CNMUN TRIALS RESEARCH DOC

COMMITTEE: DISEC (DISARMAMENT AND

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE)
●​ focuses on disarmament, global security, and the prevention of armed conflict. DISEC
plays a crucial role in addressing challenges related to the proliferation of weapons,
arms control, and promoting international peace and stability.
●​ Works on formulating and recommending measures for regulating armaments and
disarmament, considering the impact of weapons on international peace and security.
●​ The Committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament
Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament.

AGENDA: RE-EVALUATING THE R2P

(RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT) DOCTRINE
Definitions and origin of the R2P doctrine
●​ The 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) formulated the alternative principle of "the responsibility to protect," focusing on
the responsibility of all states to protect people at risk. In 2005 the UN World Summit
unanimously accepted their "responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."
●​ The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept sought to confront both the Rwanda tragedy
and the Kosovo dilemma by stipulating that states have an obligation to protect their
citizens from mass atrocity crimes; that the international community will assist them in
doing so; and that, should the state be "manifestly failing" in its obligations, the
international community is obliged to act. R2P seeks to ensure that the international
community never again fails to act in the face of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes
and crimes against humanity. By accepting a collective responsibility to protect, the
international community issued a solemn pledge that it cannot lightly ignore.
●​ Official statements: The Responsibility to Protect was unanimously adopted in
2005 at the UN World Summit, the largest gathering of Heads of State and
Government in history. It is articulated in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World
Summit Outcome Document:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement,
 through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and
will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and
support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a
timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with
the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation
with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications,
bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also
intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States
build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under
stress before crises and conflicts break out.
●​ The UN's 2005 World Summit Outcome Document explicitly limits the application of R2P
to four types of mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and ethnic cleansing. The first three crimes are legally defined in various international
legal documents, such as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols,
and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Genocide:
source: Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide
 “Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:​
(a) Killing members of the group;​
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;​
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;​
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;​
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

War crimes:

Source: Article 8 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the 1949
Geneva Conventions (and 1977 Additional Protocols)

“War crimes means grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August

1949... namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:

●​ Willful killing;​

●​ Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;​

●​ Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;​

●​ Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military

necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;​

●​ Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces

of a hostile power;​

●​ Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of

fair and regular trial.”​

Crimes against humanity:

Source: Article 7 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

“Crimes against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack:

●​ Murder;​

●​ Extermination;​
 ●​ Enslavement;​

●​ Deportation or forcible transfer of population;​

●​ Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of

fundamental rules of international law;​

●​ Torture;​

●​ Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced

sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;​

●​ Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,

national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds;​

●​ Enforced disappearance of persons;​

●​ The crime of apartheid.​

●​ Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great

suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”​

Ethnic cleansing:

Source: Not formally defined in a treaty, but used in UN resolutions and tribunals. The UN
Commission of Experts (1993) defined it as:

“A purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent

and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious
group from certain geographic areas.”

●​ measures as sanctions, arms embargoes, or the threat to refer perpetrators to the ICC.
Should peaceful means be inadequate and the state be manifestly failing or unwilling to
protect its population, then-and only thenwould the UNSC consider use of military force.
●​ Use of military intervention is justified when:

1. Seriousness of harm. The threat of atrocities must be clear and extreme enough to justify
military force.
2. Proper purpose. The central purpose of the intervention must be to prevent or halt suffering;
3. Last resort. Military force must be the last resort, with every reasonable non-military option
having been explored;
4. Proportional means. The scale and duration of military action must be commensurate with the
ends sought.
5. Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of success in averting the threat of
atrocities without worsening the situation?

●​ R2p covers crimes occurring anywhere in the world, regardless of status or prestige of
power. In this way, states with great economic, diplomatic, logistical and military
capability have a great responsibility to intervene in mass atrocity crimes.
●​ Not a part of customary law but widely accepted as an international “norm” since
unanimously adopted at the 2005 world summit outcome (and in the document).
●​ The Secretary-General's 2009 report, entitled Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect, introduced a three-pillar strategy for R2P implementation.
The three pillars are:
Pillar 1: Every state has the Responsibility to protect its populations from the four mass atrocity
crimes.
Pillar 2: The wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist
individual states in meeting that responsibility.
Pillar 3: If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community
must be prepared to take appropriate collective action in a timely and decisive manner and in
accordance with the UN Charter.

