Hacking Bluetooth enabled mobile phones and beyond Full Disclosure
Adam Laurie Marcel Holtmann Martin Herfurt
21C3: The Usual Suspects
21st Chaos Communication Congress December 27th to 29th, 2004 Berliner Congress Center, Berlin, Germany
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Who we are
Adam Laurie
CSO of The Bunker Secure Hosting Ltd. Co-Maintainer of Apache-SSL DEFCON Staff/Organiser Maintainer and core developer of the Linux Bluetooth Stack BlueZ Security Researcher Founder of [Link]
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Marcel Holtmann
Martin Herfurt
Outline (1)
Bluetooth Introduction History Technology Overview The BlueSnarf Attack The HeloMoto Attack The BlueBug Attack Bluetooone Long-Distance Attacking
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Outline (2)
Blooover Blueprinting DOS Attacks Sniffing Bluetooth with hcidump Conclusions Lessons tought Feedback / Discussion
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Bluetooth Introduction (1)
Wire replacement technology Low power Short range 10m - 100m 2.4 GHz 1 Mb/s data rate
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Bluetooth Introduction (2)
Bluetooth SIG
Trade Association Founded 1998 Owns & Licenses IP Individual membership free Promoter members: Agere, Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia and Toshiba Consumer [Link] Technical [Link]
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
History (1)
Bluejacking
Early adopters abuse 'Name' field to send message Now more commonly send 'Business Card' with message via OBEX 'Toothing' - Casual sexual liasons
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
History (2)
Bluesnarfing
First publicised by Marcel Holtmann, October 2003
Wireless Technologies Congress, Sindelfingen, Germany Bugtraq, Full Disclosure Houses of Parliament London Underground
Adam Laurie, A L Digital, November 2003
'Snarf' - networking slang for 'unauthorised copy'
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
History (3)
Bluesnarfing
Data Theft Calendar
Appointments Images Names, Addresses, Numbers PINs and other codes Images
Phone Book
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
History (4)
Bluebugging
First publicised by Martin Herfurt, March 2004
CeBIT Hanover
Create unauthorised connection to serial profile Full access to AT command set Read/Write access to SMS store Read/Write access to Phone Book
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
History (5)
Full Disclosure after 13 months
More time for manufacturers to fix
Embedded devices New process for telecom industry Firmware updates available 6310i tested OK
Nokia claims to have fixed all vulnerable devices
Motorola committed to fix known vulnerabilities Sony Ericsson publicly stated all problems fixed
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Bluetooth Technology
Data and voice transmission
ACL data connections SCO and eSCO voice channels
Symmetric and asymmetric connections Frequency hopping
ISM band at 2.4 GHz 79 channels 1600 hops per second Multi-Slot packets
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Bluetooth Piconet
Bluetooth devices create a piconet
One master per piconet Up to seven active slaves Over 200 passive members are possible Master sets the hopping sequence Transfer rates of 721 Kbit/sec
Bluetooth 1.2 and EDR (aka 2.0)
Adaptive Frequency Hopping Transfer rates up to 2.1 Mbit/sec
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Bluetooth Scatternet
Connected piconets create a scatternet
Master in one and slave in another piconet Slave in two different piconets Only master in one piconet Scatternet support is optional
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Bluetooth Architecture
Hardware layer
Radio, Baseband and Link Manager Access through Host Controller Interface
Hardware abstraction Standards for USB and UART
Host protocol stack
L2CAP, RFCOMM, BNEP, AVDTP etc.
Profile implementations
Serial Port, Dialup, PAN, HID etc.
