ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD
06.03.2024 BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, CJ AND VIKAS BUDHWAR, J.
Writ Petition No. 185 of 2024
Om Pal ...Petitioner
Versus
Smt. Manoj ...Respondent
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Bhuvanesh Kumar Mishra
1. This appeal is directed against order dated 20.01.2024 passed by the Family Court, Bijnor whereby
the application filed by respondent and objections filed by the appellant have been decided.
2. The application was filed by the respondent seeking implementation of order dated 08.08.2018
passed by the Family Court for payment of interim maintenance to the tune of Rs. 3,000/- per month.
The application was contested by the appellant by indicating that under the provisions of Section 28
A of the Act, the order can only be got executed in terms of order XXI CPC and the same cannot be
ordered to be implemented by the Family Court.
3. The objection was rejected by the Family Court and directions were given to make payment by
13.02.2024, failing which appropriate order would be passed. The order dated 20.01.2024 passed by
the Family Court is just and proper and is only interim in nature.
4. In that view of the matter, no case for interference in the order impugned is made out. Even
otherwise, the appeal is not maintainable, the same is, therefore, dismissed.
5. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner in the nature of Public Interest Litigation seeking
following reliefs:-
"a. Issue writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the Respondent Authorities
to ensure the compliance of the Govt. orders passed by the Govt. of U.P. having Govt. Order No.
2762/15-13-91-41461/91 dated 30.11.1991, (Annexure No. 2), Govt. Order No. 1546/15-7-93-
16(17)/1992 dated 04.01.1994, (Annexure No. 3), Govt. Order No. 5001/16-7-16(17)/1992 dated
29.11.1997, (Annexure No. 4), Govt. No. 4236/15-7-05/16(17)/92 dated 19.09.2005 (Annexure No.
5) & Govt. Order No. 1916/15-7-00-1 (299)/2007 dated 14.07.2009 (Annexure No. 6).
b. Issue writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the Respondent Authorities to
initiate an enquiry regarding the inaction of concerned authorities.
c. Issue writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the concerned authorities to
take appropriate actions against the schools who are not complying with the Govt. orders passed by
the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh.
d. Issue writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the concerned authorities to
formulate a committee to look into the actions of the Respondent authorities and ensure the
compliance of the Govt. orders and the committee so formulated may submit reports of its working
before this Hon'ble Court at regular intervals as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit.
e. Issue any other writ order or direction which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper under the
circumstances of the present case."
6. It is indicated in the petition that the various circulars issued by the Government, provide for 10%
reservation in admission to the students belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and it is
further required that same fee will be charged from them to be charged by the schools running under
council of Secondary Education or council of Basic Education, however, the various private schools,
which are affiliated to the C.B.S.E. are not following the said norms and therefore, enquiry be
initiated against them. (Words 547)
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD JULY, 15, 2003
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE ANJANI KUMAR, J.
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12543 of 2004
Manish Kumar Sharma ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh and others ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri J.J. Ganguli
Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C. Shri H.N. Mishra
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
1. The trial court found that PW-2 Mohd. Salim witnessed the incident because he reached the spot
immediately after hearing the hue and cry. He saw accused persons Jakir and Kutti running away
from the place of the incident after the occurrence and Zahida told him that Jakir and Kutti set her to
fire after tying her neck with a rope, set her on fire by sprinkling kerosene oil on her body. The
medical report also corroborates the prosecution case.
2. The trial court observed that though there is a discrepancy between the medical report and the
post-mortem report of the deceased about the presence of a ligature mark over the neck of the
deceased, there is a possibility that after 7 days of her treatment, ligature mark would have faded on
the neck of the deceased.
3. The trial court further found that the smell of kerosene oil was present on the body of the injured
Zahida during her medical examination, immediately after the incident and a bottle of kerosene oil
was recovered from the spot. This is an admitted fact that, before the occurrence, there was a dispute
between Jakir and the deceased, due to Jakir's illicit relation with Kutti.
