PIL Notes
PIL Notes
ritics have long argued that international law lacks the essential characteristics of a
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‘true’ legal system. A primary contention is the absence of an effective legislative
authority comparable to a state's parliament. There is no global body with the power
to create universally binding laws for all nations. Furthermore, the judicial framework
is perceived as weak. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations, lacks compulsory jurisdiction in the true sense; it can
only adjudicate disputes when states consent to its authority. Moreover, the ICJ
possesses no independent power to enforce its decisions, relying instead on the
political will of the parties or the Security Council.
I n response to these criticisms, jurists such as Hall and Lawrence have forcefully
affirmed the legal character of international law. Their counter-argument posits that
international law is habitually treated and enforced as law by the states themselves.
Foreign offices, national courts, and international tribunals consistently refer to it as
law and operate on the assumption of its binding nature. Like certain forms of
positive municipal law, much of international law is derived from custom and
precedent—the consistent practices of states undertaken out of a sense of legal
obligation. From this perspective, the absence of a centralized legislature or a global
police force does not negate its legal character; it simply highlights that its structure
is different from that of a domestic legal system.
ven among those who accept its legal status, a prevalent thesis holds that
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international law is, at best, a ‘weak law’. This characterization stems from several
practical realities. The rules created through international treaties and customs are
not comparable in efficacy to the output of a state's legislative machinery. The
consent-based jurisdiction of the ICJ means that states can evade judicial scrutiny of
their actions. Perhaps most critically, the mechanisms for enforcement are
inconsistent and often ineffective. While a domestic legal system can reliably enforce
judgments against its citizens, the international system struggles to compel
powerful states to comply with rules that conflict with their perceived national
interests. For instance, no enforcement action was taken against the United States
after its invasion of Grenada or against NATO for its actions against Serbia, illustrating
the difficulty of applying the law equally to all actors.
irst, states may apply sanctions individually throughself-help. Historically, this was
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the primary method of enforcement. However, this right is now heavily constrained
by the United Nations Charter. Specifically, Article 2(4) prohibits the use of armed
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state,
severely limiting the scope of permissible military self-help.
econd, and more significantly in the modern era, arecollective sanctionstaken by
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international organizations. The UN Charter, under Chapter VII, grants the Security
Council the authority to take necessary actions—including economic, financial,
political, and military measures—to maintain or restore international peace and
security when it identifies a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of
aggression. Furthermore, the decisions of the International Court of Justice are
binding on the parties to a dispute. As stipulated in Article 94 of the UN Charter, if a
arty fails to comply with an ICJ judgment, the other party may have recourse to the
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Security Council, which can take measures to ensure the decision is implemented.
o address the criticism that international law is vague and uncertain, significant
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efforts have been made toward its codification.Codificationis defined as the "more
precise formulation and systematization of rules of international law on subjects that
have already been extensively covered by State practice, precedent and doctrine." It
is a process of clarifying and writing down existing customary law.
wo principal theories have been developed to explain the relationship between the
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international and domestic legal spheres: dualism and monism.
● D ualism: The dualist theory posits that internationallaw and municipal law
are two distinct and separate legal systems. They operate in different spheres,
regulating different subjects (international law governs states, while municipal
law governs individuals within a state), and arise from different sources
(international law from the collective will of states, municipal law from the will
of a single state). From a dualist perspective, the domestic legal system is
superior. For a rule of international law to be applicable within a state, it is not
enough for the state to have ratified a treaty; the rule must be expressly
transformed or adopted into domestic law through an act of the national
legislature.
● Monism: In contrast, the monist theory views internationallaw and municipal
law as parts of a single, universal legal order. They are two interrelated aspects
of one unified system of law. Under this view, international law is directly
applicable within the domestic sphere without any need for transformation.
While there are variants of monism—some asserting the supremacy of
international law, others (like Kelsen's "pure theory") seeing them as co-equal
parts of a globalGrundnorm—the practical consequenceis that domestic
courts are obligated to apply international law directly, and in cases of conflict,
international law often prevails.
tate practice is often a pragmatic blend of these theories, with different rules
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applying to different sources of international law.
he U.S. Constitution, in Article II, Section 2, provides that the President has the
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power to make treaties with the "advice and consent of the Senate," requiring a
two-thirds majority for ratification. U.S. practice distinguishes between
self-executing treaties(which become domesticallyapplicable upon ratification
without further legislation) andnon-self-executingtreaties(which require an act of
Congress to be implemented). A further distinction is made between formal treaties
and'executive agreements', which are entered intoby the President using
executive power and do not require Senate approval, though their domestic legal
status can be more complex.