●​ Member states have directly engaged with the R2P dialogue in many ways. Since 2009,
more than 134 states and 6 regional organizations have participated in the UN General
Assembly’s interactive dialogues on R2P. States also discuss R2P in other human rights
forums, including in debates on the protection of civilians and at the Human Rights
Council (HRC).
●​ Group of friends of r2p???
●​ As of January 2021, R2P has been invoked in 91 UNSC resolutions, 25 General
Assembly resolutions, and 52 HRC resolutions. These resolutions have addressed
situations such as Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria – as well as thematic issues
such as the Protection of Civilians, Prevention of Genocide, Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, and the
Protection of Healthcare in Conflict.
●​ Challenges:
-The first is conceptual - to ensure that the scope, and limits, of the norm as it has evolved are
well understood in all parts of the world. As new mass atrocity risk situations arise, there needs
to be broad international consensus about how to respond in the context of R2P.

-The second challenge is institutional. There is a need to ensure that governments and
intergovernmental organizations have available all the diplomatic, civilian and, as a last resort,
military capability needed to ensure effective early warning and timely action. We need
international institutions with a capacity to provide essential assistance to those countries who
need it and to people desperately in need of protection.
-The third challenge is political. In every case where atrocities have occurred and R2P has been
invoked since 2005, the difference between success (Kenya, The Gambia, Cote d’Ivoire, etc.)
and failure (Syria, Myanmar, etc.) has depended upon political leadership and timely action by
the UNSC, working with a committed regional organization. We need to ensure that whenever
and wherever atrocity crimes are threatened, the necessary commitment will be there from
international decision-makers. This means having consensual international arrangements in
place for effective mobilization by both governments and civil society. It also requires that there
is consistency in the application of R2P.

Some historical context:

Rwanda Genocide (1994): France's role in Rwanda remains contentious. A 2021 French
government-commissioned report acknowledged that France bore "serious and overwhelming"
responsibilities due to its support for the Hutu-led government but cleared it of complicity in the
genocide itself. Reddit​

Libya (2011): France was a leading advocate for NATO intervention in Libya under R2P, aiming
to protect civilians from Gaddafi's forces. However, the aftermath saw Libya descend into chaos,
raising questions about the doctrine's effectiveness and the scope of intervention.​

Syria (2011–present): Despite clear evidence of mass atrocities, France has been vocal about
the need for R2P to be invoked. However, geopolitical complexities and vetoes in the UN
Security Council have hindered action.

●​ The concept of ‘the responsibility to protect’ has achieved a global acceptance

unimaginable for the earlier concept of ‘the right of humanitarian intervention,’
which R2P has now rightly and almost completely displaced.

France’s stance:
As a european union member, france is heavily involved in advocating for human rights and
international law within the union. It is also a permanent member of the unsc and has close ties
with NATO, united states, and other western powers, it has enough power to influence decsions
taken regarding the r2p.

●​ LEVEARAGE VETO POWER TO INFLUENCE DISCUSSIONS AND DECISIONS!!