4. The trial court further found that the credibility of the dying declaration is not affected by not
examining the doctor, who was present at the time of recording the dying declaration of the
deceased, as a witness because PW-7 Gur Saran Lal stated that the doctor was present at the time of
recording the statement of the deceased. It is settled by the Apex Court that where the dying
declaration is found truthful and voluntary, it is not necessary to corroborate the dying declaration by
any other evidence. The trial court concluded that the prosecution successfully proved the charges
against the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C., on the basis of the dying
declaration beyond reasonable doubt and thereby convicted and sentenced the appellants as above.
5. Being aggrieved by the trial court's judgment and order, the appellants have preferred this appeal.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THIS COURT
6. We have heard Sri Dharmendra Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellants; Sri Ratan Singh,
learned A.G.A., for the State; and Sri Anirudh Upadhyay, learned counsel for the informant and have
perused the record.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants vehemently urged that Firstly; the dying declaration of the
deceased was a result of tutoring and prompting because of PW-1 Mohd. Umar and his two other
sisters were present in the hospital before recording the dying declaration. It is submitted that the
possibility of tutoring the injured Zahida so as to make statement against the appellants cannot be
ruled out. The dying declaration was not free, truthful and voluntary.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD FEBRUARY 15, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE ARUN BHANSALI, J.
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2263 of 2024
Hari Saran and another ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India and 5 others ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Kalindra Kumar Rai
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C. Ishan Deo Giri
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
1. This petition has been filed by the petitioners seeking a direction to the respondents to pay sale
consideration for the land acquired and purchased by National Highway Authority of India
situated in Mauja Karimuddinpur, Tehsil Mohammadabad, District Ghazipur.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents made submissions, based on instructions, that
the amount has been paid to the petitioners.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners though does not dispute that the amount has been received
by the petitioners, however, submits that a sum of about Rs. 7 Lakhs still remains outstanding
with the respondents.
4. In view of the above fact situation, the petition filed by the petitioners is disposed of. The
petitioners may approach the respondents by way of a representation indicating the outstanding
amount and it is required of the respondents to decide the same/pay the outstanding amount
within a period of four weeks from the date the representation is made by the petitioners.
5. Accordingly and with consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition is disposed
of as follows:
(a) The petitioner shall deposit 20% of the total outstanding amount before the respondent bank
as upfront money by 26 February, 2024.
(b) The remaining amount will be deposited in three equal bimonthly installments, so that the
entire liability is cleared within next six months.
(c) In case of default in complying with the conditions stipulated above, the instant arrangement
will stand discharged automatically and it shall become open to the respondents to proceed
further in the matter in accordance with law.
6. With the above directions, the petition stands disposed of.
7. Till the time, the proceedings under Clause 6.5 of the Code are decided by the Authority, the
demand raised shall not be enforced against the petitioner.
8. In view of the submission made, the petitioners may approach the Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad. It
would be required of the respondent/Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad to pass appropriate order
resolving the issue raised by the petitioners whereby either the petitioners should get the land
comprised in Khasra no. 97 and/or they should be compensated for the same by the respondents.
Needful be done by the respondents within three months from the date the petitioners approach
the Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad. It would be open for the respondent/Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad to
consult the State Government in this regard.
9. This petition has been filed by the petitioners seeking a direction to the respondents not to
interfere in the peaceful possession of the petitioners over land of Khata No. 419, Khasra 97M
area 0.0630 hectare situated at village Noornagar, Pargana - Loni, Tehsil & District - Ghaziabad,
with the submission that the alleged resumption order dated 3.12.2014 under Section 117 of the
U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short 'Act, 1950') in favour of the
respondent no. 2 is void ab initio.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD DECEMBER 26, 2009
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE MANOJ KUMAR, J.
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 357445 of 2004
Dev Mitra Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
District Inspector of Schools, Aligarh and others ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri J.J. Munir
Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C. Shri H.P. Yadav
U.P. Secondary Selection Board retirement- within 60 days from suspension the committee
of management send proposal to the DIOS- who fixed the date for hearing- held- DIOS has no
jurisdiction-DIOS- only a Post Office to send the relevant papers to the Board who is only
competent to take decision.
