Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

months due and payable the 1st day of each month starting May
1, 1978 thru and inclusive of May 1, 1980. On the same date,
however, a chattel mortgage was executed by him in favor of
the Motor center, Inc. (Exhibit "A"). The Chattel Mortgage and
Assignment was assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corporation
with the conformity of the plaintiff. Nestor Sunga claimed that on
October 21, 1978, the minibus was seized by two (2) employees
of the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation upon orders of the
branch manager Mr. Gaspar de los Santos, without any receipt,
who claimed that he was delinquent in the payments of his
vehicle. The plaintiff reported the loss to the PC (Exhibit "Y")
and after proper verification from the office of the Filinvest, the
said vehicle was recovered from the Crisologo Compound which
was later released by Rosario Fronda Assistant Manager of the
Filinvest, and Arturo Balatbat as caretaker of the compound.
The police blotter of the Integrated National Police of Dagupan
City shows that Nestor Sunga and T/Sgt. Isidro Pascual of the
153rd PC Company sought the assistance of the Dagupan
police and one Florence Onia of the Filinvest explained that the
minibus was confiscated because the balance was already past
due. After verification that his accounts are all in order, Florence
Onia admitted it was their fault. The motor vehicle was returned
to the plaintiff upon proper receipt.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65935 September 30, 1988
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. SUGA
JR., respondents.
Labaguis, Loyola, Angara Law Offices for petitioner.
Juan C. Navarro, Jr. for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari, Filinvest Credit Corporation implores
us to declare the nullity of the Decision 1 dated September 30, 1983 and the
Resolution 2 dated December 16, 1983 of the Intermediate Appellate
Courts3 (now Court of Appeals) which were allegedly issued with grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, and
with patent denial of due process. 4
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:

After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision 6 the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders
judgment as follows, to wit:

This is a case for damages filed by Nestor B. Sunga Jr.,

businessman and owner of the NBS Machineries Marketing and
the NAP-NAP Transit. Plaintiff alleged that he purchased a
passenger minibus Mazda from the Motor center, Inc. at
Calasiao, Pangasinan on March 21, 1978 and for which he
executed a promissory note (Exhibit "B") to cover the amount of
P62,592.00 payable monthly in the amount of P2,608.00 for 24

(1) ORDERING the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation to

pay the plaintiff Nestor Sunga Jr. the following damages, to wit:
(a) Moral Damages P30,000.00
(b) Loss on Income of the minibus for three days 600.00
(c) Actual damages 500.00
1

(d) Litigation expenses 5,000.00

(e) Attorney's Fees 10,000.00

the decision because private respondent considered the

judgment (questioned by petitioner on appeal) as "perfect",
"sound" and "wise" (at pp. 17 to 20, Brief for Appellee).

(2) And to pay the costs.

In relying upon a BILL pending before the Batasan Pambansa to
buttress its judgment, the respondent Court acted contrary to
law and jurisprudence, making of its judgment a NULLITY.

SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the aforecited decision, the defendant (petitioner herein),
interposed a timely appeal with the respondent court. On September 30,
1983, the latter promulgated its decision affirming in toto the decision of the
trial court dated July 17, 1981, "except with regard to the moral damages
which, under the circumstances of the accounting error incurred by Filinvest,
is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00." 7 As the reconsideration
of said decision proved futile in view of its denial by the respondent court in its
resolution of December 16, 1983, the petitioners come to us thru this instant
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner alleges the following errors:

The extensive citation and adherence by the respondent Court

on (sic) its decision in the case of "Edilberto Rebosura, et al.
versus Rogaciano Oropeza, CA-G.R. No. 63048-R, December
17, 1983" (which is non-doctrinal and under question in the
Honorable Supreme Court) is not warranted in law and
jurisprudence, and amounts to a grave abuse of discretion.
The various assignments of error may be synthesized into the sole
issues 9 of. Whether or not the respondent court a) in allegedly ignoring the
various assigned errors in petitioners brief; b) in resolving issues not raised at
the trial and on appeal; c) in increasing the amount of moral damages; and (d)
in adhering to its decision in Edilberto Rebosura et al. vs. Rogaciano
Oropeza, CA-G.R. No. 63048-R, as well as to Batasan Bill No. 3075, which is
yet to be enacted into law, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.

It is a patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction and a bare denial of petitioner's constitutional right to
due process of law, when the respondent Court completely
ignored the assigned errors in the petitioner's Brief upon which
private respondent had joined issues with petitioner.

Contrary views are espoused by the parties in this case. Petitioner maintains
that it was patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
and a bare denial of the petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law,
when the respondent court completely brushed aside the assigned errors in
its brief. 10 It asserts that the constitutionality of the contractual stipulation
between the parties embodied in the documents denominated as Promissory
Note and Deed of Mortgage was not in issue in the court a quo and neither
was the same raised on appea 11 and therefore should not have been passed
upon based on the premise that the appellate court should not consider any
error other than those assigned or specified. 12 Further, it submits that the
controversy on appeal is capable of adjudication on other substantive
grounds, without necessarily treading into constitutional questions. 13 It is also

In resolving the appeal before it thru matters and questions not

raised at the trial or on appeal, by either of the parties,
respondent Court exceeded its jurisdiction and acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
When the respondent Court granted private respondent MORAL
DAMAGES in an exaggerated and unconscionable amount,
respondent Court exceeded the bounds of its discretion,
amounting to an absence or lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent Court had NO authority to increase the award of
DAMAGES to private respondent when the latter did not appeal
2

the petitioner's submission that the increase in the award of moral damages
from the P30,000.00 adjudged by the trial court which was not appealed by
respondent Sunga who felt that the award was "perfect," "sound," and "wise,"
to a "whopping P50,000.00" imposed by the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) amounted to a grave abuse of
discretion. 14 Thus, the increase in the award which the respondent appellate
court justified by the accounting error committed by the petitioner, should not
be countenanced, as the same had no legal basis. 15 It rationalizes that the
respondent court's invocation of a pending bill in the legislature, Batasan Bill
3075, to support its decision, is untenable. 16 Lastly, it deposits
that Rebosura is riot on all fours with the case at bar and therefore adherence
thereto was misplaced, 17 citing the following distinctions: 181) In Rebosura,
there was unlawful entry while in this case, there was none; 2) in the former,
the plaintiff did not breach the contract whereas in this case there is a finding
by the court a quo of such violation; 3) in the former, the contract was
denominated Deed of Sale with Reservation of Title, while in this case, the
contracts referred to are the Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage; 4) in the
former, the defendant Oropeza was an unpaid seller while the plaintiff
Rebosura was the buyer, whereas, in this case, the petitioner is the
promissor-mortgagee while Sunga is the promissor-mortgagor; 5) in the
former, there was no notice of delinquency and repossession, whereas, in this
case, there is notice and demand; and 6) in the former, the contract was in
fine print, whereas, in this case, it is not so.

After carefully considering and weighing all the arguments of both

protagonists, we hold that the respondent court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages and in
granting litigation expenses. In those respects, the petition is granted and to
that extent the questioned decision is modified.
There is no gainsaying that the plaintiff-appellee (respondent Sunga did not
appeal from the decision of the courta quo which awarded him the sum of
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages. "Well settled is the rule in this
jurisdiction that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case an appellee who
has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court
below." 22 Verily the respondent court disregarded such a well settled rule
when it increased the award for moral damages from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00, notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent did not
appeal from the judgment of the trial court, an act indicative of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Certiorari lies when a court has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 'without
jurisdiction' means that the court acted with absolute want of
jurisdiction. There is "excess of jurisdiction" where the court has
jurisdiction but has transcended the same or acted without any
statutory authority Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phils., 182;
Salvador Campos y CIA vs. Del Rosario, 41 Phil., 45). "Grave
abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
(Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz., 83.) or in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law. (Talavera-Luna vs. Nable,
38 Off. Gaz., 62). 23

On the other side, the private respondent maintains that the respondent court
did not abuse its discretion, stressing that a careful reading and
understanding of the assailed decision would manifest that all assigned errors
were resolved, citing portions of the decision which dealt specifically with
each of the errors assigned. 19 He maintains that the award of moral
damages, impeached as exaggerated and unconscionable, is justified by the
prayer in the appellee's (respondent Sunga's brief, to wit: FURTHER
REMEDIES AND RELIEFS DEEMED JUST AND EQUITABLE UNDER AND
WITHIN THE PREMISES ARE PRAYED FOR. 20 Lastly, the private
respondent submits that the references to Batasan Bill No. 3075
and Rebosura were mere passing comments which did not in any way detract
from the validity of the assailed decision. 21
3

Or, as held in the recent case of Robert Young vs. Julio A. Sulit, Jr., 24 "(F)or
certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical exercise of
power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with
centuries of civil law and common law tradition."

