Internal Assessment-I

The Perceptions and Challenges to Self-determination in Multicultural Polities:​

From the lens of Indian Tribal Communities

Rishi Raj Sharma

24/155
Semester II
BA (Hons.) Political Science​
Political Theory: Concepts and Debates
INTRODUCTION

India, for long has been the epitome of a pluralistic culture accommodating diverse views under an
umbrella political system. This distinctive plural culture of India, which was initially thought to be an
obstacle in securing democracy in the region, has somehow helped it strengthen it. Among the many
diverse sections of this multicultural society exist the tribal communities of India, which for long had
been behind the shadows of civilisations, churning for their right to self-determination. Self-determination
acts as an important tool for these tribal groups to express themselves as a political and social culture. A
culturally plural society, therefore, cannot be just or stable unless it acknowledges diversity as constitutive
of its unity. India’s challenge at current is not the diverse cultures that it accommodates but its inability to
politically recognise it on equal terms. Any unity built on imposed homogeneity will inherently be fragile;
true stability requires a state that recognizes its internal pluralism as a source of moral strength. The tribal
demand for self-determination exemplifies this struggle for recognition within, rather than outside, the
Indian polity.

THEORETICAL EVOLUTION: The idea of Self-Determination

The general discourse among India’s tribal communities can be meaningfully located within the broader
theoretical conversation on multiculturalism. Multiculturalism refers to a normative framework that
inquires and interrogates how modern states can reconcile cultural diversity with political unity. Leading
this discourse on multiculturalism are two major contributors, Will Kymlicka and Bhikhu Parekh who
offer complementary yet contrasting opinions on the moral and political status of cultural difference.

Classical liberals like J.S. Mill perceived the idea of self-determination not as an inherent collective right
but as a functional precondition for liberal institutions. J.S. Mill (1862) defines nationality as “a portion of
mankind united by common sympathies which make them cooperate more willingly with each other than
with other people” and who “desire to be under the same government”. Mill therefore proposes
conditional and assimilationist self-determination. Political independence, for him, is desirable only for
homogenous civilised nations of Europe that can sustain the principles of liberty and equality. Uncivilised
cultures of non-European countries may rightly be incorporated and assimilated into more advanced states
until they reach civic maturity. Mill outwardly calls despotism to be a legitimate mode of government in
dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement.
Will Kymlicka reinterprets self-determination through a multicultural liberal lens. In Multicultural
Citizenship, he claims that “individual autonomy is dependent on the presence of a societal culture,
defined by language and history” and that justice “requires a concern with cultural membership” (as cited
in McDonald, 1997, pp. 297-298). Therefore, for Kymlicka, culture provides the context of choice to
individuals which is necessary for exercising meaningful autonomy. And so, group-differentiated or
minority rights are not illiberal or secessionists, but extensions of the egalitarian liberal framework as
proposed by Rawls and Dworkin. Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship is therefore a liberal defence of
minority rights. He justifies collective rights not only morally but also as an important framework for
sustaining individual autonomy. McDonald (1997) praises Kymlicka for clarifying why minority rights
matter but says Kymlicka doesn’t fully explain how these rights should be implemented institutionally or
constitutionally.

Bhikhu Parekh, as interpreted by Iwanebel (2016) in Teosofia, advances multiculturalism as a synthesis

beyond both monism and relativistic pluralism. Each culture, according to him, represents its own feature
and meaning system, and intercultural dialogue must be facilitated between them to steer the
understanding between the cultures (Iwanebel, 2016). Parekh holds that classical liberal theorists fell into
the fallacy of cultural autonomy, treating culture as fixed and self-contained, which in turn legitimised
domination by a dominant culture on a minor culture. Parekh, therefore, goes on to critique thinkers like
Mill for moral monism and ethnocentric universalism. Self-determination in this context is dialogical and
relational. It entails the right of communities to define themselves and to have their moral visions
respected within a plural and moral universe. (Iwanebel, 2016)

So on one hand Mill’s classical liberalism subordinates self determination to a conditional political tool
for enabling liberty, Kymlicka transforms it into a liberal-egalitarian right ensuring the protection of
societal cultures as essential for individual freedom. Parekh further radicalises it into a moral-dialogical
principle– each culture’s self-definition deserves recognition within a shared human conversation. In this
theoretical evolution, self-determination shifts from being the prerequisite for liberty to being one of
liberty’s essential expressions.
MORE ON MINORITY RIGHTS

Justifying Minority Rights

Kymlicka divides minorities or marginalised sections as either national minorities or ethnic minorities.
National minorities are the original inhabitants of a region who were forcefully assimilated into the
dominant culture. Ethnic minorities, on the other hand, comprise the immigrant population in a foreign
nation—who instead of preserving their culture like national minorities—are instead focused on
expanding their own culture. Kymlicka provides justification for minority rights in two stages. Firstly, he
argues that individual autonomy depends upon access to a “societal culture” which is defined by a shared
language, history, and set of institutions that provide meaningful ways of life across the full range of
human activities (McDonald, 1997). Secondly, liberal justice requires protecting this access equally for
both majority and minority members (McDonald, 1997).