Held- Para 2
The proposal of punishment of teacher by the Committee of Management can be approved or
disapproved only by U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board under the provisions
of U.P. Secondary Educations Service Selection Board Act 1982 and the District Inspector of
Schools has nothing to do in the matter, District Inspector of Schools is only the Post Office to
transmit the relevant papers to the Board.
Cases relied on-
1995 (3) SCC P . 757 AIR 1986 SC P.391 1990 (1) AWC P.732
(Delivered by Hon’ble Anjani Kumar, J.)
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondent no. 1 and
Sri H.P. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 and perused the counter affidavit filed
by Smt. Manju Singh.
2. In paragraphs no. 13 and 14 of the counter affidavit, it is stated by Smt. Manju Singh,
District Inspector of Schools concerned that since the Committee of Management has already
passed a resolution, within sixty days from the date of suspension and submitted the proposal
of punishment in the form of compulsory retirement of the petitioner Dev Prakash Sharma,
thereafter District Inspector of Schools has fixed dates for hearing the petitioner and the
Committee of Management, as required, before making the approval/ disapproval to the
proposed compulsory retirement of the petitioner Dev Prakash Sharma. This statement is
contrary to law and cannot be accepted. The proposal of punishment of teacher by the
Committee of Management can be approved or disapproved only by U.P. Secondary Education
Service Selection Board under the provisions of U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection
Board Act 1982 and the District Inspector of Schools has nothing to do in the matter. District
Inspector of Schools is only the Post Office to transmit the relevant papers to the Board.
3. It is also settled by the Full Bench of this Court that in the matter of suspension of a teacher,
the District Inspector of Schools does not become functions- officio and can even pass orders
after expiry of sixty days and can still decide the matter of approval of suspension. In the facts
and circumstances of the case, the only decision that can be taken is that of the approval of
suspension till the matter of punishment is finally approved or disapproved by the Selection
Board.
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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.12.2021 BEFORE
THE HON’BLE B. AMIT STHALEKAR, J. THE HON’BLE ALI ZAMIN, J.
Criminal Appeal No. 476 of 2021
Ram Chander & Ors …. Appellants (In Jail)
Versus
State of U.P. .…Respondent
Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Apul Mishra, Sri Rahul Yadav, Sri Raghuvansh Kumar, Sri Sushil Kumar Pandey
Counsel for the Respondent:
A.G.A.
A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 34 - object of common intention-joint liability-As a general
principle in a case of criminal liability it is the primary responsibility of the person who actually
commits the offence and only that person who has committed the crime can be held to guilty. By
introducing Section 34 in the penal code the Legislature laid down the principle of joint liability in
doing a criminal act. The essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention
connecting the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention.
B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 374(2), Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 147, 148,
302/149 - challenge to- life imprisonment passed by trial court-high court upheld the conviction of the
accused.
List of cases cited: -
1. Prabhu Dayal Vs. St. of Raj. (2018) 3 SCC (Cr.) 518
2. St. of Karnataka Vs. Suvarnamma (2015) 1 SCC (Crl.) 663
3. Vijai Pal Vs. St. (Govt. of NCT Delhi) (2015) 2 SCC (Cr.) 733
4. St. of U.P. Vs. Krishna Master and ors. (2010) 12 SCC (324)
5. St. of Karn. Vs. Suvarnamma & anr., 2015 (1) SCC 323
6. Pal Singh Vs. St. of U.P. (1979) 4 SCC 345
(Delivered by Hon’ble Ali Zamin, J.)
1. Heard Sri Apul Mishra alongwith Sri Rahul Mishra and Sri Raghuvansh Misra, learned counsel for
the appellants and Sri Ajit Ray, learned A.G.A. for the respondent and perused the material on record.
