A.C. No. 5054. March 2, 2021.

SOLEDAD NUÑEZ, represented by ANAMIAS B. CO,

Attorney-in-Fact for Complainant, complainant, vs. ATTY.
ROMULO L. RICAFORT, respondent.

A.C. No. 6484. March 2, 2021.*

ADELITA B. LLUNAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROMULO

L. RICAFORT, respondent.
IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY OF
ROMULO L. RICAFORT.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Judicial Clemency; The basic inquiry

in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the
lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct
and character. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of
membership in the Bar.—Judicial clemency hearkens back to the
nature of membership in the Bar as a special privilege imbued
with public interest. As case law states, “[m]embership in the Bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands
it, but rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to
those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment
and in moral character.” “The same reasoning applies to
reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it
that only those who establish their present moral fitness
and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar.
Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never
permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a
duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public
to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as
a matter of justice.” At its core, “[t]he basic inquiry in a petition
for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and
character. The

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* EN BANC.

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 lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of
membership in the Bar.”
Same; Judicial Clemency; Granting judicial clemency lies in
the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (SC) pursuant to its
constitutional mandate to regulate the legal profession.—Granting
judicial clemency lies in the sound discretion of the Court
pursuant to its constitutional mandate to regulate the legal
profession. In the exercise of such discretion, the Court is
essentially called to perform an act of mercy by permitting the
return of a repentant and reformed disbarred lawyer back to the
ranks of the legal profession and thus, resume discharging the
privileges and assuming the duties attendant thereto. However,
the compassion of the Court in clemency cases must always be
tempered by the greater interest of the legal profession and the
society in general. As held by the Court: [C]lemency should not
only be seen as an act of mercy. It is not only for the
wrongdoer’s convenience. The interests of the person
wronged, as well as society in general — especially its
value in precedent — should always be taken into
primordial consideration. [Verily, clemency] is neither a right
nor a privilege that one can avail of at any time[, and its grant]
must be delicately balanced with the preservation of public
confidence in the courts [and in the legal profession in general].
Same; Same; Judges; Re: Diaz would then be consistently
cited by the Supreme Court (SC) as the jurisprudential guidelines
in resolving clemency petitions, whether filed by a disrobed judge
or a disbarred lawyer.—It was in the 2007 case of Re: Diaz that
the Court first framed the operative guidelines for judicial
clemency, albeit under the context of a clemency petition filed by a
disrobed judge. In the said case, the Court, “[i]n the exercise of its
constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts
and all personnel thereof, [laid] down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency”: 1. There must be proof of
remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or
judges associations and prominent members of the community
with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in
an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient
time must have lapsed from the imposition of the pen-

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alty to ensure a period of reformation. 3. The age of the

person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise
(such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal
system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as
potential for public service. 5. There must be other relevant
factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. Later, in the
2013 case of Macarubbo v. Macarubbo, 689 SCRA 69 (2013), the
Court explicitly applied the Re: Diaz guidelines to a clemency
petition seeking the reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. Re: Diaz
would then be consistently cited by the Court as the
jurisprudential guidelines in resolving clemency petitions,
whether filed by a disrobed judge or a disbarred lawyer.
Same; Same; Judicial clemency is granted based on a policy
framework created solely by the Supreme Court (SC) pursuant to
its constitutional power of: (a) administrative supervision over all
courts and all personnel thereof with respect to dismissed judiciary
employees; and (b) regulation of the legal profession with respect to
disbarred lawyers.—As preliminarily discussed, judicial clemency
is granted based on a policy framework created solely by the
Court pursuant to its constitutional power of: (a) administrative
supervision over all courts and all personnel thereof with respect
to dismissed judiciary employees; and (b) regulation of the legal
profession with respect to disbarred lawyers. In deciding whether
to grant clemency, the Court endeavors to strike a balance
between extending an act of mercy to an individual on the one
hand, and on the other hand, preserving public confidence in the
courts, as well as the legal profession. Certainly, safeguarding the
integrity of the courts and the legal profession is an indispensable
consideration in this assessment. Hence, the petitioner should
convincingly hurdle a high bar to be granted judicial
clemency. However, as per the current procedure following the
Re: Diaz guidelines, the Court, when resolving clemency cases, is
not impelled to go beyond the allegations in the petition and
written documents appended thereto. Institutionally, the
Court is not a trier of facts; thus, it lacks the proper
capability to probe into the finer details of the factual
assertions made in a clemency petition. In the same light,
the Court cannot, on its own, authenticate the petition’s
supporting evidence, or examine, under oath, the sincerity of the
person seeking clemency, as well as of those who vouch for him or
her. In fact, it is

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reasonable to suppose that, more likely than not, all of the

submissions in a clemency petition are self-serving since it would
always be in the petitioner’s natural desire to submit everything
beneficial to him or her so as to convince the Court to reinstate
him or her back to the Bar. Moreover, the number of
testimonials/certifications, as well as the perceived clout of the
petitioner’s sponsors/endorsers, are unspoken factors that
influence the Court’s disposition. In the end, without a proper
fact-finding procedure, the Court is constrained to resolve
a clemency petition based on a subjective — instead of an
objective — analysis of the petition.
 Same; Same; Substantial Evidence; The Supreme Court (SC),
in the recent case of Re: Ong, resolved that prospectively, all
clemency petitions which, upon the SC’s evaluation, demonstrate
prima facie merit, should be referred to a commission created to
receive the evidence to prove the allegations by substantial
evidence.—The Court, in the recent case of Re: Ong, resolved that
prospectively, all clemency petitions which, upon the Court’s
evaluation, demonstrate prima facie merit, should be referred
to a commission created to receive the evidence to prove
the allegations by substantial evidence, viz.: Prospectively,
allegations of those who apply for clemency must first be
evaluated by this Court to find whether prima facie
circumstances exist to grant the relief. Should there appear
to be so, a commission must be created to receive the
evidence, with due notice to any offended party and the public.
The commission will then determine if there is substantial
evidence supporting the allegations. x x x Furthermore, as
may be gleaned from the cited excerpt, the Court in Re: Ong
stated that “a commission must be created to receive the
evidence, with due notice to any offended party and the
public.” Nevertheless, it is to be reiterated that Re: Ong was
decided in the context of a clemency petition filed by a disrobed
judge, and not a disbarred lawyer. In this regard, the Court
herein qualifies that the public notice requirement may be too
taxing of a requisite, at least insofar as disbarred lawyers are
concerned. After all, the Court should discern that the infractions
of disbarred lawyers are not exactly on the same level as that of
disrobed judges who are more stringently bound — and hence,
held to a different standard — as public servants by virtue of the
Constitution’s public accountability framework. Thus, the public
magnification of the disbarred lawyer’s previous faults, as well as
any expenses attendant hereto, may not be reasonably
commensurate to the mercy applied for. In the same vein,

