| Home > CWE List > CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') (4.20) |
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Weakness ID: 77
Vulnerability Mapping:
ALLOWED
This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review
(with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. |
Many protocols and products have their own custom command language. While OS or shell command strings are frequently discovered and targeted, developers may not realize that these other command languages might also be vulnerable to attacks.
| Command injection |
an attack-oriented phrase for this weakness. Note: often used when "OS command injection" (CWE-78) was intended.
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This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
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Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands |
Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability
If a malicious user injects a character (such as a semi-colon) that delimits the end of one command and the beginning of another, it may be possible to then insert an entirely new and unrelated command that was not intended to be executed. This gives an attacker a privilege or capability that they would not otherwise have.
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| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
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Architecture and Design |
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
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Implementation |
If possible, ensure that all external commands called from the program are statically created.
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Implementation |
Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. |
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Operation |
Run time: Run time policy enforcement may be used in an allowlist fashion to prevent use of any non-sanctioned commands.
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System Configuration |
Assign permissions that prevent the user from accessing/opening privileged files.
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This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf |
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74 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') |
| ParentOf |
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78 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') |
| ParentOf |
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88 | Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') |
| ParentOf |
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624 | Executable Regular Expression Error |
| ParentOf |
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917 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement ('Expression Language Injection') |
| ParentOf |
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1427 | Improper Neutralization of Input Used for LLM Prompting |
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf |
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74 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') |
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf |
|
1019 | Validate Inputs |
Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ParentOf |
|
78 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') |
| ParentOf |
|
88 | Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') |
| ParentOf |
|
624 | Executable Regular Expression Error |
| ParentOf |
|
917 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement ('Expression Language Injection') |
Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ParentOf |
|
78 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') |
| ParentOf |
|
88 | Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') |
| ParentOf |
|
624 | Executable Regular Expression Error |
| ParentOf |
|
917 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement ('Expression Language Injection') |
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation | Command injection vulnerabilities typically occur when:
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| Implementation | REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic. |
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
| Languages |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence) |
| Technologies |
AI/ML (Undetermined Prevalence) |
Example 1
Consider a "CWE Differentiator" application that uses an an LLM generative AI based "chatbot" to explain the difference between two weaknesses. As input, it accepts two CWE IDs, constructs a prompt string, sends the prompt to the chatbot, and prints the results. The prompt string effectively acts as a command to the chatbot component. Assume that invokeChatbot() calls the chatbot and returns the response as a string; the implementation details are not important here.
To avoid XSS risks, the code ensures that the response from the chatbot is properly encoded for HTML output. If the user provides CWE-77 and CWE-78, then the resulting prompt would look like:
However, the attacker could provide malformed CWE IDs containing malicious prompts such as:
This would produce a prompt like:
Instead of providing well-formed CWE IDs, the adversary has performed a "prompt injection" attack by adding an additional prompt that was not intended by the developer. The result from the maliciously modified prompt might be something like this:
While the attack in this example is not serious, it shows the risk of unexpected results. Prompts can be constructed to steal private information, invoke unexpected agents, etc.
In this case, it might be easiest to fix the code by validating the input CWE IDs:
Example 2
Consider the following program. It intends to perform an "ls -l" on an input filename. The validate_name() subroutine performs validation on the input to make sure that only alphanumeric and "-" characters are allowed, which avoids path traversal (CWE-22) and OS command injection (CWE-78) weaknesses. Only filenames like "abc" or "d-e-f" are intended to be allowed.
However, validate_name() allows filenames that begin with a "-". An adversary could supply a filename like "-aR", producing the "ls -l -aR" command (CWE-88), thereby getting a full recursive listing of the entire directory and all of its sub-directories.
There are a couple possible mitigations for this weakness. One would be to refactor the code to avoid using system() altogether, instead relying on internal functions.
Another option could be to add a "--" argument to the ls command, such as "ls -l --", so that any remaining arguments are treated as filenames, causing any leading "-" to be treated as part of a filename instead of another option.
Another fix might be to change the regular expression used in validate_name to force the first character of the filename to be a letter or number, such as:
Example 3
The following simple program accepts a filename as a command line argument and displays the contents of the file back to the user. The program is installed setuid root because it is intended for use as a learning tool to allow system administrators in-training to inspect privileged system files without giving them the ability to modify them or damage the system.
Because the program runs with root privileges, the call to system() also executes with root privileges. If a user specifies a standard filename, the call works as expected. However, if an attacker passes a string of the form ";rm -rf /", then the call to system() fails to execute cat due to a lack of arguments and then plows on to recursively delete the contents of the root partition, leading to OS command injection (CWE-78).
