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Weakness ID: 306
Vulnerability Mapping:
ALLOWED
This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. |
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Varies by Context |
Scope: Access Control, Other
Exposing critical functionality essentially provides an attacker with the privilege level of that functionality. The consequences will depend on the associated functionality, but they can range from reading or modifying sensitive data, accessing administrative or other privileged functionality, or possibly even executing arbitrary code.
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| Phase(s) | Mitigation |
|---|---|
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Architecture and Design |
Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability. Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port. In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout. |
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Architecture and Design |
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
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Architecture and Design |
Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks. In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly. |
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Architecture and Design |
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45]. |
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Implementation; System Configuration; Operation |
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf |
|
287 | Improper Authentication |
| ParentOf |
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288 | Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel |
| ParentOf |
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322 | Key Exchange without Entity Authentication |
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf |
|
1211 | Authentication Errors |
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf |
|
287 | Improper Authentication |
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf |
|
1010 | Authenticate Actors |
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase. |
| Architecture and Design | Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port. |
| Operation | When migrating data to the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), there is a risk of losing the protections that were originally provided by hosting on internal networks. If access does not require authentication, it can be easier for attackers to access the data from anywhere on the Internet. |
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
| Languages |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence) |
| Technologies |
Class: Cloud Computing (Undetermined Prevalence) Class: ICS/OT (Often Prevalent) |
Example 1
In the following Java example the method createBankAccount is used to create a BankAccount object for a bank management application.
However, there is no authentication mechanism to ensure that the user creating this bank account object has the authority to create new bank accounts. Some authentication mechanisms should be used to verify that the user has the authority to create bank account objects.
The following Java code includes a boolean variable and method for authenticating a user. If the user has not been authenticated then the createBankAccount will not create the bank account object.
Example 2
In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.
Multiple vendors did not use any authentication for critical functionality in their OT products.
Example 3
In 2021, a web site operated by PeopleGIS stored data of US municipalities in Amazon Web Service (AWS) Simple Storage Service (S3) buckets.
While it was not publicly disclosed how the data was protected after discovery, multiple options could have been considered.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
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File-sharing PHP product does not check if user is logged in during requests for PHP library files under an includes/ directory, allowing configuration changes, code execution, and other impacts.
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TCP-based protocol in Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) has no authentication.
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Condition Monitor firmware uses a protocol that does not require authentication.
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SCADA-based protocol for bridging WAN and LAN traffic has no authentication.
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Safety Instrumented System uses proprietary TCP protocols with no authentication.
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Distributed Control System (DCS) uses a protocol that has no authentication.
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Bluetooth speaker does not require authentication for the debug functionality on the UART port, allowing root shell access
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WiFi router does not require authentication for its UART port, allowing adversaries with physical access to execute commands as root
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IT management product does not perform authentication for some REST API requests, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
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Default setting in workflow management product allows all API requests without authentication, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
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MFV. Access TFTP server without authentication and obtain configuration file with sensitive plaintext information.
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Agent software running at privileges does not authenticate incoming requests over an unprotected channel, allowing a Shatter" attack.
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Product enforces restrictions through a GUI but not through privileged APIs.
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monitor device allows access to physical UART debug port without authentication
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Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) does not have an authentication feature on its communication protocols.
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| Ordinality | Description |
|---|---|
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Primary
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(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
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Manual Analysis |
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authentication mechanisms.
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Automated Static Analysis
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Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authentication. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authentication libraries. Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authentication schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an established identity; an automated technique that detects the absence of authentication may report false positives. Effectiveness: Limited
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Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
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According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage:
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
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Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
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According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage:
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
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Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
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According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage:
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
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Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
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According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage:
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
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Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
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According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage:
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
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Architecture or Design Review
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According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Effectiveness: High This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
More information is available — Please edit the custom filter or select a different filter. |
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