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notice to the private offended party may be impractical due to the

fact that past infractions may have been committed so many
years ago; perhaps, due to the passage of time, it may be even
impossible to trace the address of the said party and thus, render
the notice requirement infeasible. Finally, while reception of
evidence by a fact-finding commission may be desirable as held in
Re: Ong, it would render tedious — due to logistical reasons —
the clemency procedure, at least insofar as it concerns greater the
population of lawyers all over this jurisdiction. Besides, as
mentioned, the substantive import of a disbarred lawyer’s faults
should not be equated to an erring public officer. Hence, what
remains pertinent is that the practice of resolving clemency
petitions filed by disbarred lawyers be grounded on facts
established by some fact-finding investigation. Accordingly, rather
than requiring the reception of evidence as in a full-blown trial, a
petition for reinstatement, which demonstrates prima facie merit
upon preliminary evaluation of the Court, should instead, be
referred to the OBC (or any other fact-finding body the Court so
designates) in order to verify the details and the
authenticity of the statements in and evidence attached to
the clemency petition. The said office should then submit its
report on its fact-finding to the Court for its ultimate disposition
on the clemency plea filed by the disbarred lawyer.
Cause of Action; Forgery; Case law provides that “forgery
cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence by the party alleging the same.”—As regards
the validity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale, We note that Arakor
acknowledged Gaddis’ allegation that Felicidad’s signatures in the
Deeds of Absolute Sale were forged since her death occurred prior
to the execution of the said contracts. In fact, Arakor alleged that
Fernando, Sr. and Efren also sold a property to Matulac in spite of
Felicidad’s death, stressing that it was also a victim of fraud. Case
law provides that “forgery cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party
alleging the same.” In this case, the Gaddis satisfactorily
discharged this burden by submitting in evidence the Certificate
of Death of Felicidad to prove that her demise preceded the
execution of the contracts of sale. This is in addition to Arakor’s
admission that Felicidad’s death occurred before the sale
transpired. Obviously, she could not have signed any document
which leads to no other conclusion than that her signatures in the
deeds were forged.

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Re: Diaz guidelines which, on the one hand, requires

“[s]ufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the
penalty to ensure a period of reformation” (second guideline),
while on the other hand, mandates that “[t]he age of the person
asking for clemency must show that [he or she] still has
productive years ahead of [him or her] that can be put to good use
by giving [him or her] a chance to redeem [himself or herself]”
(third guideline). Indeed, time may be perceived as a single
continuum and to require sufficient time to first lapse but at the
same time demand that productive years still remain, may be
contradictory in concept and purpose.
Same; Same; Re: Ong allows a reinstatement application to be
filed before the five (5)-year minimum period for “extraordinary
reasons”; Nonetheless, before granting such leniency in terms of
permitting petitions filed earlier, the Supreme Court (SC) must
first counterbalance the plea of clemency with the nature and
gravity of the offense for which a disbarred lawyer was removed.—
Noticeably, Re: Ong allows a reinstatement application to be filed
before the five (5)-year minimum period for “extraordinary
reasons.” It should, however, be clarified that this phrase should
only pertain to the most compelling reasons based on
extraordinary circumstances, else the Court reverts back to
the subjectivity problem tainting the Re: Diaz guidelines.
Pressing and serious health concerns, as well as highly exemplary
service to society post-disbarment, provided that they are
supported by evidence, may be taken into account by the Court,
among others. Nonetheless, before granting such leniency in
terms of permitting petitions filed earlier, the Court must first
counterbalance the plea of clemency with the nature and gravity
of the offense for which a disbarred lawyer was removed. The
rationale is that extraordinary circumstances which would
allow the filing of a petition for clemency within a shorter
period may be offset by the severity of the acts and/or
omissions which led to the lawyer’s disbarment. In this
respect, the gravity of the offense is effectively taken into account
not with respect to granting clemency (which is an act of mercy in
itself), but rather, to the period in which one can begin seeking
reinstatement. The period aims to assure the Court that a
disbarred lawyer, during such length of time, has contemplated
the consequences of his or her misconduct and has sought ways to
rehabilitate and reform. Hence, the graver the act, the more time
should one spend in reformation, and in turn, the less lenient the
Court should be in permitting exceptions to the minimum five (5)-
year period.

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Same; Same; Remorse and Reformation; The Supreme Court

(SC), in Re: Ong, has further stated that “[r]emorse and
reformation must reflect how the petitioner has redeemed their
moral aptitude by clearly understanding the gravity and
consequences of their conduct.”—At this juncture, it should be
noted that anent the requirement to prove remorse or
reformation, the Court, in Re: Ong, has further stated that
“[r]emorse and reformation must reflect how the [petitioner] has
redeemed their moral aptitude by clearly understanding the
gravity and consequences of their conduct.” Thus, “[t]here is an
element of reconciliation in clemencies.” Accordingly, the
Court, in Re: Ong, added another new guideline, holding that, as a
mandatory requirement for clemency, there must be an attempt
at reconciliation depending on whether or not a private offended
party is involved: When there is a private offended party, there
should be an attempt at reconciliation where the offender offers
an apology and, in turn, the wronged gives a full and
written forgiveness. Only after this reconciliation can this
Court acquire jurisdiction on the plea for clemency. Where
there is no private offended party, the plea for clemency
must contain the public apology. x x x It should be clarified,
however, that the “full and written forgiveness” by the “wronged
[private offended party]” may not always be obtainable by the
petitioner despite earnest efforts at reconciliation. The Court
cannot require proof of forgiveness at all times since forgiveness is
essentially an act of free will by the aggrieved party, of which the
one seeking forgiveness has no real control over. Therefore, what
should instead be required is that the petitioner genuinely
attempted to reconcile in good faith with the wronged party in the
case for which he or she was disbarred (if any), or if such is not
possible, he or she must explain with sufficient reasons as to why
such attempt at reconciliation could not be made. Overall, the
Court is bound to examine the evidence in its totality, including
any proof of apology and reconciliation submitted by the
petitioner, provided that the same is verified by the OBC’s (or
such other fact-finding body designated by the Court)
investigation. Note that, same as the minimum five (5)-year
period, this requirement should be applied prospectively in the
interest of fairness.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) now holds that, with
the exception of the minimum five (5)-year period before seeking
clemency and the requirement of good faith reconciliation as above
described, the new clemency guidelines, as detailed herein, should
not only

