Answer key for sample questions:

Answer 1:

Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the admissibility of an accused’s statement
made to the police during investigation is governed by Sections 22 and 23. Section 23(1) lays
down that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against the accused, as such
statements are presumed involuntary and unreliable. The proviso to Section 23 allows a
narrow exception: only that portion of an accused’s statement which leads directly to the
discovery of a material fact may be admitted in evidence. This exception operates strictly and
applies only when the fact discovered is the direct consequence of information furnished by
the accused.

In the present case, Arnav Sharma’s custodial statement — “I kept the knife in my car’s
dashboard after the fight. It should still be there” — does not qualify for the discovery
exception because no recovery was made in consequence of this disclosure. The car was
searched, but no knife was found in the dashboard. The subsequent recovery of the folding
knife from Arnav’s mother’s stationery shop was made independently, on the basis of the
shopkeeper’s information, not as a result of Arnav’s statement. Consequently, the proviso to
Section 23 is not attracted, and the statement remains a barred police confession under
Section 23(1).

Further, the forensic report linking the recovered knife to the complainant’s blood group
cannot retrospectively validate an otherwise inadmissible confession. The Supreme Court in
Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar held that even a voluntary confession made to a police
officer is inadmissible unless it strictly satisfies the statutory conditions of discovery.
Similarly, in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya the Court clarified that the discovery rule
applies only when the recovery is a direct outcome of the accused’s statement, not when the
information merely relates to an already known or independently discovered fact.

Therefore, Arnav’s statement to the police is inadmissible in its entirety under Section 23(1)
BSA, since no discovery followed from it. The prosecution cannot rely on this statement to
prove guilt but must instead depend on independent evidence such as the seizure memo,
CCTV footage, eyewitness testimony, and forensic findings. The statement being purely
confessional and not leading to discovery, it remains excluded from consideration under the
express bar of the BSA.

2.

Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), the burden of proof lies on the
prosecution throughout the trial to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
(Sections 104–105 BSA,)When the prosecution relies entirely on circumstantial evidence, the
law requires that the chain of circumstances be complete, coherent, and consistent only with
the guilt of the accused, leaving no reasonable ground for an alternative hypothesis of
innocence. This principle was clearly laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1622)

In the present case, the CCTV footage establishes Ramesh Yadav’s presence at the scene of
the crime during the relevant time. The forensic evidence directly connects him to the
offence: the gloves recovered from his possession contained gold dust particles and
microfibres matching those of the complainant’s jewellery bag. The pawnshop owner’s
testimony provides further corroboration by proving disposal of stolen property, while the
bank deposit soon after the theft indicates motive and gain. Moreover, Ramesh’s failure to
offer any reasonable explanation for these incriminating circumstances justifies an adverse
inference under Section 109 BSA (facts especially within the knowledge of the accused).

Taken together, these circumstances form a complete and unbroken chain pointing solely
towards the guilt of the accused and excluding any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
Therefore, the body of admissible evidence is sufficient to discharge the prosecution’s burden
of proof under the BSA, and a conviction could be sustained on this circumstantial evidence
alone.

3.

(a) Admissibility of Rohit’s Statement as a Dying Declaration

Rohit’s statement to his cousin Anita—“it was Ramesh; he locked the kitchen door from
outside and set it on fire”—made while he was grievously injured and before he died, falls
squarely within the dying-declaration limb of Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya
Adhiniyam, 2023, which makes statements by a person about the cause of his death or the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death relevant even though they are
technically hearsay; the statute preserves the long-standing exception based on the maxim
nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri. The law does not prescribe an absolute requirement that
a dying declaration must be recorded by a magistrate for admissibility; what matters is the
content, voluntariness and the circumstances in which it was made (so that the court can be
satisfied it was not tutored or induced). The Privy Council’s decision in Pakala Narayana
Swami v. King-Emperor established that the scope of admissibility is broad and includes
statements that have a proximate connection with the circumstances leading to death not
narrowly confined to the precise words describing the fatal act and that principle underpins
modern statutory formulations. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a dying
declaration may be acted upon if it inspires confidence: in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay
the Court sustained conviction based on dying declarations which it found truthful and free
from material infirmity; thus a properly made dying declaration, even if uncorroborated, can
be the sole basis of conviction if it is reliable. the court must carefully scrutinize
voluntariness, opportunity for tutoring, and medical/mental fitness at the time of making the
statement.
On these authorities, Rohit’s oral words to Anita are admissible under Section 26 BSA, but
the trial court must examine Anita’s credibility, the circumstances of recording, and any
corroboration before assigning the declaration decisive probative value.

b) When more than one dying declaration is made by a deceased person and these
declarations appear inconsistent or contradictory, the court must carefully examine their
reliability, consistency, and surrounding circumstances before deciding which one to rely
upon. Under Section 26 BSA, all statements made by a deceased person relating to the cause
of death are relevant, but the weight and credibility of each depend on the degree of
voluntariness, coherence, and consistency with the other evidence on record. The law does
not impose any hierarchy among dying declarations; each must be assessed independently for
its truthfulness and probative force.

The test is whether the declaration fits logically into the complete chain of circumstances
proving guilt and excludes other hypotheses (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra). The earlier, spontaneous statement made in extremis carries greater weight
whereas a later inconsistent one weakens the chain. Unless the preferred declaration is wholly
reliable and corroborated by other evidence, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused.
Nevertheless, because the two statements diverge materially, the court should not act on the
earlier declaration alone unless it inspires full confidence or is corroborated by independent
evidence (medical opinion about nature of burns, scene evidence such as whether the kitchen
door was locked from outside, presence of accelerant, motive, CCTV, etc.). If the early
declaration is corroborated and coherent with the other proved circumstances, the court may
safely act upon it (Khushal Rao); if not, the conflict weakens the prosecution’s case and the
benefit of doubt must go to the accused. The net result under Section 26 BSA and the cited
authorities is that both statements are admissible, but the earlier, spontaneous statement will
usually carry heavier weight — yet acceptance of either statement for conviction requires that
it fit the proved facts and exclude reasonable alternative hypotheses as emphasised in Sharad
and related precedents.