MODULE – I

CASE LAWS
 1. Shantabai v. State of Bombay

The Supreme Court examined whether the 1948 deed created rights in immovable property
under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Court noted that under Section 3
TPA, “immovable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or
grass.” Thus, standing timber is movable property, while trees not intended for
immediate felling(which continue to derive nourishment from the soil) are immovable
property as they constitute a benefit arising out of land. Since the grant covered both types —
immediately fellable timber and trees to be cut gradually over 12 years — it partly concerned
immovable property. Given the consideration of ₹26,000, the deed
required registration under the TPA and Registration Act. Being unregistered, it conveyed
no valid title or interest.

The Court clarified that this was not a transfer of immovable property under TPA but
a licence coupled with a grant (profit à prendre), i.e., a right to enter land and take forest
produce. Relying on Ananda Behera v. State of Orissa (AIR 1956 SC 17), the Court held
such rights are contractual, not proprietary, and hence cannot be enforced as fundamental
rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31. The earlier view in Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel v.
State of M.P. (AIR 1953 SC 108) was overruled by the larger Bench.

Judgment:
As the deed was unregistered and conveyed no immovable interest under Section 3 TPA, the
petitioner had no proprietary or fundamental right. The writ petition was dismissed with
costs.
 2. Bamdev Panigrahi

In Bamadev Panigrahi v. Monorama Raj (AIR 1974 AP 226), the Court clarified the
application of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act regarding the classification of
property as movable or immovable. The Court held that machinery or equipment becomes
immovable only if it is attached to the earth for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of
the land or building. The degree and purpose of annexation are decisive: if the attachment is
merely for the beneficial enjoyment of the machinery itself, it remains movable. Applying
these principles, the cinema projector and diesel oil engine installed in a temporary touring
cinema were held to be movable property, as they were attached only for the temporary use
of the equipment and not for enhancing the land. Consequently, the suit filed beyond three
years from the denial of the claim was barred by limitation, and the appeal was allowed.
This case reinforces that under Section 3 TPA, the intention and purpose behind
attachment, not just physical annexation, determine whether property is movable or
immovable.

3. Duncans Case

In Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2000) 1 SCC 633, the Supreme Court held
that plant and machinery permanently embedded in the earth for running a fertilizer
factory constitute immovable property under the Stamp Act, 1899. The Sub-Registrar’s
reference to the Collector under Section 47-A(2) was valid, as there was reason to believe
that the market value under Section 27 had not been correctly declared. The Court applied
the principle that intention and purpose of annexation determine immovability. Examining
the conveyance deed dated 9-6-1994 and the sale agreement, it was clear that the parties
intended to transfer the entire fertilizer business as a going concern, including land,
buildings, and permanently affixed plant and machinery. The Court rejected the appellant’s
argument that the machinery delivered earlier was movable, noting that the deed, schedules,
and income-tax disclosures confirmed that the title to the plant and machinery passed
under the conveyance deed. Accordingly, the stamp duty under Sections 27 and 47-A was
correctly calculated including the plant and machinery, and the appeal was dismissed.
 4. Kumar Harish Chandra Singh Deo v. Bansidhar Mohanty

Under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, a mortgage deed must be attested by at
least two witnesses. However, the law does not bar a lender, who is not a formal party to the
deed, from attesting it. The courts applied this rule by distinguishing between a party to the
deed and a person who is a party to the underlying transaction but not to the deed itself. Since
the lender had advanced the money but was not a legal party to the deed, his attestation was
valid. The courts held that the attestation requirement aims to protect the executant from
coercion, fraud, or undue influence, and proof of execution is satisfied if at least one
competent attesting witness is available. Accordingly, the lender’s attestation upheld the
validity of the mortgage deed, allowing him to sue for repayment.

5. H.N. Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Smt. Deveeramma

Under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, specific performance of a contract
cannot be enforced against a person who claims under the original party if they are a
transferee for value and have paid in good faith without notice of the original contract.
Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, defines “notice” to include actual
knowledge, as well as constructive knowledge, which arises if a person, due to willful
abstention or negligence, fails to inquire into facts they ought to have known, and also
includes possession of the property by the person having rights. In this case, the defendant
claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the plaintiff’s rights under the
reconveyance agreement. The courts found that the defendant had both actual notice, being in
close proximity to the property, and constructive notice, as a prudent person would have
inquired about the rights of the plaintiff who was in possession. Since the defendant failed to
make such inquiries, he could not claim to be a transferee without notice. Consequently, he
was not entitled to resist the suit for specific performance, and the plaintiff’s claim was
upheld. This illustrates the application of Sections 19(b) and 3 in protecting the rights of the
original contracting party against subsequent purchasers who have notice of existing rights.
MODULE – II

CASE LAWS
 1. V.N Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai

Facts:- A Bungalow originally belonging to joint family was partitioned between father and
the two son. The appellant (tenant) had been inducted into house by the father before
partition. That share of the property belonged to the respondent (Ajit Kumar). After son got
this property by partition he applied to Delhi Rent Controller for eviction of the tenant on the
ground that he require the premises bonafide for his own residence and that of his wife and
children who are dependent on him.

Issue:- Whether partition of coparcenary property can said to be a transfer?

Held:-

The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was enacted to regulate rents and prevent arbitrary eviction
of tenants. Its objective is to stop landlords from using transfers as a device to enable
purchasers to evict tenants from the premises let out to them. Section 14(1) of the Act
provides protection to tenants against eviction but also specifies grounds for recovery of
possession under clauses (a) to (e). Clause (e) allows eviction where the premises are
required bona fide by the landlord for personal occupation. Section 14(6) provides that if a
landlord acquires any premises by transfer, no application for recovery of possession under
Section 14(1) on the ground specified in clause (e) is permissible unless five years have
elapsed from the date of acquisition. Therefore, if an application is made before five years,
and the landlord is a transferee, eviction cannot be granted.

In cases of partition, when property is allotted to individual coparceners, they renounce their
rights over other properties, and each coparcener obtains an antecedent title to the property,
though its extent is determined only at the time of partition. The initial joint title of the
undivided family is thus transformed into separate titles for individual coparceners. Under
Section 14(6), a purchaser acquires the premises by transfer as if the property belonged to
them even before the transfer. However, in the case of partition, the allotment of property to
an individual coparcener is not considered a transfer, as the property already belongs to the
undivided Hindu family. Therefore, Section 14(6) does not apply to partitions, and such
allotment does not create a bar against eviction claims.