2. This appeal has been filed against the judgement and order dated 29.01.2002 passed in Session
Trial No.568 of 1996 (State vs. Ram Bahadur and 3 others), Police Station Beesalpur, District Pilibhit
by which learned Additional Session Judge, Pilibhit has convicted the appellants-accused Ram
Chander, Ram Shankar, Ram Bharosey and Ram Bahadur and sentenced appellant Ram Chander to
undergo two years rigorous imprisonment under Section 148, appellants Ram Shankar, Ram Bharosey
and Ram Bahadur have been sentenced to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment under Section 147
I.P.C. and all the appellants have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and fine of Rs.2000
under Section 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C. in default of fine to undergo further a period of 6
months additional imprisonment. Criminals ought to Be Punished in some way. This is the most widely
seen goal. Criminals have taken improper advantage, or inflicted unfair detriment, upon others and
consequently, the criminal law will put criminals at some unpleasant disadvantage to "balance the
scales." People submit to the law to receive the right not to be murdered and if people contravene these
laws, they surrender the rights granted to them by the law.
(Total words 510)
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD
09.01.2008 BEFORE
THE HON'BLE TARUN AGARWALA, J.
Writ Petition No. 375 of 2008
Virendra Kumar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
[Link] others ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri. Satyanshu Ojha Sri. Radha Kant Ojha
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri. Ashok Khare S.C.
U.P. Intermediate Education Act 1921- Chapter III Regulation 21-benefit of academic session-
person working as Ad hoc Principal-achieve the age of superannuation-during period of availing
benefit of academic session-cannot be treated as Ad hoc Principal.
Held: Para 3
The benefit of continuing to avail the benefit of the academic session after attaining the age of
superannuation is not applicable for the appointment on the post of ad-hoc Principal.
Case law discussed:
2003(3) AWC 1709, 2007(1)UPLBEC 479
(Delivered by Hon'ble Tarun Agarwala, J.)
1. Heard Sri [Link], the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ashok Khare, the learned senior
counsel appearing for respondent no.5. Since no factual controversy is involved in the present writ
petition, the same is being disposed of at the admission stage itself without calling for a counter
affidavit.
2. DNA Barcoding is a scientific technique to have precise identification of the target species of
mosquitoes has direct medical and practical implications, particularly in developing vector control
strategies. Research on stem biology with stem cell-based therapy holds an extraordinary
prospective in improving the lives of people who suffer from visual and orthodontic disorders and it
carries a promising future in producing new biological elements for medical treatment.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the controversy involved in the present writ
petition is squarely covered by two Division Bench judgments, namely, in the case of Raja Ram
Chaudhary vs. Satya Narain Gupta and others, 2003(3) AWC 1709, and in the matter of Hari Om
Tatsat Brahma Shukla vs. State of U.P. and others, 2007(1)UPLBEC 479, wherein it has been held
that a teacher continuing till the end of the academic session is not entitled to continue as an ad-hoc
Principal after attaining the age of superannuation. Information is required for traditional medicines
and developing new therapies in the search for potential treatments for COVID-19. At this juncture,
fabrication of herbal masks and hand sanitizer from herbal plants further enhance the integration of
Indian Traditional Tribal medicine into the western-based national healthcare structure are also
another option for the potential herb-drug interaction and research outlook for future research in
research institutions in India.
4. Mosquitoes are vectors of several diseases like malaria, filariasis, dengue fever, yellow fever, etc.,
causing serious health problems to human beings. The developed plant products and microbial
insecticides have already been used in the endemic areas of mosquito breeding areas of various
states including tribal settlement in South and North East India and also extended to the Tsunami
affected areas of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Pondicherry during 2004-2005. Employment of
bioinsecticides and biocoil was shown as one of the vector controls measures and further indirectly
decreased disease transmission and this way assisted to manage diseases at the tribal community and
societal level of larger populations.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD
12.12.2007BEFORE
THE HON’BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 53432 of 2008
Smt. Shajida Khan ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P and Others ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri P.N. Pandey
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Mehendra Kumar Pandey S.C.
Constitution of India, Art. 226, Art. 21- Service Law Revised family pension- petitioner’s husband died
after 31 years satisfactory service-1991 family pension fixed Rs.966/-while in Moti Lal Agarwal case-family
pension should not be less than Rs.1275/-respondent itself accepted the claim-only reason of financial
security can not be ground- once the court adjudicated in rem considering particular legal aspect-body
expected to implement the same forcing the individual to approach the court amounts multiplicity of
litigation- necessary direction issued with 8% interest.
