Command and

Control in the Future

Concept Paper 1: Grappling with Complexity

James Black, Rebecca Lucas, John Kennedy,

Megan Hughes, Harper Fine
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 Research Report

Command and Control in the Future

Concept Paper 1: Grappling with Complexity

James Black, Rebecca Lucas, John Kennedy, Megan Hughes &

Harper Fine

RAND Europe
RR-A2476-1
January 2024
Prepared for the Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)

This document has been formally reviewed and edited. RAND publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research
clients and sponsors. is a registered trademark.
Preface

This is the first in a series of four papers examining how Command and Control (C2) will manifest in the
future. The other three papers in the series are as follows:

 Concept Paper 2: Rebecca Lucas, Conlan Ellis, James Black, Paul Kendall, John Kendall, Stephen
Coulson, Peter Carlyon, & Louis Jeffries. 2024. Command and Control in the Future: Concept Paper
4 – The Defence C2 Enterprise. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation. RR-A2476-1.

 Concept Paper 3: Conlan Ellis, Rebecca Lucas, Stella Harrison, James Black, Ben Fawkes, Martin
Robson, Alan Brown, & Edward Keedwell. 2024. Command and Control in the Future: Concept
Paper 3 – Command and Control as a Capability. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation. RR-
A2476-3.

 Concept Paper 4: Rebecca Lucas, Stella Harrison, Conlan Ellis, James Black, Ben Fawkes, Martin
Robson, Alan Brown, & Edward Keedwell. 2024. Command and Control in the Future: Concept
Paper 4 – Enablers. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation. RR-A2476-4.

The overarching study is being delivered by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)
Strategic Analysis Support Contract (SASC) with the Global Strategic Partnership (GSP), a consortium of
UK and international research organisations providing strategic analysis and academic support to the
DCDC within the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD). This paper is intended to capture the findings of the
first phase of the project and has been written on the assumption that it will be read by an audience with
some familiarity with C2. Equally, it is intended to feed into the subsequent three papers in the series and
therefore stops short of providing fulsome coverage of all aspects of thinking about C2 in the future,
including the development of concrete recommendations.
The GSP is led by RAND Europe, part of the RAND Corporation, an independent, not-for-profit research
institute that aims to improve policy and decision making through objective research and analysis. RAND’s
clients include Allied governments, militaries, inter- and non-governmental organisations, and others with
a need for rigorous, independent, interdisciplinary analysis.

iii
For more information about RAND, the SASC, or this study, please contact:

James Black
Assistant Director – Defence & Security Research Group
RAND Europe
t. +44 (0)1223 353 329
e. jblack@[Link]

iv
Summary

This is the first of four concept papers commissioned by DCDC on C2 in the future. The specific focus for
this paper is the demands on C2 that arise from the complexity in the future operating environment.
Together titled ‘Project Mimisbrunnr’, the four papers inform an ongoing initiative to identify key themes
and concepts relevant to C2 in the future, building on the existing Joint Concept Note (JCN) 2/17 ‘The
Future of C2’. As DCDC also serves as the Swedish Concepts and Doctrine Centre, this conceptual work
will inform both UK and Swedish thinking about how C2 could evolve in the coming decades.

Contested definitions
There is no straightforward definition of C2, and there is debate about the term’s scope and relevance in
the contemporary operating environment. Critiques of traditional definitions of C2 have been informed by
wider questions about what constitutes effective leadership in the twenty-first century. In the UK, US and
NATO, there has been a recent profusion of new C2-related terminology and a focus on moving from joint
to multi-domain thinking. Our study frames C2 as a dynamic and adaptive socio-technical system,
necessitating consideration of organisational, technical and human elements.
Similarly, there is no universally agreed definition of complexity. The growing body of academic research
into complexity cuts across a variety of scientific disciplines but lacks a unified approach or theoretical
framework. One useful starting point is to distinguish between simple, complicated, complex and complex
adaptive systems. The literature also describes the so-called ‘wicked’ or ‘super wicked problems’ that can
emerge from such conditions. An important distinction can also be drawn between finite and infinite games
– a useful lens when considering interstate competition as a complex adaptive system. Given these debates,
our study eschews adopting a rigid definition of complexity in favour of a DCDC-furnished description of
this phenomenon in terms of its key properties (see Box 0.1).

Box 0.1 Understanding of key concepts as provided by DCDC

Command and Control (C2): ‘A dynamic and adaptive socio-technical system configured to design and
execute joint action’ whose purpose is thereby ‘[to] provide focus for individuals and organisations so
that they may integrate and maximise their resources and activities to achieve desired outcomes’.
Complex: ‘A system or phenomenon that exhibits emergent properties and often involves non-linearity,
hence small changes can have disproportionate or unpredictable effects on the overall behaviour of the
system. As a result, the system is often difficult to understand or analyse.’

Source: DCDC based on UK MOD (2017a).

v
Projected drivers of complexity
The character of the future operating environment – and the types of missions that Defence C2 systems
and organisations will be expected to undertake – is clouded by significant uncertainty, requiring caution
with any projections. Nonetheless, the literature identifies a variety of political, economic, social,
technological, legal, environmental and military (PESTLE-M) trends that are expected to shape evolution
of the international system, and thus of Defence operations, out to 2030 and beyond. These include macro-
trends such as:

 Increasing interconnectivity, multipolarity and global competition

 The impact of a changing climate

 The impact of technological change and digitalisation

 The blurring of domains, both traditional and novel

 The shifting of international norms and value sets.

Crucially, there is no single or primary trend that is driving change or complexity; rather, it is the confluence
of multiple factors and their unpredictable interactions that are of greatest concern. This understanding
provides a basis for further examination of the specific mechanisms by which these trends influence the level
and characteristics of complexity in the international system and thus creates new challenges for C2, which
operates in this same space.

Manifestations of complexity
PESTLE-M trends such as those outlined above contribute to a range of dilemmas and pressures for future
organisations to grapple with regarding C2, including but not limited to:

 Uncertainty

 Ambiguity

 Equivocality

 Information overload

 Cognitive bias

 Decision paralysis or insufficient tempo in the face of fast-moving events

 Difficulty assuring decision making (including by AI) or trusting the data, logic and assumptions
underpinning it

 Difficulty marshalling all necessary levers of power or coordinating large groups of diverse actors
(e.g. Partners Across Government [PAG], industry, international allies, citizens) involved in
generating and executing a given strategy or operational plan.

Furthermore, both theorists and practitioners lack robust measures of the effectiveness of decisions made or
actions undertaken when dealing with problems that contain non-linear dynamics. This makes it difficult
to say definitively whether complexity is objectively increasing (as opposed to taking on different forms) in

vi
the future operating environment, but there is clearly a substantial gap between political expectations for
the complex tasks the military should handle, and the ability of current C2 approaches to deliver.
Current academic theory provides the tentative outline of a methodological toolkit and some guiding
principles for deciding how to configure C2 amidst complexity – but no silver bullet. It emphasises
deliberative-analytic approaches, meaning methods that engage varied stakeholders in co-design, draw on
insights from multiple disciplines and bodies of knowledge, and build into analytic and decision-making
processes the flexibility to iterate and improve them over time based on feedback.1

Practical considerations for C2 in the future

Grappling with complex adaptive systems requires a move away from current linear C2 processes and
hierarchical structures, though more traditional approaches may retain utility when tackling non-complex
tasks and problems. In a competitive world, the UK needs to cultivate both those properties and capabilities
that enable it to exert constructive influence on others (e.g. by imposing complexity on opponents’ C2) and
those which bolster its own capacity to navigate complexity.
Influencing the perceptions, decision making and behaviours of hostile actors begins with a deep
understanding of their C2 structures, processes and culture. Informed by this understanding, UK Defence
then requires a suite of kinetic and non-kinetic levers to exert constructive influence on adversaries’ C2,
including to impose complexity. Besides hostile actors, Defence also requires an improved understanding
of how to exert constructive influence over PAGs, allies, partners, industry, academia, citizens and others
with radically differing approaches to C2.
In terms of bolstering the UK’s own capacity to deal with complexity, C2 systems and organisations in the
future must promote properties such as flexibility, resilience and a capacity for learning and adaptation.
Changes are needed across the decision cycle. For example, advances in sensor and communication
technologies provide opportunities to capture increased depth and breadth of data, including on complex
problems. Improved cognitive capacity is then essential to make sense of all this data, harnessing the benefits
of human and machine while mitigating the drawbacks of each. Changing approaches to decision making
will also require changes in styles of leadership, so as to cultivate decision makers more comfortable with
navigating complex adaptive systems. Having made a decision or plan, improving the ability to cut across
stovepipes or levels and better integrate activities or converge effects in the implementation phase is essential
to offset the UK’s limitations (e.g. in terms of mass).
Equally, integration is not a silver bullet; even the most efficient C2 systems cannot achieve success in the
future if Defence lacks sufficient depth of forces and capability to act credibly or to sustain high-tempo
operations in a hostile threat landscape. Defensive measures and reversionary and failure modes are also
needed to deter or mitigate the impact of hostile efforts to disrupt C2 systems and organisations. Given the

1
Examples of prominent methods in the complexity science(s) literature include cybernetics, systems engineering,
soft systems methodology, interpretative structural modelling, design thinking, and critical approaches. Of course, it
is important to select the right tool to tackle a given situation, threat or problem, aided by frameworks such as
Cynefin. A recurring theme across most approaches, however, is the need for continuous iteration, learning and
adaptation, emphasising that approaches to C2 must evolve over time and vary depending on the context and threat
environment faced.

vii
threats faced, and the differing forms of complex problems that UK Defence might be called to address, it
is likely that there will be multiple parallel models of C2 in play at once, rather than a monolithic approach.
Tackling complexity means continuous learning, adaptation, innovation and openness to change. Measures
of effect, signals and mechanisms for change must thus be built into plans and into C2 systems and
organisations from the outset to enable them to learn and adapt over time in response to conditions.
Crucially, the design of C2 systems and organisations in the future is only one part of the challenge – they
must also be supported by urgent reforms to the wider Defence enterprise to ensure access to the enablers
needed (people, tech, etc.). This presents its own challenges from a C2 perspective, given changing this
enterprise – a complex adaptive system – is itself a wicked problem.

Conclusions and next steps

Academic theorists and governmental, military or industry practitioners have an incomplete understanding
of the complexity or complex adaptive systems which will characterise the future operating environment for
C2. While the literature provides useful methods and tools for grappling with complexity, as well as some
initial design considerations for C2 in the future, modernising and transforming the UK’s C2 – a socio-
technical system in its own right – will be a highly complex endeavour. It implies a process of co-adaptation
alongside the evolving operating environment, and changing threat and technology landscapes, and thus of
iteration and continuous learning. Perhaps the most pressing challenge, therefore, is understanding how
best to steer this process over time, given the extent and nature of the transformation (technological,
structural, process, cultural, educational, etc.) required to position C2 systems for future success in the face
of complexity.
Paradoxically, overcoming the barriers to achieving a C2 system geared towards tackling complexity may
require that UK Defence already exhibit many of the traits of that system it is seeking to establish. In the
face of such circular logic, Defence may either need some sort of external shock to force creative destruction,
or else to initiate its own radical reform efforts using (and in spite of) more traditional, linear C2 approaches
and pivot over time as changes set in.

viii
Table of contents

Preface .................................................................................................................................................... iii

Summary ................................................................................................................................................. v
Figures, tables and boxes ......................................................................................................................... xi
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ xiii
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................. xvii
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
1.1. Background and purpose ........................................................................................................ 1
1.2. Structure of the document ...................................................................................................... 2
2. Contested definitions .............................................................................................................. 4
2.1. Summary ................................................................................................................................ 4
2.2. Defining C2 ........................................................................................................................... 4
2.3. Defining complexity ............................................................................................................... 7
3. Projected drivers of complexity ............................................................................................. 17
3.1. Summary .............................................................................................................................. 17
3.2. Understanding trends in the operating environment ............................................................. 17
4. Manifestations of complexity ................................................................................................ 21
4.1. Summary .............................................................................................................................. 21
4.2. Understanding how PESTLE-M trends can drive complexity ............................................... 22
5. Methods for tackling complexity ........................................................................................... 30
5.1. Summary .............................................................................................................................. 30
5.2. Towards a toolkit for competing effectively in the face of complexity.................................... 31
5.3. Methods for imposing complexity on others’ C2 .................................................................. 32
5.4. Methods for navigating complexity in the UK’s approaches to C2 ........................................ 34
6. Practical considerations for C2 in the future ......................................................................... 43
6.1. Summary .............................................................................................................................. 43
6.2. Demands on C2 systems and organisations in the future....................................................... 44
6.3. Properties and capabilities for exerting influence on others’ C2 ............................................. 44
6.4. Properties and capabilities for navigating complexity in our own C2..................................... 48

ix
7. Conclusions and next steps ................................................................................................... 65
7.1. Summary .............................................................................................................................. 65
7.2. Final reflections .................................................................................................................... 65
References .............................................................................................................................................. 69
Annex A. Methodology ............................................................................................................. 97
A.1. Literature review ................................................................................................................... 97
A.2. Expert engagement ............................................................................................................. 101
Annex B. Drivers of change in the operating environment ....................................................... 103
B.1. Increasing interconnectivity, multipolarity and global competition ..................................... 103
B.2. The impact of a changing climate ....................................................................................... 104
B.3. The impact of technology and digitalisation........................................................................ 106
B.4. The blurring of domains, both traditional and novel ........................................................... 110
B.5. The shifting of international norms and value sets .............................................................. 112
Annex C. Complexity-focused methods ................................................................................... 114
C.1. Cybernetics ......................................................................................................................... 114
C.2. Systems Engineering ........................................................................................................... 117
C.3. Soft Systems Methodology .................................................................................................. 119
C.4. Soft System Dynamics Methodology .................................................................................. 121
C.5. Critical Systems Thinking and Practice ............................................................................... 122
C.6. Interpretative Structural Modelling ..................................................................................... 122
C.7. Multi-Criteria Decision Methods........................................................................................ 124
C.8. Design Thinking ................................................................................................................ 125
Annex D. DMDU Methods..................................................................................................... 127
D.1. Robust Decision Making (RDM) ....................................................................................... 127
D.2. Three Horizon Foresight (3HF).......................................................................................... 129
D.3. Assumption-Based Planning (ABP) ..................................................................................... 130
D.4. Dynamic Adaptive Planning ............................................................................................... 131
D.5. Strategic Portfolio Analysis ................................................................................................. 133
D.6. Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways .................................................................................... 133

x
Figures, tables and boxes

Figures
Figure 2.1 Map of complexity science, 1940s–2020s .............................................................................. 10
Figure 2.2 Feedback loops across the continuum of cooperation-competition-conflict............................ 14
Figure 4.1 Example of multipolar and multi-level games facing UK Defence.......................................... 25
Figure 5.1 Complex adaptive systems mapping to competition or (war)fighting ..................................... 33
Figure 5.2 Cynefin framework ............................................................................................................... 37
Figure 5.3 Contrast between analytical strategies of optimisation (top) and RDM (below) ..................... 40
Figure 5.4 Defence strategic deliberation combining RDM and other DMDU methods (3HF, ABP) .... 40
Figure 6.1 Concept for US Advanced Battle Management System architecture ...................................... 51
Figure 6.2 DARPA’s Explainable AI (XAI) model .................................................................................. 54
Figure 6.3 Examples of trade-offs between C2 resilience and efficiency .................................................. 60
Figure 7.1 Nested loops of co-evolution of conceptual model, system and operational designs, and the
adaptive implementation and execution of those designs ........................................................................ 67
Figure C.1 Schematic of a general control system ................................................................................. 115
Figure C.2 Knowledge-control matrix .................................................................................................. 116
Figure C.3 Lawson’s model for C2 ....................................................................................................... 116
Figure C.4 Systems approach ............................................................................................................... 118
Figure C.5 Indicative V-diagram for systems engineering ..................................................................... 119
Figure C.6 Seven Steps of SSM ............................................................................................................ 120
Figure C.7 Steps of Interpretative Structural Modelling ....................................................................... 123
Figure D.1 Overview of the RDM process ........................................................................................... 127
Figure D.2 Example of an XLRM framework ....................................................................................... 128
Figure D.3 Three Horizon Foresight model ......................................................................................... 130
Figure D.4 Assumption-Based Planning ............................................................................................... 131
Figure D.5 Dynamic Adaptive Planning: the design phase ................................................................... 132
Figure D.6 DAPP Pathways development process ................................................................................ 134
Figure D.7 The seven steps of DAPP ................................................................................................... 135

xi
Tables
Table 2.1 Distinguishing between simple, complicated, complex and complex adaptive systems ............ 11
Table A.1 Literature review search strings ............................................................................................... 97
Table A.2 Literature review search hits ................................................................................................. 100
Table A.3 List of workshop participants ............................................................................................... 102

Boxes
Box 0.1 Understanding of key concepts as provided by DCDC................................................................ v
Box 2.1 Understanding of key concepts as provided by DCDC................................................................ 4
Box 3.1 Key findings: major drivers of complexity.................................................................................. 17
Box 4.1 Key findings: manifestations of complexity................................................................................ 21
Box 5.1 Key findings: methods for tackling complexity .......................................................................... 30
Box 6.1 Key findings: practical considerations for C2 in the future ........................................................ 43
Box 7.1 Conclusions and next steps........................................................................................................ 65

xii
Abbreviations

3HF Three Horizon Foresight

5G Fifth-Generation Telecommunications
6G Sixth-Generation Telecommunications
ABMS Advanced Battle Management System
ABP Assumption-Based Planning
ACT Allied Command Transformation
AGI Artificial General Intelligence
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process
AI Artificial Intelligence
AR Augmented Reality
ASI Artificial Super Intelligence
ATP Adaptation Tipping Point
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
BMC2 Battle Management Command and Control
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
C2 Command and Control
C3 Command, Control and Communications
C3I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance
C4ISTAR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance
C5I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence
C6I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Combat Systems
and Intelligence
CART Classification and Regression Tree

xiii
CAS Complex Adaptive Systems
CIS Communication Information Systems
COA Course of Action
CST Critical Systems Theory
CSP Critical Systems Practice
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019

CTAF Cultural Topography Analytical Framework

DAP Dynamic Adaptive Planning

DAPP Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DCDC Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

DIME Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic

DLOD Defence Line of Development

DMDU Decision Making Under Deep Uncertainty

DoD Department of Defense

DPA Deliberative Policy Analysis

Dstl Defence Science and Technology Laboratory

EM Electromagnetic

EME Electromagnetic Emissions

EMS Electromagnetic Spectrum

EW Electronic Warfare

FMN Federated Mission Networking

FMV Swedish Defence Materiel Administration

FOE Future Operating Environment

FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency

GST Global Strategic Trends

HADR Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief

HAPS High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellites

HMT Human-Machine Teaming

HQ Headquarters

xiv
IDF Israeli Defence Force

IOpC Integrated Operating Concept

IoT Internet of Things

IR International Relations

ISM Interpretative Structural Modelling

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

JADC2 Joint All Domain Command and Control

JCN Joint Concept Note

M&S Modelling and Simulation

MACA Military Aid to Civilian Authorities

MCDA Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis

MCDC Multinational Capability Development Campaign

MCDM Multi-Criteria Decision Methods

MDC2 Multi-Domain Command and Control

MDO Multi-Domain Operations

ML Machine Learning

MNC Multi-National Company

MOD Ministry of Defence

MR Mixed Reality

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO C2COE NATO Command and Control Centre of Excellence

NCW Network-Centric Warfare

NEC Network-Enabled Capacity

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

PAG Partners Across Government

PESTLE-M Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, Environmental and Military

PRIM Patient Rule Induction Method

R&D Research & Development

RDM Robust Decision Making

REE Rare Earth Elements

xv
RQ Research Question

SASC Strategic Analysis Support Contract

SATCOM Satellite Communications

SD Scenario Discovery

SME Small and Medium Enterprise

SOD Systemic Operational Design

SPA Strategic Portfolio Analysis

SQEP Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel

SSDM Soft System Dynamics Methodology

SSIM Structural Self-Interaction Matrix

SSM Soft Systems Methodology

SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats

TISM Total Interpretative Structural Modelling

TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

UAV Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle

UI User Interface

UX User Experience

V&V Validation & Verification

VR Virtual Reality

XAI Explainable Artificial Intelligence

xvi
Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the MOD for its sponsorship of this study and its support and input throughout
the research, including feedback on a draft of this concept paper. In particular, thanks are owed to Lt Col
Robert Kace, Lt Col Ed Vickers, and Cdr Leif Hansson of DCDC – the latter posted from the Swedish
Armed Forces, given DCDC’s dual role as the Swedish Doctrine and Concepts Centre – as well as Dr Peter
Houghton of the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl).
The SASC team is also grateful to all those who participated in an expert workshop held at the Swedish
Defence University in Stockholm on 7 March 2023. Lively discussions and feedback on the interim study
findings contributed to a strengthened report.
Finally, the team is thankful for the comments and advice provided by our internal quality assurance
reviewers, Dr Benedict Wilkinson and Erik Silfversten.
Despite these valued contributions, any errors or omissions remain the sole responsibility of the authors.

xvii
1. Introduction

This chapter introduces the context from which this paper was commissioned, as well as the definition of
command and control (C2) used throughout the wider ongoing study for DCDC. It then situates this paper
within the series of concept papers, before laying out research questions and methodology.

1.1. Background and purpose

1.1.1. About Project Mimisbrunnr
Effective and resilient C2 is essential to the basic functions of Defence and to the planning and execution
of military operations, up to and including warfighting. While the nature of war remains constant, the
character of warfare continues to evolve.2 So too do the types of mission that the military is expected to
undertake, the political, legal and ethical considerations that are placed on decision making, and the threats,
technologies and human factors that influence approaches to C2.
According to the UK MOD, C2 is the ‘pre-eminent Joint Function’ and ‘critical to enabling joint action’.3
Ensuring that C2 systems and organisations remain fit-for-purpose in the face of a changing operational
demands is thus essential to maintaining the advantage of the UK and its North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Allies over any competitor. To this end, DCDC is conducting ongoing analysis
through an initiative known as Project Mimisbrunnr to inform future thinking about C2, including an
update to Joint Concept Note (JCN) 2/17: Future of Command and Control.4
To support this effort, DCDC tasked the SASC to produce four exploratory concept papers over the course
of 2023 to:

 Inform Defence thinking and experimentation about C2 in the future.

 Explore Defence integration with partners across government (PAGs) and international allies and
partners to deliver decision advantage from 2030 onwards (i.e. in the time frame of the Capstone
Concepts, currently under development).

2
von Clausewitz (1874).
3
Commander Joint Forces Command, quote. in JCN 2/17. UK MOD (2017a).
4
Other JCNs tackle the related topics of human–machine teaming (JCN 1/18), information advantage (JCN 2/18)
and Multi-Domain Integration (JCN 1/20). Cf. UK MOD (2018b; 2018c; 2020b).

1
RAND Europe

 Research innovative approaches and revolutionary future understandings of the Integrated

Operating Framework.5

1.1.2. Concept Paper 1: Grappling with complexity

This first paper sets a baseline for the subsequent research by exploring the future operating environment
in which C2 systems will need to operate in the future. Specifically, it explores the drivers, manifestations
and implications of the complexity that prior research has shown is likely to characterise that environment.
DCDC provided the following research questions (RQs):

 RQ1: Projecting from current global societal and technology trends, what is the likely nature of the
operating environment for both Defence and partners where constant competition and multi-
domain operations are likely to be in play?

 RQ2: Based on this projected view of the future, what is the likely nature of the complexity that
future C2 systems and organisations will face; i.e. what are the likely sources of the complexity and
what characteristics will they have both individually and collectively?

 RQ3: Given this characterisation of the future operating environment, what will this demand of
future C2 systems and organisations, how will this differ from today, and what will need to change?

 RQ4: What sorts of new capabilities and properties will be required for future C2 systems and
organisations to respond effectively to these demands?

To address these questions, the study team undertook a literature review, as well as expert engagement
through a DCDC workshop hosted at the Swedish Defence University in Stockholm. This paper thereby
builds on previous work in this field and encompasses the latest research and thinking from academic, think
tank, industry and governmental sources. Details of the methodology, including search strings, can be found
in Annex A. The intention is to provide a foundation for the later papers in the series, which explore in
greater detail the ramifications of the future operating environment for the design of the C2 enterprise
(Paper 2), the capabilities that are required (Paper 3), and the enablers that must be put in place to deliver
on this vision (Paper 4).

1.2. Structure of the document

This paper is structured as follows:

 Chapter 2 discusses the contested definitions of key terms, such as C2 and complexity.

 Chapter 3 presents the drivers of complexity, looking out to 2030 and beyond.

 Chapter 4 discusses how complexity manifests in new pressures on C2 systems and organisations.

 Chapter 5 examines possible methods for analysing, understanding and tackling complexity.

5
As outlined in the Integrated Operating Concept (IOpC). UK MOD (2020a).

2
 Command and Control in the Future

 Chapter 6 draws together the findings of preceding chapters to outline the practical considerations
for C2 systems and organisations if they are to be successful in the 2030s and beyond.

 Chapter 7 sets out conclusions and next steps, including areas to explore in subsequent papers.

A full bibliography is also included, along with Annex A, which explains the methodology, Annex B, which
discusses in further detail the macro-trends summarised in Chapter 3, and Annexes C and D, which augment
Chapter 5’s discussion of methods for grappling with complexity and with uncertainty, respectively.

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RAND Europe

2. Contested definitions

This chapter explores the contested definitions of both ‘C2’ and ‘complexity’, as well as related terminology
such as ‘complex adaptive systems’ and ‘wicked problems’.

2.1. Summary
The box below gives the understanding of C2 as provided by DCDC as the starting point for this paper
and the wider GSP study on C2 in the future.

Box 2.1 Understanding of key concepts as provided by DCDC

Command and Control (C2): ‘A dynamic and adaptive socio-technical system configured to design and
execute joint action’ whose purpose is thereby ‘[to] provide focus for individuals and organisations so
that they may integrate and maximise their resources and activities to achieve desired outcomes’.
Complex: ‘A system or phenomenon that exhibits emergent properties and often involves non-linearity,
hence small changes can have disproportionate or unpredictable effects on the overall behaviour of the
system. As a result, the system is often difficult to understand or analyse.’

Source: DCDC based on UK MOD (2017a).

The following sections elaborate on the logic behind this understanding in more detail, noting the hotly
contested debates that exist over both the concept of C2 and the nature of complexity.

2.2. Defining C2
2.2.1. There is no straightforward definition of C2, reflecting debates about the
term’s scope and relevance in the contemporary operating environment
At the most basic level, C2 can be broken down into its two constituent elements6:

 Command: The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination
and control of military forces.

 Control: The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate
organisations, or other organisations not normally under [their] command, that encompasses the
responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

6
NATOTerm (n.d.).

4
 Command and Control in the Future

In practice, however, simply combining these two ideas into one term, C2, does not adequately capture the
nuanced challenges of exercising authority and direction in the contemporary operating environment, let
alone the future one. As recognised in JCN 2/17, ‘These terms, and their affiliated concepts and culture,
may encourage a rigid hierarchical approach that underplays the need to collaborate and influence,
particularly within a full spectrum approach where partners [across government, internationally or in
industry] may not understand or agree with the terms and associated concepts.’7

2.2.2. Critiques of traditional definitions of C2 have been informed by wider

debates about what constitutes effective leadership in the twenty-first century
Given the limitations of traditional definitions of C2, a number of practitioners and analysts have proposed
alternative framings, such as ‘focus and convergence’8 and ‘leadership and appreciation’,9 or non-hierarchical
terms such as ‘collaboration and constructive influence’.10 At the same time, others have provided sharp
critiques of the ‘myths and modalities’ of traditional military approaches to leadership, and argued for a
separation of ‘ideas of leadership from ideas of organisational hierarchy or positional power’, such as are
formalised within hierarchical C2 structures.11 There are calls for greater openness to challenge, conscious
of the well-documented failures of the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as for increasing
diversity of thought and innovation through more inclusive, collaborative approaches to C2 and to the
recruitment, training, education and promotion of more diverse leaders within Defence.12
Others have defended the focus on hierarchy within traditional definitions of C2, arguing that a more
directive approach remains essential for many roles or purposes within Defence.13 This draws in part on
military imperatives, such as the need for certainty around orders being followed by subordinates if nuclear
deterrence is to be both safe and credible. Historically, it has also reflected limitations in the available
technical means of deconflicting friendly forces operating in a crowded battlespace, which has led to reliance
on strict adherence to hierarchy and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), for example to avoid
incidents of friendly fire.14 It also reflects policy and ethical considerations, such as the need to maintain
civilian control of the military, or to recognise the moral burdens of leadership in the profession of arms,
whose members serve under a unique condition of ‘unlimited liability’ (i.e. unlike the workforce of civilian
organisations, military personnel may legally be ordered to endanger their own lives, or to use lethal force
against others on behalf of the state).15

7
UK MOD (2017a, 10).
8
Alberts (2007).
9
Osinga (2006).
10
Adams et al. (2017).
11
Adams et al. (2017).
12
UK Parliament (2017); UK MOD (2017b).
13
Lamb (2020).
14
In future, of course, new technologies may enable more distributed coordination.
15
Hackett (1983); US Army Training and Doctrine Command (2010); Mileham (2010); Shepherd (2021).

