International Relations: Realism, Liberalism, and Their

Contemporary Applications
International Politics Assignment

1. Realism and Liberalism in International Relations

Realism
Realism is one of the oldest and most dominant theoretical frameworks in
international relations. It presents a largely pessimistic view of world politics,
grounded in the assumption that states are the primary actors in an anarchic
international system — one with no overarching authority to enforce rules or
guarantee security. Rooted in the writings of Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and
later Thomas Hobbes, realism gained formal academic articulation through scholars
like Hans Morgenthau in the twentieth century.
At the heart of realism lies the concept of power. States are assumed to be rational,
self-interested actors whose primary goal is survival and the maximization of power
relative to other states. Because the international system is anarchic, states cannot
rely on any external body for protection and must therefore help themselves — a
principle known as self-help. This leads inevitably to a security dilemma: when one
state increases its military capabilities for defensive purposes, other states perceive
it as a threat and respond in kind, creating a cycle of escalating tension even without
hostile intent.
Classical realism, as articulated by Morgenthau, also emphasizes the concept of the
national interest defined in terms of power. Leaders are expected to act not
according to moral principles but according to what serves the survival and security
of the state. War, alliances, and balance of power mechanisms are considered
natural and recurring features of international life.

Liberalism
Liberalism offers a fundamentally different and more optimistic view of international
relations. Emerging from Enlightenment philosophy and associated with thinkers
such as Immanuel Kant, John Locke, and later Woodrow Wilson, liberalism holds
that cooperation, peace, and progress are achievable in international politics — not
merely idealistic aspirations.
Liberal theory rests on several core assumptions. First, it recognizes multiple actors
in world politics beyond the state, including international organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and multinational corporations. Second, it emphasizes
the role of international institutions — such as the United Nations, the World Trade
Organization, and the International Monetary Fund — in fostering rules-based
cooperation and reducing the likelihood of conflict. Third, liberalism highlights the
democratic peace theory, which holds that liberal democracies rarely, if ever, go to
war with one another, suggesting that the internal character of a state shapes its
external behavior.
Economic interdependence is another pillar of liberal thought. When states are
deeply economically interconnected through trade, investment, and shared
institutions, the cost of conflict rises dramatically, making war an irrational option.
Liberalism thus envisions a world where shared norms, international law, and mutual
benefit gradually constrain the dangerous impulses of power politics.

2. Neo-Realism versus Neo-Liberalism: A Comparative Analysis

By the late twentieth century, both realism and liberalism were refined into more
systematic and structural variants: neo-realism (or structural realism) and neo-
liberalism (or neo-liberal institutionalism). While these frameworks share some
common ground, they diverge significantly in their conclusions about international
cooperation.

Neo-Realism
Kenneth Waltz, in his landmark 1979 work Theory of International Politics,
transformed realism by shifting focus from human nature to the structure of the
international system. Neo-realism argues that it is the anarchic structure of the
international system — not the greed or ambition of individual leaders — that drives
state behavior. States are compelled to compete for power not because they are
inherently aggressive, but because the structure of anarchy leaves them no other
rational choice.
Neo-realism distinguishes between offensive and defensive variants. Defensive neo-
realists, like Waltz, argue that states seek an appropriate level of power to ensure
security, not unlimited power. Offensive neo-realists, like John Mearsheimer,
contend that the uncertainty of the anarchic system pushes states to maximize
power whenever possible, making hegemony a rational goal. In both cases,
international institutions are viewed skeptically — states use them when convenient
but abandon them when interests conflict.