Held: Para 14 & 17
Thus, retiral benefits are not bounty but a right earned by the employer and being deferred wages payable to a
Government servant in lieu of considerable length of service rendered by an employee to the employer cannot
be denied on the ground of financial scarcity or lack of funds.
Once on a particular legal aspect dealing with service condition of the employees, the matter is decided by a
Court of law, such body is expected to implement the same without forcing its all the employees similarly
placed to approach the Court individually as that would amount not only to multiply litigation wasting
avoidable public time and money but would also be against all spirit of a 'Welfare State' with which the
respondents are expected to work.
Case law discussed:
1996 (2) ESC-612, 1983 (1) SCC-305, AIR 2003 SC-2189, AIR 1983 SC-803, AIR 1958 SC-578, AIR
1963 SC-1332, 2003 (1) SCC-184, W.P. 33804/04 decided on 6.12.05.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)
1. A harassed widow, who has already suffered on account of death of her husband, having met an
indifferent treatment in the hands of the respondents with respect to payment of post death retiral benefits of
her husband/family pension, has invoked extraordinary equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India by means of the present writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents 2 and 3 to determine revised family pension and pay difference thereof since 4.3.1991 till date
and pay her along with arrears.
2. The facts in brief, giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioner's husband Late Rajjab Ali
was appointed as Revenue Inspector in Nagar Nigam, Allahabad and after rendering service of more than 30
years, died on 3.3.1991. The respondents determined family pension at Rs.480/- per month and started
payment thereof in July 1991 though with effect from 4.3.1991. A Division Bench of this Court vide
judgment dated 24.3.1988 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15309 of 1984 Moti Lal Agarwal
& others Vs. State of U.P. & others directed Allahabad Nagar Mahapalika to pay similar amount of pension
including dearness allowance and family pension etc. as admissible to the State Government's employee or
the employees of Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika since 2.7.1981.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.1.2013
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE M. CHANDRACHUN, J. THE HON’BLE PRAKASH KRISHNA, J.
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1302 of 1978
M/s Mohan Metal Industries ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Bharatji Agarwal Sri R.K. Agarwal
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri S.P. Kesarwani S.C.
Trade Tax Act- Section 4- A Small scale industry unit having investment of less than Rs.
5,00,000 would be entitled for exemption for five years- respondent to modify the eligibility
certificate dated 30.1.1988 accordingly, that is for a period of five years instead of three years
till the issuance of modified eligibility certificate for a period of five years, they should not
insist on realizing trade tax for the period 5.1.1983 to 4.1.1988.
Held- Para 8
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition is allowed and a
direction is issued to the respondent no. 2 no modify the eligibility certificate dated 30.1.1968
accordingly that is, for a period of five years instead of three years. The respondents are further
directed that till the issuance of modified eligibility certificate for a period of five years they
should not insist realizing trade tax for period 05.11.1986 to 04.01.1988.
Case law referred:
1989 U.P.T.C. 88
(Delivered by Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.)
1. The present writ petition arises out of proceedings under section 4-A of the U.P. Trade Tax
Act. The petitioner claimed exemption from payment of trade tax for a period of five years but
the eligibility certificate was issued for a period of three years. The review application filed by
the petitioner has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 17.5.1988 (Annexure 6 to the
writ petition).
2. The petitioner claimed that it is a new unit within the meaning of section 4- A of the U.P.
Trade Tax Act and was registered as a small scale industry on 22.8.1988 by the Directorate of
Industries, Ghaziabad vide Annexure 1 to the writ petition. In the said certificate the date of
commencement of production was mentioned as February 1981. The petitioner unit has also
been registered under the Factories Act w.e.f. 01.02.1983 vide Annexure 2 to the writ petition.