pecuniary estimations, are in the category of an award designed to

compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer. 29
It behooves us therefore to reiterate the caveat to lower courts "to guard
against the award of exorbitant damages that are way out of proportion to the
environmental circumstances of a case and which time and again, this Court
has reduced or eliminated. Judicial discretion granted to the courts in the
assessment of damages must always be exercised with balanced restraints
and measured objectivity. 30

We had occasion to state that "there is no hard and fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each
case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances." 25 Be that as it
may and in amplification of this generalization, we set the criterion that "in the
case of moral damages, the yardstick should be that the "amount awarded
should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it
was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial
court ... . Moreover, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and
the gravity of the injuries must be considered in arriving at reasonable
levels ... ." 26

We do not agree with private respondent's argument that the increase in the
award of moral damages is justified by the prayer in its brief, to wit:
FURTHER REMEDIES AND RELIEFS DEEMED JUST AND EQUITABLE
UNDER AND WITHIN THE PREMISES ARE PRAYED FOR. Such statement
is usually extant in practically all pleadings as a final statement; it is rhetorical
flourish as it were and could not be a substitute for appeal as required by the
rules for "the appellee cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or
affirmative relief, unless he has also appealed therefrom." 31

There is no dispute that the private respondent, a businessman and owner of

the NBS Machineries Marketing and NAP-NAP Transit, is entitled to moral
damages due to the unwarranted seizure of the minibus Mazda, allegedly
because he was delinquent in the payment of its monthly amortizations, which
as stated above, turned out to be incorrect. 27 No doubt such intent tainted
private respondent Sunga's reputation in the business community, thus
causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Considering, however,
that respondent Sunga was dispossessed of his motor vehicle for barely three
days, that is, from October 21, 1978 to October 23, 1978, possession of
which was restored to him soon after the accounting errors were ironed out,
we find that the award of moral damages even in the sum of P30,000.00 is
excessive for it must be emphasized that "damages are not intended to enrich
the complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to
enable the injured parties to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured parties have undergone by
reason of defendant's culpable action. In other words, the award of moral
damages is aimed at a restoration within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; and therefore it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted." 28 Moreover, "(M)oral damages though not incapable of

With regard to the award of litigation expenses in the sum of P5,000.00, the
same is hereby disallowed, there being no price for litigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The award of moral
damages is REDUCED to P10,000.00 and the grant of litigation expenses is
ELIMINATED. The rest of the judgment is AFFIRMED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP

No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29,
1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala
Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

THIRD DIVISION

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility
of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge
RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City
Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF
CALOOCAN,respondents.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation,

monitoring and test sampling of the leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite
to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal
and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance
from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6

Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio,
Jr. and the City Government of Caloocan.

ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to
dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern
and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay
Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are
dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists
to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.

After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on

the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected
from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the
quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of
bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample
during collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a
Cease and Desist Order 8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution
of November 10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of
5

completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage
and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the
ground, among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law,
the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the
Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of

Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was
resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of
Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at
the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes
failed to settle the problem.

On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order

consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier
case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et
al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial
that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been
treated separately.

After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August

14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991,
order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City
Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the
Camarin area.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to
dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion
to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from
enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff
City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the
pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine
National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the
entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being
utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September
17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of
the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of
Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote
the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to
a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. 9

On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16,
1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City
denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10,
1992 referring the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at
the same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the
respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of
Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from
enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was
presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
6

the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 15 Notwithstanding such

efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.

and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity
of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government
of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that:
(1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and
decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.

Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr.

filed on November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to
quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for
reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that
would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of
garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be
resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to
find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the
preliminary injunction issued in the said case was set aside; the cease and
desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining
order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of
Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the
condition that any future dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in
conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the proposal
attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo,
which was thereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of the
decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted
by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal
proceedings.

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of
Appeals to immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of
determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by the
Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be
so lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted
into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at
10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of
Appeals. 14 After the oral argument, a conference was set on December 8,
1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the
General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized
representative were required to appear.

Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the
temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until
after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation
of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.

It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992
to finish its study and review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the
dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of respondent's
technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days
from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which

On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining
the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease
7

and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until otherwise ordered
by the Court.

Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and
authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d),
(e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides,
thus:

It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to
protect the environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the
surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which
agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open
to question.

Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall

have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the
provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing rules
and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local
government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local
Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite
on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On the
basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of
the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage
in the Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan has
territorial jurisdiction.

(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of

pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which
such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it
may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and
abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial
waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and
industrial disposal system or parts thereof.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the
theory that Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the
Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not
incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927,
series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic
Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the
necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to
implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within
the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."

(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke,
suspend or modify any permit issued under this Order whenever
the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate
government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of
enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing rules and
regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.

The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling
of the Court of Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which
was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic
Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally
disregarded the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution
abatement cases.
8

In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are

applicable in this case, and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of
government agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of
whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which,
in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of
the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under
its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the
complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay
Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly
endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the
sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to
pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?

and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously
has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region
from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned
declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and
approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local
government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and
private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects
are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of
Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its lettercomplaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was
validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open
dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin
was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under
Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813
and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the said
project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary
jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental
Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at
the meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan,
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss
the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment

that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business
establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order
No. 192, series of 1987, 18 has assumed the powers and functions of the
defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act
No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and
functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to
adjudication of pollution cases. 19
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law
provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make
effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the
quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant

Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to
the following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a
"cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping
of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City
Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open
dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act
No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be
stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its
express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter
or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24(Emphasis
supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever
order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when
there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable
standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. Theponente, Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
regulations in situations like that here presented precisely
because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the
Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation
over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run
its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as
those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several
years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of
that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health,
and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the
police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue
and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City
Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,
admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of
1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that
there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power
"to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is
expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order"
were not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the
effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be
express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled
rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of
its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the
LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it
may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital

public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II,
Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative
duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of
the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind that the

In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board

v. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication
10

Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the

Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a
fundamental human right. 29

and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a
practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper
exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws.
Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by
the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal
steps would have been necessary.

Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of

conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has
provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal
proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de
Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985
AGAPITO MAGBANUA, INENIAS MARTIZANO, CARLITO HERRERA, SR.,
PAQUITO LOPEZ, AND FRANCISCO HERRERA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL CASES
DIVISION), EDUARDO, BUTCH, DIEGO AND NENA All Surnamed
PEREZ, respondents.

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad
powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region,
whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the
implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with
cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant
to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the
thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs
of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to
issue, may be sought from the proper courts.

Romulo A. Deles for petitioner.

Jose Valmayor for respondents.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna

Lake region and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned,
the Court will not dwell further on the related issues raised which are more
appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special
knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

A joint decision was rendered in CAR Case Nos. 827, 828 and 829 of the
defunct Court of Agrarian Relations stationed in San Carlos City (Negros
Occidental) because the six plaintiffs who are the petitioners at bar all alleged
that they are share tenants of the defendants; that the defendants diverted
the free flow of water from their farm lots which caused portions of their

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order

issued by the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan
11

landholdings to dry up to their great damage and prejudice: and that they
were told by the defendants' overseer to vacate their respective areas for they
could not plant palay any longer due to lack of water. They prayed that they
be declared as leasehold tenants and that the defendants be ordered to pay
attorney's fees and different kinds of damages.

WHEREFORE, with the modification above indicated, deleting

the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
respects, with costs against appellants. (Rollo, pp. 37-38.)
In this petition, the prayer is for the reinstatement of the moral and exemplary
damages and the attorney's fees which had been awarded by the trial court
on the ground that the Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave abuse
of discretion in eliminating them.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as follows:

WHEREFORE, coherent with the foregoing, this Court, in
judgment, hereby:

In awarding damages and attorney's fees, the trial court said:

1) Declares all the plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases to be
maintained as agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation in their
respective landholdings;

This Court has likewise noted the manifestation submitted by

plaintiffs on June 3, 1982 wherein they have attached
photographs of their dried-up landholdings and wilted palay
crops. The allegations in this pleading and the accompanying
pictures were never rebutted by the defendants.

2) Prohibits defendants from closing and/or disrupting the free

flow of water supplying plaintiffs' landholdings;
3) Declares the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on
February 23, 1982 to be permanent;

In view of this circumstances, this Court holds the opinion that

between the period of the inspection by the PC Team on
February 24, 1982 and June 13, 1982 when plaintiffs'
manifestation was filed, there has been complete closure of
water supplying plaintiffs' landholdings which resulted to the
drying up of the same that greatly hampered the healthy growth
of the palay crop. This Court does not believe that the disruption
of the water supply which led to the very poor harvest is due to
the fault/negligence of the plaintiffs.

