Competition

Commission of
India
Dr. Anuj Kumar Sinha
 • (1) With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by
notification, appoint, there shall be established, for the purposes of
this Act, a Commission to be called the ‘Competition Commission of
India’.
Establishment • (2) The Commission shall be a body corporate by the name aforesaid
having perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject
of to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property,
Commission both movable and immovable, and to contract and shall, by the said
(Section 7) name, sue or be sued.
• (3) The head office of the Commission shall be at such place as the
Central Government may decide from time to time.
• (4) The Commission may establish offices at other places in India.
 Composition of Commission
(seCtion 8)
• (1) The Commission shall consist of a Chairperson and
not less than two and not more than six other Members
to be appointed by the Central Government.
• (2) The Chairperson and every other Member shall be a
person of ability, integrity and standing and who has
special knowledge of, and such professional experience of
not less than fifteen years in, international trade,
economics, business, commerce, law, finance,
accountancy, management, industry technology, public
affairs or competition matters, including competition law
and policy, which in the opinion of the Central
Government, may be useful to the Commission.
• (3) The Chairperson and other Members shall be whole-
time Members.
 • (1) The Chairperson and other Members of the Commission shall be
appointed by the Central Government from a panel of names
recommended by a Selection Committee consisting of--
• (a) the Chief Justice of India or his nominee……..Chairperson;
Selection • (b) the Secretary in the Ministry of Corporate
Committee for Affairs………Member;
Chairperson • (c) the Secretary in the Ministry of Law and
and Members Justice……….Member;
of Commission • (d) two experts of repute who have special knowledge of, and
professional experience in international trade, economics,
(Section 9) business, commerce, law, finance, accountancy, management,
industry, technology, public affairs or competition matters
including competition law and policy……….Members.
• (2) The term of the Selection Committee and the manner of selection
of panel of names shall be such as may be prescribed.
 • (1) The Chairperson and every other Member shall hold office as such for a
term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall
be eligible for re-appointment:
• Provided that the Chairperson or other Members shall not hold office
as such after he has attained the age of sixty-five years.
term of offiCe • (2) A vacancy caused by the resignation or removal of the Chairperson or any
of Chairperson other Member under section 11 or by death or otherwise shall be filled by
fresh appointment in accordance with the provisions of sections 8 and 9.
and other • (3) The Chairperson and every other Member shall, before entering upon his
members office, make and subscribe to an oath of office and of secrecy in such form,
manner and before such authority, as may be prescribed.
(seCtion 10) • (4) In the event of the occurrence of a vacancy in the office of the
Chairperson by reason of his death, resignation or otherwise, the senior-most
Member shall act as the Chairperson, until the date on which a new
Chairperson, appointed in accordance with the provisions of this Act to fill
such vacancy, enters upon his office.
• (5) When the Chairperson is unable to discharge his functions owing to
absence, illness or any other cause, the senior-most Member shall discharge
the functions of the Chairperson until the date on which the Chairperson
resumes the charge of his functions
 • (1) The Chairperson or any other Member may, by notice in writing under his hand addressed to the
Central Government, resign his office:
• Provided that the Chairperson or a Member shall, unless he is permitted by the Central
Government to relinquish his office sooner, continue to hold office until the expiry of three
months from the date of receipt of such notice or until a person duly appointed as his
successor enters upon his office or until the expiry of his term of office, whichever is the
earliest.
Resignation, • (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Central Government may, by order,
removal and remove the Chairperson or any other Member from his office if such Chairperson or Member, as the
case may be,--
suspension of • (a) is, or at any time has been, adjudged as an insolvent; or
• (b) has engaged at any time, during his term of office, in any paid employment; or
Chairperson and • (c) has been convicted of an offence which, in the opinion of the Central Government,
other members involves moral turpitude; or
• (d) has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially his
(Section 11) functions as a Member; or
• (e) has so abused his position as to render his continuance in office prejudicial to the public
interest; or
• (f) has become physically or mentally incapable of acting as a Member.
• (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), no Member shall be removed from his
office on the ground specified in clause (d) or clause (e) of that sub-section unless the Supreme
Court, on a reference being made to it in this behalf by the Central Government, has, on an inquiry,
held by it in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed in this behalf by the Supreme
Court, reported that the Member, ought on such ground or grounds to be removed.
 restriCtion on employment of Chairperson and other members
(seCtion 12)