On the application claiming exemption under Section 4-A, the District Level Committee made a
recommendation for grant of exemption for five years from 05.01.1983 to 04.01.1988 vide
annexure 3 to the writ petition. However, the Divisional Level Committee issued the eligibility
certificate under 4-A granting exemption from payment of tax for three years only from
5.1.1983 to 4.1.1987. The petitioner thereafter filed a review application which has been
dismissed by the impugned order on the ground that the petitioner has purchased machineries
etc. worth Rs.19,730/- after the date of production and as such the total capital investment up to
the date of production being less than Rs. 5,00,000/-, it is entitled for exemption only for a
period of three years.
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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 25.05.2009
BEFORE
HON'BLE AJOY NATH RAY, CJ. HON'BLE ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
Special Appeal No. 293 of 2009
Gyan Singh ...Appellant
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh and others ...Respondents
Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Dr. R. Dwivedi Sri V.S. Dwivedi Sri R.B. Singhal
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A. Kumar S.C.
U.P. Panchayat Raj Rules 1947-rule 165 (4) and (5)- Prohibition on appointment of
certain relatives of village Pradhan-as mentioned in S.-165-Selection of the appellant
cancelled-only reasons for cancellation disclosed-at that material time the appellant was the
son of the brother in laws son of a lady village Pradhan-explanation ‘nephew’-does not
include a brother in law’s son-a legal restricted meaning of nephew should be given rather
than a Special wide meaning-prohibition has to be clear and accurate-accordingly-
cancellation of appointment held-illegal.
Held: Para 14
On the basis of these materials we have to take a decision whether the explanation to Rules
165 prohibits a brother-in-law's son by prohibiting a nephew. We are unable to opine that
in that explanation nephew includes a brother-in-law's son. We give a legally restricted
meaning to the word nephew rather than give it a socially wide meaning; where people's
rights are involved and curtailment of the eligibility to appointment in a Panchayat is
concerned, the prohibition has to be clear and accurate before a person can be barred from
entering into a Panchayat service.
(Delivered by Hon’ble Ajoy Nath Ray, CJ)
1. This appeal is taken up and disposed of.
2. It is from an order of an Hon'ble Single Judge dated 10.2.2005 wherein his Lordship has
quashed the selection and appointment of one Gyan Pratap Singh, who was respondent no.
5 in the Court below. The only reason for quashing is his relationship to the Village
Pradhan. It is an admitted case that the appellant at the material time was the husband's
brother's son, i.e. the brother-in-law's son of the Village Pradhan, who was a lady.
The said explanation is set out below:-
"Explanation--The word "relation" in the proviso means father, grand-father, father-in-law,
maternal or paternal uncle, son, grandson, son-in-law, brother, nephew, first cousin,
brother-in-law, sister's husband, wife, wife's brother, son of nephew"
3. We are of the clear opinion that the explanation is not illustrative but exhaustive. The
wording of the explanation indicates that the wording ''relation' is restricted in its meaning
to the particular relationships which are mentioned in the explanation and not otherwise.
That being dissatisfied by the order passed by the first appellate authority, the
dealer preferred second appeal No. 1024/2014 (A.Y. 2008-09), the Tribunal vide
its impugned order dated 25.03.2022 took the view that the disputed goods P-
chamber, weighing, batcher, oven, Lab-testing machine, cub mould, goods cum
passenger lift, gauge CTM are used in the laboratory situated at construction
site for testing the quality of construction material, testing of capacity of
pressure of bricks, testing of humidity and testing of chemical qualities of
construction material.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTIONCIVIL
SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.12.2002
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE M. KATJU, J. THE HON’BLE PRAKASH KRISHNA, J.
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1323 of 1992
M/s Mohan Lal Metal Industries ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Bharat Agarwal Sri R.K. Tiwari
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri S.P. Dubey S.C.
Trade Tax Act- Section 4- A Small scale industry unit having investment of less than Rs. 3,00,000 would be
entitled for exemption for five years- respondent to modify the eligibility certificate dated 30.1.1988
accordingly, that is for a period of five years instead of three years till the issuance of modified eligibility
certificate for a period of five years, they should not insist on realizing trade tax for the period 5.1.1983 to
4.1.1988.
