El Discurso de las Grandes Causas

Mahā Nidāna Sutta (DN 15)

Introducción
Este es uno de los discursos más profundos del Canon Pali. Da un tratamiento extenso de las enseñanzas del
cosurgimiento dependiente (paṭicca samuppāda) y del no-yo (anattā) en un contexto esbozado de cómo funcionan estas
enseñanzas en la práctica.
La primera parte del discurso toma los factores de co-surgimiento dependiente en secuencia desde el efecto hasta la
causa, remontándolos a la dependencia mutua de nombre y forma (actividad física y mental) por un lado, y la
conciencia por el otro. . En relación con este punto, vale señalar que la palabra “grande” en el título del discurso puede
tener un doble sentido: modificando la palabra “discurso” —es un discurso largo— y modificando “causas”, refiriéndose
al hecho que el nombre y la forma y la conciencia como factores causales pueden dar cuenta de todo lo descriptible en el
cosmos.
Después de rastrear la secuencia básica de factores en el patrón causal, el discurso revisa sus interrelaciones,
mostrando cómo pueden explicar el estrés y el sufrimiento tanto a nivel individual como social.
La segunda parte del discurso, retomando la enseñanza del no-yo, muestra cómo el cosurgimiento dependiente
enfoca esta enseñanza en la práctica. Comienza con una sección sobre Delineaciones de un yo, clasificando las diversas
formas en que un sentido de "yo" puede definirse en términos de forma. El esquema de análisis presentado en esta
sección: clasificar las visiones del yo de acuerdo con las variables de forma y sin forma; finito e infinito; ya existente,
desarrollándose naturalmente en el futuro y modificable a través del esfuerzo humano— cubre todas las teorías del yo
propuestas en los Upaniṣads clásicos, así como todas las teorías del yo o del alma propuestas en tiempos más recientes. La
inclusión de un yo infinito en esta lista desmiente la creencia de que las enseñanzas de Buda sobre el no-yo no negaban
nada más que un sentido de yo “separado” o “limitado”.
La siguiente sección, sobre No delineaciones de un yo, muestra que es posible que la mente funcione sin leer un "yo"
en la experiencia. Las secciones restantes se centran en las formas en que esto se puede hacer al tratar el sentido del yo en
relación con diferentes aspectos del nombre y la forma. La primera de estas secciones, Supuestos de un yo, se enfoca en el
sentido del yo en relación con el sentimiento, uno de los factores del "nombre" en el nombre y la forma. La siguiente
sección, las Siete Estaciones de la Conciencia, se enfoca en la forma, la falta de forma y la percepción, que es otro de los
factores de "nombre" que permite un lugar para que la conciencia aterrice y crezca en el nivel "macro" en el ciclo de
muerte y muerte. renacimiento. La última sección, Ocho Emancipaciones, se enfoca en la forma, la falta de forma y la
percepción en el nivel "micro" en la práctica de la absorción meditativa (jhāna).
En cada uno de estos casos, una vez que se puede romper el sentido de apego e identificación con el nombre y la
forma, también se rompe la dependencia mutua entre la conciencia y el nombre y la forma. Esto produce una libertad
total de los límites de “la medida en que hay medios de designación, expresión y delineación… la medida en que se
extiende la dimensión del discernimiento, la medida en que el ciclo gira para la manifestación (discernibilidad) de este
mundo, es decir, nombre y forma junto con la conciencia”. Esta es la liberación a la que apuntan las enseñanzas de
Buda.