Note that if argv[1] is a very long argument, then this issue might also be subject to a buffer overflow (CWE-120).
Example 4
The following code is from an administrative web application designed to allow users to kick off a backup of an Oracle database using a batch-file wrapper around the rman utility and then run a cleanup.bat script to delete some temporary files. The script rmanDB.bat accepts a single command line parameter, which specifies what type of backup to perform. Because access to the database is restricted, the application runs the backup as a privileged user.
The problem here is that the program does not do any validation on the backuptype parameter read from the user. Typically the Runtime.exec() function will not execute multiple commands, but in this case the program first runs the cmd.exe shell in order to run multiple commands with a single call to Runtime.exec(). Once the shell is invoked, it will happily execute multiple commands separated by two ampersands. If an attacker passes a string of the form "& del c:\\dbms\\*.*", then the application will execute this command along with the others specified by the program. Because of the nature of the application, it runs with the privileges necessary to interact with the database, which means whatever command the attacker injects will run with those privileges as well.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
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injection of sed script syntax ("sed injection")
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API service using a large generative AI model allows direct prompt injection to leak hard-coded system prompts or execute other prompts.
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anti-spam product allows injection of SNMP commands into confiuration file
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image program allows injection of commands in "Magick Vector Graphics (MVG)" language.
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Python-based dependency management tool avoids OS command injection when generating Git commands but allows injection of optional arguments with input beginning with a dash (CWE-88), potentially allowing for code execution.
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Canonical example of OS command injection. CGI program does not neutralize "|" metacharacter when invoking a phonebook program.
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injection of sed script syntax ("sed injection")
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injection of sed script syntax ("sed injection")
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| Ordinality | Description |
|---|---|
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Primary
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(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
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| Method | Details |
|---|---|
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Automated Static Analysis |
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Effectiveness: High |
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf | 713 | OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A2 - Injection Flaws | |
| MemberOf | 722 | OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input | |
| MemberOf | 727 | OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A6 - Injection Flaws | |
| MemberOf | 929 | OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A1 - Injection | |
| MemberOf | 990 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command | |
| MemberOf | 1005 | 7PK - Input Validation and Representation | |
| MemberOf | 1027 | OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A1 - Injection | |
| MemberOf | 1179 | SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard - Guidelines 01. Input Validation and Data Sanitization (IDS) | |
| MemberOf | 1308 | CISQ Quality Measures - Security | |
| MemberOf | 1337 | Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses | |
| MemberOf | 1340 | CISQ Data Protection Measures | |
| MemberOf | 1347 | OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection | |
| MemberOf | 1387 | Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses | |
| MemberOf | 1409 | Comprehensive Categorization: Injection | |
| MemberOf | 1425 | Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses | |
| MemberOf | 1430 | Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses | |
| MemberOf | 1435 | Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses | |
| MemberOf | 1440 | OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A05:2025 - Injection | |
| MemberOf | 1447 | General Software Weaknesses that Appear in Products that Use or Support AI/ML Technology |
| Usage |
ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW
(this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)
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| Reason | Frequent Misuse | ||||
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Rationale |
CWE-77 is often misused when OS command injection (CWE-78) was intended instead [REF-1287]. | ||||
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Comments |
Ensure that the analysis focuses on the root-cause error that allows the execution of commands, as there are many weaknesses that can lead to this consequence. See Terminology Notes. If the weakness involves a command language besides OS shell invocation, then CWE-77 could be used. | ||||
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Suggestions |
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Terminology
The "command injection" phrase carries different meanings, either as an attack or as a technical impact. The most common usage of "command injection" refers to the more-accurate OS command injection (CWE-78), but there are many command languages.
In vulnerability-focused analysis, the phrase may refer to any situation in which the adversary can execute commands of their own choosing, i.e., the focus is on the risk and/or technical impact of exploitation. Many proof-of-concept exploits focus on the ability to execute commands and may emphasize "command injection." However, there are dozens of weaknesses that can allow execution of commands. That is, the ability to execute commands could be resultant from another weakness.
To some, "command injection" can include cases in which the functionality intentionally allows the user to specify an entire command, which is then executed. In this case, the root cause weakness might be related to missing or incorrect authorization, since an adversary should not be able to specify arbitrary commands, but some users or admins are allowed.
CWE-77 and its descendants are specifically focused on behaviors in which the product is intentionally building a command to execute, and the adversary can inject separators into the command or otherwise change the command being executed.
Other
Command injection is a common problem with wrapper programs.