4) Orders plaintiffs to seek the assistance of the Ministry of

Agrarian Reforms in the fixing of their lease rentals;
5) Orders the defendants to pay all the six plaintiffs in the
above-entitled cases individually moral and exemplary damages
in the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, each;
6) Orders the defendants to pay the attorney's fees in the
amount of P5,000.00; and

Under the law, the landowner has an obligation to keep the

tenant in the peaceful and continuous cultivation of his
landholding. A disturbance of possession, such as the act
complained of, is violative of the law.

7) Dismiss all other claims and counterclaims of the parties for

lack of merit (Rollo, pp. 28-29.)

The Honorable Court of Appeals, thru Associate Justice Porfirio

V. Sison, in June 23, 1982, promulgated a decision in the case
of Buenaventura Garcia, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Eduardo

The defendants appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which in turn

rendered the following judgment:
12

Jalandoni, Salud Garcia and Chester Garcia, defendantappellees, which ruling is relevant to the above-entitled cases
when the said Honorable Court state:

Under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs (now petitioners) are entitled to a
measure of moral damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award
of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same code and the
latter stipulates that: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."

The law forbids the use of tenants like balls on a

pool table, whacked and volleyed and pocketed at
the whim and caprice of the player, or their
positions placed on the auction block like slaves to
be sold to the highest bidder. Such a calamitous
situation erode wholehearted dedication to the
soil; it is destructive of the system itself, as such
an attitude takes away the freedom the
emancipated tenants won under the aegis of the
New Republic.

It appears that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in
order to make them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the
plaintiffs' rights and caused prejudice to the latter by the unjustified diversion
of the water.
The petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the
defendants acted in an oppressive manner. (See Art. 2232. Civil Code.)
It follows from the foregoing that the petitioners are also entitled to attorney's
fees but the size of the fees as well as the damages is subject to the sound
discretion of the court.

The plaintiff-appellant is entitled to moral damages

in the sum of P5,000.00 and exemplary damages
in the further sum of P5,000.00 to be paid by
defendant Eduardo Jalandoni. Let this be a
warning to those who flout the lofty purpose of the
agrarian reform program.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the decision under review is modified

and each of the plaintiffs is entitled to the following to be paid by the
defendants jointly and severally:

Plaintiffs have all their legal rights to protect their interests under
the law in filing these cases, for what the defendants have done
to them, and as such they are entitled attorney's fees. (Rollo,
pp. 27-28.)

Moral damages P1,000.00

Exemplarly damages 500.00
Attorney's fees 1,000.00
P2,500.00

Upon the other hand, in deleting the questioned award the Intermediate
Appellate Court said:

The costs shall be assessed against the private respondents.

However, We are not inclined to sustain the award of moral and

exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. There is no
evidence showing that, in dealing with plaintiffs, defendants
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. There is no showing either that
attorney's fees are recoverable under Art: 2208, Civil Code.
(Rollo, P. 37.)

SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman) Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin and Cuevas JJ.,
concur.
13

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,

CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA
OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all
surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and
VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by
her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their
parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II
and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by
their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN,
minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE
MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA
VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO,
CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,
JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed
SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA
SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID
IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO
and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all
surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR
and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed
ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA
ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced
and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the
twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners
have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed
before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
14

action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they
"represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and

disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted
in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting
from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as
of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of
the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be
found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is
presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon
winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of
lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multibillion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and
(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases
which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other

persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which
have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four
per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of

continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as
well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION

15

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen
(16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of
the country's land mass.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut

and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage
and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors
and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from
and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no

more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per
cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or

impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of

virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire
land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced

and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State
in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors

have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares
for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto

attached as Annex "B".

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered

is hereto attached as Annex "A".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing

TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice
of plaintiffs.

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000

hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines
will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the

TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially
plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and
indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious

injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is

manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states
that it is the policy of the State
16

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under

which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other;

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a

Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of

present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June
1977)

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the

aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge
further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the
land.

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the

aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional
policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income
and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources
(sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and
resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of

humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right
to self-preservation and perpetuation.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a

cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a
sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law

other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage
of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
17

genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to selfpreservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O.
No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements

of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just
to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible,
to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection
of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover
more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's nonimpairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this
case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs
may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not
reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question
of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question
which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches
of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to
file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors
assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five
(25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to
have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately

18

their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.

receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new

timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental
law. 11

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now
proceed to the merits of the petition.

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific
legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the
complaint itself belies these conclusions.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous

consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by
the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of
the said order reads as follows:

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the
Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although
we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it
(sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific
legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific
legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1,
Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint
is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based
on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action
in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in
the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it,
being impressed with political color and involving a matter of
public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of
Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter
how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by
the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
19

is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be
lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.

Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the

country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated
on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as
well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be
provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this
right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta
and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy

of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of the country's
natural resources, not only for the present generation but for
future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide
sanctions against all forms of pollution air,
water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and,
therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance. 12

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the

Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests.

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for

the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would

be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the
20

enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of

making the exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments
of the present as well as future generations.

man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and wellbeing." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The
latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value
system that takes into account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate
and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound

ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference
to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said
section provides:

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.

Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and

Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.

A cause of action is defined as:

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of
carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right

or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of
the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground

that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to
the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth
of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case
is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 InMilitante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,
P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which
21

the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on

the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to
manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself
stands in disrepute."

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept

of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion
of the political departments of the government.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements

under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific
averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis
thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It
bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and

particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a
very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the
disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of
section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes

even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we
were to assume that the issue presented before us was political
in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1,
of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the
non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a
quo declared that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter

how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by
the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr.

Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

22

"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental

law. 24

create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked,
by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss
the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with
utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according
to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section
20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,
and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to
the particular concession area and the forest products therein.
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded
by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry,
G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the

President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State

regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a
contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be

passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts,
the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance
declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence,
the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise

would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
23

impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as
law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the
state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is
not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is

not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject
to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide,
Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases
decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down
in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of
the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of
our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court
appears to be saying.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent
Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet
24

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to
sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded
as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this
"class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in
the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from
the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is
vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to
be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector
of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found
under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown
("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate
case.

mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of

fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192
dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulations
of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic
policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment
Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of
topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon
"one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest,
with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion
language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a
right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which
can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended:
prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories
and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw
sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories,
mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes
on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
25

(vii) mineral resources

unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners
nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the
Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which
petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment
Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged
with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing
with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on
the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of

law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a

legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court
is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present
form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases;
those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted
at here.

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and

healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of
environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim
to special technical competence and experience and professional
qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative
and executive departments must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and
to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a
more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower
order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies,
whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public
respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component

of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
26

might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded

is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or
more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements
(and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate
about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of
the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the
claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative
agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from
the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is
vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to
be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector
of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found
under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown
("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate
case.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision
issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon
"one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest,
with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion
language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a
right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which
can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended:
prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories
and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw
sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories,
mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes
on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after stripmining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192
dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulations

# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide,
Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases
decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down
in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of
the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of
our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court
appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to
sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded
as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this
"class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in
27

of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic

policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing

with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on
the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment
Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of
topics:

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a

legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court
is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present
form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases;
those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted
at here.

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a
more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower
order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component

of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners
nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the
Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which
petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment
Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged

The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of

law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
28

expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the

second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative

agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

Section 1. . . .
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision
issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and
healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of
environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim
to special technical competence and experience and professional
qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative
and executive departments must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and
to implement them before the courts should intervene.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987
ERNESTO R. RODRIGUEZ, JR., ERNESTO LL. RODRIGUEZ III, SACHA
DEL ROSARIO, JOSE P. GENITO, ZENAIDA Z. RODRIGUEZ, and
ENECERIO MONDIA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DAYTONA CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies,
whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public
respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It
might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or
more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements
(and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate
about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of
the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the

Pelaez, Adriano & Gregorio Law Office for petitioners.

