Socrates

Socrates (/ˈsɒkrətiːz/;[2] Ancient Greek: Σωκράτης,

romanized: Sōkrátēs; c. 470 – 399 BC) was an ancient
Socrates
Greek philosopher from Classical Athens, perhaps the
first Western moral philosopher, and a major
inspiration on his student Plato, who largely founded
the tradition of Western philosophy.[3] An enigmatic
figure, Socrates authored no texts and is known mainly
through the posthumous accounts of classical writers,
particularly his students Plato and Xenophon. These
accounts are written as dialogues, in which Socrates
and his interlocutors examine a subject in the style of
question and answer; they gave rise to the Socratic
dialogue literary genre. Contradictory accounts of
Socrates make a reconstruction of his philosophy
nearly impossible, a situation known as the Socratic
problem. Socrates was a polarizing figure in Athenian
society. In 399 BC, he was accused of impiety and
corrupting the youth. After a trial that lasted a day, he A marble head of Socrates in the Louvre (copy
was sentenced to death. As related by Plato, he was put of a lost bronze head by Lysippus)[1]
to death by administration of poison after refusing
Born c. 470 BC
offers from allies to help him escape.
Deme Alopece, Athens
Plato's dialogues are among the most comprehensive Died 399 BC (aged approx. 71)
accounts of Socrates to survive from antiquity. They Athens
demonstrate the Socratic approach to areas of Cause of Forced suicide by poisoning
philosophy including epistemology and ethics. The death
Platonic Socrates lends his name to the concept of the
Spouse(s) Xanthippe, Myrto (disputed)
Socratic method, and also to Socratic irony. The
Socratic method of questioning, or elenchus, takes Children Lamprocles, Menexenus,
shape in dialogue using short questions and answers, Sophroniscus
epitomized by those Platonic texts in which Socrates Family Sophroniscus (father),
and his interlocutors examine various aspects of an Phaenarete (mother), Patrocles
issue or an abstract meaning, usually relating to one of (half-brother)
the virtues, and find themselves at an impasse, unable
Philosophical work
to define what they thought they understood. Socrates
Era Ancient Greek philosophy
frequently proclaims his ignorance, saying that he is
only sure that he does not know. Region Western philosophy
School Classical Greek philosophy
Socrates exerted a strong influence on philosophers in
Notable Plato · Xenophon · Antisthenes ·
later antiquity and has continued to do so in the
students Aristippus · Alcibiades · Critias
modern era. He was studied by medieval and Islamic
scholars and played an important role in the thought of Main Epistemology · ethics · teleology
the Italian Renaissance, particularly within the interests
humanist movement. Interest in him continued Notable Social gadfly
unabated, as reflected in the works of Søren ideas Socratic dialogue
Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. Depictions of
Socrates in art, literature, and popular culture have Socratic intellectualism
made him a widely known figure in the Western Socratic irony
philosophical tradition. Socratic method
Socratic paradox
Socratic questioning
Sources and the Socratic problem "The unexamined life is not
worth living"
Socrates did not document his teachings. All that is
known about him comes from the accounts of others:
mainly the philosopher Plato and the historian Xenophon, who were both his pupils; the Athenian comic
dramatist Aristophanes (Socrates's contemporary); and Plato's pupil Aristotle, who was born after
Socrates's death. The often contradictory stories from these ancient accounts only serve to complicate
scholars' ability to reconstruct Socrates's true thoughts reliably, a predicament known as the Socratic
problem.[4] The works of Plato, Xenophon, and other authors who use the character of Socrates as an
investigative tool, are written in the form of a dialogue between Socrates and his interlocutors and
provide the main source of information on Socrates's life and thought. Socratic dialogues (logos
sokratikos) was a term coined by Aristotle to describe this newly formed literary genre.[5] While the exact
dates of their composition are unknown, some were probably written after Socrates's death.[6] As Aristotle
first noted, the extent to which the dialogues portray Socrates authentically is a matter of some debate.[7]

Plato and Xenophon

An honest man, Xenophon was no trained philosopher. He could neither fully conceptualize nor articulate
Socrates's arguments. He admired Socrates for his intelligence, patriotism, and courage on the battlefield.
He discusses Socrates in four works: the Memorabilia, the Oeconomicus, the Symposium, and the
Apology of Socrates. He also mentions a story featuring Socrates in his Anabasis.[8] Oeconomicus
recounts a discussion on practical household management. Like Plato's Apology, Xenophon's Apologia
describes the trial of Socrates, but the works diverge substantially and, according to W. K. C. Guthrie,
Xenophon's account portrays a Socrates of "intolerable smugness and complacency".[9] Symposium is a
dialogue of Socrates with other prominent Athenians during an after-dinner discussion, but is quite
different from Plato's Symposium: there is no overlap in the guest list. In Memorabilia, he defends
Socrates from the accusations of corrupting the youth and being against the gods; essentially, it is a
collection of various stories gathered together to construct a new apology for Socrates.[10]

Plato's representation of Socrates is not straightforward.[11] Plato was a pupil of Socrates and outlived
him by five decades.[12] How trustworthy Plato is in representing the attributes of Socrates is a matter of
debate; the view that he did not represent views other than Socrates's own is not shared by many
contemporary scholars.[13] A driver of this doubt is the inconsistency of the character of Socrates that he
presents.[14] One common but not universally accepted account of this inconsistency is that Plato initially
tried accurately to represent the historical Socrates, while later in his writings putting his own views into
Socrates's mouth. Under this understanding, there is a distinction between the Socratic Socrates of Plato's
earlier works and the Platonic Socrates of Plato's later writings, although the boundary between the two
seems blurred and the presumed chronology rests on little evidence.[15]

Xenophon's and Plato's accounts differ in their presentations of Socrates as a person. Xenophon's Socrates
is duller, less humorous and less ironic than Plato's.[16][17] Xenophon's Socrates also lacks the
philosophical features of Plato's Socrates—ignorance, the Socratic method or elenchus—and places more
emphasis on enkrateia (self-control) than Plato's Socrates.[18] Generally, logoi Sokratikoi cannot help us
to reconstruct the historical Socrates even in cases where their narratives overlap, as authors may have
influenced each other's accounts.[19]

Aristophanes and other sources

Writers of Athenian comedy, including Aristophanes, also commented on Socrates. Aristophanes's most
important comedy with respect to Socrates is The Clouds, in which Socrates is a central character.[20] In
this drama, Aristophanes presents a caricature of Socrates that leans towards sophism,[21] ridiculing
Socrates as an absurd atheist.[22] Socrates in Clouds is interested in natural philosophy, which conforms
to Plato's depiction of him in Phaedo. What is certain is that by the age of 45, Socrates had already
captured the interest of Athenians as a philosopher.[23] It is not clear whether Aristophanes's work is
useful in reconstructing the historical Socrates.[24]

Other ancient authors who wrote about Socrates were Aeschines of Sphettus, Antisthenes, Aristippus,
Bryson, Cebes, Crito, Euclid of Megara, Phaedo and Aristotle, all of whom wrote after Socrates's
death.[25] Aristotle was not a contemporary of Socrates; he studied under Plato at the latter's Academy for
twenty years.[26] Aristotle treats Socrates without the bias of Xenophon and Plato, who had an emotional
tie with Socrates, and he scrutinizes Socrates's doctrines as a philosopher.[27] Aristotle was familiar with
the various written and unwritten stories of Socrates.[28] His role in understanding Socrates is limited. He
does not write extensively on Socrates; and, when he does, he is mainly preoccupied with the early
dialogues of Plato.[29] There are also general doubts on his reliability on the history of philosophy.[30]
Still, his testimony is vital in understanding Socrates.[31]