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Some commentators argue – though not without opposition – that the West already has a culture of
‘mission command’ (derived, in part, from the older German concept of Auftragstaktik),16 which entails a
more decentralised execution within C2 structures when compared to more rigid, top-down approaches
typically employed in authoritarian states (e.g. Soviet/post-Soviet Russia, or China).17 Some analysts thus
suggest that incremental rather than radical change is needed to traditional conceptualisations of C2, while
others argue that mission command is more ‘myth’ or ‘infatuation’ than reality in most NATO militaries.18
As such, despite a growing body of research emphasising the need for less rigid and more flexible approaches
to C2, especially as part of a comprehensive approach, much of the terminology in common usage still
reflects, whether implicitly or explicitly, the ‘hard-wired’ legacy of military hierarchy.19

2.2.3. In the UK, US and NATO, there has been a recent profusion of new C2-
related terminology and a focus on moving from joint to multi-domain
thinking
The proliferation of new C2-related buzzwords reflects the fact that ‘words move money’, and that new
terminology (even if sometimes largely a repackaging of old ideas) can help unlock new funding and reform
initiatives within the defence enterprise.20 On the one hand, this means revisiting long-established concepts,
such as Soviet-era thinking around the integration of C2 with reconnaissance and fires to create a
‘reconnaissance-fires complex’ to dominate the deep battle.21 It also reflects a growing focus on networks,
information technology and new environments, such as cyberspace, since the advent of ‘network-centric
warfare’ in the 1980s and 1990s.22 Examples of resultant jargon include, but are certainly not limited to:
C3 (command, control and communications), C3I (which adds intelligence), C4ISR (command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), C4ISTAR (which adds target
acquisition), C5ISR (which adds cyber) and even C6ISR (which also includes combat systems).23
There has also been a strong emphasis on moving beyond ‘joint’ operations (i.e. those involving more than
one service, such as the Army and Navy) towards a more ambitious vision for converging effects across all
domains, including not only land, air and maritime, but also cyber and electromagnetic, and space. This is
reflected in the current profusion of concept development, experimentation and R&D activities associated
with ‘multi-domain’ or ‘joint all domain command and control’ (MDC2 and JADC2) in the United
States.24 It is similarly evident in related efforts to pursue integration as a key priority in UK Defence, or to
develop a NATO concept for ‘multi-domain operations’ (MDO) through Allied Command
Transformation (ACT).25 There is also similarly badged work ongoing at the NATO C2 Centre of

16
Deployable Training Division of the US Joint Staff J7 (2020).
17
Lamb (2020).
18
Vandergriff (2014); Herrera (2022).
19
Alberts (2007).
20
Spirtas (2018).
21
Black, Lynch, et al. (2022).
22
Alberts (2007).
23
Daniel (2020).
24
US Congressional Research Service (2022); US DoD (2022); Priebe et al. (2020); Zeigler et al. (2021).
25
NATO (2022).

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 Command and Control in the Future

Excellence (NATO C2COE),26 through the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC)
programme,27 and in various think tanks, academic organisations and industry programmes.28

2.2.4. Our study frames C2 as a dynamic and adaptive socio-technical system,

necessitating consideration of organisational, technical and human elements
The various terms outlined in the previous section are not only overlapping, but also sometimes used
interchangeably, with broadly similar concepts articulated slightly differently by individual programmes,
services or nations. This can be a source of confusion and a challenge for organisations, such as DCDC or
NATO, trying to ensure a common lexicon. Through its four exploratory Concept Papers, this study will
seek to explore and critique many of these definitional ambiguities – at least where they are substantive
rather than purely semantic – by engaging with the live debates over issues such as the appropriate levels of
hierarchy within C2 in the future, or the changing metrics of effective leadership.
To set a baseline, the study adopts as its starting point the definitions provided by DCDC in JCN 2/1729:

 C2: ‘To provide focus for individuals and organisations so that they may integrate and maximise
their resources and activities to achieve desired outcomes.’

 C2 capability: ‘A dynamic and adaptive socio-technical system configured to design and execute
joint action’. This involves ‘essential functions’ including but not limited to: ‘creating shared
awareness (including awareness of command intent); allocating resources to create effects; assessing
progress; and recognising the need to change our approach to C2 and/or the plan of action.’

This focus on a ‘dynamic and adaptive socio-technical system’ entails considering not only the
organisational and technical aspects of C2 systems’ design, but also the vital human component. In
grappling with the future consequences of complexity for C2, this necessitates that our study considers not
only the possible role of technology (e.g. artificial intelligence [AI], machine learning [ML] and autonomy)
in providing solutions, but also the interaction with human-centred developments such as changing norms,
values, ethics and perceptions; evolving approaches to workforce management, training and professional
military education; different possible ways of integrating human and machine within the system, given the
strengths and drawbacks of each; and trends in leadership, culture, incentives and behaviours.

2.3. Defining complexity

2.3.1. The growing body of academic research into complexity cuts across a
variety of scientific disciplines, but lacks a unified approach or theoretical
framework
The academic and grey literature reviewed for this report provides many different possible definitions of
complexity; if there is one point of agreement, it is that there is no agreed understanding.30 In the absence

26
NATO C2COE (2021; 2022; 2023).
27
UK MOD (2023b).
28
For selected examples, see: Team Defence Innovation (n.d.); BAE Systems (n.d.); UK Defence Academy (2022).
29
UK MOD (2017a).
30
Kasser & Zhao (2016); Tran et al. (2015).

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of a common definition of complexity, there is also no single unifying theoretical framework to cohere
research and analysis on the topic. Instead, there are a series of overlapping and sometimes discordant
research fields that tackle similar conceptual or practical questions from different disciplinary perspectives.
This includes activity within both the natural and social sciences, and a mix of more quantitative and
qualitative research methods. Work on complexity stems from diverse fields such as mathematics, graph
theory, information theory, chaos theory, systems theory, computational science, biology, ecology,
evolutionary theory and thermodynamics, as well as from social scientists or arts and humanities specialists
applying the lenses of economics, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, critical theory or even art theory.
Brian Castellani and Lasse Gerritts have attempted to map the evolution of some of the major fields within
complexity science since the 1940s and 1950s, originating in the pioneering work of thinkers such as
Norbert Weiner, Gregory Bateson, Robert Ashby, Margaret Mead and Ludwig von Bertalanffy on topics
such as cybernetics and systems theory.31 As shown in Figure 2.1, this reveals a research landscape that is
difficult to comprehend or navigate, and which remains stovepiped despite ongoing efforts to promote more
critical, inclusive and interdisciplinary approaches to complexity science(s).32

2.3.2. A useful starting point is to distinguish between simple, complicated,

complex and complex adaptive systems
While non-specialists – including policy makers – often use terms such as complicated and complex
interchangeably, adding to conceptual confusion, the academic literature attempts to draw a distinction
between different types of system, as outlined in Table 2.1. From the beginning, the science of complexity
has thus been closely associated with the study of systems and their structure, properties, and power/causal
dynamics. This includes systems thinking and approaches such as systems engineering. Though there are a
variety of disciplines and schools of thought in this area, they share a common interest in understanding:

‘… the arrangement of and relations among the parts, which connect them into a
whole. This approach is necessary for two reasons: first, system properties emerge
at a higher level as the result of interactions among system components33 and
second, the emergent pattern itself exerts a downward causation on the lower level
from which it has emerged.’34

Focusing in on complex and complex adaptive systems (CAS) thus entails moving beyond linearity towards
concepts such as system or collective dynamics, hierarchy, and non-linearity, randomness and emergence.
For example, Lingel et al. (2021) describe how ‘something that is complex has many parts that are
interconnected and interdependent’, meaning that outcomes often have multiple causal factors. Baltaci &
Balci (2017) further point out that these parts are organised by ‘flexible and volatile hierarchical structures
connected through multiple ties’. Dawkins & Barker (2020) emphasise the non-linear nature of these ties
and dynamics, as well as resulting feedback systems. Tran et al. (2015) similarly point out that ‘complex

31
Castellani & Gerrits (2021).
32
Cairney & Geyer (2017).
33
Raia (2005), citing von Bertalanffy (1968) and Holland (1998).
34
Raia (2005), citing Campbell (1974)

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 Command and Control in the Future

systems are typically composed of independently acting agents’ whose interactions ‘result in unexpected,
emergent behaviours or features’; this includes both humans and technology within a system.35

35
Claverie & Desclaus (2022).

9
Figure 2.1 Map of complexity science, 1940s–2020s

Source: Castellani & Gerrits (2021).

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 Command and Control in the Future
Table 2.1 Distinguishing between simple, complicated, complex and complex adaptive systems

Type of Non- Adaptive Emergent

Numbers Description(s) Examples
system linearities elements phenomena
 Something which is straightforward to comprehend and solve, e.g. due to linear Plug-and-play
Simple No No No No dynamics with minimal parts or variables. printers
 Something which is difficult but ultimately knowable, predictable and solvable, Intricate
Complicated Yes No No No given the manageable number of variables involved and clarity for the observer assemblages
on cause and effect.
 A system that has ‘many parts that are interconnected and interdependent and
may create emergent behaviours. The system components are inanimate and do
not adapt over time’.36 Modern
Yes (may be  A system ‘with numerous components and interconnections, interactions or automobiles and
due to interdependence that are difficult to describe, understand, predict, manage, aircraft;
Complex Yes No No design, and/or change.’37
inanimate dissipative
features)  A ‘group of “agents” […] existing far from equilibrium, interacting through systems in
positive and negative feedbacks, forming interdependent, dynamic, chemistry
evolutionary networks, that are sensitive dependent, fractally organised, and
exhibit avalanche behaviour (abrupt changes) that follow power-law
distributions.’38
Yes (due to  A complex system that also has ‘components or agents that are animate and
adapt. It is not always clear what causes behaviours, and causes are almost Human body,
animate or
Complex always multisource. The system can demonstrate emergence.’ 39 social
Yes Yes Yes artificial
adaptive  One ‘with non-linear interactions involving adaptive animate components, organisations,
intelligence
interactions that lead to emergent macroscopic properties… a subset of complex nations
agents)
systems more generally.’40
Source: adapted from Davis et al. (2021), except where otherwise indicated via footnotes. Note: Snowden similarly distinguishes between that which is clear, complicated, complex
and chaotic using his Cynefin framework (see Chapter 5 for further discussion).

36
Lingel et al. (2021, 5).
37
Magee & de Weck (2004).
38
Castellani & Gerrits (2021).
39
Lingel et al. (2021).
40
Davis et al. (2021).

11
Though there is no single definition of complexity or of a complex system, there are common elements that
recur across multiple definitions:41

 ‘Multiplicity of many parts, out of whose interaction “emerges” behaviour not present in the parts
alone;

 Coupling to an environment with which information, energy, or other resources are exchanged;

 Presence of both order and randomness in (spatial) structure or (temporal) behaviour;

 Absence of a central control element, either internal or external;

 Robustness of structure and/or behaviour against significant perturbation; and

 Presence of memory and feedback; enabling adaptability according to its history or feedback’.42

2.3.3. The literature describes ‘wicked problems’ that can emerge from such
conditions
Proponents of complexity science(s) hope to challenge traditional positivist and ‘reductionist’ approaches
within both the natural and social sciences, and thereby come to an enhanced understanding of the world
and be able to make more effective policy interventions (such as through the application of complexity and
systems thinking to the field of policy analysis).43
Complex systems or systems of systems, such as societies or international relations, often produce challenges
known as ‘wicked problems’: unstable situations that ‘resist being solved by classical problem-solving’.44
Similar to the complex systems from which they derive, wicked problems often lack central authority or
coordination that could be applied to solving the problem.45 Such problems often also resemble a ‘social
mess’, given that they concern multiple stakeholders and there is no single agreed understanding of the
problem, let alone how to solve it, and no one actor has access to all the levers needed to achieve systemic
change.46
Furthermore, some theorists have conceived of a further category, super-wicked problems, denoting those
problems, such as climate change, considered to be near-irresolvable due to four main characteristics47:

 The time to resolve them is running short

41
Of note, as reflected in the increasing number of agents (human and machine) and variables to consider in decision
making; the continuing evolution of networks with both more nodes and more numerous and more diverse linkages;
and the increase in threat vectors and vulnerabilities, as well as the scale of the associated attack surface. By contrast,
there are enduring constraints on the size and resources of Defence (entailing a relative decline compared to the scale
of the tasks expected of it), and a decline in the relative clout of the West vs the East (in terms of population size,
GDP, soft power, etc.), and of the public vs private sector (in terms of driving innovation or exerting influence).
42
Bristol Centre for Complexity Sciences (n.d.).
43
Davis et al. (2021).
44
Masys (2016).
45
Ritchey (2013); Duczynski et al. (2021); Head (2022b).
46
Sun & Yang (2016).
47
Levin et al. (2012).

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 Command and Control in the Future

 The resolution is left in the hands of the people that create the problem

 Central authority is weak

 Any policy response assumes that future decision makers will follow through, which is unlikely due
to discounting behaviour which irrationally pushes problems and costs into the future.
Problematically, public sector governance institutions – including Defence as one of the diplomatic,
information, military and economic (DIME) instruments of power – are configured around a linear-rational
model and designed to address near- rather than long-term issues, primarily through top-down strategies
and policy interventions.48 Such governance systems are subject to the influence of structural factors that
conspire against the sort of collaborative, non-linear and systems approaches needed to understand, let alone
tackle, wicked and super-wicked problems. In this institutional context, barriers to coordinated action or
learning and adaptation include, but are not limited to49:

 The influence of political election cycles.

 Limits on the availability and fungibility of financial resources.

 Inflexible and inefficient public procurement processes.

 Institutional infighting and bureaucratic inertia (e.g. between the Services).

 Denial, avoidance and a risk-averse culture, including among political, civilian and military leaders.

 A communication gap and mutual incomprehension between the decision maker and analyst
communities, resulting in misaligned expectations around analytical products and evidence,
including the role of modelling and simulation.

 Military or civil service career structures (with their frequent rotation of postings and various
incentives to focus on near-term activity and outputs rather than long-term outcomes).

 Shortages in technical skills and other knowledge, skills and experience, not least given the financial
challenges of competing with the private sector for talent.
Faced with these challenges, the academic literature on complexity and systems thinking offers a number of
suggested improvements to analysis, modelling, decision making and, ultimately, C2, as will be explored in
Chapter 5. But the inherent uniqueness of each wicked problem means it is not possible to define a single,
universal blueprint to guide reform of government and military institutions or their decision-making
processes. Furthermore, implementing policy interventions or wider structural reforms to address existing,
known problems is likely to create unanticipated new challenges, given the complexity of social systems:

Every wicked problem is unique due to its social complexity and the diversity of
its causes, consequences, and constituent factors. Moreover, in attempting to solve
a wicked problem, each proposed solution carries with it the risk of creating new
problems that may also be ‘wicked’—unlike solutions to simplify or tame
problems, which may or may not work, but pose no risk of exacerbating the

48
Lazarus (2008).
49
Black, Paille et al. (2021); Head (2022b).

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existing problem. A further dilemma is that it is difficult to trace or predict the

‘waves of consequences’ caused by a wicked problem, especially as such problems
consist of many complex issues or roots that have become tangled together.50

2.3.4. An important distinction can be drawn between finite and infinite games,
when considering interstate competition as a complex adaptive system
Besides wicked and super-wicked problems, it is also worth defining the different types of competition in
which governments and militaries can find themselves engaged, whether at the operational, military-
strategic or grand-strategic levels. Unlike many if not most of the policy problems facing civilian
organisations, those responsible for foreign and security policy, as well as the use of the military instrument,
are primarily concerned with competition, if not outright conflict, against one or more adversary.
Indeed, many analysts characterise strategic competition – or outright warfare – at the international level as
a complex adaptive system (or system of systems) in and of itself.51 This reflects the many interconnected
and independent variables at play, the number of actors (state and non-state) within the system, and the
non-linear dynamics and various positive and negative feedback loops that exist. These determine how
actors interact with each other across the full continuum of cooperation, competition and conflict, exerting
influence and, in turn, being influenced, across all PESTLE-M dimensions, as shown in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 Feedback loops across the continuum of cooperation-competition-conflict

Source: RAND Europe, adapted from McCoy (2018).

Against the overarching backdrop of strategic competition, it is important to distinguish between different
types of competition or ‘game’ that can occur between actors. In recent years, the concept of finite and
infinite games has received significant attention in the US defence establishment, distinguishing between52:

 Finite games, i.e. contests ‘bounded by time, space, and rules regarding what is permitted and
prohibited’, with ‘agreed-on systems for scoring [that] allow players to be ranked and ordered in

50
Sun & Yan (2016), citing Rittel & Weber (1973), Whelton & Ballard (2002) and Camillus (2008).
51
Harrison (2012); Gunitsky (2013); Ragionieri (2016); White (2016); Johnson (2018).
52
Black et al. (2023).

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 Command and Control in the Future

terms of their performance against each other’ and thus ‘unambiguous conditions for terminating
the game and accepting its outcome.’53 Here, the aim is to win and success can be measured.54

 Infinite games, i.e. contests that are unbounded in terms of time, space and rules. ‘Players cannot
determine when the game begins, when it ends, or how it is scored’ and ‘victory conditions cannot
be known, nor can the ranking of the players be made in an unambiguous fashion’.55 In such a
game, therefore, the aim is not to win but merely to survive and adapt in order to continue play.56

Despite the growing interest in these concepts, however, there remains a live academic debate as to whether
strategic competition among states is truly an infinite game, or merely a long one. As shown by the historical
record, strategic rivalries between great powers can last for decades or even centuries, but they can end and
in some cases one or more of the players eventually collapses entirely.57 These are certainly ‘long games’ with
few clear boundaries and with emergent behaviour and unintended consequences; in turn, they contain a
nested series of finite games that play out in relation to specific crises (e.g. wars, or diplomatic or trade
disputes), and which inform, and are informed by, the shifting dynamics of the overarching competition.

2.3.5. Our study eschews adopting a rigid definition of complexity in favour of a

DCDC-furnished description of this phenomenon in terms of its key properties
As will be discussed further in Chapters 3 and 4, not all problems facing Defence are wicked problems; nor
are all the systems and challenges that they face complex. In recent years, there has been pushback against
the ‘fad in the academic literature’ of describing all policy problems as wicked problems, when in fact they
may be ‘difficult, and perhaps even intractable’ but not wicked in a formal sense.58 Similarly, there is not
always clarity among policy makers or those commanding military operations as to whether they are engaged
in finite or infinite games and, as such, the relevant and applicable rules and dynamics.59 Regardless, it is
clear that a subset of the challenges facing governments and militaries are indeed wicked and related to
complex and/or complex adaptive systems, while others may fall short but still exhibit certain attributes
(e.g. the potential for cascading, unanticipated consequences).60
To help navigate these nuanced definitional and conceptual debates, and in recognition of the contested
nature of language in this area, DCDC have opted to provide a description rather than a formal definition:

 Complex: ‘A system or phenomenon that exhibits emergent properties and often involves non-
linearity, hence small changes can have disproportionate or unpredictable effects on the overall
behaviour of the system. As a result, the system is often difficult to understand or analyse.’

53
Frank (2022).
54
Sinek (2019).
55
Frank (2022).
56
Carse (1986).
57
Mazarr (2022).
58
Peters (2017).
59
Black et al. (2023).
60
Sieber (1980); Cortrell & Peterson (2001); De Melo et al. (2019); Byrne (2022).

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Having summarised the contours of the research landscape and contemporary debates in relation to both
C2 and complexity, our paper now turns to understanding their drivers and manifestations, and the
implications of relevant trends in the future operating environment.

16
3. Projected drivers of complexity

This chapter identifies and analyses the trends reported to be driving change and complexity in the strategic
and operating environment, looking out to 2030 and beyond. This provides the basis for further
examination in Chapter 4 of the specific mechanisms by which these trends influence the level and
characteristics of complexity within the international system and thus C2.

3.1. Summary
Prominent trends are summarised in the box below and elaborated upon in the sections that follow.

Box 3.1 Key findings: major drivers of complexity

The nature and character of the future operating environment – and the types of missions that Defence
C2 systems and organisations will be expected to undertake – are clouded by significant uncertainty,
requiring caution with any projections. Nonetheless, the literature identifies a wide variety of PESTLE-M
trends that are expected to shape the evolution of the international system out to 2030 and beyond.
These include macro-trends such as:

 Increasing interconnectivity, multipolarity and global competition

 The impact of a changing climate

 The impact of technology and digitalisation

 The blurring of domains, both traditional and novel

 The shifting of international norms and value sets.

Crucially, there is no single or primary trend that is driving change or complexity; rather, it is the
confluence of multiple factors and their unpredictable interactions that are of greatest concern.

Source: SASC analysis of Chapter 3 findings.

3.2. Understanding trends in the operating environment

3.2.1. The character and nature of the future operating environment is clouded by
uncertainty, requiring caution with any projections
It is important to emphasise the caveats associated with futures and foresight analysis. The future is
inherently uncertain, and it is beyond the scope of this short study to project what will happen out to
2030+. Instead, the focus is on understanding factors and trends that the futures literature suggests might
impact on the types of problems and levels of complexity that UK Defence may encounter in this period.

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Furthermore, wider work is ongoing at DCDC and through the SASC to update the MOD’s Future
Operating Environment 2035 (FOE 35) publication, as well as to produce the latest iteration of Global
Strategic Trends (GST 7).61 This C2-focused paper is not intended to substitute for any of these deeper
analyses.
It should also be kept in mind that the widespread perception of the current age being one of increasing
complexity does not mean that this is the reality, at least not in all areas. Futures and foresight analysis, or
the more general discussion of the future among lay audiences, is subject to various cognitive biases. These
include but are certainly not limited to confirmation, availability, projection and ambiguity bias; the
recurring trend for individuals and organisations to emphasise the novel over the enduring (‘neophilia and
presentism’)62; the tendency to focus on quantifiable risks over broader uncertainty (given the inherent
challenges around accounting for ‘unknown unknowns’ and possible ‘Black Swans’63); and the habit of
policy organisations and planners to consider a certain narrow set of scenarios (e.g. whether the most policy-
compliant, the most desirable, or the worst-case, depending on the audience) more than others.64
Relatedly, there are well-documented waves of ‘hype’ and ‘counter-hype’ around the pace and likely impact
of technological innovation,65 as well as a tendency for some (including the military) to place less emphasis
on non-technological factors – especially in Western military traditions, with their focus on qualitative
superiority through organisation and technology, as opposed to factors such as mass, ideology or will.66

3.2.2. The literature identifies a wide variety of PESTLE-M trends that are expected
to shape the evolution of the international system out to the 2030s and
beyond
Conscious of the various caveats associated with projecting future trends, the SASC study team undertook
a meta-scan of the existing futures literature. This revealed a large number and wide variety of factors and
trends perceived to be major drivers of change in the future operating environment. These range across all
areas of Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, Environmental and Military (PESTLE-M) or
other similar frameworks (e.g. DIME). Of course, not all drivers of change necessarily drive increased
complexity. Instead, some factors merely present complicated but ultimately bounded and solvable
problems, as opposed to true complexity. A summary of these trends is presented in Table 3.1.

61
UK MOD (2015); UK MOD (2018a).
62
Barnes (2019).
63
Taleb (2007).
64
Black, Paille et al. (2021).
65
Painter (2017).
66
Johnson (2021).

18
Table 3.1 Summary of trends shaping the future operating environment

Interconnectivity,
Changing Technological change and Shifting of international norms
multipolarity and Blurring of domains
climate digitalisation and value sets
global competition
 Increasing mistrust  Environmental  Pace of technological change  Competition in and through cyberspace  Challenges to trust and
and revisionism change and  Democratisation and proliferation  Competition in and through the legitimacy for governance
 A broadening of extreme electromagnetic environment systems
weather  The shifting locus of innovation
global competition  Competition in and through outer space  Challenges to sovereignty
 Energy  Increasing sophistication and
 Increasing vulnerability of technological systems  Growing focus on multi-domain integration  Structural barriers to
multipolarity transition coordination and consensus
 Disruption to  The profusion of data  Growing focus on public-private partnership
 Increasing  A highly contested information
connectivity within food, water,  The growth and expansion of  Risk of cascading disruption to military and environment
and between and soil networks non-military systems
systems and  Increased focus on social equity
systems  Impact of AI, ML and autonomy  Potential to learn lessons from innovation in and diversity and inclusion
ecology new operating domains
 The continuing rise  Impact of other emerging disruptive  Uncertainty over future trends in
of non-state actors  Bio-security technologies
risks ethics and morality
 The changing  Challenges around workforce skills  Lawfare and weaponization of
impact of time and  Climate and barriers to absorption of new
adaptation the regulatory environment
space technologies
and
 The perception of weaponization  Challenges around costs and legacy
heightened systems
uncertainty and  Demographic
volatility shifts and
resource
scarcity
 Migration and
urbanisation

19
Nonetheless, when describing PESTLE-M developments of relevance to future complexity, our literature
review suggests that academic and policy sources place particular emphasis on a series of macro-trends.
Before we turn to a discussion of how these might shape the levels and character of the complexity in the
international system, the paragraphs below give a high-level overview of each macro-trend, with more
detailed discussion provided in Annex B.

Increasing interconnectivity, multipolarity and global competition

Geopolitical and geoeconomic trends are seen as driving complexity by heightening the number of
concurrent and converging challenges facing societies and, by extension, governments and militaries (see
Section B.1).

The impact of a changing climate

Besides geopolitical and geoeconomic change, interlinked social and environmental trends could similarly
lead to greater disorder, instability and ultimately conflict out to the 2030s and 2040s (see Section B.2).

The impact of technological change and digitalisation

As digitalisation continues worldwide, technological connections and interdependencies, including both
within military C2 systems and organisations and broader society continue to grow (see Section B.3).

The blurring of domains, both traditional and novel

Traditional distinctions between domains could diminish as global systems and networks across the
PESTLE-M spectrum multiply and become increasingly interconnected (see Section B.4).

The shifting of international norms and value sets

The literature also emphasises the impact of broader trends occurring within law, ethics and cultural norms,
both at the national/societal and international levels (see Section B.5).

3.2.3. Complexity science(s) and systems theory emphasise the need to focus on
the interlinkages across PESTLE-M dimensions
Given the complex web of causal links and feedback loops between the myriad PESTLE-M developments
outlined across these macro-trends, there is the possibility for cascading crises to occur. These may entail
unpredictable second- and third-order effects, which may overwhelm the capacity of governments or whole
societies to mitigate or adapt. The next chapter considers how such trends can manifest as heightened or
altered forms of complexity in the international system, and thus new pressures and demands on C2.

20
4. Manifestations of complexity

This chapter explores how the PESTLE-M trends driving change in the contemporary and future operating
environment might influence the levels and characteristics of complexity within the international system as
a complex adaptive system of systems. It begins by considering the lessons from academic theory in terms
of the mechanisms through which change in the international system can manifest as complexity in different
ways and at different levels of analysis. It then examines the types of dilemmas and pressures this puts on
Defence decision makers and thus on the future design of C2 systems and organisations.

