragility (nor vice versa). For example, some underdeveloped states can be considered to be

88
“About the OECD - OECD,” accessed October 23, 2021, [Link]
89
“Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States & Situations,” accessed October 23, 2021,
[Link]
90
Ibid.
91
James Putzel, “Why Development Actors Need a Better Definition of ‘State Fragility,’” Monograph (London, UK:
London School of Economics and Political Science, Crisis States Research Centre, September 2010),
[Link]

30 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

quite fragile, while others (such as Tanzania and Zambia92) have been able to achieve significant
periods of peace and safety for their citizens despite being underdeveloped. These two categories of
countries lie in different points along the spectrum of fragile states.

Underdeveloped states, by definition, have limited ability to reduce poverty, promote development,
and install the appropriate security apparatus to safeguard their citizens.93 To develop a more robust
definition of state fragility, it could be useful to consider why some states, such as Somalia94 and
Haiti95, are more fragile than other states, such as the aforementioned examples of Tanzania and
Zambia, even though all such countries are considered to be economically underdeveloped.

Finally, the definition of “state fragility” which is most suitable for this committee, was put forth by
the Conflict Studies Research Centre (“CSRC”), which is a research arm of the United Kingdom
Ministry of Defense. The CSRC lists four key factors against which state fragility should be measured:
(i) the failure of the state to exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force; (ii) the failure of
the state to develop basic bureaucratic capacity; (iii) the failure of the state to overrule edicts from
non-state institutional systems; and (iv) the failure of the state to control its territory.96 These
characteristics are observable and measurable, to some extent, and can help distinguish fragile
states from underdeveloped states broadly.

Security Issues of Fragile States

When considering security issues in fragile states, one must consider the societal and political
backdrop of these problems. Violence, especially as it relates to fragile states, typically arises more
often in states that are further along in the aforementioned fragility index.97 In these contexts, the
state itself is largely nonexistent and cannot properly address conflict that arises within its borders.

92
“Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility,” GSDRC, accessed October 23, 2021, [Link]
library/eastern-africa-security-and-the-legacy-of-fragility/.
93
“Underdeveloped Countries 2021,” accessed October 23, 2021, [Link]
rankings/underdeveloped-countries.
94
Ignacio Fuente Cobo, “Somalia: Picturing a Fragile State. The Existential Crisis of the Somali State.,” n.d., 10.
95
“Is Haiti a Failing State?,” accessed October 23, 2021, [Link]
96
“Topic Guide on Fragile States,” accessed October 23, 2021, [Link]
97
Robin Geiß, “Armed Violence in Fragile States: Low-Intensity Conflicts, and Sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by
Third Parties,” International Review of the Red Cross 91, no. 873 (March 2009), [Link]

31 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

The actors who can enact violence are often supported by trans-national networks or other criminal
and political connections, which makes them all the more elusive and powerful.98 The rise of populist
ideologies and propaganda makes it more appealing for everyday citizens to become more involved
in bouts of conflict.99 As such, the “Agent Zero” of the conflict becomes difficult to identify and can
quickly morph into ideologically or politically motivated violence.

There are two common events that occur vis-à-vis violence in fragile states: (i) territorial spillover of
conflict and (ii) law enforcement operations conducted by third parties. It should be noted that while
these two effects are common in the context of very fragile states, they are not a necessary
consequence of a very fragile state. Beginning with territorial spillover, one of the most recognizable
differences between violence in fragile states and civil wars is the desire for economic gain rather
than taking control of the government or changing regimes.100 The political institutions in very
fragile states do not have much impact, meaning that striving to take them over is not worthwhile
for such actors. The more important objective for third-party actors is being able to economically
prosper.101 This differing motivation makes territorial spillover all the more attractive: there is no
reason to remain confined within the borders of one state when there is so much more value that can
be unlocked when conducting transnational operations. This spillover effect can be incredibly
dangerous to neighboring states, especially in regions with a multitude of particularly fragile
states.102

The other common event that takes place with respect to security issues in fragile states is third-
party actors taking over the role of law enforcement. In very fragile states, as has been mentioned,
the political and security apparatuses do not have the ability to serve the law enforcement role. This
means that the state has no way to actually maintain peace within its borders. It might seem trivial
that criminal networks and other violent actors would want there to be no law enforcement and to
let the region run rampant, but this is actually counterproductive to what these actors are looking to

98
Ibid.
99
Sibylle van der Walt, “Populism and the Yearning for Closure: From Economic to Cultural Fragility,” European Journal of
Social Theory 23, no. 4 (November 1, 2020): 477–92, [Link]
100
Olivier Nay, “Fragile and Failed States: Critical Perspectives on Conceptual Hybrids,” International Political Science
Review 34, no. 3 (June 1, 2013): 326–41, [Link]
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.