●​ ALLIES ARE EU AND NATO COUNTRIES!!
# Country Date of Admission

1 Belgium 01-01-1958

2 France 01-01-1958

3 Germany 01-01-1958

4 Italy 01-01-1958

5 Luxembourg 01-01-1958

6 Netherlands 01-01-1958

7 Denmark 01-01-1973

8 Ireland 01-01-1973

9 Greece 01-01-1981

1
Portugal 01-01-1986
0

1
Spain 01-01-1986
1

1
Austria 01-01-1995
2

1
Finland 01-01-1995
3

1
Sweden 01-01-1995
4

1
Bulgaria 01-01-2007
5
1
Romania 01-01-2007
6

1
Cyprus 01-05-2004
7

1
Czechia 01-05-2004
8

1
Estonia 01-05-2004
9

2
Hungary 01-05-2004
0

2
Latvia 01-05-2004
1

2
Lithuania 01-05-2004
2

2
Malta 01-05-2004
3

2
Poland 01-05-2004
4

2
Slovakia 01-05-2004
5

2
Slovenia 01-05-2004
6

2
Croatia
7
 ●​ USE PUBLIC AND MEDIA STATEMENTS TO HIGHLIGHT FRANCE’S COMMITTMENT
TO HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY (fance has consistently made efforts to give the r2p
more dialogue after the UN general assembly conferences)
●​ PAINT FRANCE AS A GAURDIAN OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
ADVOCACY
●​ COULD PROPOSE A FORMAL CODE OF CONDUCT FRAMEWORK FOR THE
COUNTRIES THAT HOLD VETO POWER: THE P5- CHINA, FRANCE, RUSSIA, UK,
USA
●​ FREINDS OF THE R2P: very important, could make this as a bloc
-clarify criteria for response and action
-adress BRICS (brazil, russia, india, china) criticism
-adress concerns of soveriegnity breach, selective interventions, and immediate military
intervention
-refernce past leadership and intervension very clearly
-since r2p is not a law, focus on strengthening laws that aid the r2p (such as proposing a
committee to overview the R2P proceedings every 4 months and producing an unbiased,
un-overlooking quarterly report )

FRANCE STATEMENTS TABLE

Source Year / Key Points / France’s Useful Quotes

Context Framing
“L’approche Undated France describes R2P as > “La prévention est
française de la thematic having three pillars (state au coeur de la
‘responsabilité de dossier of responsibility; international ‘responsabilité de
protéger’ (R2P)” France’s UN assistance and protéger’ … Elle doit
— FranceONU mission capacity‑building; timely and donner toute leur
declarations decisive international action place aux mesures de
when state fails). Prevention règlement pacifique
is central. Also, France des différends, sans
frames R2P as a balanced écarter l’éventualité
doctrine: including peaceful d’un recours à des
dispute resolution, but also mesures coercitives, y
coercive measures (including compris le recours à la
force) if required under UN force, lorsque le
Charter. maintien de la paix et
de la sécurité
internationales l’exige
…” (Sénat)

Statement by 23 July 2009 France emphasises

France at the 2009 implementation, the need for
UN General both prevention and timely
Assembly Debate action. Likely stresses state
on R2P: duties and international
“Implementing the cooperation. (Text can be
responsibility to obtained from Global Centre
protect” for R2P archives). (Global
Center for R2P)
Statement by 5 September France emphasises that
France at 2012 2012 responses must be timely
UNGA Informal and decisive. This implies
Interactive criticism of delays in past
Dialogue on R2P: cases. Also emphasizes that
“Timely and international assistance must
Decisive be effective. (Global Center
Response” for R2P)

Statement by 8 September As title suggests, heavy

France at 2014 2014 focus on Pillar II
UNGA Informal (International Assistance) —
Interactive French view: R2P is not just
Dialogue on R2P: about coercion or
“Fulfilling our intervention, but about
collective helping states build capacity,
responsibility: prevention, early action.
International (Global Center for R2P)
assistance and the
responsibility to
protect”
“France regrets 23 April 2024 France laments
the increasing use veto‐deadlock in the Security
of the veto” — Council; frames veto not as a
Statement of privilege but a responsibility.
France at UN Mentions the France‑Mexico
initiative (since 2015) aiming
to limit veto use in cases of
mass atrocities. Says 106
States support the initiative.
Also, France supports
enlargement/reform of the
Security Council. (French
Embassy to the United
Nations)

“La responsabilité 8 September France repeats that it has

de protéger doit 2015 been ten years since 2005,
rassembler la and reminds the world of the
communauté des three pillars. Emphasises the
Nations” — importance of international
François Delattre, community acting when a
Representative of State fails its duty to protect.
France to UN Sees R2P as something that
should unite UN Member
States, not divide. (French
Embassy to the United
Nations)
Speech / 21 January France's government hosts
Conference at 2015 conference; the speech
Sciences Po: asserts that P5 should agree
“Limiting the Use to a code of conduct to
of Veto at the UN voluntarily refrain from veto
Security Council in atrocity situations. The
in the Case of idea of a trigger (from
Mass Atrocities” outside P5) is discussed
(e.g. UN Secretary‑General
being called upon when a
certain number of Member
States request it). (Global
Center for R2P)