• (1) The Chairperson and other Members shall, for a period of two years from the date on which they cease to hold office, not
accept any employment in or advise as a consultant, retainer or in any other capacity whatsoever, or be connected with the
management or administration of--
• (a) any enterprise which is or has been a party to a proceeding before the Commission under this Act; or
• (b) any person who appears or has appeared before the Commission under section 35.
• (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 35, the Chairperson or any other Member after retirement or otherwise
ceasing to be in service for any reason shall not represent for any person or enterprise before the Commission:
• Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to any employment under the Central Government or a State
Government or local authority or in any statutory authority or any corporation established by or under any Central,
State or Provincial Act or a Government company as defined in clause (45) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013.
 administrative powers of Chairperson
(seCtion 13)

• The Chairperson shall have the powers of general superintendence, direction and control in
respect of all administrative matters of the Commission:
• Provided that the Chairperson may delegate such of his powers relating to administrative
matters of the Commission, as he may think fit, to any other Member or officer of the
Commission.
Salary and allowances and other terms and conditions of service of Chairperson and other
Members
(Section 14)

• (1) The salary, and the other terms and conditions of service, of the Chairperson and
other Members, including travelling expenses, house rent allowance and conveyance
facilities, sumptuary allowance and medical facilities shall be such as may be
prescribed.
• (2) The salary, allowances and other terms and conditions of service of the
Chairperson or a Member shall not be varied to his disadvantage after appointment
vaCanCy, etC., not to invalidate proCeedings of Commission
(seCtion 15)

• No act or proceeding of the Commission shall be invalid merely by reason of--

• (a) any vacancy in, or any defect in the constitution of, the Commission; or
• (b) any defect in the appointment of a person acting as a Chairperson or as a
Member; or
• (c) any irregularity in the procedure of the Commission not affecting the
merits of the case.
 • (1) The Commission may, with the prior approval of the Central Government, appoint a Director General
for the purposes of assisting the Commission in conducting inquiry into contravention of any of the
provisions of this Act and for performing such other functions as are, or may be, provided by or under this
Act.
• (1A) The number of other Additional, Joint, Deputy or Assistant Directors General or such officers or other
employees in the office of Director General and the manner of appointment of such Additional, Joint,
Appointment Deputy or Assistant Directors General or such officers or other employees shall be such as may be
prescribed.
of Director- • (2) Every Additional, Joint, Deputy and Assistant Directors General or such officers or other employees,
General, etc. shall exercise his powers, and discharge his functions, subject to the general control, supervision and
direction of the Director General.
(Section 16) • (3) The salary, allowances and other terms and conditions of service of the Director General and Additional,
Joint, Deputy and Assistant Directors General or, such officers or other employees, shall be such as may be
prescribed.
• (4) The Director General and Additional, Joint, Deputy and Assistant Directors General or such officers or
other employees, shall be appointed from amongst persons of integrity and outstanding ability and who
have experience in investigation, and knowledge of accountancy, management, business, public
administration, international trade, law or economics and such other qualifications as may be prescribed.
 Director-General
• The Director General (DG) serves as the investigative wing of the Competition Commission
of India (CCI) and plays a pivotal role in enforcing the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002. The
DG is responsible for conducting investigations into alleged contraventions relating to anti-
competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and combinations (mergers and
acquisitions).
• The powers and duties of the DG are primarily derived from Section 41 of the Competition Act,
2002 and are further elaborated in Regulations 20 to 41 of the Competition Commission of India
(General) Regulations, 2009.
• Statutory Basis and Appointment
• Under Section 16(1) read with Section 41(1) of the Act, the Central Government appoints
the Director General, along with Additional, Joint, Deputy, or Assistant Directors General, to
assist the CCI in conducting investigations.
• Though administratively subordinate to the CCI, the DG exercises independent
investigative authority and functions as a statutory officer of the Commission.
 funCtions of the direCtor general

