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Chapter 3
Basic Emotions
Paul Ekman
University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I consolidate my previous writings about basic emotions (Ekman,
1984, 1992, 1992b) and introduce a few changes in my thinking. My views over
the past 40 years have changed radically from my initial view (Ekman, 1957) that:
(a) a pleasant-unpleasant and active-passive scale were sufficient to capture the
differences among emotions: and (b) the relationship between a facial configura-
tion and what it signified is socially learned and culturally variable. 1 was forced.
to adopt the opposite view by findings from my own and others’ cross-cultural,
studies of facial expressions. There are some who have challenged this by now
quite large body of evidence: I describe those challenges and the answers to them.
in Chapter 16
‘The framework I describe below is most influenced by Darwin (1872/1997) and
‘Tomkins (1962), although I do not accept in total what either said. There are
three meanings of the term “basic” (see also Ortony & Turner, 1990). First, it
distinguishes those who maintain that there are a number of separate emotions,
that differ one from another in important ways. From this perspective, fear.
anger, disgust, sadness and contempt, all negative emotions, differ in their ap-
praisal, antecedent events, probable behavioral response, physiology and other
characteristics described below. So, too, amusement, pride in achievement, satis
faction, relief and contentment, all positive emotions, differ from each other. This
basic emotions perspective is in contrast to those who treat emotions as funda-
‘mentally the same, differing only in terms of intensity or pleasantness.
To identify separate discrete emotions does not necessarily require that one
also take an evolutionary view of emotions. A social constructionist could allow
“Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, Edited by T. Dalgleish and M. Power
© 1999 john Wiley & Sons Lid46 P. EKMAN
for separate emotions without embracing the second meaning of the adjective
“basic”. Even the discovery of universals in expression or in antecedent events
does not require giving a major role to evolution. Instead, one can attribute
universals to species-constant learning—social learning which will usually occur
for all members of the species. regardless of culture (cf. Allport, 1924). In this
view itis ontogeny, not phylogeny. which is responsible for any commonalities in
‘emotion; universals in expression are due to what ethologists call “conventionali-
zation”, not “ritualization” (see Ekman, 1979 for a discussion of these distinc-
tions as applied to emotion),
‘The second meaning of the adjective “basic” isto indicate instead the view that
emotions evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life tasks.
Innate factors play a role in accounting for the characteristics they share, not
species-constant or species-variable learning, There are a number of ways to
escribe these fundamental life tasks. Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1992) say they
are universal human predicaments. such as achievements, losses, frustrations, etc.
Each emotion thus prompts us in a direction which, in the course of evolution, has
done better than other solutions in recurring circumstances that are relevant to
goals, Lazarus (1991) talks of “common adaptational tasks as these are appraised
and configured into core relational themes” (p.202) and gives examples of facing
aan immediate danger, experiencing an irrevocable loss, progressing towards the
realization of a goal, etc. Stein & Trabasso (1992) say that in happiness a goal is
atained or maintained, in sadness there is a failure to attain or maintain a goal,
in anger an agent causes a loss of a goal, and in fear there is an expectation of
failure to achieve a goal. Toby & Cosmides (1990) tellus that emotions impose
“...on the present world an interpretative landscape derived from the covariant
structure of the past ...". Emotions, they say. deal with recurrent *... adaptive
situations .. ighting, falling in love, escaping predators, confronting sexual infi-
delity, and so on, each [of which] recurred innumerable times in evolutionary
history ...” (pp. 407-408), Toby & Cosmides emphasize what I consider the
crucial element which distinguishes the emotions: our appraisal of a current event
is influenced by our ancestral past.
These different descriptions are quite compatible, each emphasizing another
aspect of the phenomenon. Common to all these views is the presumption that
emotions are designed to deal with inter-organismic encounters, between people
or between people and other animals. Nevertheless. itis important to note that
‘emotions can and do occur when we are notin the presence of others, and are not
imagining other people. We can have emotional reactions to thunder, music, loss
of physical support, auto-erotic activity, etc. Yet I believe the primary function of
emotion is to mobilize the organism to deal quickly with important interpersonal
encounters, prepared to do so by what types of activity have been adaptive in the
past. The past refers in part to what has been adaptive in the past history of our
species, and the past refers also to what has been adaptive in our own individual
life history.
‘The term “basic” has been used also to describe elements that combine to
form more complex or compound emotions. So, for example, smugness might beBASIC EMOTIONS "7
considered to be a blend of the two elemental emotions, happiness and contempt.
Earlier we (Ekman & Friesen, 1975) made just such a proposal about facial
expressions. I am less certain now about whether or not two basic emotions can
occur simultaneously, although that may well depend upon what aspect of emo-
tion is considered. In any case, I will not consider further this meaning of the term
“basic”, since no-one (other than Plutchik, 1962), who currently works from a
basic emotion framework, has been much concerned with this meaning.
THE CHARACTERISTICS THAT DISTINGUISH
BASIC EMOTIONS
I will describe a number of characteristics which are useful in distinguishing one
emotion from another. I will also describe other characteristics shared by all
‘emotions, but which are helpful in distinguishing emotions from other affective
phenomena, such as moods or emotional traits
Distinctive Universal Signals
Thave gone back and forth on the question of whether or not a universal signal
is the sine qua non for emotion (Ekman, 1984; 1992a, 1992b). Once again I will set
‘out that claim, as a challenge for someone to identify states which have all the
other characteristics I describe below but which have no signal. To date there is
no such evidence. and I doubt it will be found. I believe it was central to the
evolution of emotions that they inform conspecifics, without choice or considera-
tion, about what is occurring: inside the person (plans, memories. physiological
changes), what most likely occurred before to bring about that expression
(antecedents), and what is most likely to occur next (immediate consequences,
regulatory attempts, coping). For example, when we see a person with a disgust
expression, we know that the person is responding to something offensive to taste
or smell, literally or metaphorically. that the person is likely to make sounds such.
as “yuck” rather than “yum”, and is likely to turn away from the source of
stimulation. Elsewhere (Ekman, 1993; 1997) I have described seven classes of
information that emotional signals may provide, and the research necessary to
establish that this isso.
Emotional expressions are crucial to the development and regulation of inter-
personal relationships. To mention just three examples, facial expressions should
be involved in the formation of attachments (in infancy as well as in courtship).
and in the regulation, acceleration or deceleration of aggression. People I have
studied who have congenital facial paralysis (Mobius syndrome) report great
difficulty in developing and maintaining even casual relationships. since they
have no capability tor facial expressiveness, Ross (1981) also found that stroke
patients who can not properly identify the prosody that accompanies speech, or