Global Centre for Feb 2015 Explains the French proposal

R2P commentary: (originally floated in 2001,
“Limiting the reactivated under President
Security Council Hollande around 2013‑2014)
Veto” regarding voluntary restraint
of veto in mass atrocity
situations. Sets out how this
might work in practice; the
need for trigger mechanisms,
what counts as mass
atrocity, etc. (Global Center
for R2P)
France’s 2023 While not only about R2P,
Humanitarian this strategy shows France’s
Strategy current thinking about crises:
2023‑2027 — prevention, that crises are
French Ministry for overlapping/chronic,
Europe and Foreign protecting civilians,
Affairs respecting international
humanitarian law, improving
humanitarian access. This
frames how France sees its
role in crisis/conflict contexts,
relevant to R2P’s Pillar I & II.
(France Diplomacy)

A france statement from 2024

France is committed to multilateralism and, at its heart, to the United Nations
system. The Security Council, that the UN Charter entrusts with the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, is
continuing to work. Given the gravity of the crises that the world must face, and
the expectations of the international community, it is essential that the Security
Council be able to act. That is the aim of the draft resolution proposed by France
related to the situation in the Middle East, which is in line with resolution 2728
and which not only aims to address to the urgency of the situation, but also to
address the future of Gaza and the parameters for a political settlement of the
conflict.
However, given the multiplication of crises and conflicts, France regrets the
increasing use of the veto, which is reaching levels unseen since the end of the
Cold War: the eleven vetoes in the last twelve months on draft resolutions are
contributing to the Security Council’s deadlock on certain conflicts. For its part,
France considers that the veto is not a privilege, but a responsibility that is
particular to the permanent members of the Council. It is with this in mind that
France has used the veto only 18 times since 1945, and has not used it for more
than 30 years.
It is also with this spirit of responsibility that France together with Mexico has
since 2015 been proposing an initiative aiming to limit the use of the veto in
cases of mass atrocities. This initiative would not require any amendment to the
UN Charter to be implemented, and would be applicable to current permanent
members. There is a great demand for this in the Assembly, as is shown by the
support provided by 106 States for this initiative. We call on all member states
that have not yet done so to support it, in particular the other permanent
members.
Lastly, to strengthen our collective security system, we need more broadly to
reform the Security Council. France supports its enlargement in both categories
of membership, and hopes that negotiations will begin without delay on the basis
of a draft resolution.

the French proposal of a few years ago that the five permanent members of the
Security Council enter a voluntary self-restraint agreement not to exercise their veto in
mass atrocity cases, and the related proposal by the so-named Accountability,
Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group for a Code of Conduct binding all Council
members when dealing with atrocity situations. Together, these parallel initiatives
have been signed by over 120 governments.

Another proposal was the Brazilian ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ (RWP)

proposal, crafted in 2011 as a solution to the impasse over Libya, which would require
all Council members to debate more comprehensively the criteria that need to be met
before any use of force is authorized, and to accept close monitoring and review of
any coercive military mandate throughout its lifetime. Russia and China have shown
some willingness to go down this path in the past.

❖​Australia, has in the past also played a major energising role on global public
goods issues – and has been a leading supporter of R2P from the beginning –
but we have unhappily tarnished our human rights reputation in recent years, in
particular with our treatment of asylum seekers, and the recent shocking
revelation of war crimes committed by our special forces in Afghanistan.
The main issue and possible solutions:
●​ The R2P doctrine is selectively applied often times when it benefits the state putting it
into use.
●​ Many states are unwilling to respond to various situations, perhaps due to economical
ties with the other state, which leads to inaction when the r2p doctrine is really needed
●​ Preventive strategies must be strengthened as military intervention is often a breach of
supremacy
●​ Strengthen definations and criteria so that misuse is minimised
●​ Focus on rebuiding (should be a legal obligation)
●​ There is a gap between the doctrine itself and its action
●​ Clarity is extremely important and the lack of it is what has mostly caused issues
●​ Emphasize need for accountability
●​ Emphasize the need for multilateral agreements and effective communication when it
comes to reactive intervention
●​ Utlise existing un bodies for aid (world food programme WFP, united nations high
comissioner for refugees UNHCR, central emergency response fund CERF), for
overview and monitoring (OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
UN Human Rights Council HRC, Security Council Sanctions Committees & Panels
of Experts -Monitors: Implementation of UN sanctions e.g., arms embargoes, asset
freezes. -Panels: Report on violations and enforcement in specific countries e.g.,
DPRK, Sudan. UN Peacekeeping Missions -Monitors: Ceasefire agreements, human
rights, and local political developments. IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
(technically independent but reports to UN) -Monitors: Nuclear programs to ensure
peaceful use (e.g., Iran). -Tools: Inspections, verification, reporting. OPCW organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs)