The Socratic problem

In a seminal work titled "The Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher" (1818), the philosopher Friedrich
Schleiermacher attacked Xenophon's accounts; his attack was widely accepted.[32] Schleiermacher
criticized Xenophon for his naïve representation of Socrates. Xenophon was a soldier, argued
Schleiermacher, and was therefore not well placed to articulate Socratic ideas. Furthermore, Xenophon
was biased in his depiction of his former friend and teacher: he believed Socrates was treated unfairly by
Athens, and sought to prove his point of view rather than to provide an impartial account. The result, said
Schleiermacher, was that Xenophon portrayed Socrates as an uninspiring philosopher.[33] By the early
twentieth century, Xenophon's account was largely rejected.[34]

The philosopher Karl Joel, basing his arguments on Aristotle's interpretation of logos sokratikos,
suggested that the Socratic dialogues are mostly fictional: according to Joel, the dialogues' authors were
just mimicking some Socratic traits of dialogue.[35] In the mid-twentieth century, philosophers such as
Olof Gigon and Eugène Dupréel, based on Joel's arguments, proposed that the study of Socrates should
focus on the various versions of his character and beliefs rather than aiming to reconstruct a historical
Socrates.[36] Later, ancient philosophy scholar Gregory Vlastos suggested that the early Socratic
dialogues of Plato were more compatible with other evidence for a historical Socrates than his later
writings, an argument that is based on inconsistencies in Plato's own evolving depiction of Socrates.
Vlastos totally disregarded Xenophon's account except when it agreed with Plato's.[36] More recently,
Charles H. Kahn has reinforced the skeptical stance on the unsolvable Socratic problem, suggesting that
only Plato's Apology has any historical significance.[37]

Biography
Socrates was born in 470 or 469 BC to Sophroniscus and
Phaenarete, a stoneworker and a midwife, respectively, in the
Athenian deme of Alopece; therefore, he was an Athenian
citizen, having been born to relatively affluent Athenians.[39]
He lived close to his father's relatives and inherited, as was
customary, part of his father's estate, securing a life
reasonably free of financial concerns.[40] His education
followed the laws and customs of Athens. He learned the
basic skills of reading and writing and, like most wealthy
Athenians, received extra lessons in various other fields such Battle of Potidaea (432 BC): Athenians
as gymnastics, poetry and music.[41] He was married twice against Corinthians (detail). Scene of
(which came first is not clear): his marriage to Xanthippe Socrates (center) saving Alcibiades. 18th
took place when Socrates was in his fifties, and another century engraving. According to Plato,
Socrates participated in the Battle of
marriage was with a daughter of Aristides, an Athenian
Potidaea, the retreat of Battle of Delium
statesman.[42] He had three sons with Xanthippe.[43] Socrates
and the battle of Amphipolis (422 BC).[38]
fulfilled his military service during the Peloponnesian War
and distinguished himself in three campaigns, according to
Plato.[44]

Another incident that reflects Socrates's respect for the law is the arrest of Leon the Salaminian. As Plato
describes in his Apology, Socrates and four others were summoned to the Tholos and told by
representatives of the Thirty Tyrants (which began ruling in 404 BC) to arrest Leon for execution. Again
Socrates was the sole abstainer, choosing to risk the tyrants' wrath and retribution rather than to
participate in what he considered to be a crime.[45]

Socrates attracted great interest from the Athenian public and especially the Athenian youth.[46] He was
notoriously ugly, having a flat turned-up nose, bulging eyes and a large belly; his friends joked about his
appearance.[47] Socrates was indifferent to material pleasures, including his own appearance and personal
comfort. He neglected personal hygiene, bathed rarely, walked barefoot, and owned only one ragged
coat.[48] He moderated his eating, drinking, and sex, although he did not practice full abstention.[48]
Although Socrates was attracted to youth, he resisted his passion for them because, as Plato describes, he
was more interested in educating their souls and did not seek sex from his disciples.[49][50] Politically, he
did not take sides in the rivalry between the democrats and the oligarchs in Athens; he criticized both.[51]
The character of Socrates as exhibited in Apology, Crito, Phaedo and Symposium concurs with other
sources to an extent that gives confidence in Plato's depiction of Socrates in these works as being
representative of the real Socrates.[52]
Socrates died in Athens in 399 BC after a trial for impiety (asebeia) and the corruption of the young.[53]
He spent his last day in prison among friends and followers who offered him a route to escape, which he
refused. He died the next morning, in accordance with his sentence, after drinking poison hemlock.[54]
According to the Phaedo, his last words were: “Crito, we owe a rooster to Asclepius. Don't forget to pay
the debt.”[55]

Trial of Socrates
In 399 BC, Socrates was formally accused of corrupting the minds of the youth of Athens, and for
asebeia (impiety), i.e. worshipping false gods and failing to worship the gods of Athens.[56] At the trial,
Socrates defended himself unsuccessfully. He was found guilty by a majority vote cast by a jury of
hundreds of male Athenian citizens and, according to the custom, proposed his own penalty: that he
should be given free food and housing by the state for the services he rendered to the city,[57] or
alternatively, that he be fined one mina of silver (according to him, all he had).[57] The jurors declined his
offer and ordered the death penalty.[57]

Of all the works written about Socrates' trial, only three survive: Plato's Apology, Xenophon's Apology,
and Xenophon's Memorabilia.[58]

Socrates was charged in a politically tense climate.[59] In 404 BC, the Athenians had been crushed by
Spartans at the decisive naval Battle of Aegospotami, and subsequently, the Spartans laid siege to Athens.
They replaced the democratic government with a new, pro-oligarchic government, named the Thirty
Tyrants.[59] Because of their tyrannical measures, some Athenians organized to overthrow the Tyrants—
and, indeed, they managed to do so briefly—until a Spartan request for aid from the Thirty arrived and a
compromise was sought. When the Spartans left again, however, democrats seized the opportunity to kill
the oligarchs and reclaim the government of Athens.[59]

The accusations against Socrates were initiated by a poet, Meletus, who asked for the death penalty in
accordance with the charge of asebeia.[59] Other accusers were Anytus and Lycon. After a month or two,
in late spring or early summer, the trial started and likely went on for most of one day.[59] There were two
main sources for the religion-based accusations. First, Socrates had rejected the anthropomorphism of
traditional Greek religion by denying that the gods did bad things like humans do. Second, he seemed to
believe in a daimonion—an inner voice with, as his accusers suggested, divine origin.[59]