32 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

accomplish: they want to maintain power and ensure that their illicit activities can be effectively
streamlined. Violent and illicit actors are also constantly looking to mitigate any threats to
themselves and their activities. As such, third parties will often seek to take over the role of law
enforcement and set their own rules and punitive measures. The consequences of this are two-fold:
(i) the state effectively loses all legitimacy to control anything occurring in the region, as they have
no enforcement mechanism, and (ii) the norms and rules can be entirely rewritten to the desires of
these insurgent networks.103 The safety and security of citizens under third-party law enforcement
structures can (and very often will) very quickly become jeopardized and infringed upon.

Economic Issues of Fragile States

There are two broad categories under which economic issues relating to state fragility can fall: (i)
fiscal capacity and (ii) legal capacity.104 Fiscal capacity here refers to functions that are normally
carried out by the state that relate to revenues and fiscal policy. Such topics can include (but are by
no means limited to) the ability to tax its citizens, generate additional revenues, attract FDI, invest
funds into infrastructure and other public works projects, and appropriately redistribute wealth.105
Legal capacity in an economic context refers to the legal ability to support markets and enforce
economic actions. Such topics can include forming reliable credit markets, tax collection strategies,
ensuring fair trade terms between parties, enforcing contracts, and protecting the property of
citizens.106 Particularly fragile states cannot adequately satisfy their responsibilities regarding one or
more of these topics. As such, this leaves citizens without any sort of economic security and safety
over their belongings, as well as no central authority which can improve the economic well-being of
the state.

103
Robert B. Zoellick, “Fragile States: Securing Development,” Survival 50, no. 6 (December 2008): 67–84,
[Link]
104
Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, “Fragile States and Development Policy,” Journal of the European Economic
Association 9, no. 3 (June 1, 2011): 371–98, [Link]
105
Ibid.
106
Ibid.

33 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

 History of the Problem

This section will cover the past 20-50 years of history to remain relevant and provide delegates with
a more contemporary understanding of state fragility. The section will cover three geographical case
studies: (i) Sub-Saharan Africa; (ii) Latin America / Caribbean; and (iii) Europe.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Within the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, four countries will be analyzed to understand fragile states
within the region: (i) Rwanda, (ii) Mozambique, (iii) the Democratic Republic of Congo (the “DRC”),
and (iv) the Central African Republic (the “CAR”). These four states can be thought of as positioned
at different points along the fragility index. Rwanda and Mozambique were mired in conflict until
about the mid-1990’s.107 Since that point, they have managed to establish peace and rebuild the
necessary institutions for their governments to serve their citizens properly.108 However, the DRC
and CAR have not been as fortunate with their ability to establish properly functioning governmental
institutions. The DRC had a major period of violence end in 2001, at which point a peace treaty was
signed, and held elections in 2003.109 However, its development has not been sufficient to really
implement the necessary capabilities to serve and protect its citizens. The CAR has experienced
periodic conflict since it gained its independence from France in 1960. The conflict briefly ceased
between 2007-2012 when a peace treaty was signed and observed; however, the country
subsequently fell back into a trend of violence.110 What is particularly interesting about these
countries is the fact that Mozambique and Rwanda are both resource-poor countries, while the DRC
and CAR are resource-rich countries.111 As such, access and wealth of natural resources is, if
anything, negatively correlated to state fragility within this sample of countries.

107
“East Africa Living Encyclopedia,” accessed October 29, 2021, [Link]
108
Enrique Gelbard, “Building Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa’s Fragile States,” International Monetary Fund, n.d.,
[Link]
109
heidirmnp, “The Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Case Study of War and Failed Peace,” Text, Beyond
Intractability, June 26, 2020, [Link]
110
“36. Central African Republic (1960-Present),” accessed October 29, 2021, [Link]
project/sub-saharan-africa-region/central-african-republic-1960-present/.
111
“Mapping Africa’s Natural Resources | Maps News | Al Jazeera,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]

34 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

The IMF put together a list
of factors in 2015
about the factors that
influenced the
resiliency and fragility of
each state, as well as how
it had developed over
recent years.112 A
summary graphic on the
results is shown in the
graphic. The most
relevant “outcome” for
this committee is the
security, political
stability, and Figure : Pulled from IMF Report "Building Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa's Fragile
States"
governance component. As can be seen, even with different geographies, political institutions, and
levels of resource access, there is no guarantee that a state will be more or less fragile.

As an aside, the figure above could provide a starting point for delegates to consider different facets
of the problem. While the list is by no means exhaustive or the only way to approach finding
frameworks and solutions, it could be considered as a launching point for any research and ideation.