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7 Pernicious Kingdoms | Command Injection | ||
| CLASP | Command injection | ||
| OWASP Top Ten 2007 | A2 | CWE More Specific | Injection Flaws |
| OWASP Top Ten 2004 | A1 | CWE More Specific | Unvalidated Input |
| OWASP Top Ten 2004 | A6 | CWE More Specific | Injection Flaws |
| Software Fault Patterns | SFP24 | Tainted input to command | |
| SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard | IDS34-PL | CWE More Specific | Do not pass untrusted, unsanitized data to a command interpreter |
| CAPEC-ID | Attack Pattern Name |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-136 | LDAP Injection |
| CAPEC-15 | Command Delimiters |
| CAPEC-183 | IMAP/SMTP Command Injection |
| CAPEC-248 | Command Injection |
| CAPEC-40 | Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
| CAPEC-75 | Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files |
| CAPEC-76 | Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls |
| [REF-6] |
Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>. |
| [REF-140] |
Greg Hoglund and Gary McGraw. "Exploiting Software: How to Break Code". Addison-Wesley. 2004-02-27.
<https://www.amazon.com/Exploiting-Software-How-Break-Code/dp/0201786958>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07) |
| [REF-44] | Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 10: Command Injection." Page 171. McGraw-Hill. 2010. |
| [REF-1287] |
MITRE. "Supplemental Details - 2022 CWE Top 25". Details of Problematic Mappings. 2022-06-28.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2022/2022_cwe_top25_supplemental.html#problematicMappingDetails>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17) |
Submissions |
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| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization | |
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2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) |
7 Pernicious Kingdoms | ||
Contributions |
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| Contribution Date | Contributor | Organization | |
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2024-07-01
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) |
Eldar Marcussen | ||
| Suggested that CWE-77 should include more examples than CWE-78. | |||
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2024-02-29
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) |
Abhi Balakrishnan | ||
| Provided diagram to improve CWE usability | |||
| 2022-05-20 | Anonymous External Contributor | ||
| reported typo in Terminology note | |||
Modifications |
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| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization | |
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2026-04-30
(CWE 4.20, 2026-04-30) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
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2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
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2024-11-19
(CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships | |||
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2024-07-16
(CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Diagram, Mapping_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Terminology_Notes | |||
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2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships | |||
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2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction | |||
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2023-01-31
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Potential_Mitigations | |||
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2022-10-13
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples, References, Terminology_Notes | |||
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2022-06-28
(CWE 4.8, 2022-06-28) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Observed_Examples, Relationships | |||
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2021-10-28
(CWE 4.6, 2021-10-28) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
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2021-07-20
(CWE 4.5, 2021-07-20) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Observed_Examples, Relationships | |||
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2021-03-15
(CWE 4.4, 2021-03-15) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
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2020-12-10
(CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
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2020-08-20
(CWE 4.2, 2020-08-20) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
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2020-06-25
(CWE 4.1, 2020-06-25) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
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2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships | |||
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2019-06-20
(CWE 3.3, 2019-06-20) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |||
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2019-01-03
(CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
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2018-03-27
(CWE 3.1, 2018-03-27) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
|
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
|
2017-05-03
(CWE 2.11, 2017-05-05) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |||
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2015-12-07
(CWE 2.9, 2015-12-07) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships | |||
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2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings | |||
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2014-06-23
(CWE 2.7, 2014-06-23) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
|
2014-02-18
(CWE 2.6, 2014-02-19) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Other_Notes, Terminology_Notes | |||
|
2013-07-17
(CWE 2.5, 2013-07-17) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
|
2013-02-21
(CWE 2.4, 2013-02-21) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Relationships | |||
|
2012-10-30
(CWE 2.3, 2012-10-30) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations | |||
|
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | |||
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2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences | |||
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2011-03-29
(CWE 1.12, 2011-03-30) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples | |||
|
2010-06-21
(CWE 1.9, 2010-06-21) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Description, Name | |||
|
2010-02-16
(CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships | |||
|
2009-10-29
(CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences, Description, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations | |||
|
2009-07-27
(CWE 1.5, 2009-07-27) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name | |||
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2009-05-27
(CWE 1.4, 2009-05-27) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name | |||
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2008-09-08
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE | |
| updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities | |||
|
2008-08-15
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09) |
Veracode | ||
| Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping | |||
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2008-07-01
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09) |
Eric Dalci | Cigital | |
| updated Time_of_Introduction | |||
Previous Entry Names |
|||
| Change Date | Previous Entry Name | ||
| 2010-06-21 | Improper Sanitization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') | ||
| 2009-07-27 | Failure to Sanitize Data into a Control Plane ('Command Injection') | ||
| 2009-05-27 | Failure to Sanitize Data into a Control Plane (aka 'Command Injection') | ||
| 2008-04-11 | Command Injection | ||
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