I ndia's practice is complex, lacking a clear constitutional directive, and has therefore
evolved through judicial interpretation, drawing on both dualist and monist
principles.
● C ustomary International Law: The Indian judiciaryhas largely adopted the
doctrine of incorporation for customary international law. The Supreme Court
articulated this principle clearly in the case ofPeople's Union of Civil Liberties
v. Union of India (PUCL), stating that:
● Harmonious Interpretation: Indian courts strive tointerpret domestic law in a
way that avoids conflict with international law, a principle supported by Article
51 of the Constitution, which directs the state to "foster respect for
international law." InADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla,the Supreme Court
noted the principle that if a municipal law is open to more than one
interpretation, the court should adopt the one that avoids conflict with
international law. A practical application of this doctrine is seen inJolly George
Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, where the Court interpretedSection 51 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (regarding imprisonment for debt) in a manner
consistent with India's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
● A pplication of Treaties: With respect to treaties, Indian practice leans heavily
towards dualism. Treaties are not self-executing and require parliamentary
legislation to become part of domestic law. In theGramophone Company of
India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur, the Supreme Courtacknowledged the two
schools of thought (incorporation and transformation) but concluded that in a
case of direct conflict, courts are bound to apply the domestic statute over the
international treaty.
● Judicial Use of International Conventions: A landmarkdevelopment in
Indian jurisprudence is theVishaka v. State of Rajasthancase. In this
judgment, the Supreme Court addressed the absence of domestic legislation
on the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. To fill this legislative
vacuum, the Court drew upon international conventions, specifically the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), to formulate legally binding guidelines. This case stands as a
powerful example of the judiciary using international law to inform and shape
domestic legal norms in the absence of statutory law.
he discussion of how states apply international law leads naturally to the question of
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who, or what, constitutes a subject of that law.
he traditional realist theory holds that only states are subjects of international law. In
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this view, individuals are merely objects of the law, whose rights are held and
asserted on their behalf by their respective states. While this view is now considered
outdated, states remain the primary and most powerful subjects of the international
legal order.
he essential criteria for statehood are authoritatively set out inArticle 1 of the
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Montevideo Convention (1933). According to this instrument,a state as a person of
international law should possess the following four qualifications:
1. A Permanent Population: This refers to a stable communityof people. There
is no minimum requirement for the size of the population; micro-states are as
much states as those with over a billion inhabitants.
2. A Defined Territory: A state must exercise effectivecontrol over a defined
piece of territory. The existence of border disputes does not negate statehood,
so long as a core territory is definitively controlled by the government.
3. A Government: There must be an effective governmentthat exercises
independent authority over the population and territory. This is crucial as
international law lacks a central executive body and relies on states
themselves to enforce international obligations within their borders.
4. Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States:This criterion is
intrinsically linked to the concept of independence. It signifies that the entity
is not legally subject to the authority of any other state in its ability to conduct
foreign relations.
he traditional theory that individuals are merely objects of international law has
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been rendered obsolete by modern developments. A significant body of
contemporary international law now directly regulates the activities of individuals
and, crucially, confers rights and imposes duties directly upon them.
his evolution from a law of states to a law that also governs and protects individuals
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leads to the final foundational topic: the process by which a new state is formally
accepted into the community of nations.
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he Declaratory Theory: This theory posits that statehoodis a matter of fact.
An entity becomes a state once it fulfills the objective legal criteria laid out in
the Montevideo Convention (population, territory, government, and capacity to
enter into relations). According to this view, recognition by other states is
merely a formal, political act that "declares" or acknowledges a pre-existing
legal reality. The state's existence is not dependent on the consent of other
states.
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he Constitutive Theory: In contrast, this theoryargues that recognition is
what "constitutes" or creates a state in the eyes of international law. An entity
may meet all the factual criteria of statehood, but it does not become a
subject of international law until it has been recognized as such by existing
states. This view elevates the political act of recognition to a necessary legal
requirement, implying that statehood is dependent on the acceptance of the
international community.
ecognition can be granted in several forms, each with different legal and political
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implications.
he issue of recognition is closely tied to the legal effects of the acts of unrecognized
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governments, a matter addressed in theTinoco concessionscase. This case
explored whether the obligations of a prior, unrecognized government were binding
on its successor, reinforcing the principle that the legal existence and acts of a
government are distinct from its recognition by other states.
he principles and practices discussed—from the theoretical nature of law to the
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practicalities of statehood and recognition—form the bedrock of the modern
international legal order.
