NDC POLICY BRIEF

No. 04 – February 2020

Turkey’s military policy forts in Syria – for example, cancelling visas, promoting
free trade, and holding joint cabinet meetings. Turkey’s
in Syria: implications foreign policy was shaped by then Foreign Minister and

for NATO
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s thought, popularly
formulated in the concept of “Strategic Depth”. Refer-
ring to David Laing’s anti-psychiatry school, Davutoglu
claimed that the nation was alienated from its roots and
Can Kasapoglu * embraced a “false self ”. To fix the “identity crisis”, Tur-
key pursued charm offensives in the Middle East. This
ideationally motivated stance even led to speculative
Turkey’s ever transforming strategic prior- neo-Ottomanism debates in Western writings.2
ities in Syria From 2011, when the Arab Spring broke out, there
were high hopes as to Turkey’s role model status. In
In three decades, Ankara’s strategic agenda in Syria has April 2012, before the Turkish Parliament, then For-
considerably changed. First, back in the late 1990s, Tur- eign Minister Davutoglu stated that Ankara would lead
key’s primary goal was to put an end to the Hafez al-As- the change as “the master, pioneer, and servant” of the
sad regime’s use of the PKK terrorist organization as a Middle East.3 Five years later, the Turkish administration
proxy. To address the threat at its source, Ankara resort- dropped these aspirations. At the 2017 Davos meeting,
ed to a skillfully crafted coercive diplomacy, backed by then Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek stated that
the Turkish Armed Forces. A determined approach – the Assad regime’s demise was no longer one of his gov-
championed by Turkey’s late president Suleyman Demi- ernment’s considerations.4 In fact, by 2015, Turkey had
rel – formed the epicenter of this policy: it was coupled to deal with real security problems on its doorstep, such
with adept use of alliances, in particular the Turkish-Is- as the Russian expedition in Syria, ISIS rockets hammer-
raeli strategic partnership. In October 1998, Syria, a trou- ing border towns, the refugee influx, and mushrooming
blesome state sponsor of terrorism as designated by the PKK offshoots.
US Department of State since 19791, gave in. The Baath
regime ceased providing safe haven to Abdullah Oca- From great expectations to disappointment
lan, the PKK’s founder who claimed thousands of lives
in Turkey. The same year, Damascus signed the Adana In this context, why did Ankara, along with a major part
Agreement with Ankara, vowing to stop supporting ter- of the transatlantic policy community including the US
rorist groups targeting Turkey. administration,5 fail to anticipate the resiliency of the
In the following period, from the early 2000s up until Syrian Baath regime? In fact, at the beginning of the
the regional unrest in 2011, Turkish policy aimed at reju- turmoil, some critical incidents took place that seemed
venating the historical legacy. During that time, Ankara
fostered its socio-cultural and economic integration ef-
2 See J. Diehl, “Turkey’s vision of an Ottoman Commonwealth”, Atlantic
Council, December 2010.
3 S. Ergin, “Orta Dogu’nun Yeni Sahibi Biz Miyiz”, Hurriyet, 1 May 2012.
* Director of the security and defense programme of the Istanbul-based
think-tank EDAM, and Research Fellow at the German Institute for In- 4 For the full conversation, see [Link]
ternational and Security Affairs (SWP), Centre for Applied Turkey Studies mGJKuMbM
(CATS). 5 President Obama highlighting the famous “Assad’s days are numbered”
1 For a detailed listing, see “The US Department of State, State Sponsors remark in his 2012 presidential debate with Mitt Romney, [Link]
of Terrorism Overview”. [Link]/watch?v=okYrUwdNpos
NDC Policy Brief – No. 04 – February 2020
2
to be telltale indicators of a regime collapse. In 2012, dinary assembly, Secretary General Stoltenberg called for
the defection of Manaf Tlass – commander of the 104th de-escalation.6 Possibly, Turkey was expecting a harsher
Republican Guard Brigade, Bashar’s close friend, one of response from NATO.
