|
Weakness ID: 300
Vulnerability Mapping:
DISCOURAGED
This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. |
| Adversary-in-the-Middle / AITM | |
| Attacker-in-the-Middle / AITM | |
| Man-in-the-Middle / MITM | |
| Person-in-the-Middle / PITM | |
| Monkey-in-the-Middle | |
| Monster-in-the-Middle | |
| Manipulator-in-the-Middle | |
| On-path attack | |
| Interception attack |
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Read Application Data; Modify Application Data; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Access Control
An attacker could pose as one of the entities and read or possibly modify the communication.
|
| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
|
Implementation |
Always fully authenticate both ends of any communications channel.
|
|
Architecture and Design |
Adhere to the principle of complete mediation.
|
|
Implementation |
A certificate binds an identity to a cryptographic key to authenticate a communicating party. Often, the certificate takes the encrypted form of the hash of the identity of the subject, the public key, and information such as time of issue or expiration using the issuer's private key. The certificate can be validated by deciphering the certificate with the issuer's public key. See also X.509 certificate signature chains and the PGP certification structure.
|
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf |
|
923 | Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints |
| PeerOf |
|
602 | Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security |
| PeerOf |
|
603 | Use of Client-Side Authentication |
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf |
|
1011 | Authorize Actors |
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic. |
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
| Languages |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence) |
Example 1
In the Java snippet below, data is sent over an unencrypted channel to a remote server.
By eavesdropping on the communication channel or posing as the endpoint, an attacker would be able to read all of the transmitted data.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
Chain: incorrect "goto" in Apple SSL product bypasses certificate validation, allowing Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack (Apple "goto fail" bug). CWE-705 (Incorrect Control Flow Scoping) -> CWE-561 (Dead Code) -> CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) -> CWE-393 (Return of Wrong Status Code) -> CWE-300 (Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint). The code's whitespace indentation did not reflect the actual control flow (CWE-1114) and did not explicitly delimit the block (CWE-483), which could have made it more difficult for human code auditors to detect the vulnerability.
|
| Ordinality | Description |
|---|---|
|
Primary
|
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
|
Resultant
|
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
|
| Method | Details | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Automated Dynamic Analysis |
Some tools can act as proxy servers that allow the tester to intercept packets or messages, inspect them, and modify them before sending them to the destination in order to see if the modified packets are still accepted by the receiving component.
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Automated Dynamic Analysis |
Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) tools can be used to detect network traffic without encryption and/or verification. The affected protocol may be subject to Adversary-in-the-Middle attacks. Some tools act as proxy servers that allow the tester to inspect and modify packets/messages to see if they are still accepted by the receiving component.
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Automated Static Analysis |
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.) The analysis could identify use of protocols that are subject to Adversary-in-the-Middle attacks.
Effectiveness: Moderate Note:Encryption and other protection mechanisms may be provided in the environment (e.g., by a load balancer or firewall that is positioned in front of a server), but this cannot be detected by SAST tools. This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Maintenance
The summary identifies multiple distinct possibilities, suggesting that this is a category that must be broken into more specific weaknesses.
More information is available — Please edit the custom filter or select a different filter. |
|
Use of the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE™) and the associated references from this website are subject to the Terms of Use. CWE is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and managed by the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI) which is operated by The MITRE Corporation (MITRE). Copyright © 2006–2026, The MITRE Corporation. CWE, CWSS, CWRAF, and the CWE logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. |
||