Latin America / Caribbean

As an example of state fragility within the Latin America and Caribbean region, Haiti will be
considered. Haiti’s transition to democracy became full-fledged in 1986 after Jean-Claude Duvalier,
the former President of Haiti and a brutal dictator, went into exile.113 During Duvalier’s reign, a

112
Ibid.
113
“Obituary: Jean-Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier, Haiti’s Former ‘President for Life,’” BBC News, October 4, 2014, sec. Latin
America & Caribbean, [Link]

35 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

military division called the Tontons Macoutes would go around the country and enforce the laws in
incredibly punitive manners.114 Duvalier’s time in power left Haiti scarred and untrusting of the
state.115 As such, the democratic institutions that were put into place after 1986 were not properly
built up and remained dysfunctional.116 This has led to imperfect institutions and significant amounts
of corruption within the Haitian government and political arena. Over the past 20-30 years, Haiti
experienced fraudulent and illegitimate elections, military coups, and the threat of violence across all
political parties.117

One of Haiti’s core vulnerabilities is its economic system and structure of its foreign trade within the
region. Haiti has two core export industries: apparel and agriculture.118 Most of Haiti’s economic
activity is driven around these two industries, which means that exports remain the only true
stimulus of economic growth. However, the apparel market (which comprises 67% of Haiti’s exports)
only goes to the United States. In addition, the United States accounts for about 80% of Haiti’s total
exports. As such, the economic well-being of Haiti is incredibly dependent on the fluctuations of the
US economy. To make matters worse on the foreign trade side, Haiti’s imports are three times larger
than their exports on an annual basis. This very significant trade deficit causes their financial system
to become increasingly more indebted and burdened by the cost of that debt.119 In addition, the
imports are largely food and fuel, which leaves Haiti incredibly susceptible to price fluctuations in
these two core markets across the globe. As an example, the price of food in Haiti between 2005 and
2008 increased in aggregate by 83% (equating to a 22.3% compound annual growth rate).120

Another major vulnerability of Haiti is its location and geography. Due to its position in the
Caribbean, Haiti is prone to significant damage from tropical storms and hurricanes that originate in
the Atlantic. The country also sits on top of the Caribbean tectonic fault line, which means that shifts

114
Michel S. Laguerre, Voodoo and Politics in Haiti (Springer, 2016).
115
COHA, “The Tonton Macoutes: The Central Nervous System of Haiti’s Reign of Terror,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
116
“Is Haiti a Failing State?,” accessed October 23, 2021, [Link]
117
Amélie Gauthier and Madalena Moita, “Vulnerability and Causes of Fragility in Haiti,” 2010, 12.
118
“Haiti Overview: Development News, Research, Data | World Bank,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
119
“Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
120
Ibid.

36 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

in the tectonic plates can cause devastating earthquakes. These natural disasters can be so
damaging that entire villages and cities can be buried by soil or wiped away by the storms.121

While these vulnerabilities do make Haiti more susceptible to falling on the further end of the
spectrum of fragile states, they do not necessitate it. For example, Cuba shares a very similar
geographic location with Haiti, meaning that they are similarly prone to natural disasters.122
However, Cuba has managed to build up the necessary capabilities to face the storms and
earthquakes which it is likely to experience. For example, Cuba has enabled ways for rapid
evacuation of cities to occur and established a national communication network to be used in times
of emergencies. These actions by the central government have enabled Cuba to be well-positioned
and have less risk of becoming a more fragile state as a result of the natural disasters.123

When considering what makes Haiti one of the few very fragile states in the region, there are three
core factors that should be highlighted. First is underdevelopment, which as mentioned before is not
synonymous with fragility but is typically correlated. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western
Hemisphere and has around 76% of its population subsisting on less than 2 USD per day.124 The state
does not have the revenues to provide proper education and adequately respond to the needs of its
citizens. The second factor is the country’s lack of social mobility. The state cannot properly
intervene in the “poverty cycle,” which means that those stuck at the bottom of the proverbial
socioeconomic totem pole have few opportunities to move up in society.125 The third factor is the
significant inequality that exists within the society. Haitian society has a deep divide between the
poor and the wealthy, and the inequality grows wider with each year. As such, the poor have few

121
Dorte Verner and Alessandra Heinemann, “Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti : Breaking the Conflict-Poverty
Trap” (Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2006), [Link]
122
Ibid.
123
“Weathering the Storm: Lessons in Risk Reduction from Haiti,” accessed October 29, 2021, [Link]
biblio/PDF/Cuba%[Link].
124
“IFRC Country Acceleration Plan 2019 - Haiti - Haiti,” ReliefWeb, accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
125
Ibid.

37 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

options to earn money for themselves and their family through legitimate economic activities, and
consequently resort to illegal activities such as corruption, crime, and illegal trafficking.126,127

Europe

The European Union, one of the most formidable and well-known examples of international
cooperation, is not as quintessentially stable as many believe. To be sure, there have been extensive
benefits from the European Union and it has fostered a great sense of engagement between the
various European nations. On everything from common defense strategies to a single currency, the
EU has managed to integrate its member countries and become a pillar for the liberal world order in
the 20th and 21st century.

That being said, the European Union has faced its own form of fragility over the past several
decades. The turbulence goes back to the beginning for the EU, when it was formed on February 7,
1992, through the Maastricht Treaty. Denmark, one of the most developed nations on the European
Continent, held a referendum in 1992 with regards to the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty, and
consequently the choice to join the EU, was rejected by 50.7% of voters with a turnout of 83.1%.128
While it is easy to look at the slim margin of 0.7% by which the Treaty was rejected, it is more
important to consider the fact that about 50% of the population felt that it was unnecessary and
inappropriate for Denmark to be signing the Maastricht Treaty. While Denmark is now a key player
in the European Union and a core member state, this rocky beginning did not serve to bolster the
European confidence in this new international institution for cooperation.