the most prominent Sunni figures of the Baath regime, A notable consequence of the Su-24M incident was
and son of Hafez al-Assad’s long-serving defense minis- the swift rise of a Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/
ter Mustafa Tlass – was one of these milestones. AD) bubble in the Levant, as depicted by then SACEUR
However, the most significant analytical shortfall General Breedlove.7 Before this turning point, the Rus-
stemmed from a flawed conceptualization of the Syr- sian contingents in Latakia and Tartous had few land-
ian security apparatus. Unlike other flashpoints of the based air defense capabilities (only a limited number of
so-called Arab Spring (Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya), the Pantsir S1 short-to-medium range air defenses).8 The
Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAAF) have a pronounced Russian military immediately started deploying advanced
sectarian structure which has translated into a dichoto- SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems in Syria. A mix of
my in its doctrinal order of battle. Hafez al-Assad built the S-400 (SA-21 Growler) and the S-300V4 (SA-23
his praetorian guard around the Alawite sect from which Gladiator) defensive strategic weapons, along with the
the Assad clan itself hails. The elite units, such as the 4th mid-range BUK-M2 (SA-17) defenses, established dan-
Armored Division of Bashar’s thuggish brother Maher gerous engagement envelopes in the Syrian skies and be-
al-Assad, the Republican Guard, the Air Force Intelli- yond. Moscow also sent more Pantsirs (SA-22). In fact,
gence, and the Special Forces, enjoy certain privileges Russia often played the ‘SAM card’ in its expedition, such
and better equipment. They are primarily tasked with as the transfer of S-300 PM-2 to the SAAF following the
safeguarding the regime against external and internal accidental downing of a Russian electronic intelligence
threats. aircraft during an Israeli airstrike in Syria, in 2018.
As the civil unrest brought out the fault lines within
Syrian society, the violence turned into a sectarian civil The Syrian scuds that rally and separate
war. Inevitably, the armed conflict has consolidated the us: Allied missile defense contingents in
praetorian, Alawite ranks within the SAAF. Besides, al- Turkey
though the SAAF lost considerable manpower, the re-
gime’s military housing system and Soviet spy network The story of several Allies’ missile defense contingents
have prevented en masse defections at combat unit level. deployed on Turkish soil serves to showcase Turkey’s
When the civil war broke out in 2011, detachments from fluctuating perceptions of NATO throughout the Syr-
the core units were sent to bulky conventional forma- ian civil war.
tions to keep discipline. In addition, having seen the set- The SAAF, for decades, have possessed a formidable
backs in mobilization efforts, the regime opted for using ballistic missile arsenal combined with deadly weapons
paramilitaries, often through Tehran’s assistance. Finally, of mass destruction. Declassified intelligence assess-
Iranian and Russian support tipped the scales in favor of ments from Cold War times suggest that Hafez al-Assad
Assad’s forces, while the armed opposition was plagued had diligently fostered Syria’s offensive chemical weap-
with Salafi Jihadist movements and terrorist networks ons (CW) capabilities along with the Scud line of ballistic
(ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates). The regime deliberately missiles as the primary means of delivery.9 Damascus’
encouraged this trend by selectively targeting moderate strategic weapons capabilities have been augmented by
opposition groups. its shady cooperation with Tehran and Pyongyang.
When the civil war broke out, the SAAF’s strategic
A tale of two aircraft and NATO weapons arsenal principally consisted of FROG rock-
ets, SS-21, Scud-B, Scud-C, and Scud-D ballistic missiles
For Turkey, the years 2012 and 2015 were landmarks in married to the largest offensive CW inventory in the
the Syrian conundrum. On June 22nd, 2012, the SAAF Middle East, including very lethal nerve agents Sarin and
downed a Turkish RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft. Fol- VX.10 Having faced conventional shortcomings, the Syr-
lowing the incident, Ankara adopted stricter rules of en- ian regime began using ballistic missiles by late 2012 and
gagement (RoE) to intercept aircraft approaching from
Syrian airspace. Three years later, in November 2015, the
new RoE along the frontier ended up with the down- 6 Statement by the NATO Secretary General after the extraordinary NAC
meeting, 24 November 2015.
ing of a Russian Su-24M by Turkish combat air patrols,
7 “Top NATO General: Russians starting to build air defense bubble over
after persistent violations of Turkish airspace. This was Syria”, Atlantic Council, 29 September 2015.
one of the most sensational challenges in the Alliance’s 8 A. Lavrov, “The Russian Air Campaign in Syria”, Center for Naval Analyses
history. Ankara immediately demanded an emergency (CNA), 2018, p.25.