* * *
He oído que en una ocasión el Bendito estaba viviendo entre los Kurus. Ahora, los Kurus tienen un pueblo
llamado Kammāsadhamma. Allí Ven. Ānanda se acercó al Bendito y, al llegar, se inclinó ante él y se sentó a un
lado. Mientras estaba sentado allí, le dijo al Bendito: “Es asombroso, señor, es asombroso, cuán profundo es este
co-surgimiento dependiente, y cuán profundo es su aspecto, y sin embargo, para mí parece tan claro como
puede serlo”.
(El Buda:) “No digas eso, Ānanda. No digas eso. Profundo es este cosurgimiento dependiente, y profunda
su apariencia. Es por no entender y no penetrar este Dhamma que esta generación es como una madeja
enredada, un ovillo de hilo anudado, como juncos y juncos enmarañados, y no va más allá de la transmigración,
más allá de los planos de privación, dolor y malos destinos.
“Si se le pregunta a uno, '¿Existe una condición requerida demostrable para el envejecimiento y la muerte?'
uno debe responder: 'La hay'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿De qué condición requerida vienen el envejecimiento y la muerte?' uno debería
decir, 'El envejecimiento y la muerte vienen del nacimiento como su condición requerida'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿Existe una condición requerida demostrable para el nacimiento?' uno debe
responder: 'La hay'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿De qué condición requerida proviene el nacimiento?' uno debería decir, 'El
nacimiento viene del devenir como su condición requerida'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿Existe una condición requerida demostrable para llegar a ser?' uno debe
responder: 'La hay'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿De qué condición requerida viene el devenir?' uno debería decir, 'El devenir
viene del apego como su condición requerida'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿Existe una condición requerida demostrable para aferrarse?' uno debe responder:
'La hay'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿De qué condición requerida proviene el apego?' uno debería decir, 'El apego
proviene del anhelo como su condición requerida'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿Existe una condición requerida demostrable para el anhelo?' uno debe
responder: 'La hay'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿De qué condición requerida viene el anhelo?' uno debería decir, 'El anhelo
proviene del sentimiento como su condición requerida'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿Existe una condición requerida demostrable para sentir?' uno debe responder:
'La hay'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿De qué condición requerida viene el sentimiento?' uno debería decir, 'El
sentimiento viene del contacto como su condición requerida'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿Existe una condición requerida demostrable para el contacto?' uno debe
responder: 'La hay'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿De qué condición requerida viene el contacto?' uno debería decir: 'El contacto
proviene del nombre y la forma como su condición requerida'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿Existe una condición requerida demostrable para el nombre y la forma?' uno
debe responder: 'La hay'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿De qué condición requerida viene el nombre y la forma?' uno debería decir:
'Nombre y forma provienen de la conciencia como su condición requerida'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿Existe una condición requerida demostrable para la conciencia?' uno debe
responder: 'La hay'.
“Si a uno se le pregunta, '¿De qué condición requerida proviene la conciencia?' uno debería decir: 'La
conciencia proviene del nombre y la forma como su condición requerida'.
“Así, Ānanda, del nombre y la forma como condición requerida surge la conciencia. De la conciencia como
condición requerida viene el nombre y la forma. Del nombre y forma como condición requerida viene el
contacto. Del contacto como condición necesaria surge el sentimiento. Del sentimiento como condición
necesaria surge el deseo. Del deseo como condición necesaria surge el apego. Del apego como condición
necesaria surge el devenir. Del devenir como condición necesaria viene el nacimiento. Desde el nacimiento
como condición requerida, entran en juego el envejecimiento y la muerte, la tristeza, el lamento, el dolor, la
angustia y la desesperación. Tal es el origen de toda esta masa de estrés.

Envejecimiento y muerte
“'Desde el nacimiento como condición requerida viene el envejecimiento y la muerte'. Así se ha dicho. Y
esta es la manera de entender cómo del nacimiento como condición necesaria viene el envejecimiento y la
muerte. Si no hubiera nacimiento en absoluto, de ninguna manera, de nada en ninguna parte, es decir, de devas
en estado de devas, de celestiales en estado de celestiales, de espíritus en estado de espíritus, de demonios en
estado de demonios, de seres humanos en el estado humano, de cuadrúpedos en el estado de cuadrúpedos, de
pájaros en el estado de pájaros, de serpientes en el estado de serpientes, o de cualquier ser en su propio estado,
en la ausencia total de nacimiento, desde el cese del nacimiento, ¿se discerniría el envejecimiento y la muerte?
“No, señor.”
“Así, esta es una causa, esta es una razón, este es un origen, esta es una condición necesaria para el
envejecimiento y la muerte, es decir, el nacimiento.