Neo-Liberalism
Neo-liberal institutionalism, developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, accepts
the neo-realist premise of anarchy but disputes the conclusion that cooperation is
therefore impossible. Neo-liberals argue that international institutions can
substantially mitigate the effects of anarchy by providing information, reducing
transaction costs, and creating frameworks that make cheating less attractive and
more easily detectable.
The key difference between neo-realism and neo-liberalism lies in how each theory
treats gains from cooperation. Neo-realists are concerned with relative gains —
states worry not just about their own benefit but whether a rival benefits more, which
could shift the balance of power. Neo-liberals focus on absolute gains — if
cooperation makes all parties better off in absolute terms, states have reason to
sustain it. This distinction explains why neo-liberals see institutions like the WTO or
climate agreements as genuinely stabilizing, while neo-realists remain skeptical of
their durability when core national interests are at stake.
In summary, neo-realism and neo-liberalism agree that anarchy characterizes the
international system, but disagree profoundly on whether cooperation can overcome
it. Neo-realism sees structural conflict as inescapable; neo-liberalism sees
institutional design as capable of transforming state incentives toward sustained
cooperation.
3. Contemporary Applications: Realism and Neo-Realism in the
Current World
Scenario 1: The Russia–Ukraine War (2022–Present)
The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine provides a compelling illustration
of both classical realism and neo-realist logic in action. From a realist perspective,
Russia's invasion in February 2022 can be understood as a power-maximizing
response to the perceived encroachment of NATO — a Western military alliance —
on what Russia considers its sphere of influence. Russia's leadership viewed
NATO's eastward expansion as an existential threat to its security, exemplifying the
security dilemma that realism predicts: what one side frames as a defensive alliance,
the other perceives as a threatening encirclement.
Neo-realism deepens this analysis by pointing to the structural pressures of the
international system. As a great power operating in an anarchic environment, Russia
calculated that allowing Ukraine to align with Western institutions would permanently
shift the regional balance of power against it. John Mearsheimer, an offensive neo-
realist, had in fact warned as far back as 2014 that NATO expansion would provoke
precisely this kind of Russian response, arguing that great powers are highly
sensitive to shifts in power on their borders.
The conflict also demonstrates the limits of liberal institutionalism — the United
Nations Security Council was paralyzed by Russia's veto power, demonstrating that
international institutions cannot constrain great powers when core interests are at
stake, exactly as neo-realists would predict. Western sanctions, while significant,
have not compelled Russia to withdraw, reinforcing the realist view that coercive
power and security imperatives ultimately override economic interdependence.

Scenario 2: US–China Strategic Competition

The intensifying rivalry between the United States and China represents perhaps the
most significant arena of great power competition in the contemporary world, and it
maps closely onto neo-realist theory. China's rapid economic and military rise over
the past three decades has fundamentally altered the distribution of power in the
international system. According to neo-realist logic, and particularly Mearsheimer's
offensive realism, a rising power like China will inevitably challenge the existing
hegemon — the United States — and the United States will seek to contain China's
rise to preserve its primacy.
This dynamic is visible across multiple domains: military buildup in the South China
Sea, competition over semiconductor technology, disputes over Taiwan, and rival
infrastructure initiatives such as China's Belt and Road Initiative versus Western-
backed alternatives. Each of these contests reflects a struggle over relative power
and influence — a quintessentially neo-realist pattern where states prioritize strategic
positioning over mutual economic benefit.
Realist theory also explains the behavior of smaller regional powers caught between
the two giants. Countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, and South Korea face the
classic realist dilemma of balancing or bandwagoning — aligning with the stronger
power or hedging between the two. The formation of security frameworks like
AUKUS (Australia, UK, and the US) and the Quad (US, India, Japan, and Australia)
reflects states forming balancing coalitions against a rising China, a behavior
classical realism has long predicted.

Conclusion
Realism and liberalism have long served as the twin pillars of international relations
theory, offering contrasting lenses through which to understand world politics. While
liberalism holds out the promise of cooperation, institutions, and peace, realism
insists on the enduring primacy of power and self-interest in an anarchic world. Their
structural successors — neo-realism and neo-liberalism — have sharpened these
debates without fully resolving them. The Russia–Ukraine war and the US–China
rivalry demonstrate that the logic of power, security, and structural competition
remains as relevant today as ever, affirming the continued explanatory power of
realism and neo-realism in understanding the present world order.

Word Count: approximately 1,150 words