Plato's Apology starts with Socrates answering the various rumours against him that have given rise to the
indictment.[60] First, Socrates defends himself against the rumour that he is an atheist naturalist
philosopher, as portrayed in Aristophanes's The Clouds; or a sophist.[61] Against the allegations of
corrupting the youth, Socrates answers that he has never corrupted anyone intentionally, since corrupting
someone would carry the risk of being corrupted back in return, and that would be illogical, since
corruption is undesirable.[62] On the second charge, Socrates asks for clarification. Meletus responds by
repeating the accusation that Socrates is an atheist. Socrates notes the contradiction between atheism and
worshipping false gods.[63] He then claims that he is "God's gift" to the Athenians, since his activities
ultimately benefit Athens; thus, in condemning him to death, Athens itself will be the greatest loser.[64]
After that, he says that even though no human can reach wisdom, seeking it is the best thing someone can
do, implying money and prestige are not as precious as commonly thought.[65]
Socrates was given the chance to offer alternative
punishments for himself after being found guilty. He could
have requested permission to flee Athens and live in exile, but
he did not do so. According to Xenophon, Socrates made no
proposals, while according to Plato he suggested free meals
should be provided for him daily in recognition of his worth
to Athens or, more in earnest, that a fine should be imposed
on him.[67] The jurors favoured the death penalty by making
him drink a cup of hemlock (a poisonous liquid).[68] In return, The Death of Socrates, by Jacques-Louis
Socrates warned jurors and Athenians that criticism of them David (1787). Socrates was visited by
by his many disciples was inescapable, unless they became friends in his last night in prison. His
good men.[57] After a delay caused by Athenian religious discussion with them gave rise to Plato's
ceremonies, Socrates spent his last day in prison. His friends Crito and Phaedo.[66]
visited him and offered him an opportunity to escape, which
he declined.[69]

The question of what motivated Athenians to convict Socrates remains controversial among scholars.[70]
There are two theories. The first is that Socrates was convicted on religious grounds; the second, that he
was accused and convicted for political reasons.[70] Another, more recent, interpretation synthesizes the
religious and political theories, arguing that religion and state were not separate in ancient Athens.[71]

The argument for religious persecution is supported by the fact that Plato's and Xenophon's accounts of
the trial mostly focus on the charges of impiety. In those accounts, Socrates is portrayed as making no
effort to dispute the fact that he did not believe in the Athenian gods. Against this argument stands the
fact that many skeptics and atheist philosophers during this time were not prosecuted.[72] According to
the argument for political persecution, Socrates was targeted because he was perceived as a threat to
democracy. It was true that Socrates did not stand for democracy during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants
and that most of his pupils were against the democrats.[73] The case for it being a political persecution is
usually challenged by the existence of an amnesty that was granted to Athenian citizens in 403 BC to
prevent escalation to civil war after the fall of the Thirty. However, as the text from Socrates's trial and
other texts reveal, the accusers could have fuelled their rhetoric using events prior to 403 BC.[74]

Philosophy

Socratic method
A fundamental characteristic of Plato's Socrates is the Socratic method, or the method of refutation
(elenchus).[76] It is most prominent in the early works of Plato, such as Apology, Crito, Gorgias, Republic
I, and others.[77] The typical elenchus proceeds as follows. Socrates initiates a discussion about a topic
with a supposed expert on the subject, usually in the company of some young men and boys, and by
dialogue proves the expert's beliefs and arguments to be contradictory.[78] Socrates initiates the dialogue
by asking his interlocutor for a definition of the subject. As he asks more questions, the interlocutor's
answers eventually contradict the first definition. The conclusion is that the expert did not really know the
definition in the first place.[79] The interlocutor may come up with a different definition. That new
definition, in turn, comes under the scrutiny of Socratic questioning. With each round of question and
answer, Socrates and his interlocutor hope to approach the
truth. More often, they continue to reveal their ignorance.[80]
Since the interlocutors' definitions most commonly represent
the mainstream opinion on a matter, the discussion places
doubt on the common opinion.[81]

Socrates also tests his own opinions through the Socratic

method. Thus Socrates does not teach a fixed philosophical
doctrine. Rather, he acknowledges his own ignorance while
searching for truth with his pupils and interlocutors.[81]
The Debate of Socrates and Aspasia by
Scholars have questioned the validity and the exact nature of
Nicolas-André Monsiau. Socrates's
the Socratic method, or indeed if there even was a Socratic discussions were not limited to a small
method.[82] In 1982, the scholar of ancient philosophy elite group; he engaged in dialogues with
Gregory Vlastos claimed that the Socratic method could not foreigners and with people from all social
be used to establish the truth or falsehood of a proposition. classes and of all genders.[75]
Rather, Vlastos argued, it was a way to show that an
interlocutor's beliefs were inconsistent.[83] There have been
two main lines of thought regarding this view, depending on whether it is accepted that Socrates is
seeking to prove a claim wrong.[84] According to the first line of thought, known as the constructivist
approach, Socrates indeed seeks to refute a claim by this method, and the method helps in reaching
affirmative statements.[85] The non-constructivist approach holds that Socrates merely wants to establish
the inconsistency between the premises and the conclusion of the initial argument.[86]

Socratic priority of definition

Socrates starts his discussions by prioritizing the search for definitions.[87] In most cases, Socrates
initiates his discourse with an expert on a subject by seeking a definition—by asking, for example, what
virtue, goodness, justice, or courage is.[88] To establish a definition, Socrates first gathers clear examples
of a virtue and then seeks to establish what they had in common.[89] According to Guthrie, Socrates lived
in an era when sophists had challenged the meaning of various virtues, questioning their substance;
Socrates's quest for a definition was an attempt to clear the atmosphere from their radical skepticism.[90]

Some scholars have argued that Socrates does not endorse the priority of definition as a principle,
because they have identified cases where he does not do so.[91] Some have argued that this priority of
definition comes from Plato rather than Socrates.[92] Philosopher Peter Geach, accepting that Socrates
endorses the priority of definition, finds the technique fallacious. Αccording to Geach, one may know a
proposition even if one cannot define the terms in which the proposition is stated.[93]

Socratic ignorance
Plato's Socrates often claims that he is aware of his own lack of knowledge, especially when discussing
ethical concepts such as arete (i.e., goodness, courage) since he does not know the nature of such
concepts.[95] For example, during his trial, with his life at stake, Socrates says: "I thought Evenus a happy
man, if he really possesses this art (technē), and teaches for so moderate a fee. Certainly I would pride
and preen myself if I knew (epistamai) these things, but I do
not know (epistamai) them, gentlemen".[96] In some of Plato's
dialogues, Socrates appears to credit himself with some
knowledge, and can even seem strongly opinionated for a
man who professes his own ignorance.[97]

There are varying explanations of the Socratic inconsistency

(other than that Socrates is simply being inconsistent).[98]
One explanation is that Socrates is being either ironic or
Ruins of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi,
modest for pedagogical purposes: he aims to let his
where Pythia was sited. The Delphic
interlocutor to think for himself rather than guide him to a aphorism Know thyself was important to
prefixed answer to his philosophical questions.[99] Another Socrates, as evident in many Socratic
explanation is that Socrates holds different interpretations of dialogues by Plato, especially
the meaning of "knowledge". Knowledge, for him, might Apology.[94]
mean systematic understanding of an ethical subject, on
which Socrates firmly rejects any kind of mastery; or might
refer to lower-level cognition, which Socrates may accept that he possesses.[100] In any case, there is a
consensus that Socrates accepts that acknowledging one's lack of knowledge is the first step towards
wisdom.[101]

Socrates is known for disavowing knowledge, a claim encapsulated in the saying "I know that I know
nothing". This is often attributed to Socrates on the basis of a statement in Plato's Apology, though the
same view is repeatedly found elsewhere in Plato's early writings on Socrates.[102] In other statements,
though, he implies or even claims that he does have knowledge. For example, in Plato's Apology Socrates
says: "...but that to do injustice and disobey my superior, god or man, this I know to be evil and base..."
(Apology, 29b6–7).[103] In his debate with Callicles, he says: "...I know well that if you will agree with
me on those things which my soul believes, those things will be the very truth..."[103]