McDonald (1997) acknowledges that this framework provides a powerful justification for the rights of
national minorities, but raises several critical concerns. He observes that Kymlicka’s conception of
culture, tied closely to the modern nation-state, risks excluding less institutionalised groups such as
Indigenous communities. Moreover, McDonald questions whether all national cultures actually foster the
individual autonomy that liberal theory values, since some illiberal cultures may actively suppress it. He
notes that Indigenous peoples may not fit the modern institutional model of nationhood that Kymlicka
adopts, making his framework potentially Eurocentric (McDonald, 1997).

Minority Rights as Constitutional Rights

While Kymlicka largely confines himself to normative principles, McDonald argues that defending
minority rights also raises questions about their constitutional entrenchment, that is, whether they should
be written into constitutions and protected from majoritarian override (McDonald, 1997). McDonald
points out that all democratic systems are structured by rules which define who counts as part of the
majority and how collective decisions can be made, Therefore, some constraints on majorities are
necessary for the functioning of the democracy.

He suggests that if the moral case for minority rights rests on protecting groups that have historically
faced systematic neglect, discrimination, or domination, then there are strong reasons to provide them
with constitutional protection (McDonald, 1997). In societies where majoritarian politics has consistently
failed to respect minority claims, constitutional entrenchment may be essential to prevent repetition of
past injustices. Constitutional entrenchment is thus a mechanism for ensuring that minority groups have
secure guarantees of self-government, language rights, or cultural preservation that cannot be easily
undermined by political shifts or populist pressures.

THE INDIAN CONTEXT: From the lens of Indian tribal communities

The concept of tribal self-determination in India is profoundly anchored in the colonial encounter, during
which the British administration initially institutionalised cultural differences through classification.
Colonial authorities classified tribal regions as “excluded” or “partially excluded” areas, administered by
specific laws that were outside the mainstream legal framework (Xaxa Committee, 2014). The rationale
behind this administrative segregation was paternalism of Britishers. They were purportedly to “protect”
tribes from exploitation but, in effect, deprived them of political agency. As Xaxa (1999) observes, the
ethnographic imagination of the colonial state portrayed tribes as “simple, illiterate, and backward
societies,” with their transformation into “modern” or “caste” societies being interpreted as a sign of
progress. Such liberal paternalistic framework characterised tribes as objects of rule rather than as
subjects of governance.

The Fifth and Sixth Schedules

The Indian Constitution has formalised separated governance of tribal areas in the Fifth and Sixth
Schedules that constitute unique modes of autonomy. The Fifth Schedule applies to tribal areas across
central and western India—covering Jharkhand, Odisha, and parts of Madhya Pradesh—where Tribes
Advisory Councils (TACs) exist to advise governors on welfare initiatives. Although such councils exist
in advisory capacity with limited power of decision making, the latter remains with the Governor, who
serves as the figure-head of the centre (Xaxa Committee, 2014). Here, autonomy is administrative rather
than political in the sense that the tribal voice comes through the screen of bureaucratic negotiation.

It is in contrast with the Sixth Schedule that applies within the northeastern hill states. Here Autonomous
District Councils (ADCs) enjoy limited legislative and judicial authority in respect of land, resources, and
customary law. This framework is closer to the model of "self-government rights" envisioned by
Kymlicka in the sense that it secures the cultural mediums in which meaningful decisions may be made
by individuals. But again, autonomy of this sort is bounded since councils receive state-managed funds,
require governor's assent, and lack gender representation.

PESA and the Forest Rights Act

Later legislative measures focused on democratising tribal self-governments and addressing past
injustices. The Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 validated Gram Sabhas as
constitutional self-governing institutions with the power to oversee natural resources and cultural
development. Similarly, the Forest Rights Act, 2006 validated the dispossession of forest-living
communities by granting them rights to ownership and management of ancestral lands (Xaxa Committee,
2014).

However, both acts shed light on the weaknesses inherent in institutional multiculturalism.
Implementation has been faulty; the interference of bureaucracy, the role of corporations, and restrictive
interpretations of “community” continue to erode local authority (Sharma, 2022). Parekh's analysis states
that the Indian state practices monological pluralism where it recognises difference as the object of policy
rather than the subject of dialogue. This in turn results in rhetorical participation without substantive
power-sharing.