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apply to clemency petitions filed after the promulgation of this

Resolution, but likewise, to pending petitions.—It is apt to point
out that Re: Ong qualified that the new clemency guidelines
should be “prospective” in application. However, after careful
consideration, the Court now holds that, with the exception
of the minimum five (5)-year period before seeking clemency
and the requirement of good faith reconciliation as above
described, the new clemency guidelines, as detailed herein,
should not only apply to clemency petitions filed after the
promulgation of this Resolution, but likewise, to pending
petitions. After all, there is no vested right that can be claimed
when it comes to pleas of clemency, which, by their very nature,
pray for an essentially discretionary act of mercy by the Court
and more significantly, an act which is imbued with great public
interest. Nothing precludes the Court — pursuant to its sole
constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law — from
applying new clemency guidelines and procedures to pending
cases. For indeed the Court maintains the duty to ensure that the
inherent defects of the past clemency process be immediately
rectified since the same involves the reinstatement of a disbarred
lawyer back to the noble ranks of the legal profession, which in
turn affects society in general.
Same; Same; New Clemency Guidelines for Reinstatement to
the Bar.—In fine, for the guidance of the Bench, the Bar, and the
public, the new clemency guidelines for reinstatement to the Bar
are as follows: 1. A lawyer who has been disbarred cannot file a
petition for judicial clemency within a period of five (5) years
from the effective date of his or her disbarment, unless for the
most compelling reasons based on extraordinary circumstances, a
shorter period is warranted. For petitions already filed at the
time of this Resolution, the Court may dispense with the five
(5)-year minimum requirement and instead, in the interest of
fairness, proceed with a preliminary evaluation of the petition in
order to determine its prima facie merit. 2. Upon the lapse of the
said five (5)-year period, or earlier if so permitted by the Court, a
disbarred lawyer becomes eligible to file a verified petition for
judicial clemency. The petition, together with its supporting
evidence appended thereto, must show on its face that the
following criteria have been met: (a) The petitioner has fully
complied with the terms and conditions of all prior disciplinary
orders, including orders for restitution, as well as the five (5)-year
period to file, unless he or she seeks an earlier filing for the most
compelling reasons based on extraordinary circum-

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Nuñez vs. Ricafort

stances; (b) The petitioner recognizes the wrongfulness and

seriousness of the misconduct for which he or she was disbarred.
For petitions already filed at the time of this Resolution, it is
required that the petitioner show that he or she genuinely
attempted in good faith to reconcile with the wronged private
offended party in the case for which he or she was disbarred (if
any), or if such is not possible, the petitioner must explain with
sufficient reasons as to why such attempt at reconciliation could
not be made; and (c) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the
disbarred lawyer was disciplined, the disbarred lawyer has the
requisite integrity and competence to practice law. 3. Upon the
filing of the verified petition for clemency, together with its
attachments, the Court shall first conduct a preliminary
evaluation and determine if the same has prima facie
merit based on the criteria above stated. 4. If the petition
has prima facie merit based on the above criteria, the Court shall
refer the petition to the OBC (or any other fact-finding body the
Court so designates) in order to verify the details and the
authenticity of the statements made and the evidence attached to
the clemency petition. If the petition fails to show any prima facie
merit, it should be denied. 5. After its investigation, the OBC (or
such other fact-finding body designated by the Court) shall submit
its fact-finding report to the Court, which shall ultimately resolve
the clemency petition based on the facts established in the
said report. The threshold of evidence to be applied is clear and
convincing evidence since it is incumbent upon the petitioner
to hurdle the seriousness of his or her established past
administrative liability/ies, the gravity of which had warranted
the supreme penalty of disbarment. 6. Unless otherwise resolved
by the Court sitting En Banc, these guidelines and procedure
shall apply to pending petitions for judicial clemency, as well as to
those filed after the promulgation of this Resolution.

PETITION for Judicial Clemency and Compassion and

Supplemental Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
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RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before this Court are the Petition for Judicial Clemency

and Compassion1 dated March 21, 2019 (subject petition)
and the Supplemental Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion2 dated April 5, 2019 (supplemental petition)
filed by Romulo L. Ricafort (petitioner) seeking that he be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

The Facts

Records show that a total of three (3) administrative

disciplinary complaints were filed and resolved against
petitioner, all involving serious breaches of his fiduciary
duties as an attorney to his clients. These complaints were
docketed as A.C. No. 5054 decided on May 29, 2002,3 A.C.
No. 8253 decided on March 15, 2011,4 and A.C. No. 6484
decided on June 16, 2015.5

To recount, the records of A.C. No. 5054 show that in

1982, petitioner was engaged by a client to sell the latter’s
lots. After successfully selling the same, petitioner,
however, failed to remit the proceeds of the sale despite
numerous demands, resulting in his client filing a civil suit
against him. Even after his client won in the civil case,
petitioner engaged in various machinations to avoid said
remittance, and in so doing, defied the final and executory
judgment in the civil case. In light of the foregoing, the
Court indefinitely suspended

_______________

1 Rollo (A.C. No. 5054), pp. 220-225; and Rollo (A.C. No. 6484), pp. 244-
249.
2 Id., at pp. 266-268; id., at pp. 281-283.
3 Nuñez v. Ricafort, 432 Phil. 131; 382 SCRA 381 (2002).
4 Tarog v. Ricafort, 660 Phil. 618; 645 SCRA 320 (2011).
5 Llunar v. Ricafort, 760 Phil. 27; 757 SCRA 614 (2015).