Balgos & Perez Law Office for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

29

Before Us is a petition to review by certiorari 1) respondent court's decision

which sets aside the order of default rendered by the trial court and 2)
respondent court's resolution dated April 18, 1986 denying petitioners'
(plaintiffs-appellees' therein) motion for extension of time to file motion for
reconsideration of its decision. 1

1. Declaring the operation of the cement hatching plant of the

defendant corporation as a nuisance and ordering its permanent
closure;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr.
the amount of P250,000.00 as moral damages and the amount
of P5,000.00 as nominal damages;

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Plaintiffs (petitioners herein) filed on December 16, 1980, an action for
abatement of a public nuisance with damages against defendant (private
respondent herein). After being granted four (4) extensions of time to file an
answer, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on February 27, 1981
upon the ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction to hear the instant
case and for lack of cause of action. However, the motion was denied by the
court on April 3, 1981, a copy of which decision was received by the
defendant on April 23, 1981. On May 5, 1981 defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration which motion was denied on July 7, 1981.

3. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff Ernesto LL. Rodriguez

III the amount of P200,000.00 as actual damages, the amount
of P500,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P5,000.00
as nominal damages;

Instead of filing an answer, petitioner filed with Us in G.R. No. 57593, Daytona
Construction & Development Corporation vs. Rodriguez, et al. a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review, but it never filed one, prompting
Us to issue a resolution dated October 5, 1981 informing the parties and the
trial court that no petition for review was filed within the period that expired on
August 15, 1981.

5. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff Zenaida Z. Rodriguez

the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages, the amount of
P100,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P5,000.00
as nominal damages; and

4. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff SACHA del Rosario

the amount of P20,000.00 as actual damages, the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P5,000.00 as
nominal damages;

6. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of

P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of suit.

Upon motion of plaintiffs, the court declared the defendant in default on

November 4, 1981, and authorized the plaintiffs to present evidence exparte. Upon learning of the said order, the defendant on November 9, 1981
filed a motion to set aside the order of default and a motion to admit answer
with counterclaim which motions were denied by the lower court in an order
dated November 23, 1981.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 63-64, Record on Appeal)

In an order dated July 9, 1982, the trial court upon motion of plaintiffs granted
execution pending appeal it indeed appearing as alleged in the motion that
the continued operation of the cement batching plant of the defendant poses
a "great menace to the neighborhood, both in point of health and property."

On June 30, 1982, the court a quo rendered judgment for the plaintiffs and
against defendant, its dispositive portion reading as follows:

On July 23, 1982, defendant filed a petition for relief which was however
denied by the lower court. On July 29, 1982, defendant filed a petition for
injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court which found the petition

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

30

unmeritorious. 2 The appellate court promulgated on October 5, 1983, a

decision denying due course to defendant's petition.

On March 21, 1986, respondent court promulgated its decision, the decretal
portion of which is as follows:

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Appellate Court,
defendant went on appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court (G.R. No.
66097) which, after the submission of plaintiffs' comment and defendant's
reply thereto, denied its petition for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby reversed

and set aside and another one entered, remanding the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings and thereafter, to
render judgment accordingly.

The petition for injunction having been denied by both the IAC and this Court,
defendant pursued the remedy of appeal in respondent IAC, assigning the
following errors.

No pronouncement as to costs.
Notice of respondent Court's decision was received by plaintiffs-appellees
thru counsel on April 3, 1986. Plaintiffs filed on April 15, 1986 a motion for
extension of 30 days from April 18, 1986 or up to May 18, 1986 to file a
motion for reconsideration. However, on May 10, 1986, they filed a 24-page
motion for reconsideration.

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED

APPELLANT IN DEFAULT DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS
FAILURE TO FILE ITS ANSWER ON TIME WAS DUE SOLELY
TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS COUNSEL AND DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS THAT IT HAD FILED
COULD HAVE VERY WELL STOOD AS THE ANSWER OF
THE APPELLANT.

Meanwhile, on April 23, 1986, defendant's opposition to the motion for

extension and counter-motion to enter final judgment were received by
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs countered with a reply filed April 29, 1986. (Annex "C-2")
Plaintiffs' counsel was surprised to receive on April 24, 1986, respondent
Court's resolution dated April 18, 1986, denying the motion for extension.
Plaintiffs requested respondent Court to treat their aforesaid reply filed on
April 29, 1986 as a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution of April
18, 1986, received by them on April 21, 1986, the request being contained in
their opposition dated May 22, 1986, to defendant-appellant's motion to strike
out the said opposition attached thereto as Annex C-3 " Neither the motion for
reconsideration (converted from the reply filed on April 29, 1986) nor the
motion for reconsideration of the decision itself was acted upon by
respondent court.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ASSUMED

JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND WHEN IT RENDERED
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT AGAINST THE APPELLANT ON
GROUNDS AND/OR BASIS NOT ALLEGED IN THE
COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT ALLOW
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT IN THE FACE OF THE REASONS
PRESENTED TO IT AS BASIS FOR SUCH RELIEF.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN DESPITE THE APPEAL
HAVING BEEN DULY PERFECTED, IT DETAINED THE CASE
WITH IT AND THEREAFTER, ISSUED AN ALIAS WRIT OF
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL WITHOUT APPROPRIATE
PRIOR NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT. (pp. 1-2, Appellant's
Brief)
31

Hence this petition to review, petitioners alleging that "Respondent court's

challenged resolution purporting to deny appellees' motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration is a nullity because the decision
inHabaluyas v. Japson case, 3 solely relied on by the said resolution has been
made by the Supreme Court to operate prospectively and thereby rendered
inapplicable to parties situated as petitioners are, in order precisely to spare
them from unfair and unjust deprivation of their right to appeal."

justice would be better served if the ruling in the original

decision were applied prospectively from the time herein stated
The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive parties of their
fight to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a
procedure which was not expressly prohibited or allowed by the
law or the Rules. ... (pp. 3-4; Resolution dated May 30, 1986 in
G.R. No. 70895; emphasis supplied)

In Our resolution, promulgated May 30, 1986 in the Habaluyas case itself
(G.R. No. 70895), We set aside the original judgment therein, thus:

This Court further elucidated:

1). Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for
extension of time to file a motion petition for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases
pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the
extension requested. (p. 4, emphasis supplied)

However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly

prohibit the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
In the case of Gibbs vs. Court of First Instance (80 Phil. 160),
the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and ruled that the
failure of defendant's attorney to file the petition to set aside the
judgment within the reglementary period was due to excusable
neglect, and, consequently, the record on appeal was
allowed. The Court did not rule that the motion for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration could not be
granted.

The above new rules are made effective no earlier than June 30, 1986. In the
instant case, respondent Court's decision was received by plaintiffs on April 3,
1986. Plaintiffs or petitioners herein filed on April 15, 1986 a motion for
extension of 30 days from April 18, 1986 or up to May 18, 1986 to file a
motion for reconsideration. On May 10, 1986, plaintiffs filed their motion for
reconsideration. Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time was not intended for
delay but upon showing of good cause, to wit: "for lack of material time due to
heavy pressure of work on the part of petitioners' counsel presently taking
charge thereof, what is more the counsel handling this case was doing so for
the first time in substitution of Atty. Emmanuel Pelaez, who was recently
appointed Philippine Ambassador to the U.S"

In the case of Roque vs. Gunigundo (Administrative Case No.

1684, March 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 178), a division of the
Court cited the Gibbs decision to support a statement that a
motion to extend the reglementary period for filing the motion for
reconsideration is not authorized or is not in order.
The Intermediate Appellate Court 4 is sharply divided on this
issue. Appeals have been dismissed on the basis of the original
decision in this case.

It is clear therefore that petitioners' motion was based on good cause and was
filed opportunely making the act of respondent Court unwarranted in denying
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file its motion for reconsideration.

After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners

and respondents, the Court resolved that the interest of
32

Another important issue raised by the petitioners is that the "subject decision
which purports to set aside the order of default rendered by the trial court is a
nullity because respondent court arbitrarily ignored in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction 1) the conclusive effect of the trial
court's final and unappealed order denying defendant's motion to set aside
the default order," and 2) the res judicata effect of the appellate court's final
judgment in the injunction case aforementioned upholding the trial court's
order granting execution of its Judgment pending appeal and, necessarily, the
default order as well 3) the law of the case effect of the appellate court's
express ruling in the said injunction case sustaining the default order.