I n this case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) addressed Albania's responsibility
for explosions caused by mines in its territorial waters, which heavily damaged British
warships and resulted in loss of life. The Court's key findings established two crucial
principles:
1. S tate Responsibility for Territory: The Court establishedthe principle that
every state has an obligationnot to knowingly allowits territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other states.Whilethere was no direct
proof that Albania laid the mines, the Court concluded that the minefield
could not have been laid without the knowledge of the Albanian government
and thus held Albania responsible for the damage.
2. Right of Innocent Passage: The Court also affirmedthe right of innocent
passage for warships through international straits used for international
navigation between two parts of the high seas, concluding that the United
Kingdom did not violate Albanian sovereignty by sending its warships through
the channel without prior authorization.
I n this seminal advisory opinion, the ICJ was asked whether the United Nations had
the capacity to bring an international claim for reparations for damages caused to
both the organization and its agents. The Court's central finding was that:
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he United Nations possessesobjective international legal personality.This
means it is a subject of international law capable of possessing international
rights and duties.
● A s a subject of international law, the UN has the capacity to maintain its rights
bybringing an international claimagainst a state(whether a member or not)
to obtain reparation for damages caused to itself and its agents.
● This capacity is not explicitly stated in the UN Charter but is anecessary
implicationessential for the performance of the organization'sfunctions and
for ensuring the independence and protection of its agents.
his case from the Supreme Court of India is a critical examination of the rule of law
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and its relationship with constitutional provisions during a state of emergency. A
Presidential Order had suspended the right to move any court for the enforcement
of fundamental rights, including the right to personal liberty under Article 21.
● T he Majority View: The majority of the Court heldthat in light of the
Presidential Order, no person had the legal capacity (locus standi) to challenge
the legality of a detention order by filing a writ of habeas corpus. This decision
represented a significant deference to executive action during a declared
emergency.
● Justice Khanna's Dissent: Justice H.R. Khanna's powerfuldissenting opinion
argued that the rule of law and the right to life and personal liberty were not
creations of the Constitution but pre-existed it. He contended that even in the
absence of Article 21, the state has no power to deprive a person of life or
liberty without the authority of law. His dissent is celebrated as a profound
defense of the principle that the rule of law is a basic norm that cannot be
entirely suspended, even in an emergency.
Corfu Channel
- st judgment of ICJ
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Greece and Albania channel
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Explosion of 2 naval destroyer ships
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44 British sailors killed
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2 questions
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Albania resp? | Did the UK violate Albanian sovereignty
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Albania did not put the mines (no navy)
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Court said who should have known about the mines
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Mines in albanian water, they were vigilant, they visited the
site and realised the mine laying would have taken time.
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Albania should have informed
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Innocent passaged declared for UK ship
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Mine sweeping by UK NOT RIGHT (soverignity)
his response is an End-Term Examination designed to cover the entirety of the provided
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syllabus document, reflecting the academic style and demanding the level of detail (sections,
case laws, holdings) required for a 50-mark paper.
Public International Law: End-Term Examination
Maximum Marks: 50 | Time Allotted: 3 Hours
Instructions:
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1 ttemptallfive questions.
2. All questions carry equal marks.
3. Answers must be framed to provide comprehensive legal analysis, including relevant
principles, sections of conventions (where applicable), and detailed holdings of landmark
cases discussed in the syllabus.
Answer to Question 1
The foundational debate in jurisprudence is whether Public International Law (PIL) is, in fact,
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'law' . This is not a mere academic exercise, as theanswer fundamentally shapes the authority
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and efficacy of the global legal regime . The debatewas sharpened by Jeremy Bentham's
coining of the term "international law" to differentiate positive legal relations from the older,
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natural law-rooted "Law of Nations," inadvertently inviting a comparison with domestic law .
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easoning:His position was rooted in a narrow, state-centric definition of law, arguing
that PIL lacked two essential features: asovereignpolitical authorityto issue
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commands and animpartial arbiterwith enforceable judgments . He claimed PIL
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relied on little more than "public opinion" .
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he Vanishing Point:He argued that if PIL ever becamemore like 'true law' (e.g., in a
federal system with a central, enforcing authority), it would cease to be international law
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and would betransmuted into public law . He sawit as perpetually on the edge of
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law, but never fully arriving .
● Modern Relevance (or lack thereof):While historicallyinfluential, Holland's argument
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isno longer considered tenable . The vast modernnetwork of treaties, international
ourts, and organizations demonstrates a complexity and legal character that far
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exceeds his narrow, command-based definition, proving its status as a distinct, yet
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authentic, legal order .