Nacimiento
“'Del devenir como condición necesaria viene el nacimiento'. Así se ha dicho. Y esta es la manera de
entender cómo del devenir como condición necesaria surge el nacimiento. Si no hubiera devenir en absoluto,
de ninguna manera, de nada en ninguna parte, es decir, devenir sensual, devenir de forma o devenir sin forma,
en la total ausencia de devenir, desde la cesación del devenir, ¿se discerniría el nacimiento?
“No, señor.”
“Así, esta es una causa, esta es una razón, este es un origen, esta es una condición necesaria para el
nacimiento, es decir, el devenir.

Convirtiéndose
“‘From clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming.’ Thus it has been said. And this is the way to
understand how from clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming. If there were no clinging at all, in any
way, of anything anywhere—i.e., clinging to sensuality, clinging to precepts and practices, clinging to views, or
clinging to doctrines of the self—in the utter absence of clinging, from the cessation of clinging, would
becoming be discerned?”
“No, lord.”
“Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for becoming, i.e.,
clinging.

Clinging

“‘From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging.’ Thus it has been said. And this is the way to
understand how from craving as a requisite condition comes clinging. If there were no craving at all, in any
way, of anything anywhere—i.e., craving for forms, craving for sounds, craving for aromas, craving for flavors,
craving for tactile sensations, craving for ideas—in the utter absence of craving, from the cessation of craving,
would clinging be discerned?”
“No, lord.”
“Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for clinging, i.e.,
craving.

Craving

“‘From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving.’ Thus it has been said. And this is the way to
understand how from feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. If there were no feeling at all, in any way,
of anything anywhere—i.e., feeling born of contact at the eye, feeling born of contact at the ear, feeling born of
contact at the nose, feeling born of contact at the tongue, feeling born of contact at the body, or feeling born of
contact at the intellect—in the utter absence of feeling, from the cessation of feeling, would craving be
discerned?”
“No, lord.”
“Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for craving, i.e.,
feeling.
 Dependent on Craving

“Now, craving is dependent on feeling,

seeking is dependent on craving,
acquisition is dependent on seeking,
ascertainment is dependent on acquisition,
desire and passion is dependent on ascertainment,
attachment is dependent on desire and passion,
possessiveness is dependent on attachment,
stinginess is dependent on possessiveness,
defensiveness is dependent on stinginess,
and because of defensiveness, dependent on defensiveness, various evil, unskillful phenomena come into
play: the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies.
“And this is the way to understand how it is that because of defensiveness various evil, unskillful
phenomena come into play: the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations,
divisive speech, and lies. If there were no defensiveness at all, in any way, of anything anywhere, in the utter
absence of defensiveness, from the cessation of defensiveness, would various evil, unskillful phenomena—the
taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies—come
into play?”
“No, lord.”
“Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for the coming-into-
play of various evil, unskillful phenomena—the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes;
accusations, divisive speech, and lies—i.e., defensiveness.
“‘Defensiveness is dependent on stinginess.’ Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how
defensiveness is dependent on stinginess. If there were no stinginess at all, in any way, of anything anywhere, in
the utter absence of stinginess, from the cessation of stinginess, would defensiveness be discerned?”
“No, lord.”
“Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for defensiveness,
i.e., stinginess.
(Similarly back through the chain of conditions: stinginess, attachment, possessiveness, desire and passion,
ascertainment, acquisition, and seeking.)
“‘Seeking is dependent on craving.’ Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how seeking is
dependent on craving. If there were no craving at all, in any way, of anything anywhere—i.e., craving for
sensuality, craving for becoming, craving for no becoming—in the utter absence of craving, from the cessation
of craving, would seeking be discerned?”
“No, lord.”
“Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for seeking, i.e.,
craving. Thus, Ānanda, these two phenomena (the chain of conditions leading from craving to birth, aging, and
death, and the chain of conditions leading from craving to quarrels, etc.), as a duality, flow back into one place
at feeling.

Feeling

“‘From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling.’ Thus it has been said. And this is the way to
understand how from contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. If there were no contact at all, in any way,
of anything anywhere—i.e., contact at the eye, contact at the ear, contact at the nose, contact at the tongue,
contact at the body, or contact at the intellect—in the utter absence of contact, from the cessation of contact,
would feeling be discerned?”
“No, lord.”
 “Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for feeling, i.e.,
contact.