From the uncontroverted evidence presented by the plaintiffs,

there is hardly any question that the cement dust coming from
the batching plant of the defendant corporation is injurious to the
health of the plaintiffs and other residents in the area. The noise,
the vibration, the smoke and the odor generated by the day and
night operation of the plant must indeed be causing them
serious discomfort and untold miseries. Its operation therefore
violates certain rights of the plaintiffs and causes them damage.
It is thus a nuisance and its abatement justified. (Decision, p. 5;
p. 90, Rollo)

Petitioners' contentions merit our consideration.

after taking into consideration evidence presented by plaintiffs (petitioners

herein) as follows:

It has been Our consistent ruling that a default order, being interlocutory, is
not appealable but an order denying a motion or petition to set aside an order
of default is not merely interlocutory but final and therefore immediately
appealable. 5

The evidence shows that the defendant is a domestic

corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines with business address of 252 Don Mariano Marcos
Avenue (actually South Zuzuarregui Avenue), Quezon City. It
was issued by the Quezon City government a business permit
(Exhibit B) for the manufacture of road and building concrete
materials such as concrete aggregates, with cement batching
plant. Among the conditions set forth in the permit are that the
said batching plant shall (1) institute measures to prevent dust
emission during the manual charging of cement from bags to
the receiving hopper of the bucket elevator of the batching plant;
(2) remove all sediment deposit in the settling of tank for
process water and proper maintenance should be observed at
all times. While the original permit issued to the defendant
stated that its operation at the place shall "not (be) beyond Dec.
31, 1979" (Exhibit B-2), it was somehow allowed to operate way
beyond said period.

Since the trial court's order of November 13, 1981, denying defendant's
motion to set aside the order of default was appealable but was not appealed
by defendant, the necessary conclusion is that the default order became final.
Clearly therefore, respondent Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the finality of the default order.
The validity and finality of the default order was upheld by the judgment of the
Appellate Court in the injunction case (which passed upon the merits of the
issuance of an order of execution pending appeal) by virtue of the principle
of res judicata and the doctrine re the law of the case.
There is no question that there were good reasons for the trial court to issue
the order of execution pending appeal. The order categorically stated that
there was a need for the closure and stoppage of the operation of defendant's
(Daytona Construction) cement batching plant because it posed "a great
menace to the neighborhood both in point of health and property." The trial
court thus stated:

Plaintiff Ernesto LL. Rodriguez Ill testified that he has three

parcels of residential lots adjacent to the Daytona compound.
He informed the Court that his property, with an area of 8,892
square meters has been over-run by effluence from the cement
33

batching plant of the defendant. The sediment settled on the lots

and all forms of vegetation have died as a result, and the land
tremendously diminished in value. His three lots are located in a
prime residential zone and each square meter in the area is
easily valued at P500.00. While he would like to sell at least a
part of his property, he finds no buyer because of its condition. It
would cost him no less than P250,000.00 to be able to repair
the damage done to his property, and since its present condition
has been existing during the five years, he claimed that the
interest on his loss would be about P5,000.00. He has agreed to
his counsel's fee of P200,000.00. Zenaida Rodriguez testified
that she owns a lot with an area of 1,500 square meters. Two
thirds of this area has been damaged by the cement dust,
emanating from the defendant's cement batching plant. The
continous flow of cement dust into her property affected her
deep well, their source of drinking water, and most of their fruitbearing and ornamental trees dried up. She also said that she
has had sleepless nights and became nervous as a result of the
batching plant operation. Even her previous pedigreed poodles
have been afflicted by all sorts of illnesses, many of them dying
in the process. She claimed to have sustained damages
amounting to P370,000.00.

skin problems; that the place of Ernesto LL. Rodriguez III is bare
of grass and the trees are dying, (Exhibits J, J-1 and J-2 and
that there is also a high degree of calcium on the property in
question.
Witness Guido L. Quiban a civil engineer, testified that on the
basis of his examination of the property of Rodriguez I I I
affected by the pollution, it would cost at least P250,000.00 for
the excavation filling, concreting of canal and rental of
equipment to repair it or restore it to its status quo ante.
Lawyer Ernesto R. Rodriguez, Jr., the 70-year old father of both
Ernesto Ill and Zenaida Z. Rodriguez, submitted a medical
certificate that he had recently been taken ill with acute
bronchial asthma, hypertension and atherosclerotic heart
disease. (Exhibits L, L-1 to L-4). His physician, a specialist
graduate from the University of London and connected with
various hospitals in Manila, advised him against exposure to
environmental allegens, specifically cement dust and pollution.
He also submitted as exhibits various newspaper clippings
(Exhibit M and excerpts from a book (Exhibits N and N-1
showing that pollution can irritate the eye, sear lungs and
destroy vegetation, raise blood pressure, increase cholesterol
levels, interfere with sleep, cause ulcer, trigger heart attacks and
the like; that it is the common denominator of respiratory
diseases, especially asthma chronic bronchitis, bronchial
asthma and emphysema and that polluted air can develop
abnormalities in lung function.

SACHA del Rosario testified that her house has to close its
windows most of the time because of the dust pollution and her
precious plants have been destroyed by the cement powder
coming from the constant traffic of trucks and other vehicles
carrying the product of the batching plant passing through her
area. She claims damages amounting to more than
P100,000.00.

Dr. Raul I. del Rosario, a neighboring physician, testified that he

had treated several patients who traced their sickness to the
pollution caused by defendant Daytona batching plant. He said
that cement dust produces broncho-pulmonary obstructive
diseases, broncho fibriotic lesions which may produce cardio
pulmonary complications, and the people living in the
neighborhood of the batching plant are the most susceptible to

A chemical engineer, Alexander Cruz, said that the effluence

deposited on the properties of Ernesto LL. Rodriguez III and
Zenaida Rodriguez has a very high PH 11.8, and the soil is
highly alkaline and cannot support plant life; that pollution
coming from the batching plant can cause stomach disorder and
34

these diseases. He reported many cases of bronchial asthma in

both children and adult who live in the vicinity of the cement
batching plant and these cases have been intermittently
admitted and discharged from the Quirino Labor Hospital where
he presently works as a resident physician. He had intended to
open a medical clinic at his residence but he could not do so
because the washings from the cement mixers are dumped on
the access road in front of his house and when these washings
are dried up they pollute the neighborhood, rendering his
intended medical clinic unfit and impractical for the treatment of
patients, particularly those suffering from respiratory ailments.

for reconsideration of the order of denial filed by petitioner on

May 7, 1981 was denied by said court on July 7, 1981. Instead
of filing an answer promptly, petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review, but it never filed one,prompting the Supreme Court to
issue a resolution dated October 5, 1981 informing the parties
that no petition for review was filed within the period that expired
on August 15, 1981. Inspite of the Supreme Court's resolution,
petitioner still failed to file any answer or pleading to arrest the
running of the prescriptive period. It was only on July 23, 1982,
when petitioner filed its Petition for Relief which was nine (9)
months after the Supreme Court's resolution was issued.
Petitioner's assertion in its Petition for Relief that the failure to
file the answer was caused by "the unforseen sickness of its
corporate secretary who has custody of the records necessary
for the preparation of its defense" cannot be taken without much
doubt and hesitation. Petitioner did not even point out who was
the supposed corporate secretary or explain why the records
were in the possession of the corporate secretary instead of the
counsel handling the case. (Decision in Injunction case, p. 16;
emphasis supplied)

Another lawyer, Eliseo Alampay, Jr., who likewise resides a few

meters away from the site of the Daytona batching plant,
testified that the said plant is certainly injurious to the health;
that the cement dust are agents of lung ailments, impair the
growth of plants and even kill the birds in their cages; that it is a
demonstrable nuisance because its uncontrolled engine noise
and night long pounding prevent the neighborhood from being
able to sleep soundly and peacefully. He told the court that there
was a time when he felt like organizing the whole neighborhood
into a demolition team to forcibly dismantle the entire Daytona
plant because "the authorities concerned apparently have
chosen to close their eyes and leave us to our miserable plight."
He said that the homes in the community all look dirty and dusty
because of the pollution that the batching plant of the defendant
causes. (Decision in Injunction Case, AC-G.R. No. 14602-SP,
pp. 10-14)

With reference to defendant's allegation that it thought that the period within
which to answer (after its motion to dismiss had been denied) had been
suspended by its having filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court,
same is without merit. The circumstances of the case point to a deliberate
desire to delay: the corporation, governed as it is by knowledgeable business
executives, should have taken steps to prevent its being declared in default.
The corporation waited six (6) months before verifying the status of the case:
in the meantime it had been declared in default, a judgment by default had
been rendered against it, execution was already pending before it woke up to
file the case at hand.