Held- Para 8
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition is allowed and a direction is issued to
the respondent no. 2 no modify the eligibility certificate dated 30.1.1968 accordingly that is, for a period of
five years instead of three years. The respondents are further directed that till the issuance of modified
eligibility certificate for a period of five years they should not insist realizing trade tax for period 05.11.1986 to
04.01.1988.
Case law referred:
1989 U.P.T.C. 88, 1996 (2) ESC-612, 1983 (1) SCC-305, AIR 2003 SC-2189, AIR 1983 SC-803
(Delivered by Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.)
1. The present writ petition arises out of proceedings under section 4-A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act. The
petitioner claimed exemption from payment of trade tax for a period of five years but the eligibility certificate
was issued for a period of three years. The review application filed by the petitioner has been dismissed by the
impugned order dated 17.5.1988 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition).
2. The petitioner claimed that it is a new unit within the meaning of section 4- A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act
and was registered as a small scale industry on 22.8.1988 by the Directorate of Industries, Ghaziabad vide
Annexure 1 to the writ petition. In the said certificate the date of commencement of production was mentioned
as February 1981. The petitioner unit has also been registered under the Factories Act w.e.f. 01.02.1983 vide
Annexure 2 to the writ petition. On the application claiming exemption under Section 4-A, the District Level
Committee made a recommendation for grant of exemption for five years from 05.01.1983 to 04.01.1988 vide
annexure 3 to the writ petition. However, the Divisional Level Committee issued the eligibility certificate under
4-A granting exemption from payment of tax for three years only from 5.1.1983 to 4.1.1987. The petitioner
thereafter filed a review application which has been dismissed by the impugned order on the ground that the
petitioner has purchased machineries etc. worth Rs.19,730/- after the date of production and as such the total
capital investment up to the date of production being less than Rs.3,00,000/-, it is entitled for exemption
only for aperiod of three years.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.12.2007
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE ANJANEY PATHAK, J
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 53436 of 2004
Smt. Nupur Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P and Others ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Shashank Singh
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Mahendra Kumar Sharma S.C.
Constitution of India, Art. 226, Art. 21- Reliance is placed on the Constitution Bench judgment in the
case of Dharampal (supra) and also the judgment in the case of Balveer Singh (supra) in so far as
they lay down the law in the general context that the Magistrate in the event he disagrees with the
report has an option to issue process and summon the accused or if he is satisfied that a case is made
out, which is triable by the Court of Sessions, he may commit the case to the court concerned to
proceed further in the matter.
Held: Para 14 & 17
The learned Magistrate upon examining the papers, placed alongwith the application filed by the
opposite party no.3-prosecutrix, took the view that looking to the offences disclosed in the
application the power to take cognizance in the matter would be with the Special Court constituted
under the POCSO Act and not with the Magistrate and in view thereof the papers were transmitted
to the Special Court, POCSO, Aligarh. The case was thereafter taken up by the Special Judge,
POCSO and taking into consideration the facts of the case, hearing the parties concerned and also
examining the legal position, the Special Judge, POCSO vide order dated 17.10.2020 directed
registration of the case and issuance of summons to the applicants herein. It is at this stage that the
present application under Section 482 of the Code has been filed seeking quashing of the entire
proceedings of the criminal case and also the summoning order dated 17.10.2020 passed by the
Special Judge, POCSO.
Case law discussed:
1. The learned Magistrate while passing the order dated 16.09.2020 has neither taken cognizance of the
offence as per the provisions under section 190 (1) of the Code nor committed the case after following the
procedure under Sections 207 and 209 of the Code and in this manner the Magistrate has adopted a procedure
which is not provided for under the Code. In this regard he has placed reliance on the judgment in the case
of Minu Kumari and another vs. State of Bihar and others.
2. A plain reading of the FIR discloses the age of the victim to be less then 18 years. The statement of the
victim recorded under Section 164 of the Code supports the FIR version and also discloses the offence
under section 376 IPC. The aforementioned material having been placed alongwith the police report, the
Magistrate, upon taking notice thereof, has rightly held that the case would be covered within the ambit of the
POCSO Act and in view of the procedure provided under section 33(1) the matter would be cognizable by
the designated Special Court without the accused being committed to it for trial.
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