4.1. Summary
Prominent trends are summarised in the box below and elaborated upon in the sections that follow.

Box 4.1 Key findings: manifestations of complexity

Taking international relations (IR) as a complex adaptive system, PESTLE-M trends can contribute to shifts
in the character of its complexity in several ways. Applying the lens of academic theory, changes in
global politics and competition can be categorised in terms of systems, systemic and interactions
change. Applying different IR theories then suggests differing explanations as to why and how changes
are occurring. None of these theoretical lenses provides a full explanation for how and why change
occurs within the international system, with some approaches matching better the empirical record of
certain times of history or parts of the world than others. Nonetheless, it is possible to observe the
translation of PESTLE-M trends into greater levels or different forms of complexity through several
mechanisms, such as the phenomena of horizontal complexity, turbulence, and self-organisation and the
emergence of order.
These and other cross-cutting impacts from the PESTLE-M trends identified in Chapter 3 contribute to a
range of dilemmas and pressures for C2 systems and organisations to grapple with in the future,
including but not limited to: uncertainty; ambiguity; equivocality; information overload; cognitive bias;
decision paralysis or insufficient tempo in the face of fast-moving events; difficulty assuring decision
making (including by AI) or trusting the data, logic and assumptions underpinning it; and difficulty
marshalling all necessary levers of power or coordinating large groups of diverse actors (e.g. PAGs,
industry, allies) involved in generating and executing a given strategy or operational plan.
Furthermore, both theorists and practitioners lack robust measures of the effectiveness of decisions made
or actions undertaken when dealing with non-linear dynamics and problems. This makes it difficult to
say definitively whether complexity is objectively increasing (as opposed to taking on different forms) in
the future operating environment, but there is clearly a substantial gap between political expectations
for the complex tasks the military should handle, and the ability of current C2 approaches to deliver.

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Source: SASC analysis of Chapter 4 findings.

4.2. Understanding how PESTLE-M trends can drive complexity

4.2.1. Taking international relations as a complex adaptive system, PESTLE-M
trends can contribute to shifts in the character of its complexity in several
ways
It is important to distinguish between general trends and problems in global society – including those that
might drive insecurity and thus be priorities for the future designers of C2 – and those which specifically
contribute to the levels and manifestations of complexity within that complex adaptive system. To this end,
the academic literature does not currently provide a definitive theoretical framework or set of analytical
models for measuring and characterising the complexity of the international system or explaining how
developments across the PESTLE-M dimensions contribute to change in this regard.67 It does, however,
provide a range of alternative theoretical lenses for understanding aspects of how changes in IR can relate
to complexity, derived from a mix of IR theory and historical case studies.
For example, Robert Gilpin (1981, 39–41) outlines a typology of three types of change in the international
system:

 Systems change: a change in the nature of the actors within a system (e.g. states, empires, etc.)

 Systemic change: a change in the governance of the system.

 Interaction change: a change in the interactions between actors and other features.

This can be extrapolated upon to consider the impact of PESTLE-M trends through these three categories
at different levels of analysis, for example considering systems, systemic or interaction change in relation to
the international system itself, or at the level of the sub-systems and units therein (e.g. blocs such as the EU
or NATO, or individual nation-states). It is then possible to begin to understand the changing number and
nature of actors in play, the arrangement of governance, normative and power structures that shape their
relations, and the processes through which they interact (whether to cooperate, compete or fight).
Applying different IR theories can result in differing explanations as to why and how changes are occurring.
For example, Gilpin focuses on objectivism, realism and rational choice theory as explanations for interstate
competition, seeking to understand whether the shifting governance of the international system at a given
time favours the emergence of a stable equilibrium (e.g. a period of hegemony or of mutually tolerated
balance of power between rival states) and hierarchic system, or that of an anarchic system (e.g. the collapse
of hegemony and the outbreak of a period of intense multipolar competition and conflict).68 A Marxist
interpretation, by contrast, would focus on economic and class relations as the primary driver and locus of
change and competition. Meanwhile, a constructivist interpretation would place more emphasis on how
the norms and rules of international politics are socially constructed,69 and how change in the governance

67
Gunitsky (2013); Ragionieri (2016).
68
Gilpin (1981), cf. Jervis (1997).
69
Finnemore & Sikkink (1998); Wendt (1999).

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 Command and Control in the Future

and interaction processes within global society as a complex adaptive system come about through ‘cognitive
evolution’ and shifts in the perceptions and culture of the actors that compose it.70
None of these theoretical lenses provides a full explanation for how and why change occurs within the
international system, with some approaches matching better the empirical record of certain times of history
or parts of the world than others. Nonetheless, it is possible to observe the translation of PESTLE-M trends
into greater levels or different forms of complexity through several mechanisms. Crucially, it is important
to understand how the aforementioned types of change (i.e. Gilpin’s typology) and levels of analysis (i.e.
the international system, sub-systems, units, etc.) can interact to drive complexity. For example, Ragionieri
(2016) suggests that changes in international politics can lead to complexity through three primary means:

 Horizontal complexity

 Turbulence

 Self-organisation.

The contributions of PESTLE-M trends to these and other cross-cutting manifestations of complexity are
outlined in the paragraphs below.

Horizontal complexity
This refers to shifts in complexity at a given level of analysis (e.g. the international system, or a sub-system,
or an individual unit such as a given nation, or each of the levels of warfare from the tactical to the strategic).
For example, this might refer to PESTLE-M trends that affect the nature and number of actors or their
governance and interactions at a given level, and the positive and negative feedback loops that occur due to
the various actors and variables involved71:

 Positive feedback loops: Examples include arms races that lead to uncontrolled escalation, or the
domino effects of insecurity, instability, environmental degradation, economic disruption and
migration that can be mutually reinforcing and magnifying, driving cycles of regional conflict.

 Negative feedback loops: Examples include balancing by strategic rivals (e.g. the United States
and the Soviet Union) to achieve a stable equilibrium in their competitive relations, with little
interest among the key players in changing this status quo or the rules of the existing international
system (e.g. as in the period of globalisation in the aftermath of the Cold War).72

70
Adler (1997).
71
Of note, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ here do not represent normative judgements of ‘good’ or ‘bad’; rather, they are
used in the literature to denote positive feedback loops that enhance and amplify change versus negative feedback
loops that dampen or buffer change, encouraging equilibrium. In other words, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ describe a
relationship between the feedback and the stability or equilibria of the system in question.
72
Mazarr et al. (2021).

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Turbulence
Derived from fluid dynamics, James Rosenau’s (1990) notion of ‘turbulence in world politics’ refers to the
absence of stability in the distinction between levels of analysis (e.g. between the international system and
sub-systems or units therein). This focuses in on how complexity at one level interacts with complexity at
other levels, affecting their structure.
The PESTLE-M trends discussed in Chapter 3 emphasise the myriad interlinkages that exist between these
different levels. When considering competition and conflict among actors within this system of systems,
they emphasise the growing emphasis on competitive strategies that explicitly seek to gain the advantage by
bringing together all DIME levers, embracing ambiguity and non-linearity, and ignoring or subverting the
West’s neat conceptual thresholds or institutional boundaries (such as between the global and the local, war
and peace, or the tactical and the strategic).73 In this way, adversaries explicitly seek to exploit the structures,
stovepipes and seams found in the Western approach to gain an advantage – necessitating a change.
This also challenges the elegant but arguably reductive models derived from rational choice theory, which
are typically based on how actors and their preferences interact within a given structure (i.e. at only one
level of analysis). By contrast, rationality is shown to be bounded, with decisions also shaped by cognitive
bias, emotion, fatigue, imperfect information and other factors. Furthermore, shifting focus to the growing
turbulence within international affairs emphasises the multi-level nature of the games – both finite and
infinite74 – that play out simultaneously, as well as the influence that games occurring at a lower level can
have on structures, relationships and interactions at higher levels.75 Crucially, too, the games occurring as
part of strategic competition are not only multi-level (i.e. vertical or turbulent) but also multipolar (i.e.
horizontal):

 Multi-level: These games involve all DIME levers of power, including broader society, but with
varying levels of C2 (or lack thereof) across these (e.g. Defence can command and control the
military instrument, but can only exert constructive influence over PAGs responsible for
diplomacy, or over industry responsible for technological innovation and economic trends).

 Multipolar: Multi-level games, and their ‘turbulent’ interactions, are challenging enough to manage
in relation to one actor, let alone multiple ones; however, in an increasingly multipolar world
characterised by a large number of actors, that is often the situation facing UK Defence. This is
reflected not only in the rise of state actors such as China but also in the growing influence of non-
state actors (e.g. multinational corporations, private security companies and terrorist groups). The
deepened interlinkages between domestic audiences around the globe through the information
environment further heighten the influence of different actors in an increasingly interconnected
world. Together, these factors pose a heightened coordination problem, particularly given the

73
Kilcullen (2020).
74
Finite games are contests bounded in time and space, and by rules regarding what is permitted, with objective
measures for how actors are performing against each other. Infinite games are contests that are unbounded and
where players have different, subjective perceptions of when the game begins/ends or how it is scored. Cf. Carse
(1986); Frank (2022).
75
Ragionieri (2016).

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 Command and Control in the Future

growing number and variety of actors involved, their asymmetric goals, values, strengths and
vulnerabilities, and the imperfect information available.76

 Multi-objective: The challenges of navigating these different forms of competition are further
complicated by the simultaneous need to pursue multiple objectives at once. Often, this can include
both competition and cooperation simultaneously with the same actors across diverse policy areas
(e.g. to manage escalation or to tackle wicked problems of mutual interest, such as the UK working
with China on climate change at the same time as competing on technology and military strength).
As such, signals and actions undertaken in relation to a given actor may be interpreted in
unpredictable and unintended ways by that same actor or by other third parties (e.g. allies,
adversaries, neutrals, domestic audiences) and/or have cascading second- and third-order effects in
other areas of international relations as a complex adaptive system of systems.77

Even a simplified illustrative depiction of multi-level competition, as in Figure 4.1, underscores the inherent
difficulty of navigating these complex dynamics and the risk of misperceptions.

Figure 4.1 Example of multipolar and multi-level games facing UK Defence

76
Ritchey (2013); Duczynski et al. (2021); Head (2022b).
77
Jervis (1976); White (2016); Ellery & Saunders (2020).

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Source: Black et al. (2023).

The concept of turbulence further supports the idea of the changing interactions between the grand-
strategic, military-strategic, operational and tactical levels. This is driven in part by growing pressure for
tactical and operational decision makers to be cognisant of the strategic-level and PESTLE-M implications
of their choices, for a mix of political, legal, ethical and military reasons. This pressure builds on decades-
old debates about the need for the ‘strategic corporal’78 (as contrasted with the ‘tactical general’ or ‘tactical
minister’).79 It also relates to the more recent trend within Defence of promoting a so-called ‘campaigning
mindset’ that frames even low-level activities such as a training exercise as sending signals to allies and
adversaries alike and thereby consciously contributing to higher-level campaigns to deter, influence and
promote prosperity.80 (This trend seeks not only to work better within levels, e.g. tactical, strategic, etc., but
also across them, though it is unclear if this is feasible or what its consequences will be.)

Self-organisation and the emergence of order

A common concept within wider complexity theory, but less often applied to international politics, self-
organisation refers to the spontaneous emergence of spatiotemporal order and of ‘phenomena… that cannot
be brought back to the characteristics of their elements’.81 By definition, it is not something that can be
easily predicted; it emerges from the collective behaviour of multiple components but exceeds the aggregate
behaviour of the elements themselves and cannot be reduced to an examination of them.82 PESTLE-M
trends identified in Chapter 3 nonetheless allude to an expectation of emergence in various forms: for
example, in relation to economic developments brought about by environmental change, technological
innovation, and exploitation of new domains (e.g. space); or in the normative shifts that occur unpredictably
as a result of the growing volume and diversity of interactions between billions of humans (and a growing
number of machines) via the information environment; or new self-organising artificial forms of life.83 This
‘paradigm shift’ or ‘phase transition’ is not necessarily negative, of course.84 For instance, the literature raises
the potential for beneficial solutions to emerge in terms of climate adaption, resource management or
cooperative strategies.85 However, given the various threats, risks and hazards discussed, there is also
potential for the emergence of new equilibria – such as in geopolitics – that may be hostile to or even
catastrophic for the UK’s values and interests as they exist today, and difficult to dislodge.

Other cross-cutting impacts

There is a growing awareness of challenges facing C2 systems and organisations (and individual decision
makers) in terms of the dilemmas and pressures arising from factors such as:

78
Krulak (1999).
79
Singer (2009).
80
UK MOD (2020a).
81
Luhmann cit. in Ragionieri (2016).
82
Kalantari et al. (2020).
83
Gershenson et al. (2020).
84
Kuhn (1962); Lingel et al. (2021).
85
Bousquet & Page (2004); Adami et al. (2016).

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 Command and Control in the Future

 Deep uncertainty.86

 Ambiguity and equivocality.

 Shortfalls in cognitive capacity, alongside increased data saturation and information overload.87

 Cognitive bias and flawed heuristics.

 Decision paralysis and failure to keep up with the tempo of events.88

 Failure to keep up with, understand or exert influence over competitors’ own decision cycles89 (e.g.
authoritarian regimes operating outside of slow coalition politics, or using AI systems to automate
certain decisions the West cannot countenance for policy, legal or ethical reasons).

 A lack of explainability, traceability or suitable validation and verification (V&V) methods to assure
decision making (e.g. when involving non-deterministic, black box AI).90

 A lack of trust in underlying data and evidence, whether due to concerns over the security and
integrity of data and networks, or due to wider epistemic issues (e.g. contested notions of truth).

 Difficulty marshalling all necessary levers and coordinating across diverse and large groupings.

 Difficulty understanding and attributing cause and effect (given feedback loops, etc.) and thus
prioritising efforts or measuring their effectiveness.

 A crisis of confidence in rationalism, the legitimacy of public institutions and the quality of their
strategies, plans or attempts to execute these when faced with complicated problems, let alone
complex ones (including wicked or super wicked problems, such as climate change or
warfighting).91
The identified PESTLE-M trends exacerbate these issues, and have an impact on all the defining features
of a complex adaptive system outlined in Table 2.1, namely:

 Numbers: As reflected in the increasing number of agents (human and machine) and variables to
consider in decision making; the continuing evolution of networks with both more nodes and more
numerous and more diverse linkages; and the increase in threat vectors and associated attack
surfaces and vulnerabilities. By contrast, there are enduring constraints on the size and resources of

86
Black, Paille et al. (2021).
87
Johnson (2018); Whitler (2018).
88
Conflict today is arguably ‘faster and more complex than any point in history.’ Cf. Garamone (2017).
89
The US DoD endeavours to improve its decision cycle to operate at ‘the speed of relevance’, while ensuring
leadership can make ‘high-quality decisions in an increasingly complex strategic landscape’. Cf. Dransfield (2020).
90
The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy in the decision-making cycle aims to reduce
complexity based on the increased tempo of operations but runs the risk of human cognition being unable to keep
up with machine-aided decision making. New technologies such as AI and machine learning (ML) are increasingly
used to process and prioritise data, as well as to sense-make on behalf of human decision makers. Algorithmic biases
or ‘black box’ technologies could potentially drive complexity in the decision-making space. Rising complexity and a
greater speed of war may make decision making in armed conflicts too fast for humans to handle.
91
Head (2022a).

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Defence (entailing a relative decline compared to the scale of the tasks expected of it), and a decline
in the relative clout of the West vs the East (in terms of population size, GDP and soft power, etc.),
and of the public vs private sector (in terms of driving innovation or exerting influence).

 Non-linearities: PESTLE-M trends contribute to feedback loops and non-linear dynamics. Some
of the identified trends have a known potential to lead to cascading and exponential crises (e.g.
from catastrophic climate collapse, or from a pandemic, nuclear war or unaligned AGI). These can
be worsened by poorly understood second- and third-order effects; similarly, other potential crisis
triggers may be unknown and unpredictable.
 Adaptive elements: PESTLE-M trends influence the international system as a complex adaptive
system of systems (as well as the systems therein, e.g. the economy or war), while also adding to the
pressures on defence C2 systems and organisations to adopt new structures, processes and cultures
configured around adaptation and learning and, at the same time, making it difficult to do so.
These barriers to change run across DLODs and include factors such as political expectations,
funding constraints, difficulty accessing the different, more diverse and sophisticated talent and
skills required or harnessing technology in a timely manner. These and other issues are explored
further in Chapters 5 and 6.
 Emergent phenomena: As already discussed in relation to self-organisation.

4.2.2. Ultimately, given the difficulty of measuring complexity, it is unclear if it is

objectively increasing, but the growing burdens on C2 are evident
Ideally, this paper would now draw together the analysis from the preceding sections and provide a firm
conclusion as to whether complexity is indeed increasing within the international system, as so many
strategy and policy documents and other sources suggest. Certainly, there are a variety of PESTLE-M trends
which, collectively and individually, are contributing to new manifestations of complexity, as shown above.
Any definitive assessment of trend lines, however, would be illusory, given the inherent difficulties in
quantifying complexity, which lacks objective measures.92 There is, as such, a live debate about whether the
complexity of society, warfare and other phenomena is truly increasing, or whether this widespread
perception is instead driven by some combination of:

 The human and institutional bias towards viewing the current period and problem set as uniquely
challenging.

 An academic or bureaucratic ‘fad’ of applying the novel lens of complexity and systems theory to
new issues outside of the natural sciences, such as international affairs, and labelling policy
challenges as wicked problems as a means of funding, citations or other goals.93

 A misinterpretation of the difficulties facing C2 systems and organisation, incorrectly framing them
as being caused by an increase in objective levels of complexity, as opposed to just a growing
subjective awareness of complexity (backed by recent decades’ advances in both theory and data,

92
Kavalski (2007); Bousquet & Curtis (2011); Gunitsky (2013); Lineweaver et al. (2013).
93
Peters (2017); De Melo et al. (2019).

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 Command and Control in the Future

improving understanding of the limitations of reductionism). Alternatively it could reflect a

growing gap between the demands that are placed on C2 (e.g. due to unrealistic expectations from
‘stakeholder society’ about what the military can do, or the possibilities arising from new
technologies94) and what current hierarchical, linear approaches can deliver.95 In this sense,
complexity may or may not be growing relative to an objective measure of the operating
environment; we may simply be increasingly aware of the gap between our ambitions and our
capabilities, and of risks, uncertainties and vulnerabilities that have existed but gone
underappreciated in recent decades.96

There is also a broader question about whether it is even necessary or useful to compare the levels of
complexity in the FOE with the current or past periods. The most pressing issue for C2 is not whether
complexity is increasing, per se, but rather that current approaches are simply not configured to deal with
complex problems or to understand, navigate and influence complex adaptive systems. To this end, the next
two chapters outline possible methods for grappling with or exploiting complexity (Chapter 5) and other
associated design considerations for C2 in the future (Chapter 6).

94
Hallo et al. (2020).
95
This recalls the original and influential thesis of Rittel & Weber (1973) that most of the easy policy problems (i.e.
those that were merely simple or complicated) had already been solved by the second half of the twentieth century,
meaning that future challenges would, by default, tend to be more complex and challenging, perhaps even
intractable.

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5. Methods for tackling complexity

This chapter outlines some of the methods available in the academic literature for understanding, navigating
and tackling complexity. Our findings emphasise the inherent limitations of any single approach, and thus
the need to develop and apply a toolkit of different methods for grappling with situations of varying levels
and forms of complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity and pace of change. This builds on the ideas of
‘deliberation with analysis’ – i.e. of a deeper and more productive dialogue between the analyst community
and the decision maker(s), making use of the latest data sources, technologies, and analysis and modelling
techniques – and of approaching complex systems and non-linear problems through a mix of collaboration,
iteration, learning and adaptation. Such an approach would likely involve breaking down current stovepipes
(e.g. between Intelligence, Planning and Operations) to enable collaboration across and between functions.
As such, this chapter focuses on the higher-order conceptual and methodological considerations, leaving
the practical implications of complexity for the design of C2 systems and organisations in the future (e.g.
how to ensure survivability of headquarters or access to the necessary people and technology) to Chapter 6.

5.1. Summary
Box 5.1 Key findings: methods for tackling complexity

C2 systems and organisations face significant pressure to perform better in conditions of complexity,
ambiguity, uncertainty and rapid change. Past RAND research has explored the potential for
consciously imposing complexity on opponents’ own C2 systems and approaches to gain a relative
advantage even if the UK itself cannot tackle complexity as well as desired.
Current academic theory provides a tentative outline of a methodological toolkit and some guiding
principles for deciding how to configure C2 amidst complexity – but no silver bullet. It emphasises
deliberative-analytic approaches, meaning methods that engage varied stakeholders in co-design; draw
on insights from multiple disciplines and bodies of knowledge; and build into analytic and decision-
making processes the flexibility to iterate and improve them over time based on feedback.
Examples of prominent methods in the complexity science(s) literature include cybernetics, systems
engineering, soft systems methodology, interpretative structural modelling, design thinking and critical
approaches. Of course, it is important to select the right tool from this toolkit to tackle a given situation,
threat or problem, aided by frameworks such as Cynefin. A recurring theme across most approaches,
however, is the need for continuous iteration, learning and adaptation, emphasising that future
approaches to C2 must evolve over time and vary depending on the context and threat environment
faced.
Source: SASC analysis of Chapter 5 findings.

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5.2. Towards a toolkit for competing effectively in the face of

complexity
5.2.1. Applying complexity and systems theory to the future, both friendly and
hostile C2 systems and organisations face significant pressure to
continuously improve and enhance their performance
Given the manifestations of complexity described in Chapter 4, any concept for the future of C2 must
grapple with the simultaneous pressures on Defence C2 systems and organisations to better:

 Understand, influence and shape diverse audiences and events across multiple levels of the
international system by bringing purpose and direction to focus and converge effects, using all
levers of power that will best promote UK advantage. This includes not only those levers under the
direct control of Defence (i.e. the military) but also working with PAGs, allies, partners, industry,
academia and wider society, all of which pose their own unique demands from a C2 perspective. It
also necessitates understanding which levers or effects will be most relevant to addressing a given
problem or achieving advantage in the first place, given the shifting rules and dynamics of global
competition (which may favour certain instruments over others).

 Mitigate this complex web of interactions and orchestrate the execution of a strategy or plan,
while building in mechanisms to measure the effectiveness of different approaches for managing
complexity and enable adaptation and learning.

 Minimise the risk of negative unintended consequences through hedging and mitigating actions,
at least to the limited extent possible given the finite resources and levers available to UK Defence
and the opacity and incomprehensibility of the systems involved.

 Guide and prioritise these efforts by making the best possible sense of the constantly shifting
character of international relations as a complex adaptive system (or system of systems), given
the challenges of uncertainty and ambiguity and the impact of PESTLE-M trends in terms of
horizontal complexity, turbulence, and self-organisation and emergence.

This would be a difficult task even in a benign threat environment and with ample resources (human,
technical, etc.). Looking out to the 2030s and beyond, however, Defence faces a considerably more
challenging threat landscape, and a less than favourable one from a funding or workforce perspective.
Ultimately, too, the focus should not simply be on how best to configure UK C2 systems and organisations
to deal with complexity, but also how to do so in the context of persistent global competition, and occasional
overt conflict, with hostile state and non-state actors (the nested set of finite and infinite games discussed
in previous chapters). As such, success and failure are not judged against an objective yardstick, but rather
in relation to how the UK’s C2 does or does not enable it to overcome its adversaries, including by

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outperforming those opponents’ own C2 systems, and thus achieve the UK’s objectives – or at least
minimise the impact of failure.97
Given the constraints faced and the competitive dynamics at play, the following sections consider possible
methods and tools that future approaches to C2 could use to understand, exploit or navigate complexity.

5.3. Methods for imposing complexity on others’ C2

5.3.1. Past RAND research has explored the potential for consciously imposing
complexity on opponents’ own C2 to gain a relative advantage
Given the incomplete theoretical understanding of complex adaptive systems, or even an agreed common
definition of complexity (see Chapter 2), it is not surprising that there is no academic consensus on whether
the best competitive strategy is to focus on minimising the negative effects of complexity on friendly C2
systems and organisations (i.e. to improve performance in absolute terms), or instead to maximise the
impact on hostile C2 (i.e. to improve performance in relative terms).
In practice, it is likely that any approach to future ‘systems confrontation’ or ‘informationalised warfare’,
such as is envisaged by the United States, China, Russia and others, will combine elements of both strategies.
Lingel et al. (2021, 2) describe the purpose of more offensive actions:

To impose or exploit complexity is to take an action that increases an aspect of

the complexity of the environment in a way that makes it more difficult for an
adversary to make decisions or to operate, essentially shaping conditions to favour
[a friendly actor]. Thus, to conduct a complexity attack is to take an action that
exploits characteristics of CAS to have a deliberate negative effect on the adversary.

Possible avenues for imposing added complexity on an adversary’s own C2 are summarised in Figure 5.1.

97
This relates not only to game and prospect theory, but also to aforementioned Chinese and Russian thinking
around ‘systems confrontation’ and ‘systems warfare’, which conceptualises future warfare as a struggle between
competing system of systems for information and cognitive advantage. Cf. Engstrom (2018); Black, Lynch et al.
(2022).

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 Command and Control in the Future

Figure 5.1 Complex adaptive systems mapping to competition or (war)fighting

Source: Lingel et al. (2021, 6).

As shown in the graphic, there are multiple ways in which the UK might seek to confuse, paralyse, outpace
or otherwise shape its opponents’ C2 and decision making in favourable directions (e.g. to impose multiple
dilemmas).98 Practical enablers and capabilities (i.e. means) required to do so are elaborated upon in Chapter
6. Collectively, though, these different avenues focus on gaining the advantage by exploiting the concept of
bounded rationality first described by Herbert Simon (1972). This refers to the fact that human and
institutional decision makers are goal-oriented, as in game theory, but also limited by imperfect cognitive
capacity and information, as well as being shaped by their values, imagination and prior experience.99
By this understanding, the UK can seek to exert influence on and through the information environment
over its opponents’ capacity for effective sense and decision making, and, consequently, for action.100
Potential approaches to exert such influence include:
 Degrading the operational picture: Degrading the adversary’s understanding of the operating
environment (a complex adaptive system) and events, let alone causality, therefore impacting their
ability to make informed decisions; degrading cognitive capacity; exacerbating distrust of imperfect
information or of communications from superiors/peers/subordinates; and maximising opponents’
awareness of known unknowns or deepening their uncertainty about unknown unknowns; leading

98
Behzadan & Munir (2017).
99
Simon (1990); Jones (1999); Triezenberg (2017).
100
Lingel et al. (2021, 10–14).

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to bad decisions due to a lack of understanding of choices and thus how to prioritise finite resources
most effectively.101
 Impair response: Proactively hindering the capacity of opponents’ C2 (a complex adaptive system
in its own right) to identify relevant signals and feedback and thus to learn and adapt over time.
 Span boundaries: Maximising turbulence and disruption by targeting key steps, nodes or linkages
in hostile C2 systems and processes – especially if their networks are highly hierarchical in nature,
as is the case for most militaries (especially authoritarian ones) – and forcing opponents into actions
that depend on effective boundary-spanning and coordination of diffuse nodes, such as those under
a different command or those cut off from central C2 by disrupted communications.102
 Leverage non-linearities: Overloading C2 structures and processes – for example, by confronting a
given node within the network with pressures and dilemmas that exceed their cognitive and
information processing capacities – and overwhelming the adversary by exploiting non-linear
dynamics and encouraging feedback loops that lead to cascading impacts favourable to the UK.
At the same time, of course, the UK’s opponents are likely to be seeking to exert similar influences on UK
C2 – whether consciously or implicitly. To this end, the UK requires not only defensive countermeasures
to combat this (whether through deterrence or active or passive defences against hostile attempts to influence
UK C2), but also methods and tools for better navigating complexity itself. Of note, different modes of C2
will likely be required to handle different forms of complexity. These are discussed in the next section.

5.4. Methods for navigating complexity in the UK’s approaches to C2

5.4.1. Current academic theory provides the tentative outline of a methodological
toolkit for grappling with C2 in the face of complexity, but no silver bullet
As has been discussed above, there is no unifying theoretical framework for the complexity science(s), nor
any silver bullet solution for conceptualising, analysing and shaping complex adaptive systems. Nonetheless,
some qualitative and quantitative analytic approaches are candidates for inclusion in a toolkit of methods
for grappling with complexity in decision making.
Importantly, proponents of complexity and systems thinking emphasise the need for humility, iteration,
learning and pragmatism about the art of the possible, when applying such methods, given the limitations
of both theory and data.103 This reflects wariness about falling into the very same over-confidence and
mistakes of the positivist, reductionist scientific approaches that complexity science(s) aims to reject and
supplant. Many thinkers in this space advocate for more deliberative and adaptive approaches, meaning

101
Note that the UK may not always want its opponents to make bad decisions, as these may lead to a situation that
is unfavourable to all parties. As such, the UK needs some assurance that deep uncertainty will not lead opponents to
stumble into actions that are a worse net outcome for the UK even if also damaging to the UK’s adversaries. Cf.
Lingel et al. (2021, 11).
102
Any attempt to disrupt less hierarchical, more diffuse network structures, such as terrorist groups, will require a
different approach to targeting compared to a traditional military adversary. Social network analysis (SNA) may
assist.
103
Head (2020); Peterson St-Laurent et al. (2020).