Anent the default order, the appellate court in the injunction case said:
From the foregoing, it appears that petitioner was recreant in
failing to file an answer after respondent judge denied its motion
to dismiss the complaint. The motion to dismiss was denied in
the order of the lower court under date of April 3, 1981, a copy
of which was received by petitioner on April 23, 1981. A motion

We agree with Justice Luis A. Javellana in his concurring opinion in the

injunction case before the appellate court, thus:
35

Petitioner's conduct here appears to me to be tainted with fraud

and intended simply to delay the disposition of the case. When
its motion to dismiss the complaint was denied, and its motion
for reconsideration of that denial was, Unwise denied, it
manifested its intention to elevate these orders to the Supreme
Court on a petition for review. Yet, it did nothing to this end. The
purpose of the ploy is obvious. Once it had announced its
intention to go to the Supreme Court, it effectively suspended
the proceedings in the trial court, or, at least, that was the effect.
This enabled it to continue with its operations and it would have
done so indefinitely if it had not been declared in-default and
private respondents allowed to present their evidence. It is quite
apparent that petitioner really had no intention of elevating the
case to the Supreme Court otherwise, it would not have allowed
the extended period given to it by the Supreme Court to lapse
without filing the petition. Or, if it was in good faith, there it
should have informed the trial court that it was no longer
pursuing its remedy in the Supreme Court after it had decided
that it is no longer availing of such remedy. Instead, it concealed
this fact from the trial court and the adverse party, and allowed
matters to take their course. It was not until it received the
adverse decision that it frantically sought to set things right I do
not think that petitioner deserves any consideration for trifling
with the administration of justice. (pp. 3-4; emphasis supplied)

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring:

As a rule, I am against substantial damages being awarded ex parte through
default judgments. In this case, the evidence is completely one-sided as the
private respondent was unable to present any defenses nor to refute the
evidence put forward by the plaintiffs regarding the damages allegedly
inflicted upon them. However, I find from the records that there is hardly any
legal reason why the private respondent should not suffer the negligence of
its counsel, not only in the trial court but even in this court.
I, therefore, concur in the results.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution are hereby SET ASIDE,
and a new judgment is hereby rendered REINSTATING the decision of the
trial court with the modification that all awards for nominal damages are
hereby eliminated. Costs against private respondent.

Fernan (Chairman), Padilla and Cortes, JJ., concur.

As a rule, I am against substantial damages being awarded ex parte through

default judgments. In this case, the evidence is completely one-sided as the
private respondent was unable to present any defenses nor to refute the
evidence put forward by the plaintiffs regarding the damages allegedly
inflicted upon them. However, I find from the records that there is hardly any
legal reason why the private respondent should not suffer the negligence of
its counsel, not only in the trial court but even in this court.

Bidin, J., took no part.

I, therefore, concur in the results.

SO ORDERED.

36

permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and

Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.
At the requested conference on February 20, 1989, petitioner, through
its representative, undertook to comply with respondent's request for
the production of the required documents. In compliance with said
undertaking, petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-Department
of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit,"
although among the permits previously secured prior to the operation
of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution
Installation" issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission
(now Environmental Management Bureau) and is now at a stage
where the Environmental Management Bureau is trying to determine
the correct kind of anti-pollution devise to be installed as part of
petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 94759

January 21, 1991

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding Judge,
Bulacan, RTC, and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor and the
MUNICIPALITY OF STA. MARIA, BULACAN, respondents.
Diosdado P. Peralta for petitioner.

Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it

sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure the same
but were not entertained.

GANCAYCO, J.:

On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon

petitioner, respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipality's station
commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus
effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.
Left with no recourse, petitioner instituted an action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against private
respondent with the court a quo which is presided by the respondent
judge. In its prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, it alleged therein that the closure order was issued in grave
abuse of discretion.

The authority of the local executive to protect the community from pollution is
the center of this controversy.
The antecedent facts are related in the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals as follows:
Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture
and export of charcoal briquette, received a letter dated February 16,
1989 from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the
full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant located at
Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order. The letter likewise
requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring with him to the
office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building

During the hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction on April 14, 1989, herein parties adduced their
respective evidences. The respondent judge, April 19, 1989, found that
petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, hence, it ordered as follows:

37

In view of the foregoing, upon petitioner's posting of a bond in

the amount of P50,000.00 to answer for such damages that
respondents may sustain should petitioner eventually be found
not entitled to the injunctive relief hereby issued, let a
PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION issue ordering the
respondent Hon. Pablo N. Cruz, and other person acting in his
behalf and stead to immediately revoke his closure order dated
April 6, 1989, and allow petitioner to resume its normal business
operations until after the instant case shall have been
adjudicated on the merits without prejudice to the inherent
power of the court to alter, modify or even revoke this order at
any given time.

c) Exhibit "B-3", a letter addressed to Hon. Roberto Pagdanganan

Governor of the Province of Bulacan, dated November 22, 1988,
complaining about the smoke coming out of the chimney of the
company while in operation.
Reassessing all the evidence adduced, the lower court, on June 14,
1989, issued an order (a) setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989,
which granted a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and (b)
dissolving the writ consequently issued.
A motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1989 was filed by petitioner.
Said motion drew an opposition dated July 19, 1989 from private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Resolving the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the respondent
judge issued an order dated August 9, 1989, denying said motion for
reconsideration.1

The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on April 28,

1989, upon petitioner's posting a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
Private respondent filed his motion for reconsideration dated May 3,
1989. Said motion for reconsideration was heard on May 30, 1989.
Petitioner's counsel failed to appear and the hearing proceeded with
the Provincial Prosecutor presenting his evidence. The following
documents were submitted:

Hence a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was
filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals seeking to annul and set aside (a)
the order issued by the trial court on June 14, 1989, setting aside the order
dated April 28, 1989, and (b) the order of August 9, 1989, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the order of June 14, 1989. In due course the
petition was denied for lack of merit by the appellate court in a decision dated
January 26, 1990. 2 A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioner
was denied on August 10, 1990.

a) Exhibit "A", Investigation report on the Technology Developers Inc.,

prepared by one Marivic Guina, and her conclusion and
recommendation read:

Thus, the herein petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. Six errors
are alleged to have been committed by the appellate court which may be
synthesized into the singular issue of whether or not the appellate court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering its question decision and
resolution.

Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials

used, the fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate
matters which are hazardous to the health of the people. As
such, the company should cease operating until such a time that
the proper air pollution device is installed and operational.

The petition is devoid of merit.

b) Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", three (3) sheets of coupon bond
containing signatures of residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan;

The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its
action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of
38

its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary
relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.

members of the same family), but on the whole the many signatures
appear to be written by different persons. The certification of the barrio
captain of said barrio that he has not received any complaint on the
matter 6 must be because the complaint was sent directly to the
Governor through the Acting Mayor.

To the mind of the Court the following circumstances militate against the
maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an
investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of
December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of
petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper
air pollution device has been installed. 7

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter
of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that
requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is
essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control
Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town
has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and
by virture of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit
to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate
measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the
residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the
business.

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of

Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an official
of Makati on March 6,1987.8
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate
by the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15,
1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. 9 Petitioner had not
exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install
any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health
of the residents of the community.

2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called the

attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant
whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also
affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was
ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to
bring the following:

All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by
the trial court and the appellate court correctly upheld the action of the lower
court.

(1) Building permit;

Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment
in this dollar-earning industry.1wphi1 It must be stressed however, that
concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth
of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health,
nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of
the environment.

(2) Mayor's permit; and

(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution permit. 3

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against petitioner.

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of

the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the
Provincial Governor through channels. 4 The alleged NBI finding that
some of the signatures in the four-page petition were written by one
person, 5 appears to be true in some instances, (particularly as among

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
39

The assailed decision3 of the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) to stay the latter from
energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through its cables
erected from Sucat, Paraaque to Araneta Ave., Quezon City.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006

But, first, the facts:

EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, MA. ENCARBACION R. LEGASPI, JAIME

BLANCO, JR., ENRIQUE BELO, CARLOS VIAPLANA, CARL FURER,
VIVENCIO TINIO, MICHAEL BRIGGS, ROSA CARAM, FAUSTO
PREYSLER, ROBERT KUA, GEORGE LEE, GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO,
PETER DEE, LUISA MARQUEZ, ANGELITA LILLES, JUAN CARLOS,
HOMER GO, AMADEO VALENZUELA, EMILIO CHING, ANTONIO CHAN,
MURLI SABNANI, MARCOS ROCES, RAYMUNDO FELICIANO, NORMA
GAFFUD, ALF HOLST, LOURDES P. ROQUE, MANUEL DY, RAUL
FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA TENGCO, CHI MO CHENG, BARANGAY
DASMARIAS, and HON. FRANCISCO B. IBAY, petitioners
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondent

Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped

steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high
tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak
Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the
Sergio Osmea, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort
Bonifacio, and Dasmarias Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where
petitioners homes are.
Said project later proved to be petitioners bane of existence.
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the
internet on the possible adverse effects that such a structure could cause to
their health and well-being. Petitioners got hold of published articles and
studies linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to
electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from cancer to leukemia.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Petitioners left no stones unturned to address their malady. They aired this
growing concern to the NAPOCOR, which conducted a series of meetings
with them.

Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends
only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative
acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of
law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising
their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. 1 In such cases, let the
hammer fall and let it fall hard.