Ever since the formation of the EU, and the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, there have
been an accumulation of signals that the idea of the EU is an incredibly fragile concept. Since the
Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”) in 2008, the broad perception of the European Union, as measured by
the EU Eurobarometer surveys, has been slow to recover. Only in 2021 have the levels of confidence

126
Ibid.
127
“Gini Coefficient: Wealth Inequality in Haiti,” Statista, accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
128
Sara Binzer Hobolt, “From No to Yes: The Danish and Irish Referendums on the Maastricht and Nice Treaties,” in
Europe in Question (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), [Link]

38 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

in the EU started to return to pre-GFC levels.129 The election of multiple populist and xenophobic
leaders as heads of state, along with constitutional crises and concerns over appropriate governance,
have become widely present in many European states. There are even EU member states, such as
Sweden, who are not willing to adopt the Euro as its currency.130 This is all on top of the most recent
event, Brexit, which saw the United Kingdom leave the European Union to pave its own path. While
the EU remains a quintessential and revolutionary example of how states can work together, it is
plagued with its own form of fragility which has been ever-present over the course of its existence.

129
“Standard Eurobarometer 95 - Spring 2021 - September 2021 - - Eurobarometer Survey,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
130
“In a Referendum, Swedes Resoundingly Reject the Euro - The New York Times,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]

39 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

 Past Actions

To understand some of the past actions taken with regards to state fragility, the case study method
will be once again adopted. Using the case studies from the previous section (“History of the
Problem”), multiple ideas, frameworks, and solutions will be presented. Furthermore, a brief
description of the role of international economic actors, such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (“IMF”), will be provided for the sake of completeness.

Sub-Saharan Africa

With regards to Sub-Saharan Africa, past actions for both Rwanda / Mozambique and the DRC / CAR
will be considered. This will help demarcate what solutions might be more effective than others.

One of the core actions taken by these states to help build resilience and reduce fragility was to
rebuild their economic capacity and institutions. In order to accomplish this, the governments
needed to raise revenue. All four of the countries placed an emphasis on trying to mobilize and
generate domestic revenue.131 While Mozambique, Rwanda, and the DRC were able to significantly
increase the amount of revenue that they brought in, the CAR had a very difficult time achieving the
same level of results.132 These funds were used to rebuild public financial management systems and
to strengthen the central bank and the banking sector. Public financial management systems helped
build financial transparency and accountability, as well as generate a secure and effective route for
donor support to flow into the countries.133 The central bank and banking sector were also focused
on ensuring that there was appropriate monetary policy in place and that capital could flow
throughout the economies.134 Mozambique and Rwanda were most successful at rebuilding their

131
Ibid.
132
Ibid.
133
Matthew Andrews, “How Far Have Public Financial Management Reforms Come in Africa?,” SSRN Electronic Journal,
2010, [Link]
134
Tito Tomas Siueia, Jianling Wang, and Tamakloe Geoffrey Deladem, “Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial
Performance: A Comparative Study in the Sub-Saharan Africa Banking Sector,” Journal of Cleaner Production 226 (July
20, 2019): 658–68, [Link]

40 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

economic capacity. Rwanda in particular was able to reinstate their budget process by 1998 and had
rebuilt its public financial management systems by the mid-2000s.135

Another core step for these countries was to implement a comprehensive legal code that would hold
citizens accountable for their actions. While it is difficult to immediately implement an exhaustive
set of legislation in this regard, the first step was often to institute some form of a universal code of
human rights.136 This would ensure that human rights were valued above all else, increasing trust in
the government, and that any subsequent constitutions and legal codes would have to honor these
basic rights. One core obstacle to implementing a strict and all-encompassing legal code was the
fact that every citizen needed to adhere. Countries like the CAR and DRC had rampant levels of
corruption, meaning that there was significant pushback from the political elite, who were happy to
keep the systems of corruption and nepotism.137

One particular challenge for the DRC was the fact that it was such a fragile state while also being one
of the most resource-rich countries in the region. The DRC holds an incredible store of precious
metals such as diamonds and rare minerals, as well as fossil fuels. During periods of fragility, foreign
companies and states would enter the region looking to extract these resources.138 Oftentimes,
these external actors cared very little for attempting to stabilize the region, so long as they had
adequate access to these resources.139 This system of profiteering was enabled through deeply
entrenched systems of corruption by Congolese officials.140 There was some attempt for
international bodies to begin arbitrating these types of situations. This quickly became problematic

135
“Rwanda Public Finance Management Reform Project - World Bank,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
[Link].
136
Daniel Thürer, “The ‘Failed State’ and International Law - ICRC,” International Review of the Red Cross (1, 00:00:00.0),
[Link]
137
“Democracy, Corruption, and U.S. Policy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Brookings (blog), December 11,
2020, [Link]
years-into-the-tshisekedi-administration/.
138
“Violence Linked to Natural Resource Exploitation - United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights,” accessed October 29, 2021, [Link]
5_Natural_Resources_FINAL.pdf.
139
“Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the DRC, 1993-2003,” Global Witness, accessed October 29,
2021, [Link]
140
Ibid.

