… elements

Dynamic bindings to `href` and `xlink:href` attributes on SVG `<a>` elements (`<svg:a>`) were previously unmapped in the DOM security schema. As a result, they bypassed sanitization completely, creating a potential XSS vulnerability if bound to untrusted user inputs (e.g., `javascript:` URLs).

This fix mitigates this risk by:

1. Registering `href` and `xlink:href` on `<svg:a>` elements under the `SecurityContext.URL` context in both the compiler and core DOM security schemas.

2. Enabling template compilation to output runtime URL sanitization checks (`ɵɵsanitizeUrl`) on these attributes.

3. Adding regression and verification test cases to ensure dynamic SVG link bindings are safely sanitized at runtime while static values are correctly allowed.

# Conflicts:
#	packages/core/src/sanitization/dom_security_schema.ts

…ntSchemaRegistry

Custom XML/XHTML namespaced elements (e.g., <xhtml:a>) fall back to the standard HTML namespace during element creation at compile-time/runtime. However, their property and security context lookups inside the schema registry were incorrectly performed using the full namespaced tag name (e.g., :xhtml:a), which bypassed the default a|href sanitization registry and incorrectly returned SecurityContext.NONE instead of SecurityContext.URL.

This commit introduces tag name normalization inside DomElementSchemaRegistry for custom namespaces (other than the built-in svg and math namespaces). Custom namespaced tag names are now normalized to their simple HTML element counterparts for all registry queries, ensuring that correct property schema validation and dynamic security sanitization rules (such as URL sanitization) are enforced at runtime.