• (a) Conducting Investigations

• When directed by the CCI, the DG undertakes a comprehensive investigation into alleged violations of:
• Section 3 – Anti-competitive agreements;
• Section 4 – Abuse of dominant position; and
• Section 6 – Regulation of combinations.
• The DG gathers evidence, interviews witnesses, and examines documents to ascertain whether the alleged conduct contravenes the
provisions of the Act.
• (b) Collection of Evidence
• The DG has powers akin to those of a civil court for collecting evidence. The investigation may involve:
• Examining company records, agreements, communications, or emails;
• Conducting interviews with key personnel;
• Inspecting the premises of enterprises; and
• Gathering market data or expert analysis relevant to the inquiry.
• (c) Preparation and Submission of Investigation Report
• After the investigation is completed, the DG prepares a detailed investigation report and submits it to the CCI under Regulation
20(4).
• The report contains findings, analysis of facts, relevant evidence, and conclusions regarding whether a contravention has occurred.
• The DG may also submit supplementary reports if the CCI seeks further clarification or additional evidence.
• (d) Assisting the CCI in Proceedings
• The DG assists the Commission during the adjudicatory phase by providing clarifications, presenting findings, and supporting the
Commission’s inquiries into the case.
 • (a) Civil Court Powers (Section 41(2))
• While discharging duties, the DG has the same powers as those of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, including:
Powers of the Director
• Summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person for examination on oath;
• Requiring discovery and production of documents;
• Receiving evidence on affidavit;
• Requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any office;
• Issuing commissions for examination of witnesses or documents.
• These powers enable the DG to conduct thorough investigations with legal authority comparable to judicial proceedings.
General

• (b) Power of Search and Seizure (Section 41(3))

• If the DG believes that important documents or evidence are likely to be destroyed, concealed, or altered, they may apply to the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, for authorization to conduct a search and seizure operation.
• This power is further regulated by Regulation 41 of the CCI (General) Regulations, 2009.
• Such search operations must be carried out in accordance with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
• (c) Power to Examine Witnesses
• The DG may summon company officials, employees, or other persons connected with the case to appear before them for
examination on oath and record their statements, which can be used as evidence.
• (d) Power to Obtain Information from Other Authorities
• The DG may request information, documents, or data from any government department, regulator, public authority, or enterprise,
if deemed necessary for the investigation.
• (e) Power to Retain Documents
• Documents seized or obtained during the investigation can be retained for such period as may be required for examination or
legal proceedings.
 Duties and Responsibilities of the DG
• The DG, while exercising these powers, is bound by several obligations:
• To conduct investigations fairly, impartially, and objectively;
• To adhere to the principles of natural justice;
• To maintain confidentialityof sensitive commercial information under Regulation 35;
• To avoid any bias or conflict of interest during the investigation; and
• To ensure that all findings are supported by credible evidence.

Contd.. Enforcement Role of the DG

• The DG plays a crucial role in the enforcement mechanismof the Competition Act.
• The DG’s investigation transforms prima facie allegations into concrete factual findings.
• The CCI relies on the DG’s report to determine whether a violation has occurred and to impose penalties
or issue appropriate directions.
• Although the DG cannot impose penalties, their findings form the foundation for CCI’s final enforcement
orders under Section 27 (anti-competitive agreements) and Section 28 (abuse of dominance).
 • Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.
(SAIL), (2010) 10 SCC 744
Judicial • The Supreme Court held that the DG’s powers arise only after the
Interpretation of CCI forms a prima facie opinion and directs an investigation
DG’s Powers under Section 26(1). It emphasized the procedural discipline and
independence of the DG’s investigation.
• Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. CCI, (2017) 8 SCC 47
• The Court recognized the DG’s wide powers of investigation,
including examining evidence from any relevant source. The DG
can investigate entities not specifically named in the original
information if evidence suggests their involvement.
• Rajasthan Cylindersand Containers Ltd. v. CCI, (2018) 16 SCC 657
• The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the DG’s report is
recommendatory in nature and not binding on the CCI, which
has the authority to agree or disagree with the DG’s findings.
 • Google Inc. v. Competition Commission of India & Ors., W.P. (C) 7084/2014, Delhi High Court
(2015)
• The Court upheld the DG’s power to call for information and documents from any person
or enterprise connected to the matter under investigation.
It clarified that the DG’s powers under Section 41(2) are akin to those of a civil court, but
must be exercised reasonably and proportionately.
• Coordination Committee of Artists and Technicians of W.B. Film and Television v. CCI, (2017) 5
SCC 17
• The Supreme Court held that the DG can investigate associations, unions, or collective

