MOOT COURT FILE, 2025

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF WINDIA

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF SUVARNABHUMI

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SUVARNABHUMI

IN RE:

Stephanie v. State of Windia

STEPHANIE ......................... PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE OF WINDIA .......................... RESPONDENT

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

[Link] GUPTA Devendra Pratap Yadav
ASSISTANT PROESSOR BBALLB
SCHOOL OF LEGAL STUDIES 4th YEAR & 7th SEM.
1220991033

(MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT)

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Table Of Content ......................................................................... 2

2. List of Abbreviations ............................................................................ 3

3. Index of Authorities ........................................................... 4

4. Statement of Jurisdiction ..................................................................5

5. Statement of Facts ................................................................................. 6-7

6. Issues Raised ..................................................................................... 8

7. Summary of Arguments................................................................... 9-12

8. Arguments Advanced
I. The Appellant’s act clearly amounts to “murder” under Section 302 IPC
because the ingredients of Section 300 (Thirdly) are fully satisfied ....................... 13
II. The Appellant cannot claim the protection of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC
since provocation was neither “grave” nor “sudden”, and the cooling-off period
entirely negates her plea ............................................................................................ 14
III. The killing of the child is a separate, deliberate act and conclusively
establishes premeditation, intention, and full mental control .................................. 15
IV. The plea of “diminished responsibility” and psychological breakdown has no
place in Indian criminal jurisprudence and is legally inadmissible ....................... 16

V. The High Court rightly convicted the Appellant under Section 302 IPC; the
Sessions Court committed grave error in extending Exception 1 IPC without
legal basis........................................................................................................ 17-18

9. Prayer ...................................................................................................... 19

Page 2 of 19
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION FULL FORM

& And

¶ Para

AIR All India Reporter

BLJR Bihar Law Journal Reports

Co. Company

Cri. Criminal

CriLJ Criminal Law Journal

DHC Delhi High Court

Govt. Government

Hon’ble Honourable

Page 3 of 19
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I. Indian Case Law

1. Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465

2. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45
3. K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605
4. State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran, (1999) 8 SCC 679
5. State of Karnataka v. Suvarnamma, (2015) 1 SCC 323

II. International Cases

1. R. v. Smith (UK) [2000] 4 All ER 289

2. R. v. Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168

III. Statutes

1. Constitution of Windia
2. Indian Penal Code, 1860
3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
4. Indian Evidence Act, 187

Page 4 of 19
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

(¶1)The Respondent respectfully submits that this Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction
to entertain and adjudicate the present appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution
of Windia, which empowers the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from
any judgment, decree, sentence, or order passed by any court or tribunal within the
territory of Windia.

(¶2) The present matter arises out of a judgment delivered by the Hon’ble High Court
of Shipla, wherein the conviction of the Appellant was rightly altered from Section
304 IPC to Section 302 IPC, restoring the charge of murder for the killing of her
husband and minor child. The Appellant, being aggrieved by the judgment of the High
Court, has sought appellate consideration before this Hon’ble Court.

(¶3) The questions involved in the present case relate to the interpretation and
application of Section 300 IPC, particularly the scope of Exception 1 (grave and
sudden provocation), the doctrine of cooling-off period, and the legal parameters
governing the distinction between culpable homicide and murder. These questions
raise substantial issues of general public importance and involve the proper
understanding of the statutory framework under the Indian Penal Code.

(¶4) Further, the Appellant seeks to challenge findings of fact and law concurrently
upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court, under Article 136, possesses wide
discretionary powers to examine whether the High Court committed any error leading
to miscarriage of justice. As the judgment impugned directly affects criminal liability
under Section 302 IPC, the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is clearly maintainable.

(¶5) The Respondent submits that the procedural requirements prescribed under the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have been duly complied with, and the appeal
has been filed within the permissible legal framework. No statutory bar exists to
restrict the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court in hearing the present matter.

(¶6) Accordingly, this Hon’ble Court is fully empowered to adjudicate the present
criminal appeal and render an authoritative determination on the legality and
correctness of the conviction under Section 302 IPC.