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him from the practice of law, and ordered him to return to

the complainant the amount of P13,800.00.6
Meanwhile, in A.C. No. 8253, petitioner was engaged by
a client in 1992 to assist him in a dispute involving the
latter’s foreclosed property. Instead of consigning the
money given to him by his client, petitioner deposited the
amount into his personal account. Furthermore, when the
court required the filing of a memorandum, petitioner,
despite having been paid additional expenses by his client,
did not file the same. Since he failed to return the
aggregate amount of money despite demands, his client
filed a disciplinary complaint against him. After due
proceedings, petitioner was found administratively liable,
and considering his previous similar infraction in A.C. No.
5054, the Court imposed on him the supreme penalty of
disbarment, and ordered him to return to the complainant
the amount of P80,000.00.7
Finally, in A.C. No. 6484, petitioner was once more,
engaged by a client in September 2000 regarding a
potential case for recovery of land. In connection therewith,
the latter gave petitioner the money that was supposed to
answer for the redemption price of the land, the filing fees,
and his legal fees. Three (3) years later, the client
discovered that petitioner did not institute the necessary
action, as agreed upon. When the client demanded for the
return of the money, petitioner explained that he assigned
another lawyer to file the case for him; as such, petitioner
expressed his willingness to return only the remaining
amount which was in his possession. Further, the client
found out that petitioner was indefinitely suspended from
the practice of law since May 29, 2002, which was probably
the reason why the latter pawned off the case to another
counsel. In light of his transgressions against his client and
for practicing law despite his indefinite suspension, the
Court found him administratively liable for violations of
Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional Respon-

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6 Supra note 3.

7 Supra note 4.

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sibility, as well as for unauthorized practice of law. Thus,

petitioner was, once again, imposed the penalty of
disbarment. He was further ordered to return to the
complainant the amount of P95,000.00.8
On March 25, 2019, petitioner filed the subject petition,
attaching numerous certifications and testimonials in
support of his plea for clemency. He laments that it has
been 17 years since he was ordered indefinitely suspended
in A.C. No. 5054 and has since atoned for his indiscretions.
At the age of 70, petitioner earnestly hopes to be accorded
judicial clemency “before he embarks on his final journey
into the unknown,”9 and that his absolution would be the
only legacy he would leave to his children and
grandchildren.10
On April 11, 2019, petitioner filed the supplemental
petition, reiterating his prayer to be reinstated as a
member of the Philippine Bar in good standing.11
Notably, the captions of the subject petition and
supplemental petition (subject petitions) indicate the
docket numbers of the three (3) cases against petitioner,
i.e., A.C. Nos. 5054, 6484, and 8253.

Proceedings Before the Court

Considering the three (3) docket numbers indicated in

the captions, the subject petitions were separately assigned
to three (3) different Members of the Court for appropriate
action. Subsequently, all three (3) cases were taken up on
the same En Banc agenda date, i.e., June 4, 2019, and since
the cases were not consolidated, conflicting recommended
actions on the subject petitions resulted.

_______________

8 Supra note 5.
9 Rollo (A.C. No. 5054), p. 221; and Rollo (A.C. No. 6484), p. 245.
10 Id.
11 Id., at pp. 267; id., at p. 282.

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In particular, in A.C. No. 5054, the Court noted the

subject petitions, and referred the same to the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report, and
recommendation,12 while in A.C. No. 6484, the Court
merely noted the same.13 In contrast, in A.C. No. 8253, the
Court denied the exact same petitions,14 which denial was
then contested by petitioner in a motion for
reconsideration.15
On August 8, 2019, the OBC submitted its report16
recommending the following: (a) for the purpose of
resolving the subject petitions, A.C. Nos. 5054, 6484, and
8253 be consolidated in order to avoid conflicting actions
and/or resolutions from the Court; (b) deem the subject
petitions docketed under A.C. Nos. 5054 and 6484 as moot
and academic in light of their denial in A.C. No. 8253; and
(c) deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in A.C. No.
8253 for merely reiterating his previous statements.17
In a Resolution18 dated August 28, 2019, the Court
ordered the consolidation of A.C. Nos. 5054 and 6484 only,
and in a Resolution19 dated June 23, 2020, the Court denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in A.C. No. 8253.

The Issue Before the Court

 The central issue in this case is whether or not judicial
clemency should be granted in favor of petitioner.

_______________

12 Id., at pp. 257-258.

13 Rollo (A.C. No. 6484), pp. 292-293.
14 Rollo (A.C. No. 8253), p. 416.
15 Dated July 22, 2019. Id., at pp. 417-422.
16 Rollo (A.C. No. 5054), pp. 260-261; Rollo (A.C. No. 6484), pp. 290-291;
and Rollo (A.C. No. 8253) pp. 426-427.
17 Id., at p. 261; id., at p. 291; id., at p. 427.
18 Rollo (A.C. No. 5054), pp. 262-263; and Rollo (A.C. No. 6484), pp.
308-309.
19 Not attached to the Rollo.

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The CourtÊs Ruling

I. Preliminary Considerations.

At the onset, the Court observes that the separate

docketing and assignment of the subject petitions to
different Justices resulted in conflicting actions on the
same. On one hand, the subject petitions and subsequent
motion for reconsideration in A.C. No. 8253 were denied by
the Court, while, on the other hand, the exact same
petitions were referred to the OBC for evaluation, report,
and recommendation in A.C. No. 5054 and noted in A.C.
No. 6484. As it stands, the petitions in A.C. No. 5054
remains unresolved, whilst the same set of petitions have
already been denied in A.C. No. 8253, and merely noted in
A.C. No. 6484.
Notwithstanding the Court’s action in A.C. No. 8253,
the Court deems it appropriate to take cognizance of the
subject petitions as filed in A.C. Nos. 5054 and 6484 and
examine the same under the lens of the new clemency
guidelines hereinafter set forth. As will be explained below,
it is high time — as it has, in fact, been long overdue —
that the Court institutionalize a new set of operative
guidelines in resolving petitions for judicial clemency of
disbarred lawyers. This change is largely impelled by the
observation that the Court — which is not a trier of facts —
is primarily called to resolve clemency petitions based on
purely factual submissions, without the benefit of
hearings/mechanisms for their authentication; thus, the
need for a fact-finding process to vet clemency petitions
that are, at the very least, prima facie meritorious.
To be sure, the disposition in A.C. No. 8253 does not bar
the Court from taking a second look at the subject petitions
since administrative-disciplinary cases never really become
final;20 more significantly, the act of judicial clemency is

_______________

20 See Que v. Revilla, Jr., 746 Phil. 406, 413; 739 SCRA 459 (2014).

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purely discretionary and inherent to the Court. Hence, the

power to grant clemency may be duly exercised in the
rectified manner it now deems fit pursuant to its
constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law.21

II. Judicial Clemency in

General.

Judicial clemency hearkens back to the nature of

membership in the Bar as a special privilege imbued with
public interest.
As case law states, “[m]embership in the Bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who
demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in
intellectual attainment and in moral character.”22 “The
same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a
disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to
grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only
those who establish their present moral fitness and
knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar.
Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are

_______________

21 Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Article VIII
Judicial Department
xxxx
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. x x x
xxxx
22 Que v. Revilla, Jr., supra note 20 at p. 412; p. 465.