41 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

due to concerns over sovereignty and infringing on the government’s need to seem to hold
control.141

Latin America / Caribbean

In Haiti, one of the most notable actions taken to help reduce the fragility of the country was the
United Nations Mission in Haiti (“MINUSTAH”). The objective of MINUSTAH was to act as a UN
peacekeeping mission in Haiti, beginning in 2004, and it comprised 2,366 military personnel along
with 2,533 police force members.142 The mandate from the UN Security Council (“UNSC”) was to use
its resources to restore and maintain the rule of law, public safety, and public order in Haiti.143 The
MINUSTAH personnel had a very difficult time fighting against the armed gangs for control and saw
widespread violence across the country.144 The mandate for MINUSTAH was extended and
broadened after the initial few years did not yield significant success, as well as due to natural
disasters such as the earthquake in October 2010. The mission officially ended in October 2017, per
the UNSC’s direction.

MINUSTAH, in addition to its lack of success over the course of its deployment, faced significant
domestic and international criticism. From its first moments on the ground, it became heavily
politicized and was subject to significant pressure from the conservative and liberal parties.145
Beyond this, there have been numerous accusations of human rights abuses by MINUSTAH
personnel, as well as civilian casualties.146 One of the most dramatic instances of alleged civilian
casualties was on July 6, 2005, where a Brazilian general carried out a raid on rebels. However, many
people opposed to MINUSTAH believe that the raid targeted civilians, with casualties ranging
between 10-80 civilians. This added fuel to the fire for those who did not support the MINUSTAH

141
Ibid.
142
“MINUSTAH Fact Sheet,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
143
Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson, eds., Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond (Tokyo ; New York: United Nations
University Press, 2011).
144
“United States Institute of Peace Special Report,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
145
Marta Fernández Moreno, Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, and Maíra Siman Gomes, “Trapped Between Many Worlds:
A Post-Colonial Perspective on the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),” International Peacekeeping 19, no. 3 (June 1, 2012):
377–92, [Link]
146
“A New Chapter for the Disastrous United Nations Mission in Haiti | The New Yorker,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]

42 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

presence in the country.147 Towards the end of MINUSTAH’s mandate in Haiti, there were regular
protests in the country with demonstrators chanting “Down with the occupation” and burning flags
of countries who contributed personnel to the mission.148 It is important for delegates to understand
what happened in Haiti and the benefits and risks of intervening with military forces. That being said,
the dais will not look favorably upon solutions leveraging the United Nations Peacekeepers. This is
due to the controversy that surrounds historical UN peacekeeping missions, as well as the fact that
the only UN body that has the power to mandate UN peacekeeping missions is the UNSC.149

Europe

The European Project and the European Union have been working on proving their value to their
member states. This has been done through three core areas: politics, economics, and defense. On
the political front, a timely example is the centralized power and decision-making that the EU as an
institution could bring to the Covid-19 pandemic. On the political side, the EU has been able to foster
coordination across the various heads of states. While this caused tension during the more
logistically difficult parts of the pandemic, such as with vaccine distribution while vaccines were very
scarce, citizens of countries overall viewed this cooperation as beneficial.150 The EU leaders were also
able to ensure priority areas across the EU were defined and that adequate personal protective
equipment (“PPE”) was provided to ensure the safety of its member states’ citizens.151 However, it is
widely perceived that Germany was the driving factor of EU collaboration during this period. There is
also broad perception that the EU actions during the pandemic exacerbated the North-South divide
in the European continent.152 Please note that while the COVID-19 pandemic is a good example of

147
“Soldiers Without a Cause: Why Are Thousands of UN Troops Still in Haiti?,” Center for Economic and Policy Research
(blog), April 1, 2012, [Link]
148
Ibid.
149
“Deploying Peacekeepers,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
150
“EU Defends Vaccine Distribution as Nations Complain It Is Uneven,” Reuters, March 13, 2021, sec. Healthcare &
Pharma, [Link]
151
“Regulation (EU) 2016/425 on Personal Protective Equipment | Safety and Health at Work EU-OSHA,” accessed
October 29, 2021, [Link]
equipment.
152
Iryna Sabat et al., “United but Divided: Policy Responses and People’s Perceptions in the EU during the COVID-19
Outbreak,” Health Policy 124, no. 9 (September 1, 2020): 909–18, [Link]

43 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

how the EU can work together to prevent state fragility, it will not be a topic of debate during this
committee.