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methods that engage a range of stakeholders in co-design, draw on insights from multiple disciplines and
bodies of knowledge, and build into analytic and decision-making processes the flexibility to iterate and
improve them over time based on feedback.
One prominent example of this sort of meta-approach in the literature is ‘deliberation with analysis’ or
citizen science, as advocated by the US National Research Council (2008). This is closely associated with
analysing complex problems and non-linear dynamics, including those where decisions are clouded by deep
uncertainty. It seeks to move away from linear, positivist approaches to analysis and top-down decision
making, conscious that commonly used tools and modelling techniques can provide decision makers with
false levels of confidence in the quality of evidence underpinning their choices, leading them astray when
tackling complex problems.104 This necessarily implies a move away from more traditional C2 approaches.
Though deliberation with analysis originated in a drive to involve the general public and other stakeholders
in analysis and decision making around climate and environmental management, it has since been adapted
and applied to a variety of settings, including defence strategy, planning and capability-related decisions.105
It has also informed, and been informed by, movements such as deliberative policy analysis (DPA), which
promotes forms of strategy and policy analysis that are more inclusive and participative, and less
technocratic, as a response to dealing with complexity and the realities of a modern networked world.106
Clearly, a lengthy process of deliberation is not appropriate in all situations or types of decisions facing C2
systems and organisations. Such an extended process may be feasible, and advisable, when formulating cross-
governmental or defence strategy. But faster decisions are sometimes required when planning or executing
a military operation, especially in a warfighting scenario. Nonetheless, many of the core guiding principles
of deliberative-analytic and robust approaches remain relevant and scalable107:

 Being humble from the outset about the limitations on theory, data, tools and cognitive capacity,
and designing deliberative-analytic processes with this in mind.

 Avoiding short-termism in favour of prioritising consideration of longer-term outcomes and

potential second- and third-order effects, aiming not to optimise strategies or plans for a specific
scenario, or even a small set of scenarios (e.g. worst-case, best-case) but rather to identify what steps
would minimise regret across the widest range of plausible scenarios that could unfold, conscious
of the ever-present challenges posed by unknown unknowns and non-linear dynamics. 108

 Engaging as wide as possible a range of perspectives (e.g. across stakeholders, disciplines, etc.) to
understand the problem from different angles, seek feedback and stress-test emerging thinking.

 Using exploratory models as a ‘digital campfire’ to bring analysts and decision makers together to
encourage increased dialogue and mutual understanding between these communities, which

104
Lempert et al. (2013).
105
Davis (2014); Popper (2022).
106
Li & Wagenaar (2019).
107
Lempert et al. (2013); Lempert (2019); Marchau et al. (2019); Black, Paille et al. (2021).
108
For more information about approaches to minimise regret and the inclusion of regret minimisation in decision-
making frameworks, see Yager (2004); Bell (1982).

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typically have different professional backgrounds and approach problems with differing forms of
reasoning (with analyst culture, for example, typically favouring deductive logic and numerate-
based analysis, compared to decision makers often favouring inductive logic).

 Using technology to supplement rather than supplant debate, with a human-in-the-loop approach
to development and exploitation of advanced computational methods, including AI and ML.

 Focusing on avoiding surprise by interrogating assumptions and biases, rather than by seeking to
make predictions about the future or to try to reduce complexity down to simplistic analyses.

 Proactively building in mechanisms for identifying signals as to whether a given analytic approach,
decision or plan is working, and for learning and adapting accordingly.

 Iterating as needed.

Such an overall philosophy aims to produce strategies, policies, plans or decisions that adhere to the so-
called ‘FARness principle’, meaning they are flexible, adaptive and robust.109 These properties are recurring
themes that will run throughout the various specific methods outlined below.

5.4.2. Guided by these overarching principles, it is important for C2 systems and

organisations in the future to select the right tools for different problems
Selecting the appropriate method(s) or tool(s) for C2 systems and organisations in the future to use to
navigate a complex problem depends on a range of factors.110 Above all, it is important to understand the
nature of the problem and the types of decisions to be made. Crucially, given complex systems (including
CAS) are dynamic, not static, components within the system can move between these different domains
over time. A problem or system may be complex overall but have simple or complicated elements. Here,
recalling Chapter 2, it is still essential to ascertain if a problem or a facet thereof is truly complex or if it
could be tackled through positivist methods and traditional, linear and hierarchical approaches to C2. David
Snowdon’s Cynefin (Welsh for habitat) framework offers a well-known tool for making such a
determination. As depicted in Figure 5.2, this framework helps the user characterise their environment or
problem and thereby determine the appropriate approach for a given situation111:

109
Davis (2014).
110
For example: the nature of the problem faced, and the goals being pursued; the nature of the decision(s) to be
made (e.g. a strategy, policy, plan, or tactical order); the information available and the level of confidence in it; the
required level of confidence in the decision(s) to be made, given known risks (e.g. for political reasons or due to risk
to life or some other possible negative impact from any mistake); the timelines available to make a decision, and the
consequences of delay or indecision; the resources available by way of decision support (e.g. technology, data,
specialist skills, funds); the levers available to execute that decision and time-space considerations for converging
effects; the rigor and feasibility of possible measures of effect; the role of other parties in influencing, disrupting, or
enabling that decision, the information available, or the execution phase (e.g. adversaries, allies, partners, PAG,
industry, academia); the relevance and familiarity of a given method or tool (e.g. qualitative or quantitative models);
the strengths and limitations of a method or tool from both a theoretical and empirical perspective and given
practical considerations in terms of the required inputs (data, time, money, etc.); and lessons learned from prior
application of such methods.
111
Snowden & Boone (2007).

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 For simple situations: Sense-categorise-respond.

 For complicated situations: Sense-analyse-respond.

 For complex situations: Probe-sense-respond.

 For chaotic situations: Act-sense-respond.

 For confused/aporetic situations: Exit into any other domain as possible.

Just as complex systems may move between these domains, an unprecedented situation is similarly likely to
be chaotic at first, given the lack of any obvious guide from prior experience; however, individuals and
organisations will learn with time and the structure and dynamics of the system may become more defined,
with emergence of order. The Cynefin framework is thus a sense-making tool for understanding how to
react to a given issue at a given time, while acknowledging that applying the same lens in a month or year
may produce a different answer.112

Figure 5.2 Cynefin framework

Source: IT Revolution (2021).

This framework also helps make sense of how to establish sufficiency, i.e. determining when a decision
maker knows enough to decide or act. For ordered systems, this is straightforward, measured by whether
the decision maker has collected enough data and expertise to apply best practice (in the case of clear
problems) or good practice (in the case of complicated ones). Sufficiency cannot be pre-determined so easily
when grappling with complex systems, however, as it is an emergent property. Equally, delaying a decision
forever, or failing to decide at all, may produce negative outcomes or, at the very least, be anathema to
military culture and to the expectations placed upon defence decision makers by political leadership. As
such, sufficiency emerges from probing, trying to detect feedback loops and patterns, and taking steps to
influence the more favourable ones in an ongoing, iterative process. This encourages a more experimental

112
IT Revolution (2021).

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approach, founded in learning and adaptation, as opposed to pursuing a level of confidence in initial
decisions about complex problems that is not feasible within current theory or cognitive capacities.113

5.4.3. Relevant methods include cybernetics, soft systems methodology,

interpretative structural modelling, systems engineering and critical or design
approaches
Assuming that a problem or situation is indeed complex, various analytic tools and methods can then be
applied based on the context. Prominent examples in the literature include, but are not limited to:

 Cybernetics

 Systems Engineering

 Soft Systems Methodology

 Critical Systems Thinking and Practice

 Interpretative Structural Modelling

 Multi-Criteria Decision Methods

 Design Thinking.

These examples are summarised in Annex B. While each has its own strengths and limitations, recurring
themes include application of multiple perspective or disciplinary lenses; iterative engagement with and
exploration of the environment or problem; identification of system elements and characterisation of the
relationships among them; monitoring feedback to refine any prototypical mental or computer-based
model, and any associated strategy or plan of action; and a focus on encouraging creativity and critical,
lateral or divergent thinking.114
Importantly, proponents of such methods emphasise the need to apply their underlying principles not only
to a given strategy or plan, but also to the meta-strategy, i.e. the architecture, system or process through
which those strategies and plans are developed, and the metrics framework by which the success or failure
of implementation is then monitored. This calls for a continuous effort to co-adapt the UK’s C2 systems
in light of the prototyping and evolving design of the UK’s plans and changing understanding of the external
environment (including opponents’ own C2).
This self-reflexive meta-approach – iteratively engaging with complexity by applying the analytic principles
both externally in the operating environment and internally to the C2 organisation in question, and then
learning and adapting the approach over time in response to feedback – also bears some similarities to
uncertainty-sensitive planning techniques outlined in the next section.

113
IT Revolution (2021).
114
Furtado (2019).

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5.4.4. There is a related toolkit of well-documented deliberative-analytic methods

for grappling with decision making under deep uncertainty
Besides the various methods focused on complexity, there is also a lively international research community
working on methods for grappling with uncertainty. This coalesces around the Decision Making Under
Deep Uncertainty (DMDU) Society, which provides education and arranges academic conferences, and has
clusters of activity primarily within universities (including the graduate school at RAND).115
DMDU methods refer to a mix of qualitative and quantitative techniques for making robust decisions in
the face of deep uncertainty. This goes beyond consideration of risk (i.e. where the probability and impact
of different choices or events is known and where outcomes can be predicted using models) and known
unknowns. Instead, contexts of deep uncertainty, as are often found when dealing with complex adaptive
systems, are characterised by the absence of knowledge or agreement on:116

(1) the appropriate models to describe the interactions among a system’s variables,
(2) the probability distributions to represent uncertainty about key variables and
parameters in the models, and/or (3) how to value the desirability of alternative
outcomes.

In response, DMDU methods prioritise developing strategies, policies or plans that are flexible, adaptive
and robust, as a way of minimising the surprise or regret that might be experienced once they are applied
in the real world in a highly uncertain future (i.e. FARness).117 Though many of the methods make use of
exploratory modelling and the latest advances in computational methods, they are intended to be scalable
and useful even in contexts where data, time or resources are scarce, on the guiding principle that ‘any job
worth doing is worth doing superficially’, as the basis for further deliberation, analysis and refinement.118
Prominent methods in the DMDU toolkit include119:

 Robust Decision Making (RDM)

 Three Horizon Foresight (3HF)

 Assumption-Based Planning (ABP)

 Dynamic Adaptive Planning (DAP)

 Strategic Portfolio Analysis (SPA)

 Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways (DAPP)

Though each of these techniques differs in its specifics, they share a common focus on stress-testing
assumptions, considering feedback loops, and examining the possible robustness of strategies, plans, etc.,
across a wide range of plausible futures (e.g. potentially many thousands of scenarios, if using an exploratory

115
Lempert et al. (2013).
116
Lempert et al. (2003).
117
Davis (2014).
118
Popper (2019a).
119
Black, Paille et al. (2021).

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[computer-based] model in support of deliberation with analysis), rather than optimising for a predicted
future set of conditions and thus inviting surprise and regret if that predicted future does not come to pass.

Figure 5.3 Contrast between analytical strategies of optimisation (top) and RDM (below)

Source: Popper (2021, 300). COA: Course of Action.

A summary of each method is provided in Annex D. More detailed discussion of the inputs, steps, strengths
and weaknesses of each can be found in a 2021 study commissioned study by Dstl.120 As with the
complexity-centred methods outlined in the previous section, different methods can be used individually
or combined to help offset the inherent and recognised limitations of any one approach when grappling
with complexity and uncertainty. An example combining RDM, 3HF and ABP is shown below.

Figure 5.4 Defence strategic deliberation combining RDM and other DMDU methods (3HF, ABP)

Source: Popper (2021, 300). Note: 3HF = Three Horizon Foresight. ABP = Assumption-Based Planning.

Of course, for C2 systems and organisations in the future, the application of methods for tackling
complexity and understanding does not occur in a vacuum. A military operation is not conducted under
perfect laboratory conditions for the application and testing of academic theory. Turning the principles
behind these modelling, analysis and strategy or operational design techniques into practice requires
compromise, between methodological purism and pragmatism – another of the important lessons from the

120
Black, Paille et al. (2021).

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history of using these techniques in the context of defence C2.121 Ensuring these methods deliver value also
means grappling with a hostile threat environment – including proactive attempts by hostile state and non-
state actors to impose complexity, confusion and paralysis on the UK’s C2 – as well as the internal barriers
to change that hinder any large and complex organisation such as the military. An iterative and adaptive
approach is thus required to establish what is most appropriate, recalling the probe-sense-respond model of
Cynefin or the notion of sufficiency.122
To this end, the next chapter explores some of the major practical considerations for designing C2.

121
For example, application of the Systemic Operational Design (SOD) methodology, derived from design thinking,
within the Israeli Defence Forces led to a debate between purists and pragmatists as to where the optimal balance lay
between making the technique as rigorous as possible and making concessions to more traditional planning practices
and terminology to build support for SOD among a wider body of IDF officers and other ranks. The US Army’s
equivalent, the Army Design Methodology (ADM), similarly had some of its language watered down over multiple
iterations to make it less esoteric and easier for practitioners to engage with, at the expense of methodological purity.
Cf. Annex C and Jackson (2019).
122
[Link] (2021).

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6. Practical considerations for C2 in the future

Building on Chapter 5’s discussion of the extant methodological toolkit for grappling with complexity, this
chapter examines some of the other practical future design considerations for C2 systems and organisations
arising out of PESTLE-M trends in the future operating environment. These reinforce the need to
understand C2 as a ‘socio-technical system’ and a complex adaptive one at that, with changes needed across
DLODs to shape this system for the future and cultivate the sorts of properties and capabilities favourable
to success.

6.1. Summary
The chapter is summarised in the box below and elaborated upon in the sections that follow.

Box 6.1 Key findings: practical considerations for C2 in the future

Grappling with complex adaptive systems requires a move away from current linear C2 processes and
hierarchical structures, though more traditional approaches may retain utility when tackling non-complex
tasks and problems. In a competitive world, the UK needs to cultivate both those properties and
capabilities that enable it to exert constructive influence on others (e.g. by imposing complexity on
opponents’ C2) and those which bolster its own capacity to navigate complexity.
Influencing the perceptions, decision making and behaviours of hostile actors begins with a deep
understanding of their C2 structures, processes and culture. Informed by this understanding, UK Defence
then requires a suite of kinetic and non-kinetic levers to exert constructive influence on adversaries’ C2,
including to impose complexity. Besides hostile actors, Defence also requires an improved
understanding of how to exert constructive influence over PAGs, allies, partners, industry, academia,
citizens and others with radically differing approaches to C2.
In terms of bolstering the UK’s own capacity to deal with complexity, C2 systems and organisations will
need to promote properties such as flexibility, resilience and a capacity for learning and adaptation.
Changes are needed across the decision cycle. For example, advances in sensor and communication
technologies provide opportunities to capture increased depth and breadth of data, including on
complex problems. Improved cognitive capacity is then essential to make sense of all this data,
harnessing the benefits of human and machine while mitigating drawbacks of each. Changing
approaches to decision making will also require changes in styles of leadership, so as to cultivate
decision makers more comfortable with navigating complex adaptive systems. Having made a decision
or plan, improving the ability to cut across stovepipes or levels and better integrate activities or
converge effects in the implementation phase is essential to offset the UK’s limitations (e.g. in terms of
mass).

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Equally, integration is not a silver bullet; even the most efficient C2 cannot achieve success if Defence
lacks sufficient depth of forces and capability to act credibly or to sustain high-tempo operations in a
hostile threat landscape. Defensive measures and reversionary and failure modes are also needed to
deter or mitigate the impact of hostile efforts to disrupt C2 systems and organisations. Given the threats
faced, and the differing forms of complex problems that UK Defence might be called to address, it is
likely that there will be multiple parallel models of C2 in play at once, rather than a monolithic
approach.
Tackling complexity means continuous learning, adaptation, innovation and openness to change.
Measures of effect, signals and mechanisms for change must thus be built into plans and into C2
systems and organisations from the outset to enable them to learn and adapt over time in response to
conditions.
Crucially, the design of C2 systems and organisations in the future is only one part of the challenge –
they must also be supported by urgent reforms to the wider Defence enterprise to ensure access to the
enablers needed (people, technology, etc.). As outlined in Chapter 7, this presents its own challenges
from a C2 perspective, given changing this enterprise – a complex adaptive system – is itself a wicked
problem.

Source: SASC analysis of Chapter 6 findings.

6.2. Demands on C2 systems and organisations in the future

6.2.1. Complex adaptive systems require a move away from current thinking,
though traditional approaches may retain utility when tackling non-complex
tasks
As discussed in Chapter 4, complexity poses a series of interrelated challenges to Defence C2 systems and
organisations, which are not currently configured to deal with complexity or complex adaptive systems, or
for the future threat environment. While there is a range of conceptual frameworks for thinking about and
grappling with decision making in the fact of complexity, as outlined in Chapter 5, turning this theory into
practical reality requires changes across DLODs. The following sections outline how these might be
manifest in a future operating environment defined by complexity, uncertainty and continuous global
competition. They begin by considering the offensive dimension discussed in Section 5.3 (i.e. how to
influence opponents’ C2), before turning inwards (to UK C2).

6.3. Properties and capabilities for exerting influence on others’ C2

6.3.1. Influencing the perceptions, decision making and behaviours of hostile
actors begins with a deep understanding of their C2 structures, processes
and culture
To achieve cognitive and decision advantage over an adversary in this manner necessitates not only
improving the UK’s C2, but also maximising its ability to shape, slow, disrupt or paralyse opponents. As

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discussed in Chapter 5, the UK can seek to impose complexity on other actors’ C2 through several routes.123
Exerting such an influence starts with understanding. The literature emphasises the need to understand the
factors that influence the target actor’s bounded rationality, not only in terms of C2 structures and processes,
but also the values, norms, culture, behaviours and assumptions that inform their decision-making
calculus.124 Here, it is possible to draw on the extensive literature around strategic culture. This emphasises
the need to understand the key stakeholders and processes that shape decision making in a given national
or organisational context, their complex web of interrelationships, and the political, ethical, legal and
cultural lenses through which information is processed, assumptions are drawn and choices are made.125
Various methods and tools can be used to achieve such an understanding, involving both intelligence and
open-source information, such as the Cultural Topography Analytical Framework (CTAF).126
An actor’s strategic culture and, relatedly but at a lower level, its approach to operational art do not exist in
a vacuum. They are also influenced by external developments, not least in terms of the perceived threat.
There is an extensive body of theory and empirical research into the role of perception and signalling in
shaping the assumptions that the UK and its opponents make about each other (e.g. as part of deterrence
theory).127 Crucially, this literature emphasises the decisive role of imperfect information in decision
making, and the importance of ever-changing asymmetries in the levels of knowledge and certainty available
to each party about their respective intentions, capabilities and levels of mutual understanding. This
introduces various opportunities to exert constructive influence to shape others’ thinking, and potential
pitfalls in terms of misguided interventions that lead to unintended escalation.128
This extends to understanding specifically how the adversary understands contemporary competition or
conflict dynamics, and the role of complexity and systems theory in their conceptual or planning
approach.129 By understanding in detail how its opponents understand and seek to shape complex adaptive
systems, if they do at all, the UK can thereby target interventions to confound those hostile actors’ efforts
(e.g. by reducing the function of any monitoring systems they have established to monitor signals of
changing conditions, or by targeting key nodes or linkages that affect their capacity for adaptation on the
basis of those signals) as well as to reduce the likelihood of sending the wrong signals and thus causing
accidental escalation or some other negative outcome. This forms the basis for an informed and robust
approach to ‘systems confrontation’ or ‘systems warfare’ tailored to the target audience in question.130
Importantly, the potential for manipulation also extends to machine agents. There is an extensive literature
on the threat of hostile actors manipulating or poisoning the training data used to develop AI and ML
systems, in addition to the risk of accidental and non-malicious introduction of biases.131 This includes a

123
Behzadan & Munir (2017); Lingel et al. (2021).
124
Grisogono (2019).
125
Snyder (1977); Lantis (2009); Covington (2016).
126
Johnson & Maines (2018).
127
Schelling (1966); Jervis (1976).
128
Triezenberg (2017).
129
Mazarr (2022).
130
Engstrom (2018).
131
Hofman & Kim (2022).

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subset of the literature specifically focused on understanding the attack surface and threat vectors associated
with adversarial attacks on complex adaptive systems. Examples include dynamic attacks with AI that are
designed to fool and induce the adversary’s deep reinforcement learning systems (a type of neural network)
to come to policy or planning decisions hostile to the interests of their owners/users.132

6.3.2. Informed by this understanding, UK Defence requires a suite of levers to

exert constructive influence on adversaries’ C2, including to impose
complexity
Having understood the culture, structures, processes and algorithms that shape hostile actors’ C2, including
both its human and machine elements as a combined ‘socio-technical system’, the UK can then seek to
target key nodes and linkages with relevant effects to influence those opponents’ capacity to make and enact
decisions in the UK’s favour. As detailed by Lingel et al. (2021), this broader attempt at C2 warfare133 can
include, but is certainly not limited to, conscious efforts to impose complexity on other actors, such as
through proactive measures to degrade their operational picture, impair their response, span boundaries or
leverage non-linearities.
To achieve this across the differing levels of warfare (i.e. from the tactical to the strategic) and in differing
contexts, C2 systems and organisations in the future will require access to a broad range of kinetic and non-
kinetic effects. It is beyond the scope of this short study to assess the optimal balance of investment across
different DIME levers or, within the military instrument, across domains and capability areas. Nonetheless,
the literature expects not only continued development of more traditional effectors (e.g. platforms, missiles,
etc.) but also novel ones (e.g. directed energy weapons, hypersonic glide vehicles, etc.), as well as improved
offensive capabilities in the emerging domains (cyber and electromagnetic, and space).134 This includes a
focus on increasing the UK’s ability to deliver effects at standoff ranges, as well as at speed, and ideally with
scalable (and in some cases even reversible) effects. Such investment and innovation should yield a wider
range of potential means for delivering effect, both military and non-military in nature.135
As will be expanded upon in Section 6.4, the UK requires not only a suite of improved effectors, but also
the ways and means of integrating these with sensors, networks and C2 to maximise their impact on the
adversary’s decision making by converging effects at the right time and place.

6.3.3. UK Defence also requires an improved understanding of how to exert

constructive influence over partners and allies with differing approaches to
C2
Just as the UK needs to understand other actors’ approach to C2 in order to disrupt or shape them, so
Defence needs to better understand how to exert constructive influence over partners as part of its own
C2.136 The literature emphasises the need for whole-of-government or even whole-of-society responses to

132
Behzadan & Munir (2017).
133
Hutcherson (1994); Struble (1995); High (1997); Granasen et al. (2011).
134
UK MOD (2023a).
135
For a recent DCDC-commissioned study on the topic, see: Black, Lucas & Stockwell (2021).
136
Priebe et al. (2020); Cook et al. (2022).

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complex problems such as warfare, terrorism, disinformation or climate change.137 Official documents are
replete with references to this concept, variously labelled integrated delivery by the UK (replacing the
terminology of Fusion Doctrine138), the comprehensive approach by NATO, or the integrated approach by
the EU139 – with related notions of Total Defence or comprehensive security found in northern European
countries and elsewhere.140 The recent experience of COVID-19 also provides relevant lessons in C2 and
health systems engineering.141
Such approaches emphasise the need to break down stovepipes between the military and other parts of
government, as well as to integrate international allies and partners and various categories of non-state actor
(e.g. private security companies, proxy groups, industry, academia, NGOs, media, individual citizens).142
They cut across sectors to encourage information sharing, collaborative problem-solving among a diverse
set of stakeholders and experts, and the collective implementation of actions using all available levers. If
successful, this would subvert many of the common problems posed by complexity. Traditionally, for
example, C2 constructs driven by component-centred planning can risk insufficient expertise in all domains.
Additionally, they can promote preferences against all-domain solutions of the kind needed to apply a
systems thinking lens. Additionally, control over multi-domain or wider DIME capabilities is often divided
among components, which increases internal complexity. Widening the scope of decision making and
implementation to external entities could secure greater domain expertise and decrease internal
complexity.143
Conversely, achieving effective interagency working within government, let alone coordination with other
types of actors, remains a significant challenge. Overcoming it necessitates spanning boundaries in terms of
organisational structures, technical systems, working cultures, language and more – a major contributor to
increased complexity in C2 systems, recalling Lingel et al. (2021). This challenges the military view of C2,
given Defence can neither command nor control the rest of government (let alone partner nations or non-
state actors) in the traditional manner, and must instead seek to understand how it can influence, shape,
encourage, incentivise and collaborate in a more flexible, non-hierarchical and fluid manner.
To inform such efforts, as the basis for integrated action of the kind expanded upon in Section 6.4, Defence
must start with an improved understanding of C2 approaches and culture within other types of
organisation, viewing these as complex adaptive systems in their own right, and seeking to better inform
Defence personnel on how to navigate and influence these, as well as how military and non-military
components of an integrated approach can best co-adapt over time. Recent research for Dstl has developed

137
Gentzel et al. (2021); Rasmussen (2021).
138
UK MOD (2018d).
139
Slapakova, Stockwell et al. (2022).
140
Finnish Security Committee (n.d.); Swedish Government (2021).
141
During the COVID-19 pandemic, several countries including the UK attempted with varying levels of success to
adopt a whole of society approach, often including comprehensive testing and quarantine protocols, a nationwide
vaccination programme, widespread school closure, public education through mass media, enhanced border
controls, and protections for the economy and households. This involves extensive engagement of military personnel
in planning and coordination functions. Cf. Dubb (2020); Bremmer (2021).
142
Dubb (2020); Cook et al. (2022).
143
Priebe et al. (2020).

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guidance for improved collaboration with PAGs.144 This emphasises the need for a comprehensive
understanding of the similarities and differences between the goals, assumptions, biases, values, structures,
processes, culture, career pathways and incentive structures of PAGs to inform Defence personnel’s efforts
to shape these in a constructive and targeted manner (and minimise the risk of pushback or territorialism).
At the same time as better understanding the complexities of interfacing with and exerting influence over
the complex adaptive systems of partner C2 systems, or civilian equivalents, Defence will also need to reflect
on how it is perceived by those with whom it is seeking to collaborate. The literature emphasises not only
barriers to working with Defence (e.g. reticence by civilian agencies to see the securitisation or militarisation
of a policy problem, or opposition from tech firms to working with the military on ethical grounds), but
also the risks of doing so in the wrong manner (e.g. civilians wrongly deferring to and assuming that military
planning processes and C2 structures are appropriate for a given problem, just because civilian agencies lack
equivalents – e.g. to a J5 – or the same level of experience and codified doctrine for running operations).145
UK Defence thus requires an understanding of its ‘value proposition’ to other entities it wants to integrate
within C2 systems and processes in the future: what does it offer, where does it bring something unique to
the table, and what are the incentives for others to work with UK Defence given their own goals and
values?146

6.4. Properties and capabilities for navigating complexity in our own

C2
6.4.1. C2 systems and organisations in the future must promote key overarching
properties such as flexibility, resilience and a capacity for learning and
adaptation
The literature highlights a variety of implications from change and complexity for the design of C2 systems
and organisations in the future. This includes some relatively mature – or at least part-funded – visions for
the United States, such as the DoD’s concept for JADC2 and its associated implementation strategy and
change programmes.147 There is, however, less clarity on the future vision for C2 in the UK, or among other
medium powers (e.g. France), given constraints on funding, people, technology and other essential inputs.
The UK arguably faces one of the toughest dilemmas: achieving sufficient size to be a globally deployable
and highly capable military force, though unable to replicate the US approach in full. However, it lacks the
scale, redundancy or many of the input resources needed to make more ambitious visions of C2 a success
without extensive cooperation. Additionally, the UK must still maintain sufficient size to be able to avoid
having to accept a more junior or passive role in adopting, rather than shaping, circumstances imposed
upon it by the United States and/or NATO.
Nonetheless, there are several recurring themes in the literature, in terms of properties for any future
approach to C2 to promote. These include attributes such as:

144
Slapakova, Stockwell et al. (2022).
145
Ellery & Saunders (2020).
146
This applies also to ‘own-collaborate-access’ decisions about developing C2 capability. Retter et al. (2022).
147
US Congressional Research Service (2022); US DoD (2022); Priebe et al. (2020); Zeigler et al. (2021).