Answer to Question 2
The frameworks of sanctions and codification provide a practical response to the charge that
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international law is a 'weak law' by lending structure and systematic coherence .
Answer to Question 3
The interface between international and municipal (domestic) law determines how international
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obligations become enforceable rights and duties within a state .
1. Dualism:
○ Concept:Posits that international law and municipal law are twodistinct and
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separate legal systems .
○ S
phere and Source:They operate in different spheres,regulating different
subjects (international law governs states, municipal law governs individuals),
and arise from different sources (collective will of states vs. will of a single
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state) .
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○ Applicability:The domestic system is superior .International rules arenot
directly applicable; they must beexpressly transformedor adoptedinto
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domestic law through an act of the national legislature .
2. Monism:
○ Concept:Views international law and municipal lawas parts of asingle,
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universal legal order .
○ Applicability:International law isdirectly applicablewithin the domestic
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sphere without any need for transformation . In casesof conflict, international
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law often prevails (especially in variants asserting its supremacy) .
3. D
elegation Theory:A critique of strict dualism, itsuggests that international law's
constitutional rules"delegate"to each state theauthority to determine how treaties
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become applicable within its domestic system, allowing for flexible state practice .
Answer to Question 4
International legal personalityis the capacity ofan entity to possess rights and obligations
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under international law . While historically stateswere considered the sole subjects, the
modern system recognizes that other entities also play a crucial role and possess this
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personality .
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1. A Permanent Population:A stable community of peopleis required . There is no
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minimum requirement for size .
2. A Defined Territory:The state must exercise effectivecontrol over a defined
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territory . The existence of border disputes doesnot negate statehood, provided a
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core territory is definitively controlled .
3. A Government:There must be an effective governmentexercising independent
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authority over the population and territory . Thisis crucial for enforcing international
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obligations domestically .
4. C
apacity to Enter into Relations with Other States:This criterion is intrinsically linked
toindependence, signifying that the entity is notlegally subject to the authority of any
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other state in conducting foreign relations .
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eparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (1949
Advisory Opinion): This seminal case decisively establishedthe legal personality of
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IOs .
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acts and Question:Following the assassination ofa UN mediator, the ICJ was asked
if the UN had the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible
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government for damages caused to the organization and the victim .
● ICJ's Central Finding and Holding (Objective Legal Personality):
○ The ICJ held that theUN possesses objective internationallegal personality
and is asubject of international lawcapable of possessinginternational rights
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and duties .
○ The capacity to maintain its rights by bringing an international claim (against a
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member or non-member state) was affirmed .
○ D
octrine of Necessary Implication:The Court reasonedthat while the UN
Charter does not explicitly confer legal personality, this status is a"necessary
implication"arising from the functions and purposeslaid out in the Charter.
This capacity is essential for the UN to effectively carry out its mission and
ensure the independence and protection of its agents on the international
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stage .
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onferral of Rights:Treaties like the InternationalCovenant on Human Rights bestow
a wide range of rights directly upon individuals, which they can sometimes seek to
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vindicate before international bodies .
● Imposition of Duties:International criminal law imposesdirect dutieson individuals,
establishingindividual criminal responsibilityforthe most serious crimes (e.g.,
genocide, war crimes) via instruments like theGenocideConvention (1948)and the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998),bypassing the traditional
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shield of state sovereignty .
uestion 5: Recognition and State Responsibility in Landmark Cases (10
Q
Marks)
. Recognition in international law involves two competing theories regarding its legal
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effect: the Declaratory Theory and the Constitutive Theory. Contrast these two theories.
(5 Marks)
. Discuss the two crucial principles of international law established by the International
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Court of Justice (ICJ) in theCorfu Channel Case(UnitedKingdom v. Albania), ensuring
you detail the Court’s reasoning regarding State Responsibility for acts on its territory. (5
Marks)
Answer to Question 5
A. Competing Theories of Recognition
Recognition is the formal process by which an existing state acknowledges a new political
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entity's statehood or a new government's effective ruling power .
ffect of
E ecognition is merely a
R Recognition is anecessary legal
Recognition formal, political actthat 91
requirement .
"declares" or acknowledges a
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pre-existing legal reality .
egal
L n entity becomes a state
A n entity does not become a
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Existence once it fulfills the objective subject of international law until it
criteria (Montevideo has beenrecognized by existing
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Convention) . Its existence is states . Statehood is dependent
not dependent on the on the acceptance of the
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consentof other states . international community .