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 Nuñez vs. Ricafort

never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the

Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as
to the general public to ensure that if the doors are
opened, it is done so only as a matter of justice.”23
At its core, “[t]he basic inquiry in a petition for
reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer
has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct
and character. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again
worthy of membership in the Bar.”24
Nevertheless, granting judicial clemency lies in the
sound discretion of the Court pursuant to its constitutional
mandate to regulate the legal profession.25 In the exercise
of such discretion, the Court is essentially called to perform
an act of mercy by permitting the return of a repentant
and reformed disbarred lawyer back to the ranks of the
legal profession and thus, resume discharging the
privileges and assuming the duties attendant thereto.
However, the compassion of the Court in clemency cases
must always be tempered by the greater interest of the
legal profession and the society in general. As held by the
Court:

[C]lemency should not only be seen as an act of

mercy. It is not only for the wrongdoer’s convenience.
The interests of the person wronged, as well as
society in general — especially its value in precedent
— should always be taken into primordial
consideration. [Verily, clemency] is neither a right nor a
privilege that one can avail of at any time[, and its grant]
must be delicately balanced with the preservation of public

_______________

23 Re: In the Matter of the Petition for Reinstatement of Rolando S.

Torres as a Member of the Philippine Bar, 767 Phil. 676, 682-683; 768
SCRA 149, 156 (2015); emphases and underscoring supplied.
24 See San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Romanillos, A.C. No.
5580, July 31, 2018, 875 SCRA 53, emphasis and underscoring supplied.
25 See Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

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confidence in the courts [and in the legal profession in

general.]26 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The foregoing clemency principles have been framed into

jurisprudential guidelines in the 2007 case of Re: Letter of
Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency27
(Re: Diaz). However, as will be explained below, recent
jurisprudence in the 2021 case of Re: Allegations Made
Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing
Held on September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan28 (Re: Ong) has exposed
substantial flaws in the application of the said guidelines.
Although Re: Ong was decided under the auspices of
a clemency petition filed by a disrobed judge, some
of the key observations therein are equally
applicable to disbarred lawyers seeking
reinstatement to the Bar; hence, coming off the heels of
the very recent Re: Ong ruling, the Court takes this ripe
opportunity to modify the current clemency guidelines for
disbarred lawyers and consequently, apply the same to the
present case.

III. Jurisprudential Guide-

lines in Judicial Clem-
ency Cases Involving
Members of the Bar.

Our jurisprudence on judicial clemency traces its roots

to the 1910 case of Re: Macario Adriatico29 (Re: Adriatico).
While the ruling in Re: Adriatico did not explicitly discuss
the governing

_______________

26 See Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee Hearing Held on September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, January 19, 2021,
969 SCRA 342.
27 560 Phil. 1; 533 SCRA 534 (2007).
28 Re: Ong, supra.
29 17 Phil. 324 (1910).

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principles pertinent to clemency petitions, the following

factors were considered by the Court in granting clemency
to therein petitioner: (1) his reinstatement was urged by
the Philippine Bar Association; (2) he served as a member
of the Philippine Assembly, and has merited the approval
of Sergio Osmeña, then Speaker of the Assembly; (3) a
judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit certified his good
conduct; and (4) there were no objections to his
reinstatement.30
In the 1964 case of Cui v. Cui31 (Cui), the Court first
articulated certain governing principles on clemency cases,
citing American sources, viz.:

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to

a great extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court
 action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it
decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice will be conserved by the
applicant’s participation therein in the capacity of an
attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he
is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper
person to practice law. The court will take into
consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior
to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge
for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am.
Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is
entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding [that] the
attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and
the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the
same as for original admission to the bar, except that the
court may require a greater degree of proof than in an
original admission. (7 G.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p.
815).
The decisive questions on an application for
reinstatement are whether applicant is ‘of good moral
charac-

_______________

30 Id., at pp. 324-325.

31 120 Phil. 725; 11 SCRA 755 (1964).

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ter’ in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied

to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be
entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney,
and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable
him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the
moral attributes are to be regarded as a (sic) separate and
distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney &
Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).32

Albeit discussing clemency principles, it should be noted

that the issue in Cui was not whether or not reinstatement
was proper but rather, whether or not a previously
disbarred lawyer, i.e., Antonio Ma. Cui, was qualified to act
as an administrator in light of his reinstatement by the
Court.33 This notwithstanding, the Court would go on and
cite the clemency principles in Cui as bases for succeeding
reinstatement cases, such as Re: Rovero,34 Re: Publico35 and
Re: Vailoces.36
It was in the 2007 case of Re: Diaz that the Court first
framed the operative guidelines for judicial clemency, albeit
under the context of a clemency petition filed by a disrobed
judge. In the said case, the Court, “[i]n the exercise of its
constitutional power of administrative supervision over all
courts and all personnel thereof, [laid] down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency”:37

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These

shall include but should not be limited to certifications or
testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and
prominent members of the community with proven integrity
and probity. A subsequent finding of

_______________

32 Id., at p. 731; p. 761.

33 Id., at pp. 727-730; pp. 757-761.
34 189 Phil. 604; 101 SCRA 799 (1980).
35 190 Phil. 612; 102 SCRA 721 (1981).
36 Re: Vailoces cited the same American sources mentioned in Cui, (see
202 Phil. 322; 117 SCRA 1 [1982]).
37 Re: Diaz, supra note 27 at p. 5; p. 539.

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guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar

misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-
reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of
the penalty to ensure a period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show
that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be
put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual
aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as
potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances
that may justify clemency.38

Later, in the 2013 case of Macarubbo v. Macarubbo,39

the Court explicitly applied the Re: Diaz guidelines to a
clemency petition seeking the reinstatement of a disbarred
lawyer. Re: Diaz would then be consistently cited by the
Court as the jurisprudential guidelines in resolving
clemency petitions, whether filed by a disrobed judge or a
disbarred lawyer.40

IV. Reformulation of the Judicial Clemency

Guidelines and Procedure.
 As preliminarily discussed, judicial clemency is granted
based on a policy framework created solely by the Court
pursuant to its constitutional power of: (a) administrative
super-

_______________

38 Id., at pp. 5-6; p. 539.

39 702 Phil. 1; 689 SCRA 69 (2013).
40 See supra note 24; Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Villalon-
Pornillos, 805 Phil. 688; 817 SCRA 440 (2017); Magandingan v. Adiong,
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1826, February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA 43; and Talens-Dabon
v. Arceo, 699 Phil. 1; 686 SCRA 1 (2012).