Even with its plural constitutional framework, the Indian adventure with tribal self-government is framed
within the limits of developmentalism and majoritarian nationalism. The Fifth and Sixth Schedules as
well as PESA and FRA indicate an uncomfortable compromise between assimilation and autonomy. The
liberal multiculturalism of Kymlicka accounts for the inclusionary discourse–- the institutional
safeguarding of the rights of minorities within the moral order of the state. But such systems, as cautioned
by Parekh's dialogical multiculturalism, lack moral reciprocity since the state hears but doesn't converse.
It is this paradox that underlies Indian multiculturalism as diversity is symbolically celebrated but
paternalistically governed. This tribal call for self-determination is thus not secessionist but dialogic.

CASE STUDY: Pathalgadi Movement in Jharkhand

The Pathalgadi movement that originated in Jharkhand in the year 2017 is the classic example of modern
expression of tribal autonomy within the Indian constitutional framework. The movement is the modern
expression of the earlier Munda customary practice of setting up megaliths (pathalgadi or literally
"stone-carving") to define social and territorial boundaries. Pathalgadi became reimagined in the form of
constitutional and statutory rights, which were being inscribed upon stone plinths (Davidsdottir, 2021).
The inscriptions refer to Articles 244 and 243 of the Indian Constitution and statutory acts like the
Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA, 1996) and the Forest Rights Act (FRA, 2006),
thus claiming the power of Gram Sabhas to administer village affairs and manage natural assets. What
started as a cultural reassertion of autonomy in the form of self-governance soon transformed into the
legal and moral indictment of the inability of the state to convert constitutional pluralism into practical
autonomy.

The movement arose in the context of widespread discontent with state-led development and successive
moves to amend the Chotanagpur Tenancy (CNT) and Santhal Pargana Tenancy (SPT) Acts protecting
tribal rights to land. The perceived dilution of these safeguards reinforced a sense of betrayal among
Adivasis, who viewed these efforts as eroding the fragile autonomy promised in the Fifth Schedule. The
movement’s appropriation of law as a means of resistance, what O’Brien and Li (2006) call “rightful
resistance”, is central to its political philosophy. The movement's activists work "within the letter of the
law," buttressing the state's own discourse of law with demands for the realization of pre-existing rights
which the state already has obligations to uphold. The writing of constitutional provisions in stone is both
symbolic and tactical—subjecting legal text to collective memory of entitlement.

From a theoretical perspective, the Pathalgadi movement exemplifies the limitations of India's liberal
multiculturalism as interpreted by Kymlicka and Parekh. Kymlicka's model of self-government rights
presumes the existence of a liberal state capable of acknowledging minority cultures as autonomous
contexts for choice. However, in Jharkhand, the state's interaction with Adivasi self-rule remains
bureaucratic and paternalistic. The advisory structures of the Fifth Schedule, combined with the executive
override by governors, diminish autonomy to mere administration. Conversely, the Pathalgadi
movement's moral insistence on reciprocity aligns with Parekh's concept of dialogical multiculturalism,
which demands recognition not as wards of development, but as equal partners in shaping the moral and
political order. Through collective acts of inscription and ceremony, the movement enacts what Parekh
would characterize as the dialogical encounter between moral universes, thereby reaffirming a culturally
grounded vision of democracy.

Yet the state response has all too often been coercive. Despite its reliance on constitutional documents, the
Pathalgadi has been termed "anti-national" and "anti-constitutional," with leaders arrested under sedition
laws (Davidsdottir, 2021). This criminalisation exposes a deep paradox– the same Constitution which
accords legitimacy to tribal autonomy also provides the tool of its repression. By “carving rights in
stone,” Adivasi communities in Simdega and Khunti transform law into lived resistance, asserting that
recognition is not granted, but enacted. Their struggle exemplifies the transition of self-determination
from a liberal instrument of inclusion to a moral dialogue of coexistence.

CRITICAL APPRAISAL: Challenges to self-determinism in India

The discourse surrounding self-determination in India’s tribal communities reveals a persistent

detachment between the normative ideal of autonomy and its institutional implementation. As Oyibodoro,
Gasiokwu, and Aloamaka (2024) note, self-determination is inherently ambiguous, fluctuating between its
legal codification as a collective right and its political application within sovereign states. This ambiguity,
when applied to the Indian context, manifests in a complex structure of recognition without genuine
empowerment. Although the Indian Constitution facilitates differentiated governance through the Fifth
and Sixth Schedules, these mechanisms often convert the moral right of self-determination into a
bureaucratic practice of control. Tribal self-rule, limited to advisory and administrative functions,
becomes symbolic rather than substantive.