HISTORY OF THE R2P DOCTRINE: FAILURES AND SUCCESSES

1. Libya (2011) — “First Major Test”

What happened:

After protests in Libya in early 2011, the Gaddafi regime threatened violence against protestors
and was moving troops toward Benghazi, making statements about purging the
opposition.E-International Relations+2Taylor & Francis Online+2

UNSC passed Resolution 1970 (Feb 2011), recalling Libya’s responsibility to protect,
condemning violations, imposing sanctions and referring the situation to ICC.E-International
Relations+2Emerald+2

Then in March 2011, UNSC adopted Resolution 1973 authorising "all necessary measures" to
protect civilians (no-fly zones, etc.). NATO intervened, carried out air strikes, etc.E-International
Relations+1​

Successes:

Swift action: Compared to earlier crises like Rwanda or Bosnia, UNSC moved
quickly.E-International Relations+2Emerald+2

Prevented a large-scale massacre in Benghazi which was the immediate [Link]

Affairs+1

Legitimacy of R2P boosted: first time a state was intervened against its wishes under R2P’s
framework for protection of civilians.E-International Relations+2Emerald+2​

Failures / Criticisms / What went “wrong”:

Beyond Protection → Regime Change: NATO and other interveners ended up pressing for
Gaddafi’s removal, which many saw as beyond the scope of R2P’s mandate (officially it was
about civilian protection). This shift eroded trust among some states.E-International
Relations+2Taylor & Francis Online+2

Post-intervention instability: After Gaddafi fell, Libya descended into political chaos, with
militias, lack of rule of law, security vacuum, factionalism, terrorism, and foreign interventions.
The “responsibility to rebuild” was weak.E-International Relations+2Emerald+2

(basically, they interveneved but took no responsibility of what happened to the country after the
intervention. They intervened for the sake of intervening and did not help ease the
consequences on the people. This is a major failure as the r2p is supposed to be for the people,
and here, intervention caused suffering to the poeple.)

Ambiguity in mandate / execution / oversight: What exactly “all necessary means” entailed
was not clearly defined; the rules of engagement, limitations, oversight of intervening forces, exit
strategy, etc., were murky.E-International Relations+2Emerald+2

(basically, criteria needs to be more well defined as to prevent chaos like the one ensued in
libiya 2011).​

Lessons:

Speed is critical, but so is clarity: a strong UNSC resolution with clear limits, precise operational
framework, exit strategy and post-conflict plan is essential.

Legitimacy depends on multilateral support; perceived overreach (regime change vs protection)

damages future willingness of others to accept interventions.​
Rebuilding is just as important as intervention; without reconstruction, the protection is
temporary or may even worsen the situation.​

2. Syria (2011–ongoing) — What Went Wrong / Partial Application

What happened:

Massive atrocities: civilian massacres, chemical weapon use, displacement,

[Link]+1

Multiple attempts for UNSC resolutions. Russia and China frequently vetoed or blocked more
coercive [Link]+2Emerald+2

(this instance proves that veto power may be the reason r2p is unable to be applied at its fullest
potential- so a veto code of conduct framework may work here)

Challenges exposed:

Geopolitical power competition: Major Security Council members have differing interests
(Russia, Iran backing Assad; US, France, UK opposing). That prevents unified
[Link]+2Emerald+2

(this means that there is a lack of communication and cooperation in regards to applying the
r2p- what could help is making an emergency council absolutely necesarry when direct
intervention seems inevitable. This could increase cooperation and better decisions would be
made since more than one state would be involved in the intervention)