Page 5 of 19
STATEMENT OF FACTS

(¶[Link] and Jones were married in the year 2000 in the State of Windia. The
couple had a male child who was mentally challenged and required regular parental
care and supervision. Despite certain marital disagreements, the State submits that
there is no recorded evidence of any formal complaints by the Appellant regarding
severe cruelty, sustained torture, or physical violence capable of endangering her life.

(¶[Link] the years, normal domestic disputes arose between the couple, many of
which were rooted in economic stress, differing temperaments, and Jones’ occasional
consumption of alcohol. However, the Respondent submits that the Appellant
continued to reside with Jones, manage household affairs, and jointly parent the child.
There is no evidence showing that such disputes escalated to such an extreme level as
to justify or foreshadow a double homicide.

(¶[Link] 21 March 2006, the Appellant and the deceased allegedly engaged in a quarrel
later in the evening. According to the Appellant’s own version, the deceased slapped
her and engaged in heated verbal exchange. The Respondent asserts that even if such
an incident occurred, it did not cause any lasting physical injury nor was it of a nature
that could trigger an uncontrollable emotional breakdown. No medical report, police
complaint, or witness statement corroborates any exceptionally grave assault by Jones.

(¶[Link] the alleged quarrel, Jones retired to bed around 11:00 PM, indicating that
the altercation had ceased. The Appellant did not sustain any injury requiring
treatment, nor did she express any fear or distress to neighbours or family members.
The household remained quiet for the next several hours, demonstrating that the
alleged provocation had subsided.

(¶[Link] approximately 4:00 AM, when Jones was sleeping peacefully and was
completely unaware of any impending danger, the Appellant picked up a heavy iron
rod from the house and approached him. Without warning and without any immediate
provocation, she delivered multiple forceful blows on his head, face, and chest,
causing instantaneous death due to severe cranial and internal injuries.

(¶[Link] killing Jones, the Appellant proceeded to the adjoining room where her
mentally challenged son was asleep. Instead of seeking help or showing remorse, the
Appellant inflicted another fatal blow on the child’s head using the same iron rod. The
child, being physically and mentally vulnerable, had no ability to resist or comprehend
the attack. The Respondent asserts that this second killing constitutes a separate and
independent act, proving conscious decision-making beyond any emotional or
psychological loss of control.

Page 6 of 19
(¶[Link] discovered the crime when the Appellant reportedly screamed
sometime after the killings. Police officials arrived promptly and found the deceased
husband lying in the bedroom with blood-spattered bedding and deep skull fractures,
while the child lay lifeless in another room. The iron rod used as the weapon was
recovered with visible bloodstains. The Appellant was present at the scene and did not
deny involvement in the killings.

(¶[Link] post-mortem report confirmed that both victims had sustained multiple
injuries, especially on vital parts of the body. The nature of the injuries indicated
clear application of significant force and repeated strikes. There were no signs of
struggle or defensive wounds on the victims, confirming that both were attacked while
asleep.

(¶[Link] prosecution filed charges under Section 302 IPC for double murder. During
the trial, the Sessions Court—while accepting that the Appellant caused both deaths—
extended the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, treating the offence as
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Sessions Court reasoned that the
Appellant may have acted under

(¶[Link] State of Windia appealed against the reduced conviction. The Hon’ble High
Court of Shipla observed that the alleged provocation was neither grave nor sudden,
and that the Appellant had a cooling-off period of nearly five hours before
committing the murders. The Court found that the killings were not impulsive but
deliberate, especially the killing of the child, which demonstrated renewed intention.
Accordingly, the High Court set aside the Sessions Court’s finding and convicted the
Appellant under Section 302 IPC for murder.

(¶[Link] Sessions Court wrongly applied Section 304 IPC, but the High Court
correctly convicted her under Section 302 IPC.

Page 7 of 19
ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the Appellant’s act amounts to murder under Section 302 IPC?

2. Whether the Appellant is entitled to Exception 1 of Section 300 IPC (grave

and sudden provocation)?

3. Whether the killing of a sleeping husband and child shows premeditation

and intention?