Contd..
bodies if they are involved in anti-competitive conduct under Section 3. The DG’s power
is not confined to individual enterprises but extends to any entity that influences market
competition.
• Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufacturers’ Association & Ors., (2016) CompLR 1
(CCI)
• The CCI, relying on judicial precedent, reaffirmed that the DG has discretion to expand
the scope of inquiry if new evidence indicates the involvement of additional enterprises.
The DG’s investigative autonomy is essential for uncovering cartelization and ensuring
comprehensive enforcement.
 duties and funCtions of Commission
(seCtion 18)

• Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the Commission to eliminate practices having
adverse effect on competition, promote and sustain competition, protect the interests of consumers and ensure
freedom of trade carried on by other participants, in markets in India:
• Provided that the Commission may, for the purpose of discharging its duties or performing its functions
under this Act, enter into any memorandum or arrangement with the prior approval of the Central
Government, with any agency of any foreign country:
• Provided further that, the Commission may, for the purpose of discharging its duties or performing
its functions under this Act, enter into any memorandum or arrangement with any statutory
authority or department of Government.
 inquiry into Certain agreements and dominant position of
enterprise
(seCtion 19)

• (1) The Commission may inquire into any alleged contravention of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 3 or sub-section (1) of section 4 either on its own motion or on--
• (a) receipt of any information, in such manner and accompanied by such fee as may be determined by regulations, from any person, consumer or their association or trade association; or
• (b) a reference made to it by the Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority.
• Provided that the Commission shall not entertain an information or a reference unless it is filed within three years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen:
• Provided further that an information or a reference may be entertained after the period specified in the first proviso if the Commission is satisfied that there had been
sufficient cause for not filing the information or the reference within such period after recording its reasons for condoning such delay.
• (2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), the powers and functions of the Commission shall include the powers and functions specified in sub-sections (3) to (7).
• (3) The Commission shall, while determining whether an agreement has an appreciable adverse effect on competition under section 3, have due regard to all or any of the following factors,
namely:--
• (a) creation of barriers to new entrants in the market;
• (b) driving existing competitors out of the market;
• (c) foreclosure of competition;
• (d) benefits or harm to consumers;
• (e) improvements in production or distribution of goods or provision of services;
• (f) promotion of technical, scientific and economic development by means of production or distribution of goods or provision of services.
 • (4) The Commission shall, while inquiring whether an enterprise enjoys a dominant position or not under section 4, have due
regard to all or any of the following factors, namely:--
• (a) market share of the enterprise;
• (b) size and resources of the enterprise;
• (c) size and importance of the competitors;
• (d) economic power of the enterprise including commercial advantages over competitors;
• (e) vertical integration of the enterprises or sale or service network of such enterprises;
• (f) dependence of consumers on the enterprise;
• (g) monopoly or dominant position whether acquired as a result of any statute or by virtue of being a Government
company or a public sector undertaking or otherwise;

(Contd..) • (h) entry barriers including barriers such as regulatory barriers, financial risk, high capital cost of entry, marketing
entry barriers, technical entry barriers, economies of scale, high cost of substitutable goods or service for consumers;
• (i) countervailing buying power;
• (j) market structure and size of market;
• (k) social obligations and social costs;
• (l) relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the economic development, by the enterprise enjoying a dominant
position having or likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition;
• (m) any other factor which the Commission may consider relevant for the inquiry.
• (5) For determining whether a market constitutes a ‘relevant market’ for the purposes of this Act, the Commission shall have
due regard to the ‘relevant geographic market’ and ‘relevant product market’.
 (Contd..)