Sovereignty vs intervention / Legal and moral ambiguity: Without consensus that the state
has failed (depending on narrative), invoking R2P becomes contested. Also, the various rebel
and opposition groups complicate matters; who’s responsible, who’s
legitimate?openDemocracy+1

(basically the arguement that intervention may present itself as a breach of sovereintiy. In this
case it may help to stress the importance of interventon and prevention strategies that do not
resort to violence, think more laws, protective bodies, reviews and investigations)​
Risk of escalation / unintended consequences: Concerns about intervener casualties,
spillover to neighboring states, extremist groups exploiting chaos, [Link] & Francis Online+1

(what could help here is to strengthen laws regarding consent and consequences) ​

Partial successes / what was achieved:

Diplomatic pressure, humanitarianism (aid NGOs), limited sanctions. These are under-pillars of
R2P (pillars 1 & 2).openDemocracy​

Lessons:

Without UNSC mandate, or with powerful veto-exercising states opposed, coercive action under
R2P is nearly impossible in some contexts.

Early preventive measures, pressure, diplomacy matter, but need to be more specifc so they
actually work. (means making these preventive measures stronger, so that forceful intervention
may not be needed at all. This would rule out the sovereignty issue too, and is more state
independent in the way that a lot can be done without use of actual economical or millitant
resources, but the use of media outlets, aid to NGOs and protestors, protection to states that
may reach out etc).

The expectation for regime change can overshadow or derail protection objectives, so instead of
an expectation we make use of public opinion. Utilise anonymous surveying systems, regular
reviews, utilising media outlets to bring awareness etc. ​

3. Darfur (Sudan, from ~2003 onward) — A “Big Let‑Down”

What happened:

The Sudanese government, often using proxy militias (Janjaweed), initiated widespread killings,
displacement, ethnic targeting. .Global Center for R2P+1

International community debated R2P application; deployed peacekeeping / hybrid missions:

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), later UN‑AU hybrid [Link]
Journals+2Brookings+2​

Failures & limitations:

Peacekeeping was under‑resourced, under‑mandated: troops had limited capability, restricted

freedom of movement, weak enforcement [Link] Journals+1
(this is where veto power should come into play- use it to intervene through institutional laws,
dispatching journalists to asses situations more accurately and having their reports be open to
the public, provide strategic aid to suffering masses, initiate emergency meetings in cases of
urgent crises like genocides, ethnic cleansings, crimes against humanity and war crimes).

Slow, patchy, often reactive rather than preventive. The government often obstructed
[Link] Journals+1

(utlise preventive measures, ensure adequate communication through talks and use of media)

The protection of civilians was often partial, localized; many atrocities [Link]
Journals+1​

Moral and political dilemmas:

The tension between preventing atrocities vs respecting state sovereignty.

Risk that military intervention, when considered, could lead to worse outcomes (like in libiya).

the question: when is intervention justified? What mandate? What about the cost?

(basically think of strengthening the criteria for intervention, define what “absolutely necessary”
means).

Lessons:

Pillars 1 & 2 (State responsibility & capacity, plus international assistance) are necessary
foundations. If these fail, Pillar 3 (coercive action) is hard to justify or implement.

Peacekeeping/hybrid operations need stronger mandates, clearer rules of engagement, and

proper resourcing.

Early warning, civil society engagement, pressure on governments are vital.​

4. Kenya Post‑Election Violence (2007‑2008)

What happened:

After disputed elections, large ethnic violence erupted. Thousands killed, many [Link]
Center for R2P+1

International community (Kenyan actors, AU, UN) mediated; Kofi Annan led process. Peace
agreements, national [Link] Center for R2P

Successes:
Rapid diplomatic intervention prevented escalation to full‑scale civil war.

International pressure plus regional mediation helped contain violence.

The case is often cited as a positive example for early preventive action under [Link]
Center for R2P​

Limitations:

Not a military intervention; so no coercive measures (which R2P allows only as a last resort, but
it worked well and we must use this as an example that military intervention isnt always
necesary).

Some blame that the prevention was incomplete and that grievances were not fully addressed,
leading to longer‑term ethnic tension still existing.