Whether Socrates genuinely thought he lacked knowledge or merely feigned a belief in his own
ignorance remains a matter of debate. A common interpretation is that he was indeed feigning modesty.
According to Norman Gulley, Socrates did this to entice his interlocutors to speak with him. On the other
hand, Terence Irwin claims that Socrates's words should be taken literally.[104]

Gregory Vlastos argues that there is enough evidence to refute both claims. In his view, for Socrates,
there are two separate meanings of "knowledge": Knowledge-C and Knowledge-E (C stands for
"certain", and E stands for elenchus, i.e. the Socratic method). Knowledge-C is something unquestionable
whereas Knowledge-E is the knowledge derived from Socrates's elenchus.[105] Thus, Socrates speaks the
truth when he says he knows-C something, and he is also truthful when saying he knows-E, for example,
that it is evil for someone to disobey his superiors, as he claims in Apology.[106] Not all scholars have
agreed with this semantic dualism. James H. Lesher has argued that Socrates claimed in various dialogues
that one word is linked to one meaning (i.e. in Hippias Major, Meno, and Laches).[107] Lesher suggests
that although Socrates claimed that he had no knowledge about the nature of virtues, he thought that in
some cases, people can know some ethical propositions.[108]
Socratic irony
There is a widespread assumption that Socrates was an ironist, mostly based on the depiction of Socrates
by Plato and Aristotle.[109] Socrates's irony is so subtle and slightly humorous that it often leaves the
reader wondering if Socrates is making an intentional pun.[110] Plato's Euthyphro is filled with Socratic
irony. The story begins when Socrates is meeting with Euthyphro, a man who has accused his own father
of murder. When Socrates first hears the details of the story, he comments, "It is not, I think, any random
person who could do this [prosecute one's father] correctly, but surely one who is already far progressed
in wisdom". When Euthyphro boasts about his understanding of divinity, Socrates responds that it is
"most important that I become your student".[111] Socrates is commonly seen as ironic when using praise
to flatter or when addressing his interlocutors.[112]

Scholars are divided on why Socrates uses irony. According to an opinion advanced since the Hellenistic
period, Socratic irony is a playful way to get the audience's attention.[113] Another line of thought holds
that Socrates conceals his philosophical message with irony, making it accessible only to those who can
separate the parts of his statements which are ironic from those which are not.[114] Gregory Vlastos has
identified a more complex pattern of irony in Socrates. In Vlastos's view, Socrates's words have a double
meaning, both ironic and not. One example is when he denies having knowledge. Vlastos suggests that
Socrates is being ironic when he says he has no knowledge (where "knowledge" means a lower form of
cognition); while, according to another sense of "knowledge", Socrates is serious when he says he has no
knowledge of ethical matters. This opinion is not shared by many other scholars.[115]

Socratic eudaimonism and intellectualism

For Socrates, the pursuit of eudaimonia motivates all human action, directly or indirectly.[116] Virtue and
knowledge are linked, in Socrates's view, to eudaimonia, but how closely he considered them to be
connected is still debated. Some argue that Socrates thought that virtue and eudaimonia are identical.
According to another view, virtue serves as a means to eudaimonia (the "identical" and "sufficiency"
theses, respectively).[117] Another point of debate is whether, according to Socrates, people desire what is
in fact good—or, rather, simply what they perceive as good.[117]

Moral intellectualism refers to the prominent role Socrates gave to knowledge. He believed that all virtue
was based on knowledge (hence Socrates is characterized as a virtue intellectualist). He also believed that
humans were guided by the cognitive power to comprehend what they desire, while diminishing the role
of impulses (a view termed motivational intellectualism).[118] In Plato's Protagoras (345c4–e6), Socrates
implies that "no one errs willingly", which has become the hallmark of Socratic virtue
intellectualism.[119] In Socratic moral philosophy, priority is given to the intellect as being the way to live
a good life; Socrates deemphasizes irrational beliefs or passions.[120] Plato's dialogues that support
Socrates's intellectual motivism—as this thesis is named—are mainly the Gorgias (467c–8e, where
Socrates discusses the actions of a tyrant that do not benefit him) and Meno (77d–8b, where Socrates
explains to Meno his view that no one wants bad things, unless they do not know what is good and bad in
the first place).[121] Scholars have been puzzled by Socrates's view that akrasia (acting because of one's
irrational passions, contrary to one's knowledge or beliefs) is impossible. Most believe that Socrates left
no space for irrational desires, although some claim that Socrates acknowledged the existence of
irrational motivations, but denied they play a primary role in decision-making.[122]
Religion
Socrates's religious nonconformity challenged the views of
his times and his critique reshaped religious discourse for the
coming centuries.[125] In Ancient Greece, organized religion
was fragmented, celebrated in a number of festivals for
specific gods, such as the City Dionysia, or in domestic
rituals, and there were no sacred texts. Religion intermingled
with the daily life of citizens, who performed their personal
religious duties mainly with sacrifices to various gods.[126]
Whether Socrates was a practicing man of religion or a
'provocateur atheist' has been a point of debate since ancient
times; his trial included impiety accusations, and the
controversy has not yet ceased.[127]

Socrates discusses divinity and the soul mostly in Alcibiades,

Euthyphro, and Apology.[128] In Alcibiades Socrates links the
human soul to divinity, concluding "Then this part of her
resembles God, and whoever looks at this, and comes to
know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge
of himself."[129] His discussions on religion always fall under Henri Estienne's 1578 edition of
the lens of his rationalism.[130] Socrates, in Euthyphro, Euthyphro, parallel Latin and Greek text.
reaches a conclusion which takes him far from the age's usual Estienne's translations were heavily used
practice: he considers sacrifices to the gods to be useless, and reprinted for more than two
especially when they are driven by the hope of receiving a centuries.[123] Socrates's discussion with
Euthyphro still remains influential in
reward in return. Instead, he calls for philosophy and the
theological debates.[124]
pursuit of knowledge to be the principal way of worshipping
the gods.[131] His rejection of traditional forms of piety,
connecting them to self-interest, implied that Athenians should seek religious experience by self-
examination.[132]

Socrates argued that the gods were inherently wise and just, a perception far from traditional religion at
that time.[133] In Euthyphro, the Euthyphro dilemma arises. Socrates questions his interlocutor about the
relationship between piety and the will of a powerful god: Is something good because it is the will of this
god, or is it the will of this god because it is good?[134] In other words, does piety follow the good, or the
god? The trajectory of Socratic thought contrasts with traditional Greek theology, which took lex talionis
(the eye for an eye principle) for granted. Socrates thought that goodness is independent from gods, and
gods must themselves be pious.[135]