4. Whether the High Court correctly reversed the Sessions Court judgment?

Page 8 of 19
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS (EXPANDED RESPONDENT VERSION)

I. The Appellant’s act clearly amounts to “murder” under Section 302 IPC
because the ingredients of Section 300 (Thirdly) are fully satisfied.

(¶1) The Respondent submits that the Appellant intentionally inflicted multiple,
forceful blows with an iron rod on the vital parts of the deceased while he was asleep
and defenseless. As held in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, once
the prosecution proves (i) an intentional injury, (ii) on a vital part, (iii) sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, the act automatically falls under Section 300
“Thirdly”.

(¶2) The Appellant’s conduct demonstrates a conscious and deliberate act. The
choice of weapon (iron rod), the repetition of blows, and targeting sensitive parts of
the body unequivocally prove mens rea and intention. A sleeping victim cannot be
said to have offered any threat or provocation; therefore, the act cannot be categorized
as impulsive or unintentional.

(¶3) The prosecution further submits that the brutality and intensity of violence used
by the Appellant meet the threshold of murder under Section 302 IPC. The High
Court correctly appreciated evidence showing that the injuries sustained were neither
accidental nor the result of any sudden emotional collapse, but deliberate and fatal.

II. The Appellant cannot claim the protection of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC
since provocation was neither “grave” nor “sudden”, and the cooling-off period
entirely negates her plea.

(¶4) The doctrine of provocation requires that the provocation must be sudden,
immediate, and sufficient to deprive the accused of self-control. The Supreme Court

Page 9 of 19
in K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605, emphasized that if
sufficient time exists for passions to cool, the defence collapses.

(¶5) In the present case, the alleged assault by the deceased occurred at around 11:00
PM, while the killing occurred at 4:00 AM, after the Appellant had nearly five hours
to calm down. This cooling-off period is fatal to the claim of sudden provocation.
After this extended interval, the Appellant had regained control and proceeded with
deliberation. Thus, the temporal gap alone disqualifies her from invoking Exception 1.

(¶6) Further, provocation must arise from the conduct of the deceased at the time of
the incident. At 4:00 AM, Jones was asleep, offering no instance of provocation. The
Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendra, (1999) 8 SCC 679, held that
killing a sleeping person demonstrates absence of provocation and presence of
intention.

(¶7) Additionally, past acts of cruelty—even if assumed to be true—cannot constitute

“sudden provocation” under law. Provocation must be immediate and
contemporaneous, not accumulated over years. Therefore, the Appellant is not
entitled to any statutory protection under Exception 1.

III. The killing of the child is a separate, deliberate act and conclusively
establishes premeditation, intention, and full mental control.

(¶8) The Respondent emphasizes that after killing her husband, the Appellant went to
a different room and killed her child with another blow on the head. This was not part
of the same incident or emotional impulse. It was a fresh and independent decision,
showing clear intention to kill.

Page 10 of 19
(¶9) The child was innocent, fragile, asleep, and completely uninvolved in the quarrel.
No provocation or threat existed from the child. The killing of the child is the clearest
evidence that the Appellant acted with full consciousness and clarity of mind, not in
a trance-like state as alleged.

(¶10) As held in State of A.P. v. Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45, intention is inferred
from the totality of circumstances — weapon used, number of blows, place of injuries,
and post-conduct. All these indicators point toward active and deliberate murder.
Even if (without admitting) provocation is assumed for the husband, it cannot be
extended to justify killing an innocent minor.

(¶11) Thus, the killing of the child alone firmly establishes murder under Section 302
IPC and destroys any claim of diminished responsibility or emotional disturbance.

IV. The plea of “diminished responsibility” and psychological breakdown has no

place in Indian criminal jurisprudence and is legally inadmissible.

(¶12) The Respondent submits that Indian law does not recognize diminished
responsibility as a defence. The only mental defence available is legal insanity under
Section 84 IPC, requiring complete loss of cognitive faculties. The Appellant neither
pleaded nor proved such insanity.