On the economic front, the Covid-19 pandemic saw the European Union redirect EU funds to help its
member states. For example, the EU directed 37 billion Euros from its structural funds to help EU
countries fight against the outbreak.153 In addition, the budget was amended at multiple points to
deliver billions of Euros to its member states on a continual basis. Another major economic
accomplishment was the establishment of the Euro itself – a single common currency across 19
countries. The Euro has accomplished its goal of achieving regional price stability and has been
widely successful in the eyes of citizens of the member countries.154 That being said, recent empirical
studies by researchers at firms such as Bloomberg have noted that data on the benefit of the Euro
remains inconclusive.155

153
“Covid-19: Parliament Approves €37 Billion Crisis Response | News | European Parliament,” March 25, 2020,
[Link]
billion-crisis-response.
154
Professor Karl Whelan, “The Euro at 20: Successes, Problems, Progress and Threats,” n.d., 20.
155
“Euro’s 20th Anniversary: A Report Card on the Single Currency’s Success,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]

44 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

 Figure 2: From Bloomberg's "Euro's 20th Anniversary: A Report Card on the Single Currency's Success"

Finally, on the defense front, the EU has implemented a Common Security and Defense Policy
(“CSDF”). The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009, set up the initial framework for the
EU’s CSDF.156 The CSDF includes strategies such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (“PESCO”),
which involves long-term collaborative defense strategies across EU member states.157 In addition,
the European Defence Fund (“EDF”) helps direct financial resources and manpower on an EU-level
towards defense research and capability development.158 These defense strategies, focused on

156
“The Treaty of Lisbon | Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
157
“PESCO: A Force for Positive Integration in EU Defence,” CEPS (blog), September 14, 2021, [Link]
publications/pesco-a-force-for-positive-integration-in-eu-defence/.
158
“The European Defence Fund (EDF),” accessed October 29, 2021, [Link]
defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_de.

45 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

common goals and collaboration, have been largely successful and well-received by EU member
states.159

World Bank / IMF

The World Bank (the “Bank”) is a global institution that was established in 1944 to initially help post-
WWII Europe rebuild.160 The Bank now acts as an international organization that works on
combating poverty through developmental assistance to countries that are on the lower end of the
development spectrum. This is largely done through giving loans and working with the private and
public sectors to ensure that they are rapidly developing.161 The International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”), on the other hand, is an international organization focused on stabilizing the international
monetary system and monitoring currencies across the globe. Core goals of the IMF are to secure
financial stability, facilitate international trade, and promote high levels of employment.162

With regards to fragile states, the World Bank has often deployed financial resources to help with
reconstruction and development for countries that have higher levels of fragility.163 For example, the
International Development Association (“IDA”), which is the division of the Bank that focuses on the
world’s least developed countries, announced $26 billion of financing available for fragile states.164
The World Bank also established a State and Peacebuilding Fund (“SPF”) in 2008, which is a large
multi-donor trust fund that supports interventions in fragile states.165 These funds will often be
deployed for projects such as rebuilding economic capacity, developing infrastructure, facilitating
FDI, generating new jobs for citizens, and helping deliver basic services like education to citizens.166

159
European Union Institute for Security Studies., CSDP in Action: What Contribution to International Security? (LU:
Publications Office, 2015), [Link]
160
“History,” Text/HTML, World Bank, accessed October 29, 2021, [Link]
161
“The World Bank: What It Is and How It Operates,” Bretton Woods Project, July 16, 2020,
[Link]
162
“About the IMF,” accessed October 29, 2021, [Link]
163
“Fragility, Conflict & Violence,” Text/HTML, World Bank, October 15, 2021,
[Link]
164
Ibid.
165
“State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF),” Text/HTML, World Bank, accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
166
Nicole Ball and Mariska van Beijnum, “Review of the Peacebuilding Fund,” Cligendael Institute, June 4, 2009, 51.

46 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

The IMF engages fragile states through three key channels: surveillance, lending, and capacity
development. Surveillance involves monitoring the situations of fragile states and keeping track of
any developments for the broader international community.167 The IMF only helps through its
lending and capacity development practices at the request of the state itself.168 The IMF offers
multiple facilities, including the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility/Extended Credit Facility
(“PRGF/ECF”)169, the Rapid Credit Facility (“RCF”)170, and Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance
(“EPCA”).171 These facilities are pools of capital that have been deployed in prior engagements with
fragile states to aid in their development, especially after periods of violence and conflict. Delegates
should note that, while the Bank and IMF can be valuable partners for fragile state solutions, they
should by no means be relied upon as a consistent or endless source of capital and funding.
Delegates should rather understand actions they have taken and understand how that might be
emulated or improved upon.

167
“Overview of the IMF’s Work on Fragile States,” n.d.
168
“The IMF and Fragile States,” IMF, accessed October 29, 2021, [Link]
work/Evaluations/Completed/2018-0403-the-imf-and-fragile-states.
169
“IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF),” IMF, accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
170
“IMF Rapid Credit Facility (RCF),” IMF, accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
171
“IMF Emergency Assistance: Supporting Recovery from Natural Disasters and Armed Conflicts - World,” ReliefWeb,
accessed October 29, 2021, [Link]
disasters-and-armed-conflicts.