Socrates affirms a belief in gods in Plato's Apology, where he says to the jurors that he acknowledges
gods more than his accusers.[136] For Plato's Socrates, the existence of gods is taken for granted; in none
of his dialogues does he probe whether gods exist or not.[137] In Apology, a case for Socrates being
agnostic can be made, based on his discussion of the great unknown after death,[138] and in Phaedo (the
dialogue with his students in his last day) Socrates gives expression to a clear belief in the immortality of
the soul.[139] He also believed in oracles, divinations and other messages from gods. These signs did not
offer him any positive belief on moral issues; rather, they were predictions of unfavorable future
events.[140]
In Xenophon's Memorabilia, Socrates constructs an argument close to the contemporary teleological
intelligent-design argument. He claims that since there are many features in the universe that exhibit
"signs of forethought" (e.g., eyelids), a divine creator must have created the universe.[137] He then
deduces that the creator should be omniscient and omnipotent and also that it created the universe for the
advance of humankind, since humans naturally have many abilities that other animals do not.[141] At
times, Socrates speaks of a single deity, while at other times he refers to plural "gods". This has been
interpreted to mean that he either believed that a supreme deity commanded other gods, or that various
gods were parts, or manifestations, of this single deity.[142]

The relationship of Socrates's religious beliefs with his strict adherence to rationalism has been subject to
debate.[143] Philosophy professor Mark McPherran suggests that Socrates interpreted every divine sign
through secular rationality for confirmation.[144] Professor of ancient philosophy A. A. Long suggests that
it is anachronistic to suppose that Socrates believed the religious and rational realms were separate.[145]

Socratic daimonion
In several texts (e.g., Plato's Euthyphro 3b5; Apology 31c–d;
Xenophon's Memorabilia 1.1.2) Socrates claims he hears a
daimōnic sign—an inner voice heard usually when he was
about to make a mistake. Socrates gave a brief description of
this daimonion at his trial (Apology 31c–d): "...The reason for
this is something you have heard me frequently mention in
different places—namely, the fact that I experience something
divine and daimonic, as Meletus has inscribed in his
indictment, by way of mockery. It started in my childhood,
the occurrence of a particular voice. Whenever it occurs, it Alcibiades Receiving Instruction from
always deters me from the course of action I was intending to Socrates, a 1776 painting by François-
engage in, but it never gives me positive advice. It is this that André Vincent, depicting Socrates's
has opposed my practicing politics, and I think its doing so daimon[146]
has been absolutely fine."[147] Modern scholarship has
variously interpreted this Socratic daimōnion as a rational
source of knowledge, an impulse, a dream or even a paranormal experience felt by an ascetic
Socrates.[148]

Virtue and knowledge

Socrates's theory of virtue states that all virtues are essentially one, since they are a form of
knowledge.[149] For Socrates, the reason a person is not good is because they lack knowledge. Since
knowledge is united, virtues are united as well. Another famous dictum—"no one errs willingly"—also
derives from this theory.[150] In Protagoras, Socrates argues for the unity of virtues using the example of
courage: if someone knows what the relevant danger is, they can undertake a risk.[149] Aristotle
comments: " ... Socrates the elder thought that the end of life was knowledge of virtue, and he used to
seek for the definition of justice, courage, and each of the parts of virtue, and this was a reasonable
approach, since he thought that all virtues were sciences, and that as soon as one knew [for example]
justice, he would be just..."[151]
Love
Some texts suggest that Socrates had love affairs with
Alcibiades and other young persons; others suggest that
Socrates's friendships with young boys sought only to
improve them and were not sexual. In Gorgias, Socrates
claims he was a dual lover of Alcibiades and philosophy, and
his flirtatiousness is evident in Protagoras, Meno (76a–c) and
Phaedrus (227c–d). However, the exact nature of his
relationship with Alcibiades is not clear; Socrates was known
for his self-restraint, while Alcibiades admits in the
Symposium that he had tried to seduce Socrates but
failed.[152]

The Socratic theory of love is mostly deduced from Lysis,

where Socrates discusses love[153] at a wrestling school in the
company of Lysis and his friends. They start their dialogue by
investigating parental love and how it manifests with respect
to the freedom and boundaries that parents set for their
Socrates and Alcibiades, by Christoffer
children. Socrates concludes that if Lysis is utterly useless,
Wilhelm Eckersberg, 1813–1816
nobody will love him—not even his parents. While most
scholars believe this text was intended to be humorous, it has
also been suggested that Lysis shows Socrates held an egoistic view of love, according to which we only
love people who are useful to us in some way.[154] Other scholars disagree with this view, arguing that
Socrates's doctrine leaves room for non-egoistic love for a spouse; still others deny that Socrates suggests
any egoistic motivation at all.[155] In Symposium, Socrates argues that children offer the false impression
of immortality to their parents, and this misconception yields a form of unity among them.[156] Scholars
also note that for Socrates, love is rational.[157]

Socrates, who claims to know only that he does not know, makes an exception (in Plato's Symposium),
where he says he will tell the truth about Love, which he learned from a 'clever woman'. Classicist
Armand D'Angour has made the case that Socrates was in his youth close to Aspasia, and that Diotima, to
whom Socrates attributes his understanding of love in Symposium, is based on her;[158] however, it is also
possible that Diotima really existed.

Socratic philosophy of politics

While Socrates was involved in public political and cultural debates, it is hard to define his exact political
philosophy. In Plato's Gorgias, he tells Callicles: "I believe that I'm one of a few Athenians—so as not to
say I'm the only one, but the only one among our contemporaries—to take up the true political craft and
practice the true politics. This is because the speeches I make on each occasion do not aim at gratification
but at what's best."[159] His claim illustrates his aversion for the established democratic assemblies and
procedures such as voting—since Socrates saw politicians and rhetoricians as using tricks to mislead the
public.[160] He never ran for office or suggested any legislation.[161] Rather, he aimed to help the city
flourish by "improving" its citizens.[160] As a citizen, he abided by the law. He obeyed the rules and
carried out his military duty by fighting wars abroad. His dialogues, however, make little mention of
contemporary political decisions, such as the Sicilian Expedition.[161]
Socrates spent his time conversing with citizens, among them powerful members of Athenian society,
scrutinizing their beliefs and bringing the contradictions of their ideas to light. Socrates believed he was
doing them a favor since, for him, politics was about shaping the moral landscape of the city through
philosophy rather than electoral procedures.[162] There is a debate over where Socrates stood in the
polarized Athenian political climate, which was divided between oligarchs and democrats. While there is
no clear textual evidence, one widely held theory holds that Socrates leaned towards democracy: he
disobeyed the one order that the oligarchic government of the Thirty Tyrants gave him; he respected the
laws and political system of Athens (which were formulated by democrats); and, according to this
argument, his affinity for the ideals of democratic Athens was a reason why he did not want to escape
prison and the death penalty. On the other hand, there is some evidence that Socrates leaned towards
oligarchy: most of his friends supported oligarchy, he was contemptuous of the opinion of the many and
was critical of the democratic process, and Protagoras shows some anti-democratic elements.[163] A less
mainstream argument suggests that Socrates favoured democratic republicanism, a theory that prioritizes
active participation in public life and concern for the city.[164]

Yet another suggestion is that Socrates endorsed views in line with liberalism, a political ideology formed
in the Age of Enlightenment. This argument is mostly based on Crito and Apology, where Socrates talks
about the mutually beneficial relationship between the city and its citizens. According to Socrates,
citizens are morally autonomous and free to leave the city if they wish—but, by staying within the city,
they also accept the laws and the city's authority over them.[165] On the other hand, Socrates has been
seen as the first proponent of civil disobedience. Socrates's strong objection to injustice, along with his
refusal to serve the Thirty Tyrants' order to arrest Leon, are suggestive of this line. As he says in Critias,
"One ought never act unjustly, even to repay a wrong that has been done to oneself."[166] Ιn the broader
picture, Socrates's advice would be for citizens to follow the orders of the state, unless, after much
reflection, they deem them to be unjust.[167]