NAPOCOR received flak from Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero,

who in his Privilege Speech dated 10 May 1999, denounced the cavalier
manner with which Napocor ignored safety and consultation requirements in
the questioned project.
Petitioners brought their woes to the attention of Rep. Arnulfo Fuentebella,
Chairman of the House Committee on Energy, wherein NAPOCOR was
asked to shed light on the petitioners problem. In a letter dated 8 November
1999, Napocor President Federico Puno stated that NAPOCOR was still in
the process of coming up with a "win-win" solution to the concerns of the
Dasmarias Village and Forbes Park residents.4

With health risks linked to exposure to electromagnetic radiation as their

battle cry, petitioners, all residents of Dasmarias Village, are clamoring for
the reversal of the decision2 dated 3 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 57849 as well as the resolution dated 27 September 2000,
denying their motion for reconsideration.
40

In a letter dated 10 August 1999 addressed to Congressman Arnulfo P.

Fuentebella, NAPOCORs President wrote:

Acting on the plaintiffs "Urgent Omnibus Motion," it appearing that the subject
area will be energized by midnight tonight based on a report taken from
Representative Joker P. Arroyo by plaintiffs counsel, so as not to render moot
and academic the instant case, as prayed for, defendant National Power
Corporation is ordered to maintain the status quo and/or be enjoined from
energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through its cables for
forty eight (48) hours starting 4 oclock in the afternoon today and ending 4
oclock in the afternoon of 15 March 2000.9

We have discussed the matter with the Dasmarias and Forbes residents and
we have come up with four (4) options on how to address the problem, to wit:
Option Cost
Option 1: Transfer the line to Lawton Avenue P 111.84 million
(proposal of Dasmarias/Forbes)

By order10 of 15 March 2000, the trial court extended the restraining order for
18 more days.

Option 2: Maintain 12 meters distance along P 77.60 million the village

NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the
above order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree No. 1818
(1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary
Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource
Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government,"
particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR stalwartly sought the dismissal of the case on
the ground of lack jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1818 provides:

Option 3: Construct an underground line P 482.00 million

Option 4: Reroute along C-5 and South Luzon P 1,018.83 million
Expressway (combination of overhead and underground) 5
Negotiations between petitioners and the NAPOCOR reached an impass,
with petitioners vying for the relocation of the transmission lines to Fort
Bonifacio on one hand, and the NAPOCOR insisting on a 12-meter easement
widening, on the other.6

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any

restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in
any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a
mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the
government, or any public utility operated by the government, including
among other public utilities for transport of the goods or commodities,
stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or
government official from proceeding with or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility or
pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or
operation.

Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint 7 for Damages with

Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. Harping on the hazardous effects
of exposure to electromagnetic radiation to the health and safety to
themselves and their families, petitioners, through the instant case, sought
what they had failed to achieve through amicable means with NAPOCOR and
prayed, inter alia, for damages and the relocation of the transmission lines to
Lawton Avenue, Fort Bonifacio.

In the interregnum, by order dated 3 April 2000, the trial court ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against NAPOCOR. 11 The trial
court articulated that an injunction was necessary to stay respondent
NAPOCORs activation of its power lines due to the possible health risks
posed to the petitioners. Asserting its jurisdiction over the case, the trial court
was of the view that Presidential Decree No. 1818 and jurisprudence

On 13 March 2000, Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an order 8 in Civil Case

No. 00-352, which temporarily restrained the respondent from energizing and
transmitting high voltage electric current through the said project. The
pertinent portion of the said order reads:

41

proscribing injunctions against infrastructure projects do not find application in

the case at bar because of the health risks involved.

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the
act complained of will probably work injustice to the applicant or probably
violate his rights and tends to render the judgment ineffectual.15 (Emphasis in
the original.)

The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR from further preparing and
installing high voltage cables to the steel pylons erected near petitioners
homes and from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current
through said cables while the case is pending final adjudication, upon posting
of the bond amounting to P5,000,000.00 executed to the effect that
petitioners will pay all the damages the NAPOCOR may sustain by reason of
the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the petitioners are not
entitled thereto.12

Fundamental to the resolution of the instant petition is the issue of whether or

not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the 29 decagon-shaped
steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree
No. 1818.
Petitioners clutch on their stand that Presidential Decree No. 1818 could not
be construed to apply to cases of extreme urgency as in the present case
when no less than the rights of the petitioners to health and safety hangs on
the balance.

In light of the foregoing order of the trial court, the petition which NAPOCOR
filed with the Court of Appeals was later amended to include the prayer for the
nullification and injunction of the Order dated 3 April 2000 of the trial court.
In the challenged decision of 3 May 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial courts order, with the following fallo:

We find the petition to be imbued with merit.

Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting
judges from issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure
projects. In part, the decree says, "No court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
order, preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy
involving an infrastructure project." Realizing the importance of this decree,
this Tribunal had issued different circulars to implement this particular law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is

hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the respondent court, dated March
13, 2000 and April 3, 2000, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 13
In the Court of Appeals rationale, the proscription on injunctions against
infrastructure projects of the government is clearly mandated by the abovequoted Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818, as reiterated by the
Supreme Court in its Circulars No. 2-91 and No. 13-93, dated 15 March 1991
and 5 March 1993, respectively.

Presidential Decree No. 181816 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions

against government infrastructure projects. In Garcia v. Burgos,17 Presidential
Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit courts from issuing an injunction
against any infrastructure project in order not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit
of essential government projects or frustrate the economic development effort
of the nation.

As their motion for reconsideration was met with similar lack of success,
petitioners, in a last attempt at vindication, filed the present petition for review
on the following arguments:

While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the
implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource
development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there
are actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find
application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential
Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases

I.
Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions were purposely
designed to address matters of extreme urgency where there is probability of
grave injustice and irreparable injury.14
II.
42

involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance

of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues
clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court
declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to
restrain or prohibit administrative acts.18

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or

acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to
the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. (3a) (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction

on the ground that the NAPOCOR Project impinged on their right to health as
enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the
act complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the
judgment ineffectual.

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill consciousness among them.
To boot, petitioners, moreover, harp on respondents failure to conduct prior
consultation with them, as the community affected by the project, in stark
violation of Section 27 of the Local Government Code which provides: "no
project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless
the consultations mentioned are complied with, and prior approval of
the Sanggunian concerned is observed."

Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the
project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and safety of the
petitioners so as to justify the issuance by the trial court of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Petitioners adduced in evidence copies of studies linking the incidence of
illnesses such as cancer and leukemia to exposure to electromagnetic fields.
The records bear out, to boot, a copy of a brochure of NAPOCOR regarding
its Quezon Power Project from which will be supplying NAPOCOR with the
power which will pass through the towers subject of the controversy. The
NAPOCOR brochure provides that because of the danger concomitant with
high voltage power, Philippine laws mandate that the power lines should be
located within safe distances from residences. And the Quezon Power Project
mandates an easement of 20 meters to the right and 20 meters to the left
which falls short of the 12-meter easement that NAPOCOR was proposing to
petitioners.

From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners constitutionally

protected right to health and whether respondent NAPOCOR had indeed
violated the Local Government Code provision on prior consultation with the
affected communities are veritable questions of law that invested the trial
court with jurisdiction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary
injunction. As such, these questions of law divest the case from the protective
mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction finds legal
support in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Likewise on record, are copies of letters of Napocor President Federico Puno

to Rep. Arnulfo Fuentebella, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy,
stating updates on the negotiations being undertaken by the NAPOCOR and
the Dasmarias Village and Forbes Park residents. Also on file is the Privilege
Speech dated 10 May 1999 of Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero,
who denounced the cavalier manner with which Napocor ignored safety and
consultation requirements in the questioned project.

Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary

injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
43

With a member of Congress denouncing the subject project of NAPOCOR

because of the very same health and safety ills that petitioners now hew to in
this petition, and with documents on record to show that NAPOCOR made
representations to petitioners that they are looking into the possibility of
relocating the project, added to the fact that there had been series of
negotiations and meetings between petitioners and NAPOCOR as well as
related agencies, there is ample indicia to suggest to the mind of the court
that the health concerns of the petitioners are, at the very least, far from
imaginary.

Moreover, the Local Government Code, requires conference with the affected
communities of a government project. NAPOCOR, palpably, made a shortcut
to this requirement. In fact, there appears a lack of exhaustive feasibility
studies on NAPOCORs part before making a go with the project on hand;
otherwise, it should have anticipated the legal labyrinth it is now caught in.
These are facts, which the trial court could not ignore, and form as sufficient
basis to engender the cloud of doubt that the NAPOCOR project could,
indeed, endanger the lives of the petitioners. A preliminary injunction is
likewise justified prior to a final determination of the issues of whether or not
NAPOCOR ignored safety and consultation requirements in the questioned
project. Indeed, the court could, nay should, grant the writ of preliminary
injunction if the purpose of the other party is to shield a wrongdoing. A ruling
to the contrary would amount to an erosion of judicial discretion.