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Bluetooth Stack
Application specific security mechanisms
Bluetooth host security mechanisms
Security mechanisms on the Bluetooth chip
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Bluetooth Security
Link manager security
All security routines are inside the Bluetooth chip Nothing is transmitted in plain text
Host stack security
Interface for link manager security routines Part of the HCI specification Easy interface No further encryption of pin codes or keys
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Security Modes
Security mode 1
No active security enforcement
Security mode 2
Service level security On device level no difference to mode 1
Security mode 3
Device level security Enforce security for every low-level connection
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Linux and Bluetooth
# hciconfig -a hci0: Type: USB BD Address: 00:02:5B:A1:88:52 ACL MTU: 384:8 SCO MTU: 64:8 UP RUNNING PSCAN ISCAN RX bytes:9765 acl:321 sco:0 events:425 errors:0 TX bytes:8518 acl:222 sco:0 commands:75 errors:0 Features: 0xff 0xff 0x8b 0xfe 0x9b 0xf9 0x00 0x80 Packet type: DM1 DM3 DM5 DH1 DH3 DH5 HV1 HV2 HV3 Link policy: RSWITCH HOLD SNIFF PARK Link mode: SLAVE ACCEPT Name: 'Casira BC3-MM' Class: 0x1e0100 Service Classes: Networking, Rendering, Capturing, Object Transfer Device Class: Computer, Uncategorized HCI Ver: 1.2 (0x2) HCI Rev: 0x529 LMP Ver: 1.2 (0x2) LMP Subver: 0x529 Manufacturer: Cambridge Silicon Radio (10) # hcitool scan Scanning ... 00:04:0E:21:06:FD 00:01:EC:3A:45:86 00:04:76:63:72:4D 00:A0:57:AD:22:0F 00:E0:03:04:6D:36 00:80:37:06:78:92 00:06:C6:C4:08:27
AVM BlueFRITZ! AP-DSL HBH-10 Aficio AP600N ELSA Vianect Blue ISDN Nokia 6210 Ericsson T39m Anycom LAN Access Point
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Sniffing with hcidump
Recording of HCI packets
Commands, events, ACL and SCO data packets
Only for local connections Decoding of higher layer protocols
HCI and L2CAP SDP, RFCOMM, BNEP, CMTP, HIDP, HCRP and AVDTP OBEX and CAPI
No sniffing of baseband or radio traffic
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Security Commands
HCI_Create_New_Unit_Key HCI_{Read|Write}_Pin_Type HCI_{Read|Write|Delete}_Stored_Link_Key HCI_{Read|Write}_Authentication_Enable HCI_{Read|Write}_Encryption_Mode HCI_Authentication_Requested HCI_Set_Connection_Encryption HCI_Change_Local_Link_Key HCI_Master_Link_Key
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Pairing Functions
Events
HCI_Link_Key_Notification HCI_Link_Key_Request HCI_Pin_Code_Request
Commands
HCI_Link_Key_Request_Reply HCI_Link_Key_Request_Negative_Reply HCI_Pin_Code_Request_Reply HCI_Pin_Code_Request_Negative_Reply
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
How Pairing Works
First connection
(1) HCI_Pin_Code_Request (2) HCI_Pin_Code_Request_Reply (3) HCI_Link_Key_Notification
Further connections
(1) HCI_Link_Key_Request (2) HCI_Link_Key_Request_Reply (3) HCI_Link_Key_Notification (optional)
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
BlueSnarf
Trivial OBEX PUSH channel attack
obexapp (FreeBSD) PULL known objects instead of PUSH No authentication IrMC (Specifications for Ir Mobile Communications)
Infrared Data Association
e.g. telecom/[Link]
Ericsson R520m, T39m, T68 Sony Ericsson T68i, T610, Z1010 Nokia 6310, 6310i, 8910, 8910i
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
HeloMoto
Requires entry in 'Device History' OBEX PUSH to create entry Connect RFCOMM to Handsfree or Headset
No Authentication required Full AT command set access
Motorola V80, V5xx, V6xx and E398
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
BlueBug History (1)
First presentation in February 2004
FH Salzburg 'Forum IKT 2004' Spicing up a presentation about Wardriving
Got inspired from Adam's BlueSnarf which has been written about on slashdot Tried to figure out how Adam did it (no purposebuilt tools available) Found BlueBug
Based on AT Commands -> not OBEX
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
BlueBug History (2)
Fieldtrial at CeBIT 2004
Booth close to the restrooms -> many people there Even Policemen ;)
Got on slashdot at the end of March 2004 Teamed up with Adam in April 2004 Various media citations Presentation at Blackhat and DEFCON in August 2004 Full Disclosure at 21C3 in December 2004 (now!)
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
BlueBug Facts (1)
As mentioned earlier...
BlueBug is based on AT Commands (ASCII Terminal) Very common for the configuration and control of telecommunications devices High level of control...
Call control (turning phone into a bug) Sending/Reading/Deleting SMS Reading/Writing Phonebook Entries Setting Forwards -> causing costs on the vulnerable phones!
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
BlueBug Facts (2)
How come!?