Lessons:

Non‑military responses can be extremely effective if timely, credible, and backed by legitimacy
and regional cooperation.

Early warning signs (hate speech, electoral fraud, political polarization) are as important to
respond to as actual violence.​

5. Côte d’Ivoire (2010‑2011)

What happened:

Post‑election crisis: two presidents both claimed legitimacy. Violence, threats to

[Link] Analytics+1

UNOCI (UN mission) plus French forces assisted; eventually resolved via international pressure,
recognition, use of UN & regional legal / diplomatic [Link]+1

Successes:

The combination of UN, regional organization (ECOWAS), and France’s involvement helped to
force peaceful transfer of power.
Civilian protection and mediation worked. (and frame got a good look).​

Limitations:

The solution relied heavily on international force presence and political pressure; expensive and
controversial. (embrace contoversy because it can be resolved through representation and
communication, but physical consequences of military intervention cannot be resolved).

Some loss of life and violations occurred; the intervention was not perfect.​

Lessons:

Regional actors + established missions + political legitimacy + multilateral support matter.

Force does not have to mean large-scale coercive military intervention; peacekeeping, legal
recognition, political leverage can do part.

Document / Event Date Where to Key French Positions as Stated

Download /
Source

Statement by France at 8 Sep Global Centre Emphasizes Pillar II (international

the 2014 UNGA 2014 for R2P — has assistance) and collective
Informal Interactive PDF version. responsibility. Use of the French
Dialogue on the (Global Center text to stress prevention, building
Responsibility to for R2P) capacity, early warning. France
Protect (“Fulfilling our positions itself as supporting not
collective responsibility: just action after atrocities begin
International assistance but bolstering state ability to
and the responsibility to prevent. (Global Center for R2P)
protect”)
Political Declaration on 1 Aug Global Centre A voluntary political declaration:
Suspension of Veto 2015 for R2P — PDF P5 members called upon to
Powers in Cases of in both English voluntarily suspend use of veto in
Mass Atrocities (France & French. mass atrocity situations.
& Mexico Initiative) (Global Center Signatories list, terms, what
for R2P) “mass atrocities” mean (genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
crimes against humanity). Key
French support. (Global Center
for R2P)

“Why France wishes to (Various French France explains the reasoning

regulate use of the updates, government behind veto restraint: to prevent
veto in the United initial official website, paralysis in UNSC, to improve
Nations Security proposal PDF material. legitimacy, to respect UN Charter.
Council” — French from 2013) (France Also describes how France
Ministry for Europe and Diplomacy) unilaterally decided (in some
Foreign Affairs circumstances) to renounce use
of veto for mass atrocities. France
talks about thresholds (number of
Member States, etc.) and
securing political declaration
support (over 100 states). (France
Diplomacy)

Statement by France at 8 Sep Global Centre France reiterates its commitment

the 2015 UNGA 2015 for R2P — PDF. to R2P, calls for stronger
Interactive Dialogue on (Global Center preventive measures, capacity
R2P (“A vital and for R2P) building, improved international
enduring commitment: cooperation. Also links the veto
Implementing the initiative to making R2P more
responsibility to protect”) effective — as part of
implementation. (Global Center
for R2P)
“The veto is not a 30 Sep France ONU Fabius says France has
privilege, it is a 2015 official site — committed itself to not using its
responsibility” — PDF / Official veto in cases of mass crimes. He
Speech by Laurent transcript. frames veto use as something
Fabius (French that carries responsibility; that the
Embassy to the initiative is not weakening the
United Nations) Council but strengthening its
legitimacy. Also mentions that
many countries have signed up to
the code proposed, pushing for
broader support. (French
Embassy to the United Nations)

General Debate at 25 Sep French Ministry Macron sets goal: by end of that
UNGA, Macron’s 2018 for Europe & year, two‑thirds of UN member
Speech Foreign Affairs states to support the suspension
official site. of right to veto in mass atrocities.
(France Reinforces France’s position that
Diplomacy) veto should not block action when
mass atrocity is happening. Also
ties R2P / veto restraint to
universal human rights, respect
for international humanitarian law.
(France Diplomacy)