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 A systems-thinking approach and ability to leverage tools such as those discussed in Section 5.4

 Robustness

 Agility

 Flexibility in structure and process (e.g. hierarchical where needed, non-hierarchical where not)

 Resilience

 Improved cognitive capacity

 Improved awareness of assumptions and potential shocks

 Improved comfort with uncertainty, risk, ambiguity and non-linear dynamics

 Improved data and information sharing, fusion and security

 Improved monitoring of signals and feedback loops

 The capacity for learning and adaptation over time, in response to those signals

 The capacity for innovation and more rapid acquisition or development of new capability

 The ability to leverage a greater diversity of perspectives, skills, expertise and inputs, both from
within and beyond Defence itself (e.g. to include PAGs, allies, partners, industry, academia, other)

 Affordability and feasibility (technical, bureaucratic, legal, ethical, political, etc.).

These cut across the full cycle of sensing, sense-making and action, as explored in the sections below.

6.4.2. Advances in sensor and communication technologies provide opportunities

to capture increased depth and breadth of data, including on complex
problems
Sense-making is impossible without sensing. Access to accurate, real-time data on the environment and the
entities and events therein is essential for any military operation. As stressed by the Cynefin framework,
however, effective sensing is especially important when tackling situations of complexity or chaos, given the
lack of expertise or established good or best practice to guide decision making. Instead, tackling such
situations rests on an ability to rapidly gather, fuse and act on sensor data to begin to understand the
pertinent system dynamics and feedback loops, thereby informing iterative learning and adaptation of a
strategy or operational plan over time (through the model of probe-sense-respond).148
Continuing advances in sensor technology open new possibilities for the 2030s and beyond. These include
improvements in established types of sensors (e.g. radar, sonar, electro-optic), as well as the emergence of
novel categories such as quantum sensing. Crucially, innovation is not focused solely on improving sensor
performance, but also on reducing space, weight and power requirements as well as cost, including through
use of novel materials, advanced manufacturing techniques and dual-use technologies. It is also leveraging
comparatively under-utilised domains and environments, such as through use of satellite constellations in

148
[Link] (2021).

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low-Earth orbit or other regimes, or uncrewed high-altitude pseudo-satellites (HAPS) within the Earth’s
atmosphere, in lieu of traditional airbreathing ISR platforms, or use of wearable or biosensors on personnel.
For C2 systems and organisations in the future, this implies not only the deployment of an increasing variety
of military sensors with improved performance (e.g. range, fidelity, ability to operate in adverse conditions),
but also a need to navigate the benefits and risks associated with operating in an environment pervaded by
civil and dual-use sensors. These include not only today’s smartphones and civilian uncrewed assets
(drones), but also the proliferation of cyber-physical systems and the Internet of Things, along with mass
digital surveillance using Big Data and associated technologies of the kind outlined in Section 3.2.
This proliferation of sensors and data presents substantial potential benefits to C2 in terms of understanding
complex and complex adaptive systems, capturing a huge volume and variety of data which C2 systems can
use to feed modelling, simulation and decision support tools. But it also introduces a variety of risks, ranging
from cognitive overload to the obvious survivability challenges of operating in a more transparent battlefield,
as will be discussed in more detail below. First and foremost, however, future demands on C2 require
systems being able to collate and move sensor data in a timely and secure manner to then make sense of and
exploit it.
Within this requirement, different levels of hierarchy, flexibility, agility, connectivity and resilience may be
necessary depending on the operating environment in question and the nature of the data, networks, entities
and threats involved.149 Advances in ICTs (e.g. 6G, SATCOM, fibre, optical), cloud and edge computing,
encryption, cybersecurity and other technologies could all help to improve bandwidth, reduce latency and
enhance the size, efficiency and resilience of networks. They could also enable a shift in the fundamental
philosophy around sharing and security (e.g. to secure the data rather than the network, to enable networks
to heal and reconfigure themselves in the event of attack or disruption, and to move to a zero-trust model
while also enabling allies, PAGs and others to contribute to and access relevant subsets of data, including
open-source, even without security clearances).150 This opens the potential of connecting a sensing grid
across all domains to relevant processing and effector nodes to enable rapid sense and decision making and
then convergence of multi-domain effects on the relevant targets. To this end, the United States is seeking
to develop a ‘military Internet of Things’ and Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) architecture,
as part of ongoing efforts to develop JADC2 (see Figure 6.1), while NATO is exploring similar technologies
as it considers the future of Federated Mission Networking (FMN).

149
Tran et al. (2015); Lucas et al. (2022).
150
Cook et al. (2022).

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 Command and Control in the Future

Figure 6.1 Concept for US Advanced Battle Management System architecture

Source: US Department of the Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office, cit. in National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering and Medicine (2022, 38). Note: CONUS = Continental United States; BMC2 = Battle Management
Command and Control; SATCOM = Satellite communications; 5G = Fifth-generation telecommunications.

If brought to fruition, advances in sensor, computing and network technologies and architectures could
contribute to tackling complexity in a variety of ways: enabling a common operating picture and improved
understanding of complex systems and their underlying dynamics and non-linearities; more proactive
recognition of risks and uncertainties; and enhanced monitoring of feedback loops and measures of effect
to inform iterative improvements to plans. Realising this ambitious vision of C2, however, requires
navigating substantial risks and putting in place a range of enablers, as discussed below.

6.4.3. Improved cognitive capacity is needed to make sense of all this data,
harnessing the benefits of human and machine while mitigating the
drawbacks
A profusion of data, and challenges to the integrity and trustworthiness of that data, strain finite cognitive
capacity and risk information overload and decision paralysis. The first challenge for C2 is bolstering raw
processing power and the ability to clean, fuse and analyse this data. To this end, continuing advances in
information technology offer the potential for improved processing power, along with Big Data analytics,
as well as new options over whether this occurs at the edge or in the cloud.151 While there is uncertainty
over whether the rate of growth in processing power, hitherto characterised by Moore’s Law,152 can be
sustained using classical computing paradigms and silicon-based manufacturing, there are potential new
opportunities for C2 associated with quantum computing or other innovations (e.g. biocomputing).153

151
Bouhafa & Hess (2017): Williams & Hess (2017); Saur (2021); Rieks & Mannheim (2022).
152
This refers to a prediction by Gordon Moore in 1965, since popularised as ‘Moore’s law’, that circuit complexity
– and thus processing power – can be expected to double every 18–24 months. Cf. Encyclopaedia Britannica (2023).
153
Krelina (2021).

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Besides ensuring that C2 organisations in the future have access to improved data fusion, storage and
processing capabilities, there follows the vital question of how that data is turned into analysis and insight,
and subsequently into a decision – or whether this is even the right paradigm for thinking about information
science and management.154 Here, the literature emphasises the need to integrate people and technology,
harnessing the benefits of human–machine teaming, rather than to merely emphasise one over the other.

 Combating cognitive bias: To tackle complex problems, personnel will need to be selected,
developed and trained to minimise the impact of cognitive biases, and analysis, planning and
decision-making processes designed accordingly. This will require greater comfort with challenge,
uncertainty, ambiguity and thinking about non-linear dynamics. (See Section 6.4.4 for further
discussion of the types of traits required among future leaders and others involved in C2.)

 Building diverse and effective teams: Relatedly, C2 systems and organisations will need to cultivate
effective cross-disciplinary teams, bringing together expertise not only from across the Services or
domains, but also the DIME levers more broadly, and to include both human and machine agents,
if they are to understand, navigate and shape complex adaptive systems.155 These teams should lead
on proactive learning and sharing lessons learned as they accumulate knowledge and various points
of view related to problem-solving.156

 Modelling, simulation and data visualisation: Advances in fields such as modelling and simulation
(M&S), virtual, augmented or mixed reality (AR/VR/MR) or synthetic environments and the
metaverse, offer potential new ways of supporting informed and efficient decision making in future
HQs – if implemented correctly.157 Such technologies offer potential benefits in terms of sifting
and prioritising the information fed to decision makers based on context and the need to avoid
cognitive overload. They can also support visualisation of the dynamics of a complex system and
development of a simulation of the possible cascading consequences of alternative courses of action,
especially if the underlying models can be run many times faster than real time, to enable robust
approaches to decision making (see Annex D). Such tools also open up opportunities in terms of
remote and collaborative working with distributed teams, and use of wearable sensors and other
aids to track, analyse and enhance the individual and group performance of those personnel
involved in C2 processes, informing continuous improvement.158 Equally, there are a host of
potential dependencies introduced by increasing use of – and reliance upon – new technologies, as
well as the enduring risk that these will bake in further biases. For instance, this could be an issue
if the user interface or experience (UI/UX) leads decision makers to place too much focus on or
trust in certain data feeds over other sources, or if the use of modern visualisation tools leads to
overconfidence in people’s ability to comprehend or predict emergent behaviours. Here, there are

154
Frické (2009).
155
Balis & O’Neill (2022).
156
Gitelman et al. (2020).
157
Eversden (2022).
158
For a practical example, see NATO C2COE’s Multi-Domain Operations C2 Demonstrator, which aims to
demonstrate how a future command post might make use of virtual reality. Source: NATO C2COE (2020).

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potential lessons to be learned from the observed pros, cons and risks of integrating data
visualisation tools in other high-pressure, high-risk contexts (e.g. pilots, surgeons, nuclear safety).
Importantly, too, C2 organisations will need access to and familiarity with reversionary modes –
balancing resilience and efficiency as appropriate (see Section 6.4.8).

 Exploiting the benefits of AI and autonomy: Recent years have seen significant advances in AI and
ML, including most recently the high-profile rollout of large language models such as ChatGPT-
4. It is expected that AI and autonomy will play a growing role in C2 activities across the spectrum
of operations. However, it is important to note that such technologies should not be seen as a ‘silver
bullet’ for either data analysis or decision making. C2 systems will involve anthropotechnic
elements as technological and human elements interact on, and between, multiple levels.159
Autonomous systems are also likely to be present in increasing number and variety across all
domains, serving as sensing nodes or strike assets. This deepening use of AI for decision support or
decision making, and autonomous systems for execution, presents both opportunities and
challenges, as even human oversight may not prevent misuse. Similarly, the possibility of increasing
dependency on machines, and the possibility that their function may be poorly understood, or their
underlying training data poisoned, is likely to unintentionally lead to further complexity.160

 Maintaining a human in or on the loop: There is an extensive and ongoing debate within the
academic literature, as well as in international institutions, over the appropriate governance of AI
(focusing on narrow AI in the near term, but also considering the severe, potentially existential,
risks associated with AGI or ASI). This is not only a pressing policy, legal and ethical question for
society in general. It also specifically relates to the question of complexity as applied to C2. As
emphasised in the literature, managing AI within C2 systems and organisations will itself be a
highly complex endeavour.161 A recent Center for Security and Emerging Technology report gives
examples of how AI may, ironically, drive greater complexity and uncertainty into decision making,
contributing to problematic feedback loops, cascading effects and escalation risks:

Offensive operations incorporating AI or interfering with an adversary’s AI systems

could result in unforeseen system failures and cascading effects, triggering accidental
escalation. AI systems that are insecure, inadequately trained, or applied to the wrong
types of problems could inject bad information into decision-making processes,
leading to inadvertent escalation. Discovery of a compromise of an AI system could
generate uncertainties about the reliability or survivability of critical capabilities,
driving decision makers toward deliberate escalation if conflict appears imminent.162

This leads to a dilemma: ‘decision makers want to use AI to reduce uncertainty, especially when it
comes to their awareness of the battlefield, knowing their adversaries’ intentions and capabilities,
or understanding their own capacity to withstand an attack… [but] they introduce a new source

159
Claverie & Desclaux (2022).
160
Balis & O’Neill (2022).
161
Segran (2021).
162
Hoffman & Kim (2023, 1).

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of uncertainty in the likelihood and consequences of technical failures in AI systems.’163 To offset

this, the literature emphasises the enduring need for a human ‘in’ or ‘on the loop’ for major
operational decisions, especially where these relate to use of force.164 In addition, C2 systems and
organisations will need appropriate governance, standards, guidance and training in place to ensure
there are appropriate safeguards around the use of AI in different contexts (e.g. building on the
Ethical Principles for AI outlined in the UK MOD’s first Defence AI Strategy).165 Personnel will
also be required to have appropriate understanding of the strengths and limitations of AI and how
to identify and mitigate any system failures. Advances in fields such as AI safety and explainable AI
can also help here (see Figure 6.2), combating the ‘black box’ effect and making it easier for humans
to understand the logic behind, and flaws in, AI systems’ decision making, and thereby contributing
to greater traceability and trust.166 Nonetheless, significant further work will be required to address
the enduring issues around validation and verification (V&V), and thus to enable Defence to sign
off on the risks associated with using AI systems in certain mission contexts, especially when
considering the inherent challenges of V&V for non-deterministic AI.167

Figure 6.2 DARPA’s Explainable AI (XAI) model

Source: Turek (2018).

 Mitigating adversaries’ more permissive approaches to HMT: Crucially, the UK’s integration of
AI and autonomy into its C2 systems and organisations will not be occurring in a vacuum. This

163
Hoffman & Kim (2023).
164
Scharre (2018); Payne (2022).
165
UK MOD (2022b).
166
Turek (2018); Rudner & Toner (2021); Scheerer & Reussner (2021).
167
Nielsen (2019).

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development process will be shaped not only by broader societal uptake of, cultural responses to
and governance approaches for AI, but also by the continuous competition for advantage and other
actors’ incorporation of AI into their own C2.168 As such, the UK will require ways of identifying
and mitigating the vulnerabilities that its own use of AI and autonomy introduces into its C2
systems, and simultaneously seeking to counter opponents’ own use of AI, especially since it is
likely that the UK and its Allies will face adversaries with fewer policy, legal or ethical restrictions
on maintaining a human in or on the loop. Such situations may provide adversaries with significant
tactical benefits (e.g. faster decision-making times, unencumbered by the need to reach back to and
wait on a human commander), in which case the UK will require ways and means of nullifying
opponents’ advantage. These can and should be asymmetric (e.g. seeking to deter, disrupt or
otherwise counteract hostile use of AI and fully autonomous systems, or to gain advantages in other
areas), rather than necessarily involving watering down the UK’s own constraints on the use of such
technologies, which could be incompatible with its values or its legal and regulatory obligations.169

6.4.4. Changing approaches to decision making also requires changes in

leadership to cultivate decision makers comfortable with navigating
complexity
Effective HMT also entails cultivating effective analysts, decision makers and other categories of generalist
or specialist personnel who will be involved in C2. The literature emphasises qualities such as:

 Leadership over management: This is seen a necessary property for dealing with complex situations
and problems.170 Leadership in the face of complexity requires a flexible and dynamic hierarchical
structure to adapt and respond to new conditions, rather than a rigid focus on standardisation,
bureaucracy and compliance. Leaders should be capable of coordinating complex dynamics and
establishing group interactions which generate creative ideas and are open to challenge.171

 Diversity of expertise: New forms of technical knowledge and skills are likely to be required to
exploit new technologies (e.g. AI) and domains (e.g. space) and apply the latest tools and techniques
for grappling with complex problems (see Annexes C and D). Professional military education and
training should evolve accordingly, with examples including greater emphasis on data literacy, as
well as adaptability, problem-solving, communication and cross-domain effects.172

 Diversity of thought: There is also a growing body of empirical research highlighting the benefits
of increased diversity of thought in a military context. This increases the range of perspectives
brought to bear on a complex problem, encourages constructive challenge, counters groupthink

168
Allison & Schmidt (2020).
169
UK MOD (2022a).
170
White (2016).
171
Baltaci & Balci (2017).
172
Nisperos (2020); Balis & O’Neill (2022).

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and other cognitive biases, and offers other practical benefits such as a larger recruiting pool.173 This
includes also harnessing neurodiversity, especially in roles well-suited to such viewpoints.174

 Diversity of approaches to collaboration: The literature suggests that multiple leadership styles may
need to be promoted within a more federated system that supports the flexible allocation of roles
and responsibilities to those best placed to effectively respond (as with Cynefin). Leaders should
further reduce internal complexity as much as possible through changing structures, processes and
governance systems for their C2 cell or headquarters. Power and responsibility within the team or
organisation should be reallocated as needed to ensure timely and appropriate reactions to changes,
whilst also upskilling staff to perform new and unfamiliar tasks, as is likely in complex situations.175

 Creativity, experimentation and imagination: A key future capability will be C2 networks

containing staff who are intellectually and psychologically prepared to confront wicked problems.
The lack of experience on which to gauge actions is one prominent element of such a problem.
Open-mindedness and non-linear thinking are therefore important, alongside a willingness to
conceive of the issue at hand beyond existing frames of reference when facing complexity.176

 Culture of informed risk management rather than risk avoidance: Personnel involved in C2 should
have a sense of clear purpose and ambition, and should be able to take risk and bear responsibility
for unconventional solutions. Failure should not be conflated with incompetence; instead, ‘failing
fast’ to test radical ideas should be commonplace as the basis for iterative learning.177

6.4.5. Having the ability and authority to cut across stovepipes or levels and
converge effects is essential to offset limitations in the implementation phase
Once a strategy or operational plan has been developed, or a tactical decision made, this then needs to be
translated into efficient and timely effect. Here, the literature emphasises the need for improvements to how
C2 systems and organisations will function178:

 Orchestrate multi-domain operations across the joint force and beyond (i.e. through an integrated
or comprehensive approach).

 Integrate effects occurring through or across multiple domains and environments.

 Concentrate distributed forces or effects at the decisive point (assuming there is one), accounting
for time and space considerations (including the unique dynamics of environments such as
cyberspace and outer space, which can have long or uncertain lead times to deliver certain effects).

173
Slapakova, Caves et al. (2022).
174
Weinbaum et al. (2023).
175
Gitelman et al. (2020).
176
Duczynski et al. (2021).
177
Meddings (2020); Narbutovskih (2020); Tucholski (2021).
178
Stegall (2020); Segal (2023).

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This places central importance on the concept of convergence.179 It also speaks to the need to address not
only technical or cultural barriers to interoperability within an interagency taskforce or coalition (see Section
6.3 on exerting constructive influence on different categories of actor and achieving effective non-
hierarchical collaboration, as opposed to linear C2), but also to clarify and delegate authorities.180 Realising
the ambitious visions of C2 and their integrated delivery of multi-domain effects in this manner relies on
overcoming any issues associated with policies and permissions, especially for those capabilities typically
held at a higher level (e.g. offensive cyber) and/or requiring PAG, allied or political approvals. This also
includes clarifying the delegated authorities and permissions for machine agents, including lethal
autonomous weapons systems as an especially contentious subset of this policy, legal and ethical problem.181
Crucially, too, C2 systems and organisations will need to deal with authorities and permissions changing
rapidly, perhaps repeatedly, not only as FOEs evolve but also as shifting threats and conditions enable a
more or less networked and thus more centralised or distributed approach to C2 (see Section 6.4.8).

6.4.6. Even the most efficient C2 cannot achieve success if Defence lacks the
capability to act credibly or to sustain operations
Though better integrating C2 (whether across domains, nations or the DIME levers) offers many benefits,
it is important to remember that there is an irreducible minimum level of capability and mass required to
withstand the pressures of the future operating environment. Defence could develop a fully optimised C2
system and set of processes fully capable of understanding and navigating complexity, and of achieving
information and decision advantage over the adversary, but these would still be insufficient if not supported
by adequate deployable forces held at readiness for the onset of an operation and with a commensurate
ability to sustain and, if necessary, re-arm and replenish them over the course of a sustained fight.182
For the UK, pursuing qualitative advantage through, inter alia, superior C2 and decision making in the face
of complexity is a prudent asymmetric response to adversaries with quantitative advantages (in terms of
population, GDP, military forces, etc.). Nonetheless, the logic of an offset strategy can only be pushed so
far. The literature emphasises the importance of resilience and redundancy to cope with shocks and the
need for sustained, long-term campaigns to tackle complex problems; this suggests an enduring need for
mass as well as quality. To this end, new technologies, such as uncrewed systems and AI/ML, offer potential
help in the form of lower-cost means of building mass, but do not erase the need for sustained investment.
This is especially pertinent when discussing the effectors that reconnaissance-fires complexes can employ,
with the literature revealing an enduring debate about the appropriate balance between (highly expensive)
precision fires and (cheap but plentiful) massed fires.183

179
According to the US Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations, ‘Convergence is an outcome created by the
concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains and echelons against combinations of decisive points
in any domain to create effects against a system, formation, decision maker, or in a specific geographic area.’ Cf. US
Department of the Army (2022).
180
Black & Lynch (2022).
181
Hoffman & Kim (2023).
182
Barnes & Stickings (2018).
183
Alman & Venable (2020); Gouré (2022); Hasik (2023).

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Ultimately, however, precision vs. mass is a false dichotomy. Instead, C2 systems and organisations will
likely need to integrate a heterogeneous ‘high-low mix’; with a small number of nodes in the sensing or
effector grids being expensive but exquisite high-end capabilities, and a larger number being lower-cost,
attritable, or even single-use.184 Here, the literature explicitly links growing pressures on defence budgets
and procurement to increasing complexity – specifically, the non-linear dynamics and problematic feedback
loops that are associated with the increasing technological complexity of military platforms and, relatedly,
the industrial programmes that deliver them. This ‘rampant and self-reinforcing spiral of cost, complexity,
and capability’185 contributes to both inter-generational cost escalation and intra-programme cost growth.186
‘If complexity is the disease, then high cost, low production rates, low readiness, and low adaptability are
the symptoms.’ Future success will thus rest not only on improved C2 to deal with external drivers of
complexity, but also on improved management of internal drivers such as misaligned bureaucratic and
industrial incentives around designing and developing a new capability. Only a revised approach to force
and capability development that finds a better balance between complexity, cost, mass, risk and schedule
can provide the outputs (i.e. force elements at readiness) needed to make any future vision of C2 a reality.

6.4.7. Defensive measures and reversionary and failure modes are needed to deter
or mitigate the impact of hostile efforts to disrupt C2
C2 systems will need to be designed with a deteriorating threat environment in mind. There is extensive
literature on the growing kinetic and non-kinetic threats from both state and non-state actors.187
Meanwhile, the academic research on complexity and, relatedly, on deep uncertainty, emphasises the need
for C2 systems and organisations to deal with the likelihood of disruption, surprise or shocks caused not
only by anthropogenic threats but also broader hazards, risks and uncertainties.188
To deal with the anthropogenic threats, there are several response options available189:

 Non- or counter-proliferation: Preventing opponents from developing or acquiring the capabilities

needed to threaten key nodes or linkages within, or imposing complexity upon, UK C2 systems
and organisations. While some of the levers associated with achieving this sit outside of direct
Defence control (e.g. use of diplomacy), there are also more active interdiction options available.

 Deterrence: Seeking to dissuade hostile actors from undertaking actions that would disrupt the
UK’s C2 or increase complexity (e.g. by degrading the operational picture, etc.).

 Counter force: Targeting hostile actors’ counter-C2 capabilities before they can be employed.

 Active defence: Intercepting or countering counter-C2 capabilities before they affect a target.

184
Seip (2020); Bledsoe & Benitez (2017a).
185
Retter et al. (2017).
186
Bledsoe & Benitez (2017b).
187
Donaldson & Sciarini (2019a; 2019b).
188
Davies (2014); Lempert (2019); Marchau et al. (2019).
189
These categories reflect the Five Pillars Framework developed by the UK’s Missile Defence Centre, in relation to
ballistic missile defence, but are more broadly applicable.

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 Passive defence: Reducing the impact of counter-C2 capabilities, for example by dispersal,
camouflage or physical hardening of C2 nodes, improved cyber defences and electronic
countermeasures, or broader efforts to improve resilience (e.g. redundancy, reversionary modes).

Tailoring an appropriate suite of defensive measures across these categories will necessitate a strong level of
self-knowledge from C2 systems, as to the threat vectors, attack surface, vulnerabilities and dependencies
inherent in their organisational structure, processes, technologies and other aspects. This again underscores
the need to conceive of C2 as a socio-technical system, and a complex adaptive one at that, and thereby
guide analysis of possible cascading second- and third-order effects from any threat.

6.4.8. It is likely that there will be multiple parallel models of C2 in play at once,
rather than a monolithic approach
Resilience is not simply about improved defences against hostile efforts to disrupt the UK’s C2 or to impose
complexity upon it. It is also about the robustness of the UK’s strategies and operational plans to deal with
complexity, change and uncertainty more generally; identifying early warning signs; building in mechanisms
for learning and adapting over time; and having sufficient enablers in terms of people, technology and
infrastructure (see Sections 6.4.8 and 6.4.9). Importantly, efforts to enhance C2 resilience must be balanced
against the countervailing imperative to maximise C2 efficiency. This is because it is neither possible nor
desirable to protect C2 networks and systems against all threats all the time. Instead, there are trade-offs:

 Undertaking extensive efforts to harden C2 nodes (e.g. headquarters) against physical, cyber or
electronic attack, for example, may mean they are less mobile or easy to conceal. Any investment
in defences for these key nodes would also consume finite resources that could otherwise have been
devoted towards developing many smaller, dispersed C2 nodes to ensure resilience and fall-back
options should these defences fail.

 Conversely, distribution and dispersal may boost survivability by complicating the adversary’s
targeting decisions, but physical distance between forces entails a greater need for secure
communication information systems (CIS). This requirement, in turn, drives new demands for
signature management, electronic and cyber defences, and reversionary modes, as well as for a
resilient network architecture and approach to data management and security.

 While advances in technology of the kind described above can assist here, they also add complexity
to the overall C2 system and introduce new critical dependencies and vulnerabilities, which may
be poorly understood. Any redundancies are also, by definition, potentially redundant, placing
added strain on the finite financial, technical and human resources allocated to developing C2
capability – even if they may offer greater value for money in the long term compared to an
efficiency-optimised, cost-minimising approach.

Determining the balance to strike between C2 resilience and C2 efficiency is thus not straightforward. The
literature suggests that there is no single answer. Rather than optimising C2 systems and organisations for
a narrow set of criteria, missions or operating environments, Defence may need to cultivate FARness190 by

190
Davis (2014).

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developing the ability to employ multiple forms of C2 at once, each variant’s compromise between resilience
and efficiency tailored to its specific context (in particular, the complexity of the problem at hand and the
nature of the threats faced), and with in-built capacity to transition between forms as conditions change.191
This recalls work within Dstl to develop a C2 Resilience Response Framework, envisaging multiple ‘C2
states’ that would apply depending on how benign, contested or denied the operating environment is in a
given space and time, both in terms of kinetic threats and the ability of UK forces to securely and safely use
the electromagnetic spectrum.192 In this vein, C2 systems grappling with complex, changing and uncertain
conditions will need to take multiple parallel forms and be flexible and adaptive to shift between these as
required. C2 in a more benign setting (e.g. strategic HQ in the UK Homeland, or on an uncontested
HADR mission) should thus optimise for efficiency, so as to bring together sensors, data, analysts, decision
makers and effectors to tackle complex problems through a common operating picture and a broad range
of levers. Meanwhile, in much more contested or denied environments, C2 networks and the associated
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) will need to enable layered C2 to ‘fail forward’ if key nodes or
linkages are compromised; ensure that tactical commanders and formations can function effectively even if
cut off from higher levels and operating dispersed and on the move; manage their signatures; deconflict
their activities and concentrate forces or converging effects across domains in the appropriate windows of
opportunity; improvise their plans based on command intent, in the absence of reach-back; and exploit
reversionary modes as needed, so as to remain resilient in the face of kinetic and non-kinetic threats.193

Figure 6.3 Examples of trade-offs between C2 resilience and efficiency

Source: Clerici & Kaemper (2021).