Contact

“‘From name-&-form as a requisite condition comes contact.’ Thus it has been said. And this is the way to
understand how, from name-&-form as a requisite condition comes contact. If the qualities, traits, themes, &
indicators by which there is a description of name-group (mental activity) were all absent, would designation-
contact with regard to the form-group (the physical body) be discerned?”
“No, lord.”
“If the permutations, signs, themes, & indicators by which there is a description of form-group were all
absent, would resistance-contact with regard to the name-group be discerned?”
“No, lord.”
“If the permutations, signs, themes, & indicators by which there is a description of name-group and form-
group were all absent, would designation-contact or resistance-contact be discerned?”
“No, lord.”
“Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for contact, i.e.,
name-&-form.

Name-&-Form
“‘From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-&-form.’ Thus it has been said. And this is the
way to understand how from consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-&-form. If consciousness were
not to descend into the mother’s womb, would name-&-form take shape in the womb?”
“No, lord.”
“If, after descending into the womb, consciousness were to depart, would name-&-form be produced for
this world?”
“No, lord.”
“If the consciousness of the young boy or girl were to be cut off, would name-&-form ripen, grow, and
reach maturity?”
“No, lord.”
“Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for name-&-form,
i.e., consciousness.

Consciousness

“From name-&-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness.’ Thus it has been said. And this is the
way to understand how from name-&-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness. If consciousness were
not to gain a foothold in name-&-form, would a coming-into-play of the origination of birth, aging, death, and
stress in the future be discerned?”
“No, lord.”
“Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for consciousness,
i.e., name-&-form.
“This is the extent to which there is birth, aging, death, passing away, and re-arising. This is the extent to
which there are means of designation, expression, and delineation. This is the extent to which the dimension of
discernment extends, the extent to which the cycle revolves for the manifesting [discernibility] of this world—
i.e., name-&-form together with consciousness.

Delineations of a Self

“To what extent, Ānanda, does one delineate when delineating a self? Either delineating a self possessed of
form & finite, one delineates that ‘My self is possessed of form & finite.’ Or, delineating a self possessed of form
& infinite, one delineates that ‘My self is possessed of form & infinite.’ Or, delineating a self formless & finite,
one delineates that ‘My self is formless & finite.’ Or, delineating a self formless & infinite, one delineates that
‘My self is formless & infinite.’
“Now, the one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as possessed of form & finite, either delineates it
as possessed of form & finite in the present, or of such a nature that it will (naturally) become possessed of
form & finite [in the future/after death/when falling asleep], or the thought occurs to him that ‘Although it is
not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.’ This being the case, it is proper to say that speculation
about a self possessed of form & finite obsesses him.
“The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as possessed of form & infinite, either delineates it as
possessed of form & infinite in the present, or of such a nature that it will (naturally) become possessed of
form & infinite, or the thought occurs to him that ‘Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being
that way.’ This being the case, it is proper to say that speculation about a self possessed of form & infinite
obsesses him.
“The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless & finite, either delineates it as formless &
finite in the present, or of such a nature that it will (naturally) become formless & finite, or the thought occurs
to him that ‘Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.’ This being the case, it is proper
to say that speculation about a self formless & finite obsesses him.
“The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless & infinite, either delineates it as formless
& infinite in the present, or of such a nature that it will (naturally) become formless & infinite [in the
future/after death], or the thought occurs to him that ‘Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into
being that way.’ This being the case, it is proper to say that speculation about a self formless & infinite obsesses
him. 1

Non-Delineations of a Self

“To what extent, Ānanda, does one not delineate when not delineating a self? Either not delineating a self
possessed of form and finite, one does not delineate that ‘My self is possessed of form and finite.’ Or, not
delineating a self possessed of form and infinite, one does not delineate that ‘My self is possessed of form and
infinite.’ Or, not delineating a self formless and finite, one does not delineate that ‘My self is formless and finite.’
Or, not delineating a self formless and infinite, one does not delineate that ‘My self is formless and infinite.’
“Now, the one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as possessed of form and finite, does
not delineate it as possessed of form and finite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it
will (naturally) become possessed of form and finite [in the future/after death], nor does the thought occur to
him that ‘Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.’ This being the case, it is proper to
say that speculation about a self possessed of form and finite does not obsess him.
“The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as possessed of form and infinite, does not
delineate it as possessed of form and infinite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it
will (naturally) become possessed of form and infinite [in the future/after death], nor does the thought occur
to him that ‘Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.’ This being the case, it is proper
to say that speculation about a self possessed of form and infinite does not obsess him.
“The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and finite, does not delineate it
as formless and finite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will (naturally) become
formless and finite [in the future/after death], nor does the thought occur to him that ‘Although it is not yet
that way, I will convert it into being that way.’ This being the case, it is proper to say that speculation about a
self formless and finite does not obsess him.
“The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and infinite, does not delineate
it as formless and infinite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will (naturally)
become formless and infinite [in the future/after death], nor does the thought occur to him that ‘Although it is
not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.’ This being the case, it is proper to say that speculation
about a self formless and infinite does not obsess him.