47 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

 Possible Solutions

This section will provide delegates with a few ideas of what potential solutions could look like and
what might make them particularly effective (or ineffective). Delegates should use this to
understand potential starting points for their research or to stimulate ideation.

One major issue that is often overlooked is the lack of energy access that fragile states have. Over
800 million people worldwide have no access to electricity, with 86% (translating to 688 million
people) living in countries that are classified as fragile by the OECD. Poor energy not only impedes
development, but also perpetuates the vicious poverty cycle and creates structural circumstances
that foster conflict and social, political, and economic instability.172 Overseas development
assistance (“ODA”) has been partly directed towards this issue, but it has become skewed towards
investments in non-fragile states.173 Solutions such as distributed or off-grid energy are modular and
disperse risk, which helps reduce the potential for a single issue to bring down the entire power grid.
Distributed generation systems broadly are largely resilient during periods of conflict, while also
being affordable and environmentally sustainable.174 There is also no technological barrier, as all
necessary technologies have already been developed for such types of distributed power systems.175
The core obstacle to this type of solution is securing the appropriate financing and establishing the
necessary partnerships between national governments and private and public actors to execute on
this task. Through this solution, energy could be brought rapidly to regions and citizens that could
immensely benefit from such access.

Another solution might be to look at the food systems that exist in fragile states and ensure that the
agricultural systems and markets are effective. Fragile states have, on average, 43% of their
population employed in the agriculture sector. This can be compared to non-fragile, non-high-

172
“Fragile States: Securing Development,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
[Link]?sequence=1.
173
Qiang Wang, Jiaqi Guo, and Zequn Dong, “The Positive Impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA) on
Renewable Energy Development: Evidence from 34 Sub-Saharan Africa Countries,” Sustainable Production and
Consumption 28 (October 1, 2021): 532–42, [Link]
174
“Scaling Energy Investments in Fragile States - Council on State Fragility,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
content/uploads/2021/03/scaling_energy_investments_in_fragile_states_council_on_state_fragility.pdf.
175
OAR US EPA, “Distributed Generation of Electricity and Its Environmental Impacts,” Overviews and Factsheets,
August 4, 2015, [Link]

48 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

income countries, which see only 27% of their population employed in the agriculture sector.176 As
such, there is a significant need to ensure that people can be fed and that livelihoods can be
maintained in fragile countries through adequate agricultural systems. Farmers might need cash
assistance, especially if regional banks and lenders have constraints due to economic downturns.177
As such, data systems can be implemented to assess where there are distribution bottlenecks and
financial issues, such that financial resources can be appropriately allocated.178 Technology could
also be leveraged to provide high-quality information to farmers about best practices, crop prices,
and how to effectively bargain with suppliers.179

The advent of technological innovation across all sectors could also be heavily utilized to ensure that
basic services are provided to the citizens of countries. One of the largest driving factors of state
fragility and stability of a populace is their access to adequate healthcare.180 The government,
alongside international support, can act as a major catalyst in innovating healthcare solutions. For
example, in Rwanda, hospital waiting times for blood supplies were hovering around four hours in
the most optimal conditions. This meant that oftentimes, blood supplies could not be delivered on-
time, causing the risk of surgeries and other procedures to dramatically skyrocket. However, a
system was developed wherein online ordering from hospitals and other healthcare providers was
combined with drone-based delivery of blood supplies. This reduced the waiting time by over 75% to
an average of 45 minutes.181

In general, solutions will protect fragile states by strengthening their weakest areas. For a state that
is threatened by foreign or domestic violence, solutions must involve strengthening military and
police forces. Meanwhile, many fragile states lack critical infrastructures; solutions for these nations
will require developing water access, education, agriculture, health care, and more. A state must be
able to stand on its own in order to become more stable. However, somewhat contrary to this idea of

176
“Strengthening Food Systems in Fragile Contexts,” accessed October 29, 2021, [Link]
content/uploads/2020/08/10989%E2%80%A2Fragile-Context-Policy-Brief_3Aug.pdf.
177
Clive A. Edwards, Sustainable Agricultural Systems (CRC Press, 2020).
178
“A Roadmap for Food System Recovery in Fragile States and Territories,” ICARDA, accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]
179
“Timor-Leste’s Drivers of Growth and Sectoral Transformation,” n.d.
180
Wendy A. Rogers and Mary J. Walker, “Fragility, Uncertainty, and Healthcare,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 37,
no. 1 (February 2016): 71–83, [Link]
181
“Drones Take Rwanda’s National Blood Service to New Heights,” accessed October 29, 2021,
[Link]

49 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

independently-driven stability, many solutions require the cooperation of multiple nations.
Delegates must find solutions which utilize the resources of a globalized world to strengthen fragile,
sovereign states.