In this sense, there is likely no such monolith as ‘future C2’. Instead, future C2 is likely to entail a flexible
toolkit of heterogeneous and context-specific approaches to making resilience–efficiency trades, which can
be employed either in sequence or in parallel depending on changes in the mission, operating environment
and the threats faced. Furthermore, these various future approaches to C2 will manifest in different ways at

191
Clerici & Kaemper (2021).
192
Bain et al., cit. in Clerici & Kaemper (2021).
193
Schweiker (2017); Seip (2020).

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differing levels; for example, C2 (or MDO/MDI) at the grand-strategic level will look different to that at
the Corps or Divisional level or that of smaller tactical formations all the way down to a squad or section.
This differentiation by threat and layering by the levels of warfare or by the military’s internal unit structures
adds further complexity and fluidity to defining the C2 enterprise in the future.194
This introduces obvious challenges in terms of developing the necessary enablers across the DLODs to
realise not one but multiple variants of C2 in the future. Furthermore, there are likely to be acute challenges,
both for Defence as a whole and for individuals’ mindsets, in transitioning from one C2 state or model to
another; from a complexity theory perspective, these phase transitions entail increased turbulence and
uncertainty, and necessitate spanning boundaries, posing a risk that adversaries may exploit this moment of
vulnerability, disorganisation and confusion to sow chaos or influence system dynamics in their favour. The
alternative, however, is a single, optimised but rigid approach to C2 – resource-efficient but lacking
resilience and dynamism and thus inviting cascading failures if adversaries or events conspire to disrupt the
UK’s C2.195

6.4.9. Measures of effect, signals and mechanisms for change must be built into
plans, systems and organisations to enable them to learn and adapt over
time
The literature suggests that C2 organisations need to move away from inadequate strategy making or
planning philosophies, such as the linear and prescriptive ‘ends, ways and means’ approach, which are
inadequate to deal with complexity in defence decision making. As discussed in Chapter 5 and Annexes C
and D – including in relation to methods such as ISM, RDM and DAP – navigating complexity requires:

 More robust strategies and plans focused on iteration in the face of complexity and uncertainty,
understanding and exploiting feedback loops and non-linearities, and avoiding surprise or shock.

 Early and explicit identification of the critical underpinning assumptions about system dynamics
and the theory of success for shaping or exploiting these.

 In-built monitoring systems for detecting early warning signs that these planning assumptions
and/or external conditions are changing in a manner that risks failure of the initial plan.

 The organisational capacity to learn and adapt at speed once that tipping point has been reached.

Crucially, C2 systems and organisations in the future will need to understand and monitor relevant
measures of effect.196 This poses several challenges, for example:

 Causality is not currently sufficiently well understood or modelled when dealing with the non-
linear dynamics and phenomenon of emergence within complex adaptive systems. It is difficult to
anticipate, let alone to monitor or attribute, cascading second- and third-order effects from a given
intervention, especially when these only manifest over the longer term.

194
Segal (2023).
195
Seip (2020); Smith & Atwell (2022).
196
Gitelman et al. (2020).

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 This is made more difficult when considering turbulence, i.e. measuring the impact of a given
intervention on one level of analysis (e.g. at the tactical level) at higher levels (e.g. the strategic).

 Furthermore, traditional approaches to Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), or to combat indicators

and combat assessment more generally, are much more mature for kinetic effects delivered in the
land, air or maritime domains, than for non-kinetic effects – including those in cyberspace and the
EMS, or outer space, as subsets of this problem – and for information operations.197

Assuming that a monitoring system has been put in place to track identified signals of possible changes in
key assumptions or conditions needed for success, and to consider the possible relevance of other signals
not specified in advance, C2 systems and organisations then need processes in place to ensure that these
tipping points trigger a change in the plan or strategy towards an alternative pathway (e.g. through defensive,
corrective or capitalising actions, as outlined in Annex D).198 This reassessment may need to occur outside
of the typical battle rhythm and planning cycle, given time sensitivity. To put this approach of continuous
testing and iteration (probe-sense-respond, in the language of the Cynefin framework199) into practice, C2
systems and organisations will need greater capacity for learning, adaptation and innovation.200 This ability
to not only identify Adaptation Tipping Points (ATPs) in a timely manner, but also to decide upon,
resource and implement the necessary changes at speed, is the essence of turning lessons identified into
lessons learned, and achieving FARness (flexibility, adaptiveness and robustness).201
This requires overcoming barriers to learning and continuous change at both the organisational level (e.g.
rigid structures and processes, technical systems with long lead times to adapt, cultural aversion to change
or risk taking, misalignment of incentives around career progression, etc.) and the individual level (e.g.
cognitive biases such as the sunk cost fallacy, or discomfort with uncertainty).202 Here, there are obvious
links to the extensive body of theory and good practice that exists in relation to increasing the ability of
teams or organisations to absorb innovation, promote continuous improvement and manage change. This
includes literature on well-documented commercial practices such as DevSecOps, agile or scrum, as well as
broader research on how to promote innovation within Defence specifically.203 This includes recognition
of the need to apply a complexity and systems thinking lens to the question of building an ‘innovation
ecosystem’ within Defence that cultivates creativity, experimentation, challenge, informed risk taking and
FARness at all levels, encouraging both top-down and bottom-up innovation.204
While the innovation literature also speaks to wider, though not unrelated, issues such as improving the
development and integration of software and emerging technologies, many of the underlying insights about

197
US Joint Chiefs (2019); Kim et al. (2022).
198
Johnson (2018).
199
Snowden & Boone (2007); IT Revolution (2021).
200
Baltaci and Balci (2017).
201
Davis (2014).
202
Baltaci & Balci (2017); Causey (2020).
203
Freeman et al. (2015);
204
Hulter (2019); Lewis (2021); Kotila et al. (2022); Pickett (2022).

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how to make Defence, as a complex socio-technical system, more conducive to learning and adaptation are
likely transferrable to thinking about such properties in the future context of C2.

6.4.10. The future design of C2 must be supported by urgent reforms to the wider
Defence enterprise
Recognising the scale and urgency of the challenge that complexity poses to C2 entails that DCDC
considers the potential need for sweeping changes across the decision cycle, as well as to the wider C2
enterprise and thus to Defence or, beyond that, the apparatus of government at large. These issues go
beyond questions of structure or process – though those remain important – and incorporate broader
debates about workforce and career management, the pace of acquisition of new technologies, the evolution
of education and training, and the organisational capacity and cultural willingness of the UK to innovate
in the face of mounting threats, constrained resources and other pressures.
Such overarching considerations are summarised in Chapter 7, which also provides brief final reflections
and outlines next steps for this ongoing project.

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7. Conclusions and next steps

This final chapter outlines the SASC team’s reflections on the first of the four papers within this wider
study, as well as the next steps in further research into the detail of future design considerations for C2, in
terms of the overall C2 enterprise, the associated capability, and the underpinning enablers.

7.1. Summary
The chapter is summarised in the box below and elaborated upon in the sections that follow.

Box 7.1 Conclusions and next steps

Academic theorists and governmental, military or industry practitioners have an incomplete

understanding of complexity or complex adaptive systems, such as will characterise the future operating
environment for C2. While the literature provides useful methods and tools for grappling with
complexity, as well as some initial design considerations for C2, changing C2 – a socio-technical
system in its own right – will be highly complex. This implies a process of co-adaptation alongside the
evolving operating environment, and changing threat and technology landscapes, and thus of iteration
and continuous learning. Perhaps the most pressing challenge, therefore, is understanding how best to
steer this process over time, given the extent and nature of the transformation (technological, structural,
process, cultural, educational, etc.) required to position C2 systems for future success in the face of
complexity.
Given the challenges of achieving a C2 system that can tackle complexity, Defence may either need
some sort of external shock to force creative destruction, or else to initiate its reform efforts using (and in
spite of) more traditional, linear C2 approaches and pivot over time as changes set in.

7.2. Final reflections

7.2.1. There is an incomplete understanding of the complexity that will characterise
the future operating environment for C2
As outlined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, the nature, drivers and manifestations of complexity all remain topics
of considerable uncertainty and debate. Although there has been a profusion of research into complexity
theory and related fields since the 1940s, this remains an area which lacks common agreed definitions, let
alone a codified blueprint for successfully navigating complex problems such as those that Defence C2 is
expected to face out to the 2030s and beyond. Advances in computational modelling and the application
of AI and ML, as well as innovation in more qualitative areas, are driving continuing advances in our
understanding of complex adaptive systems. But in many ways the research landscape remains diffuse,

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disjointed and at a comparatively early stage of maturation. Recalling Cynefin, complexity remains the
domain of probing and emergent insights, not of best practice guided by definitive expertise.
For DCDC, this incompleteness of the collective understanding of complex adaptive systems implies that
their own ongoing work to apply the lens of complexity thinking to Defence C2 – with its traditional
approaches to sense- and decision-making being so at odds with this non-linear mode of thinking – is near
the cutting edge of research and concepts development on this theme. This can be viewed as an opportunity,
and an exciting one at that; however, it also entails a need for humility, probing, iteration, feedback and
continuous learning in the face of substantial uncertainty. This will be necessary to meet Defence’s ultimate
goal of achieving a decisive advantage over the UK and its allies’ adversaries through improvements to its
ability to command and control operations in a future operating environment characterised by complexity.

7.2.2. While the literature provides useful methods and tools for grappling with
complexity, changing C2 will be highly complex and iterative
As outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, and explored in more detail in Annexes C and D, this paper has identified
a series of tools and techniques for understanding complex systems or problems, and thereby coming to
decisions that better satisfy the FARness principle (the need to be flexible, adaptive and robust). It has also
identified broader practical considerations affecting the design of C2 systems and organisations, including
the challenges posed by external threats and internal barriers to change, as well as the need to strike an ever-
shifting balance between C2 efficiency and C2 resilience depending on the operating context.
For DCDC, this implies that there is no single monolith known as ‘future C2’; rather it will likely be a
series of different potential C2 states, which UK Defence will need to shift between in an agile manner as
conditions change. This introduces a series of design dilemmas requiring further consideration, such as:

 How to manage the pivot between states, given the added risks of turbulence, chaos and confusion
during this phase transition, or of adversaries exploiting this window of opportunity for advantage.

 How to strike a balance between traditional, hierarchical and linear approaches to sense-making,
planning and execution which are optimised to simple or complicated problems (and which will
retain their relevance in some situations) and the more novel approaches needed for complex ones.

 Whether to focus on developing people, technical systems, organisational structures and processes
that are generalist in nature, thereby risking an inadequate response to the unique demands of
complex problems, or to focus on cultivating specialists tailored to specific C2 states, thereby risking
spreading finite resources too thin and/or a bifurcation of the force into those elements configured
to deal with the complicated and those trained and cognitively equipped for the complex.

 Whether to position the UK at the leading edge of implementing novel approaches to C2 – which
could yield first-mover advantage and prestige if successful but also implies carrying substantial risk
by trading existing strengths in traditional C2 approaches for investment in untested ideas – or to
wait for others (notably the United States) to ascertain and demonstrate the most efficient path
forward.

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 How to balance between designing an approach to C2 configured to the UK’s unique needs and
designing one that maximises interoperability with Allies (e.g. the US’s vision of JADC2), especially
given the political and operational risks that divergence entails for Alliance cohesion.

This paper has emphasised that C2 is a complex socio-technical system in its own right and thus that its
future will be shaped by the phenomenon of emergence. For DCDC, this means that any concept for C2
in the future should not be a vision of a fixed end-state, but rather a set of aspirational goals and guiding
principles with which to approach a fluid, uncertain and self-reflexive process of co-adaptation of the C2
enterprise alongside continuous evolutions in the operating environment and in the variables affecting both
the demand (e.g. any shifts in the political expectations placed on Defence C2 or in the objectives that the
UK seeks to achieve) and supply sides of C2 (e.g. changes in the technology or workforce skills available).
This sort of nested, iterative approach is illustrated in Figure 7.1, and could be applied both to configuring
the C2 approach for a specific operation and to DCDC’s higher-level task of developing a revised JCN.

Figure 7.1 Nested loops of co-evolution of conceptual model, system and operational designs, and
the adaptive implementation and execution of those designs

Source: Grisogono (2019, 81).

7.2.3. Perhaps the most pressing challenge is understanding how to steer this
process of co-adaptation over time
For DCDC, the challenge is not only to set out a concept of C2 better suited to grappling with complexity,
but also to ensure there are realistic implementation pathways to make that vision a reality. This paper has
described significant debate within the literature and expert workshop as to whether Defence will be able
to make the transition from its current industrial-age structures, processes and culture towards the types of
thinking needed for organisations to succeed in the information age – and, if so, how.

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In one school of thought, Defence may need an external shock to force change, given the levels of
institutional and cultural inertia inherent in a risk-averse and hierarchical organisation such as the military.
At the same time, it could be observed that even the shock of defeat in Afghanistan, a global pandemic, the
onset of war in Ukraine, the mounting impacts of climate change or the pacing threat from China, have
together not proven to be a sufficient impetus to engender radical change in UK or Allied approaches to
C2. Furthermore, relying on a strategic shock to sweep aside internal barriers to change implies a passivity
which will likely be unpalatable to Defence. Consequently, a proactive and iterative approach is required.
Paradoxically, however, a C2 system geared towards tackling complexity may be precisely what is needed to
implement the sort of transformative pan-DLOD, cross-governmental, whole-of-society and multinational
change programme needed to realise a C2 system geared towards tackling complexity. Such circular logic
implies a need, instead, for an adaptive and learning-focused approach, starting with targeted changes (e.g.
to training, exercises or interagency working) implemented initially using current C2 approaches and then
refined over time as the C2 enterprise begins to exhibit improvements in properties relevant to influencing
complex adaptive systems, such as creativity, innovation, agility or capacity to learn.

7.2.4. Subsequent papers in this GSP study build on this initial paper’s themes,
exploring the future trade-offs and design decisions for C2 in more detail
Following this paper, further research was needed to help DCDC address the C2 design and change
management dilemmas raised in this final chapter. As outlined in the introduction to this report, this has
been only the first paper within a larger GSP study in support of DCDC’s Project Mimisbrunnr. The
remaining three papers focus on the future of the C2 enterprise, of C2 capability, and of the associated
enablers, respectively. On the theme of C2 enterprise, the second paper considers the following questions:

 RQ1: Based on current best forecasting of the future operating environment (i.e. the demand placed
upon the C2 enterprise) and the likely state of S&T and workforce trends (i.e. the potential supply
of technical and people solutions to enhance C2), what are the opportunities, challenges and
dilemmas for designing the future C2 enterprise?

 RQ2: What are the most significant properties that collectively drive the effectiveness of this
enterprise? How might these properties interact with each other?

 RQ3: What barriers need to be overcome to realise these properties within Defence?

 RQ4: What barriers need to be overcome to realise these properties in a whole-of-society approach?

 RQ5: What new requirements (new capabilities, concepts, functions and necessary activities, etc.)
does such an approach entail?

These questions build upon the initial analysis provided in Chapters 5 and 6 of this first paper. In adopting
such an iterative approach of exploration, analysis and refinement, the team behind Project Mimisbrunnr
thereby hope to apply some of the complexity and systems thinking principles explored in this paper to the
study itself.

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Welburn, Jonathan, & Aaron Strong. 2021. ‘Systemic Cyber Risk and Aggregate Impacts.’ Risk Analysis
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Weinbaum, Cortney, Omair Khan, Teresa Thomas & Bradley Stein. 2023. Neurodiversity and National
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Annex A. Methodology

A.1. Literature review

Based on consultation with RAND Knowledge Services205 as well as DCDC, the study team agreed upon a
series of Boolean search strings as listed in Table A.1. The initial search was limited to articles from 2015
to the present, and to sources in the English language.

Table A.1 Literature review search strings

Search Search string Descriptor

TS=(defen*e OR military OR "armed force*" OR army OR armies OR

naval OR navy OR navies OR "air force*" OR maritime OR "marine
corps" OR "national security" OR "counter-intelligence" OR
counterintelligence OR "intelligence community" OR aerospace OR
A aeronaut* OR aviation OR warfare OR weapon* OR battlefield OR Defence + situation
joint) AND TS=(War* OR crisis OR conflict OR operation OR operating OR
situation OR situational OR “situation* awareness” OR “situation*
understanding” OR sensemaking OR “cross-domain” OR Hybrid OR “grey
zone” OR competition OR “hyper competition” OR "sub-threshold")

TS=(defen*e OR military OR "armed force*" OR army OR armies OR

naval OR navy OR navies OR "air force*" OR maritime OR "marine
corps" OR "national security" OR "counter-intelligence" OR
counterintelligence OR "intelligence community" OR aerospace OR
aeronaut* OR aviation OR warfare OR weapon* OR battlefield OR
joint) AND TS=(“complex network*” OR “wicked problem*” OR complex* Defence + problem
B OR chaos OR chaotic OR diverse OR diversity OR "hard problems" OR context
“challenging problems” OR “multi-domain challenges” OR wickedness OR
“coercion campaign” OR measures OR maskirovka OR “reflexive control”
OR “messy problems” OR “tame problems” OR “critical problems” OR
“complex adaptive system*” OR "CAS" OR “complexity theory” OR
uncertainty OR "complex system*" OR "complex organisation*" OR
"complex organization*")

205
RAND Knowledge Services is a team of information professionals, many of whom have graduate degrees in
library science, information science, or archive studies, which provides information resources and services across the
different RAND offices.

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Search Search string Descriptor

TS=(defen*e OR military OR "armed force*" OR army OR armies OR

naval OR navy OR navies OR "air force*" OR maritime OR "marine
corps" OR "national security" OR "counter-intelligence" OR
counterintelligence OR "intelligence community" OR aerospace OR
aeronaut* OR aviation OR warfare OR weapon* OR battlefield OR
C joint) AND TS=(C2 OR "command and control" OR "command & control" Defence + capability
OR “crisis management” OR “conflict management” OR multi*domain OR
“multi-domain operations” OR “integrated whole of non-nuclear” OR
“integrated approach” OR “whole of government” OR “whole of society”
OR fusion OR “fusion approach” OR “fusion doctrine” OR “comprehensive
approach” OR “effect* based” OR “integrated effect*”)

TS=(defen*e OR military OR "armed force*" OR army OR armies OR

naval OR navy OR navies OR "air force*" OR maritime OR "marine
corps" OR "national security" OR "counter-intelligence" OR
counterintelligence OR "intelligence community" OR aerospace OR
aeronaut* OR aviation OR warfare OR weapon* OR battlefield OR
joint) AND TS=(War* OR crisis OR conflict OR operation OR operating OR
situation OR situational OR “situation* awareness” OR “situation*
understanding” OR sensemaking OR “cross-domain” OR Hybrid OR “grey Defence + situation
D zone” OR competition OR “hyper competition” OR "sub-threshold") AND + problem context
TS=(“complex network*” OR “wicked problem*” OR complex* OR chaos (subset of Search A)
OR chaotic OR diverse OR diversity OR "hard problems" OR “challenging
problems” OR “multi-domain challenges” OR wickedness OR “coercion
campaign” OR measures OR maskirovka OR “reflexive control” OR “messy
problems” OR “tame problems” OR “critical problems” OR “complex
adaptive system*” OR "CAS" OR “complexity theory” OR uncertainty OR
"complex system*" OR "complex organisation*" OR "complex
organization*")

TS=(defen*e OR military OR "armed force*" OR army OR armies OR

naval OR navy OR navies OR "air force*" OR maritime OR "marine
corps" OR "national security" OR "counter-intelligence" OR
counterintelligence OR "intelligence community" OR aerospace OR
aeronaut* OR aviation OR warfare OR weapon* OR battlefield OR
joint) AND TS=(War* OR crisis OR conflict OR operation OR operating OR
situation OR situational OR “situation* awareness” OR “situation*
understanding” OR sensemaking OR “cross-domain” OR Hybrid OR “grey
zone” OR competition OR “hyper competition” OR "sub-threshold") AND Defence + situation
TS=(“complex network*” OR “wicked problem*” OR complex* OR chaos + problem context +
OR chaotic OR diverse OR diversity OR "hard problems" OR “challenging capability (overall
E
problems” OR “multi-domain challenges” OR wickedness OR “coercion subset of search
campaign” OR measures OR maskirovka OR “reflexive control” OR “messy A/search D)
problems” OR “tame problems” OR “critical problems” OR “complex
adaptive system*” OR "CAS" OR “complexity theory” OR uncertainty OR
"complex system*" OR "complex organisation*" OR "complex
organization*") AND TS=(C2 OR "command and control" OR "command &
control" OR “crisis management” OR “conflict management” OR
multi*domain OR “multi-domain operations” OR “integrated whole of non-
nuclear” OR “integrated approach” OR “whole of government” OR “whole
of society” OR fusion OR “fusion approach” OR “fusion doctrine” OR
“comprehensive approach” OR “effect* based” OR “integrated effect*”)

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Search Search string Descriptor

TS=(War* OR crisis OR conflict OR operation OR operating OR situation

OR situational OR “situation* awareness” OR “situation* understanding”
OR sensemaking OR “cross-domain” OR Hybrid OR “grey zone” OR
competition OR “hyper competition” OR "sub-threshold") AND
TS=(“complex network*” OR “wicked problem*” OR complex* OR chaos
OR chaotic OR diverse OR diversity OR "hard problems" OR “challenging Situation + problem
F context
problems” OR “multi-domain challenges” OR wickedness OR “coercion
campaign” OR measures OR maskirovka OR “reflexive control” OR “messy
problems” OR “tame problems” OR “critical problems” OR “complex
adaptive system*” OR "CAS" OR “complexity theory” OR uncertainty OR
"complex system*" OR "complex organisation*" OR "complex
organization*")

TS=(War* OR crisis OR conflict OR operation OR operating OR situation

OR situational OR “situation* awareness” OR “situation* understanding”
OR sensemaking OR “cross-domain” OR Hybrid OR “grey zone” OR
competition OR “hyper competition” OR "sub-threshold") AND
TS=(“complex network*” OR “wicked problem*” OR complex* OR chaos
OR chaotic OR diverse OR diversity OR "hard problems" OR “challenging
problems” OR “multi-domain challenges” OR wickedness OR “coercion Situation + problem
campaign” OR measures OR maskirovka OR “reflexive control” OR “messy context + capability
G problems” OR “tame problems” OR “critical problems” OR “complex (overall subset of
adaptive system*” OR "CAS" OR “complexity theory” OR uncertainty OR search F)
"complex system*" OR "complex organisation*" OR "complex
organization*") AND TS=(C2 OR "command and control" OR "command &
control" OR “crisis management” OR “conflict management” OR
multi*domain OR “multi-domain operations” OR “integrated whole of non-
nuclear” OR “integrated approach” OR “whole of government” OR “whole
of society” OR fusion OR “fusion approach” OR “fusion doctrine” OR
“comprehensive approach” OR “effect* based” OR “integrated effect*”)

TS=(War* OR crisis OR conflict OR operation OR operating OR situation

OR situational OR “situation* awareness” OR “situation* understanding”
OR sensemaking OR “cross-domain” OR Hybrid OR “grey zone” OR
competition OR “hyper competition” OR "sub-threshold") AND TS=(C2 OR
"command and control" OR "command & control" OR “crisis management” Situation +
H capability
OR “conflict management” OR multi*domain OR “multi-domain operations”
OR “integrated whole of non-nuclear” OR “integrated approach” OR “whole
of government” OR “whole of society” OR fusion OR “fusion approach” OR
“fusion doctrine” OR “comprehensive approach” OR “effect* based” OR
“integrated effect*”)

Source: RAND Knowledge Services with input from DCDC.

Each of these searches was made across five databases, as shown in Table A.2. RAND Knowledge Services
recorded the top 250 hits (where available) based on each databases’ ranking of relevance. For searches that
resulted in less than 1000 hits, the entire set of results was recorded. EndNote was then used to identify and
remove duplicates, first within a single database and subsequently across all five databases. The initial hit
count as well as the number of articles from each search reflected in the initial list of sources provided to
the project team are given in Table A.2.

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Table A.2 Literature review search hits

Search Database Total hits Number of titles included

Scopus 172,082 249

Web of Science 127,577 183

A ProQuest Military Database 1,106 249

Policy File Index 7.148 247

Business Source Complete 3,878 246

Scopus 165,251 247

Web of Science 161,021 132

B ProQuest Military Database 581 201

Policy File Index 2,696 213

Business Source Complete 4,718 199

Scopus 23,534 243

Web of Science 17,923 123

C ProQuest Military Database 110 80

Policy File Index 294 253

Business Source Complete 436 391

Scopus 36,576 173

Web of Science 32,297 118

D ProQuest Military Database 217 115

Policy File Index 1,248 112

Business Source Complete 1,009 182

Scopus 1,549 219

Web of Science 1,102 141

E ProQuest Military Database 15 0

Policy File Index 59 0

Business Source Complete 29 0

Scopus 623,075 227

F
Web of Science 680,848 121

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Search Database Total hits Number of titles included

ProQuest Military Database 7,978 241

Policy File Index 3,915 160

Business Source Complete 46,693 243

Scopus 16,599 208

Web of Science 13,334 113

G ProQuest Military Database 240 214

Policy File Index 91 28

Business Source Complete 1,292 226

Scopus 69,105 211

Web of Science 46,497 118

H ProQuest Military Database 1.098 179

Policy File Index 338 88

Business Source Complete 5,378 176

Source: RAND Knowledge Services.

These results were then given to the study team for further refinement, which involved two reviewers
combing through the initial search lists. Based on previous discussions with the client, they each
independently indicated which articles might be most relevant, based on title, abstract and authors/source;
this resulted in agreed-upon list of 50 articles. The team then went through those articles and selected 25
for detailed review and extraction. This final shortlist was then verified with DCDC before information was
extracted. Following the initial extraction, ‘snowballing’ occurred to identify additional articles of interest
based on the references and bibliographies of the sources consulted and thereby fill any gaps in coverage of
the research questions that remained after the initial review.

A.2. Expert engagement

In addition to the literature review, the study team engaged with a variety of Anglo-Swedish stakeholder
and expert perspectives through an in-person workshop convened by DCDC and hosted at the Swedish
Defence University in Stockholm on 7 March 2023. A list of attendees is provided in Table A.3.

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Table A.3 List of workshop participants

Name Organisation

Air Cdre Anders Persson Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Swedish Defence University

Björn J.E. Johansson FOI

Christina Ekenstierna Swedish Armed Forces, Defence Staff

Lt Col Daniel Thenander Swedish Defence University

Elsa Lindstedt Swedish Armed Forces, Joint Operation

Cdr Fabian Tamm Swedish Armed Forces, Joint Operation

Isabell Andersson Swedish Defence University

James Black RAND Europe

Jason Poole Aperture Strategy

Lt Col Johan Ivari Swedish Defence University

Jonas Herkevall FOI

Cdr Leif Hansson DCDC

Linnea Hjalmarsdotter Swedish Armed Forces, Defence Staff

Magdalena Granasen FOI

Lt Col Michael Aust Swedish Armed Forces, Joint Operation

Nicholas Fernholm Public speaker

Niklas Hallberg FOI

Paddy Turner QinetiQ

Lt Col Patrik Sandstrom Swedish Armed Forces, Defence Staff

Peter Houghton Dstl

Lt Col Rob Kace DCDC

Lt Cdr (R) Roy Johansson FMV

Lt Col Stefan Cako Swedish Armed Forces, Defence Staff

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Annex B. Drivers of change in the operating environment

This annex expands on the macro-trends briefly summarised in Chapter 3, based on the literature review.

B.1. Increasing interconnectivity, multipolarity and global competition

Government strategy and policy documents and academic or think tank sources are replete with references
to intensifying great power competition, an increasingly multipolar and anarchic world, and revisionist
challenges to the supposed post-1945 liberal rules-based international order based on bodies such as the
UN and NATO, the Bretton Woods system and principles such as the sanctity of sovereign borders.206
These geopolitical and geoeconomic trends are seen as driving complexity by heightening the number of
concurrent and converging challenges facing societies and, by extension, governments and militaries.
Examples include:

 Increasing mistrust and revisionism: Aggression by Russia, the systemic challenge from China, and
enduring difficulties presented by regimes such as North Korea and Iran have seen the re-emergence
of competition as the primary lens through which decision makers view global politics.207

 A broadening of global competition: Competition is occurring through use of all levers of power
(e.g. DIME) and using a mix of covert, ambiguous, deniable and overt means. Authoritarian actors
such as Russia and China envisage a single continuum of global competition on all fronts and in
all areas.208 As such, they consciously seek to exploit the ‘grey zone’ and ambiguity around the
thresholds (e.g. Article 5 in NATO) and stovepipes (e.g. between domestic and foreign, or between
military and non-military issues) that still persist in the approaches of liberal democracies.209

 Increasing multipolarity: At the same time, increasing multipolarity is brought about by the rise of
BRICS210 countries and others, and the consequent lack of a clear hegemon or stable balance of
power (e.g. between the United States and China).211 This implies a shift to a more confrontational
and anarchic world. It also poses added challenges in terms of navigating the complex web of
international relations with adversaries, allies, partners and neutral third parties (e.g. posing

206
Kundnani (2017); Mearsheimer (2019); Cimmino & Kroenig (2020).
207
Mazarr et al. (2022).
208
Duczynski et al. (2021); Black, Lynch et al. (2022).
209
Kilcullen (2020).
210
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
211
Mazarr et al. (2021).