Assumptions of a Self

Ā
 “To what extent, Ānanda, does one assume when assuming a self? Assuming feeling to be the self, one
assumes that ‘Feeling is my self’ (or) ‘Feeling is not my self: My self is oblivious (to feeling)’ (or) ‘Neither is
feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious to feeling, but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.’
“Now, one who says, ‘Feeling is my self,’ should be addressed as follows: ‘There are these three feelings, my
friend—feelings of pleasure, feelings of pain, and feelings of neither pleasure nor pain. Which of these three
feelings do you assume to be the self? At a moment when a feeling of pleasure is sensed, no feeling of pain or
of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling of pleasure is sensed at that moment. At a moment when
a feeling of pain is sensed, no feeling of pleasure or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling of
pain is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed, no feeling of
pleasure or of pain is sensed. Only a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed at that moment.
“Now, a feeling of pleasure is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away,
dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of pain is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject
to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is inconstant,
fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. Having sensed a
feeling of pleasure as ‘my self,’ then with the cessation of one’s very own feeling of pleasure, ‘my self’ has
perished. Having sensed a feeling of pain as ‘my self,’ then with the cessation of one’s very own feeling of pain,
‘my self’ has perished. Having sensed a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain as ‘my self,’ then with the cessation
of one’s very own feeling of neither pleasure nor pain, ‘my self’ has perished.
“Thus he assumes, assuming in the immediate present a self inconstant, entangled in pleasure and pain,
subject to arising and passing away, he who says, ‘Feeling is my self.’ Thus in this manner, Ānanda, one does not
see fit to assume feeling to be the self.
“As for the person who says, ‘Feeling is not the self: My self is oblivious (to feeling),’ he should be addressed
as follows: ‘My friend, where nothing whatsoever is sensed [experienced] at all, would there be the thought, “I
am”?’”
“No, lord.”
“Thus in this manner, Ānanda, one does not see fit to assume that ‘Feeling is not my self: My self is
oblivious (to feeling).’
“As for the person who says, ‘Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious (to feeling), but rather my
self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,’ he should be addressed as follows: ‘My friend, should feelings
altogether and every way stop without remainder, then with feeling completely not existing, owing to the
cessation of feeling, would there be the thought, “I am”?’”
“No, lord.”
“Thus in this manner, Ānanda, one does not see fit to assume that ‘Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self
oblivious (to feeling), but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.’
“Now, Ānanda, in as far as a monk doesn’t assume feeling to be the self, nor the self as oblivious, nor that
‘My self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,’ then, not assuming in this way, he is not sustained by [does
not cling to] anything in the world. Unsustained, he is not agitated. Unagitated, he is totally unbound right
within. He discerns that ‘Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this
world.’

The Monk Released

“If anyone were to say with regard to a monk whose mind is thus released that ‘The Tathāgata exists after
death,’ is his view, that would be mistaken; that ‘The Tathāgata does not exist after death’ … that ‘The Tathāgata
both exists and does not exist after death’ … that ‘The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death’ is
his view, that would be mistaken. Why? Having directly known the extent of designation and the extent of the
objects of designation, the extent of expression and the extent of the objects of expression, the extent of
description and the extent of the objects of description, the extent of discernment and the extent of the objects
of discernment, the extent to which the cycle revolves: Having directly known that, the monk is released. 2 The
view that, ‘Having directly known that, the monk released does not see, does not know’: That would be
mistaken. 3