• (6) The Commission shall, while determining the "relevant • (7) The Commission shall, while determining the "relevant
geographic market", have due regard to all or any of the following product market", have due regard to all or any of the
factors, namely:-- following factors, namely:--
• (a) regulatory trade barriers; • (a) physical characteristics or end-use of goods or the
• (b) local specification requirements; nature of services;
• (c) national procurement policies; • (b) price of goods or service;
• (d) adequate distribution facilities; • (c) consumer preferences;
• (e) transport costs; • (d) exclusion of in-house production;
• (f) language; • (e) existence of specialised producers;
• (g) consumer preferences; • (f) classification of industrial products.
• (h) need for secure or regular supplies or rapid after-sales • (g) costs associated with switching demand or supply to
other goods or services;
services. • (h) categories of customers.
• (i) characteristics of goods or nature of services;
• (j) costs associated with switching supply or demand to
other areas.
 inquiry into Combination by Commission
(seCtion 20)

• (1) The Commission may, upon its own knowledge or information relating to acquisition referred to in clause (a) of section 5 or acquiring
of control referred to in clause (b) of section 5 or merger or amalgamation referred to in clause (c) of that section 5 or acquisition of any
control, shares, voting right or assets of an enterprise, merger or amalgamation referred to in clause (d) of that section, inquire into
whether such a combination has caused or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India:
• Provided that the Commission shall not initiate any inquiry under this sub-section after the expiry of one year from the date on
which such combination has taken effect.
• (2) The Commission shall, on receipt of a notice under sub-section (2) of section 6, inquire whether a combination referred to in that notice
or reference has caused or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India.
• (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 5, the Central Government shall, on the expiry of a period of two years from the date of
commencement of this Act and thereafter every two years, in consultation with the Commission, enhance or reduce by notification, or
keep at the same level, on the basis of the wholesale price index or fluctuations in exchange rate of rupee or foreign currencies, or such
factors that in its opinion are relevant in this matter, the value of assets or the value of turnover or value of transaction, for the purposes of
that section.
 Contd..

• (4) For the purposes of determining whether a combination would have the effect of or is likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the relevant market, the Commission
shall have due regard to all or any of the following factors, namely:--
• (a) actual and potential level of competition through imports in the market;
• (b) extent of barriers to entry into the market;
• (c) level of concentration in the market;
• (d) degree of countervailing power in the market;
• (e) likelihood that the combination would result in the parties to the combination being able to significantly and sustainably increase prices or profit margins;
• (f) extent of effective competition likely to sustain in a market;
• (g) extent to which substitutes are available or arc likely to be available in the market;
• (h) market share, in the relevant market, of the persons or enterprise in a combination,
• individually and as a combination;
• (i) likelihood that the combination would result in the removal of a vigorous and effective competitor or competitors in the market;
• (j) nature and extent of vertical integration in the market;
• (k) possibility of a failing business;
• (l) nature and extent of innovation;
• (m) relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the economic development, by any combination having or likely to have appreciable adverse effect on competition;
• (n) whether the benefits of the combination outweigh the adverse impact of the combination, if any.
 referenCe by statutory authority
(seCtion 21)

• (1) Where in the course of a proceeding before any statutory authority an issue is raised by any
party that any decision which such statutory authority has taken or proposes to take, is or would
be, contrary to any of the provisions of this Act, then such statutory authority may make a
reference in respect of such issue to the Commission:
• Provided that any statutory authority, may, suo motu, make a reference to the Commission on
any issue that involves any provision of this Act or is related to promoting the objectives of
this Act, as the case may be.
• (2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the Commission shall give its opinion, within
sixty days of receipt of such reference, to such statutory authority which shall consider the
opinion of the Commission and thereafter, give its findings recording reasons therefor on the
issues referred to in the said opinion.
 referenCe by Commission
(seCtion 21a)