Indeed, if there is no cause for concern, NAPOCOR would not have been
stirred to come up with options to address the woes of petitioners, nor would
Congressman Escudero have fired away those strong words of censure,
assailing what to Congressman Escudero smacks of a "cavalier manner by
which the NAPOCOR has responded to earnest pleas for a review of its
practice of installing massive pylons supporting high tension cables in densely
populated areas."19

After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not
require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant.
Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is
enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is different
from injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute
certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.

True, the issue of whether or not the transmission lines are safe is essentially
evidentiary in nature, and pertains to the very merits of the action below. In
fact, petitioners recognize that the conclusiveness of their life, health and
safety concerns still needs to be proved in the main case below and they are
prepared to do so especially in the light of some studies cited by respondent
that yield contrary results in a disputed subject. Despite the parties conflicting
results of studies made on the issue, the possibility that the exposure to
electromagnetic radiation causes cancer and other disorders is still, indeed,
within the realm of scientific scale of probability.

Pending the final determination of the trial court on the main case for
damages, of whether or not the NAPOCOR Project infringes on petitioners
substantive right to health and pending determination of the question of
whether there was non-observance of the prior-consultation proviso under the
Local Government Code, it is prudent to preserve the status quo. In Phil.
Ports Authority v. Cipres Stevedoring & Arrastre, Inc., 20 we held:

Equally important, we take judicial notice that the area alluded to as location
of the NAPOCOR project is a fragile zone being proximate to local
earthquake faults, particularly the Marikina fault, among other zones. This is
not to mention the risks of falling structures caused by killer tornadoes and
super typhoons, the Philippines, especially Central Luzon, being situated
along the typhoon belt.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to

judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain
from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the
protection of a partys substantive rights or interests pending the final
judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the
existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be
avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as
the party applying for the writ is concerned.
44

At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled

that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls
for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only
be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an
adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme
urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative
inconvenience bear strongly in complainants favor; where there is a willful
and unlawful invasion of plaintiffs right against his protest and remonstrance,
the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory
injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing
relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the
defendant, than to establish a new relation." (Emphasis supplied.)

Lest we be misconstrued, this decision does not undermine the purpose of

the NAPOCOR project which is aimed towards the common good of the
people. But, is the promotion of the general welfare at loggerheads with the
preservation of the rule of law? We submit that it is not. 26
In the present case, the far-reaching irreversible effects to human safety
should be the primordial concerns over presumed economic benefits per se
as alleged by the NAPOCOR.
Not too long ago, the Court, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,27 upheld the validity of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining the
implementation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authoritys proposed
action of opening of the Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic. We were
categorical -

What is more, contrary to respondents assertion, there is not a single syllable

in the circulars issued by this Court enjoining the observance of Presidential
Decree No. 1818, which altogether and absolutely, ties the hands of the
courts from issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. What Circular 2-91 21 dated
15 March 1991 seeks to enjoin is the indiscriminate issuance of court
injunctions. The same holds for Circular 13-9322 dated 5 March 1993 and
Circular 68-94.23 And, in Circular No. 7-99, judges are enjoined to observe
utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of temporary
restraining order and in the grant of writs of preliminary injunction to avoid any
suspicion that its issuance or grant was for consideration other than the strict
merits of the case.24

Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve

urgent problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the
best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law.
Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA
to open for public use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold
that the general welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be
achieved at the expense of the rule of law.28
In hindsight, if, after trial, it turns out that the health-related fears that
petitioners cleave on to have adequate confirmation in fact and in law, the
questioned project of NAPOCOR then suffers from a paucity of purpose, no
matter how noble the purpose may be. For what use will modernization serve
if it proves to be a scourge on an individuals fundamental right, not just to
health and safety, but, ostensibly, to life preservation itself, in all of its desired
quality?

There is not a hint from the foregoing circulars suggesting

an unbridled prohibition against the issuance of temporary restraining orders
or preliminary injunctions.
In sum, what Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the untimely
frustration of government infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional
remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by disrupting the pursuit of
essential government projects or frustrate the economic development effort of
the nation. Presidential Decree No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a
blanket prohibition so as to disregard the fundamental right to health, safety
and well-being of a community guaranteed by the fundamental law of the
land.25

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated 3 May 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57849 is REVERSED as well as the
resolution dated 27 September 2000. The Order dated 3 April 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 00-352 is hereby
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
45

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARESMA. ALICIA AUSTRIASANTIAGO
MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Asscociate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public

concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information,
petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.
This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the
fundamental right to information. The same remedy was resorted to in the
case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et. al., (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24,1985,136
SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973
Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked in order to compel the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions and other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the
right in said Constitution the statutory right to information provided for in the
Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by a
newspaper editor in another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand
access to the records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of gathering
data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil.
383 [1948]).

Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained

recognition in the Bill of Rights, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which
states:
Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,

CORTES, J.:

46

transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject

to such limitations as may be provided by law.

securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no

ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the
information he seeks.

The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided
amplified in Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution with the addition of the
phrase, "as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development." The new provision reads:

1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been

instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal,
corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the
enjoyment of a legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix,
77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The petitioner in every case must therefore be an
"aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be
enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.

The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such stations as may be provided by law.

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the
petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of
any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a vague reference to
an unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made
inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by

means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise
on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the
ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which
must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11,
Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may
be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7
have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New
Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus
proceeding such as this one.

But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly
anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held
that:
* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty,
the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs.
Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27,
36).

The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due

course to this Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the
ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of
the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls
attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding

involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
47

satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of
the general "public" which possesses the right.

such limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further
enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public
disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in
Article 11, Section 28 thereof, to wit:

The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in

the Subido case, supra, when it held that even those who have no direct or
tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the "public" to whom
"(a)ll records relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds
shall be open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as amended). In the words of the
Court:

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State

adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).
In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by
what this Court declared as an imperative duty of the government officials
concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general
applicability. We granted mandamus in said case, and in the process, We
found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:

* * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly

construed, it embraces every person. To say that only those who
have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in
the particular information sought are given the right of inspection
is to make an unwarranted distinction. *** (Subido vs.
Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).

* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the

people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our
mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to
what must be in included or excluded from such
publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera,supra, at 39). (Emphasis
supplied).

The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek
redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find
no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit.
2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern, to respect and protect
that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional
regime. Only governments operating under fundamental rules defining the
limits of their power so as to shield individual rights against its arbitrary
exercise can properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5).
Without a government's acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by the
Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment
on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the
Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.

The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing

the examination of public records, specifically, the records in the Office of the
Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the
examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not
believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to
concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of
the person seeking access to the records. It is not their
prerogative to see that the information which the records contain
is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of

In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution

and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents
to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition,
government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to
48

it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the

legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is
called upon to devise a remedy. *** (Subido v. Ozaeta, supra at
388). (Emphasis supplied).

made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to

a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the
access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access
to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III,
Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency
charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is
to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records
may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be
prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional
right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaetal supra).

It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government

agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to,
information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public
records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by
the public. In the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of
Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to do so, may
inspect, examine or copy records relating to registered lands. However, the
regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to

reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty
to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such
agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be
rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The
constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled
by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end

that damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that
undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books
and documents and other employees may be prevented, that
the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be
insured * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the
public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional
guarantee.

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a

municipal judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of criminal
docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against
the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow examination of the
criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating Judge
that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the
subject records, We absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held
that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon the manner of examining
the public records were reasonable.

3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to

information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free
flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm.
Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free
discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of
general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our
statement that the authority to regulate the manner of examining public
records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be
49

Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving them a better perspective of the vital
issues confronting the nation.

courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of

interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is

not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under
the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The
law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny,
such as those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23,
1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986
Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in every case, the availability of
access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of
the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves
public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not
the information sought is of public interest or public concern.

The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the
need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to
regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra,the
public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the knowledge of
those real estate transactions which some believed to have been registered in
violation of the Constitution.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of
certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the
positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares
as a State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according
to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and
except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art.
IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).

a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody

of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give
the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of
denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the
information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that
the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To
hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ".
. . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret
arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To
safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government
agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case,
access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.

Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate
concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at
all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their
respective positions.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern

there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public
interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility,
the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which
would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those
who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure

b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest.
For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the
species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

50

examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there
is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And
when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil
service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their
professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of

eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service
eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the
Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the
absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of
civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission
to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the
position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

51