Bowett's (1966) observations on postcolonial self-determination prove astonishingly prescient in this

respect. He argued that newly developing nations, afraid of disintegration, often choose territorial
integrity over participatory autonomy. Indian policy on tribal self-determination provides an exemplary
example of this defensive nationalism. The insistence on "integration with distinction" by the state
extends the logic of colonial protectionism, in which the difference is respected but controlled.
Consequently, such movements like the Pathalgadi, become counter narratives, recovering constitutional
and moral authority with ground-up points of view. The movement's expression of Gram Sabha's
sovereignty captures an aspiration for "internal self-determination" (Oyibodoro et al., 2024), requesting
recognition within the political community rather than demanding exclusion from it.

However, multiple challenges constrain this realisation. Firstly, legal uncertainty remains the principal
concern. The selective implementation of constitutional provisions by the Indian state—the subordination
of the autonomy of the tribes to executive discretion—undercuts effective self-government. Secondly,
structural asymmetry remains in force–- while the Sixth Schedule provides increased devolution in the
north-eastern states, regions covered by the Fifth Schedule continue to be ruled by governors and hence
reinforce dependency rather than autonomy. Thirdly, the political economy of extractive industry wears
away the material foundations of autonomy. Tribal territories continue to be subjected to displacement
pressures arising out of the projects of industry and mining, thus bringing out the limitations of statutory
protections offered under PESA and the Forest Rights Act. Finally, cultural representation without
political power provides what Parekh might call recognition without reciprocity—a moral failure of the
Indian model of multiculturalism.

Cumulatively, the impact of such challenges is that the existing practice of self-determination becomes
managerial rather than emancipatory. The Indian case illustrates Bowett's caveat that opposition to
self-determination all too frequently results in internal strife rather than unity. In order to break out of this
impasse, tribal self-determination must be reconceptualised in terms of dialogical rather than monological
lines and grounded in mutual moral authorship and reciprocal participation. By the example of the
Pathalgadi movement, self-determination in Indian tribal regions is less an expression of secessionist
desire than it is an insistence upon real federal partnership— an insistence that democracy, in order to be
pluralist at all, must also be co-authored.

CONCLUSION

The discourse on self-determination within India’s tribal communities encapsulates the deeper struggle of
modern democracies to reconcile unity with diversity. At its core lies a paradox: the Indian state
constitutionally celebrates pluralism yet functionally limits it through centralised control and
developmental paternalism. This contradiction mirrors the theoretical tension between liberal and
dialogical models of multiculturalism articulated by Will Kymlicka and Bhikhu Parekh. Kymlicka’s
liberal multiculturalism situates minority rights within the framework of justice and autonomy, arguing
that individual freedom flourishes only when individuals have secure access to their societal cultures. Yet,
as Leighton McDonald (1997) observes, Kymlicka’s account remains largely moral rather than
institutional, insufficiently addressing how such rights may be safeguarded within the complex realities of
majoritarian democracies. In contrast, Parekh’s dialogical multiculturalism transcends institutional
inclusion, envisioning recognition as a process of moral reciprocity—where each culture not only
demands justice but also contributes to a shared human conversation.

When applied to the Indian context, these theories reflect both the promise and the limits of India’s
constitutional pluralism. The Fifth and Sixth Schedules, along with the PESA and Forest Rights Acts,
represent commendable attempts to institutionalise self-determination through differentiated governance.
However, they have often operated as instruments of administrative management rather than of genuine
autonomy. The structures meant to empower tribal communities remain mediated by bureaucratic
discretion and political hierarchy, turning the moral right of self-rule into a technocratic process of
consultation. The Pathalgadi movement of Jharkhand reclaims this lost moral core of self-determination.
It exemplifies Parekh’s dialogical vision by asserting that recognition cannot be conferred unilaterally by
the state but must be co-authored by all its members.

For tribal self-determination to move from rhetoric to reality, the state must shift from viewing diversity
as a problem to be managed toward embracing it as a source of democratic vitality. Constitutional
entrenchment of minority rights, as McDonald (1997) argues, is not a threat to democracy but its
refinement. In this sense, tribal self-determination is not an external claim against the Indian nation but an
internal call to complete its democratic promise. The movement from Mill’s conditional liberty to
Kymlicka’s liberal autonomy and Parekh’s dialogical reciprocity traces not only the evolution of
self-determination as a political idea but also the ethical horizon of Indian democracy itself, one that
recognises plurality as both its foundation and its fulfillment.

REFERENCES

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McDonald, Leighton (1997). "Regrouping in Defence of Minority Rights: Kymlicka's Multicultural

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Oyibodoro, U. G., Gasiokwu, P. I., & Aloamaka, P. C. (2024). The ambiguity and complexity of the right
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Sharma, R. (2022). Issues of tribal integration and autonomy in Indian society. Inspira Journal of
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[Link]

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