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questions about the relevance of Cold War-era bipolar approaches to deterrence in a newly
multipolar world).212

 Increasing connectivity within and between systems: Equally, deepening interconnectivity across
politics, economies and societies at the global, regional, national and sub-national levels – driven
by globalisation and continuing advances in information communications technologies – is eroding
the traditional distinctions between home and away, or the global and the local. This does not
mean the emergence of a single cohesive world culture or agreed set of norms and values (see below);
rather, there is an increasing risk of social, political and economic fragmentation.

 The continuing rise of non-state actors: The private sector is expected to continue to play an ever-
larger role in international affairs, not only a driver of economic growth and technological
innovation, but also key in shaping the information environment (e.g. through moderation of
content on social media platforms) and even wars (e.g. as with the Wagner Group or Microsoft
and SpaceX in Ukraine).213

 The changing impact of time and space: In an age when an increasing number of actors can deliver
an increasing variety and scale of kinetic or non-kinetic effects to the other side of the globe with
the simple click of a button (e.g. to launch a cyber-attack, promote a narrative on social media, or
deliver a missile over tremendous distances), the role of time and distance in shaping planning,
decision making and execution is also changing. This combination of deepening connectivity and
the erosion of time and space limitations presents both new possibilities and new risks, such as an
increased attack surface for malicious actors, myriad dependencies and vulnerabilities (e.g. to supply
chains) that may not be properly understood, and new sources of tension between actors.

 The perception of heightened uncertainty and volatility: As a result of these and other trends (see
below), the political landscape at both the international and national levels is increasingly volatile
and uncertain and characterised by a constant shifting of coalitions. While global competition
intensifies, a proliferation of ‘wicked problems’ requiring greater international consensus as the
basis for collective action adds another layer of complexity to the future operating environment,
with fears that current governance structures are simply inadequate for this task.214 There are
concerns that this could potentially presage a decisive future breakdown of the current international
or domestic political order in favour of some other new equilibrium – potentially one hostile to the
interests and values of self-identified status quo powers such as the UK.215

B.2. The impact of a changing climate

Besides geopolitical and geoeconomic change, interlinked social and environmental trends could similarly
lead to greater disorder, instability and ultimately conflict out to the 2030s and 2040s. Examples include:

212
Cimbala (2015).
213
Reynolds (2019); Uberti et al. (2022).
214
Levin et al. (2012).
215
For example, the Integrated Review emphasises the need for the UK to defend the rules-based international order.

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 Environmental change and extreme weather: Accelerating climate change, as well as pollution and
other drivers, could result in sweeping and unpredictable changes to all regions of the globe in this
time period. The impacts are likely to be varied and non-linear; for example, the melting of the ice
caps and permafrost is projected to reduce the ‘albedo effect’, meaning that the Arctic would be less
bright and thus reflect less sunlight, leading to more energy absorption and thus runaway regional
and global warming. Simultaneously, southern Europe could be affected by increasingly hot
summers and desertification, even as the interruption of the Gulf Stream across the Atlantic might
lead to extremes of cold in other parts of Europe and the UK.216 All of this is likely to affect Defence
not only directly, in terms of the missions it is called to undertake (e.g. Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities [MACA] and Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief [HADR] tasks of increased
frequency and intensity) but also indirectly through the environmental conditions in which it will
operate, thus determining everything from training and infrastructure to the specifications of
military kit.217

 Energy transition: Both the climate emergency and the increasing awareness of the potential risks
to energy security (e.g. in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine War) are projected to drive continued
investment in renewable energy, though oil and gas are expected to retain a significant role for the
coming decades. In turn, electrification and, potentially, the advent of disruptive new technologies
such as fusion power could lead to sweeping changes in infrastructure, economies, societies and
global relations (e.g. reducing the significance of oil and gas exporting regions).218

 Disruption to food, water, and soil systems and ecology: Relatedly, climate change, pollution and
overuse are projected to lead to disruption of food and water supplies, potentially driving migration,
instability and communal violence, especially in already fragile regions. Similarly, soil erosion
caused by deforestation and a reduction in the nutrient quality of the soil due to poor agricultural
practices, extreme weather and other factors could lead to falling food yields in some regions, or
the cascading collapse of complex regional ecosystems. Similarly, this could lead to mass extinctions
(beyond those already experienced), with unpredictable consequences for both nature and
humankind.219

 Bio-security risks: A major additional risk emerges from the production of manmade bioweapons
(the proliferation of which is being aided by the democratisation of technologies such as gene
editing and synthetic biology), as well as from natural pandemics, with the potential for cascading
disruption across the PESTLE-M dimensions already made clear by the COVID-19 pandemic.220

 Climate adaptation and weaponisation: Given the trends outlined above, governments, businesses
and families are already investing in ways of combating climate change (e.g. by reducing emissions)
and/or mitigating, adapting to or reversing its effects. Looking out to the 2030s and 2040s, this

216
Jouan, Ogden et al. (2022).
217
Cox et al. (2020); Retter et al. (2021).
218
Hammelehle (2021).
219
Pozza & Field (2020); Environment Agency (2021).
220
Johnson et al. (2023).

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raises the potential for sweeping changes to economies and societies, but also knock-on effects for
international politics and global security.221 Possible drivers of instability include a divergence in
approaches to dealing with climate change; pressure to coerce or compel free-riding states and major
polluters to cut emissions, potentially by force; or the weaponisation of the climate, such as through
use of geoengineering technologies (e.g. to seed rains that damage crops in a rival country).222

 Demographic shifts and resource scarcity: An increasing global population is likely to lead to more
demand for resource sharing and competition for land and raw materials. Combined with
dwindling stocks of certain finite resources and disruption to supply chains due to climate change
and other sources of instability (e.g. terrorism, war), this is likely to place growing stress on supplies
of critical raw materials. These may, in turn, increasingly become the focus for competition and
conflict among states, as is already becoming the case with rare earth elements (REEs). At the same
time, demographic trends will be uneven across regions, with a youth population boom in Sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, contrasting with ageing populations in Europe and China. This is
likely to prompt sweeping social, political, economic and cultural changes domestically and affect
the competitiveness of different states and thus their role and influence internationally.

 Migration and urbanisation: Climate-related events such as floods and desertification are expected
to increase internal and cross-border migration and refugee flows in the coming years.223 This will
include migration towards Europe and the UK, placing additional strain on both transit and
recipient countries and provoking tensions and even violence. At the same time, hostile actors may
proactively seek to weaponise illegal migration as a coercive or disruptive tool (as with Russia and
Belarus in recent years224), or to promote narratives hostile to migrants or to governments’ responses
to migration. Equally, the futures literature emphasises the growing distribution of the world’s
population towards coastal areas (at risk from rising sea levels) and to cities, including mega-cities.
These are likely to be major political and economic centres of power in their own right, but also
complex and challenging operating environments for military forces deployed in the area.225

B.3. The impact of technology and digitalisation

As digitalisation continues worldwide, technological connections and interdependencies, including both
within military C2 systems and organisations and broader society, continue to grow,226 driven by trends
including:

 Pace of technological change: Policy documents and academic literature make repeated reference
to the accelerating pace of innovation, which may continue to increase in the future as new

221
Pfluger (2020).
222
Sovacool et al. (2023).
223
Duczynski et al. (2021).
224
Galeotti (2021).
225
Lacdan (2018).
226
Masys (2016).

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technologies enhance the ability to design, prototype, manufacture and deploy new hardware
solutions as well as to automate the generation of software. Whether innovation maintains or
increases its current rate or not, there is a widespread perception that it already far outstrips the
absorptive and adaptive capacity of public sector (and many other) institutions, which were
ultimately configured for the industrial age rather than the information one.227 This raises concerns
about the ability of the state to comprehend, let alone regulate, the cascading second- and third-
order PESTLE-M implications of disruptive new technologies; potential of dependencies that are
not fully understood or vulnerabilities that are not properly mitigated are likely. It also suggests an
urgent need to radically overhaul current approaches to capability development and acquisition
within Defence to keep pace with the latest generation of technology and the threat posed by others
(e.g. China).228

 Democratisation and proliferation: Along with speed, technological innovation is characterised by

its diffuse and globalised nature. This implies not only proliferation of key technologies to a wider
range of countries (threatening the technological advantage of the UK and its allies), but also the
democratisation of many of the underlying tools that enable actors to develop, acquire, use and
maintain these technologies. For example, individuals are now able to access and employ AI, ML,
cloud computing and 3D printing or other advanced manufacturing equipment to design and
produce hardware that would have required a factory in previous decades; similarly, individuals can
also access biotech previously found only in sophisticated and secure labs.229 The emergence of the
citizen and open science movements accentuates these trends, bringing both benefits and risks.230

 The shifting locus of innovation: There is an ongoing shift in the locus of innovation away from the
public sector (including defence laboratories) towards the private sector, and from large, vertically
integrated firms to a diffuse, globally distributed network of innovative companies and specialist
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Today, the research and development (R&D) budgets of
large multinational companies (MNCs) already far outstrip those of the UK MOD; this trend is
expected to continue in the future, with a growing focus on civil and dual-use technologies (i.e.
those with both civil and military applications) as opposed to bespoke military ones.231 This implies
a diminished role for government, and Defence specifically, in shaping innovation trends and
markets, and challenges in terms of being an intelligent customer for or regulator of technology.
Big Tech is projected to become increasingly influential within society and across the PESTLE-M
dimensions, demanding new forms of public-private partnership.232 The military is also expected
to need a different approach to technology integration, incorporating industry into its activities and

227
Barrons (2018).
228
Schoff & Ito (2019); Popper et al. (2020); Waltzman et al. (2020).
229
Cameron (2017).
230
Smith et al. (2017).
231
Kepe et al. (2018).
232
E.g. the role of Starlink in Ukraine. SpaceX (2022); Jaso (2022); Tett (2022); Verbyany & Krasnolutska (2022).

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C2 structures and making greater use of dual-use systems, ideally whilst avoiding risks such as
dependency or vendor lock-in (e.g. by embracing open systems architectures and modularity).233

 Increasing sophistication and vulnerability of technological systems: Military systems, and those
in society more generally, are becoming more complex as new technologies are introduced and
integrated, and both incremental and radical changes are made to existing systems and processes.234
The possible threat vectors and attack surfaces are similarly increasing, given the proliferation of
both vulnerabilities and dependencies, and new kinetic and non-kinetic means of causing
disruption (e.g. space, cyber, electronic). While there are advances underway in defences and
countermeasures (e.g. using AI to automate cyber defence), the increasing complexity of technical
systems and the deepening of digital society’s dependencies upon them raises the possibility that
threats will outstrip the capacity of defenders to protect critical infrastructure.235

 The profusion of data: Recent decades have seen an exponential increase in the volume (and variety)
of data generated by human society, and this trend is expected to continue into the 2030s and
beyond. This has profound ramifications across the PESTLE-M dimensions, with an expectation
that data will be one of if not the primary commodity of value in the future economy and the basis
for sweeping changes to society, enabling everything from changes to education to mass
surveillance. Advances in Big Data and data analytics, as well as cyber-physical systems and the
Internet of Things236 (and associated models such as the Internet of Bodies237), are coupled with
progress in data visualisation and simulation technologies, such as synthetic environments, virtual,
augmented and mixed reality (VR/AR/MR) and the metaverse. This offers potential benefits,
including through the use of AI, synthetic environments and digital twins for decision support. At
the same time, there is a heightened risk that data may be targeted, poisoned or misused, or that
the overwhelming volume of data may outstrip the cognitive capacity of decision makers.238

 The growth and expansion of networks: Secure, resilient and efficient networks are a crucial
capability for data and information sharing and system collaboration amidst greater technological
sophistication. However, network-centric warfare (NCW) and network enabled capacity (NEC)
have led to military systems becoming increasingly dependent on such networks.239 Russian,
Chinese and other nations’ doctrines make clear that they perceive future war as a ‘systems
confrontation’, where the primary intent is to target, disrupt and paralyse networks and C2 systems
and organisations via key nodes and linkages, rather than to destroy all or even most of the forces
that they connect and direct.240 At the same time, the growing impetus to incorporate new and

233
Priebe et al. (2020).
234
Chen et al. (2022).
235
Duczynski et al. (2021).
236
For more on the related Internet of Military Things (IoMT), see Poulter & Mackay (2018).
237
Irving (2021).
238
Lingel et al. (2021).
239
Tran et al. (2015).
240
Engstrom (2018).

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diverse actors into networks (e.g. PAGs, allies, partners, industry, citizens) poses new challenges for
architecture design and how to balance security and accessibility.241

 Impact of AI, ML and autonomy: Of all technologies, advances in AI and related fields are expected
to have the most profound potential impact on human society, as well as on Defence in general
and C2 specifically. This reflects the near-term impact of growing use of AI, ML and autonomy
across society and the military (including not only frontline but also back-office functions), with
sweeping ramifications across DLODs. Such technologies are especially important from the
perspective of complex adaptive systems, expanding the number and variety of machine agents
within the system, the interaction of which with human and inanimate features of the system is not
yet fully understood.242 Similarly, they raise challenges around law and ethics (see below) as well as
around explainability, traceability and AI safety. This includes the potential existential threat of
exponential growth in AI capabilities towards the so-called singularity and Artificial General
Intelligence (AGI) or Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI).243 Even short of this, autonomy and
automation could cause sweeping disruption to society, though the impacts are uncertain, with
some suggesting AI will lead to mass joblessness and hyper-inequality between AI ‘haves’ and ‘have
nots’, but others being more positive (e.g. with visions of ‘fully automated luxury communism’244).

 Impact of other emerging disruptive technologies: Significant disruption and change are projected
to arise from advances in diverse areas such as sensors, computing, ICTs, effectors (e.g. hypersonics,
directed energy weapons, cyber, counterspace technologies), synthetic biology, quantum, space,
energy and other fields.245 These not only affect wider society and the balance of power within the
global economy and politics, but also have a direct impact on the military, including C2. For
example, technology is expected to drive an increase in lethality and the ability to deliver effects at
scale and range, and new challenges in terms of survivability, camouflage or deception, including
the possibility of all-pervasive sensors creating a transparent battlefield.

 Challenges around workforce skills and barriers to absorption of new technologies: As noted in
Chapter 2, the focus for this paper and study is on C2 as a complex ‘socio-technical system’.
Technology must be integrated alongside other DLODs to constitute a new capability. This
includes the vital human element. New technologies are likely to exacerbate existing shortages in
terms of technical skills (e.g. for AI or cyber), even as automation reduces the need for certain older
skills and causes sweeping change and disruption to the workforce and economy. Government and
Defence are projected to continue to struggle to compete for and retain the top talent in niche skill
areas, given demand and salaries in the private sector, necessitating continuing innovation in
approaches to recruitment, development and retention, and use of the Whole Force (e.g. reserves).

241
Black & Lynch (2021).
242
Beautement (2015); McNeese et al. (2021).
243
McLean et al. (2021); Rudner & Toner (2021).
244
Bastani (2019).
245
UK MOD (2019).

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 Challenges around costs and legacy systems: Crucially, Defence C2 systems and organisations
will need to overcome cost constraints, as well as to consider how to integrate new tech alongside
legacy systems as part of an overall system of systems. This includes ensuring interoperability with
allies and partners, including a United States that is likely to be running further ahead with its high-
tech vision of future JADC2, even as smaller European allies still struggle to wean themselves off
Soviet-era equipment, posing the risk that NATO may find itself with a fragmented, patchwork
approach to C2 in the future or caught in a dilemma of ‘buy American’ for military advantage or
‘fall behind’ if prioritising domestic technical and industrial solutions to ensure sovereignty.246

B.4. The blurring of domains, both traditional and novel

Traditional distinctions between domains could diminish as global systems and networks across the
PESTLE-M spectrum multiply and become increasingly interconnected:

 Competition in and through cyberspace: The aforementioned dependencies of both militaries and
societies on data and networks increase the need for effective cybersecurity and cyber defence, as
well as the potential to achieve cognitive and decision advantage by targeting competitors’ systems
using offensive cyber capabilities. Cyberspace is increasingly contested, not only by peer rivals (e.g.
China, Russia) but also rogue states seeking to deliver disproportionate effects with finite resources
(e.g. North Korea, Iran) and by non-state actors ranging from terrorist groups to hacktivists.247
There is also growing concern over the potential impact of AI and quantum technologies (e.g.
optimisation and automation of cyber-attacks with AI or moves to post-quantum cryptography).248

 Competition in and through the electromagnetic environment: Comparatively overlooked for

decades, especially in Western militaries, the EME is also a focus of increasing activity and
contestation. This is reflected in continuing advances in ICTs, including 5G and 6G technologies,
as well as in electronic warfare (EW) capabilities (e.g. cognitive EW systems, jamming or spoofing
signals). This increases the risk of accidental fratricide, as the spectrum becomes more congested
and heavily used, as well as deliberate disruption of networks and systems by hostile action.249

 Competition in and through outer space: Recent decades have seen an exponential growth in the
number and variety of objects in orbit, aided by trends such as commercialisation, miniaturisation
and falling costs of launch (e.g. due to reusable vehicles). This has led to the emergence of the
NewSpace economy, with sweeping ramifications not only for activities in space but also the
provision of data and services to terrestrial users. Development is projected to accelerate into the

246
Black & Lynch (2021).
247
Bellasio & Silfversten (2021); Welburn & Strong (2021).
248
NCSC (2020).
249
Casey (2020); Healey (2021).

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2030s and beyond,250 leading to sweeping changes to the economy as well as new threats, risks and
dependencies in a domain that is becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive.251

 Growing focus on multi-domain integration: Formal recognition of new domains such as cyber and
EM, or space, and the ambition to better integrate activities across all domains and environments,
have led to concepts of multi- or joint all domain operations, as outlined in Chapter 2. Though
there are no direct Russian or Chinese analogues, there are overlaps in terms of the underlying
principles within the military thinking of the UK’s potential adversaries. This is driving investment
activity and experimentation and concept and capability development work, looking to the 2030s
and beyond. At the same time, there are enduring conceptual and practical challenges to bringing
together effects across the domains through joint planning and execution, including the differing
nature, ownership, time frames and measures of effect for, say, kinetic as opposed to cyber-
attacks.252

 Growing focus on public-private partnership: The distinction between the civilian and military
sectors is becoming more blurred, particularly in domains and environments such as cyber and EM,
and space, given the emphasis on ‘dual use’ technologies. This necessitates alternative, more
collaborative approaches to C2 as well as new dynamics within complex adaptive systems.

 Risk of cascading disruption to military and non-military systems: Decision makers will need to
navigate a growing number of strategic choices to anticipate and respond to greater risks and
uncertainties within individual domains as well as those emerging from their interlinkages. Any
decision made in one area is likely to cause unpredictable effects elsewhere in the international
system. There is a particular concern in the literature over the limited understanding of how to
manage cross-domain effects from a deterrence and escalation management perspective.253

 Potential to learn lessons from innovation in new operating domains: There are opportunities to
learn from novel approaches to C2, interagency, multinational and public-private partnerships, or
technology development and acquisition in the newer domains of cyber and space. Organisations
in these domains are relatively unencumbered by legacy systems or processes, providing scope to
try out novel approaches that might then inform change in more established areas (e.g. land).254 At
the same time, activity in new domains may be constrained by the immaturity of understanding of
their unique nature and characteristics, as well a tendency to draw false parallels to established
domains (e.g. by viewing space power primarily through the lens of air or maritime analogies).255

250
Black, Slapakova & Martin (2022).
251
DIA (2022).
252
Black, Lynch et al. (2022).
253
Mallory (2018); Gartzke & Lindsay (2019); Sweijs & Zilinick (2019).
254
Retter et al. (2022).
255
Mendenhall (2018).

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B.5. The shifting of international norms and value sets

The literature also emphasises the impact of broader trends occurring within law, ethics and cultural norms,
both at the national/societal and international levels. Examples include:

 Challenges to trust and legitimacy for governance systems: Failure to fulfil pledges on economic
growth, mitigate the negative impact of technology, or combat climate change, as well as the fact
that costs and risks are expected to fall unevenly across populations (affecting the poor and
marginalised in particular), may undermine public trust in state institutions. This could drive
political extremism (e.g. the rise of ecoterrorist groups or fringe political parties), and push some
groups to turn to citizen movements and private actors to provide support and action where states
have failed. Hostile actors may seek to exploit this, for instance to promote authoritarian models
of governance or otherwise challenge and reshape the rules-based international system.

 Challenges to sovereignty: Along with the continuing democratisation of technology and

empowerment of extremist groups and even individuals with capabilities that were reserved to states
in previous decades or centuries, comes the erosion of the monopoly of the state on legitimate
violence and the basic principles of the Westphalian system of global politics.256 As NGOs, MNCs,
media and Big Tech become increasingly influential, they are projected to play an increasing role
in shaping international norms, laws and regulations, including around governance of new
technologies such as AI. Similarly, interstate conflict (e.g. in Ukraine, or potentially over Taiwan)
may further undermine the sanctity of post-1945 principles such as resolving issues through
diplomacy rather than armed aggression. The growing range of ways and means to deliver
subversive or coercive effects in the ‘grey zone’ provides additional challenges, such as normalising
certain hostile behaviours or encouraging the securitisation of a growing range of policy problems
(which may not always be beneficial or appropriate).257

 Structural barriers to coordination and consensus: Achieving change in this context of increasingly
diffuse power (e.g. to address a super-wicked problem such as climate change) is progressively more
difficult, given the coordination problems inherent with a large number of actors.258 Progress
requires achieving compromise and a balance of interests between multiple competing audiences
(both domestic and foreign), which is a challenge when faced with increased global connectivity.

 A highly contested information environment: Trends in this area include the ongoing digitalisation
of society and proliferation of ICTs and relevant technologies (e.g. social media) to global
audiences; the fragmentation and contestation of the concept of truth, leading to misinformation,
disinformation and contested facts259; changes in the media sector, including both traditional
players (e.g. newspaper and TV) and newer outlets, and both the promotion of state-backed voices
(e.g. by China, Russia, Iran, etc.) and the powerful grip of partisan private outlets on certain

256
Lake et al. (2021).
257
Mazarr et al. (2019).
258
Ritchey (2013); Duczynski et al. (2021); Head (2022b).
259
Kavanagh & Rich (2018); Devaux, Grand-Clement & Hoorens (2022).

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markets (e.g. Fox); and the use of AI, deepfakes, Big Data and various other tools and technologies
to expand the potential reach and impact of messages targeted at different audiences.260

 Increased focus on social equity and diversity and inclusion: The literature emphasises not only
continuing shifts in political, economic and cultural power at the global level (e.g. with a growing
role for voices from the East or Global South), but also enduring power imbalances in the
international system that favour Western nations. There is an ongoing discourse around equity and
equality at the international, national and local level, including a wave of social movements tackling
injustices, critiquing established power structures, and promoting the rights and interests of
marginalised groups (e.g. based on ethnicity, sex, gender, sexuality, belief, etc.). Local issues can
inspire a global backlash or sympathy, depending on group identity or other factors, making use of
digital technologies to mobilise support from individuals, businesses or NGOs. Culture wars may
also reduce the scope for nuanced dialogue and compromise on complex but politicised issues,
leading to further fragmentation, paralysis and potentially even civil strife, public disorder or
violence. This poses both direct and indirect challenges for the military, for example in terms of
mobilising domestic or foreign audiences’ support for operations or accessing talent from diverse
backgrounds.261

 Uncertainty over future trends in ethics and morality: More generally, there is uncertainty in the
futures literature as to how broader values, culture and systems of ethics and morality may evolve
out to the 2030s and beyond. There is particular discussion of the role of technology in shaping –
and in turn being shaped by – these shifting norms. A prominent example of obvious relevance to
Defence C2 is the ongoing debate about how ethics and norms will evolve in relation to AI and
autonomy, up to and including the role of lethal autonomous weapon systems. Such trends raise
fundamental questions about humanity, its relationship with technology and the environment, the
organisation of politics, the economy and society, and how leadership styles and military ethics
should evolve in the future operating environment.262

 Lawfare and weaponisation of the regulatory environment: Norms and cultural values are also
reinforced through legal and regulatory instruments, both at the national and international level.
These continue to evolve, for example through ongoing work at the international level to develop
new governance regimes for global commons (e.g. space, cyberspace). However, actors can exploit
legal systems in malicious ways (so-called lawfare) and are seeking to influence the development of
international law and regulation to favour their own interests amidst strategic competition.263

260
Hybrid CoE (2020).
261
Slapakova, Caves et al. (2022).
262
Krause (2021).
263
Ormsbee (2021); Brackup et al. (2022); Lafontaine (2022).

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Annex C. Complexity-focused methods

This annex provides a brief description and, where relevant, visualisation of prominent examples of methods
for analysing complexity and complex adaptive systems, building on the discussion in Chapter 5:

 Cybernetics

 Soft Systems Methodology (SSM)

 Systems Engineering (SE)

 Critical Systems Theory (CST) and Practice (CSP)

 Interpretative Structural Modelling (ISM)

 Other Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis Methods

 Design Thinking.

C.1. Cybernetics
As outlined in Chapter 2, cybernetics has been a major influence on the development of complexity and
systems theory.264 Cybernetics has been defined by its early proponent, Norbert Weiner, as ‘the science of
control and communication, in the animal and the machine’.265
A foundational concept within the cybernetics literature is Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, also sometimes
known as the First Law of Cybernetics.266 This postulates that ‘when the variety or complexity of the
environment exceeds the capacity of a system (natural or artificial) the environment will dominate and
ultimately destroy that system’ and that, as a consequence, ‘the complexity of a control system must be
equal to or greater than the complexity of the system it controls’.267 This hypothesis implies that C2 systems
and organisations in the future will need to be sufficiently complex, and able to draw on a wide variety of

264
Castellani & Gerrits (2021).
265
Weiner (1948).
266
For more information about the derivation of the Law of Requisite Variety, see Boisot & McKelvey (2011).
267
Ashby (1956).

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potential nuanced responses, if they are to grapple with complex problems.268 Or, as Ashby put it, ‘only
variety can absorb variety’.269 Other relevant concepts within cybernetics include270:

1.) Cybernetic models describe the behaviour of control systems. They comprise
a ‘controller,’ which specifies system goals, and a ‘control object.’ 2.) Adaptive
systems are open, interacting with their environments. They must be able to
modify structure and function to adapt to environmental change. 3.) The state
that a system is in at any point in time depends on past states and the goal state
specified by the ‘controller.’ 4.) System performance is monitored in time, and
information on actual performance is fed back to a comparator, which contrasts
what is happening with what is wanted. 5.) Resources are allocated as required to
ensure that actual system performance is within the limits specified by the
controller. 6.) The range of adaptability is limited by the variety of available
resources. If the system is subjected to a variety of environmental disturbance, but
has a limited variety of resources, its adaptive capability is limited. 7.) The lowest
levels of the system must be able to function autonomously because centralized
control is limited. Man, for example, has both a central and autonomic nervous
system. The autonomic system controls variables such as blood pressure, body
temperature, and blood sugar level. The central nervous system is not involved at
this level of control unless the autonomic system malfunctions.

Cybernetics can thus be used as the basis for generating an understanding of a control system and its ability
to exert – or not – influence over an external system or process, as shown in Figure C.1 below.

Figure C.1 Schematic of a general control system

Source: Skyttner (2005).

268
Dabell (2018).
269
Quot. in Dabell (2018).
270
Howland (1988), cit. in Oluvie (1997).

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Cybernetics thus emphasises the need for C2 systems and organisations to increase their FARness
(flexibility, adaptiveness and robustness), so as to maximise the variety of responses they can call upon, and
to make use of improved sensor and sense-making capabilities (e.g. using AI and Big Data) to attenuate
(filter) any variety in the environment which is irrelevant to what they are seeking to observe, and better
understand what is known and controllable.

Figure C.2 Knowledge-control matrix

Source: Schuck (2021).

In turn, it is possible to map this generalised model of a control system to the specific context of decision
making within military C2. A prominent example is Lawson’s model, as shown in Figure C. 3 below.

Figure C.3 Lawson’s model for C2

Source: Lawson (1978), cit. in Skyttner (2005).