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vision over all courts and all personnel thereof41 with

respect to dismissed judiciary employees; and (b) regulation
of the legal profession42 with respect to disbarred lawyers.
In deciding whether to grant clemency, the Court
endeavors to strike a balance between extending an act of
mercy to an individual on the one hand, and on the other
hand, preserving public confidence in the courts, as well as
the legal profession. Certainly, safeguarding the integrity
of the courts and the legal profession is an indispensable
consideration in this assessment. Hence, the petitioner
should convincingly hurdle a high bar to be granted
judicial clemency.
However, as per the current procedure following the Re:
Diaz guidelines, the Court, when resolving clemency cases,
is not impelled to go beyond the allegations in the petition
and written documents appended thereto. Institutionally,
the Court is not a trier of facts; thus, it lacks the
proper capability to probe into the finer details of
the factual assertions made in a clemency petition.
In the same light, the Court cannot, on its own,
authenticate the petition’s supporting evidence, or
examine, under oath, the sincerity of the person seeking
clemency, as well as of those who vouch for him or her.
In fact, it is reasonable to suppose that, more likely than
not, all of the submissions in a clemency petition are self-
serving since it would always be in the petitioner’s natural
desire to submit everything beneficial to him or her so as to
convince the Court to reinstate him or her back to the Bar.
Moreover, the number of testimonials/certifications, as well
as the perceived clout of the petitioner’s
sponsors/endorsers, are unspoken factors that influence the
Court’s disposition.43 In

_______________
41 See Section 5(6), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
42 See Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
43 See Daven, Mark T., Forever Banned: An Analysis of Permanent
Disbarment in Arkansas After in Re: Madden, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1029 (2013)
available at <[Link]

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the end, without a proper fact-finding procedure, the

Court is constrained to resolve a clemency petition
based on a subjective — instead of an objective —
analysis of the petition.
Thus, in Re: Ong, the Court cautioned that:

Judicial clemency cannot be subjective. The more we

have personal connections with one who pleas for clemency,
the more we should seek to distance ourselves. It is also
anticipated that pleas for judicial clemency are largely self-
serving.44 (Emphasis supplied)

Aside from the problem of subjectivity, equally

significant is the quandary of authenticating the
alleged socio-civic activities meant to prove that the
petitioner has indeed reformed. Due to the lack of a fact-
finding mechanism, the Court is hard-pressed to determine
whether or not these activities were actually undertaken,
or if so, how many times they were undertaken and their
actual scope. In this regard, the Court cannot simply
discount the possibility that these so-called “socio-civic
activities” may just be isolated instances which are not
truly reflective of the petitioner’s sincere and genuine
reformation but rather, listed only to pad up the petition.
In light of these issues, the Court, in the recent case of
Re: Ong, resolved that prospectively, all clemency
petitions which, upon the Court’s evaluation, demonstrate
prima facie merit, should be referred to a commission
created to receive the evidence to prove the
allegations by substantial evidence, viz.:

Prospectively, allegations of those who apply for

clemency must first be evaluated by this Court to find
whether prima facie circumstances exist to grant

_______________
285/files/2014/03/[Link]>, (last visited March 2,
2021).
44 Supra note 26.

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 the relief. Should there appear to be so, a commission
must be created to receive the evidence, with due
notice to any offended party and the public. The
commission will then determine if there is
substantial evidence supporting the allegations.45
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, as may be gleaned from the cited excerpt,

the Court in Re: Ong stated that “a commission must be
created to receive the evidence, with due notice to
any offended party and the public.”46
Nevertheless, it is to be reiterated that Re: Ong was
decided in the context of a clemency petition filed by a
disrobed judge, and not a disbarred lawyer. In this regard,
the Court herein qualifies that the public notice
requirement may be too taxing of a requisite, at least
insofar as disbarred lawyers are concerned. After all, the
Court should discern that the infractions of disbarred
lawyers are not exactly on the same level as that of
disrobed judges who are more stringently bound — and
hence, held to a different standard — as public servants by
virtue of the Constitution’s public accountability
framework. Thus, the public magnification of the disbarred
lawyer’s previous faults, as well as any expenses attendant
hereto, may not be reasonably commensurate to the mercy
applied for.
In the same vein, notice to the private offended party
may be impractical due to the fact that past infractions
may have been committed so many years ago; perhaps, due
to the passage of time, it may be even impossible to trace
the address of the said party and thus, render the notice
requirement infeasible.
Finally, while reception of evidence by a fact-finding
commission may be desirable as held in Re: Ong, it would
render tedious — due to logistical reasons — the clemency
procedure,

_______________

45 Id.
46 Id.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

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at least insofar as it concerns greater the population of

lawyers all over this jurisdiction. Besides, as mentioned,
the substantive import of a disbarred lawyer’s faults should
not be equated to an erring public officer. Hence, what
remains pertinent is that the practice of resolving clemency
petitions filed by disbarred lawyers be grounded on facts
established by some fact-finding investigation. Accordingly,
rather than requiring the reception of evidence as in a full-
blown trial, a petition for reinstatement, which
demonstrates prima facie merit upon preliminary
evaluation of the Court, should instead, be referred to the
OBC (or any other fact-finding body the Court so
designates) in order to verify the details and the
authenticity of the statements in and evidence
attached to the clemency petition. The said office
should then submit its report on its fact-finding to the
Court for its ultimate disposition on the clemency plea filed
by the disbarred lawyer.
To note, Re: Ong also provides for a five (5)-year
minimum period before “dismissal or disbarment
[can] be the subject of any kind of clemency,” viz.:

Generally, unless for extraordinary reasons,

dismissal or disbarment cannot be the subject of any kind of
clemency in less than five years.47 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

To be sure, the underlying impetus of establishing a

default uniform period is to curtail the broadly
subjective process of determining the appropriate period
within which genuine remorse and reformation are
perceived to have been attained. Conceptually, the five (5)-
year requirement48 is a

_______________

47 Id.
48 This same five (5)-year period is also applied under the American
Bar Association Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (see
<[Link]
enforcement/rule_25/>. [last visited March 2, 2021]).