North Atlantic Council meeting, in accordance with Ar- 9 Central Intelligence Agency, Syria’s offensive chemical weapons capability, 1985
(approved for release, 2011).
ticle 4 of the Washington Treaty. Following the extraor-
10 M. Nomark [Link]., Syria and WMD: incentives and capabilities, FOI, 2004.
NDC Policy Brief – No. 04 – February 2020
3
CW in early 2013.11 that a NATO nation had deployed brigade-level con-
Turkey did not possess adequate defensive capabilities ventional formations to fight ISIS. The second and third
to address the threat. Given the resemblance to the pre- campaigns, namely Olive Branch and Peace Spring, pre-
vious Iraqi crises, Ankara asked the Alliance for help. In dominantly targeted the PKK-affiliated groups in Syria.
2013, the US, Germany, and the Netherlands provided Control of Syrian airspace, divided between Russia to
Turkey with six Patriot air and missile defense batter- the west of the Euphrates and the US to the east, was
ies.12 These deployments highlighted a firm support to the most crucial international affairs parameter in Tur-
Ankara’s national defense concerns. Later, however, all key’s expeditions. Two examples given below show what
the initial Patriot provider countries decided to withdraw the implications of this airspace issue could be.
their batteries from Turkey (the Netherlands in 2014, First, during Operation Olive Branch, on 3 February
the US and Germany in 2015). Although the explana- 2018, Ha’yat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an al-Qaeda affili-
tions focused on technical considerations and changes ated group, downed a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft over
in the threat assessment, the Turkish policy community Idlib. The pilot managed to eject. When he landed, he
considered the withdrawals to be politically motivated engaged in an exchange of fire
amidst divergences in Syria. with HTS militants and even-
Notwithstanding the withdrawals, the contingents tually, to avoid capture, blew The Allies,
were later replaced by Spanish Patriots and Italian
SAMP/Ts. In addition, the 2018 NATO Brussels Sum-
himself up with a hand grenade.
Russia reacted by temporarily
especially European
mit Declaration openly emphasized the Syrian missiles closing its sector of Syrian air- nations […], should
hitting the Turkish soil as a major concern. However, in space between 5 and 9 February. compartmentalize
October 2019, when Ankara launched Operation Peace
Spring against the PKK-affiliated Kurdish militancy in
During that period, the Turkish
Air Force could not fly manned
their disputes
northeastern Syria, the “politicization” claims as to the aircraft over the zone of action. with the Turkish
NATO air and missile defense deployments surfaced The setbacks in close air support administration
again in league with arms exports restrictions exercised caused significant hardships on
by Western nations on Turkey. This time, Italy decided the battleground. and avoid pursuing
to remove the SAMP/T batteries with a clear reaction Second, during Operation policies that would
to the Turkish cross-border campaign; Spain, only at the
last moment, opted to keep its Patriots.13
Peace Spring, Turkey’s removal
from the anti-ISIS coalition’s air
mean gifting a
Nevertheless, NATO has tried its hardest to keep tasking order by the Pentagon NATO member
the withdrawal discussions limited to bilateral contacts marked a critical crossroads. The state’s weapons
between member nations, and away from the Alliance’s
agenda as an institution. Secretary General Stoltenberg
decision had practically deprived
the Turkish Air Force of joint
market to Moscow
stated that the deployments should continue “because surveillance and intelligence
they show that despite the differences we see among data. Had Washington opted to close northeastern Syri-
NATO allies about the situation in northern Syria, an airspace to Turkish aircraft, NATO’s cohesion would
we have to be able to deliver on the activities we do have faced one of the most significant tests in the Alli-
together”.14 ance’s history. Fortunately, the tensions did not go that
far.
Turkish cross-border campaigns: into the
conflict zone The divergence

Between summer 2016 and fall 2019, Turkey launched Political reactions from the Allies to Ankara’s recent
three major military campaigns in Syria. The initial cam- cross-border campaign, particularly in the defense sec-
paign, Operation Euphrates Shield, was the first time tor, remain the chief divergence factor for Ankara’s
geopolitical identity. Although there was no EU-wide
11 See J. Holliday, “The Assad regime: from counterinsurgency to civil arms embargo, all the EU countries exercised several
war”, ISW, 2013, p.24; and M. Beth [Link]., “Syria’s chemical weapons: issues
for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, 2013.