The cybernetics literature thus holds a range of relevant insights and potential guiding principles for
designing C2 systems and organisations. It emphasises the need for improved information flows and
communications, enhanced cognitive capacity, agility and ability to innovate, and a flexible range of levers
to use to exert an influence (control) on the external environment.271 It also emphasises the fundamental
trade-offs that exist between meaningful insights and precise language, models or plans when dealing with
the messy realities of complex systems such as society, geopolitics or warfare – Lotfi Zadeh’s concept of

271
Oluvie (1997); NATO STO (2014).

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‘Fuzzy Logic’ (the Law of Incompatibility) stressing ‘as complexity rises, precise statements lose meaning
and meaningful statements lose precision.’272 This has thus led to the emergence of various so-called fuzzy
techniques for modelling and analysis, examples of which are included in Section C.6 below.
These insights can also be pushed even further and applied recursively as a critique of the practice of
cybernetics itself – known as second-order cybernetics. Originating in the work of Heinz van Foerster in
1974, this cybernetics-of-cybernetics examines the ‘control of control and the communication of
communication’ and explores the recursive nature of relationships with and among the observers (or other
actors such as designers, users, etc.) engaging with and trying to understand an observed system.273 In turn,
there have been tentative attempts to develop a theory of third-order cybernetics, which would push this
logic even further by trying to embed second-order cybernetics within a broader social or ecological context,
but this promotion of higher orders has had more limited uptake.

C.2. Systems Engineering

Systems Engineering (SE) can be defined as ‘a methodical and multi-disciplinary approach for the design,
realization, technical management, operations, and retirement of a system’ and ‘the art and science of
developing an operable system capable of meeting requirements within often opposed constraints’.274 While
there are questions over whether SE is an appropriate tool for understanding all complex systems or CAS,
or is instead best applied only to manmade systems which can be designed and engineered, SE has emerged
as a popular body of theory and practice across academia, the private sector and to an extent government.
SE seeks to balance a series of interactions within complex systems, such as between organisational structure,
the performance of a technical solution, cost, and stakeholder buy-in to a given programme.

272
Zadeh quot. in McNeil & Freiberger (1993).
273
Scott (2004).
274
NASA (2019).

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Figure C.4 Systems approach

Source: BHW (2023).

To achieve this balance between opposing, potentially conflicting, constraints and objectives, SE emphasises
the need for system engineers to consider the big picture while also diving deep into specifics, before
repeatedly resurfacing to test and adjust the approach over time. This begins with defining a concept of
operations, before moving through the architecture, system and sub-system levels down to the granular
detail, before working back up and revisiting plans and assumptions as needed in response to multiple levels
of testing and verification activities. This ‘combination of “top-down” design and “bottom-up” build and
check’ is often depicted as a V-diagram, as shown in Figure C.5 below.275

275
BHW (2023).

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Figure C.5 Indicative V-diagram for systems engineering

Source: Wikimedia (n.d.). Note: such an approach may not be appropriate or useful for complex systems or CAS.

Various tools and techniques are associated with SE as an overarching approach. These include but are not
limited to the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) (see Section C.7 for further discussion); function means
analysis; holistic requirements modelling; matrix diagrams (including the Pugh Matrix); stakeholder or
systems mapping; and viewpoint analysis. SE is now a well-established management practice in many large
and complex organisations, such as those responsible for designing and implementing programmes relating
to industrial production, healthcare, nuclear or transport. Equally, it has its acknowledged limitations,
including difficulty grappling with more unstructured situations, leading to the emergence of alternative
approaches, such as Soft Systems Methodology and Critical Systems Thinking, as discussed below.276

C.3. Soft Systems Methodology

Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) is an alternative and widely applied approach to thinking about and
grappling with complex problems. It emerged out of research at the Lancaster Systems Department in the
1970s into the struggles of ‘hard’ systems engineering approaches to solving business management or policy
challenges, positing that more success could be had with a ‘soft’ approach to such messy and ill-defined real-
world problems.277 SSM differentiates between the real world and the systems thinking world, postulating
that the latter is best understood as a domain of abstract concepts (holons) which, when used against the
real world, can help to inform interventions that achieve positive change.278

276
Flood (1988).
277
Checkland (1981); Wilson (2001).
278
Rodriguez-Ulloa & Paucar-Caceres (2005).

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Over time SSM has evolved to encompass a well-documented seven-step process, as outlined in the figure
below.

Figure C.6 Seven Steps of SSM

Source: Burge (2015).

This process is associated with a variety of tools, including279:

 Rich Picture: A visual depiction of a complex situation which enables identification of differing
interpretations of the situation, the relevant systems and elements, and their interrelationships.
These should not be constrained by formal notations or symbology.

 Root Definitions: A statement of purpose that captures the essence of a particular situation.

 CATWOE: A framework for defining and analysing different stakeholder perspectives and roles
within any change programme, comprising a mnemonic for Customer, Actor, Transformation,
Worldview (or the German ‘Weltanschauung’), Owner and Environmental Constraints.

 Conceptual Models: Defensible logical models of Human Activity Systems, i.e. the possible changes
that could be undertaken to achieve a desired transformation in the real world.

These have a common focus on drawing out different perspectives on, and mental models of, the world,
fleshing out and refining these, and then defining a transformation programme and series of operational

279
Burge (2015).

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activities that appear rational and logically defensible within the constraints of having incomplete
information and bounded rationality. SSM also emphasises the need to compare these models with the real
world, and to establish a monitoring and control system (or, argue some theorists, a two-tiered system280)
to implement refinements to the approach as needed based on feedback from the environment. This focuses
on evaluating systems performance in terms of the so-called three E’s, namely281:

 Effectiveness: Is the system doing the right thing – contributing to higher-level goals?

 Efficacy: Is the system providing the desired result?

 Efficiency: Is the system using the minimum of resources?

As such, SSM offers a structured yet flexible approach to look at complex problems and encourage debate
among a variety of stakeholder or expert perspectives. At the same time, such a ‘soft’ approach is inherently
limited in terms of its ability to leverage ‘hard’ systems engineering or modelling techniques. In particular,
its models are not descriptions of the real world and thus cannot be treated as offering robust or normative
guidance on how to solve a given problem. As a result, there have been various attempts to merge elements
of SSM with other approaches, such as outlined below.

C.4. Soft System Dynamics Methodology

Given the abovementioned limitations to SSM, it has been combined with insights from Systems Dynamics
to form the Soft System Dynamics Methodology (SSDM). This focuses on three worlds rather than the
two counterposed in SSM: the Real World, the Problem-Situation-Oriented System Thinking World and
the Solving-Situation-Oriented System Thinking World. SSDM involves ten steps rather than seven,
moving back and forth between these three worlds282:
Real World:

1. Looking at the Unstructured Problem-Situation

2. Structured Problem-Situation or ‘Rich Picture’

First SSDM Systemic Loop: Problem-Situation Systems Thinking World

3. Problem-Oriented Root Definitions

4. Building System Dynamics Models of the ‘Problematic Situation’

Real World:

5. Compare Stage 4 Against Stage 2

280
Wilson argues that there should be only one level of monitoring and control, since any operational activities
derived via defensible logic from the Root Definition must be aligned to the intended purpose and thus effective. By
contrast, Checkland argues that an additional layer is required, beyond the monitoring and controlling of
operational activities (which determines their efficacy and efficiency), to account for the wider environment (to
determine effectiveness). Cf. the discussion in Burge (2015, 9–10).
281
Checkland (1981); Wilson (2001).
282
Rodriguez-Ulloa & Paucar-Caceres (2005).

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Second SSDM Systemic Loop: Solving-Situation Systems Thinking World

6. Determine Culturally Feasible and Systematically Desirable Changes

7. Building System Dynamics Models of the ‘Solving Situation’

8. Solving Situation-Oriented Root Definitions

Real World:

9. Implementation of Feasible and Desirable Changes in the Real World

10. Learning Points

C.5. Critical Systems Thinking and Practice

Critical Systems Thinking and Practice (CST or CSP) address similar themes to deliberation with analysis,
another meta-approach that focuses on broadening the number and variety of voices and disciplinary
perspectives brought to bear on a problem. This is based on a critique of enduring stovepipes and failures
to engage with a greater diversity of perspectives even within mainstream complexity and systems thinking,
despite the avowed rejection of positivism, reductionism and hierarchical approaches within those fields.
Proponents of CSP advocate a guiding rubric known as EPIC283:

 E: Exploring the problem situation

 P: Producing an appropriate intervention strategy

 I: Intervening flexibly (and revisiting the previous two steps as needed)

 C: Checking on progress.

As is a recurring theme, this again proposes an iterative, adaptive approach to manage complexity over time.

C.6. Interpretative Structural Modelling

Various modelling techniques can be employed to help understand and navigate complex adaptive systems.
A prominent example is Interpretative Structural Modelling (ISM), a method which emerged from the
work of John Warfield in the 1970s. ISM provides a structured approach to analysing complex systems by
first deconstructing them to their system elements (nodes) and then exploring and modelling the
relationships among them (links), thereby obtaining a hierarchical structural model of the overall system284:

ISM deals with the interpretation of the embedded object or representation system
by systematic iterative application of graph theory resulting in a directed graph for
the complex system for a given contextual relationship amongst a set of elements.
Interpretive structural modelling, can, therefore, be defined as a process that

283
Jackson (2020).
284
Sushil (2012).

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transforms unclear and poorly articulated mental models of systems into visible,
well-defined models useful for many purposes.

Importantly, ISM is intended as an iterative and, often, group process.285 It seeks to bring together multiple
actors’ perspectives and interpretations – the I in ISM – of a complex issue or system, and to refine mental
models over time through analysis and learning.286 Algorithmic steps include development of structural self-
interaction (SSIM) and reachability matrices, and then a digraph to depict the system elements and their
relationships, and thus feedback loops (though these may sometimes be eliminated, to produce a digraph
of minimum edges, if the intention is to focus only on direct rather than indirect relationships).287

Figure C.7 Steps of Interpretative Structural Modelling

Source: Thakkar (2021).

ISM has been employed in a wide range of civilian settings but has also specifically been used to help
understand military–civil integration and other questions of C2.288 It benefits from enabling the ‘first-cut’
visualisation of a complex system in a simplified manner – and thus one more digestible to policy makers
or military officials – and facilitating deliberation and analysis among experts to move towards a better
understanding of the structure of that system.289 However, ISM also suffers from drawbacks. These include

285
Janes (1988).
286
Kumar & Singh (2019).
287
Sushil (2012).
288
Yang & Zhang (2019).
289
Kumar & Singh (2019).

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the reliance on computing modelling and specialist knowledge to interpret the data, as well as the fact that
ISM can depict the what and how of a system, but not the why (i.e. the causality of the links depicted).290
A more recent iteration of the ISM approach is Total Interpretative Structural Modelling (TISM), which
seeks to generate a deeper understanding of the why, while so-called ISM* seeks to combine elements of
both classical and TISM approaches.291

C.7. Multi-Criteria Decision Methods

ISM is one of the more prominent examples among a broader toolkit of methods known as Multi-Criteria
Decision Analysis (MCDA) or Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM). This field has seen significant
research and practitioner interest in recent decades, including applications within UK Defence and PAGs
(e.g. to inform force and capability development decisions).292
Besides ISM, examples of MCDA methods include, but are not limited to:

 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)

 Analytic Network Process (ANP)

 Fuzzy Set Theory (FST)

 Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS)

 Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL)

A more complete list of MCDA methods, including original sources and citation numbers as of 2022, can
be found in Taherdoost & Madanchian (2023).
Though these methods differ in their respective steps, strengths and limitations, a recurring theme is a focus
on improving problem structuring; understanding the decision and trade space; scoring alternative courses
of action based on evaluation criteria; and, ultimately, assigning weighting to those different criteria and
thus coming to a final decision. MDCA techniques are thus intended to help decision makers face the messy
reality that their choices are likely to be a compromise between several competing impulses and will have
contradictory, even counterintuitive, impacts, but still need to be as robust and defensible as possible even
though they cannot optimise for one single criterion.293
Though they are not all explicitly tailored to – or appropriate for – dealing with CAS,294 MCDA methods
offer potential utility in their focus on providing structured approaches to grappling with uncertain and
imperfect information, exploring multivariate and non-linear dynamics, providing weighting for different
data inputs (including stakeholder or expert opinion295), and striking more informed compromises in

290
Sushil (2012).
291
Sushil (2012); Sorooshian et al. (2023).
292
DCLG (2009); Bailey & Pitinanondha (2016); HM Treasury (2022).
293
Taherdoost & Madanchian (2023).
294
Voronin (2017).
295
Bailey & Pitinanondha (2016).

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strategic or operational decision making (of interest when seeking to align the overlapping, perhaps
competing, goals of cross-governmental or multinational partners within a C2 system of systems).296

C.8. Design Thinking

Related to the surge in activity around complexity and systems thinking over the last few decades, there has
also been a proliferation of academic literature and practical initiatives under the auspices of Design
Thinking. While there is no single authoritative definition, design is often understood to mean the act of
imagining or creating that which is needed but does not yet exist.297 Beaulieu-B and Dufort offer a definition
in the military context which explicitly ties design thinking to grappling with complexity298:

Military design thinking means the capability to understand a current conflict

environment from a holistic perspective, to imagine a desired post-conflict
environment and to realize it with counterintuitive military and non-military
means. In short… [it] is an umbrella term for a more or less consistent assemblage
of reflexive approaches including complexity theory (e.g. John Holland, Yaneer
Bar-Yam, Robert Axelrod), systems thinking (e.g. Peter Checkland, Fritjof Capra,
Humberto Maturana) and postmodern social theory (e.g. Michel Foucault, Gilles
Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Jacques Ranciere) to name a few.

Since its emergence in the 1960s and 1970s, design thinking has been applied in a range of civilian sectors
grappling with complex systems. Examples include computing, urban planning and consumer product
design. Design thinkers often emphasise and practice multidisciplinary approaches, drawing from many of
the diverse fields discussed in Chapter 2. Over the decades, various sub-fields have emerged, such as service
design, with a more recent trend towards human-centric or social systems design.
Military design thinking started in Israel, where the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) coined the Systemic
Operational Design (SOD) method in the 1990s. This drew on ‘a diverse interdisciplinary approach that
included foremost an analysis of Soviet operational art using general systems theory, informed by a critical
reading of military history’ as well as cybernetics, psychology and post-modernism.299 Though the IDF later
turned away from SOD in the years before the 2006 Hezbollah War, having found it hard to replace more
traditional joint operational planning processes, its military design thinking soon influenced other
militaries. In 2010, the United States outlined its own Army Design Methodology, while the US Marine
Corps followed with its own in 2017.300 The IDF introduced a successor to SOD in 2013, with its Systemic
Inquiry in Operational Mediation methodology,301 while the Australian Defence Force folded elements of
this thinking into its Joint Military Appreciation Process.302 Design thinking has subsequently been

296
Taherdoost & Madanchian (2023).
297
Nelson & Stolterman (2003); Jackson (2019); Wrigley et al. (2021).
298
Beaulieu-B & Dufort (2017, 2).
299
Naveh (1997), cit. in Jackson (2019).
300
US Department of the Army (2015); US Marine Corps (2017).
301
Zweibelson (2017).
302
ADF (2016).

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incorporated into professional military education courses on both sides of the Atlantic, and the notion of
‘operational design’ introduced into NATO doctrine.303 For its part, the UK MOD has ‘provided doctrine
to their military that expresses many design concepts while avoiding the word “design” entirely’.304
While each national or service-level methodology for operational design has its own nuances, common
themes include a strong focus on environment and problem framing, critical thinking and iterative cycles
of exploration, prototyping and refinement of possible solutions.305 This links more classical approaches to
planning and operational art (e.g. identification of desired end states, centre of gravity analysis, etc.) to
complex adaptive systems theory.306 Military design thinking methods also tend to be more community or
civilian-centred and thus aligned to concepts of human security.307 Outside of strategy making and joint
planning, design methods have also been applied to other Defence problems in recent years, including force
design and transformation of approaches to capability development. Examples of specific methods include
horizon scanning, scenario analysis, systems mapping, wind tunnelling, prototyping, empathy mapping,
GIGA-mapping, paradoxical reasoning, and substantive play.308 While each has its own strengths and
limitations, there is a recurring focus on encouraging creativity and lateral and divergent thinking.309
Importantly, proponents emphasise the need to apply design thinking not only to a given strategy or plan,
but also to the meta-strategy, i.e. the architecture, system or process through which those strategies and
plans are developed, and the metrics framework by which the success or failure of implementation is then
monitored. This calls for a continuous effort to co-adapt the UK’s C2 systems in light of both the
prototyping and design of plans and an evolving understanding of the external environment (including
hostile actors’ own C2). This is illustrated in Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5. This self-reflexive design approach
also bears some similarities to uncertainty-sensitive planning techniques outlined in Annex D.

303
De Spiegeleire et al. (2014); van der Veer (2015).
304
Zweibelson (2018), quot. in Jackson (2019).
305
Wrigley et al. (2021).
306
Jackson (2019).
307
Wrigley et al. (2021).
308
Pincombe et al. (2019); Zweibelson (2019).
309
Furtado (2019).

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Annex D. DMDU Methods

This annex provides a brief description and, where relevant, visualisation of prominent DMDU methods,
building on the discussion in Chapter 5 about the intersection between tackling complexity and uncertainty:

 Robust Decision Making (RDM)

 Three Horizon Foresight (3HF)

 Assumption-Based Planning (ABP)

 Dynamic Adaptive Planning (DAP)

 Strategic Portfolio Analysis (SPA)

 Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways (DAPP).

For a more detailed description and assessment of each, including potential applications for UK Defence
and necessary enablers, see Black, Paille et al. (2021).

D.1. Robust Decision Making (RDM)

RDM is one of the most high-profile DMDU methods. It seeks to create a range of robust options (for a
given strategy, policy, plan or decision) rather than to predict the optimal approach. Options can then be
tested against a large number of plausible futures using computer modelling to evaluate their performance
as they adapt over time and to enable an assessment of the trade-offs between them.

Figure D.1 Overview of the RDM process

Source: Lempert et al. (2013).

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This involves the following steps310:

 Decision structuring or framing: understanding the objectives that a decision maker is seeking to
frame in subsequent generation of a robust strategy or plan. This typically involves use of an XLRM
framework to identify: (X) exogenous factors, i.e. those external factors that affect the success or
failure of a strategy but which cannot be controlled by the decision maker; (L) levers, i.e. the
possible actions available to them; (R) relationships, i.e. causal linkages between X and L; and (M)
measures of performance, i.e. indicators that can be used to assess progress with a given strategy
towards the agreed objectives. Figure B.2 provides an illustrative example of an XLRM framework
(note: while RDM has been widely applied in defence and security studies,311 given their
sensitivities this example is instead drawn from an unclassified study on environmental
management).

Figure D.2 Example of an XLRM framework

Source: Marchau et al. (2019).

 Case generation: using modelling and simulation to generate a wide range of plausible futures
against which to test possible strategies. Here, the focus is on measuring and minimising ‘regret’
across these plausible futures, i.e. minimising the difference between the outcome of a possible
strategy and the optimal one for a given world state. This differs from optimising a strategy for a
single scenario or small set of scenarios selected according to particular criteria (e.g. likelihood);
instead, the aim is to identify those strategies that minimise regret across the widest range of
plausible futures. This does not necessarily mean that outcomes would be favourable, but rather
that outcomes would be as good, or as least bad, as possible (which may still be unsatisfactory).
Crucially, this does not mean seeking the lowest common-denominator strategy. Rather, it is about

310
Groves & Lempert (2007); Kasprzyk et al. (2013); Kalra & Groves (2017); Marchau et al. (2019).
311
E.g. Dixon et al. (2007); Leftwich et al. (2019); Popper (2019b).

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identifying those actions which help to minimise regret across a range of plausible futures so as to
mitigate the risk of surprise, strategic shock or high levels of regret.

 Scenario discovery: assessing the strengths and vulnerabilities of potential strategies when applied
to this wide range of plausible futures. This often involves using Scenario Discovery (SD)
algorithms such as the Patient Rule Induction Method (PRIM) or Classification and Regression
Tree (CART) to help identify vulnerabilities via statistical cluster analysis. These algorithms can
pinpoint clusters of possible strategies that perform well for one or more values of uncertainty, and
identify associated vulnerabilities or other alternative strategies for mitigating them.

 Trade-off analysis: assessing the trade-offs between the identified strategies, given the stated
objectives of the decision maker (from Step 1). This can include combining elements of multiple
strategies, based on analysis of levels of regret experienced over time and across the full uncertainty
space in terms of plausible futures.

 Identification of robust strategies: adopting and then implementing strategies that are most robust
across a wide range of plausible futures and minimise regret. Robust strategies should involve
adaptive elements and monitoring of signals of changing conditions, so as to help them remain
effective over time, informed by the analysis of vulnerabilities and potential shocks or surprises that
could occur within the uncertainty space.

D.2. Three Horizon Foresight (3HF)

3HF focuses on the requirement for decision makers to consider multiple time frames simultaneously312:

 Horizon 1, representing the current state of the operating environment, as well as ‘pockets of the
future’, i.e. immature manifestations of emergent behaviour and order, and weak signals about how
the structure and dynamics of the system may evolve in the future.

 Horizon 3, representing the range of plausible alternative future states in the face of uncertainty.

 Horizon 2, representing the transition between 1 and 3, where variables and actors interact to
determine which of the plausible alternative futures comes to pass, with competitors trying to steer
towards their own desired futures based on their own bounded rationality and finite levers.

This technique is intended to help frame a structured conversation between analysts and decision makers
in the absence of a quantitative model, focusing on understanding how best to navigate the ‘triangle of
conflict’ that exists in Horizon 2 and to identify weak signals early on when envisaging Horizon 3.313

312
Curry & Hodgson (2008).
313
Curry & Hodgson (2008).

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Figure D.3 Three Horizon Foresight model

Source: Ecola et al. (2018).

D.3. Assumption-Based Planning (ABP)

ABP is a qualitative method for developing more robust decisions in the face of an uncertain and complex
situation.314 It involves five steps:

 Identifying the assumptions underpinning a given strategy or plan.

 Identifying which of these are ‘load bearing’ (i.e. their negation would jeopardise success and
require significant changes to the approach) and which are vulnerable (i.e. ‘if a plausible event in
the world would cause them to fail… within the planning time horizon’315).

 Identifying signals that may suggest to decision makers that these assumptions are changing and
thus that the initial plan is becoming increasingly vulnerable to failure, if not adjusted. Monitoring
systems can then be set up to capture these warning signs and enable adaptation.

 Identifying shaping actions, defined as proactive steps that can be taken in the short term of the
planning horizon to ‘control the vulnerability of an important assumption’ (e.g. if a plan relies on
an ally’s continuing support, taking diplomatic action to shore up that support).

 Identifying hedging actions, defined as steps that can be taken in the short term of the planning
horizon ‘intended to better prepare an organisation for the failure of one of its important
assumptions’ (e.g. if a plan relies on an ally’s continuing support, taking steps to diversify into other
partnerships or shore up sovereign capacity to act alone if the ally withdraws support).

314
Dewar & Levin (1992); Lempert et al. (2008).
315
Dewar et al. (1993).

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Figure D.4 Assumption-Based Planning

Source: Ecola et al. (2018).

D.4. Dynamic Adaptive Planning

DAP draws on a similar overarching philosophy to ABP, but elaborates upon it within an overall two-phase
approach covering design and implementation. The design phase involves five steps316:

 Stage setting: defining the objectives that a plan aims to fulfil, along with known constraints and
possible options available to decision makers.

 Assembling an initial plan: development of an initial plan on the basis of the outputs of the first
step and gathering a variety of expert and stakeholder perspectives to identify the conditions (e.g.
PESTLE-M or similar framework) necessary to achieve success (i.e. key assumptions).

 Increasing the robustness of the initial plan: taking action to increase robustness and the scope for
the plan to endure and adapt over time in response to feedback. This includes identifying
opportunities and vulnerabilities, i.e. elements that will reduce or increase the success of the plan
as initially envisaged. This can be done via a range of methods depending on data, time and
resource, including exploratory modelling for a more quantitative approach, or a more qualitative
SWOT analysis or Delphi process.317 Five types of near-term actions can then be taken to address
these opportunities and vulnerabilities:

o Mitigating actions: these address the initial plan’s likely vulnerabilities.

o Hedging actions: these address uncertain vulnerabilities and the associated risks.

o Seizing actions: these are those likely to improve the plan based on likely opportunities.

o Exploiting actions: these exploit uncertain opportunities for the plan’s benefit or success.

316
Marchau et al. (2019).
317
SWOT = Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Delphi is a workshop-based expert elicitation
technique involving multiple rounds of assessment and scoring, with deliberation in between, so as to identify the
reasons for divergence of expert opinions and move towards a common position.

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o Shaping actions: these seek to influence the external environment of the plan (e.g. the
international system) to limit its likelihood of failure and increase its likelihood of success.

 Setting up a monitoring system: developing a monitoring system to capture signals that decision
makers can use to evolve and adapt the plan over time during the implementation phase, based on
feedback on the environment. This involves identification of indicators that could feasibly be
tracked and, where relevant, thresholds that indicate a change to the plan needs to occur.

 Preparing the trigger responses: identifying four types of contingent actions that can be taken if
needed due to signals picked up by the monitoring system set up in the previous step:

o Defensive actions: taken in response to triggers identified in Step 4 but which do not alter
the nature of the plan.

o Corrective actions: taken to change the plan in light of the triggers.

o Capitalising actions: taken to exploit emerging opportunities to increase the performance

of the plan after it is implemented.

o Reassessment: stepping back to the beginning of the planning cycle when it becomes clear
that the plan can no longer be successful (e.g. due to changing conditions or goals).

Having addressed these issues in the design phase, it is then possible to implement the initial plan and then
monitor signals and learn and adapt over time as needed, increasing robustness in the face of uncertainty.

Figure D.5 Dynamic Adaptive Planning: the design phase

Source: Marchau et al. (2019).

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D.5. Strategic Portfolio Analysis

Portfolio analysis focuses on how to balance between multiple objectives, as opposed merely to increasing
the robustness of a plan to deliver on one goal. It can be defined as an ‘analysis that assesses alternative
investment options by diverse qualitative or quantitative objectives, including risk mitigation. The analysis
aids in “balancing” investment to address all objectives and mitigate all risks but to different degrees,
depending on priorities, budgets, and feasibilities.’318
SPA encourages a strategic, top-down but layered view of how alternative futures might affect performance
against multiple goals, helping to identify not only the mitigations and hedging actions that can be taken
but also the trade-offs between goals. Various evaluation tools exist to support this sort of activity.319

D.6. Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways

Bearing some similarity to DAP, DAPP integrates flexibility and adaptive pathways into the design and
implementation of a given strategy, policy or plan. This involves seven main steps:

 Problem framing: defining the current state of a system, i.e. whether it is complex, its structure,
characteristics and objectives if applicable (e.g. if looking at an organisation), as well as the
constraints which bound it. The aim here is to understand the uncertainties and measures,
indicators or targets that can be used later in the process to monitor and evaluate whether the plan
has been successful or not.

 Assessment of vulnerability and opportunities: identifying the conditions under which the plan is
likely to fail (using various methods, e.g. by assessing the plan against future scenarios), so as to
clarify the ‘adaptation tipping point’ (ATP) conditions that signpost the need for change.

 Contingent actions: identifying possible contingent actions (akin to DAP’s Step 5) and assessing
these against the ATPs to determine which are most promising (e.g. efficient).

 Pathways design and execution: developing pathways (i.e. individual or groups of actions in
pursuit of the plan’s objectives) that can evolve over time in response to ATPs and their signals.
These can then be evaluated against relevant criteria (e.g. urgency, impact, uncertainty) using a
variety of quantitative tools (e.g. agent-based, or multi-objective optimisation models) or
qualitative methods (e.g. deliberative mechanisms) to identify trade-offs between them. The aim is
to enable transfer between possible actions based on monitoring changing conditions and ATPs.

318
Davis et al. (2008).
319
Davis et al. (1996); Davis & Dreyer (2009); Davis (2014).

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Figure D.6 DAPP Pathways development process

Source: Marchau et al. (2019).

 Adaptive strategy design: identifying the preferred pathway(s) based on this evaluation of trade-
offs. At the same time, short- and long-term options and preparatory actions (e.g. defensive,
corrective, capitalising, etc.) are identified and a monitoring system established to identify reliable
signals and triggers for a change in pathway. (Note: whereas ATPs relate to the plan’s objectives,
these broader signals and triggers relate to wider changes in conditions that could affect the system.)

 Strategy implementation: implementation of the plan, starting with short-term actions.

 Strategy monitoring: rolling usage of the monitoring system established in the previous steps to
capture signals that may then trigger decisions to change pathway.

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Figure D.7 The seven steps of DAPP

Source: Marchau et al. (2019).

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