Legacy

Classical antiquity

Carnelian gem imprint representing Socrates, Rome, 1st century BC–1st century AD (left); Wall painting at a
house depicting Socrates, 1st–5th century AD, Museum of Ephesus (right)

Socrates's impact was immense in philosophy after his death. With the exception of the Epicureans and
the Pyrrhonists, almost all philosophical currents after Socrates traced their roots to him: Plato's
Academy, Aristotle's Lyceum, the Cynics, and the Stoics.[168] Interest in Socrates kept increasing until the
third century AD.[169] The various schools differed in response to fundamental questions such as the
purpose of life or the nature of arete (virtue), since Socrates had not handed them an answer, and
therefore, philosophical schools subsequently diverged greatly in their interpretation of his thought.[170]
He was considered to have shifted the focus of philosophy from a study of the natural world, as was the
case for pre-Socratic philosophers, to a study of human affairs.[171]

Immediate followers of Socrates were his pupils, Euclid of Megara, Aristippus, and Antisthenes, who
drew differing conclusions among themselves and followed independent trajectories.[172] The full
doctrines of Socrates's pupils are difficult to reconstruct.[173] Antisthenes had a profound contempt of
material goods. According to him, virtue was all that mattered. Diogenes and the Cynics continued this
line of thought.[174] On the opposite end, Aristippus endorsed the accumulation of wealth and lived a
luxurious life. After leaving Athens and returning to his home city of Cyrene, he founded the Cyrenaic
philosophical school which was based on hedonism, and endorsing living an easy life with physical
pleasures. His school passed to his grandson, bearing the same name. There is a dialogue in Xenophon's
work in which Aristippus claims he wants to live without wishing to rule or be ruled by others.[175] In
addition, Aristippus maintained a skeptical stance on epistemology, claiming that we can be certain only
of our own feelings. This view resonates with the Socratic understanding of ignorance.[176] Euclid was a
contemporary of Socrates. After Socrates's trial and death, he left Athens for the nearby town of Megara,
where he founded a school, named the Megarians. His theory was built on the pre-Socratic monism of
Parmenides. Euclid continued Socrates's thought, focusing on the nature of virtue.

The Stoics relied heavily on Socrates.[177] They applied the Socratic method as a tool to avoid
inconsistencies. Their moral doctrines focused on how to live a smooth life through wisdom and virtue.
The Stoics assigned virtue a crucial role in attaining happiness and also prioritized the relation between
goodness and ethical excellence, all of which echoed Socratic thought.[178] At the same time, the
philosophical current of Platonism claimed Socrates as its predecessor, in ethics and in its theory of
knowledge. Arcesilaus, who became the head of the Academy about 80 years after its founding by Plato,
radically changed the Academy's doctrine to what is now known as Academic Skepticism, centered on the
Socratic philosophy of ignorance. The Academic Skeptics competed with the Stoics over who was
Socrates's true heir with regard to ethics.[179] While the Stoics insisted on knowledge-based ethics,
Arcesilaus relied on Socratic ignorance. The Stoics' reply to Arcesilaus was that Socratic ignorance was
part of Socratic irony (they themselves disapproved the use of irony), an argument that ultimately became
the dominant narrative of Socrates in later antiquity.[180]

While Aristotle considered Socrates an important philosopher, Socrates was not a central figure in
Aristotelian thought. One of Aristotle's pupils, Aristoxenus even authored a book detailing Socrates's
scandals.

The Epicureans were antagonistic to Socrates.[181] They attacked him for superstition, criticizing his
belief in his daimonion and his regard for the oracle at Delphi.[182] They also criticized Socrates for his
character and various faults, and focusing mostly on his irony, which was deemed inappropriate for a
philosopher and unseemly for a teacher.[183]

The Pyrrhonists were also antagonistic to Socrates, accusing him of being a prater about ethics, who
engaged in mock humility, and who sneered at and mocked people.[184]
Medieval world
Socratic thought found its way to the Islamic Middle East
alongside that of Aristotle and the Stoics. Plato's works on
Socrates, as well as other ancient Greek literature, were
translated into Arabic by early Muslim scholars such as Al-
Kindi, Jabir ibn Hayyan, and the Muʿtazila. For Muslim
scholars, Socrates was hailed and admired for combining his
ethics with his lifestyle, perhaps because of the resemblance
in this regard with Muhammad's personality.[185] Socratic
doctrines were altered to match Islamic faith: according to
Muslim scholars, Socrates made arguments for monotheism
and for the temporality of this world and rewards in the next
life.[186] His influence in the Arabic-speaking world continues
to the present day.[187]

In medieval times, little of Socrates's thought survived in the

Depiction of Socrates in a manuscript by
Christian world as a whole; however, works on Socrates from Al-Mubashshir ibn Fatik
Christian scholars such as Lactantius, Eusebius and Augustine
were maintained in the Byzantine Empire, where Socrates
was studied under a Christian lens.[188] After the fall of Constantinople, many of the texts were brought
back into the world of Roman Christianity, where they were translated into Latin. Overall, ancient
Socratic philosophy, like the rest of classical literature before the Renaissance, was addressed with
skepticism in the Christian world at first.[189]

During the early Italian Renaissance, two different narratives of Socrates developed.[190] On the one
hand, the humanist movement revived interest in classical authors. Leonardo Bruni translated many of
Plato's Socratic dialogues, while his pupil Giannozzo Manetti authored a well-circulated book, a Life of
Socrates. They both presented a civic version of Socrates, according to which Socrates was a humanist
and a supporter of republicanism. Bruni and Manetti were interested in defending secularism as a non-
sinful way of life; presenting a view of Socrates that was aligned with Christian morality assisted their
cause. In doing so, they had to censor parts of his dialogues, especially those which appeared to promote
homosexuality or any possibility of pederasty (with Alcibiades), or which suggested that the Socratic
daimon was a god.[191] On the other hand, a different picture of Socrates was presented by Italian
Neoplatonists, led by the philosopher and priest Marsilio Ficino. Ficino was impressed by Socrates's un-
hierarchical and informal way teaching, which he tried to replicate. Ficino portrayed a holy picture of
Socrates, finding parallels with the life of Jesus Christ. For Ficino and his followers, Socratic ignorance
signified his acknowledgement that all wisdom is God-given (through the Socratic daimon).[192]