(¶13) The Supreme Court in Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563, held
that unless the accused proves unsoundness of mind, no psychological condition can
reduce culpability. Courts have consistently rejected the import of foreign doctrines
like “battered woman syndrome” in absence of legislative recognition.

(¶14) The Appellant’s conduct — selecting a weapon, approaching both victims

separately, striking vital blows, remaining at the scene, showing awareness of
Page 11 of 19
surroundings — demonstrates full mental capacity and comprehension. The actions
were deliberate, sequenced, and executed with awareness.

(¶15) Therefore, the High Court correctly concluded that the defence of diminished
responsibility is untenable and unsupported by Indian law.

V. The High Court rightly convicted the Appellant under Section 302 IPC; the
Sessions Court committed grave error in extending Exception 1 IPC without
legal basis.

(¶16) The Respondent submits that the High Court’s judgment reflects a correct
appreciation of facts and settled precedence. It rightly held that the Sessions Court
erred in giving undue weight to alleged past abuse while ignoring the essential legal
requirement of “suddenness” of provocation.

(¶17) The High Court restored the legal position that when evidence proves intention,
planning, and conscious decision-making, the appropriate conviction is murder
under Section 302 IPC and not culpable homicide.

(¶18) The Sessions Court’s reliance on sympathy, rather than legal reasoning, diluted
the seriousness of the offence. The High Court rectified this error by applying
principles laid down in Punnayya, Virsa Singh, and Rajendran.

(¶19) The Respondent therefore submits that the impugned judgment is just, sound,
and consistent with criminal jurisprudence. It deserves full affirmation by this Hon’ble
Court.

Page 12 of 19
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. The Appellant’s act clearly amounts to “murder” under Section 302 IPC
because the ingredients of Section 300 (Thirdly) are fully satisfied.

(¶1) The Respondent submits that the Appellant intentionally inflicted multiple,
forceful blows with an iron rod on the vital parts of the deceased while he was asleep
and defenseless. As held in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, once
the prosecution proves (i) an intentional injury, (ii) on a vital part, (iii) sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, the act automatically falls under Section 300
“Thirdly”.

(¶2) The Appellant’s conduct demonstrates a conscious and deliberate act. The
choice of weapon (iron rod), the repetition of blows, and targeting sensitive parts of
the body unequivocally prove mens rea and intention. A sleeping victim cannot be
said to have offered any threat or provocation; therefore, the act cannot be categorized
as impulsive or unintentional.

(¶3) The prosecution further submits that the brutality and intensity of violence used
by the Appellant meet the threshold of murder under Section 302 IPC. The High
Court correctly appreciated evidence showing that the injuries sustained were neither
accidental nor the result of any sudden emotional collapse, but deliberate and fatal.

Page 13 of 19
II. The Appellant cannot claim the protection of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC
since provocation was neither “grave” nor “sudden”, and the cooling-off period
entirely negates her plea.

(¶4) The doctrine of provocation requires that the provocation must be sudden,
immediate, and sufficient to deprive the accused of self-control. The Supreme Court
in K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605, emphasized that if
sufficient time exists for passions to cool, the defence collapses.

(¶5) In the present case, the alleged assault by the deceased occurred at around 11:00
PM, while the killing occurred at 4:00 AM, after the Appellant had nearly five hours
to calm down. This cooling-off period is fatal to the claim of sudden provocation.
After this extended interval, the Appellant had regained control and proceeded with
deliberation. Thus, the temporal gap alone disqualifies her from invoking Exception 1.

(¶6) Further, provocation must arise from the conduct of the deceased at the time of
the incident. At 4:00 AM, Jones was asleep, offering no instance of provocation. The
Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran, (1999) 8 SCC 679, held that
killing a sleeping person demonstrates absence of provocation and presence of
intention.

(¶7) Additionally, past acts of cruelty—even if assumed to be true—cannot constitute

“sudden provocation” under law. Provocation must be immediate and
contemporaneous, not accumulated over years. Therefore, the Appellant is not
entitled to any statutory protection under Exception 1.

Page 14 of 19
III. The killing of the child is a separate, deliberate act and conclusively
establishes premeditation, intention, and full mental control.