Seven Stations of Consciousness

Ā
 “Ānanda, there are these seven stations of consciousness and two dimensions. Which seven?
“There are beings with multiplicity of body and multiplicity of perception, 4 such as human beings, some
devas, and some beings in the lower realms. This is the first station of consciousness.
“There are beings with multiplicity of body and singularity of perception, such as the Devas of Brahmā’s
Retinue generated by the first (jhāna) and (some) beings in the four realms of deprivation. 5 This is the second
station of consciousness.
“There are beings with singularity of body and multiplicity of perception, such as the Radiant Devas. This
is the third station of consciousness.
“There are beings with singularity of body and singularity of perception, such as the Beautiful Black Devas.
This is the fourth station of consciousness.
“There are beings who, with the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, with the
disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite
space,’ arrive at the dimension of the infinitude of space. This is the fifth station of consciousness.
“There are beings who, with the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space,
(perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ arrive at the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness. This is the sixth
station of consciousness.
“There are beings who, with the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of
consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ arrive at the dimension of nothingness. This is the seventh
station of consciousness.
“The dimension of non-percipient beings and, second, the dimension of neither perception nor non-
perception. [These are the two dimensions.]
“Now, as for the first station of consciousness—beings with multiplicity of body and multiplicity of
perception, such as human beings, some devas, and some beings in the lower realms: If one discerns that
(station of consciousness), discerns its origination, discerns its passing away, discerns its allure, discerns its
drawbacks, discerns the escape from it, would it be proper, by means of that [discernment] to take delight
there?”
“No, lord.”
[Similarly with each of the remaining stations of consciousness and two dimensions.]
“Ānanda, when knowing—as they have come to be—the origination, passing away, allure, drawbacks of—
and escape from—these seven stations of consciousness and two dimensions, a monk is released through lack
of clinging, he is said to be a monk released through discernment.

Eight Emancipations

“Ānanda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight?

“Possessed of form, one sees forms. This is the first emancipation.
“Not percipient of form internally, one sees forms externally. This is the second emancipation.
“One is intent only on the beautiful. This is the third emancipation.
“With the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, with the disappearance of perceptions
of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space,’ one enters and remains
in the dimension of the infinitude of space. This is the fourth emancipation.
“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite
consciousness,’ one enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness. This is the fifth
emancipation.
“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There
is nothing,’ one enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness. This is the sixth emancipation.
“With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the
dimension of neither perception nor non-perception. This is the seventh emancipation.
 “With the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, one enters
and remains in the cessation of perception and feeling. This is the eighth emancipation.
“Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward order, in reverse order, in forward and
reverse order, when he attains them and emerges from them wherever he wants, however he wants, and for as
long as he wants, when through the ending of effluents he enters and remains in the effluent-free release of
awareness and release of discernment, having directly known it and realized it for himself in the here and now,
he is said to be a monk released in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher or more sublime
than this, there is none.”
That is what the Blessed One said. Gratified, Ven. Ānanda delighted in the Blessed One’s words.

Not es
1. Some scholars, in an attempt to place the Buddha’s teachings in an historical context, have maintained that his
not-self teaching was meant to apply specifically to the Upaniṣadic self-doctrine. In other words, the Buddha’s intention
was to deny the truth of the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the universal self; he was not denying other, more common-sense
doctrines of the self. This understanding of the non-self teaching has partial support in MN 22 —which subjects the idea
of a universal self to specific ridicule.
Other scholars take an opposite tack, saying that the Buddha was refuting the existence of a perduring individual
self, but not the existence of a universal or inter-connected self.
Neither position does justice to the wide variety of self doctrines that the Buddha rejects in this passage—whether
finite or infinite (or endless—ananta); whether possessed of form or formless—for the act of holding to any of these
doctrines involves clinging, and thus suffering and stress.
The first position, in particular, also fails to take into account two aspects of the Buddha’s actual historical context:
a) The Upaniṣadic tradition was not the only tradition at the Buddha’s time espousing doctrines of the self. DN 2
cites—and refutes—the self-doctrines of other, non-Vedic schools of the time.
b) No single self-doctrine can claim to be “the” Upaniṣadic doctrine of the self. The Upaniṣads were a diverse body
of texts, offering a wide variety of teachings on the topic. Some, such as the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad and Kaṭha
Upaniṣad, state explicitly that each person has two selves, finite and infinite; and the major Upaniṣads differ on the
nature of these two selves and how the infinite self can be attained.
In fact, it is instructive to classify the various Upaniṣadic self-doctrines in light of the twelve categories listed in this
passage. A survey of the major Upaniṣads reveals self-doctrines falling into eight—and perhaps nine—of these categories,
as follows: (Passage numbers are taken from S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads. London: George Allen & Unwin,
1969.)