Modern times
In early modern France, Socrates's image was dominated by features of his private life rather than his
philosophical thought, in various novels and satirical plays.[194] Some thinkers used Socrates to highlight
and comment upon controversies of their own era, like Théophile de Viau who portrayed a Christianized
Socrates accused of atheism,[195] while for Voltaire, the figure of Socrates represented a reason-based
theist.[196] Michel de Montaigne wrote extensively on Socrates, linking him to rationalism as a
counterweight to contemporary religious fanatics.[197]
In the 18th century, German idealism revived philosophical
interest in Socrates, mainly through Hegel's work. For Hegel,
Socrates marked a turning point in the history of humankind
by the introduction of the principle of free subjectivity or self-
determination. While Hegel hails Socrates for his
contribution, he nonetheless justifies the Athenian court, for
Socrates's insistence upon self-determination would be
destructive of the Sittlichkeit (a Hegelian term signifying the
way of life as shaped by the institutions and laws of the
State).[198] Also, Hegel sees the Socratic use of rationalism as
a continuation of Protagoras' focus on human reasoning (as
encapsulated in the motto homo mensura: "man is the
measure of all things"), but modified: it is our reasoning that
can help us reach objective conclusions about reality.[199] Socrates along with his wives (he was
Also, Hegel considered Socrates as a predecessor of later married once or twice) and students,
ancient skeptic philosophers, even though he never clearly appears in many paintings. Here
explained why.[200] Socrates, his two Wives, and Alcibiades,
a painting by the Dutch Golden Age artist
Søren Kierkegaard considered Socrates his teacher,[201] and Reyer van Blommendael. Often, his wife
authored his master's thesis on him, The Concept of Irony Xanthippe, alone or with Myrto (the other
alleged wife of Socrates) is depicted
with Continual Reference to Socrates.[202] There he argues
emptying a pot of urine (hydria) over
that Socrates is not a moral philosopher but is purely an
[203]
Socrates.[193]
ironist. He also focused on Socrates's avoidance of
writing: for Kierkegaard, this avoidance was a sign of
humility, deriving from Socrates's acceptance of his ignorance.[204] Not only did Socrates not write
anything down, according to Kierkegaard, but his contemporaries misconstrued and misunderstood him
as a philosopher, leaving us with an almost impossible task in comprehending Socratic thought.[202] Only
Plato's Apology was close to the real Socrates, in Kierkegaard's view.[205] In his writings, he revisited
Socrates quite frequently; in his later work, Kierkegaard found ethical elements in Socratic thought.[203]
Socrates was not only a subject of study for Kierkegaard, he was a model as well: Kierkegaard paralleled
his task as a philosopher to Socrates. He writes, "The only analogy I have before me is Socrates; my task
is a Socratic task, to audit the definition of what it is to be a Christian", with his aim being to bring
society closer to the Christian ideal, since he believed that Christianity had become a formality, void of
any Christian essence.[206] Kierkegaard denied being a Christian, as Socrates denied possessing any
knowledge.[207]

Friedrich Nietzsche resented Socrates's contributions to Western culture.[208] In his first book, The Birth
of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche held Socrates responsible for what he saw as the deterioration of ancient
Greek civilization during the 4th century BC and after. For Nietzsche, Socrates turned the scope of
philosophy from pre-Socratic naturalism to rationalism and intellectualism. He writes: "I conceive of [the
Presocratics] as precursors to a reformation of the Greeks: but not of Socrates"; "with Empedocles and
Democritus the Greeks were well on their way towards taking the correct measure of human existence, its
unreason, its suffering; they never reached this goal, thanks to Socrates".[209] The effect, Nietzsche
proposed, was a perverse situation that had continued down to his day: our culture is a Socratic culture,
he believed.[208] In a later publication, The Twilight of the Idols (1887), Nietzsche continued his offensive
against Socrates, focusing on the arbitrary linking of reason to virtue and happiness in Socratic thinking.
He writes: "I try to understand from what partial and idiosyncratic states the Socratic problem is to be
derived: his equation of reason = virtue = happiness. It was with this absurdity of a doctrine of identity
that he fascinated: ancient philosophy never again freed itself [from this fascination]".[210] From the late
19th century until the early 20th, the most common explanation of Nietzsche's hostility towards Socrates
was his anti-rationalism; he considered Socrates the father of European rationalism. In the mid-20th
century, philosopher Walter Kaufmann published an article arguing that Nietzsche admired Socrates.
Current mainstream opinion is that Nietzsche was ambivalent towards Socrates.[211]

Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss and Karl Popper, after

experiencing the horrors of World War II, amidst the rise of
totalitarian regimes, saw Socrates as an icon of individual
conscience.[212] Arendt, in Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963),
suggests that Socrates's constant questioning and self-
reflection could prevent the banality of evil.[213] Strauss
considers Socrates's political thought as paralleling Plato's.
He sees an elitist Socrates in Plato's Republic as exemplifying
why the polis is not, and could not be, an ideal way of
organizing life, since philosophical truths cannot be digested
The statue of Socrates outside the
by the masses.[214] Popper takes the opposite view: he argues National Library of Uruguay, Montevideo
that Socrates opposes Plato's totalitarian ideas. For Popper,
Socratic individualism, along with Athenian democracy,
imply Popper's concept of the "open society" as described in his The Open Society and Its Enemies
(1945).[215]

See also

Philosophy portal

Codex Vaticanus Graecus 64 – Socratic Letters

De genio Socratis
List of cultural depictions of Socrates
List of barefooters
List of speakers in Plato's dialogues