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reasonable estimation by the Court of the minimum period

necessary for the petitioner’s reflection of his or her past
transgressions for which he or she was meted the ultimate
penalty of disbarment. For clarity, the period is reckoned
from the time the Court’s resolution is promulgated since it
is only by then that the lawyer becomes duly informed of
his or her administrative liability and hence, would be able
to begin atoning for his or her malpractice.
This uniform period also addresses the apparent
inconsistency of the Re: Diaz guidelines which, on the one
hand, requires “[s]ufficient time must have lapsed from the
imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation”
49
(second guideline), while on the other hand, mandates
that “[t]he age of the person asking for clemency must show
that [he or she] still has productive years ahead of [him or
her] that can be put to good use by giving [him or her] a
chance to redeem [himself or herself]”50 (third guideline).
Indeed, time may be perceived as a single continuum and
to require sufficient time to first lapse but at the same time
demand that productive years still remain, may be
contradictory in concept and purpose.
Nonetheless, this period requirement should not cause
the denial of petitions already filed in the interest of
fairness, since it is only now that the abstract ideal of
“sufficient” time to reform has been concretized into a
uniform eligibility period.
Noticeably, Re: Ong allows a reinstatement application
to be filed before the five (5)-year minimum period for
“extraordinary reasons.”51 It should, however, be clarified
that this phrase should only pertain to the most
compelling reasons based on extraordinary
circumstances, else the Court reverts back to the
subjectivity problem tainting the Re: Diaz

_______________

49 Re: Diaz, supra note 27 at p. 5; p. 539.

50 Id., at p. 6; p. 539.
51 Supra note 26.

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guidelines. Pressing and serious health concerns, as well as

highly exemplary service to society post-disbarment,
provided that they are supported by evidence, may be
taken into account by the Court, among others.
Nonetheless, before granting such leniency in terms of
permitting petitions filed earlier, the Court must first
counterbalance the plea of clemency with the nature and
gravity of the offense for which a disbarred lawyer was
removed. The rationale is that extraordinary
circumstances which would allow the filing of a
petition for clemency within a shorter period may be
offset by the severity of the acts and/or omissions
which led to the lawyer’s disbarment. In this respect,
the gravity of the offense is effectively taken into account not
with respect to granting clemency (which is an act of mercy
in itself), but rather, to the period in which one can begin
seeking reinstatement. The period aims to assure the Court
that a disbarred lawyer, during such length of time, has
contemplated the consequences of his or her misconduct
and has sought ways to rehabilitate and reform. Hence, the
graver the act, the more time should one spend in
reformation, and in turn, the less lenient the Court should
be in permitting exceptions to the minimum five (5)-year
period.
At this juncture, it should be noted that anent the
requirement to prove remorse or reformation, the Court, in
Re: Ong, has further stated that “[r]emorse and
reformation must reflect how the [petitioner] has redeemed
their moral aptitude by clearly understanding the gravity
and consequences of their conduct.”52 Thus, “[t]here is an
element of reconciliation in clemencies.”53
Accordingly, the Court, in Re: Ong, added another new
guideline, holding that, as a mandatory requirement for
clemency, there must be an attempt at reconciliation
depending on whether or not a private offended party is
involved:

_______________

52 Id.
53 Id.; emphasis supplied.

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When there is a private offended party, there should be

an attempt at reconciliation where the offender offers an
apology and, in turn, the wronged gives a full and
written forgiveness. Only after this reconciliation
can this Court acquire jurisdiction on the plea for
clemency. Where there is no private offended party,
the plea for clemency must contain the public
apology.54 (Emphasis supplied)

It should be clarified, however, that the “full and written

forgiveness” by the “wronged [private offended party]” may
not always be obtainable by the petitioner despite earnest
efforts at reconciliation. The Court cannot require proof of
forgiveness at all times since forgiveness is essentially an
act of free will by the aggrieved party, of which the one
seeking forgiveness has no real control over. Therefore,
what should instead be required is that the petitioner
genuinely attempted to reconcile in good faith with the
wronged party in the case for which he or she was
disbarred (if any), or if such is not possible, he or she must
explain with sufficient reasons as to why such attempt at
reconciliation could not be made. Overall, the Court is
bound to examine the evidence in its totality, including any
proof of apology and reconciliation submitted by the
petitioner, provided that the same is verified by the OBC’s
(or such other fact-finding body designated by the Court)
investigation. Note that, same as the minimum five (5)-
year period, this requirement should be applied
prospectively in the interest of fairness.
Finally, it is apt to point out that Re: Ong qualified that
the new clemency guidelines should be “prospective” in
application. However, after careful consideration, the
Court now holds that, with the exception of the
minimum five (5)-year period before seeking clemency
and the requirement of good faith reconciliation as
above described, the new clemency guidelines, as
detailed herein, should not only apply to clemency
petitions filed after the promulgation

_______________
54 Id.

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of this Resolution, but likewise, to pending petitions.

After all, there is no vested right that can be claimed when
it comes to pleas of clemency, which, by their very nature,
pray for an essentially discretionary act of mercy by the
Court and more significantly, an act which is imbued with
great public interest. Nothing precludes the Court —
pursuant to its sole constitutional authority to regulate the
practice of law — from applying new clemency guidelines
and procedures to pending cases. For indeed the Court
maintains the duty to ensure that the inherent defects of
the past clemency process be immediately rectified since
the same involves the reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer
back to the noble ranks of the legal profession, which in
turn affects society in general.
In fine, for the guidance of the Bench, the Bar, and the
public, the new clemency guidelines for reinstatement to
the Bar are as follows:
1. A lawyer who has been disbarred cannot file a
petition for judicial clemency within a period of five
(5) years from the effective date of his or her
disbarment, unless for the most compelling reasons
based on extraordinary circumstances, a shorter
period is warranted.
For petitions already filed at the time of this
Resolution, the Court may dispense with the five (5)-
year minimum requirement and instead, in the
interest of fairness, proceed with a preliminary
evaluation of the petition in order to determine its
prima facie merit.
2. Upon the lapse of the said five (5)-year period, or
earlier if so permitted by the Court, a disbarred
lawyer becomes eligible to file a verified petition for
judicial clemency.
The petition, together with its supporting evidence
appended thereto, must show on its face that the
following criteria have been met:

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 (a) The petitioner has fully complied with the terms and
conditions of all prior disciplinary orders, including orders
for restitution, as well as the five (5)-year period to file,
unless he or she seeks an earlier filing for the most
compelling reasons based on extraordinary circumstances;
(b) The petitioner recognizes the wrongfulness and
seriousness of the misconduct for which he or she was
disbarred. For petitions already filed at the time of this
Resolution, it is required that the petitioner show that he or
she genuinely attempted in good faith to reconcile with the
wronged private offended party in the case for which he or
she was disbarred (if any), or if such is not possible, the
petitioner must explain with sufficient reasons as to why
such attempt at reconciliation could not be made; and
(c) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the disbarred
lawyer was disciplined, the disbarred lawyer has the
requisite integrity and competence to practice law.