(¶8) The Respondent emphasizes that after killing her husband, the Appellant went to
a different room and killed her child with another blow on the head. This was not part
of the same incident or emotional impulse. It was a fresh and independent decision,
showing clear intention to kill.

(¶9) The child was innocent, fragile, asleep, and completely uninvolved in the quarrel.
No provocation or threat existed from the child. The killing of the child is the clearest
evidence that the Appellant acted with full consciousness and clarity of mind, not in
a trance-like state as alleged.

(¶10) As held in State of A.P. v. Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45, intention is inferred
from the totality of circumstances — weapon used, number of blows, place of injuries,
and post-conduct. All these indicators point toward active and deliberate murder.
Even if (without admitting) provocation is assumed for the husband, it cannot be
extended to justify killing an innocent minor.

(¶11) Thus, the killing of the child alone firmly establishes murder under Section 302
IPC and destroys any claim of diminished responsibility or emotional disturbance.

IV. The plea of “diminished responsibility” and psychological breakdown has no

place in Indian criminal jurisprudence and is legally inadmissible.

(¶12) The Respondent submits that Indian law does not recognize diminished
responsibility as a defence. The only mental defence available is legal insanity under
Section 84 IPC, requiring complete loss of cognitive faculties. The Appellant neither
pleaded nor proved such insanity.
Page 15 of 19
(¶13) The Supreme Court in Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563, held
that unless the accused proves unsoundness of mind, no psychological condition can
reduce culpability. Courts have consistently rejected the import of foreign doctrines
like “battered woman syndrome” in absence of legislative recognition.

(¶14) The Appellant’s conduct — selecting a weapon, approaching both victims

separately, striking vital blows, remaining at the scene, showing awareness of
surroundings — demonstrates full mental capacity and comprehension. The actions
were deliberate, sequenced, and executed with awareness.

(¶15) Therefore, the High Court correctly concluded that the defence of diminished
responsibility is untenable and unsupported by Indian law.

Page 16 of 19
V. The High Court rightly convicted the Appellant under Section 302 IPC; the
Sessions Court committed grave error in extending Exception 1 IPC without
legal basis.

(¶16) The Respondent submits that the High Court’s judgment reflects a correct
appreciation of facts and settled precedence. It rightly held that the Sessions Court
erred in giving undue weight to alleged past abuse while ignoring the essential legal
requirement of “suddenness” of provocation.

(¶17) The High Court restored the legal position that when evidence proves intention,
planning, and conscious decision-making, the appropriate conviction is murder
under Section 302 IPC and not culpable homicide.

(¶18) The Sessions Court’s reliance on sympathy, rather than legal reasoning, diluted
the seriousness of the offence. The High Court rectified this error by applying
principles laid down in Punnayya, Virsa Singh, and Rajendran.

(¶19) The Respondent therefore submits that the impugned judgment is just, sound,
and consistent with criminal jurisprudence. It deserves full affirmation by this Hon’ble
Court.

A. The Sessions Court relied on sympathy, not legal principles.

The Sessions Court focused on emotional aspects and not on strict statutory
interpretation.

It ignored the mandatory requirement that provocation must be sudden and immediate.

Page 17 of 19
B. The High Court correctly applied binding Supreme Court precedents.

The High Court restored legal accuracy by relying on:

 Virsa Singh
 Nanavati
 Punnayya
 Rajendran

All these judgments support murder, not culpable homicide.

C. The High Court correctly appreciated evidence of premeditation and

intention.

The High Court noted:

1. multiple blows
2. vital injuries
3. the child’s killing
4. cooling-off period
5. absence of provocation

These factors overwhelmingly support conviction under Section 302 IPC.

Page 18 of 19
PRAYER (RESPONDENT)

In light of the above, the Respondent respectfully prays that this Hon’ble Court may
be pleased to:

1. Dismiss the appeal filed by the Appellant;

2. Uphold the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court convicting the Appellant
under Section 302 IPC;
3. Pass any other order deemed fit in the interest of Justice.

Page 19 of 19