• (1) Where in the course of a proceeding before the Commission an issue is raised by any party that any
decision which, the Commission has taken during such proceeding or proposes to take, is or would be contrary
to any provision of an Act whose implementation is entrusted to a statutory authority, then the Commission
may make a reference in respect of such issue to the statutory authority:
• Provided that the Commission, may, suo motu, make a reference to a statutory authority on any issue
that involves provisions of an Act whose implementation is entrusted to that statutory authority.
• (2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the statutory authority shall give its opinion, within sixty
days of receipt of such reference, to the Commission which shall consider the opinion of the statutory
authority, and thereafter give its findings recording reasons therefor on the issues referred to in the said
opinion.
• (1) The Commission shall meet at such
times and such places, and shall
observe such rules of procedure in
regard to the transaction of business at
its meetings as may be provided by
regulations.
• (2) The Chairperson, if for any reason,
is unable to attend a meeting of the
Commission, the senior-most Member
present at the meeting, shall preside at
the meeting.
• (3) All questions which come up
before any meeting of the Commission
shall be decided by a majority of the
Members present and voting:
• Provided that the quorum for such meeting
shall be three Members.
 • (1) On receipt of a reference from the Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority or on its own
knowledge or information received under section 19, if the Commission is of the opinion that there exists a prima facie case, it
shall direct the Director General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter:
• Provided that if the subject matter of an information received is, in the opinion of the Commission, substantially the
same as or has been covered by any previous information received, then the new information may be clubbed with the
previous information.
• (2) Where on receipt of a reference from the Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority or information
Procedure received under section 19, the Commission is of the opinion that there exists no prima facie case, it shall close the matter
forthwith and pass such orders as it deems fit and send a copy of its order to the Central Government or the State Government or

for inquiry
the statutory authority or the parties concerned, as the case may be.
• (2A) The Commission may not inquire into agreement referred to in section 3 or conduct of an enterprise or group under section

under
4, if the same or substantially the same facts and issues raised in the information received under section 19 or reference from the
Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority has already been decided by the Commission in its previous
order.

section 19 • (3) The Director General shall, on receipt of direction under sub-section (1), submit a report on his findings within such period as
may be specified by the Commission.

(Section 26) • (3A) If, after consideration of the report of the Director General referred to in sub-section (3), the Commission is of the opinion
that further investigation is required, it may direct the Director General to investigate further into the matter.
(3B) The Director General shall, on receipt of direction under sub-section (3A), investigate the matter and submit a
supplementary report on his findings within such period as may be specified by the Commission.
• (4) The Commission may forward a copy of the report referred to in sub-section (3) and (3B) to the parties concerned:
• Provided that in case the investigation is caused to be made based on reference received from the Central Government or
the State Government or the statutory authority, the Commission shall forward a copy of the report referred to in sub-
section (3) and (3B) to the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority, as the case may be.
Contd..

• (5) If the report of the Director General referred to in sub-section (3) and (3B) recommends that there is no contravention of
the provisions of this Act, the Commission shall invite objections or suggestions from the Central Government or the State
Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned, as the case may be, on such report of the Director General.
• (6) If, after consideration of the objections or suggestions referred to in sub-section (5), if any, the Commission agrees with the
recommendation of the Director General, it shall close the matter forthwith and pass such orders as it deems fit and
communicate its order to the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties
concerned, as the case may be.
• (7) If, after consideration of the objections or suggestions referred to in sub-section (5), if any, the Commission is of the
opinion that further investigation is called for, it may direct further investigation in the matter by the Director General or
cause further inquiry to be made in the matter or itself proceed with further inquiry in the matter in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
• (8) If the report of the Director General referred to in sub-section (3) and (3B) recommends that there is contravention of any
of the provisions of this Act, and the Commission is of the opinion that further inquiry is called for, it shall inquire into such
contravention in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
• (9) Upon completion of the investigation or inquiry under sub-section (7) or sub-section (8), as the case may be, the
Commission may pass an order closing the matter or pass an order under section 27, and send a copy of its order to the
Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned, as the case may be:
• Provided that before passing such order, the Commission shall issue a show-cause notice indicating the contraventions
alleged to have been committed and such other details as may be specified by regulations and give a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned.
•
Extra-Territorial Operation of
The Competition Act, 2002
• Acts taking place outside India but having an effect on competition in India- Section
32
• The Commission shall, notwithstanding that,--
• (a) an agreement referred to in section 3 has been entered into outside India; or
• (b) any party to such agreement is outside India; or
• (c) any enterprise abusing the dominant position is outside India; or
• (d) a combination has taken place outside India; or
• (e) any party to combination is outside India; or
• (f) any other matter or practice or action arising out of such agreement or dominant
position or combination is outside India,
• have power to inquire in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 19,
20, 26, 29, 29A and 30 of the Act into such agreement or abuse of dominant
position or combination if such agreement or dominant position or combination
has, or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market in India and pass such orders as it may deem fit in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.
 extra-territorial operation of the
Competition aCt, 2002