Notes
1. Amy C. Smith (2003), “Athenian Political 3. "Socrates (469—399 B.C.E.)" ([Link]
Art from the fifth and fourth centuries BCE: [Link]/socrates/). Internet encyclopedia of
Images of Historical Individuals,” ([Link] philosophy. Retrieved 27 August 2024.
[Link]/demos/article_portraits@page= 4. Guthrie 1972, pp. 5–7; Dorion 2011, pp. 1–
12&greekEncoding=[Link]) p. 14, 2; May 2000, p. 9; Waterfield 2013, p. 1.
in C.W. Blackwell, ed., Dēmos: Classical 5. May 2000, p. 20; Dorion 2011, p. 7;
Athenian Democracy. The Stoa: a Waterfield 2013, p. 1.
consortium for electronic publication in the
humanities. 6. Doering 2011, pp. 24–25.
2. Jones 2006. 7. Dorion 2011, pp. 7–9.
8. Guthrie 1972, p. 335.
 9. Guthrie 1972, p. 339. 46. Guthrie 1972, p. 78.
10. Guthrie 1972, p. 345. 47. Guthrie 1972, pp. 66–67.
11. Guthrie 1972, pp. 29–31; Dorion 2011, 48. Guthrie 1972, p. 69.
p. 6. 49. Guthrie 1972, pp. 70–75; Nails 2020,
12. Guthrie 1972, p. 30. Socrates's strangeness.
13. Guthrie 1972, pp. 29–33; Waterfield 2013, 50. Obdrzalek 2013, pp. 210–211; Nails 2020,
pp. 3–4. Socrates's strangeness.
14. May 2000, p. 20; Dorion 2011, pp. 6–7. 51. Guthrie 1972, pp. 92–94; Nails 2020,
15. May 2000, p. 20; Waterfield 2013, pp. 3–4. Socrates's strangeness.
16. Guthrie 1972, p. 15. 52. Kahn 1998, p. 75.
17. May 2000, pp. 19–20. 53. Ahbel-Rappe 2011, pp. 15–19.
18. Dorion 2011, pp. 4, 10. 54. Ahbel-Rappe 2011, pp. 17, 21.
19. Waterfield 2013, pp. 10–13. 55. Plato. "Phaedo" ([Link]
20. Guthrie 1972, pp. 39–41. edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3
A1999.01.0169%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3As
21. Guthrie 1972, pp. 39–51. ection%3D118a). Perseus. Retrieved
22. Ahbel-Rappe 2011, p. 5. 1 March 2024. "See §118a"
23. Konstan 2011, pp. 85, 88. 56. May 2000, p. 30, 40.
24. Waterfield 2013, pp. 7–8. 57. May 2000, pp. 47–48.
25. Vlastos 1991, p. 52; Kahn 1998, pp. 1–2. 58. Danzig, Gabriel. 2003. "Apologizing for
26. Guthrie 1972, pp. 35–36; Waterfield 2013, Socrates: Plato and Xenophon on
p. 8. Socrates' Behavior in Court." Transactions
27. Guthrie 1972, p. 38. of the American Philological Association.
Vol. 133, No. 2, pp. 285.
28. Guthrie 1972, pp. 38–39.
59. Nails 2020, A Chronology of the historical
29. Dorion 2011, pp. 11, 16; Waterfield 2013, Socrates.
p. 11.
60. May 2000, p. 31.
30. Waterfield 2013, pp. 8–11.
61. May 2000, pp. 33–39.
31. Waterfield 2013, p. 11.
62. May 2000, pp. 41–42.
32. Dorion 2011, pp. 1–3.
63. May 2000, p. 42.
33. Dorion 2011, pp. 2–3.
64. May 2000, p. 43.
34. Dorion 2011, p. 5.
65. May 2000, pp. 45–46.
35. Dorion 2011, pp. 7–10.
66. Guthrie 1972, pp. 65–66.
36. Dorion 2011, pp. 12–14.
67. Guthrie 1972, pp. 63–65; Ahbel-Rappe
37. Dorion 2011, pp. 17–18. 2011; Ober 2010, p. 146.
38. Guthrie 1972, p. 2. 68. Guthrie 1972, pp. 64–65.
39. Ober 2010, pp. 159–160; Ahbel-Rappe
69. Guthrie 1972, pp. 20, 65–66; Ober 2010,
2011, p. 1; Guthrie 1972, p. 58; Dorion p. 146.
2011, p. 12; Nails 2020, A chronology of
the historical Socrates in the context of 70. Ralkowski 2013, p. 302.
Athenian history and the dramatic dates of 71. Ralkowski 2013, p. 323.
Plato's dialogues. 72. Ralkowski 2013, pp. 319–322.
40. Ober 2010, pp. 160–161. 73. Ralkowski 2013, pp. 307–308.
41. Ober 2010, pp. 161–162. 74. Ralkowski 2013, pp. 303–304.
42. Ober 2010, p. 161. 75. Ahbel-Rappe 2011, p. 53.
43. Guthrie 1972, p. 65. 76. Benson 2011, p. 179; Wolfsdorf 2013,
44. Guthrie 1972, p. 59. pp. 34–35.
45. Guthrie 1972, p. 65; Ober 2010, pp. 167–
171.
77. Wolfsdorf 2013, p. 34: Others include 100. McPartland 2013, pp. 117–119.
Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, 101. McPartland 2013, pp. 118–119.
Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, 102. Vlastos 1985, p. 1.
Lysis, Protagoras. Benson 2011, p. 179,
also adds parts of Meno. 103. Vlastos 1985, pp. 6–7.
78. Benson 2011, pp. 182–184; Wolfsdorf 104. Vlastos 1985, pp. 1–2; Lesher 1987,
2013, pp. 34–35. p. 275.
79. Benson 2011, p. 184. 105. Lesher 1987, p. 276.
80. Guthrie 1972, pp. 125–127. 106. Lesher 1987, p. 276; Vasiliou 2013, p. 28.
81. Guthrie 1972, pp. 128–129. 107. Lesher 1987, p. 278; McPartland 2013,
p. 123.
82. Benson 2011, pp. 179, 185–193.
108. McPartland 2013, pp. 123–124.
83. Benson 2011, p. 185; Wolfsdorf 2013,
pp. 34–35; Ambury 2020, The Elenchus: 109. Lane 2011, p. 239.
Socrates the Refuter. 110. Vasiliou 2013, p. 20.
84. Benson 2011, p. 185; Wolfsdorf 2013, 111. Vasiliou 2013, p. 24; Lane 2011, p. 239.
p. 44; Ambury 2020, The Elenchus: 112. Lane 2011, pp. 249–251.
Socrates the Refuter. 113. Lane 2011, pp. 241–242.
85. Benson 2011, p. 185. 114. Lane 2011, p. 243.
86. Ambury 2020, The Elenchus: Socrates the 115. Vasiliou 2013, pp. 28–29.
Refuter: Benson (2011) names in a note
scholars that are of constructivist and non- 116. Brickhouse & Smith 2013, p. 185; Vlastos
constructivism approach: "Among those 1991, p. 203.
"constructivists" willing to do so are 117. Reshotko 2013, p. 158.
Brickhouse and Smith 1994, ch. 6.1; 118. Brickhouse & Smith 2013, p. 185.
Burnet 1924, pp. 136–137; McPherran 119. Segvic 2006, pp. 171–173.
1985; Rabinowitz 1958; Reeve 1989, ch. 120. Segvic 2006, p. 171.
1.10; Taylor 1982; and Vlastos 1991, ch. 6.
Those who do not think a Socratic account 121. Brickhouse & Smith 2013, pp. 185–186.
of piety is implied by the text 122. Brickhouse & Smith 2013, pp. 190–191.
("anticonstructivists") include Allen 1970, 123. Ausland 2019, pp. 686–687.
pp. 6–9, 67; and Grote 1865, pp. 437–457. 124. McPherran 2011, p. 117.
Beckman 1979, ch. 2.1; Calef 1995; and
Versényi 1982" p.118 125. McPherran 2013, p. 257.
87. Benson 2013, p. 136. 126. McPherran 2013, pp. 259–260.
88. Benson 2013, pp. 136–139; Ahbel-Rappe 127. McPherran 2013, pp. 257–258.
2011, p. 71. 128. Guthrie 1972, pp. 151–153.
89. Guthrie 1972, p. 112. 129. Guthrie 1972, p. 153.
90. Guthrie 1972, pp. 110–111. 130. McPherran 2013, pp. 260–262; McPherran
91. Benson 2013, pp. 143–145; Bett 2011, 2011, p. 111.
p. 228. 131. McPherran 2013, p. 265.
92. Benson 2013, pp. 143–145, 147; Bett 132. McPherran 2013, p. 266.
2011, p. 229. 133. McPherran 2013, pp. 263–266.
93. Benson 2013, p. 145. 134. McPherran 2013, p. 263:See also note 30
94. Ahbel-Rappe 2011, p. 144. for further reference; McPherran 2011,
95. Guthrie 1972, p. 122; Bett 2011, p. 215; p. 117.
McPartland 2013, pp. 94–95. 135. McPherran 2011, pp. 117–119.
96. McPartland 2013, p. 98. 136. McPherran 2013, pp. 272–273.
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Further reading
Brun, Jean (1978). Socrate (in French) (6th ed.). Presses universitaires de France. pp. 39–
40. ISBN 978-2-13-035620-2.
Benson, Hugh (1992). Essays on the philosophy of Socrates. New York: Oxford University
Press. ISBN 978-0-19-506757-6. OCLC 23179683 ([Link]
83).
Rudebusch, George (2009). Socrates. Chichester, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
ISBN 978-1-4051-5085-9. OCLC 476311710 ([Link]
Taylor, C. C. W. (1998). Socrates ([Link]
PP10). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-287601-0.
Taylor, C. C. W. (2019). Socrates: A Very Short Introduction ([Link]
s?id=RgulDwAAQBAJ). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-883598-1.
Vlastos, Gregory (1994). Socratic Studies ([Link]
EC). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-44735-5.

External links
Socrates ([Link] at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology
Project
The Dialogues of Plato ([Link] at
Project Gutenberg

Retrieved from "[Link]