Various Manufacturers poorly implemented the Bluetooth security mechanisms Unpublished services on RFCOMM channels
Not announced via SDP
Connecting to unpublished HS service without pairing!
Nokia has quite a lot of models (6310, 6310i, 8910, 8910i,...) Sony Ericsson T86i, T610, ... Motorola has similar problems (see HeloMoto)
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Bluetooone
Enhancing the range of a Bluetooth dongle by connecting a directional antenna -> as done in the Long Distance Attack Original idea from Mike Outmesguine (Author of Book: Wi-Fi Toys) Step by Step instruction on [Link]
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Long-Distance Attacking (BlueSniper)
Beginning of August 2004 (right after DEFCON 12) Experiment in Santa Monica California Modified Class-1 Dongle Snarfing/Bugging Class-2 device (Nokia 6310i) from a distance of 1,78 km (1.01 miles)
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Blooover -What is it?
Blooover - Bluetooth Wireless Technology Hoover Proof-of-Concept Application Educational Purposes only Phone Auditing Tool Running on Java
J2ME MIDP 2.0 Implemented JSR-82 (Bluetooth API) Nokia 6600, Nokia 7610, Nokia 6670, ... Series 60 Siemens S65 SonyEricsson P900 ...
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Blooover- What does it do?
Blooover is performing the BlueBug attack
Reading phonebooks Writing phonebook entries Reading/decoding SMS stored on the device (buggy..) Setting Call forward (predef. Number) +49 1337 7001 Initiating phone call (predef. Number) 0800 2848283
Not working well on Nokia phones :( but on some T610
Please use this application responsibly!
For research purposes only! With permission of owner
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Blueprinting What is it?
Blueprinting is fingerprinting Bluetooth Wireless Technology interfaces of devices This work has been started by Collin R. Mulliner and Martin Herfurt Relevant to all kinds of applications
Security auditing Device Statistics Automated Application Distribution
Released paper and tool at 21C3 in December 2004 in Berlin (again, now!)
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Blueprinting - How
Hashing Information from Profile Entries
RecordHandle RFCOMM channel number Adding it all up (RecHandle1*Channel1)+ (RecHandle2*Channel2)+...+(RecHandlen*Channeln) First three bytes refer to manufacturer (IEEE OUI)
Bluetooth Device Address
Example of Blueprint 00:60:57@2621543
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
BlueSmack
Using L2CAP echo feature
Signal channel request/response L2CAP signal MTU is unknown No open L2CAP channel needed
Buffer overflow Denial of service attack
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
BlueSmack
< HCI Command: Create Connection (0x01|0x0005) plen 13 0000: b6 1e 33 6d 0e 00 18 cc 02 00 00 00 01 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 0000: 00 01 05 04 > HCI Event: Connect Complete (0x03) plen 11 0000: 00 29 00 b6 1d 32 6d 0e 00 01 00 ..2m......... .... .)...2m....
< ACL data: handle 0x0029 flags 0x02 dlen 28 L2CAP(s): Echo req: dlen 20 0000: 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 51 52 53 54 EFGHIJKLMNOPQRST 0010: 55 56 57 58 UVWX > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 0000: 01 29 00 01 00 .)... > ACL data: handle 0x0029 flags 0x02 dlen 28 L2CAP(s): Echo rsp: dlen 20 0000: 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 51 52 53 54 EFGHIJKLMNOPQRST 0010: 55 56 57 58 UVWX < HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3 0000: 29 00 13 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 0000: 00 01 06 04 > HCI Event: Disconn Complete (0x05) plen 4 0000: 00 29 00 16 ).. .... .)..
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Conclusions
Bluetooth is a secure standard (per se)
Problems at application level Pre-release testing at UPF (UnPlugFest)
Cooperation with Bluetooth SIG
Specifics under NDA Security Expert Group mailing list [Link] more open areas
Better communication channels for external testers
Mandatory security at application level
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
[Link]
[Link] Loose association of BT security experts Features
[Link] [Link] [Link] [Link]
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
[Link]
Adam Laurie (the Bunker Secure Hosting) Marcel Holtmann (BlueZ) Collin Mulliner ([Link]) Tim Hurman (Pentest) Mark Rowe (Pentest) Martin Herfurt ([Link]) Spot (Sony)
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
Questions / Feedback / Answers
Contact us via 21c3@[Link] (group alias for Adam, Marcel and Martin)
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3