50 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

 Bloc Positions

While this discussion of state fragility has emphasized fragility in nations across the globe, there are
areas of the world with a higher concentration of more-fragile states than others. Rather than
approaching the potential bloc positions as a “savior and saved” dynamic between states with lower
levels of fragility and states with higher levels of fragility, delegates should recognize the valuable
insight that each nation can bring to the table. Those with higher levels of fragility can bring
impactful insights into where assistance and preventative measures can have the largest impact,
whereas those with lower levels of fragility can develop strategies that might have worked in their
countries. This is not even to mention the various cultural and geographic differences that enable
each delegation to bring an equally unique and valuable set of perspectives and solutions to this
discussion.

Figure 3: From Statista [Link]

51 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

Asia & Oceania

Asia and Oceania have countries with a very diverse set of experiences vis-à-vis state fragility.
According to the FSI, New Zealand is currently the 4th-least fragile nation in the world, whereas
Myanmar is the 23rd-most fragile nation in the world. As such, countries with stronger and weaker
institutions interplay with one another within this geographic region. It should be noted that with
major population and power-hubs within the region (China, India, and Australia), there are a variety
of economic systems and trade networks which have allowed for unprecedented growth. That being
said, the Asian and Oceanic regions are well-suited for collaboration which strengthens state
stability, in the midst of economic growth, cultural shifts, and rapid urbanization.

Middle East

The Middle East has historically been home to a number of high-fragility states, including four out of
five of the most-fragile states, as per the FSI. Middle Eastern nations have also experienced large
amounts of violence from both domestic and international actors, contributing to the instability of
the nations. On top of this, having a large number of fragile states within relative geographic
proximity to one another compounds the problems of each state, causing a “cycle” of instability.
However, there are also some countries in the region (such as Israel and Qatar) which are considered
to be significantly less-fragile states. As such, these types of countries might be able to act as
geographic partners to build a strong Middle Eastern coalition that prioritizes societal stability
through economic development. Furthermore, delegates from this region should prioritize
protecting fragile states from the military threats such as hostile non-state actors and foreign acts of
aggression.

Africa

For the past few centuries, the African continent has been divided up arbitrarily and faced a
significant number of domestic, regional, and international headwinds to set up effective
institutions. In spite of these obstacles, many African nations have found some level of stability.
However, in aggregate, Africa is home to many countries that rank quite poorly on the FSI. As such,
delegations from Africa can leverage experiences (both successes and failures) from their countries

52 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

to help push the committee forward with innovative solutions and impact-oriented ideas. African
nations should prioritize developing basic systems (such as infrastructure, healthcare, and
agriculture), to ensure state stability. Many problems of state fragility in Africa were caused by
foreign intervention, whether by governments or by private companies. As such, African nations
need solutions which develop local industries and governing capabilities, while also preserving self-
determination.

Europe

Many countries, especially within the European Union, rank as the least-fragile nations in the world
according to the FSI. Nations such as Finland, Norway, and Switzerland consistently rank as some of
the least-fragile states. Countries with these types of historical rankings can leverage their
understanding of what types of institutions and processes have been most effective at home to
stimulate brainstorming and ideas for committee. However, not all European nations have been very
stable in the past. One must only consider the series of conflicts and insurgencies fought in the
former Yugoslavia between 1991 to 2001 to see that European nations are not immune from high
levels of state fragility. As such, delegations from Europe should ensure that they do not overlook
the fact that they have also experienced such fragility “at home,” so to speak. For this committee,
European delegations can focus on problems in other regions, but delegates should also know that
stability in Europe is threatened by the rise of other antagonistic powers and the decline of allied
support. Even after the Trump presidency, the United States has become increasingly isolationist.
Meanwhile, Russia’s rejection of the west has manifested in a variety of economic and security
concerns for European countries aligned with the EU and NATO.182 With these dual forces in mind,
European countries can look for solutions which either strengthen international political and
economic unions. Or, European nations can advocate for more independence in their decision-
making process, so that states are less reliant on the European Union.

182
Niblett, Robin. “Fragility in Europe Is on the Rise, and We're Not Doing Enough to Respond.” World Economic Forum.
World Economic Forum, January 13, 2017. [Link]
and-we-re-not-doing-enough-to-respond/.

53 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

Latin America & South America

In Latin America and South America, there are a few countries (such as Venezuela, Honduras,
Nicaragua, etc.) that have historically had significant difficulty with state fragility. Coupled with the
economic crises that many of these countries face, citizens of such nations are often very discontent.
As such, one of the most common issues for countries in this region is the migration flows from
more-fragile states to less-fragile states. This has placed a significant burden on the slightly-less
fragile states and caused institutions to be rendered somewhat ineffective. This compounds issues
within the region, causing states that were not having much difficulty to suddenly be unable to
deliver basic services to their citizens. Delegations of this region should target the root causes of
migration, and then also ensure that migration is not a severely destabilizing force.

North America

North America, particularly the United States and Canada, have historically been ranked lower on
the FSI and have had less issues with state fragility. However, as mentioned multiple times in this
discussion, the effects of fragile states are global issues with global ramifications. As such, North
American nations should not be dissuaded from engaging with these issues. North American nations
provide significant resources and know-how from their existing institutions to create ideas on how to
prevent and mitigate state fragility.

54 Disarmament and International Security Committee | MUNUC 34

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