weapons exports restrictions to Turkey. The US also de-
12 “All NATO Patriot batteries in Turkey operational”, NATO website, 16 cided to take tough measures. Senator Lindsey Graham
February 2016. even tweeted that he was working with Senator Chris
13 See T. Kington, “Italy to remove its air-defense assets from Turkey Van Hollen to introduce bipartisan sanctions, calling for
by year’s end”, 25 october 2019, Defense News, and S. Erkuş, “Spain exten- Turkey’s suspension from NATO unless Ankara ceased
ds Patriot deployment since NATO ally’s security is crucial”, Hurriyet Daily
News, 16 December 2019. its military action.15 In fact, back in 2016, it was Sen-
14 S. Sprenger and T. Kington, “Amid Syria discord, NATO chief backs
continued deployment of allies’ air defenses in Turkey”, Defense News, 24 15 See Lindsey Graham�s twitter page at [Link]
October 2019. seyGrahamSC/status/1181219542778953728
NDC Policy Brief – No. 04 – February 2020
4

ator Graham himself who criticized then Secretary of some other trends led to serious disagreements between
Defense Ashton Carter for the Obama administration’s Ankara and its traditional allies. After all, from 2015
support to the PYD/YPG in Syria (under the banners of to 2018, Turkey transformed from being the primary
Syrian Democratic Forces/SDF): the criticism was based reason for Russia’s S-400 deployment in Syria into the
on these groups’ substantial ties to the PKK, which the one and only Allied nation that procured the very same
US too designate as a terrorist organization.16 weapon system.
Washington’s position did not change until Vice Pres- To fully grasp the NATO angle and Turkey’s military
ident Mike Pence reached an agreement in Ankara, on policy in Syria, two facts are essential. First, Ankara has
17 October 2019, to halt the campaign in return for the not pursued one single military policy in Syria. One can
withdrawal of the PKK-affiliated militants along the spot several strategic priorities, including the demise of
120km-long frontier between Tal Abyad and Rasalayn, the Baath regime, confrontation (and then cooperation)
30 km away from the Turkish border. with Russia, clearing al-Bab from ISIS, and preventing
On the one hand, it was clear that Turkey’s public di- the PKK offshoots’ fait accompli autonomy aspirations.
plomacy efforts were not selling well in Western capi- Each military policy objective, intrinsically, resonated
tals, leaving Ankara with a long way to go. On the other differently with the transatlantic strategic community.
hand, the West’s tendency of reacting through sanctions Second, although Turkey had many differences with
that would hit the Turkish defense sector may not be some of its allies as to the Syria issue, in particular the
the best idea for NATO cohesion. Following the Soviet United States, Ankara has not collided with NATO as an
legacy, defense deals are tantamount to entry points for institution. On the contrary, especially at the outset of
enhancing Moscow’s sphere of influence in the Krem- the Syrian civil war, Ankara saw Turkey’s NATO mem-
lin’s eyes.17 Russia has opportunistically used arms sales bership as an invaluable asset. Within only one year, back
to wear away Turkey’s NATO ties. Thus, the Allies, espe- in 2012, Turkey invoked Article 4 of the Washington
cially European nations (given the possibility of the US Treaty twice – first upon the downing of its RF-4E air-
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions craft, and afterwards when the Syrian Arab Army’s shell-
Act sanctions against Turkey), should compartmental- ing killed five civilians in the border town of Akcakale.
ize their disputes with the Turkish administration and And in 2015, the Allies agreed on the Tailored Assurance
avoid pursuing policies that would mean gifting a NATO Measures for Turkey (TAMT) package, extending intelli-
member state’s weapons market to Moscow. Above all, gence, early-warning, and information sharing assistance
protecting Turkey’s military cooperation with the BAE to Ankara.
systems and EUROSAM remains key in this respect, At present, it is clear that Turkey has serious disagree-
since the Russian defense industry is particularly ambi- ments with the West on Syria, especially as to Operation
tious in the aircraft and air defense segments. Olive Branch and Operation Peace Spring. These diver-
gences are geopolitical in essence, and they are there to
NATO-Turkey ties more important than stay. In order to weather the ongoing storm, all NATO
Syria capitals, including Ankara, Washington, and those in Eu-
rope, should keep bilateral disputes as they are and avoid
From 2011 onwards, while certain developments show- extending the divergences to the broader framework of
cased the crucial role of NATO defense guarantees, the Alliance. Realistically speaking, there are only few, if
any, possibilities of convergence in Syria. Yet, NATO’s
16 For the exchange between Senator Graham and Secretary Carter, see importance to Turkey’s national security, as well as Tur-
[Link]
key’s value to NATO, remain bigger than the Syrian is-
17 R. Connoly and C. Sendstad, “Russia’s role as an arms exporter: the
strategic and economic importance of arms exports for Russia”, Chatham sue.
House, 2017.

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