1) Already possessed of form and finite:

Bṛhad-āraṇyaka II.5.1
Maitrī VI.11
2) Naturally becoming possessed of form and finite:
Bṛhad-āraṇyaka IV.3.19-21
3) Can be made possessed of form and finite:
—
4) Already possessed of form and infinite:
Bṛhad-āraṇyaka I.4.7-10
Bṛhad-āraṇyaka I.5.20
Chāndogya III.14.2-3
Muṇḍaka III.1.7
5) Naturally becoming possessed of form and infinite:
Chāndogya VIII.3.4
Chāndogya VIII.12.2-3
6) Can be made possessed of form and infinite:
Praśna IV.6-11
Subāla III
Kaivalya VI
7) Already formless and finite:
Kaṭha I.3.1-4 (?—the description here suggests, but does not explicitly state, that the self is formless)
8) Naturally becoming formless and finite:
 —
9) Can be made formless and finite:
—
10) Already formless and infinite:
Bṛhad-āraṇyaka III.8.8-11
11) Naturally becoming formless and infinite:
Praśna IV.6-11
12) Can be made formless and infinite:
Kaṭha I.3.13-15
Subāla III
Subāla IX.15
Paiṅgala III.6

There is no way of knowing if these Upaniṣads, as we have them, were composed before or after the Buddha’s time.
Thus, the classifications here may or may not have been formulated in response to them. Nevertheless, the sheer variety
of their teachings shows that there was no single Upaniṣadic doctrine of the self, and that the Buddha did not formulate
his not-self teaching in response to only one doctrine. As the framework here shows, the not-self teaching was
formulated in such a way as to counteract the act of clinging to any self-doctrine, regardless of how the self might be
defined.
2. The relationship between the limitations of language and the question of the existence of the Tathāgata after
death is indicated by SN 23:2 . There the Buddha notes that one defines oneself as a being through passion and delight
for any of the five aggregates. Once there is no passion or delight for the aggregates, one can no longer be defined as a
being. Once one is no longer defined, there is no way of describing one as existing, not existing, neither, or both—
regardless of whether one is alive or dead (see SN 22:85–86 ).
3. The various readings for this sentence all seem corrupt. The sense of the paragraph, read in light of AN 10:96 ,
demands that the view expressed in the last sentence be about the monk released, unlike the four earlier views, which are
wrongly attributed to the monk released. In other words, the monk released has no opinion on the question of whether
the Tathāgata does, doesn’t, etc., exist after death. This might lead to the supposition that his lack of opinion comes from
a lack of knowledge or vision. The description of what he comes to know in the course of gaining release shows that this
supposition is inappropriate. He does know, he does see, and what he knows and sees about the limitations of language
and concepts shows him that the question of the existence of the Tathāgata after death should be set aside.
Thus I would reconstruct the Pali of the final sentence in this paragraph as: Tadabhiññā vimutto bhikkhu na jānāti nā
passati iti sā diṭṭhi tadakallaṁ.
4. MN 137 indicates that perceptions of multiplicity deal with the six senses, whereas perceptions of singularity
form the basis of the four formless attainments.
5. This last phrase—“and (some) beings in the four realms of deprivation” is in the Thai edition of the Canon, but
not in the PTS or Burmese editions. It seems required by the context in order to cover the beings in the lower realms not
included in the first station of consciousness.

Véase también: MN 109 ; MN 148 ; SN 12:2 ; SN 12:15 ; SN 12:20 ; SN 12:65 ; SN 12:67 ; SN 12:70 ; SN 22:1 ; SN
22:85–86 ; AN 2:30 ; AN 4:199 ; AN 7:11–12 ; AN 9:43–45 ; AN 10:96 ; Sn 3,12 ; Sn 4:11