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Banking Crisis Management in Ireland & Korea

This document discusses a presentation given by Christopher Gandrud and Mícheál O'Keeffe at the Waseda University GLOPE II Conference in January 2011 about government responses to banking crises. The presentation explores why governments choose the banking crisis responses they do and why their choices are often not aligned with their preferences, using case studies from Ireland and Korea. Banking crises frequently prompt policy responses from governments, who have a wide variety of options at their disposal, including liability guarantees, recapitalizations, liquidity support, mergers, and nationalizations.

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Albertus Holbein
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43 views6 pages

Banking Crisis Management in Ireland & Korea

This document discusses a presentation given by Christopher Gandrud and Mícheál O'Keeffe at the Waseda University GLOPE II Conference in January 2011 about government responses to banking crises. The presentation explores why governments choose the banking crisis responses they do and why their choices are often not aligned with their preferences, using case studies from Ireland and Korea. Banking crises frequently prompt policy responses from governments, who have a wide variety of options at their disposal, including liability guarantees, recapitalizations, liquidity support, mergers, and nationalizations.

Uploaded by

Albertus Holbein
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Getting What You Want: Information & Crisis

Management in Ireland & Korea


Christopher Gandrud Mcheal OKeee
Waseda University GLOPE II Conference, January 2011
Getting What You Want 1 / 1
1
Introduction
Getting What You Want Outline 2 / 1
Motivation

Banking crises are relatively frequent (Reinhart & Rogo 2009) and
almost always prompt a policy response (Rosas 2009).

There are a wide variety of responses that can be chosen, including:


liability guarantees, recapitalisations, liquidity support, mergers, and
nationalisations

Questions:

Why do governments choose the banking crisis responses that they


do?

Why are their choices often not aligned with their preferences?
Getting What You Want Introduction 3 / 1
Motivation

Banking crises are relatively frequent (Reinhart & Rogo 2009) and
almost always prompt a policy response (Rosas 2009).

There are a wide variety of responses that can be chosen, including:


liability guarantees, recapitalisations, liquidity support, mergers, and
nationalisations

Questions:

Why do governments choose the banking crisis responses that they


do?

Why are their choices often not aligned with their preferences?
Getting What You Want Introduction 3 / 1
Motivation

Banking crises are relatively frequent (Reinhart & Rogo 2009) and
almost always prompt a policy response (Rosas 2009).

There are a wide variety of responses that can be chosen, including:


liability guarantees, recapitalisations, liquidity support, mergers, and
nationalisations

Questions:

Why do governments choose the banking crisis responses that they


do?

Why are their choices often not aligned with their preferences?
Getting What You Want Introduction 3 / 1
Motivation

Banking crises are relatively frequent (Reinhart & Rogo 2009) and
almost always prompt a policy response (Rosas 2009).

There are a wide variety of responses that can be chosen, including:


liability guarantees, recapitalisations, liquidity support, mergers, and
nationalisations

Questions:

Why do governments choose the banking crisis responses that they


do?

Why are their choices often not aligned with their preferences?
Getting What You Want Introduction 3 / 1

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