• Globalization has led to the rise of multinational corporations and cross-border business transactions. Anti-competitive practices
such as international cartels, price-fixing, and abuse of dominance often transcend national boundaries. To ensure that foreign
entities do not distort competition within India, the Competition Act, 2002 provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction; enabling the
Competition Commission of India (CCI) to examine and take action against conduct occurring outside India but having an
appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) within the Indian market.
• The transformation from the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTP Act) to the Competition Act, 2002
marked a paradigm shift in India’s approach to market regulation.
• While the MRTP Act focused on curbing monopolies and restrictive trade practices within India, the Competition Act was designed
to align India’s legal framework with global competition standards, especially in light of liberalization (post-1991) and cross-border
trade.
• One of the most significant changes introduced by the Competition Act was the recognition of extra-territorial jurisdiction,
enabling the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to act against foreign conduct affecting Indian markets - something the
MRTP Act did not permit.
 Cases on extra-territorial
appliCation
• Umar Javeed, Sukarma Thapar & [Link] Google LLC & Ors.(Case 39 of 2018)
• Facts: The CCI investigated US-based Google LLC (and its Indian subsidiary) for alleged abuse of dominance in the Android OS / app-pre-installation market in
India.
• Key Point on Extraterritoriality: Shows how a foreign company’s global business decisions (outside India) were targeted by CCI because of their effect on the
Indian market.
• Take-away: Important for how Indian law treats digital/tech multinationals under Section 32 (effects doctrine) of the Act
• Cartelisation by Shipping Lines in the matter of provision of MaritimeMotor Vehicle Transport Services to the OEMs (Case No. 10 of 2014)
• Facts: Four Japanese shipping companies — Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK Line), Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (K-Line), Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd (MOL)
and Nissan Motor Car Carrier Company (NMCC) were found guilty of cartelisation in providing maritime motor vehicle transport services to automobile OEMs
for various trade-routes — many of the routes involved exports from/through India.
• Key Point: Even though the service was international and the ultimate destination may not have been the Indian final consumer, CCI held jurisdiction because
Indian OEMs were involved and the agreement had or likely had AAEC in India.
• “The impugned parties … argued that the collusion was outbound in nature … and India was neither the origin nor destination for the vehicles … Therefore, if at
all any adverse effect on competition would have taken place, it would be within the territorial jurisdiction of other countries and not India.”
 • According to S.46 of the Act, if an enterprise that is part of a cartel and is
accused of violating the provisions of S.3(3) of the Act, makes a full, accurate,
and crucial disclosure on the alleged violations, the Commission has the
authority to impose a reduced penalty on that enterprise.
• However, the reduced penalty is not imposed if the Commission has received
Leniency the investigative report by the DG before the disclosure is made.

Provision
• Nevertheless, if the individual who is revealing information ceases cooperating
with the Commission prior to the conclusion of the legal proceedings, they will
not be eligible for a reduced penalty. If this occurs, the Commission has the
authority to bring charges against the individual for the offence and inflict the
maximum penalty if, throughout the proceedings, the individual had-
• Not complied with the conditions on which the lesser penalty was
granted by the Commission; or
• Given false evidence; or
• The disclosure made is not vital.
• S.46 of the Act deals with the leniency programme as the power of the
Commission. The CCI has in order to provide for the application of lesser
penalty enacted the Lesser Penalty Regulation in 2009 which was amended in
the year 2017. This Regulation was repealed by The CCI (Lesser Penalty)
Regulations, 2024 (w.e.f. 20.02.2024).
 • Regulation 3 of the Lesser Penalty Regulations, 2024 outlines the
requirements for obtaining a lesser penalty. It states that an applicant
seeking this benefit must:
• Immediately stop participating in the cartel once it has been
disclosed, or follow the instructions given by the Commission;
the CCi • Cooperate fully, consistently, and promptly throughout the
(lesser investigation and any other proceedings conducted by the
penalty) Commission;
regulations, • must not hide, destroy, alter, or remove the relevant papers in any
2024 way that could help establish a cartel;
• disclose important information concerning the cartel and must
additionally, submit all necessary related information, documents,
and evidence as requested by the Commission
 immunity based on priority status