3. Upon the filing of the verified petition for clemency,

together with its attachments, the Court shall first
conduct a preliminary evaluation and determine
if the same has prima facie merit based on the
criteria above stated.
4. If the petition has prima facie merit based on the
above criteria, the Court shall refer the petition to
the OBC (or any other fact-finding body the Court so
designates) in order to verify the details and the
authenticity of the statements made and the evidence
attached to the clemency petition.
If the petition fails to show any prima facie merit, it
should be denied.

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5. After its investigation, the OBC (or such other fact-

finding body designated by the Court) shall submit its
fact-finding report to the Court, which shall ultimately
resolve the clemency petition based on the facts
established in the said report. The threshold of
evidence to be applied is clear and convincing
evidence since it is incumbent upon the petitioner to
hurdle the seriousness of his or her established past
administrative liability/ies, the gravity of which had
warranted the supreme penalty of disbarment.
6. Unless otherwise resolved by the Court sitting En
Banc, these guidelines and procedure shall apply to
pending petitions for judicial clemency, as well as to
those filed after the promulgation of this Resolution.

V. Application

To recall, herein petitioner committed multiple

administrative infractions all involving serious breaches of
his fiduciary duties to his clients.
In 1982, petitioner was tasked by his client to sell
parcels of land but after doing so, repeatedly failed to remit
to his client the proceeds of the sale. Thereafter, he even
committed various machinations to avoid the remittance.
This was the subject matter in A.C. No. 5054 for which he
was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law on May
29, 2002.
In 1992, petitioner received various amounts of money
from his client for designated purposes. However, he
deposited the money to his personal account without his
client’s consent, and failed to return the money despite
several demands. This was the subject matter in A.C. No.
8253, which resulted in his disbarment on March 15,
2011.
Finally, from the period of 2000 to 2003, petitioner
again received professional fees from a client but failed to
provide the legal service as agreed upon. Also, petitioner
did not re-

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Nuñez vs. Ricafort

imburse the fees received from his client despite numerous

demands. Furthermore, petitioner failed to disclose to his
client that he was already suspended in 2002, thereby
engaging in unauthorized practice of law until 2003. For
his violations, he was again meted with the penalty of
disbarment in A.C. No. 6484 on June 16, 2015.
On March 25, 2019 — or just three (3) years, nine (9)
months, and nine (9) days from the most recent Decision
against him in A.C. No. 6484 — petitioner filed the subject
petition; and seventeen (17) days later, on April 11, 2019,
filed the supplemental petition.
As indicated by the facts, the subject petitions were filed
less than five (5) years from the time the last
administrative resolution in A.C. No. 6484 was handed
down against him. However, as stated in the new
guidelines, “[f]or petitions already filed at the time of this
Resolution, the Court may dispense with the five (5)-year
minimum requirement and instead, in the interest of
fairness, proceed with a preliminary evaluation of the
petition in order to determine its prima facie merit.”
After preliminary evaluation, the subject petitions,
however, fail to show any prima facie merit.
At the outset, it is observed that the testimonials/
certifications attached to the subject petitions were all one-
pagers that are similarly patterned and worded. These
documents may be grouped based on their contents, viz.:55
_______________

55 Rollo (A.C. No. 5054), pp. 238-256, 269, 272; and Rollo (A.C. No.
6484), pp. 260-278, 284, 287.

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The
uncanny
 similarities
between
the

testimonials/certifications create an impression that they

were not actual and personal accounts of the signatories,
but rather — more likely than not — all pre-made, pro
forma documents conveniently made for their signing.
Complementarily, it is further observed that none of
these testimonials/certifications were executed under oath
and hence, render doubtful, on their face, the genuineness
of the statements or at the very least, the sincerity of those
who signed the same.

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Even more, neither was there any corroborative

evidence included in the petition to show that the alleged
socio-civic activities mentioned in the petition were indeed
conducted and if so, how many times were they conducted,
including their details and scope.
At any rate, it is discerned that petitioner committed
multiple serious breaches of his fiduciary duties to different
clients, demonstrating his great propensity in this respect.
This resulted into the imposition of the most drastic
penalties of indefinite suspension in A.C. No. 5054,
disbarment in A.C. No. 8253, and another disbarment in
A.C. No. 6484. In fact, despite having been indefinitely
suspended in A.C. No. 5054 on May 29, 2002, he continued
practicing law from the years 2002 to 2003. Worse, aside
from his unauthorized practice of law, he concealed the fact
of his indefinite suspension from his client in A.C. 6484 and
furthermore, failed to file the action for recovery as agreed
upon resulting into the said client’s prejudice. To note, as
found in the Decision of A.C. No. 6484, it was only three (3)
years later from the time of petitioner’s engagement that
the complainant in said case learned that no such action
was ever filed by him. Thus, in view of petitioner’s
numerous infractions, the Court does not believe that
“[sufficient time [has] lapsed from the imposition of the
penalty to ensure a period of reformation,”56 as already
required in Re: Diaz.
All told, since the subject petitions fail to show prima
facie merit based on the foregoing observations, and
likewise, considering the multiplicity of petitioner’s
infractions which all constitute serious breaches of his
fiduciary duties to his past clients, the Court denies the
subject petitions filed in A.C. Nos. 5054 and 6484. This is
consistent with the Court’s earlier denial of the same
subject petitions in A.C. No. 8253.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion dated March 21, 2019 and the Supplemental
 _______________

56 Re: Diaz, supra note 27 at p. 5; p. 539.

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Nuñez vs. Ricafort

Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated April

5, 2019 filed in A.C. Nos. 5054 and 6484 are hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Peralta (CJ.), Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, Hernando,

Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez,
Delos Santos, Gaerlan, Rosario and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion and the

Supplemental Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion are denied.

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Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and

promise are considered as indispensable requirements to
the grant of judicial clemency. (Re: Deceitful Conduct of
Ignacio S. Del Rosario, Cash Clerk III, Records and
Miscellaneous Matter Section, Checks Disbursement
Division, FMO-OCA, 866 SCRA 425 [2018])

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