Type of Immunity Conditions to be fulfilled Immunity from Civil Penalties Immunity from Criminal
Sanctions
First in Priority Status Applicant and the Individual mentioned in sub-regulation (2) of Regulation Reduction of monetary penalty up to or *******
3 must be the first applicant and must fulfill the conditions stipulated in equal to 100% (No Such Immunity)
sub-regulation (1) and (2) of Regulation 3 based on Marker System

Second in Priority Status Applicant and the Individual mentioned in sub-regulation (b) of Regulation Reduction of monetary penalty up to or *******
4 must add significant value to the evidence already in possession of the CCI equal to 50% (No Such Immunity)
or DG
Third and subsequent in Same as condition of Second in priority status Reduction of monetary penalty up to or *******
Priority Status equal to 30% (No Such Immunity)
 Procedure for Grant of Lesser Penalty

• An individual who wishes to receive a reduced penalty may apply to the designated authority. This application should include all relevant information, such
as the identities of the parties involved, a comprehensive description of the alleged cartel arrangement, the goods or services affected, the geographic market
affected, and the duration of the claimed cartel.
• The individual may provide information pertaining to the approximate extent of business impact in India resulting from the cartel, specifics about the
individuals involved in the alleged cartel, information about the authorities that have been or will be contacted regarding the matter, and evidence
supporting the application.
• An applicant has the option to communicate with the authorized authority either verbally or through electronic means such as email or fax. As soon as the
information is received by the Commission, the matter must be put before the Commission within 10 working days (regulation 6(1)).
• Upon submission, the Commission assigns a priority status to the applicant, and the designated authority must give written confirmation of receiving the
application, indicating its priority status to the applicant.
• When the information is given orally, or through email or fax, the Commission instructs the applicant to provide a formal application within 15 days. This
application should include all the necessary information regarding the matter (regulation 6(3)).
 Contd..
• If the Commission does not receive the application and required documents within 15 days from the date of direction
communication, or within any additional period that the Commission may allow, the applicant may lose their claim for
priority status and, as a result, the opportunity to receive a lesser penalty (regulation 6(5))
• It is important to mention that having priority status for the application does not guarantee the applicant a lesser penalty.
The Commission is unable to assess the subsequent application until it has examined the evidence provided by the initial
applicant (regulation 6(6))
• The Commission is obligated to adhere to the notion of natural justice. Prior to dismissing the application, the Commission
must offer the applicant seeking a reduced penalty the chance to present their case, provided that the applicant has not
fully and truthfully disclosed the required information and proof as stated in the application or as requested periodically. If
the first application does not receive priority status, the Commission will prioritize the subsequent applicants in order of
their priority status. The procedure will be applied mutatis mutandis, just like in the case of the first
application(regulation 6(7))
 Competition
advoCaCy

• The role of CCI extends beyond the enforcement of the Competition Law. It is
necessary for it to be involved in the development of the country’s economic
policies, which could have a negative impact on the competitive market
structure, company behaviour, and economic performance.
• Hence, the Commission must fulfil the function of a competition advocate by
implementing government policies that reduce barriers to entry, encourage
deregulation and trade liberalisation, and foster competition in the
marketplace.
• Hence, there exists a clear correlation between the promotion of competition
and the implementation of competition legislation. The objective of
competition is to foster a more competitive market structure without the direct
involvement of the CCI.
• In order to establish an effective competition advocacy campaign, CCI must
cultivate connections with the Ministries and Departments of the Government,
regulatory agencies, and other entities.
• This would enable the CCI to design and implement policies that influence the
demand and supply dynamics in different markets. These ties will make it
easier to communicate and find alternatives that have less negative impact on
competition and consumer well-being.
• The CCI must foster discourse on competition and facilitate enhanced and
well-informed economic decision-making.
Contd..

• To preserve the integrity and effectiveness of the CCI, it is crucial

that competition advocacy is conducted in an open and transparent
manner.
• To increase competition advocacy, CCI can improve media
relations and provide clear explanations on the role and
significance of Competition Policy/Law within the government’s
economic framework.
• The Commission is playing a crucial role in its ongoing efforts to
convert India’s economy into an open, modern, efficient, and
developed economy.
• An exceptional aspect of the Act is its formal inclusion of
mechanisms for competition advocacy.